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NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF
CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY
New Directions in the Study of
China's Foreign Policy

Edited by Alastair lain ]ohnston

and Robert S. Ross

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

STANFORD, CALIFORNIA 2006

Stanford University Press
Stanford, California

© 2006 by the Board of Trustees of the

Leland Stanford Junior University.
All rights reserved.
No part of this book may be reproduced
or transmitted in any form or by any means,
electronic or mechanical, including photocopying
and recording, or in any information storage
or retrieval system without the prior written
permission of Stanford University Press.

Printed in the United States of America on

acid-free, archival-quality paper

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

New directions in the study of China's foreign policy I edited by Alastair lain
Johnston and Robert S. Ross
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN o-8047-5362-8 (cloth: alk. paper)-ISBN 0-8047-5363-6 (pbk.:
alk. paper)
I. China-Foreign relations-1976- I. Johnston, Alastair I. II. Ross,
Robert S.
DS779.27.N49 2006
327·SI-dC22

Original Printing 2006

Last figure below indicates year of this printing:

15 14 13 12 II 10 09 o8 07 o6

Typeset by G&S Typesetters, Inc. in Io/12.5 Sabon

To Alien S. Whiting
Scholar, Practitioner, Mentor
Contents

List of Figures and Tables lX

Contributors Xl

Editors' Preface XV

I. Introduction I

ROBERT S. ROSS AND ALASTAIR lAIN JOHNSTON

Part I. Security Studies

2. Comparative Deterrence: The Taiwan Strait and

the Korean Peninsula I3

ROBERT S. ROSS

3. Windows and War: Trend Analysis and Beijing's

Use of Force 50
THOMAS J. CHRISTENSEN

4· China's Decision for War with India in I962 86

JOHN W. GARVER

5. Across the Yalu: China's Interests and the Korean

Peninsula in a Changing World I3I
AVERY GOLDSTEIN

6. The Limits of Economic Interdependence:

Sino-Japanese Relations I62
MICHAEL YAHUDA

7. Reputation and the Security Dilemma: China Reacts

to the China Threat Theory I86
YONG DENG
VIII CONTENTS

Part II. China and Globalization

8. More Than Just Saying No: China's Evolving
Approach to Sovereignty and Intervention
Since Tiananmen 2I7
ALLEN CARLSON

9· China in Geneva: Lessons from China's Early Years

in the World Trade Organization
MARGARET M. PEARSON

IO. Chinese Foreign Policy Faces

Globalization Challenges
SAMUEL S. KIM

Part Ill. Domestic Politics

I r. Identity and Conflict in Sino-American Relations
PETER HAYS GRIES

The Correlates of Beijing Public Opinion

I 2.

Toward the United States, I998-2004

ALASTAIR lAIN JOHNSTON

I 3. Conclusions and Future Directions 379

THOMAS J. CHRISTENSEN, ALASTAIR lAIN JOHNSTON,

AND ROBERT S. ROSS

Select Bibliography 42I

Index
List of Figures and Tables

Figures
I2.I Sources on "rising Chinese nationalism" in U.S.
newspapers, October 2ooo-july 200I 343
I2.2 U.S. temperature in comparison across time
and across countries 3 53
12.3 Distribution of levels of amity to the United States,
I998 and 2004 354
I 2.4 Average respondent perception of Chinese,
Americans, and Japanese on combined peaceful
(I) to warlike (7) and moral (I) to immoral (7) scales 3 58
I 2. 5 Identity difference scores for Americans and
Japanese, 2000-2004 359
I2.6 The perceived main threat to Chinese national
security, 2o0I-2003
I 2. 7 Temperature category as portion of respondents

Tables
7.I Chinese interpretations of the China threat theory I93
IO.I Globalization in China's "State of the
World Message" in the General Assembly's
Grand Debate, I994-2002 282
I0.2 China's GDP growth rate in comparative
perspective, I990-20oi
I0.3 Multinational citizens' perceptions of
threat and influence in Asia (late 2ooo)
10.4 Voting in the Security Council, I97I-2004 294
I2.I Dependent and socioeconomic/demographic
control variables, and the BAS survey years for
which there are data 352
X FIGURES AND TABLES

12.2 Summary of results concerning levels of amity

toward the United States
12.3 Summary of findings about "identity difference"
12.4 Summary of findings about the "main threat

to China's national security"

Contributors

Alien Carlson is assistant professor in Cornell University's Government

Department. He is the author of Unifying China, Integrating with the
World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty During the Reform Era (Stanford
University Press, 2005 ). He also recently co-edited (with J. J. Suh and
Peter Katzenstein) Rethinking Security in East Asia: Power, Identity and
Efficiencies (Stanford University Press, 2004). In addition, he has pub-
lished articles in the Journal of Contemporary China and Pacific Affairs.

Thomas J. Christensen is professor of politics and international affairs at

Princeton University. He received his B.A. in history from Haverford Col-
lege, M.A. in international relations from the University of Pennsylvania,
and Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University. Before arriving
at Princeton in 2003, he taught at Cornell University and the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology.

Yong Deng is associate professor in political science at the U.S. Naval

Academy at Annapolis, Maryland. His scholarly works on Chinese foreign
policy include two edited volumes, In the Eyes of the Dragon: China
Views the World (co-editor, 1999) and China Rising: Power and Motiva-
tion in Chinese Foreign Policy (co-editor, 2005). He has also published in
academic journals, including Political Science Quarterly, China Quarterly,
and Pacific Affairs, as well as in several edited volumes.

John Garver is professor with the Sam Nunn School of International

Affairs at Georgia Institute of Technology. His research specializes on
Chinese foreign relations, and he has written many books and articles in
that area. His most recent research has dealt with China-India and China-
lran relations. He has set up and directed student programs in both China
and greater East Asia for Georgia Tech.

Avery Goldstein is professor of political science and associate director of

the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania and senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Insti-
tute in Philadelphia. He is the author of Rising to the Challenge: China's
Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford University Press,
XII CONTRIBUTORS

2005 ), Deterrence and Security in the 2rst Century: China, Britain,

France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution (Stanford
University Press, 2ooo), and From Bandwagon to Balance-of-Power Poli-
tics: Structural Constraints and Politics in China, 1949-1978 (Stanford
University Press, 1991).

Peter Hays Gries is assistant professor of political science at the University

of Colorado, Boulder, and director of the Sino-American Security Dia-
logue. He is author of China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Di-
plomacy (University of California Press, 2004) and co-editor of State and
Society in 2rst Century China: Crisis, Contention, and Legitimation
(RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), as well as author of over a dozen journal
articles and book chapters.

Alastair lain Johnston is the Laine Professor of China in World Affairs in

the Government Department at Harvard University. Johnston is the au-
thor of Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese
History (Princeton University Press, r 99 5), and co-editor of Engaging
China: The Management of an Emerging Power (Routledge, 1999). He
has written on socialization theory, strategic culture, China's participation
in international institutions, Chinese nuclear doctrine and arms control,
and Party-Army relations in China, among other topics.

Samuel S. Kim (M.I.A. and Ph.D., Columbia) is adjunct professor of polit-

ical science and senior research scholar at the Weatherhead East Asian
Institute, Columbia University. He is the author or editor of twenty-one
books, including, most recently, The International Relations of Northeast
Asia (ed., Rowman & Littlefield, 2004) and The Two Koreas in the
Global Community (forthcoming).

Margaret M. Pearson is professor of government and politics at the Uni-

versity of Maryland, College Park. She received her Ph.D. in political sci-
ence from Yale University. Her publications include the books Joint Ven-
tures in the People's Republic of China (Princeton University Press, 1991)
and China's New Business Elite: The Political Results of Economic Re-
form (University of California Press, 1997), as well as articles in World
Politics, China Journal, Modern China, China Business Review, and other
journals.

Robert S. Ross is professor of political science at Boston College, associate,

John King Fair bank Center for East Asian Research, Harvard University,
and senior advisor, Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of
 CONTRIBUTORS XIII

Technology. His current research focuses on Chinese security policy and

U.S.-China relations, in particular Chinese use of force and deterrence in
East Asia. His recent publications include Normalization of U.S.-China
Relations: An International History (Asia Center, Harvard University,
2001), of which he was co-editor.

Michael Yahuda is professor emeritus of international relations at the

London School of Economics and visiting scholar at the Sigur Center
for Asian Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Wash-
ington University. He enjoys an international reputation as a specialist
on the international relations of East Asia. He has published more than
150 journal articles and book chapters and is the author of six books, the
latest being The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific (1996; rev ed.,
RoutledgeCurzon, 2004).
Editors~ Preface

This volume is dedicated to Alien Whiting. The contributors are jun-

ior and senior scholars who share a commitment to building the field of
China's foreign policy and who share an approach to the subject that blends
theory and evidence in a way that originated with Whiting. Beginning with
his early writings, Whiting combined empirical research with a theoretically
rich and policy-relevant analysis of China's international behavior. In short,
the contributors join us in a tribute to Whiting as the founding father of
Chinese foreign policy studies.
Whiting's work teaches us that China specialists need to understand not
only Chinese history and politics but also international politics and the en-
during sources, both domestic and international, of the international be-
havior of the Chinese state. His 1960 classic China Crosses the Yalu: The
Decision to Enter the Korean War established the norm of using empirical
research to support analytic conclusions regarding the sources of Chinese
foreign policy, of Chinese deterrence signaling, and of misperceptions in the
U.S.-China conflict. His second book on China's use of force, The Chinese
Calculus of Deterrence: India and China, developed a comparative analysis
for understanding Chinese deterrence behavior. His work on the domestic
sources of Chinese policy-making is equally insightful. In China Eyes Japan,
he combined theoretically informed analysis with documentary research
and interviews in China and Japan to explain the historically derived cog-
nitive sources of Sino-Japanese conflict. His work on Chinese nationalism
similarly reflects his appreciation of domestic political and societal factors
in foreign policy.
That scholars can and should serve the public interest is demonstrated by
Whiting's career as a policy analyst and government advisor. His work with
the Council on Foreign Relations and the Rand Corporation showed that
scholars can inform the public and contribute to policy-making. Whiting
served in government during the mid 196os, when the United States was
struggling with the seemingly interminable conflict in Vietnam and casting
about to understand the political convulsions in China. After he left gov-
ernment, Whiting continued to serve American foreign policy. In 1969, he
played a pivotal role in calling the attention of the White House to the es-
calating military conflict along the Sino-Soviet border and its implications
for U.S.-China relations. Henry Kissinger later recalled in a letter to
XVI EDITORS' PREFACE

Whiting: "When you served as a consultant to the Department of State in

the Nixon administration I, too, benefited from your knowledge of the
Pacific region. I particularly remember the time you came to San Clemente
to brief me on the Sino-Soviet border dispute. It was a most impressive
briefing and helped significantly to shape my own thinking about how the
United States should react."
Thus, we honor Alien Whiting for having launched Chinese foreign pol-
icy as a field of study and having sustained it with a record of scholarship
and public service that continues to inform new research agendas and to
serve as a model for the civic-minded scholar.
NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF
CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY
1 Introduction
Robert S. Ross and Alastair lain Johnston

This volume reflects an effort to take stock of the field of Chinese

foreign policy and to consider potential avenues of new research. It is a col-
laborative effort by scholars of different generations and many academic
perspectives who share an interest in and commitment to explaining Chi-
nese foreign policy and to using systematically gathered and analyzed evi-
dence. It is not intended to be a comprehensive survey of the field of Chinese
foreign policy, which is simply too large and diverse for one volume to be
able to cover all the topics, draw on all the relevant theories, and include all
the first-rate scholars in the field. Rather, scholars were chosen in an at-
tempt to represent current research in Chinese foreign policy from multiple
theoretical perspectives and methodologies and multiple academic genera-
tions. To some degree, the timing of the volume is also worth noting: it ap-
pears at a point in history when the integration of the People's Republic of
China (PRC) with regional and global economic and political institutions
has never been greater, and when a narrowing range of tropes of unease
about "rising China" are coming to dominate policy and pundit discourses
both in the United States and elsewhere. Not only is there greater demand
today for information about China's foreign policy, but scholars are able, in
principle, to supply greater amounts of sophisticated analysis.
The chapters were first presented at a conference held at the John King
Fairbank Center at Harvard University in December 2002. 1 The volume is
organized into three subfields of Chinese foreign policy. Part I examines Chi-
nese security policy, including Chinese use of force, policy toward conflicts
of interests affecting war and peace, and China's strategy as a rising power.
Owing to greater access to Chinese analysts, decision-makers, and docu-
ments, these chapters draw on a wider range of materials about the sources
and effects of Chinese security policy than was available in the earlier days of
the field. 2 Part II considers China as an actor in multilateral institutions and
China's response to emerging global trends, including evolving conceptions
2 INTRODUCTION

of sovereignty and the emergence of globalization. These topics are rela-

tively new for the field, 3 reflecting the fact that since the late r98os, China
has advanced more rapidly into international institutional life than any
other major state moving from a similar position of isolation. Part III pre-
sents new research on domestic-foreign linkages, considering the impact of
trends in public opinion and of Chinese identity on China's policy toward
major powers. This is a very new subfield, because access to public attitudes
has been severely restricted in authoritarian China, and the impact of pub-
lic opinion on foreign policy has never been considered relevant. With rapid
urbanization, marketization, and the diversification of political, economic,
and foreign policy preferences, this seems to be changing. 4

