~I • . • t ..

·
,~w~stview SpeGial Studies, in .Ocean,
,.. , '•f;i
Sci~nce
..
and' Policy
·· '
 The Management of
Pacific Marine Resources
i
l

\
i
 Also of Interest

Making Ocean Policy: The Politics of Government Organiza-

tion and Management, edited by Francis W. Hoole, Robert
L. Friedheim, and Timothy M. Hennessey

Resource Management and the Oceans: The Political

Economy of Deep Seabed Mining, Kurt Michael Shusterich

Managing Ocean Resources: A Primer, edited by Robert L.

Friedheim

Georges Bank: Past, Present, and Future of a Marine Envi-

ronment, edited by Guy C. McLeod and John H. Prescott

Coastal Aquaculture Law and Policy: A Case Study of

California, Gerald Bowden

International Ocean Shipping: Current Concepts and Prin-

ciples, Bernhard J. Abrahamsson

Superships and Nation-States: The Transnational Politics of

The Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization,
Harvey B. Silverstein

Aquaculture Development in Less Developed Countries:

Social, Economic, and Political Problems, edited by Leah J.
Smith and Susan Peterson

Aquaculture Economics: Basic Concepts and Methods of

Analysis, Yung C. Shang
 Westview Special Studies in
Ocean Science and Policy

The Management of Pacific Marine Resources:

Present Problems and Future Trends
John P. Craven

The mineral, food, and energy potential of the oceans in-

creases in importance as land-based resources approach their
ultimate limits. International planning for the utilization of
common ocean areas beyond territorial waters has thus
become a vital task, one made difficult by competition
among nations and the unregulated operations of multina-
tional companies.
As a senior adviser to the U.S. delegation at UNCLOS III
(Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea), Dr. Craven
provides an expert look at the full range of ocean resources
and an insider's view of UN negotiations on common areas of
the Pacific Ocean. His book is essential reading for those in-
terested in the future uses of the oceans and in who will
benefit from the bounty.

John P. Craven, an ocean engineer and lawyer, was chief

scientist of the Polaris system and promoted the first suc-
cessful U.S. experiment in generating usable energy from the
thermal gradient in tropical ocean waters. He is now dean of
Marine Programs at the University of Hawaii, marine affairs
coordinator for the state of Hawaii, and director of the Law
of the Sea Institute.
 Published in cooperation with
The Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota

Pacific Basin Project, Publication #1

 The Management of
Pacific Marine Resources:
Present Problems and
Future Trends
John P. Craven

Foreword by Harlan Cleveland

W estview Press I Boulder, Colorado

Westview Special Studies in Ocean Science and Policy

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in

any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, record-
ing, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publisher.

Copyright © 1982 by Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs

Published in 1982 in the United States of America by

Westview Press, Inc.
5500 Central Avenue
Boulder, Colorado 80301
Frederick A. Praeger, President and Publisher

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Craven, John P.
The management of Pacific marine resources.
(Westview special studies in ocean science and policy) (Pacific basin project;
publication #1)
"Published in cooperation with the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Af-
fairs, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota"-p. iv.
Includes index.
l. Marine resources- Pacific Ocean. I. Title. II. Series. III. Series: Pacific
basin project; publication #1.
GC1023.885.C73 1982 333.91'64 82-8442
ISBN 0-86531-424-1 AACR2

Printed and bound in the United States of America

 Contents

List of Maps and Tables .............................. ix

Foreword: The Pacific Basin and the Law of the Sea,
Harlan Cleveland . ................................. xi
Acknowledgments .................................. xix

1. The Unsettled Law of the Sea ....................... 1

2. Energy Futures of the Oceans ....................... 5

Conventional Sources: Oil and Coal .................. 6
Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion (OTEC) .......... 11
Nuclear Power and the Seas ........................ 23
The Ocean as an Energy Commons ................. 25
3. Mineral Futures of the Oceans ..................... 29
The Non-Law of Seabed Mining .................... 31
Six Seabed Mining Scenarios ....................... 34
Seabed Mining and the Commons .................. 45
4. Living Resource Futures of the Oceans .............. 47
The Diversity of Fisheries ......................... 47
U.S. Fishery Management Dilemmas ................ 51
The Pelagic Game ................................ 54
Exhortations in the Draft Treaty .................... 56
Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit ........ 58
5. Transportation Futures of the Oceans ............... 65
6. Ocean Technology Futures ........................ 73
Small-Scale, Indigenous Technologies ............... 73

vii
viii Contents

New Understanding of Ocean Processes ............. 76

Large-Scale, Capital-Intensive Technologies ......... 78
7. The Ocean Commons: Try Again in the Pacific? . ..... 83

Appendixes
A. Workshop Participants ........................ 87
B. Workshop Papers ............................ 89
C. Chee Plan .................................. 90
Notes ............................................. 93
Bibliography ....................................... 95
Abbreviations ...................................... 99
Index ............................................ 101
 Maps and Tables

