The Southern Journal of Philosophy
Volume 50, Issue 2
June 2012
NEW PHENOMENOLOGY IN FRANCE
László Tengelyi
abstract: Phenomenology is a basic philosophical movement belonging to what is
called “continental philosophy.” Recently, a new phenomenology has emerged in
France. In the period from Levinas and Henry to Marion and Richir, it has become
evident that the phenomenon as such cannot be reduced to a mere constitution by
intentional consciousness; rather, it must be considered as an event of appearing that
establishes itself by itself. This fundamental insight entails important consequences: on
the one hand, a new concept of the subject has been elaborated; on the other hand,
a new approach to effective reality and objectivity has been developed. Idealism is
overcome, transcendentalism is revised and reinterpreted. These changes will cer-
tainly have an impact on the destiny of continental philosophy.
It is not easy to pass a well-founded judgment on the future of what is usually
referred to in the Anglo American world as “continental philosophy.” The
bearer of this name is a constellation of thoughts, practices, methods, and
convictions that encompasses a heterogeneous multiplicity of different cur-
rents and approaches. Concerning historical phenomena, a motivated
surmise about the future can only result from familiarity with all tendencies
that, in a particular field, have recently emerged. Who can claim, however, to
be closely familiar with every tendency that may have an impact on the
destiny of continental philosophy?
Among the currents and approaches circumscribed by this collective des-
ignation, there is a basic philosophical movement, which, in its general
outlook and fundamental methods, is—just like analytic philosophy—
László Tengelyi is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Institute of Phenomenology
at the University of Wuppertal, Germany. Between 2003 and 2005, he was the president of
the German Society of Phenomenology. He assumed guest professorships in Poitiers, in
Nizza, at the Sorbonne (University Paris I), in Memphis, Tennessee, and in Québec, Canada.
Besides four books in Hungarian, he published Der Zwitterbegriff Lebensgeschichte (English
version, The Wild Region in Life-History, Northwestern University Press, 2004; French version,
L’histoire d’une vie et sa région sauvage, Millon, 2005), L’expérience retrouvée (L’Harmattan, 2006),
Erfahrung und Ausdruck (Springer, 2007), and Neue Phänomenologie in Frankreich (with H.-D.
Gondek, Suhrkamp, 2011).
The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 50, Issue 2 (2012), 295–303.
ISSN 0038-4283, online ISSN 2041-6962. DOI: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2012.00100.x
295
296 LÁSZLÓ TENGELYI
animated by only one ambition, namely, to understand the world. This move-
ment is generally called “phenomenology.” Here, this term is taken in its
broader sense, so that it does not simply refer to Edmund Husserl’s thought
but, rather, designates a hundred-year-old tradition to which different post-
Husserlian thinkers like Martin Heidegger or Maurice Merleau-Ponty belong
just as well as the originator of the entire movement himself. I shall leave open
the question whether, for instance, hermeneutics or deconstruction can be
said to be grafted on the phenomenological movement in this broad sense of
the word, or whether it must be considered as a separate movement of equally
fundamental aims and scopes. However, among the currents and approaches
indicated by the expression “continental philosophy,” we also find some types
of discourse—or some discursive formations—that are determined to accom-
plish a social task or to achieve a historical goal. They are designed, for
example, to justify sexual and cultural diversity or even, more generally, to
promote radical democracy. They are imbued, in a word, by the ambition of
changing the world. Such discursive formations are by no means unnecessary
or illegitimate. However, they can hardly be described as (purely) philosophi-
cal currents or approaches, even if they take inspiration from thinkers like
Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Alain
Badiou, or Jacques Rancière.
Obviously, the destiny of continental philosophy depends to a large extent
on whether or not philosophy will preserve its ability and willingness to gather
all its strength in view of a social task or a historical goal. Undeniably, since
the time of the French Enlightenment and French Revolution, this has been
one of the most powerful incentives for thinking in philosophy and the
humanities. But, precisely in our age, several philosophers and historians of
ideas have already proclaimed the end of the epoch in which “intellectuals”
in the French sense of the word had played an important role (for details see
the epilogue of Winock 1997–1999). Whether or not their diagnosis is correct
is still the question. In the following considerations, I do not intend to decide
this question. I shall limit myself to some remarks on the destiny of the basic
philosophical movement called “phenomenology.”