The Study of Chinese Security Policy

Robert Ross examines the role of deterrence and use of force in Chi-
nese foreign policy. His Chapter 2, "Comparative Deterrence: The Taiwan
Strait and the Korean Peninsula," places these two theaters of deterrence in
the context of the theoretical literature on effective deterrence and on the
sources of unstable deterrence and unintended war, enabling comparative
analysis of the two theaters and estimates of the likelihood of war in East
Asia. Regarding Korea, Ross assesses North Korean deterrence of U.S. use
of force for either regime change or denuclearization, and U.S.-South Ko-
rean deterrence of North Korean use of force for unification. Regarding the
Taiwan Strait, he considers Chinese deterrence of a Taiwan declaration of
independence, an "act of war," and U.S. deterrence of Chinese initiation of
use of force for unification. Using deterrence theory and concepts of credi-
bility, capability, and expected utility, he considers the effectiveness of mu-
tual deterrence dynamics in each region. He also compares these two deter-
rence theaters regarding incentives for first strikes and the implications for
crisis instability and unintended war. Ross argues that although there is ef-
fective mutual deterrence on both the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan
Strait so that the status quo is preferred to use of force by all of the other-
wise revisionist states, the distinct weapons capabilities of the actors in each
theater and the distinct geography of each theater create distinct crisis dy-
namics. He argues that these differences have made the Korean peninsula a
more probable military threat than the Taiwan Strait since the end of the
Cold War, and that the Korean peninsula will remain a more likely source
of war than the Taiwan Strait.
Thomas Christensen's Chapter 3, "Windows and War: Trend Analysis
and Beijing's Use of Force," examines conditions under which China has
used force since 1949. Working within international politics theories of pre-
emptive and preventive war, Christensen applies the concept of "closing
 INTRODUCTION 3

windows" to provide a comprehensive explanation for all post-1949 cases

of Chinese use of force. He argues that Chinese leaders have used force
to achieve international political objectives, despite the absence of a clear
"red-line" provocation, when they perceive a closing window for China to
achieve its strategic objectives, to deter an adversary from becoming more
aggressive, or to create favorable long-term strategic trends. Christensen
also argues that domestic conditions have consistently contributed to Chi-
nese use of force, not because domestic instability can contribute to Chinese
threat perception but because Chinese leaders have seen use of force as an
appropriate instrument to achieve their domestic political objectives. Chris-
tensen further establishes that Chinese leaders have used force to reverse a
deteriorating international situation even when China faced a more power-
ful and committed adversary, suggesting that China may be an especially
difficult state to deter. Christensen's analysis of the patterns in Chinese use
of force suggests a relatively pessimistic outlook for relying on deterrence
to maintain stability in the Taiwan Strait. Based on past PRC behavior, he
warns that although Taiwan might not offer a red-line provocation by de-
claring de jure independence, mere continued Taiwan movement toward de
jure independence could produce sufficient Chinese concern about a closing
window to elicit use of force, even should Chinese leaders expect interven-
tion by superior U.S. forces.
John Garver's Chapter 4, "China's Decision for War with India in 1962,"
presents an analysis of Chinese use of force against India in 1962. This case
study integrates many of the issues addressed by Ross and Christensen to
explain a major Chinese use of force. Drawing on voluminous new materi-
als, the chapter analyzes the sources of Chinese threat perception, Chinese
deterrence strategy, and China's decision to use force. Following the works
of Alien Whiting and Neville Maxwell, Garver concurs that India's border
policy challenged China's territorial integrity and that the Chinese failure
to deter Indian forward deployment across the McMahon Line reflected
low Indian assessment of China's resolve to use force and the constraints
of Indian domestic politics on Nehru's ability to moderate India's broader
policy. But, in contrast to Whiting and Maxwell, Garver argues that China's
subsequent use of force against India reflected not simply China's impera-
tive to defend its territorial integrity but rather primarily reflected height-
ened Chinese threat assessment resulting from Mao Zedong's misperception
that Indian border policy reflected Nehru's contribution to the CIA-assisted
I 9 59 uprising in Tibet and his determination to promote Tibetan separatism.

Psychologically, Mao was simply unable to grasp Nehru's actual moderate

intention to promote Tibetan autonomy within Chinese sovereignty and the
domestic situational constraints on Nehru's Tibet and border policies. Mao
thus developed a worst-case assessment of Nehru's intentions. Garver con-
cludes that although China's victory over India established Chinese resolve
4 INTRODUCTION

and compelled India to adopt a more cautious China policy, Mao's misper-
ception of Nehru's intentions also inflicted significant costs on China, in-
cluding long-term hostility with a determined and more modern Indian
army and development of anti-China Soviet-Indian cooperation.
Chapters 5 and 6 analyze Chinese policy toward two key issues affecting
Chinese security-developments on the Korean peninsula and trends in
Sino-Japanese relations. Avery Goldstein's Chapter 5, "Across the Yalu:
China's Interests and the Korean Peninsula in a Changing World," exam-
ines contemporary Chinese policy toward the Korean conflict. He stresses
that during the Cold War, ideology, territorial security, and alignment with
Soviet power against U.S. capabilities dominated Chinese policy. In con-
trast, although in the post-Cold War era, U.S. power remains at the heart
of PRC assessments of trends on the peninsula, in the absence of the option
of alignment with a great power, Beijing has had to accommodate U.S.
power, while seeking gradual development of greater Chinese capabilities
and minimization of domestic political instability. These demands require
Beijing to seek a peaceful international environment, including peace on the
Korean peninsula, even as management of domestic instability and concern
about U.S. capabilities require vigilance against U.S. policy and an endur-
ing commitment to the survival of the North Korean government. This an-
alytical indeterminacy requires development of a framework for forecasting
the future of China's Korean policy. Goldstein develops four "stylized sce-
narios" and assesses each in terms of its implications for China's pursuit of
its multiple interests on the Korean peninsula, especially vis-a-vis the United
States. He then applies two conceptual frameworks to assess the likely
course of Chinese policy among these four futures. First, he builds on Whit-
ing's concepts of Chinese threat perception and deterrence behavior, stress-
ing that linkage between internal instability and heightened PRC threat per-
ception, on the one hand, and the role of force in diplomatic signaling in
Chinese deterrence efforts, on the other, may affect crisis outcomes. Second,
he considers the impact of China's Korean policy on U.S.-China manage-
ment of the rise of China, stressing that the very indeterminacy in PRC pol-
icy creates space for a negotiated solution, which can facilitate a peaceful
power transition.
Michael Yahuda's Chapter 6, "The Limits of Economic Interdependence:
Sino-Japanese Relations," also adopts a conceptual approach to the trends
in a bilateral Chinese foreign policy. He considers the impact of increas-
ing Sino-Japanese economic interdependence on the trends in the bilateral
relationship. Observing that Sino-Japanese relations have become more
contentious just as economic cooperation has increased, contrary to the
expectations of the international political economy literature, Yahuda con-
siders what factors have been responsible for this countervailing trend. Like
 INTRODUCTION 5

Goldstein, he argues that the end of the Cold War in East Asia has transformed
the security preferences of each country. In the absence of the constraints
imposed by the Soviet Union, each country has developed more assertive
and independent security policies. Simultaneously, each country has also
been increasingly intolerant of the changes in the other's policies. Yahuda
explains this development and the resulting tension in relations by observ-
ing each country's inability to appreciate the impact of its changing security
policies, especially the growth in respective military capabilities, on the
other's security, that is, its inability to appreciate the impact of the security
dilemma in international politics, so that each develops a worst-case per-
spective on the other's intentions. He explains these mutual worst-case
analyses by developments in domestic politics. Following Whiting's analy-
sis of Sino-Japanese relations in the 198os, he finds that anti-Japanese na-
tionalism in Chinese education has fostered widespread Chinese misper-
ceptions about Japanese behavior. Moreover, generational change in China
and Japan has given rise to leaders with limited knowledge of the other's
culture and society. The result is that security perspectives, informed by
domestically informed misperceptions, have offset the potentially positive
effects of increased economic interdependence.
Part I concludes with Deng Yong's Chapter 7, "Reputation and the
Security Dilemma: China Reacts to the China Threat Theory," which dis-
cusses China's management of its rising power status, considered in the con-
text of Beijing's implicit appreciation of the impact of the security dilemma
in international politics. Whereas Yahuda suggests that Chinese leaders are
insensitive to the impact of Chinese policy on Japanese security, Deng ar-
gues that the Chinese leadership is aware that China's reputation in other
countries can be a major factor in their assessments of Chinese intentions
and in their corresponding response to China's rising capabilities. In partic-
ular, perceptions of a "China threat" can lead other countries to adopt bel-
ligerent policies toward China that might disrupt Beijing's ability to focus
on economic development and to enhance Chinese security in a peaceful in-
ternational environment. Thus, Chinese diplomacy has actively tried to neu-
tralize China threat arguments. First, it accuses proponents of the China
threat of having a Cold War mentality of containment, seeking to delegiti-
mate China's critics. Second, it has tried to foster a benign image of itself.
One aspect of this is China's public diplomacy to define its own reputation
in world affairs. Deng explains that China's development of its "peaceful
rise" diplomacy aims to undermine China threat arguments. Another aspect
of its rising power diplomacy is its extensive participation in multilateral in-
stitutions, including in arms control and nonproliferation institutions. Deng
concludes with the observation that China's recognition of the importance
of reputation for security dilemma dynamics is indicative of the fundamen-
6 INTRODUCTION

tal changes in Chinese foreign policy that have taken place since the Maoist
era, when China primarily depended on a reputation for military resolve to
influence the behavior of potential adversaries.

China and Globalization

Part I of this volume thus considers the impact of China's interna-

tional strategic environment on Chinese policy. Part 11 is also concerned
with China's response to its international environment, but the focus is on
China's response to globalization, including the globalization of norms of
limited sovereignty, humanitarian intervention, and economic cooperation.
Alien Carlson's Chapter 8, "More Than Just Saying No: China's Evolv-
ing Approach to Sovereignty and Intervention Since Tiananmen," examines
in depth perhaps the most sensitive challenge of globalization-China's
gradual compromise of its long-term commitment to absolute sovereignty
in response to its determined exposure to the deepening and increasingly
global norm of humanitarian intervention. Although Carlson acknowledges
the role of material interests in Chinese behavior, he explains the evolution
in Chinese thinking on sovereignty by focusing on the susceptibility of Chi-
nese foreign policy elites to international norms through "social learning."
He argues that Chinese participation in international society has led to in-
ternalization of hitherto unacceptable ideas. His empirical work examines
changes in Chinese attitudes toward sovereignty as they relate to the legiti-
macy of security and humanitarian international intervention in a state's
domestic affairs. Carlson argues that even as interest calculations clearly
drove China's initial moderation of its stand on absolute sovereignty in the
early 1990s, China's changing policy also encouraged underlying ideational
change among Chinese foreign policy elites that sustained and even deep-
ened the trend in China toward acceptance of the concept of limited sover-
eignty well into the decade. By the first decade of the twenty-first century,
despite enduring Chinese concern that Western democracies, in particular
the United States, have used the concept of limited sovereignty to suit their
narrow national interests, the global norm of humanitarian multilateral in-
tervention in protection of human rights, expressed in the very language used
by Western foreign policy elites, had become widespread in Chinese foreign
policy circles, and Chinese government attitudes toward multilateral inter-
vention had become increasingly flexible.
Margaret Pearson's Chapter 9, "China in Geneva: Lessons from China's
Early Years in the World Trade Organization," turns to China and the global
economy, in particular to Chinese participation in the WTO and its impact
on global trade. Similar to Carlson's investigation of China's stance toward
 INTRODUCTION 7

the norms of sovereignty and nonintervention, Pearson examines China's

stance toward the WTO's formal rules and informal norms in the early and
critical period after December 2oor. But whereas Carlson stresses growing
Chinese socialization into evolving norms of sovereignty, Pearson, while
open to the suggestion that China may become "socialized" into WTO
norms, stresses that calculations of economic interest drive cooperative,
norm-acceptant Chinese policy. Rather than actively promoting the revi-
sionist agenda of developing countries, China works with the handful of
states at the center of power in the WTO; it aligns with coalitions of devel-
oped states that promote policies favorable to greater PRC access to inter-
national markets, including the markets of developing countries. Thus, on
agriculture issues, it has aligned with the United States to promote open
markets. On textiles, although it opposes U.S. protectionist efforts, it has
maintained a low profile, even when its preferences favor the interests of de-
veloping countries. Insofar as the WTO norms enable agenda stetting and
negotiations to be dominated by the economic powers and their interest
in maintaining the existing trade order, since 2000, China has avoided
revisionist behavior and has accommodated itself to well-established WTO
rules and norms. Underscoring Samuel Kim's observation that globalization
and the development of so-called intermestic actors have undermined the
policy-making authority of the central government, Pearson observes that
China's ability to assume leadership in the WTO will depend on its ability
to forge a consensus position among competing domestic interests prior to
conducting negotiations with its international trading partners.
Samuel Kim's Chapter ro, "Chinese Foreign Policy Faces Globalization
Challenges," steps back and addressees the big picture-the multiple chal-
lenges China faces as it engages globalization and the wide range of inter-
national institutions that are the agents of globalization. He observes that
after many years of criticizing globalization as a threat to Chinese sover-
eignty and as a plot to foment domestic instability, by the early 1990s, Chi-
nese leaders had acknowledged that both domestic stability and Chinese
international security required China to participate in globalization, that
China could not be a revisionist power. Since then, China has fully engaged
economic, security, and political globalization. But Kim observes that
whereas economic globalization and membership in the WTO have been
relatively easy for China to manage, insofar as the growth of the Chinese
economy, of exports, and of foreign investment have made China a winner
in economic globalization, China has had to make important trade-offs in
other sectors. For example, engagement with globalization has required
China to come to terms with evolving norms of sovereignty. As a member
of the UN Security Council, China has acceded to numerous multilateral se-
curity arrangements. It has also compromised its position on intervention
8 INTRODUCTION

in a state's sovereign affairs, increasingly supporting UN peacekeeping op-

erations since the late 1990s. Kim observes that whereas participation in
globalization has enhanced Chinese national power and its ability to defend
its external sovereignty, the associated weakening of national boundaries has
simultaneously undermined China's internal sovereignty. Domestic groups
with competing international interests, intermestic actors, require Chinese
leaders to engage in domestic negotiations before they can successfully ne-
gotiate at the international level. Moreover, the central government's dimin-
ishing control over localities and of cross-border information flows poses a
long-term challenge to political stability.