Maps
1. Major world shipping routes ........................ 3
2. Favorable offshore areas for oil and gas ............... 7
3. Potential OTEC utilization zone .................... 15
4. North Pacific manganese nodule zone ............... 30
5. World distribution of fishery resources .............. 49
6. South Pacific Forum .............................. 55
Tables
1. Maximum probable indigenous annual energy
consumption and probable resource availability ....... 17

ix
 Foreword:
The Pacific Basin
and the Law of the Sea

In the late 1970s a sudden wave of organizational enthu-

siasm crested for various projects concerning the Pacific.
Japan's Prime Minister (1979-80) Masayoshi Ohira initially
envisioned the concept of a "Pacific Community" and dis-
covered a mutually interested party in Australia's Prime Min-
ister, Malcolm Fraser. In fact, Australia sponsored the first in
a series of seminars about a Pacific Community of nations.
Meanwhile, in the United States, congressional committees
compiled reports and held hearings on Ohira's Pacific Com-
munity idea.
In the structure of world order the technologically strong
are usually the first to demand and establish organization and
institutions. The technologically weak- the developing
nations- customarily react with apprehension, fearing that
the strong want to freeze their comparative strength. So it
was with the Pacific Community. A Korean described the
concept as "a prematurely born child." Voices from ASEAN
(the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), protective of
their newly valued subregional cooperation, were fiercely
cautious about what one of their spokesmen called "pro-
moting a generalized Community."
In the Western Pacific and East Asia, wartime Japan's
Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere still lives in

Portions of this foreword were previously published. See Harlan

Cleveland, "The Libyan Episode and the Great Sea Grab," The Christian
Science Monitor, 21 August 1981, p. 22, © 1981 by Harlan Cleveland, all
rights reserved.

xi
xii Foreword

memory. Forty years later, another coprosperity sphere,

even if promoted by certifiably democratic politicians in
Japan, Australia, and the United States, still recalls too many
disturbing overtones. Just now, it seems, every U.S., Japa-
nese, or Australian drumbeat for new Pacific-wide political
institutions intensifies the polite-but-firm, passive resistance
of the Pacific's "South" -ASEAN, the Pacific islands, the
Republic of Korea, and the two parts of a still divided China.
Meanwhile, two independent American institutes engaged
in policy research have remained deeply interested in the
future of the Pacific-the Aspen Institute for Humanistic
Studies and the University of Minnesota's newly expanded
Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs. Together
they envisioned a new approach to the Pacific Community,
namely, to set aside for the time being the issue of political
organization in the Pacific Basin and begin instead with the
underlying questions: What concrete problems need to be
tackled, what functions need to be performed that might re-
quire new forms of international consultation, cooperation,
coordination, parallel national action, or common action by
communities-of-the-concerned in the Pacific Basin?
Until there is some consensus about what has to be done
and by whom, the questions raised by "Pacific Community"
in its generalized form are indeed unanswerable because pre-
maturely political. A political question like "Which countries
should be 'members' of a Pacific Community?" can be ad-
dressed only in the context of the functional questions: What
action is required, and which countries are in a position to do
what about it? To answer these questions, the Pacific Basin
Project was born, a joint venture of the Aspen and Hum-
phrey institutes.
Our plan of attack was first to consider, in a series of
multinational but nongovernmental workshops, four func-
tional fields in which a thicker web of Pacific-wide coopera-
tion might turn out to be needed: (1) the management of
Pacific marine resources, (2) the changing industrial geog-
raphy of the Pacific Basin, (3) the prospects for food and
development, and (4) the Pacific impact of the communica-
tions/information revolution.
Harlan Cleveland xiii

The first workshop, on marine resources, was held in

Tokyo in June 1981. 1 It was cosponsored and hosted by the
International House of Japan, and the program was orga-
nized by the author of this book.
The book itself grew directly out of the workshop. It is
partly based on substantial contributions from several work-
shop participants- political scientist Roger Benjamin, ad-
junct member of the Humphrey Insti.tute faculty and asso-
ciate dean of the College of Liberal Arts at the University of
Minnesota; Choung 11 Chee, international fisheries expert
from Korea; Edgar Gold, a Canadian expert on maritime
transportation; Michael Hirschfeld, a businessman from New
Zealand, who served as workshop rapporteur; Kent Keith,
deputy director of the State of Hawaii's Department of
Planning and Economic Development; Frances Lai, a politi-
cal scientist at the National University of Singapore;
Masataka Watanabe, National Institute for Environmental
Studies in Tsukuba, Japan; and Peter Wilson, an adviser to
the government of Papua New Guinea.
This book is not, however, a consensus report or a meeting
summary- in my experience such consensus writings have
often been bland and uninteresting, and what John Craven
has pulled together in this book is neither. He is one of the
world's most original thinkers in both ocean science and
ocean law. An ocean engineer and lawyer by training, John
Craven has been chief scientist of the Polaris program, a pro-
fessor at M.l.T., author of Ocean Engineering Systems, and
for the past decade dean of Marine Programs at the Univer-
sity of Hawaii, marine affairs coordinator for the governor of
Hawaii, and director of the International Law of the Sea
Institute, which is based in Honolulu. His perception of the
oceans' future management is far from conventional, but is
grounded in competent, thorough scholarship and an
educated intuition.