The causes that ultimately led to a radical cleavage between phenomenol-
ogy and analytic philosophy are far from obvious. It is well-known that, in his
early period, Husserl shared Gottlob Frege’s and Bertrand Russell’s interest
in logics and mathematics. Michael Dummett’s proposal to discern in the
early works of Frege and Husserl the germs of an opposition between two
philosophical orientations—a psychological and a linguistic one (see
Dummett 1993)—has never been accepted by experts. From a historical
point of view, it seems to be clearly untenable: Frege was engaged, to some
extent, in linguistic analysis, but not in a linguistic orientation toward phi-
NEW PHENOMENOLOGY IN FRANCE 297
losophy, and Husserl was just as radical a critic and opponent of psychologism
in logic, mathematics, and philosophy as Frege himself. Therefore, I am
rather inclined to see in the cleavage of the two main currents of twentieth-
century philosophy the consequence of some tenets and attitudes that, for a
long period of time, were to have a prevalent role in analytic philosophy. That
philosophical problems arise from the misunderstanding of the logic of our
language or that metaphysical statements are plainly and bluntly meaningless
proved to be insurmountable stumbling blocks to a reception of analytic
philosophy by continental philosophers. Moreover, early analytic philosophy
was often marked by a touch of British empiricism, which could not be
attractive in the post-Kantian transcendental climate characteristic of the
intellectual life on the European continent. In the 1930s, the positivism of the
Vienna circle, which was to have an endurable influence on analytic thinking,
especially in North America, was as severely rejected by Husserl as by
Heidegger. The later conviction, according to which philosophy is nothing
but the analysis of ordinary language, did not alter the situation, and this in
spite of a certain affinity of Ludwig Wittgenstein and of John Langshaw
Austin for a quasi-phenomenological approach (at least) to language.
However, during the last three or four decades, all of these tenets and
attitudes have been revised, abandoned, or overcome by analytic philosophy.
Consequently, an entirely new situation has emerged. Even if phenomenol-
ogy remains distinguished from analytic philosophy by its historical roots, its
style, and its methods, it is no longer clear why a general and, as it were,
antagonistic opposition between the two philosophical movements should be
maintained in our age. There are some phenomenologists who have already
drawn unequivocal consequences from this situation. Dan Zahavi’s work,
including the book on The Phenomenological Mind (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008),
is a case in point. Jocelyn Benoist’s development is equally conspicuous: the
earlier phenomenologist has recently dedicated himself to a philosophy influ-
enced no less by Austin and Wittgenstein than by Husserl. Paul Ricœur’s
Oneself as Another (1990) can be mentioned as an example as well. Indeed, since
the publication of this work, the theory of narrative identity, put forward—
among others—by Ricœur, has not ceased to provide an opportunity for a
dialogue and a debate between phenomenologists and analytic philosophers
(see Hutto 2007).
However, the trend of cooperation and controversy with analytic thinkers
cannot be considered as predominant in or generally characteristic of con-
temporary phenomenological thought. In France, a new phenomenological
approach has recently established itself, and it has been developed indepen-
dently of the Anglo American philosophical mainstream. It may be distin-
guished as a third form of phenomenology from Husserl’s transcendental
298 LÁSZLÓ TENGELYI
inquiry and from Heidegger’s hermeneutic thinking. Thus, it constitutes a
new phase of the phenomenological movement, and, as such, it will certainly
have an impact on the future of continental philosophy. Since, together with
a friend and collaborator, I have dealt with this current in a book-length study
(Gondek and Tengelyi 2011), I feel sufficiently prepared to reflect on the
question of how its achievements may influence the future of continental
philosophy.