Domestic Politics and Chinese Foreign Policy

The chapters in the second part of this volume argue that Chinese
participation in globalization has necessarily eroded the boundary between
China's domestic politics and its foreign policy. Part III directly addresses
this issue and the domestic sources of China's international behavior. In
particular, it seeks to assess the impact of the erosion of the Chinese central
government's authority over society and the corresponding implications of
the influence of mass attitudes on China's foreign policy.
Peter Gries's Chapter r r, "Identity and Conflict in Sino-American Rela-
tions," examines the role of "othering" in Chinese nationalism and thus its
impact on China's involvement in international conflict, in particular in
conflict with the United States. Like Carlson in Chapter 8, Gries acknowl-
edges the important role of material interests in shaping foreign policy and
also argues that a constructivist approach employing social identity theory
can reveal the substance of Chinese nationalism and its contribution to
conflict. Examining the writings of China's more vocal nationalists, Gries
develops a "hard test" to argue that Chinese nationalism is not necessarily
a source of Chinese belligerence. Following the research on social identity
theory, he argues that China's in-group identity does not require a zero-sum
policy framework that promotes hostility toward the out group, so that na-
tionalism is an indeterminate source of competitive, conflict-prone attitudes
toward the United States. Gries's case studies are the 1999 U.S.-China ten-
sion over the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the
2001 U.S.-China tension over the crash of a Chinese surveillance plane after
its collision with an American EP-3 intelligence aircraft near Hainan Island.
Whereas conflict over the embassy bombing continues to fester in China,
the EP-3 incident was fully resolved. The difference, Gries explains, was that
whereas U.S. policy in both cases undermined China's positive self-identity,
in the latter case, creative ambiguity in U.S.-China diplomacy enabled both
 INTRODUCTION 9

sides to "save face," while enabling China to escape zero-sum dynamics in

its nationalist out-group competition with the United States.
lain Johnston's Chapter 12, "The Correlates of Beijing Public Opinion
Toward the United States, 1998-2004,'' addresses broader themes in pub-
lic attitudes toward key international actors and the potential long-term im-
plications for China's role in international politics and its policy toward the
United States. Taking advantage of a variety of social science methodologies
and seven years of polling of Beijing-area residents, he presents the first
randomly sampled, nongovernmental time-series analysis of Chinese public
opinion on foreign policy issues, with controls for various socioeconomic
and demographic variables. Johnston observes that repeated short-term
mini crises in U.S.-China relations have contributed to a gradual decline of
"warmth" toward the United States among Beijing residents. But Johnston's
findings also suggest that wealth, education, and travel abroad may help off-
set these trends to some degree. Thus insofar as China's exposure to glob-
alization contributes to the expansion of an educated middle class and to
greater cross-border information flows resulting from travel and news re-
ports about international politics, the foreign policy preferences of this
group will tend to be relatively less anti-American and nationalistic. More-
over, greater income levels, education, and travel all tend to diminish Chi-
nese tendencies toward "othering," in which a positive Chinese self-identity
is paired with a negative characterization of the United States. Johnston ac-
knowledges the many limitations in the polling data and the limited role
that public opinion continues to have in Chinese policy-making. Yet his
analysis since 1998 of the opinions of Beijing-area residents suggests that re-
duced central government control over society, including that resulting
from globalization and democratization, may not necessarily lead to greater
anti-American nationalism and heightened U.S.-China conflict.

Conclusions

The research in this volume should not be considered as either defini-

tive or all-encompassing. Rather, it simply reflects an effort to consider the
study of Chinese foreign policy from multiple dimensions, including differ-
ent research agendas and diverse methodologies and research materials. It
is the hope of all the contributors that the volume will be considered a ges-
ture of their appreciation of the work of their predecessors, who first estab-
lished the importance and viability of the field of Chinese foreign policy
studies, and whose work contributed to the richness and sophistication of
current research. They also hope that the volume may make a modest con-
tribution to the future development of the field.
10 INTRODUCTION

Notes

1. We are grateful to Elizabeth Economy, Joseph Fewsmith, Steven Goldstein,

Roderick MacFarquhar, Alan Romberg, and Ezra Vogel for serving as discussants
and for their valuable contributions to the conference and to the quality of the chap-
ters in this book, as well as to David Zweig for sharing his research on China's re-
verse brain drain. We also wish to thank the Fair bank Center for providing the fund-
ing and administrative support for the conference, which was the Fairbank Center's
way of honoring Alien S. Whiting, owing to the fact that he had been unable to de-
liver the prestigious Reischauer Lecture the year before.
2. The earlier literature on Chinese security behavior is too rich to cite here. But
some of the pioneering work- research that tried to mainstream Chinese foreign pol-
icy behavior by applying standard analytical constructs such as deterrence theory, ra-
tional actor models of decision-making, and a realism-influenced focus on China's
pursuit of power within different regional and global configurations of power and in-
terest-include AlienS. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the
Korean War (1960; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968); Peter Van Ness, Rev-
olution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Libera-
tion (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970); AlienS. Whiting, The Calculus
of Chinese Deterrence: India and Indochina (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 197 5 ); ]. D. Armstrong, Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and
the United Front Doctrine (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); and
Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Huang, China Under Threat: The Politics of Strat-
egy and Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).
3. In contrast to the work on Chinese security, there are very few pioneering
works on which to build this new research. The most obvious of these are Samuel
Kim, China, the United Nations and World Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1979 ); Gerald Chan, China and International Organizations (Hong
Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Harold K. Jacobson and Michel Oksen-
berg, China's Participation in the IMF, the World Bank, and GATT (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1990).
4· This research is new in the sense that it tries to analyze the impact of ideol-
ogy, historical memory, and collective identity in society, not primarily among the
decision-making elites in the Chinese system. But this work, too, stands on the shoul-
ders of giants in Chinese foreign policy, scholars who have taken ideational variables
seriously in their own work. See Alien S. Whiting, China Eyes Japan (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1989) and "Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy
After Deng," China Quarterly, no. 142 (June 1995): 295-316, www.people.fas
.harvard.edu /-johnston/GOV 28 8o/whiting.html (accessed 27 September 200 5 );
Steven I. Levine, "Perception and Ideology in the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy,"
and Steven M. Goldstein, "Nationalism and Internationalism: Sino-Soviet Rela-
tions," both in Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, ed. Thomas W. Robin-
son and David Shambaugh (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 30-46 and 224-65,
respectively; and Michel Oksenberg, "China's Confident Nationalism," Foreign
Affairs 65, 3 (1987): 501-23.
2 Comparative Deterrence
THE TAIWAN STRAIT AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Robert S. Ross

In the 1990s, the United States was involved in two confrontations in

East Asia involving the People's Republic of China. In 1994, it contended
with North Korea, the PRC's immediate neighbor and ally, over Pyongyang's
nuclear weapons program, and in March 1996, it contended with the PRC
over Beijing's military activities in the Taiwan Strait. The difference between
these two incidents presents a puzzle. Former Secretary of Defense William
Perry characterized the confrontation on the Korean peninsula as a crisis in
which the United States risked war, but he was also clear that the 1996 Tai-
wan Strait confrontation was not a crisis. Why is it that the United States
I

did not experience a crisis in a direct military confrontation with China, a

major power possessing considerable naval and air force capabilities, con-
tending over a vital interest, Taiwan's sovereignty relationship with main-
land China, but did experience crisis decision-making when it directly con-
fronted North Korea, a small state with a weak and backward military, and
only indirectly confronted China, over a prospective North Korean nuclear
weapons program?
The solution to this puzzle does not lie in the respective capabilities of
China and North Korea in weapons of mass destruction. In the mid 1990s,
China possessed a small yet credible nuclear capability deployed on inter-
continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching the continental
United States and on shorter-range missiles capable of targeting U.S. re-
gional allies, including Japan. In 1994, North Korea did not possess nuclear
weapons, but it possessed a significant arsenal, possibly including chemical
and biological weapons, and a large land force that could cause great de-
struction in South Korea, as well as to U.S. forces deployed in South Korea.
War with either country could be catastrophic.
The argument of this paper is that in the mid 1990s, effective mutual
deterrence existed both on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait.
 SECURITY STUDIES

None of the protagonists preferred war to maintaining the status quo, and
all of the protagonists believed that their adversaries possessed sufficient re-
solve to use force to resist a challenge to the status quo. From this perspec-
tive, the risk of war and thus the propensity for crisis escalation should have
been the same in each case. Nonetheless, despite these similar conditions,
there were different outcomes, reflecting the difference in mutual deterrence
in the two cases. Whereas there was mutual stable deterrence in the Taiwan
Strait, there was mutual unstable deterrence on the Korean peninsula.
Following the conceptual work of Thomas Schelling, this paper argues
that crisis dynamics and the propensity for escalation reflected the unique
character of each deterrence dyad. Whereas the protagonists in the Taiwan
2

theater possess effective deterrence capabilities, these same capabilities do

not have significant offensive potential, so there exists mutual stable deter-
rence. In contrast, the deterrence capabilities of the adversaries on the Ko-
rean peninsula also possess significant offensive capabilities, creating mu-
tual fear of incurring a debilitating first strike. The resulting intense security
dilemma dynamics create pressures for each side to prepare for war and to
consider the merits of a preemptive strike. Thus, there is mutual yet unsta-
ble deterrence on the Korean peninsula, explaining the propensity for crisis
escalation and the potential for unintended war.
The first part of this paper discusses the sources of effective mutual de-
terrence and unstable mutual deterrence. The second part argues that there
is mutual deterrence in both the Korean and Taiwan theaters. The third part
assesses the sources of stable and unstable deterrence in each theater. The
final part considers the policy implications for the United States of the dis-
tinct deterrence dynamics of each dyad.

Deterrence and the Taiwan and Korean Conflicts

In the Taiwan theater, mutual deterrence involves U.S. deterrence of

Chinese use of force for unification and Chinese deterrence of a formal Tai-
wan declaration of independence. In the Korean theater, mutual deterrence
depends on U.S. deterrence of North Korean use of force for unification of the
Korean peninsula under Pyongyang's rule and North Korean deterrence of
U.S. use of force for unification under Seoul's rule or for denuclearization of
North Korea. In each deterrence relationship, effective deterrence requires
the status-quo state to possess the retaliatory capability to inflict costs that
outweigh the benefits to a country that might use force to change the status
quo and the reputation for resolve to make its retaliatory threats credible.
Effective deterrence thus requires that all of the actors value peace more
than costly forceful revision of the status quo. This is clearly the case. China
 DETERRENCE AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TAIWAN I5

has not used force to unify Taiwan for over fifty years, and although Taiwan
has moved closer to declaring formal independence, its leaders have thus far
judged the risk to be too great. Similarly, the protagonists on the Korean
peninsula have preferred peace to war since I 9 53. The question for the
future is whether changes in capabilities or domestic political conditions
have altered this assessment for any of the actors and thus the deterrence
dynamics in either or both of the two theaters.
But even should each of the actors be deterrable by the costs of war, they
must also have sufficient respect for their opponent's resolve to make their
retaliatory threats credible. Credibility in part reflects interests. Sometimes,
the deterrer's interests are so high that its credibility is not in doubt. At other
times, its interests are so low that reputation cannot enhance credibility, re-
gardless of capabilities. In between lurks the extended deterrence problem,
where uncertainty about the deterrer's interests and resolve can determine
the credibility of threats. 3
The United States faces the extended deterrence problem in its effort to
deter Chinese and North Korean use of force against Taiwan and South
Korea, respectively. In the I 9 5os and I 9 6os, U.S. policymakers feared that
if the U.S. deterrent of a Soviet invasion of western Europe was undermined
by the questionable credibility of its retaliatory threats, the U.S. ability to
deter conventional use of force by a nuclear-armed China was even less cer-
tain, because U.S. interest in the East Asian status quo was not as strong as
its interest in the European status quo. 4 Washington's extended deterrence
problem in East Asia is no different today than it was during the first half
of the Cold War.
China also faces an extended deterrence problem. Its commitment to
defend its North Korean ally is necessarily not as strong as its commitment
to defend its own territory. The questionable credibility of its commitment to
maintain a buffer state on its northern border in part explains its failure to
deter U.S. expansion of the Korean War to northern Korea in the I950s.
Many U.S. leaders believed that China would not go to war if Washington
established its determination to use force to unify Korea under southern
rule. 5 In contemporary East Asia, China's reputation for resolve to defend
its ally affects U.S. willingness to risk war to eliminate the North Korean
regrme.
Perceptions of the resolve of Taiwan and North Korea also affect deter-
rence. In North Korea's case, the issue is not the leadership's willingness to
defend North Korea and its regime from attack, but whether the regime
possesses sufficient legitimacy to survive during a war, and whether its
people will defend the country from attack. To the extent that there is doubt
regarding Pyongyang's ability to resist, deterrence must rest on an assured
destruction capability. Taiwan's resolve also reflects the extent to which
r6 SECURITY STUDIES

the people of Taiwan will resist a mainland attack. Taiwan's democratic

government is legitimate, but it is unclear whether the people of Taiwan
will maintain their resistance to unification in a war, given the high costs of
war to other important Taiwanese interests, China's overwhelming supe-
riority in size and likely war-fighting endurance, and the common culture
and increasing societal ties connecting the people on the two sides of the
Strait.
The capabilities and credibility of the status-quo state interact with the re-
visionist state's interest in challenging the status quo to create the "expected
cost" of the use of force and thus the effectiveness of deterrence. Leaders must
balance the credibility of a threat to retaliate with the likely costs of retali-
ation when addressing the expected cost of use of force. Thus, high costs of
war can offset low credibility of retaliation. This was the source of effective
nuclear deterrence in the mutually assured destruction relationship between
the United States and the Soviet Union. 6 In contemporary East Asia, the
high cost of war can compensate for a status-quo power's questionable re-
solve, as in extended deterrence threats or when doubts about resolve can
reflect domestic politics, creating a high expected cost of use of force and
thus effective deterrence.
Deterrence can be effective in both East Asian theaters, but nonetheless
unstable if any of the protagonists fears that a surprise attack would lead to
very high costs or to defeat. Unstable deterrence can reflect the influence of
geography, weapons technologies, and defense strategies on first-strike ca-
pabilities, creating heightened security dilemma dynamics as the offensive
potential of military capabilities and actions designed to deter or defend cre-
ate fears of attack and thus spiraling preparations for war. 7 This is the crit-
ical distinction between the Korean and Taiwan theaters. There is effective
mutual deterrence in both theaters, but heightened security dilemma dy-
namics undermine the contribution of deterrence to peace on the Korean
peninsula, but do not do so in the Taiwan Strait.

Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait

Peace in the Taiwan Strait requires mutual deterrence-both China

and Taiwan must be deterred from challenging the status quo. Deterring
China requires U.S. possession of the capabilities and credibility necessary
to persuade Beijing that the expected cost of U.S. retaliation would be
greater than the benefits of using force for unification. Deterrence of Taiwan
requires sufficient Chinese capabilities and resolve to persuade Taipei that
the expected costs of a Chinese retaliation would be greater than the benefits
of formally declaring independence for Taiwan.
 DETERRENCE AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TAIWAN I7

CAPABILITIES AND CREDIBILITY: DETERRING CHINA

Effective U.S. deterrence of Chinese use of force requires that Chinese

leaders understand that the United States possesses the capabilities and re-
solve to make Chinese use of force too costly to other Chinese interests.
They must understand that China lacks sufficient capabilities to incorporate
Taiwan and deter costly U.S. intervention.
Chinese military analysts argue that the most fundamental change in U.S.
conventional capabilities since the end of the Cold War is that the United
States no longer faces adversaries with superior or even equal conventional
power. During the Cold War, when the United States confronted adversaries
with effective conventional forces, it depended on its nuclear forces for
extended deterrence. Today, U.S. extended deterrence relies on the over-
whelming superiority of the United States in high-technology conventional
weaponry, so that Washington can de-link extended deterrence from reliance
on nuclear weapons. PRC military analysts further concluded from the U.S.
victories in the 1991 Gulf War and the 1999 war in Kosovo not only that
high-technology weaponry had become the most important factor in war-
fighting, but that the elements of high-technology warfare "to a very high de-
gree determine the outcome of war." Thus, superiority in "precision-guided
weapons of greater variety and higher performance" results in "battlefield
control." 8 Moreover, the U.S. military's rapid deployment capabilities allow
it to project force "as soon as needed" for any regional contingency, further
reducing U.S. dependency on nuclear missiles for retaliation. 9
U.S. conventional military superiority also benefits from superiority in
information warfare. In the era of information warfare, "military combat
'transparency' [toumingdu] ... has already become an effective form of ...
combat." The superior power can blind the adversary by destroying its
information systems, thus immobilizing its war-fighting capabilities and
establishing information dominance. Indeed, a fundamental element of con-
temporary deterrence is "information deterrence" (xinxi weishe). Some
Chinese military specialists argue that superior information capabilities can
create an "information umbrella" (xinxi san) that not only can substitute
for the nuclear umbrella but is superior to it. Information deterrence is the
"finest result" of "defeating the enemy without fighting." It seeks "blood-
less confrontation to achieve military victory." 10 It is a "peace umbrella"
(heping san). 11
The conventional superiority of the United States enhances its ability to
deter war. First, if nuclear extended deterrence had failed during the Cold
War, the United States could not have used its nuclear capabilities to retal-
iate without exposing itself to universal condemnation. Today, because col-
lateral damage to an adversary would be relatively small, there are reduced
r8 SECURITY STUDIES

U.S. misgivings about punishing potential challengers. 12 As one military an-

alyst concluded, "the usability of conventional deterrence forces is far
greater than that of nuclear deterrence forces" and the credibility of U.S. ex-
tended deterrence commitments to intervene in local conflict is thus higher
than in the past. 13
Second, if deterrence fails, the United States can achieve its objectives
through victory on the battlefield. Conventional deterrence failure therefore
has the unintended effect of enhancing the credibility of subsequent U.S. de-
terrence threats. This was the effect of deterrence failure against Iraq and
the subsequent U.S. victory in the Gulf War. Presumably, U.S. deterrence
failure and subsequent military actions first against Serbia and then against
al-Qaeda terrorists and their Afghan host government have had a similar
effect in enhancing the credibility of the U.S. retaliatory threats. 14
Third, if nations do not submit to U.S. demands, Washington can use con-
ventional forces to carry out "assured destruction," which in the past would
have depended on nuclear weapons. U.S. offensive conventional capabilities
enable the United States to abandon the strategies of limited war and grad-
ual escalation it unsuccessfully employed in the Vietnam War. Should deter-
rence fail, U.S. strategy calls for the rapid and decisive introduction of U.S.
forces, facilitating victory in the shortest possible time in the initial stages
of the war .1'
Chinese leaders acknowledge that U.S. capabilities would be particularly
effective against Chinese forces operating in the Taiwan theater. A senior
Chinese military officer has lectured his troops that China's likely adversary
in a local war would possess high-technology equipment that could neu-
tralize China's ability to rely on manpower to defeat the enemy. A civilian
analyst has noted that in a war in China's coastal region, it would be
difficult for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to take advantage of its su-
perior numbers as it did during the Korean War, and that the adversary could
"make full use of its superiority in air and naval long-range, large-scale, high-
accuracy weaponry." 16 A military analyst was more direct, explaining that
not only would such superior capabilities seriously restrict China's ability to
seize and maintain sea control around a "large island," but would also pose
a major threat to coastal political, economic, and military targets in China. 17
Experts at China's Air Force Command College have concluded that an "air-
attack revolution" has occurred and that a "generation gap" exists between
the high-technology air-attack capabilities of the United States and the "stag-
nant" air defense capabilities of less advanced countries, causing a "crisis" in
air defense. Despite ongoing modernization of Chinese capabilities, funda-
mental PRC inferiority has not changed. In July 200 5, Chinese General Zhu
Chenghu observed that China has "no capability to fight a conventional war
against the United States." 18
 DETERRENCE AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TAIWAN 19

Beijing must assume that the prospect of victory in a conflict with the
United States would be close to nil and that the costs of war and defeat
would be massive, even if China could defeat Taiwan and compel it to con-
cede. Once war began, the United States could target China's large but
backward navy. Even China's advanced Russian destroyers equipped with
highly capable missiles would not contribute to its war-fighting capability,
because they lack sufficient standoff range to challenge U.S. offensive forces.
Indeed, U.S. capabilities would be even more effective in targeting Chinese
surface assets at sea than they have been in targeting enemy assets in deserts,
as in the 1991 Gulf War, the 2001 war in Afghanistan, and the 2003 war in
lraqY War with the United States would also compel China to switch to a
wartime economy, requiring reallocation of resources away from civilian in-
frastructure development to large-scale acquisition of outdated military
hardware and would cost it access to international markets, capital, and
high technology. The resulting economic dislocations would defer China's
ability to achieve great power status well into the second half of the twenty-
first century. 20 Most important, the combination of a military defeat over
Taiwan and a domestic economic crisis would challenge the leadership's top
priority-continued leadership of China by the CCP. Nationalism and eco-
nomic performance, the twin pillars of CCP legitimacy, would collapse,
bringing Party rule down with them.
Thus, China assumes that if the United States intervened in a mainland-
Taiwan war, the costs of defeat would be catastrophic. It also assumes that
the United States has the resolve to intervene in a mainland-Taiwan war and
to impose such costs. Chinese civilian and military analysts understand that
U.S. domestic politics has encouraged the growth in U.S. arms sales to
Taiwan since the early 1990s and will constrain the administration's options
during a mainland-Taiwan conflict. They also acknowledge that the March
1996 U.S. deployment of two carriers to the vicinity of Taiwan during PRC
military maneuvers and missile launches was a "strong military signal" of
U.S. readiness to intervene in a war over Taiwan. 21 The carrier deployment
strongly coupled the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan to the credibility
of its commitments to its allies in East Asia. Since then, Chinese leaders have
assumed that a war with Taiwan means a war with the United States. As one
observer noted, "What many, many people realize is that the effectiveness
of [U.S.] deterrence ... must markedly exceed that of 1996, so that the like-
lihood of U.S. military intervention is even more notable, with a likely cor-
responding escalation in the deterrence dynamics." 22 Another analyst has
warned that the possibility of U.S. intervention means that any Chinese
actions could encounter "unexpectedly serious consequences." 23 Overall,
Chinese decision-makers acknowledge that China cannot deter costly U.S.
intervention in a Taiwan-mainland war. 24
20 SECURITY STUDIES

Chinese analysts also realize that U.S. forces can wage war while re-
maining out of range of enemy forces and can use precision-guided munitions
to target leadership command-and-control centers to shorten the war and
further reduce casualties, thus enhancing American resolve to use force. Chi-
nese studies of the I 99 I Gulf War concluded that high-accuracy, long-range
weaponry was the decisive factor in the U.S. victory. One Chinese military
analyst, summing up the impact of high technology on warfare, argued that
"whoever possesses the newest knowledge and technology can thus grab the
initiative in military combat and also possess the 'killer weapon' to vanquish
the enemy. " 25
Beijing possesses considerable respect for U.S. resolve, but it may believe
that Taiwan lacks resolve to fight a war against the mainland. Chinese lead-
ers may calculate that a rapid barrage of missile and air attacks against Tai-
wan in combination with the deployment of special forces could quickly
devastate Taiwan's resolve to resist, leading to political collapse and rapid
Taiwan capitulation to Beijing's political demands that it acknowledge the
mainland's sovereignty over Taiwan. Such a fait accompli strategy might en-
able Beijing to end the hostilities with a political victory before U.S. inter-
vention, leaving Washington the unattractive option of engaging PRC forces
in order to reverse Taiwan's compromise over a political issue of little con-
sequence to U.S. security interests. 26
But Beijing can have little confidence in the coercive capability of its mis-
siles. Beijing may have deployed as many as 700 DF-I5 missiles across from
Taiwan by 200 5. 27 But Chinese missiles and aircraft have only limited
coercive capability. The United States dropped approximately 22,ooo bombs
in its wars in Yugoslavia and in Afghanistan, including over I 2,ooo precision-
guided bombs in the latter case. Yet in both cases, U.S. missile and air assaults
did not cause enough destruction to cause rapid political surrender. In 2003,
the United States used cruise missiles to oust the Saddam Hussein govern-
ment, but it could not weaken his army's ability to wage protracted warfare.
Chinese missiles, despite significant improvement since I 99 5, still lack the
accuracy of U.S. missiles. 28 Thus, a Chinese missile-based fait accompli strat-
egy might wreak havoc in Taiwan, but Beijing cannot have high confidence
that it would cause Taiwan to accede to even symbolic political unification.
If Taiwan did not surrender, the humiliation would devastate the CCP's do-
mestic legitimacy and significantly undermine its staying power. If Taiwan
fought back and inflicted high casualties on the mainland military, the hu-
miliation would be even greater. Should Chinese leaders then decide that they
had no choice but to prosecute a long-term war for unification, the CCP
would face the likelihood of U.S. intervention, military defeat, domestic
humiliation, and collapse.
Moreover, China cannot be confident that it could bring a war to rapid
conclusion before U.S. intervention. Chinese analysts are generally impressed
 DETERRENCE AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TAIWAN 21

with post-Cold War U.S. rapid response capabilities. The United States
possesses significant forward military presence of the U.S. military in East
Asia. In addition to U.S. aircraft deployed in Japan, the United States has
transferred aircraft carriers and attack submarines to the Pacific theater, de-
veloped nuclear-powered guided missile submarines for East Asia, and sta-
tioned cruise missiles on Guam, as well as fighter aircraft, bombers, and un-
manned reconnaissance aircraft. It is also gaining increased access to naval
facilities in Japan, Singapore, and the Philippines. U.S. rapid response ca-
pabilities have thus greatly improved. 29 Finally, given the difficulty of sur-
prise and U.S. satellite and signal intelligence capabilities, additional U.S.
deployments would also likely be present at the outbreak of war. 30
Beijing acknowledges the high cost of a U.S.-China war, respects U.S. re-
solve, and is necessarily uncertain of its coercive capabilities and of Taiwan's
resolve. Accordingly, Chinese military officers and civilian analysts urge
caution and promote reliance on "peaceful unification" though long-term
development of China's economy and modernization of its military. "Smooth
economic development" is China's most fundamental interest and most im-
portant national security strategy. It is also the most effective way to assure
Chinese territorial integrity. As long as China's economy continues to de-
velop, time is on its side. 31 As one Chinese analyst has argued, China has
already waited r oo years to achieve unification and should be prepared to
wait another 50 years. 32 In the meantime, as long as Chinese deterrence of
Taiwan is effective, China can achieve peaceful unification through long-
term economic and military modernization. 33

CAPABILITIES AND CREDIBILITY: DETERRING TAIWAN

Peace in the Taiwan Strait also requires deterring a formal Taiwan

declaration of independence. This task falls to China. Beijing must possess
sufficient capability and credibility to impose costly retaliation against a
Taiwan challenge to the status quo. Effective deterrence of a Taiwan decla-
ration of independence by the PRC does not depend on its ability to defeat
Taiwan, but rather on its ability to punish it. PRC punishment capability rests
on the combination of the mainland's missile and aircraft capability and
Taiwan's economic and political vulnerability to mainland use of force.
China's medium-range missiles are not very accurate and possess minimal
war-fighting capability. Minimal hardening of Taiwan's defense facilities
would negate their pure military value. 34 Nonetheless, in combination with
penetration of Taiwan air space by the Chinese air force, Chinese missiles
have significant punishment capability. Overnight, Taiwan's economy would
contract, and unemployment would skyrocket as its stock market plum-
meted and capital fled the island. In the first three months of 1996, when
China massed its troops across the Strait from Taiwan and carried out
22 SECURITY STUDIES

military exercises nearby, the Taiwanese stock market fell by 25 percent,

even though the government spent U.S.$r.6 billion to reduce the decline.
Loss of confidence in the Taiwan dollar and panic buying of the U.S. dollar
required the Taiwan government to intervene in capital markets. 35 More-
over, Chinese missiles are inexpensive and in close proximity to Taiwan, so
that over the long term, missile-defense systems will not be able to offset
Taiwan's vulnerability to PRC missiles. 36
In addition to targeting Taiwan with its SRBMs, the mainland could also
declare a blockade around the island. Although the Chinese navy and air
force would lack the ability to militarily enforce a blockade against U.S.
military intervention, the mere announcement of such a blockade and PRC
threats of economic sanctions against any of its trading partners that con-
tinued to trade with Taiwan would not only dramatically curtail commer-
cial shipping to Taiwan but also cut off most of Taiwan's remaining foreign
trade.
Finally, the mainland could directly retaliate against Taiwan's economic
interests. As Taiwan has increased its economic involvement in the main-
land economy, it has been losing its economic autonomy and ceding lever-
age over its continued prosperity to the mainland. In 2oor, the combined
Chinese-Hong Kong market surpassed the U.S. market as Taiwan's most
important export market. In 2002 and in 2003, Taiwan's exports to the
mainland increased by more than 25 percent, while Taiwan's exports to the
United States declined. And in 2003, more than 3 5 percent of Taiwan's ex-
ports went to the China-Hong Kong market, while Chinese exports to Tai-
wan amounted to only 6.4 percent of total Chinese exports. 37 Moreover, in
2002, the mainland became the leading production center of overseas Tai-
wan investors. Nearly 55 percent of Taiwan overseas investment is located
on the mainland and Taiwan's largest corporations, including its high-
technology manufacturers, have invested in the mainland. These investment
trends create an additional source of PRC leverage over Taiwan's economy. 38
Cross-Strait economic trends are creating societal ties that the mainland
can use for political purposes. More than one million Taiwanese now have
residences on the mainland, where they have established separate Taiwan
communities, complete with elementary schools. More than 50o,ooo Tai-
wanese live in the Shanghai area alone. 39 More than 3o,ooo Taiwan compa-
nies have manufacturing facilities there. In 2002, a Taiwan bank opened its
first branch office in China, Chinese and Taiwanese state-owned energy cor-
porations developed a joint venture for oil exploration, and Chinese firms
began recruiting Taiwan financial and technology experts. 40 Should Taiwan
declare independence, the mainland could retaliate by curtailing trade,
freezing investments, and threatening the livelihood of citizens of Taiwan
living in China.
 DETERRENCE AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TAIWAN 23

Chinese military and economic retaliation against a Taiwan declaration

of independence and the ensuing international and domestic crisis would
inevitably cause political instability on Taiwan. In a mainland-Taiwan war,
not only would Taiwan's economy suffer, but the survival of Taiwan's dem-
ocratic political system would be in jeopardy. Thus, the cost to Taiwan of
mainland retaliation against a declaration of independence would be the
loss of its economic prosperity and of its democracy.
The mainland's threat to retaliate against a declaration of independence
is credible. As noted above, the result of China's fifty-year commitment to
unification is that the political legitimacy and survival of the Chinese lead-
ership is attached to its commitment to resist Taiwan independence. As one
Chinese analyst argues, "no Chinese politician, strategist, or anyone else
will dare to abandon the objective of making Taiwan return and the
unification of the motherland. " 41 Failure to respond to a declaration of in-
dependence would also challenge China's international reputation to defend
other vital interests, affecting border security and independence movements
around its periphery. But the mainland also has developed a reputation for
resolve regarding the Taiwan issue. Despite the risk of U.S. intervention and
of a U.S.-China crisis, in March 1996, the PLA launched DF-1 5 missiles
into coastal waters within the vicinity of Kaohsiung, Taiwan's major port
city, to underscore its will to oppose Taiwan independence and thus reverse
the trend in U.S. policy toward Taiwan and Lee Teng-hui's independence
policy. Senior Taiwan political and military officials concur that a declara-
tion of independence would lead to war with the mainland. 42
The deterrent effect of mainland capabilities and credibility is reflected
in Taiwan's domestic politics. Since 1997, in public opinion surveys com-
missioned by the Taiwan government, support for an immediate declaration
of Taiwan independence has declined since the high of 7·4 percent in mid
1998. The consistent low level of support for immediate independence
reflects widespread understanding on Taiwan that mainland retaliation
would be both costly and likely. Indeed, Taiwan voters have routinely sig-
naled their opposition to pro-independence politicians. Since Taiwan's first
competitive election in 1989, on all but one occasion, the pro-independence
party has not won a majority of the votes in either presidential or legislative
elections. The sole exception was the 2004 presidential election, in which
Chen Shui-bian won 50.02 percent of the vote in an outcome heavily influ-
enced by an alleged attempt to assassinate him the day before the election.
Prior to the alleged assassination attempt, almost all public opinion polls
had predicted defeat for Chen. Most recently, the inability of the Demo-
cratic Progressive Party (DPP) to win a majority of seats in the Legislative
Yuan in the December 2004 election and its losses in the December 2005 city
and county government elections reflected in great part voters' dissatisfac-
 SECURITY STUDIES

tion with his mainland policy. 43 Since then, visits to the mainland and the
strong statements in opposition to Taiwan independence by opposition
party leaders have been widely supported by the electorate.

Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula

As with the Taiwan Strait, peace on the Korean peninsula requires mu-
tual deterrence. Deterring North Korea depends on U.S. possession of theca-
pabilities and credibility necessary to persuade Pyongyang that the expected
cost of U.S. intervention in a north-south war would be greater than the
benefits of using force for unification. Deterrence of the United States and
South Korea from using force to eliminate the Pyongyang government or its
nuclear weapons capability requires that the expected cost of North Korean
retaliation be high enough to persuade them to accept the status quo.

CAPABILITIES AND CREDIBILITY: DETERRING NORTH KOREA

North Korean commentary does not use the language of deterrence

to discuss contemporary military trends. Nor does North Korea publish de-
tailed analyses of contemporary military affairs or of the likely course of a
war on the Korean peninsula. Nonetheless, North Korea's assessment of the
U.S. military makes it clear that North Koreans share Chinese respect for
U.S. ability to intervene in post-Cold War regional conflicts.
North Korean commentators concur with Chinese analysts that the
United States faces no opponent in the Third World that can limit its use of
force, its "tyranny and military hegemony." This is a "very dangerous de-
velopment," Song Mu-kyong asserts, because it enables the United States to
use force "as it sees fit" and to carry out "armed intervention at any time."44
Pyongyang further understands that the source of U.S. post-Cold War su-
premacy is its development of high-technology weaponry. North Korean
analysts observe that modern warfare is "three-dimensional" and that it re-
lies on long-range weaponry, such as missiles, to carry out offensive opera-
tions. These analysts point to such advances as stealth air and naval tech-
nologies, including radar-elusive vessels equipped with long-range missiles,
and laser weaponry as reflecting Washington's quest for domination. 45
Moreover, North Korea understands that the forward military presence
of the United States enables it to "carry out armed intervention at any
time," and that since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been
expanding its deployment in East Asia. In the aftermath of the U.S. war
against the Taliban, North Korean commentaries observed that the United
States is trying to consolidate its supremacy in East Asia to better prepare
to cope with a Korean "contingency." 46
 DETERRENCE AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TAIWAN 25

Pyongyang also acknowledges the security consequences of North Korea's

extreme technological backwardness. An editorial in the Korean Workers'
Party newspaper put it bluntly. "Now is the age of science and technology.
We cannot even take a step forward." Thus, whether North Korea can
"possess up-to-date science and technology ... in a short period of time is
a serious question decisive to the future of the nation." 47 Key to North
Korea's interest in science and technology is its preoccupation with informa-
tion technologies. "Everything depends on the ideological point of view. In
the new century, we cannot do anything at all without the knowledge of in-
formation technology. Nor can we remain loyal to the party and leader. " 48
Another author observed, "We are living in a century where the national
strength of each country is guaranteed by science and technology, which is
developing at an unimag[nably rapid rate." 49 Thus, "how to develop mili-
tary science and technology is a crucial issue to national defense." Because
a "bloody competition is taking place in the science and technology sector
world wide ... , it is imrossible to have one's own strong military capabil-
ity without improved science and technology. " 50 Given the gravity of North
Korea's strategic circumEtances, it is "incumbent upon the North Korean
revolutionary party and people to build up their own military force more
firmly than ever before." Thus, they should focus on developing science and
technology to help arm the military with "sophisticated weapons and de-
fend the sovereignty of their country." 51
The leadership's recognition of North Korean technological inferiority
has led to fundamental cbanges in Pyongyang's approach to ideology, eco-
nomic development, and foreign trade. Whereas in the past, North Korea's
economic isolation reflected its ideological commitment to self-reliance,
today it also reflects the U.S. blockade of science and technology. North
Koreans must "smash" t1is blockade, Kim Chong-son asserts, or they will
not be able to "free them;;elves from backwardness even after roo years." 52
Similarly, whereas the doctrine of self-reliance once implied economic
autarchy, Pyongyang now sees self-reliance as an objective requiring devel-
opment of high-technology capabilities through imports from advanced
economies. In the contemporary era, where there is no science and tech-
nology, "there is no self reliance." To build a strong economy "on the prin-
ciple of self-reliance by no means signifies doing economic construction
with the door closed up." Rather, only by "introducing" modern science
and technology "positively" can self-reliance be strengthened. 53 From their
observation of the experience of other developing countries, North Korean
commentators have learned that developing countries "import the relevant
technology and make great efforts on understanding, absorbing, and devel-
oping the technology." 54 These changes explain North Korea's recent
introduction of early Chinese-style economic reforms, including limited
 SECURITY STUDIES

use of the market and creation of special economic zones for foreign
investment. 55
North Korea can hold little hope of withstanding an encounter with U.S.
forces. Even should Pyongyang's ground forces be able to occupy much
of South Korea, U.S. air and naval power would be able to inflict devastat-
ing assaults on the primitive and undernourished North Korean army, so
that North Korea's ability to hold South Korean territory is doubtful. More-
over, its air force, missiles, and artillery could not provide assistance to its
ground forces, because U.S. air and naval platforms could target North
Korean assets while remaining out of range of its air defense systems. The
North Korean military might be able to impose significant costs on South
Korea, but the United States would retain the military capabilities to inflict
rapid defeat on the North Korean military and high costs on its economic
system.
Moreover, paralleling the Chinese situation, North Korean military de-
feat would not only frustrate Pyongyang's effort to unify the peninsula un-
der communism but would lead to the fall of the North's Korean Workers'
Party and to Korean unification under southern rule. In North Korea's case,
the end of Party rule would result not only from loss of legitimacy and the
economic dislocations following military defeat, but also from likely U.S.
and South Korean determination to achieve an unnegotiated end to the war
based on unconditional surrender.
North Korea also respects the credibility of U.S. retaliatory threats. First,
Pyongyang must contend with Washington's fifty-year security commitment
to the defense of South Korea. This commitment is reflected in U.S. partic-
ipation in the Korean War, the subsequent and ongoing U.S. military pres-
ence in South Korea, and the United States-Republic of Korea Mutual
Defense Treaty. Because none of these signals of commitment exist in the
U.S.-Taiwan relationship, North Korea's assessment ofU.S. resolve to defend
South Korea is likely much greater than China's assessment of U.S. resolve
to defend Taiwan.
Second, the U.S. reputation for resolve is bolstered by North Korea's
evaluation of U.S. willingness to use force in the post-Cold War era. Ac-
cording to North Korean commentary, American use of force to overthrow
the Taliban government was simply the latest post-Cold War example of
the U.S. effort to rid the world of countries that resist its will. Moreover,
each U.S. victory fuels its ambition and its readiness to wage war. After the
war in Afghanistan, Washington was "flush with victory" and had set its
sights on the "axis of evil." 56 The "danger of new war is growing all the
more by the day," the North Korean paper Nodong Sinmun commented in
2002. 57 North Korean commentary warns that North Korea is prepared to
defend itself and, unlike the Taliban, will retaliate with "unimaginable fire
 DETERRENCE AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TAIWAN 27

of punishment." 58 Changes in U.S. defense doctrine indicating readiness to

use nuclear weapons against states developing weapons of mass destruction
suggest even greater U.S. resolve. Pyongyang argued that Asia was the most
contentious region in the world, and that the Korean peninsula was the
"dangerous ignition point for nuclear war in Asia." North Korea was the
"first target of the U.S. nuclear attack plan," according to Kim Chong-son. 59
Thus, both North Korea and China believe the United States has the
commitment and capabilities necessary to make credible its retaliatory
threats. But whereas in the Taiwan theater, Beijing understands that the
United States can rely on its long-range missiles and advanced aircraft to
limit its casualties, North Korea's ability to use its ground forces to inflict
significant casualties on the United States may undermine the credibility of
the American commitment to defend South Korea. This difference between
the two theaters is not trivial. Nonetheless, another difference between the
two regions is also significant. Whereas in the Taiwan theater, U.S. deter-
rent forces remain outside the theater, thus suggesting the possibility of
mainland-Taiwan war that does not involve the United States, in the Korea
theater, U.S. troops are at the front line, so that U.S. credibility to defend
South Korea is enhanced by the presumed U.S. resolve to retaliate against
an attack on its own forces. U.S. forces play the role of a "trip wire." In ad-
dition, the large U.S. civilian presence in Seoul and elsewhere in South
Korea means that Pyongyang cannot avoid inflicting significant collateral
damage on U.S. citizens.
Complementing the U.S. retaliatory capabilities and resolve is South
Korea's own development of a retaliatory capability. Since the 1990s, Seoul
has acquired over 100 U.S.-made advanced 300-kilometer-range ground-
to-ground guided missiles and 29 launchers. Since then, it has begun the
acquisition of U.S. joint direct attack munitions (]DAMs), which the United
States used in Afghanistan in 2001 and has used in Iraq since 2003. 60 The
deployment of these missiles will give South Korea an independent and sur-
vivable retaliatory capability that can reach over a North Korean invasion
force to target Pyongyang's command and control facilities and its defense
facilities.
Thus, in the early twenty-first century, American and also South Korean
credibility to use force in defense against a North Korean attack is greater
than ever before. The result for North Korea is thus similar to that for
China-the combination of high costs plus high credibility of retaliatory
threats creates a high expected cost for the use of force. Thus, just as Bei-
jing no longer advocates the "liberation" of Taiwan, but now stresses peace-
ful unification, Pyongyang's commentary no longer advocates the forceful
removal of the U.S. presence from the peninsula and the "liberation" of
South Korea, but stresses deterrence of U.S. use of force and defense against
 SECURITY STUDIES

the unification of Korea by the U.S. military. As with China's attitude

toward Taiwan, North Korea has waited over fifty years to "liberate" South
Korea and is prepared to wait another fifty years.

CAPABILITIES AND CREDIBILITY: DETERRING

SOUTH KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES

Deterring war on the Korean peninsula also requires that the United
States and South Korea be deterred from using force against North Korea.
The effectiveness of North Korea's deterrence posture, based upon its as-
sured destruction retaliatory capability, is evident from U.S. assessments of
Pyongyang's capabilities and resolve, from its assessment of the risk of war,
and from its caution in crisis situations.
North Korean capabilities make the cost of war prohibitively high for
both South Korea and the United States, and no strategy, including a mas-
sive surprise attack, can create sufficient confidence that this cost can be re-
duced to an acceptable level. Pyongyang's only plausible strategy to defend
against an invasion is to go on the offensive, and just as South Korea has de-
ployed the bulk of its forces between the demilitarized zone and Seoul
(which is some 30 miles from the DMZ), North Korea has deployed most
of its forces-over 70o,ooo soldiers and two thousand tanks-south of its
capital (which is 8 5 miles from the border). It lacks both the infrastructure
to enable dispersed forces to coordinate a rapid response against a focused
attack and the ability to turn back an attack from deep within its territory.
As General James R. Clapper, former deputy director of the U.S. Defense
Intelligence Agency, observed, North Koreans "think that the best defense
is a good offense." 61
Complementing Pyongyang's conventional defense strategy is its conven-
tional and WMD-based deterrent capability. Its forward deployment of its
conventional forces deters invasion by threatening to make a ground attack
on North Korea very costly. Between Pyongyang and the demilitarized zone,
North Korea has deployed approximately 8,ooo artillery systems, including
500 long-range systems, armed with one million tons of ammunition. The
U.S. Department of Defense estimates that this artillery could sustain a bar-
rage on South Korea of up to 5oo,ooo rounds an hour for several hours.
Augmenting North Korea's conventional deterrent is its deployment of
chemical munitions in its artillery systems. Beginning in the late r98os, as
North Korea experienced increasing military inferiority vis-a-vis South
Korea, it developed chemical weapons. By the late 1990s, Pyongyang had
stockpiled up to 5,ooo metric tons of chemical agents. Approximately
ro percent of its forward-deployed artillery shells are deployed with chem-
ical weapons. North Korea is also assumed to have the ability to produce
biological weapons. 62
 DETERRENCE AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TAIWAN 29