* * *
Amidst all the rhetoric of the 1970s about a fairer interna-
tional order, there was only one real negotiation about struc-
tural change in the global system. That was the long-running
xiv Foreword

Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,

nicknamed UNCLOS III. Its starting point was a 1970 U.N.
General Assembly resolution, endorsed by the United States,
declaring the oceans to be "the common heritage of
mankind." Yet the one subject on which, after more than a
decade, consensus has eluded the marathon negotiators is the
governance of the ocean commons.
"What happened to the ocean commons?" A professor
from Singapore answered her own rhetorical question at the
Tokyo workshop: "They put the cake on the table, and the
cake disappeared." Eighty-nine of the 120 coastal nations
have already staked out 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones,
and the world is reacting as though these zones are both legal
and policeable. The EEZs may well become legal, by custom
if not by treaty. Most of them will never be policeable.
The long-running ocean law talks (one expert calls them
"an international version of single-issue politics") have thus
been partly channeled into declarations of national juris-
diction, if not control, of most of the traditional marine
resources. The resulting bonanza, except for smaller payoffs
here and there (around the Pacific islands, for example), is
mainly for the account of the already affluent nations.
In the short run, the most important consequence of the
"sea grab" will be to move into national jurisdictions 90 per-
cent of the ocean's fish. Even the "highly migratory
species" - such as Pacific tuna and salmon which cavalierly
ignore the lines man carefully draws in the water- are being
subjected to national jurisdiction. Congress has now legis-
lated that salmon spawned in U.S. rivers carry their Ameri-
can citizenship wherever they swim. But the Coast Guard,
even if reinforced by the FBI's computers and the U.S. Navy's
gunships, can never catch up with most of the trawlers
operated by foreigners who catch made-in-America salmon
as they swim in the open seas.
The "sea grab" has also nationalized most of the Pacific's
remaining known deposits of offshore oil and gas. But the
richest deposits of those other exotic minerals, the manganese
nodules, are on the deep seabed, still part of the Pacific
"commons."
Harlan Cleveland xv

Seabed mining of manganese nodules - the favored

"claims" are under Pacific waters- seemed "just around the
corner" a decade ago. Today the block has been extended,
hence the distance to that corner has lengthened. The key
constraint is uncertainty about the rules of the game. Efforts
by the United States and other high-technology nations to
write their own rules may not completely satisfy the great in-
ternational companies that must contemplate not only the in-
vestment of a billion dollars per operation, but also making
the investment without certainty in laying claim to the result-
ing product. The potential for conflict in the absence of inter-
nationally accepted ground rules may deter the oil giants and
others for whom seabed mining, potentially large as it will be
some day, is only a sideline today. The current absence of
high demand for some of the minerals involved (nickel, cop-
per, and cobalt) is also slowing things down.
The outcomes of UNCLOS III will not much affect the
profitable future of Pacific shipping. But despite resistance
from shipowning nations, especially Japan, a pattern of
tighter regulation is likely to develop in other contexts-
IMCO (Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organi-
zation) controls on vessel safety and vessel-based pollution,
and UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development) campaigns against "flags of convenience."
Moreover, systems of marine traffic control are overdue for
modernization; they are technically several decades behind
the comparable systems for air traffic control.

* * *
A major new factor in Pacific Basin development- so new
that its governance was not really considered in the Law of
the Sea negotiations-will be ocean thermal energy conver-
sion (OTEC).
This idea, proved out in Hawaii's "mini-OTEC" experi-
ment only two years ago, is that substantial differences in
temperature between the ocean surface and deep waters can
be converted into useful energy by pumping the cold water to
the surface. The electricity such a system makes possible can
be used either directly for operations based at sea or on
xvi Foreword

nearby islands, or indirectly for powering the production of

transportable fuel (synthetic fuel from sea-borne coal, or hy-
drogen from seawater, as examples).
Although there will eventually be applications of OTEC in
many parts of the world, it is quintessentially a "Southern"
and a Pacific resource. Most of the best places for OTEC,
which needs five thousand to six thousand feet of depth and
will be optimal in tropical waters, are either clearly in the high
seas commons or in the claimed economic jurisdictions of
developing countries including - and especially- islands in
the South Pacific. OTEC does not have to be a large central
system; the resource could be adapted to the power needs of
an island nation or a large (e.g., synthetic fuel) operation.
The thermal-conversion potentials are theoretically enor-
mous. In the world's oceans, between latitudes of twenty
degrees on either side of the equator, some 1,000 quads
(quadrillion British thermal units) per year are quietly unex-
ploited today- three times the current world demand for
energy and perhaps one-third of the world energy demand
100 years from now.
OTEC, like other forms of "solar" energy, will probably
have a lengthy developmental time frame. The time span
depends more upon projected need than technology. Un-
doubtedly we will have to look at least twenty years ahead for
significant development of all the really important alterna-
tives to oil as the world's dominant energy source. (The one
exception is conservation, which can be effected right away.)
If development does not start now, we will still be overdepen-
dent on the dwindling oil supply even in the first part of the
twenty-first century.
The environmental effects of OTEC are positive. In Tokyo
a Japanese expert sketched for us how the nutrients brought
up from the deep sea along with the cold water could be used
to produce biomass that could be the basis for producing
more energy (in the form of methane) or food from aquacul-
ture. The nutrients brought up as an OTEC by-product could
be an environmental problem - for example, by inducing
eutrophication in an enclosed sea. But they might better be
considered as the basis for a new technology-based biomass
Harlan Cleveland xvii