Twenty years ago, Dominique Janicaud was the first to become aware of
the new initiatives that marked the beginnings of this current. He identified
the novel characteristic of these initiatives as a “theological turn” in French
phenomenology (Janicaud 1991). Accordingly, he considered Emmanuel
Levinas, Michel Henry, Jean-Luc Marion, and Jean-Louis Chrétien as its
main representatives, opposing to them, in the first place, Merleau-Ponty, in
the second place, Ricœur, and finally, also Marc Richir ( Janicaud 1998).
Retrospectively, it is not difficult to see that, in its polemical thrust, the picture
of the new current outlined by Janicaud was rather one-sided. It is obviously
indispensable to distinguish between the precursors and the protagonists of
the new phenomenology in France, and, arguably, not only Levinas and
Henry but also Merleau-Ponty and Ricœur can be said to be among the
forerunners of this current. As far as the protagonists of the new phenom-
enology in France are concerned, not only Marion, Chrétien, and the later
Henry but also Richir and some other thinkers belong to them. Among the
protagonists of this movement, there are some, who are strictly committed to
Christian religion, but there are others who are not. Not only Richir belongs
to the latter group but also Didier Franck, Renaud Barbaras, Françoise
Dastur, and Éliane Escoubas. It is true that, to some extent, even Richir and
Franck are interested in theological issues, but this interest by no means
testifies to a theological turn in French phenomenology. It rather arises from
the insight that, in a post-Nietzschean era, some problems, which, in earlier
times, could only be formulated in theological terms, can now be vindicated
for philosophy.
His polemical thrust induces Janicaud to designate Marion and others
simply as the “nouveaux théologiens” of France. Indeed, Marion has presented
not only important studies in phenomenology and scholarly writings on
Descartes, but also some books of a theological nature. However, with the
possible exception of his recent work on Augustine’s thought, he has never
intermingled his phenomenological and historical investigations with his
theological convictions. It should not be forgotten that, in his Being Given, he
has put forward a phenomenological inquiry into a “gift without [a] giver”
(Marion 1997/2002, 145/101). Indeed, the givenness analyzed in this work is
“purged of any transcendent giver” (146/102). Therefore, even Marion’s
NEW PHENOMENOLOGY IN FRANCE 299
Being Given can be said to vindicate for philosophy a problem that, in earlier
times, could only be formulated in theological terms.
As for Henry or Chrétien, the situation is incontestably much less
unambiguous. These thinkers are not concerned with any separation of
phenomenology from theology. However, they by no means subordinate
phenomenology to a traditional form of theology. Just like Marion, they opt
for a religion that breaks with ontotheological metaphysics, and it is mainly in
their struggle against the tradition of ontotheology that they draw upon
phenomenology. But nobody can deny that such a struggle is a genuine affair
of phenomenology.
In order to get an impression of the main achievements that can be
attributed to the new phenomenology in France, it is useful to take a look at the
general difference between the precursors and the protagonists of this current.
At the end of the 1950s and at the beginning of the 1960s, the most creative
French phenomenologists found themselves confronted with certain special
phenomena that put up a resistance to the application of well-known phenom-
enological methods and techniques of description. Merleau-Ponty led the way,
among other things, by his analysis of modern painting to overcome the
traditional opposition of the subject and the object, and he tried to grasp the
“flesh” of the world in its interrelation with the embodied self. Levinas made
serious efforts to describe the “face,” to which he attributed a high ethical
significance. Ricœur dedicated himself to the analysis of “symbols” in religion,
in psychoanalysis, and in literature, meaning by this term not only linguistic
expressions but also extralinguistic objects with a double sense. Henry engaged
himself in a study of affectivity in order to make “life” accessible to an adequate
understanding. Flesh, face, symbol, and life are quite different phenomena,
however, they have one thing in common: they are, strictly speaking, inde-
scribable, inapparent, deprived of phenomenalization. Even if they are clearly
indicated by certain appearances, they themselves withdraw from appearing.