Deployed at the front lines, North Korea's WMD capability is a destruc-

tive trip wire that poses a credible "use it or lose it" retaliatory threat of
widespread civilian and military casualties in South Korea, even should
North Korea be unable to avoid rapid political collapse after a U.S. retalia-
tory attack. Thus, in 1994 Washington could not discount Pyongyang's
threat to turn Seoul into a "sea of fire" if United States carried out a pre-
ventive strike against North Korea's nuclear facilities. The U.S. Department
of Defense estimated that in the first ninety days of an ensuing war, there
would be over so,ooo U.S. casualties and nearly soo,ooo South Korean
casualties. 63
North Korea's nuclear program and its ballistic missile program possess
a similar deterrent threat. Pyongyang began its nuclear weapons program in
the late 198os, just as the collapse of Soviet power undermined the balance
of power on the peninsula and Moscow was normalizing relations with
Seoul. 64 By 1994, North Korea had extracted sufficient enriched uranium to
produce two nuclear bombs. In 2005, U.S. officials reported that it had ex-
tracted sufficient plutonium to make six nuclear bombs. 65 In June 2003, as
U.S.-North Korean tension escalated, Pyongyang declared that it was ac-
tively developing a nuclear deterrent to counter U.S. aggression. In August,
it said that it planned to declare itself a nuclear power, and that it was
prepared to carry out a nuclear test. 66 Although North Korea has yet to
conduct a nuclear test, and there is uncertainty regarding North Korean
possession of a delivery vehicle, the United States cannot assume that war
on the Korean peninsula will not escalate to North Korean use of nuclear
weapons.
North Korea's deterrent capability is enhanced by the credibility of its
retaliatory threat. Pyongyang's past willingness to use terrorism, special op-
erations, and low-level force against the South Korean leadership reflects its
willingness to create crises and risk war even in the absence of threats to re-
gime survival. Its style of crisis diplomacy, including its frequent readiness
to heighten tension and threaten war, further contributes to its reputation
for recklessness. 67 Indeed, mirroring North Korea's perception of the re-
solve in U.S. defense policy to carry out a preemptive strike, the United
States and South Korea perceive in North Korean behavior the resolve nec-
essary to use force for unification, much less in response to an attack. As a
"rogue state" and a member of the "axis of evil," North Korea is assumed
to have a ready inclination to use force. 68
Finally, China's interest in maintaining secure borders contributes to
deterrence of U.S. use of force. One of the "lessons of history" from the
Korean War is that a U.S. troop presence near Chinese borders will provoke
Chinese intervention and a very costly war for the United States. 69 This
makes the risk of war with North Korea even more dangerous for the
United States, and deterrence thus more reliable.
30 SECURITY STUDIES

Stable and Unstable Deterrence

Effective deterrence exists both in the Taiwan Strait and on the

Korean peninsula, but whereas it is stable in the former case, in the latter,
it is unstable. The difference lies in the distinct geographic deployments of
the protagonists and the implications for security dilemma dynamics.
Instability in deterrence is characterized by a propensity for unintended
crisis escalation and for unintended war. This occurs when a status-quo
state is vulnerable to a debilitating first strike, so that it experiences pres-
sure to prepare for war rather than risk being caught unprepared. Stable de-
terrence, on the other hand, reflects confidence on the part of both states
that the outcome of a war would not be determined by a surprise attack. In
these circumstances, each of them can observe its counterpart's actions with
greater patience, rather than prepare for possible imminent attack. Thus,
crises are slower to develop and unintended war less likely. Mutual deter-
rence can be effective yet unstable. Two states may be deterred from using
force by their opponent's retaliatory threat, but if each state's deterrent pos-
ture includes first-strike capabilities, each may nonetheless respond to the
other's efforts at deterrence with preparations for war, thus contributing to
a crisis spiral.
In the U.S.-China dyad in the Taiwan Strait, there is relatively minimal
security dilemma pressure for unintended crisis escalation. The United
States has little apprehension that a surprise PRC attack on U.S. naval forces
would determine the outcome of the war, for China lacks the capability to
launch an attack that would deny the United States time to protect sufficient
forces to maintain a powerful retaliatory capability. Although China has in-
creasingly been relying on Russian submarines to enable it to threaten U.S.
surface ships and to develop an access-denial capability, this capability does
not allow a decisive first-strike capability. The security of the U.S. surface
fleet reflects China's intrinsic inability as a land power to contend with the
naval forces of an advanced maritime power. It also reflects its backward
economy and technology. Given U.S. information warfare dominance and
China's limited targeting ability, U.S. surface vessels will be relatively secure
from Chinese capabilities for many years. Thus, Chinese capabilities that
deter Taiwan independence do not have a first-strike capability against U.S.
forces.
Moreover, China's development of its naval power projection capability
will be limited by enduring budget constraints reflecting its political geog-
raphy. Whereas the United States can continue to prioritize naval spending
for the indefinite future, Chinese defense policy will have to hedge against
the emergence of adversaries along its land border, including the inevitable
revival of Russian power in Central Asia/ 0 The limits to Chinese naval
 DETERRENCE AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TAIWAN 31

spending and the considerable head start the United States possesses in both
quantity and quality in the U.S.-China naval balance ensure long-term U.S.
maritime superiority and, thus, continued stable deterrence in the Taiwan
Strait.
The security of U.S. deployments in East Asia against a surprise Chinese
attack enables the United States to respond to Chinese mobilization of de-
terrent capabilities that also allow for a coercive fait accompli strike against
Taiwan without contributing to crisis escalation. U.S. aircraft based on
Okinawa can come to Taiwan's defense without extensive defensive prepa-
rations suggesting offensive planning. The United States can also deploy
its power-projection naval forces to the region to "observe" Chinese actions
without placing these forces on high alert, thus contributing to conflict
control.
Just as U.S. naval forces are secure from a surprise Chinese attack, China
is secure from a surprise U.S. attack. Although the United States possesses
capabilities that can inflict considerable costs on China, Chinese leaders do
not fear that a surprise attack will determine either the outcome of war or
the fate of the regime. China's mere size offers it security from air attack.
The United States significantly depleted its stockpile of cruise missiles in its
war in Kosovo, but the impact on Serbian will or war-fighting capability
was minimal.7 1 China's ability to absorb such an attack is far greater. More-
over, China's DF-r5 missile launchers are mobile, so that they can be pro-
tected from attack, preserving China's ability to retaliate against a Taiwan
declaration of independence. 72 Defeating China requires engaging it on the
mainland. But as the U.S. experience in both the Korean and Vietnam wars
revealed, the United States possesses minimal ability to project war-winning
power onto the East Asian mainland.
The security of U.S. and Chinese capabilities explains each side's com-
posure during the 1996 March confrontation in the Taiwan Strait. China
launched DF-rss in the vicinity of Taiwan, and the United States responded
by deploying two aircraft carriers within 200 miles of the Chinese coast.
Nevertheless, Secretary of Defense Perry confidently observed that a Chi-
nese attack on Taiwan would be" a dumb thing." China, he said, did "not
have the capability" to invade Taiwan. Although Perry believed that China
had the ability to "harass" Taiwan, he observed that "it does not make any
sense .... I do not expect China to be attacking Taiwan." 73 Perry told Vice
Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu that Chinese missile firings were a "threat
to American interests" and that the United States "had more than enough
military capability to protect its vital national security interests in the re-
gion."74 Although Chinese forces could conceivably have been used against
U.S. maritime forces, U.S. policymakers did not expect war and did not
believe that there was a crisis.
 SECURITY STUDIES

China was equally composed. Although the United States deployed two
aircraft carriers to the vicinity of Taiwan and possessed considerable
forward-presence air power on Okinawa, China did not perceive the U.S.
response to its political use of force as posing an imminent threat of a deci-
sive first strike. Hence, it did not heighten the readiness of Chinese forces in
response to U.S. deployments. To the extent that Beijing may have short-
ened its military show of force, it responded to the political costs of its con-
frontation with the United States, not the risk of war. 75
Mutual deterrence in the Taiwan Strait is effective and stable. But on the
Korean peninsula, there is unstable mutual deterrence. The likelihood of
crisis escalation and unintended war is greater, reflecting each side's vulner-
ability to a surprise attack and the likelihood that a surprise attack could
determine the outcome of the war.
In contrast to the character of the Chinese deterrent forces in the Taiwan
Strait, North Korean and U.S. capabilities that deter use of force and defend
against an invasion also possess offensive, first-strike capabilities. Both
countries have deployed land-based forces and weapons systems to serve as
a trip-wire deterrent, yet trip wires do not only contribute to deterrence.
Trip-wire deployments close to a border also create a first-strike capability
that contributes to an adversary's fear of attack. The resulting security di-
lemma dynamics are thus a critical factor in threat perception on both sides
of the demilitarized zone.
North Korea's forward-deployed ground forces and tanks pose the threat
of a blitz warfare strategy. According to retired General John Tilelli, the for-
mer commander of U.S. forces in South Korea, the "tyranny of proximity"
of Pyongyang's massive forward deployment of artillery systems and chem-
ical weapons enables North Korea to carry out destructive shelling of both
U.S. and South Korean forces and the civilian population in Seoui.76 Should
North Korea launch a surprise massive first strike, there would be extraor-
dinarily high casualties among both the military and civilian populations.
Moreover, the ensuing associated panic and widespread destruction in South
Korea could also make an effective retaliatory attack difficult. U.S. and South
Korean infantry and land-based aircraft might be immobilized, limiting the
initial U.S. reprisal to shelling from naval-based capabilities.7 7
North Korea experiences similar pressures for rapid mobilization.
The overwhelming military superiority of the United States, including its
long-range high-accuracy attack weaponry, suggests a capability to launch
preemptive strikes against command and control centers. A surprise U.S. at-
tack might not only immobilize the North Korean military command but
also cause the collapse of the North Korean communist leadership. The
Bush administration's doctrine of preemptive war further contributes to
North Korean fear of a surprise attack.
 DETERRENCE AND THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TAIWAN 33

In these strategic circumstances, there is intense pressure for crisis esca-

lation on both sides of the border. General Lean J. LaPorte, commander of
U.S. forces in South Korea, explained that due to the "proximity and lethal-
ity" of North Korean capabilities, U.S. forces "must be 'ready to be able to
fight tonight.' " 78 In these insecure circumstances, North Korean military
moves designed to signal deterrent credibility will be readily seen by the
United States as potentially dangerous preparations for a first strike, thus
eliciting corresponding military mobilization and spiraling crisis dynamics.
During the June 1994 crisis, as the United States prepared to mobilize its
forces for a possible strike against North Korea's nuclear facilities, the Clin-
ton administration feared that its own military preparations might elicit a
North Korean preemptive strike, even though the United States had not yet
decided to use force. Such fears were warranted-North Korea had begun
to mobilize its forces just as the United States was evaluating its deployment
options. Former President Jimmy Carter's diplomatic intervention during
his visit to Pyongyang on 16 June 1994 did not forestall an imminent U.S.
attack, but it did defuse a developing crisis that might well have quickly
escalated into unintended war.7 9 Thus, in 1994, the mere preparation for
deployment of U.S. forces had elicited heightened tension and a dangerous
U.S.-North Korean crisis in a way that China's actual military deployments
and missile and naval exercises in the Taiwan Strait in 1996 had not.
The 2003 Korean crisis reflected similar elements of crisis instability.
Whereas the Clinton administration had considered positioning forces near
North Korea to prepare to attack North Korean facilities, in 2003, the Bush
administration actually deployed U.S. forces near North Korea to try to co-
erce Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons program. In February, it
positioned equipment for launching precision-guided missiles near North
Korea and placed B-1 and B-52 bombers on alert for deployment to Guam.
In March, it deployed these bombers to Guam, immediately following Pres-
ident Bush's warning that he was prepared to use force to end North Ko-
rea's nuclear program. In addition, U.S. and South Korean forces carried
out large-scale war games, using F-II? Stealth fighters for the first time in
seven years. Following the exercises, these fighters remained deployed in
South Korea. During the exercises, U.S. forces also increased their aerial
and naval reconnaissance of North Korea. According to North Korean
sources, in March, the United States carried out more than 220 espionage
flights against North Korea. In the aftermath of the initial phase of the air
war in Iraq, Washington transferred three aircraft carriers from the Iraq
theater to the Pacific theater, so that it had altogether four carriers deployed
within range of the Korean peninsula in April2003. Two of the carriers re-
turned to the United States, but two remained in the region within range of
North Korea. 80 Then, in May, Washington announced that it would aug-
34 SECURITY STUDIES

ment its capabilities on the Korean peninsula by immediately deploying an

advanced Stryker Brigade Combat Team to South Korea, facilitating rapid
and flexible application of U.S. medium and heavy weaponry. Washington
also announced that it would deploy advanced Apache military helicopters
and PAC-3 missiles in Korea. 81
The United States accompanied its increased military deployments with
signals that it was prepared to initiate use of force against North Korea. In
September 2002, the Bush administration released its report on U.S. na-
tional security, which explicitly stated that preemption was an effective re-
sponse to threats of nuclear proliferation. 82 Following U.S. use of force
against Iraq in March 2003, North Korea seemed the likely next target of
U.S. preemptive use of force. In February, President Bush repeatedly warned
North Korea that "all military options were open" to deal with its nuclear
program. In March, he warned that if U.S. efforts "don't work diplomati-
cally, they'll have to work militarily." Other U.S. officials warned that North
Korea should learn a lesson from U.S. use of force against lraq. 83 In May,
U.S. Defense Department officials explained that the United States was de-
ploying its forces in Northeast Asia to be able to carry out an attack on the
North Korean leadership similar to the attack that it had just launched
against the Iraqi leadership. 84
In this context, both U.S. and North Korean forces prepared to be at-
tacked. U.S. forces were at the "highest stage of readiness." According to a
U.S. defense official, there was no way for them "to be any more prepared."
Echoing General LaPorte's remark in 2002, General George Coggins, the
operations officer for U.S. forces in South Korea, reported that U.S. soldiers
were "ready to fight tonight if we have to." 85 North Korea was similarly
prepared for war. As the United States made the final preparations for war
against Iraq, North Korean president Kim Jong 11 went into seclusion for
fifty days near the Chinese border, apparently fearing that he might be the
target of a U.S. attack. U.S. forces prepared to interdict North Korean
vessels suspected of carrying components of weapons of mass destruction,
and Pyongyang warned that its forces were at "full combat readiness."
Pyongyang declared that it was "closely watching" U.S. preparations "with
a high degree of vigilance. " 86
U.S. concern for the North Korean "tyranny of proximity" and North
Korean fear of U.S. high-technology capabilities and alleged readiness to
use force combined to cause mutual fear of a first strike. Each side feared
that a first strike would have devastating consequences, so that each side
was on heightened alert and prepared to go to war at any time. Thus, rela-
tively minor incidents could have easily been interpreted as the first step in
an attack and escalated to all-out war. In February 2003, North Korea fired
an anti-ship missile into the sea between the Korean peninsula and Japan,
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 Il dit et suspendit à son épaule l'épée aux clous d'argent.