industry. (That still leaves some interesting uncertainties. If

nutrients are brought up from the deep-ocean commons, who
is entitled to the resulting biomass, who owns the resulting
methane?)
Although, as noted, energy from the ocean thermal gradi-
ent is an inherently "Southern" resource, it can be exploited
only by advanced technology from the Northern Hemi-
sphere's industrialized nations. Inside the 200-mile zones, the
development of ocean energy can be regulated by national
laws (as in the OTEC operations now being planned by the
Japanese for Okinawa and by General Electric, Lockheed,
TRW Inc., and the local utility for Hawaii) or by arrange-
ments between the island "owners" of the warm tropical
waters and those who have the technology and capital to take
energy from the thermal gradient.
On the high seas, some international rules of the game will
sooner or later be necessary to regulate OTEC "grazing
rights." One workshop participant went further: he suggested
a "Commons Agency" to develop OTEC, a partnership be-
tween those who might invest in the system and the residents
of the tropical regions in which it will have to be developed.
(See Appendix C-the Chee Plan.) The idea found an inter-
ested audience. It might help the equity equation, said
another conferee from a developing country: "The EEZs
mostly help the developed countries. Maybe the ocean com-
mons can be some use to the rest of us."

* * *
Futurists have been forecasting a "Pacific century." To
participants in our Tokyo workshop, the long-run prospects
for the Pacific Basin were hard to be pessimistic about if we
were willing to look a generation ahead.
The central problem for the Pacific region today is all too
obvious: its great dependence on Middle East oil and Atlantic
products, squeezing through the narrow choke points of
Malacca and Panama. With modem technologies and a
generation of time, the Pacific Basin contains sufficient
resources to erase the region's energy deficit.
Meanwhile more and more Pacific nations will be mov-
xviii Foreword

ing - they already are moving- from the periphery to the

center of communications and information flows. The rapid
development of educated peoples and rural enterprise already
points to an era of food adequacy without undue dependence
on the great world granaries (which also rim the Pacific). The
message of overpopulation has gotten through, including to
China. In one generation, without war, there should be no
"poor nations" lapped by the Pacific Ocean.
In the future, sharing an ocean will be at least as significant
a basis for cooperation as sharing a landmass. Oceans have
traditionally been regarded as separating countries and
peoples from each other. Today, however, it may be more
sensible to view oceans as a primary means of bringing func-
tional partners together for development, prosperity, secu-
rity, and peace. For the Pacific Basin countries, the world's
largest ocean forms the basis for this expanded cooperative
sphere.

Harlan Cleveland
Director, Hubert H. Humphrey
Institute of Public Affairs,
University of Minnesota
 Acknowledgments

Special thanks are due to Mikio Kato, program director of

the International House of Japan; Harlan Cleveland, director
of the Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs;
Joseph E. Slater, president of the Aspen Institute for Hu-
manistic Studies; and the Tokyo workshop participants for
their kind participation in and sponsorship of this book.
Special thanks are also due to D. K. Schaff for editing, to
Kathleen Ganley for typing the final manuscript, and to
Gregory Chu of the University of Minnesota Cartographic
Laboratory for creating our maps.

J.P.C.

xix
 1
The Unsettled Law of the Sea

The widely held belief that the seas and their resources are
a commons to be shared by all peoples derives its plausibility
from the facts of nature, not from international treaties and
compacts. Indeed, the history of treaties and compacts has
been one of continuous but unsuccessful attempts to parti-
tion the seemingly infinite oceans into finite units of sover-
eignty. From the Boatman's Code of the recorded laws of
Hammurabi in 1750 B.C. through the Papal Bull of 1493,
from the Mare Clausum of Selden in 1610 to the 1958 Geneva
Convention of the Law of the Sea, the realities of the mari-
time environment have made these legal agreements, and
many others, ineffectual.
Even with the advanced technologies now available it is a
daunting consideration that the oceans can, and in fact,
must, be managed. This essay reviews the major issues associ-
ated with the development of management policy related to
the oceans, particularly the Pacific. Whether the Pacific
Marine Commons will become more rather than less of the
common heritage of the world's peoples is the question ad-
dressed. The Pacific Ocean as a resource offers humankind
incalculable potential benefits. However, the fate to be ap-
prehended is some new but as yet unenvisioned oceanic ver-
sion of the "tragedy of the commons"2 - a tragedy which is
indeed so often present in the history of land-based develop-
ments.
The newest attempt to establish a legal regime for the
oceans is embodied in the current text of the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). It
suggests a dramatic change in the free and common use of the