A disconcerting situation for a phenomenologist! He or she is supposed to
describe phenomena, to grasp appearances, but how to grasp the inapparent,
how to describe the indescribable? Moreover, phenomena that are withdrawn
from phenomenalization are encountered without being constituted by an
intentional consciousness. It is no wonder that the thinkers in question had a
recourse to something other than phenomenology in order to find an issue with
this awkward situation: Merleau-Ponty coined the term “endo-” or “intra-
ontology”; Levinas conceived of ethics as a “first philosophy”; Ricœur envis-
aged a “hermeneutic turn” of phenomenology; Henry insisted on calling his
approach “phenomenology,” but he opposed the revelation of life through
affectivity to “classical phenomenology,” which he interpreted as a doctrine of
“ecstatic manifestation.”
300 LÁSZLÓ TENGELYI
Subsequently, it became increasingly evident that, as a matter of fact, these
thinkers by no means had left behind the realm of phenomena, even if the
phenomena they had been interested in showed the particularity of manifest-
ing themselves only indirectly through traces and indications without appear-
ing directly. The “flesh” of the world remained invisible, but it proved to be,
so to speak, the invisible of this world. The “face” manifested itself by traces
it left behind on the perceptible surface of the skin. In “symbols,” a literal
sense anchored in sensible experience opened the way to understanding a
figurative meaning. Affective “life” withdrew from appearing in ordinary
sense-perception, but it plainly revealed itself through feelings and attune-
ments. It became ultimately obvious that the analysis of these special phe-
nomena was still to be understood as a piece of phenomenology, though of an
unusual or even unorthodox one. Janicaud clearly saw that with Levinas,
Henry, and others a new type of phenomenology had emerged. He borrowed
from the later Heidegger the paradoxical term of a “phenomenology of the
inapparent” in order to designate its particularity. Even if he never ceased to
combat this kind of phenomenology and opposed to it his own “minimal” art
of thinking ( Janicaud 1997), it is incontestably to his merit to have recognized
its specificity.
To be sure, he was not the only thinker to reflect on the novelty brought by
the former generation of French phenomenologists. In his study of Reduction
and Givenness (1989), relying mainly on Levinas and Henry, Marion had
already distinguished a third form of phenomenological reduction—a reduc-
tion to “pure appeal”—from Husserl’s transcendental reduction to objectivity
as well as from Heidegger’s ontological reduction to being. This distinction
between three different forms of reduction can be considered the first expres-
sion of the awareness that, in France, a new phenomenology had developed.
Two years later, in his paper on “The Four Principles of Phenomenology”
(1991), Henry relied on Marion’s Reduction and Givenness in order to propose a
new principle of phenomenology: the more of reduction, the more of gift. With this
principle, the self-consciousness of the new phenomenology in France came
to a definitive breakthrough.
However, we must not jump to the conclusion that Marion’s third reduc-
tion or Henry’s just-mentioned principle is the distinctive feature of the new
phenomenology in France. In reality, it is highly contestable whether
the different phases of the phenomenological movement can be adequately
grasped by the three terms ‘objectivity’, ‘being’, and ‘pure appeal’. As to
the principle the more of reduction, the more of gift, it is so far from being gen-
erally accepted by contemporary French phenomenologists that Richir even
proposed a counterprinciple: the more of reduction, the less of gift (Richir 1995,
154).
NEW PHENOMENOLOGY IN FRANCE 301
The expression “phenomenology of the inapparent” is no less misleading,
partly because it seems to contain in itself a latent inconsistency, and partly
because it is apt to restrict the scope of the new phenomenology in France to
some particular phenomena. However, the protagonists of the new move-
ment differ from the entire generation of their forerunners precisely by
relating the discoveries of this generation to the phenomenon as such—and not
just to certain special phenomena.