Au coucher du soleil, les présents étant arrivés, des hérauts les

portèrent dans la demeure d'Alcinoüs. Celui-ci, précédant les
convives, entra dans le palais et tous s'assirent sur des sièges
élevés. Alcinoüs, s'adressant à Arété, lui dit:
—Femme, apporte-nous le coffre le plus précieux que tu possèdes
et un vêtement d'une blancheur éclatante. Fais chauffer de l'eau
dans un vase d'airain, afin que notre hôte, s'étant baigné, se
réjouisse et prenne part à notre festin. Moi, je lui donnerai ma coupe
d'or merveilleuse; ainsi chaque jour, il se souviendra de moi en
faisant, dans son palais, les libations à Zeus.
Arété et ses suivantes s'empressèrent aussitôt, apportant à Ulysse
un coffre merveilleux, contenant les présents magnifiques, puis la
reine lui adressa ces paroles ailées:
—Scelle toi même le couvercle et mets un lien de peur que
quelqu'un ne dérobe tes richesses sur le noir vaisseau, pendant ton
sommeil.
Alors le patient Ulysse, d'un nœud compliqué que lui avait jadis
enseigné Circé, ferma le coffre. L'intendante l'invita alors à se
baigner et Ulysse se réjouissait en voyant tous ces préparatifs, car
de semblables soins ne lui avaient pas été donnés depuis son départ
de la grotte de Calypso à la belle chevelure. Après que les jeunes
suivantes l'eurent frotté d'huile, le héros se rendit parmi les
convives.
Nausicaa, debout sur le portique, contemplait Ulysse avec
admiration, et lui adressa ces paroles ailées:
—Bel étranger, je te salue! Quand tu seras rentré dans ta patrie,
souviens-toi que c'est Nausicaa qui t'accueillit la première.
Le divin Ulysse lui répondit:
 —Douce Nausicaa, que Zeus m'accorde de revoir mon foyer, et là,
chaque jour, comme à une déesse, je t'adresserai des vœux, car
c'est à toi que je dois la vie.
Il dit et s'assit près d'Alcinoüs.
Un héraut amena l'aède Démodocus. Alors Ulysse, coupant, d'un
porc aux dents blanches, une large tranche succulente, dit au
héraut:
—Prends, et donne cette viande à Démodocus. Malgré mon
chagrin, je veux l'honorer, car c'est la Muse qui chante par sa bouche
divine.
Il dit et Démodocus se réjouit. Les convives étendirent les mains
vers les mets préparés, et lorsqu'ils eurent apaisé la faim et la soif,
Ulysse dit à l'aède:
—Démodocus, toi que j'honore et qui chantes si bien le destin des
Grecs, leurs souffrances, leurs fatigues, dis-nous maintenant le piège
trompeur, ce cheval de bois que construisit Epéus aidé de Minerve et
que l'ingénieux Ulysse introduisit dans Ilion. Si tu nous dis ces
choses avec vérité, je déclarerai à tous les hommes qu'un dieu
bienveillant t'accorde le génie divin.
Il dit et Démodocus, que le dieu inspire, commença son chant: Il
dit d'abord comment une partie des Grecs s'éloignèrent sur leurs
vaisseaux, ayant brûlé leurs tentes, tandis que d'autres avec Ulysse,
se trouvaient dans Ilion, cachés dans les flancs du cheval, amené
par les Troyens eux-mêmes dans leur citadelle. Les Troyens
délibéraient; trois avis les partageaient: ouvrir le cheval avec l'airain
ou le précipiter des rochers, ou bien le consacrer aux dieux. Cette
dernière résolution s'accomplit. Il dit encore comment les Achéens
quittant les flancs du perfide cheval, ravagèrent la cité, pillant la
superbe Ilion, tandis qu'Ulysse et Ménélas se dirigeaient vers la
demeure de Deiphobe.
 Pendant ces récits, Ulysse s'affligeait; des larmes brûlantes
mouillaient ses joues. Alcinoüs entendant ses profonds soupirs, dit
aux Phéaciens, amis de la rame:
—Que Démodocus interrompe ses chants, car ils ne réjouissent
pas tous les cœurs. Cet étranger n'a cessé de gémir et la douleur
enveloppe son âme. Maintenant, qu'il ne nous cache rien. Qu'il nous
fasse connaître le nom de sa mère, de son père et de sa patrie, qu'il
nous raconte sincèrement dans quelles mers il a erré, qu'il nous
décrive les peuples farouches, injustes, ou bien hospitaliers, chez
lesquels il a abordé. Peut-être quelqu'un de ses parents a-t-il péri
devant Ilion, ou bien a-t-il perdu un compagnon chéri, aimé comme
un frère?
 Chant IX

LE CYCLOPE
 Le prudent Ulysse prit la parole et dit:
—Puissant Alcinoüs, certes il est doux d'écouter, assis à la table de
ton palais, l'aède à la voix divine, tandis qu'un échanson, puisant le
vin pur dans le cratère, en remplit nos coupes; oui certes, cela est
doux. Mais le désir de m'interroger t'est venu; tu veux le récit de
mes aventures? Par où commencerai-je?...
»Je suis Ulysse, fils de Laërte, dont les ruses de toutes sortes
préoccupent les hommes et dont la gloire monte jusqu'au ciel.
J'habite Ithaque, située au couchant; là est une verte montagne, le
Nérite au feuillage agité; autour d'Ithaque, sont groupées des îles
nombreuses, Dulichium, Samé et la verdissante Zacynthe. L'âpre
Ithaque est nourricière de guerriers et, pour moi, rien n'est plus
doux que mon pays.
»Calypso à la belle chevelure m'a retenu dans ses grottes
profondes, me désirant comme époux, de même que l'artificieuse
Circé d'Ea, mais elles n'ont pu persuader mon cœur. Maintenant, je
vais te raconter les maux que m'envoya Zeus après mon départ de
Troie.
»Le vent qui m'éloignait d'Ilion, me conduisit chez les Ciconiens, à
Ismare; je saccageai la ville et massacrai les habitants; nous
enlevâmes leurs épouses et les jeunes vierges, ainsi que de
nombreuses richesses, et nous en fîmes le partage. J'engageai alors
mes compagnons à fuir d'un pas agile, mais les insensés ne
m'écoutèrent pas. Ils égorgeaient les bœufs au pas lent et buvaient
à longs traits le vin pur. Cependant les Ciconiens qui s'étaient enfuis
appelèrent d'autres Ciconiens leurs voisins, très braves et sachant
combattre. Ils arrivèrent dès l'aurore, nombreux comme les fleurs
printanières. Nous soutînmes victorieusement le combat près des
vaisseaux rapides, tant que monta le jour divin, mais au déclin du
soleil, les Ciconiens nous domptèrent et mirent les Grecs en fuite.
Chaque vaisseau perdit six guerriers aux belles cnémides.
»Le cœur affligé, nous continuâmes notre route, mais nos
vaisseaux ne s'éloignèrent pas du rivage, avant que, par trois fois,
nous n'eussions appelé nos malheureux compagnons tombés sous le
fer des Ciconiens. Zeus alors souleva contre nos navires à la proue
azurée le vent Borée; une tempête violente s'élança du ciel, et nos
vaisseaux furent désemparés et rejetés au rivage, où nous restâmes
deux nuits et deux jours, accablés de fatigue. Mais quand se leva
pour nous l'aurore du troisième jour nous reprîmes la mer, et je
serais arrivé sain et sauf dans ma terre chérie si, en doublant le cap
Malée, Borée rapide ne m'avait repoussé de Cythère.
»Durant neuf jours, nous fûmes emportés sur la mer
poissonneuse, et nous abordâmes, le dixième, au pays des
Lotophages qui mangent une nourriture fleurie. Nous descendîmes à
terre pour puiser de l'eau et j'envoyai deux guerriers conduits par un
héraut, pour reconnaître quels étaient les habitants de ce pays.
Ceux-ci les accueillirent et leur firent goûter le lotus, et ayant mangé
de ce mets doux comme le miel, ils en oublièrent le retour. Je les
ramenai à mes vaisseaux malgré leurs larmes, puis j'ordonnai le
départ de peur que d'autres, goûtant au lotus, n'oubliassent aussi
leur patrie. Mes compagnons s'embarquèrent aussitôt et, assis à
leurs bancs, ils frappèrent de leurs rames la blanche mer.
»Nous arrivâmes bientôt à la terre des Cyclopes, géants cruels qui
n'ont qu'un œil au milieu du front. Ils ne sèment, ni ne labourent,
confiants dans les dieux, et la vigne aux larges grappes, grossies par
la pluie de Zeus, leur donne le vin doux au cœur. Ils habitent des
cavernes profondes au sommet des montagnes et gouvernent leurs
familles sans souci de leurs voisins.
»Au long du port des Cyclopes, s'étend une petite île; dans ses
forêts les chèvres sauvages sont innombrables, fertiles sont ses
humides prairies; mais on ne voit ni troupeaux conduits par des
bergers, ni cultures, ni habitations; cependant la vigne y serait
immortelle, le labour facile, et, la saison venue, d'innombrables épis
seraient la récompense de l'homme des champs, car le sol est gras
et fécond. Le port est commode, on n'y a nul besoin d'amarres, et,
sans y jeter l'ancre, le navigateur peut attendre que son cœur l'invite
à partir, ou que le souffle du zéphir s'élève. Près du port, au fond
d'une grotte qu'entourent des peupliers, coule une fontaine
cristalline; c'est là qu'un dieu nous conduisit, et nous nous
endormîmes sur le rivage en attendant l'aurore. Quand elle parut,
nous parcourûmes l'île avec admiration; puis, divisés en trois
groupes, nous commençâmes la chasse, et fîmes une proie
abondante. Chacun des douze vaisseaux qui me suivaient, eut pour
sa part neuf chèvres et j'en choisis dix pour moi seul. Jusqu'au
coucher du soleil nous savourâmes des mets abondants et bûmes un
vin délicieux, car celui de nos navires n'était pas épuisé, et nous en
avions rempli de nombreuses amphores, lorsque nous avions pris la
ville sacrée des Ciconiens.
»Cependant nous regardions vers la terre des Cyclopes; nous
entendions leurs cris et ceux de leurs troupeaux, et le lendemain,
réunissant mes compagnons je leur dis: «Chers amis, restez ici
pendant que j'irai reconnaître quels sont ces hommes, afin de voir
s'ils sont injustes ou hospitaliers et si leur esprit craint les dieux.»
»J'ordonnai alors à mes rameurs de détacher les câbles de mon
vaisseau et de me suivre; assis en ordre, ils frappèrent aussitôt la
blanche mer que nous franchîmes rapidement. Bientôt nous
aperçûmes une haute caverne ombragée de lauriers, de pins élevés
et de peupliers à la haute chevelure servant d'abri à de nombreux
troupeaux.
»Là, habitait un homme d'une taille formidable, monstre terrible
qui, solitaire, faisait paître ses troupeaux et ne connaissait pas les
lois de l'hospitalité. Je choisis parmi mes compagnons douze des
plus braves et me mis en marche, emportant avec moi une outre
pleine d'un vin capiteux que m'avait donné Naron, fils d'Evanthée,
prêtre d'Apollon et habitant Ismare: je l'avais protégé lui, son fils et
sa femme, et il m'avait offert sept talents d'or, une coupe d'argent,
et il avait puisé pour moi dans douze amphores, un vin pur,
breuvage divin, que lui seul, son épouse et son intendante
connaissaient. Quand il voulait boire de ce vin délicieux, il en
remplissait une coupe et la versait dans vingt mesures d'eau; un
bouquet divin s'exhalait alors du cratère, et il eût été bien pénible de
n'en point goûter. J'en avais emporté une outre pleine. Arrivés à
l'entrée de la caverne, nous ne trouvâmes personne. Nous
contemplions avec admiration les claies chargées de fromages, et les
étables remplies d'agneaux. Les vases débordaient de lait et mes
compagnons me suppliaient de partir au plus vite emportant ces
richesses et chassant devant nous les troupeaux du Cyclope. Je ne
les écoutai pas, ce qui cependant eût été plus sage.
»Ayant allumé du feu pour les sacrifices, nous mangeâmes
quelques fromages, puis, assis dans la caverne, nous vîmes venir le
Cyclope portant une immense charge de bois sec qu'il jeta au dehors
de la caverne avec grand bruit; épouvantés, nous nous sauvâmes au
fond de l'antre. Le Cyclope chassa ses troupeaux dans la vaste
grotte, laissant à l'entrée les béliers et les boucs, puis il souleva du
sol une pierre énorme et ferma sa caverne. Il s'assit, se mit à traire
les brebis et les chèvres bêlantes, puis il plaça un agneau sous
chaque mère. Alors, disposant la moitié du lait dans des vases pour
son repas du soir, il réserva l'autre moitié pour ses provisions d'hiver.
Ayant allumé du feu, il nous aperçut, et, nous interrogeant, il nous
dit:
»—Étrangers, qui êtes-vous? Un intérêt vous amène-t-il sur ces
rives? ou bien errez-vous au hasard sur les plaines humides comme
des pirates portant le ravage chez les peuples paisibles?
»Il dit, et sa voix terrible nous glaça d'effroi. Cependant je lui
répondis en ces termes:
»—Nous sommes des Grecs, revenant de Troie; des vents
contraires nous ont éloignés de notre patrie, sans doute par la
volonté de Zeus. Nous étions les glorieux soldats d'Agamemnon, fils
d'Atrée, dont la renommée touche au ciel. Nous sommes venus à tes
genoux, espérant de toi les dons de l'hospitalité qu'il est d'usage
d'offrir à l'étranger. Homme généreux, respecte les dieux et les
suppliants, protégés de Zeus.
»Il répondit d'un cœur impitoyable:
»—Étranger insensé, de quel pays viens-tu donc que tu m'engages
à craindre les dieux? Les Cyclopes n'ont souci ni de Zeus, ni des
Immortels, car ils sont plus puissants qu'eux; cependant, dis-moi, où
as-tu laissé ton vaisseau? Est-il loin d'ici?
 »Il parlait ainsi pour m'éprouver, mais je lui fis cette réponse
artificieuse:
»—Neptune a brisé mon navire contre les rochers de cette île.
Seul avec les compagnons que tu vois, j'ai échappé à la mort cruelle.
»Sans me répondre, il jeta les mains sur mes compagnons, en
saisit deux et les frappa contre terre comme deux chiens; leur
cervelle s'écrasa sur le sol. Les dépeçant, il les dévora comme un
lion nourri sur les montagnes, ne laissant ni entrailles, ni chairs, ni os
remplis de moëlle. A ce spectacle horrible, nous élevâmes en
pleurant nos mains vers Zeus. Le Cyclope ayant apaisé sa faim, but
abondamment du lait pur et s'étendit au milieu de ses troupeaux. Le
cœur ulcéré je m'apprêtais à plonger mon épée aiguë dans sa
poitrine, mais une pensée prudente m'arrêta. Jamais nos mains
n'auraient pu écarter la pierre pesante qui fermait l'antre du Cyclope.
Alors, gémissants, nous attendîmes l'aurore divine. Dès le matin, le
monstre alluma du feu, et se mit à traire ses bêtes magnifiques; puis
saisissant encore deux de mes compagnons, il en fit son repas.
Chassant alors ses troupeaux hors de l'antre, il replaça
soigneusement la pierre immense qui fermait l'entrée de la caverne,
comme l'on place un couvercle sur un carquois. Le Cyclope dirigea
ses troupeaux sur la montagne; quant à moi, roulant en mon cœur
des désirs de vengeance, je m'arrêtai à ce parti qui me semblait le
meilleur: Le Géant conservait au fond de l'étable une énorme
branche d'olivier comparable par sa taille au mât d'un vaisseau à
vingt rangs de rames. J'en coupai la longueur d'une brasse que je fis
amincir par mes compagnons; j'en affilai l'extrémité, et pour la
durcir, je la tournai dans la flamme d'un feu ardent; ensuite je la
cachai dans le fumier amoncelé au fond de la grotte. J'ordonnai alors
à mes compagnons de chercher par le sort ceux d'entre eux qui
enfonceraient avec moi ce pieu dans l'œil du Cyclope pendant son
sommeil. Le sort désigna ceux mêmes que j'aurais choisis.
»Vers le soir, le monstre cruel revint et fit entrer ses gras
troupeaux dans la caverne immense qu'il ferma avec soin. Il s'assit
et se mit à traire les chèvres bêlantes, puis saisissant encore deux
de mes compagnons, il en fit son repas du soir. Alors, je m'approchai
du géant, tenant une coupe de vin noir dans les mains, et je lui dis:
»—Cyclope, bois ce vin que notre vaisseau portait. J'avais préparé
cette libation, confiant en ton hospitalité, mais ta fureur sans bornes
éloigne les mortels qui voudraient venir vers toi.
»Il prit la coupe et but. Trouvant ce breuvage délicieux, il m'en
redemanda:
»—Que ton cœur bienveillant m'en donne encore, et dis-moi ton
nom maintenant, afin que je te donne un présent d'hospitalité qui te
réjouisse. Notre terre généreuse produit aussi du vin dont la pluie de
Zeus fait croître les grappes puissantes, mais celui-ci me semble
d'Ambroisie et de Nectar.
»Je lui versai encore du vin noir. Trois fois il vida la coupe, et
quand le vin eut obscurci son esprit, je lui dis ces paroles
caressantes:
»—Cyclope, mon père et ma mère et tous mes compagnons
m'appellent Personne. Indique-moi maintenant le présent
d'hospitalité que tu m'as promis.
»Il me répondit aussitôt d'un cœur impitoyable:
»—Je mangerai Personne le dernier; ce sera là mon présent
d'hospitalité!
»Il dit, et l'ivresse qui dompte les sens s'empara de lui. Alors
poussant la branche d'olivier sous la cendre brûlante, quoique verte
elle fût bientôt prête à s'enflammer; puis exhortant mes
compagnons, et une divinité nous inspirant une grande audace, nous
enfonçâmes le pieu aigu dans l'œil du Cyclope; et moi le dirigeant et
appuyant sur lui, je le faisais tourner.—De même qu'un homme perce
avec une tarière les poutres d'un vaisseau, de même nous faisions
tourner le pieu embrasé dans l'œil du monstre. Le sang ruisselait;
une vapeur ardente dévorait sa paupière, l'œil se consumait avec
bruit. Comme un forgeron plonge dans l'eau froide, pour la tremper,
une hache rougie au feu, ainsi l'œil du monstre frémissait autour de
la branche d'olivier. Il poussa alors un gémissement terrible et nous
reculâmes remplis d'épouvante. Ecumant de rage, il arracha de son
œil le pieu souillé de sang et le rejeta au loin. A ses cris, les
Cyclopes voisins accoururent de tous côtés et lui demandèrent la
cause de sa douleur:
»—Polyphème, pourquoi ces cris de détresse qui troublent notre
sommeil? Un mortel t'enlève-t-il malgré toi tes troupeaux, ou crains-
tu qu'on ne te tue par ruse ou par violence?»
»Du fond de sa caverne, le puissant Polyphème leur répondit:
»—O amis! Personne me tue par ruse et non par violence.»
»Les Cyclopes lui répondirent:
»—Si personne ne te fait violence, tu ne saurais éviter une
maladie envoyée par Zeus; adresse donc tes prières au divin
Neptune, ton père.»
»Disant ainsi, ils s'éloignèrent, et je riais en mon cœur de voir
comment ma ruse habile les avait trompés. Le Cyclope, aveuglé et
hurlant de douleur, tâtant avec les mains, enleva la pierre qui fermait
la caverne, puis il s'assit à l'entrée et étendit les bras pour saisir celui
d'entre nous qui chercherait à sortir. Réfléchissant au meilleur moyen
de me soustraire à la mort ainsi que mes compagnons, voici le parti
auquel je m'arrêtai: Des béliers beaux et grands, à la noire toison se
trouvaient dans l'étable; prenant des osiers flexibles, sur lesquels
dormait le Cyclope monstrueux, j'en liai les béliers trois par trois;
celui du milieu portait un de mes compagnons sous lui, les deux
autres placés de chaque côté le protégeaient. Gardant pour moi le
plus grand des béliers, je le saisis par sa laine et me glissai sous son
ventre velu, attendant avec anxiété l'aurore divine. Quand elle parut,
les troupeaux avec hâte sortirent de la caverne. Le Cyclope méfiant,
tâta le dos de tous les béliers, mais l'insensé ne put découvrir mes
compagnons liés sous leurs ventres touffus; celui qui me portait,
sortit le dernier. Polyphème, le caressant de la main, lui dit:
 »—Cher bélier, pourquoi sors-tu le dernier du troupeau? Jusqu'à
présent tu étais toujours le premier à brouter les tendres fleurs des
prairies, et le premier tu arrivais au courant des rivières; tu étais le
premier le soir à rentrer à l'étable: regretterais-tu l'œil de ton
maître? Un homme méchant, aidé de ses compagnons perfides,
ayant dompté mes sens par le vin, m'a ôté la vue. Mais Personne
n'échappera pas au trépas et sa mort soulagera mon cœur altéré.»
»Il dit, et le bélier franchit la porte. Arrivé à quelque distance de la
caverne, me dégageant, je m'empressai de délier mes compagnons.
Alors, d'un pas rapide, nous poussâmes les gras troupeaux devant
nous, regagnant notre vaisseau. Notre arrivée fut douce à nos amis,
mais ils se lamentèrent sur le sort de nos compagnons. D'un signe
de mes sourcils, je leur défendis de pleurer, et j'ordonnai
d'embarquer aussitôt ces troupeaux à la belle toison. Prenant place à
leurs bancs, mes rameurs frappèrent la blanche mer de leurs rames,
et, quand nous fûmes à la distance d'où la voix peut encore se faire
entendre, j'adressai au monstre hideux ces paroles rapides:
»—Cyclope, tu pensais dévorer dans ta caverne profonde les
compagnons d'un homme sans vigueur. Le juste châtiment de tes
forfaits devait t'atteindre, toi qui ne craignais pas de manger tes
hôtes dans ta demeure; c'est pourquoi les dieux t'ont puni par ma
main.
»Je dis et sa colère redoublant, il arracha le sommet d'une haute
montagne qu'il jeta à l'avant du vaisseau à la proue azurée. La mer
bouillonna et le flot nous ramena vers l'île; avec une perche longue,
j'éloignai le navire du rivage, puis, d'un signe de tête, j'ordonnai à
mes compagnons de ramer avec vigueur. Quand nous fûmes
éloignés de nouveau, je voulus encore parler au Cyclope, mais mes
compagnons cherchèrent à me retenir par des paroles caressantes:
»—Insensé, pourquoi veux-tu irriter cet homme sauvage? S'il
entendait encore des cris ou des paroles, il briserait notre navire
avec une roche aiguë, car son bras sait atteindre au loin.
 »Ils dirent ainsi, mais ne persuadèrent pas mon cœur magnanime
et je m'écriai:
»—Cyclope, si quelque mortel t'interroge sur ta hideuse cécité dis-
lui que c'est Ulysse, roi d'Ithaque qui t'a privé de la vue.
»Alors gémissant, il s'écria:
»—Grands dieux, voilà l'accomplissement des prédictions de
Télème, fils d'Euryme. Il m'annonça qu'un jour la main d'Ulysse me
priverait de la vue. Je m'attendais à voir un mortel revêtu d'une
force immense et voilà qu'un homme misérable et sans vigueur
m'arrache la lumière après m'avoir dompté par le vin. Allons reviens,
Ulysse, afin que je t'offre les présents de l'hospitalité et que j'invite
Neptune à t'accorder le retour, car je suis son fils et seul il me
guérira.
»Il dit, mais je lui répondis en ces termes:
»—Si seulement je pouvais t'arracher la vie et t'envoyer chez
Pluton, comme il est sûr que Neptune ne guérira pas ton œil.
»Je dis et il adressa alors cette prière au puissant Neptune:
«—Neptune à la chevelure azurée, écoute-moi. S'il est vrai que tu
te glorifies d'être mon père, fais qu'Ulysse, le destructeur de villes,
n'aborde pas dans sa patrie; mais si le destin veut qu'il revoie sa
terre chérie, qu'il n'y arrive que misérable et trouve le malheur dans
sa maison.»
»Telle fut sa prière: Neptune l'entendit. Le Cyclope alors,
soulevant une pierre plus grande encore que la première, la lança au
delà du navire à la proue azurée. Le vaisseau, poussé par le flot
puissant, faillit de nouveau toucher le rivage.