I
2 The Unsettled Law of the Sea

oceans. High seas freedoms remain unabridged only in areas

200 miles distant from the nearest continent or inhabitable
islands, and in the deep oceans only in the water column
above the seabed.
A very large part of the "common heritage" has been
chopped up into 12-mile territorial seas, 24-mile contiguous
zones, 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), and "def-
initions" of the continental shelf that run it out to 350 miles
and as deep as 2,500 meters below the surface, depending on
the geological formation. (See Figure 1 for illustration of the
EEZs.)
Although the UNCLOS text has yet to be formalized, there
are many who maintain that major portions of the text have
already become the international law of the sea. Many na-
tions have made unilateral, bilateral, and regional assertions
of rights and duties which more or less conform to the treaty.
The pervasive notion of UNCLOS and of the developed na-
tions is that the new Law of the Sea has, in fact, terminated
the commons status of the ocean except for navigation, mili-
tary use, and limited forms of fishing. But there are compet-
ing views advanced by the Third World countries to the effect
that United Nations resolutions have made the resources of
the seas the common heritage (and thus the common prop-
erty) of humankind and that they cannot be legally harvested
without formal consent by the peoples of the world (i.e., the
United Nations). Socialist lawyers have argued that the sea-
bed is res communes 3 and cannot be utilized without the
mutual assent of socialist nations. Thus only the industri-
alized democracies have maintained that the current status of
the seabed and its resources is res nullius, 4 but their view has
prevailed in practice-for now.
The long and unsuccessful past efforts at regulating the
oceans make it naive to believe that UNCLOS can readily ac-
complish what its predecessors could not. Indeed, there are
infinite challenges and potential challenges to the letter and
the spirit of the UNCLOS text. Already a pattern is emerging
of overt, covert, and negotiated violations of treaty provi-
sions. The violations are probably most flagrant with respect
to fisheries, but are also occurring in the dumping of wastes
4 The Unsettled Law of the Sea

into the ocean, noncompliance with flag state and port state
pollution laws, and illegal entry of goods and people.
Realistic projections of the future of the oceans as a com-
mons should not be predicated on the UNCLOS text alone,
but should include an analysis of international actors (non-
signatory nations, multinational corporations, international
and regional organizations) and the threats they can pose to
legal regimes (economic coercion; clandestine, open, or nego-
tiated violation; piracy, misinterpretation, perceived threats
to security) in relation to the full spectrum of ocean uses
(transportation, military, fishing, energy, mineral extraction,
waste disposal, etc.).
The potential combination of actors, threats, and ocean
uses defies examination in a finite treatise. What will be
reported here is an examination of some potentially dominant
uses of the ocean in the Pacific Basin. This examination was
made in a workshop in Tokyo, during the last week of June
1981, on "The Management of the Pacific Marine
Commons." 5 The workshop participants recognized that the
current use of the Pacific Ocean is as a medium for transpor-
tation and for the projection of military might. However,
they concluded that in the future, the processing and trans-
port of energy, together with the extraction of mineral and
food resources, will constitute the dominant use of the sea.
These uses of the Pacific Commons were analyzed on the
following cumulative assumptions: (1) that the United Na-
tions treaty and/ or its provisions will soon be in place as the
international norm; (2) that regional arrangements in confo:r-
mance with the treaty will, nonetheless, produce regional
regimes that may largely nullify the intents of the treaty; and
(3) that attempts by noncooperative international entities to
avoid the restraints and duties imposed by the treaty will be
widespread.
 2
Energy Futures of the Oceans

To understand the relationship of energy to the oceans, we

must view the current near-term predictions of the world
energy situation as shortsighted. In the past four thousand
years the world has made major shifts in its dominant forms
of energy utilization. The initial development was that of
wood as a fuel for heat, solar energy as wind for motive
power at sea, and biomass in the form of fodder for animal
power. The first major transition, from the middle to the end
of the nineteenth century, was to coal as the fuel for ships and
trains and the major fuel for electricity. The second transi-
tion, beginning in the 1920s, shifted coal to third place behind
oil and gas, resulting in our current world dependence on
these increasingly scarce resources.
We are now experiencing the beginnings of the next transi-
tion. These beginnings signal a return to coal in order to pro-
duce electricity and synthetic fuels (synfuel). But the new
shift will have to go further; the transition will have to be
more fundamental. One hundred years from now the world
could consume 3,000 quads (3 x 10 18 BTU) of energy per
year even if world per-capita consumption would be only
two-thirds of current U.S. per-capita consumption, if popu-
lation control techniques would have proved successful, and
if 1conservation would be extensively practiced. This would
compare with the current world consumption of about 300
quads per year. Thus, all possible forms of energy will be re-
quired to meet this enormous demand; the production of this
energy will entail the fullest development of such solar tech-
;niques as ocean thermal energy, possibly in combination with
nuclear fusion. It is thus a central assumption of this analysis

5
6 Energy Futures of the Oceans

that the transition to new energy forms must be well under-

way in the next fifty to one hundred years and that new en-
ergy sources such as ocean thermal energy (OTEC) will
become the dominant forms of production.
Students of world energy may find the emphasis on OTEC
to be in conflict with current consensus. Indeed it is a thesis
of this text that OTEC has been neglected, but that it cannot
be much longer neglected.