It is indeed in the phenomenon as such that the protagonists of the new
phenomenology in France came to see an event, which establishes itself by itself
and is, therefore, irreducible to a pure and simple constitution by an inten-
tional consciousness. This is the basic insight, in which we can recognize the
very distinctive feature of the new phenomenology in France. During the last
three decades, this observation, which concerns the spontaneity of phenom-
enalization, has taken quite different forms. Marion’s and Henry’s principle
of gift is clearly an expression of this spontaneity. Marion’s reduction to a
“pure appeal” points in the same direction. Chrétien’s (1992) study of appeal
and response, heavily drawn upon in the last part of Marion’s Being Given,
leads to similar conclusions. The same insight finds expression in Richir’s
phenomenology of spontaneous sense-formation as well (see Richir 1992).
The leading idea of this phenomenology is that the sense or meaning of a
phenomenon cannot be reduced to a sense-bestowal by the intentional con-
sciousness, because it arises from an interrelation, intertwinement, and even
interpenetration with other senses or meanings. Consequently, the emer-
gence of a phenomenon is seen by Richir, as well as by Marion, Henry, or
Chrétien, as an event of spontaneous phenomenalization, which makes its
irruption by itself into the intentional consciousness.
This central insight entails a whole series of consequences, two of which
deserve to be mentioned here. The first of these two consequences is related
to the notion of the subject. Originally, Husserl conceived of phenomenology
as an inquiry into subjectivity. In the 1920s, Heidegger by no means rejected
this orientation toward subjectivity, even if he clearly saw that phenomenol-
ogy required a break with the traditional notion of a self-possessed and
self-sustained ego, which was prevalent in modern philosophy. According to
Benoist, the new phenomenology in France was also centered on subjectivity.
He even puts into Marion’s mouth the following exclamation: “French phenom-
enology will be a phenomenology of the subject, or it will not be at all” (Benoist 2001, 16;
cf. Marion 1989, 247). However, no self-possessed and self-sustained ego is
tolerated by the precursors and the protagonists of the new phenomenology
in France. From Levinas to Marion, it is repeatedly stated that it is not in the
nominative case but rather in the accusative or, even more, in the dative case
that the subject is originally given in self-awareness and self-perception. The
302 LÁSZLÓ TENGELYI
subjectivity of the subject is ultimately due to the event of phenomenalization,
which happens to it, without being controlled or even dominated by it.
The second consequence consists in an objectivity—or objective reality—
that is regained by phenomenological inquiry. Since the event of phenom-
enalization imposes itself upon the subject spontaneously, reality is first
encountered in experience, before it is constituted by intentional conscious-
ness. Consequently, constitution does not imply any ontological dependence
on the mind. Nor are the conditions for the possibility of experience deter-
mined in advance by the structure of subjective abilities. Idealism is over-
come; transcendentalism is revised and reinterpreted. These changes open up
a new field of investigation on the categories of experience. It is neither “being
qua being” nor the “transcendental object” of experience that categories are
related to in this investigation. They rather are related to the event of phe-
nomenalization. Thus, phenomenology comes to establish itself as “another
first philosophy” (Marion 2001, 16). It becomes possible to pick up Husserl’s
idea of a phenomenological metaphysics of contingent facticity, as it is
opposed, at the end of Cartesian Meditations, to every metaphysics in the
customary sense of the word.
These are achievements of the new phenomenology in France that, fore-
seeably and predictably, will have an impact on the future of this basic
philosophical movement. Where will they unfold their influence on the destiny
of continental philosophy? Probably—and hopefully—not exclusively in
France. Hopefully, because they still have to be appropriated and restated in
a less Franco-immanent—or sometimes even Franco-esoteric—way than
they were originally formulated in order to enter into a dialogue and a debate,
for instance, with the recently rehabilitated and refurbished metaphysics of
the analytic tradition. Hopefully, also because Marion is right in saying that,
“as a general rule, one must be on one’s guard against identifying a moment
of philosophy with a language and with a nation” (Marion 2002, 10). Marion
even adds, “Philosophy is an enfant de bohème, it lives nowhere, except if it is
transmuted into the ideology of national philosophies (inventions as young as
the national states—and as dangerous as these)” (2002, 10; emphasis added).
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