»Quand nous arrivâmes à l'île où nos compagnons nous

attendaient toujours, nous tirâmes notre vaisseau sur la plage et
nous fîmes le partage des troupeaux du Cyclope. M'étant réservé le
bélier, je l'immolai à Zeus qui assemble les nues, mais le dieu
n'accueillit pas mon sacrifice. Le lendemain, nous partîmes. Mes
compagnons assis sur leurs bancs, frappèrent de leurs rames la
blanche mer; nous continuâmes notre route contents d'avoir
échappé au trépas, mais cependant le cœur affligé de la perte de
nos chers compagnons.
Chant X

CIRCÉ
 »Nous arrivâmes à l'île flottante d'Eolie habitée par Eole, fils
d'Hippotas; six filles et six fils ont reçu le jour dans son palais; il a
donné ses filles pour épouses à ses fils, et près de leur père chéri et
de leur mère vénérée, ils sont sans cesse en festins.
»Eole m'accueillit amicalement. Pendant un mois, je restai dans
son palais, lui faisant le récit de mes aventures. Quand je pris congé
de lui, il prépara tout pour mon départ et me fit don d'une outre
faite avec la peau d'un bœuf de neuf ans dans laquelle il avait
enfermé les vents mugissants, car Neptune l'avait fait le
dispensateur des vents. Avec une chaîne d'argent, il enchaîna cette
outre au fond de notre navire afin qu'aucun souffle ne pût s'en
échapper, ne laissant en liberté que le doux Zéphir pour conduire
notre vaisseau. Hélas, sa volonté ne devait pas s'accomplir, et notre
imprudence devait nous être funeste. Pendant neuf jours nous
naviguâmes, et, le dixième, nous apercevions déjà notre terre
chérie, quand un profond sommeil s'empara de moi. J'étais au
gouvernail que je n'avais voulu confier à aucun de mes compagnons.
Ceux-ci s'entretenaient des présents magnifiques que contenait le
vaisseau et chacun disait ainsi, causant à son voisin: «—Que cet
homme est aimé des mortels dont il visite les villes. Il ramène de
Troie un riche butin, et nous qui avons accompli les mêmes travaux,
nous revenons dans nos foyers les mains vides. Et maintenant, voici
qu'Eole bienveillant l'a comblé de présents. Voyons combien cette
outre renferme d'or et d'argent!» Ils dirent et l'esprit pernicieux
l'emporta. Ils délièrent l'outre, et les vents, déchaînés, fondirent sur
nous.
»Me réveillant, désespéré, je m'étendis dans mon vaisseau, tandis
que l'ouragan terrible poussait mes navires vers l'île d'Eolie, sur le
rivage de laquelle nous vînmes bientôt échouer. Alors prenant avec
moi un héraut je me dirigeai vers le palais d'Eole; celui-ci était à
table au milieu de ses enfants; nous apercevant, il nous interrogea
plein de surprise:
»—Comment se peut-il que tu sois revenu, Ulysse, car j'avais tout
préparé pour que tu puisses regagner ta patrie?
»Le cœur affligé, je lui répondis:
»—Un perfide sommeil et de méchants compagnons m'ont perdu,
mais je t'en supplie, viens à mon secours, car tu en as le pouvoir.
 »Je cherchais à l'attendrir par de douces paroles, mais il me
répondit avec violence:
»—O le plus méprisable des mortels, quitte cette île au plus vite,
car je ne puis accueillir un homme détesté des dieux!
»Malgré mes gémissements, il me chassa de sa demeure. Nous
reprîmes la mer, le cœur attristé, et pendant six jours les matelots
ramèrent, brisés de fatigue. Le septième, nous arrivâmes à la haute
cité de Lamos, Télépyle, ville des Lestrygons, où le berger rentrant
son troupeau appelle un autre berger pour faire sortir le sien. Là, un
homme ne cédant point au sommeil gagnerait un double salaire en
faisant paître tour à tour ses bœufs ou ses blanches brebis. Les nuits
sont si courtes que le jour présent est voisin du jour qui vient.
»Nous pénétrâmes dans un port magnifique où régnait un calme
parfait; c'est là que mes compagnons arrêtèrent leurs vaisseaux
recourbés; seul je laissai le mien en dehors du port, puis je montai
sur une hauteur avec deux compagnons auxquels j'adjoignis un
héraut, et je leur ordonnai d'aller reconnaître les peuples qui
mangeaient les fruits de cette terre. Ils suivirent une route unie et,
près des murs de la ville, ils rencontrèrent une jeune fille qui puisait
de l'eau à la belle fontaine d'Artacie. C'était la noble fille du
Lestrygon Antiphate; ils lui demandèrent quel était le roi de ce pays;
aussitôt, elle leur indiqua la demeure de son père. Dans un palais
magnifique ils trouvèrent une femme grande comme une montagne
et à sa vue ils furent frappés de terreur: c'était la femme
d'Antiphate. Elle appela son époux qui leur prépara une mort
déplorable:—ayant saisi un de mes compagnons il le réserva pour en
faire un repas—les deux autres prirent la fuite. Mais Antiphate
poussant un cri perçant, les robustes Lestrygons accoururent en
foule, semblables non à des hommes, mais à des géants.—
Détachant des rochers énormes, ils écrasèrent nos vaisseaux, et nos
malheureux compagnons, bientôt exterminés, furent emportés, leur
chair devant servir à de cruels festins. Voyant cela, je coupai avec
mon épée le câble de mon navire, j'excitai mes matelots à se
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