Conventional Sources: Oil and Coal

Although the initial stages of transition to new forms of
energy have already begun, reliance must still be placed on
coal and oil throughout the remainder of this century and be-
yond. Primary reliance upon ocean transportation will insure
adequate supplies of these resources.
The Pacific Ocean's role in the development of coal as an
energy resource had its beginnings in the nineteenth century.
The most historically significant effect of the utilization of
coal was the choice made by the United States to employ
Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines as sites for coaling sta-
tions. Concurrently Britain, France, and Germany estab-
lished their own separate stepping stones in the Gilberts,
Samoa, Hong Kong, Fiji, the New Hebrides, Tahiti, the Mar-
shalls, and the Carolines. As oil replaced coal, the coaling
stations all but disappeared, and today the role of the Pacific
and other oceans in the development of oil resources is of
more immediate interest.
Geologists recognize that the landmasses of the world were
once a single continent, which later was fractured by move-
ment of the world's tectonic plates (partly subcontinental and
partly suboceanic) (like the cooling crusts of a "baked
Alaska"). The sediments slumping and washing into the sea
from the separating continents enriched the marine organic
deposits already there, and as the plates were subjected to
folding, pinchouts, and doming, oil was entrapped from
decaying organic deposits. Thus the world's major oil field~"
will be and are in current or former coastal regions, the con-
tinental shelves, or shallow seas. A look at Figure 2 will show
 Favorable offshore areas for oil and gas
Miller Cylmdnca! Pro1ec11on

FIGURE 2 Favorable offshore areas for oil and gas

8 Energy Futures of the Oceans

where these major oil deposits are, or are believed to be-the

Middle East, Alaska's North Slope, the Persian Gulf, the In-
donesian archipelago, the Yellow Sea, the China Sea, and
probably the Mediterranean, the offshore shelves of Angola
and Brazil, and the separation zone between Argentina and
the Antarctic.
Any illusions that the oil and gas on the continental shelves
would be available as the common heritage of humankind
were shattered by the Truman declaration of 1946, which
declared U.S. sovereignty over its continental shelf for the
purpose of exploiting oil and gas. The UNCLOS treaty em-
beds this nationalist notion in international law with a com-
plex continental shelf formula. The small, site-specific, and
nonmobile character of continental-shelf oil fields is compat-
ible with this legal regime. But it is not a foregone conclusion
that this establishes the legal status of offshore oil. A number
of areas are in dispute. For example, the status of such
uninhabited or rarely inhabited islands as the Tiuyutais or
Senkakus, the Paracels, the Spratleys, and the Banjos, has
raised differences of opinion on whether these islands affect
the legal status of the seabed. The status of the shelf near the
Antarctic continent is also in doubt. The signatories to the
Antarctic treaty are but a fraction of the international com-·
munity. The treaty is deliberately ambiguous as to whethe:r
sovereignty exists for any part of the Antarctic shelf -despite
the fact that, or perhaps because, several signatories have
claimed sovereignty. In either the semienclosed sea, or i,n
Antarctica itself, the presence of a drilling rig carrying the
flag of any nation would cause an international dilemma
(which might nonetheless result in international inaction).
Even taking these complexities into account, few observ~rs
would be rash enough to predict that the development of off-
shore oil will not follow the pattern proposed by UNCLOS.
The transportation, processing, and storage of oil present
other issues. The scale of economic transport, requiring the
use of deep-draft supertankers, has greatly constrained the
routes of energy commerce in the ocean. Oil from the Persian
Gulf must pass through the Straits of Hormuz with Iran on
the East Bank and the tiny Emirate of Oman on the West. Oil
Energy Futures of the Oceans 9

bound for the east coast of the American continent must pass
through the economic zone of the Malagasy Republic and
round the southern tip of Africa. Oil bound for Japan and
the west coast of America must pass through the Straits of
Malacca with Malaysia on the north, Indonesia on the south,
and Singapore guarding the eastern portal. There are no prac-
tical transit alternatives to using these straits. The Sunda and
Lombok alternatives are too shallow. Even Malacca is so
shallow that deep-draft vessels and tankers often find their
bottoms in the silt, and tankers are encouraged to utilize local
pilots to ensure a successful transit.
The industrialized nations have been successful in estab-
lishing a transit passage regime through traditional straits (in-
cluding Gibraltar). Nonetheless, states bordering the straits
have a number of legal means to regulate or deny transit - for
example, in the language on pollution in the UNCLOS treaty
draft or in the language of a straits regime itself. These states
would reap great political and economic benefits if they could
regulate and charge tolls for passage through the straits. In-
deed, political and economic lures have been a factor in per-
suading these states to accede to the proposed UNCLOS
regime. When the price paid to maintain unimpeded transit is
inadequate, states bordering the straits will have both the
l~gal justification and the physical capability to regulate
passage.
The perceived necessity for strategic oil reserves has added
a new element in the use of the oceans as a commons. The
m~aintenance of oil reserves, which will last from two months
to two years, is a goal of most oil-dependent states. Japan has
d.eveloped a novel and cost-effective method of storage by
us'ing surplus tankers that drift on the high seas. Western na-
tions have followed suit. Standby power is available, and a
continuous navigation and radar watch is maintained so that
each ship can be underway in time to avoid navigation inter-
ference in prohibited waters. (Although calculations of ship
density and response time indicate that these operations
should be perfectly safe, these ships are, in fact, not under
<O:Ontrol for an hour or more after an initial alert.)
The incentives for regional or basin cooperation in the pro-
JO Energy Futures of the Oceans

duction and distribution of energy are highly dependent on

the nature and source of energy flow. Presently, the domi-
nant energy flow for the Western Pacific is from the Middle
East through the Straits of Malacca. Indonesia and Malaysia
are major producers of crude oil, and one would expect that
these countries would be major consumers of their own prod-
ucts and that the ASEAN nations would be major importers
of this regionally generated energy resource. Such is not the
case. The economic pull from the Western Pacific and the
West Coast of the United States is so great that the ASEAN
nations import the vast majority of their crude from the Mid-
dle East and export the bulk of their production to Japan, the
United States, and the Western Pacific. Thus Indonesia ex-
ports 90 percent of its crude to Japan, the United States, and
Trinidad; Malaysia's domestic consumption is mainly met
from Middle East imports (90,000 b/d) and its domestic pro-
duction (260,000 b/d) is mainly export-oriented. The de-
pendence of the Western Pacific on Mideastern oil and the re-
sulting exclusion of the Malaccan strait states (Thailand,
Indonesia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Korea) from a propor-
tionate share of the energy inhibits regional and Pacific Basin
cooperation and places a high premium on placating the Mid-
dle Eastern producers. J. F. Kirk, in a paper on ''Energy
Problems and Growth Prospects of the Pacific Basin," ha.s
highlighted the significance of the energy deficit of the West-
ern Pacific and its dependence on transit through the straits
and an assured supply of Mideast crude. He emphasizes th1at
quite a different situation exists or will exist in the Eastem
Pacific as a result of Mexican, Alaskan, and California
crudes. This region can become a net exporter in the ne:ar
future, alleviating the straits dependence of the Westt"!rn
Pacific. Kirk also points out that energy needs of the year
2000 will not be met unless there is a substantial development
of synthetic fuels:

Coal is projected to be a major source of energy supply

growth, replacing oil and gas in major industrial and electric
utility markets and meeting a substantial share of new energy
demand. Coal use is projected to grow almost three percent
per year, marginally increasing its share of world energy sup-
Energy Futures of the Oceans 11

ply from its present 26 percent to 28 percent by the year 2000.

Including coal converted to synthetic oil and gas, coal's share
in 2000 would increase to 30 percent and rival oil as the largest
single source of energy. 6

Kirk's projection for reducing the energy deficit in the

Western Pacific Basin is highly dependent on the expanded
development of coal-derived synthetic fuels and, in particu-
lar, the use of Australian coal. He concludes that the combi-
nation of Australian coal and oil from the Eastern Pacific
should reduce dependence on Middle East oil from 65 percent
in 1980 to 40 percent in the year 2000. A continuation of such
a trend could form the basis for increased Western Pacific
Basin cooperation and decrease the significance of the straits.
Greater cohesion among the ASEAN nations would require
cooperation in the development of the China and Yellow
seas, as no other viable long-term fossil fuel alternative would
be available to them.
The major inhibitions to realizing the energy scenario envi-
sioned by Kirk are the costs and the technical problems asso-
ciated with the development of synthetic fuel from coal. A
National Academy of Engineering Report ("Refining Synthe-
tic Liquids from Coal and Shale") cites the need for a source
o;f carbon-free hydrogen as the key to the large-scale develop-
ment of synthetic fuel. Producing hydrogen on such a scale is
within the capabilities of OTEC.

0< !ean Thermal Energy Conversion (OTEC)

:Potential energy sources for the production of hydrogen
froim sea water are nuclear power, hydroelectric power, geo-
the~rmal energy, and ocean thermal energy. Although geo-
the1~mal resources exist in Japan, Taiwan, and the volcanic
Pacific islands, and although untapped hydroelectric power
exiists in the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Korea, the
magnitude of these energy resources is small compared to the
requirements of the synthetic fuel industry. The most reason-
zible alternate energy source may therefore be ocean thermal
e:nergy conversion (OTEC). This source will probably
12 Energy Futures of the Oceans

develop in the form of floating or "grazing" OTEC plants

that manufacture, store, and distribute ammonia, hydrogen,
methanol, and other forms of synthetic fuel.
Though OTEC will very likely be a major source of world
energy in the next few decades, its implications for the oceans
as a commons and for UNCLOS have not as yet been part of
international debate at the Law of the Sea negotiations or
elsewhere.
OTEC: Concepts and Implications
OTEC warrants extensive review in that readers may not
realize its significance as a major energy issue in the next
several decades. The concept of obtaining energy from the
difference of temperature between the surface of the ocean
and the deep ocean is not new, but dates back at least to
Arsene d'Arsonval (1881). During the early 1930s, the noted
engineer Georges Claude seriously investigated ocean thermal
energy, correctly but prematurely anticipating energy short-
ages. His brilliant test installation demonstrated the viability
of the concept (although it did not produce net power). His
calculations demonstrated that the energy produced would
not be competitive with oil at ten cents a barrel.
Ocean energy was reconsidered in the early 1970s by a num-
ber of investigators who anticipated that OTEC might prov·e
economically feasible because of rapidly rising oil prices. Th.e
investigators were aware that the necessary installation.s
would be large and capital-intensive, and they also expecte'd
that the installation and operation of the cold water pipe (a
vertical pipe of large diameter, some 800 meters long) and t} 1e
biofouling of heat exchangers would pose difficult technic ,al
problems. Initial calculations showing that OTEC would be
economically competitive were doubted. But in August of
1979 a pilot plant called Mini-OTEC, built by the Lockhe;ed
Corporation, Alfa Laval, the Dillingham Corporation, and
the State of Hawaii, produced the first net power from oce. an
thermal energy (more than 10 kilowatts out of 40 kilowatts
gross). The test also demonstrated that the engineering prob 1-

lems of the cold water pipe were manageable and that bio·-
fouling was controllable.
Energy Futures of the Oceans 13

Since then at least ten independent investigators (Applied

Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins, The Rand Corporation,
Science Applications Incorporated, the Hawaii Natural
Energy Institute, Lockheed, TRW, Westinghouse, General
Electric, and Toshiba) have concluded that electricity pro-
duced from ocean thermal energy will be cost-competitive
with electricity produced by coal or by nuclear power.
OTEC's initial implications alone are staggering.
An economically viable OTEC would be a renewable re-
source of tremendous value. The annual production of en-
ergy from this tropical source can potentially be well in excess
of 300 quads of energy per year (1 quad is 1x1015
BTU)- that is, in excess of the current world consumption of
energy. Considering the magnitude of the resource and the
successful development efforts to date, OTEC proponents
are understandably frustrated by arguments that OTEC can
only be produced where not needed-in the tropical oceans.
But oil is also obtained in places remote from its users - the
Middle East, or Alaska's North Slope, or the marine environ-
ment of continental shelves. Therefore, oil and OTEC trans-
portation issues are comparatively similar.
Oil is at least as remote as OTEC and in addition is accessi-
ble to most nations only if it passes successfully through po-
litically sensitive and vulnerable choke points (the several
straits and canals). Military, political, and economic uncer-
tainties abound. However, the liabilities of oil transport have
be.en discounted because of the incalculable capital invest-
ment already made in its transportation, processing, and use;
technology and world society have been tailored to an oil-
ba~ed energy economy. Because oil is continuously depleted,
the capital investment required to maintain an oil supply will
co11tinue to leave little, if any, capital for development of
substitute systems. It is natural, then, that research and devel-
opment should remain focused on an oil-based economy-
syni.thetic fuels derived from coal and shale, more natural gas,
and further exploitation of ocean oil. This capital constraint
will place a brake on OTEC's development. Though the
potential is revolutionary, the development of ocean thermal
energy will, by virtue of restricted investment, be evolu-
14 Energy Futures of the Oceans

tionary. The evolution-from an energy economy based on

dwindling energy resources to one based on renewable re-
sources-should provide a unique opportunity for the world's
island communities to serve as models for the transition.
The pace of this transition will depend on the economic
and cultural needs of the communities in the OTEC belt, the
state of the world energy situation, and the status of the
oceans as a commons. Considering these factors, a scenario
exists for OTEC to meet the energy needs of the Pacific
islands in the late 1980s or early 1990s. OTEC could con-
tribute to the needs of the entire Pacific Basin before the turn
of the century and be a major source of world energy in the
first decade of the twenty-first century.
The nations and communities of the OTEC belt (plus or
minus twenty degrees latitude) are not homogeneous. (See
Figure 3.) Many are Third World states: Brazil, Ecuador, and
Peru; the African states of Liberia, Benin, Ivory Coast, and
Cameroon; and farther east, Sri Lanka and India. Mexico
and nations in the Isthmus of Panama are continental states
that have rich thermal resources in their 200-mile exclusive
zones. The major archipelagos with access to such waters are
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Japan.
Lyle Dunbar of 'Science Applications Incorporated has
identified 98 nations and territories having access to the re-
source. Of these, 3 are developed nations (United States,
Japan, and Australia), 29 are territories of developed m1-
tions, 3 are socialist (Cuba, China, and Vietnam), and 63 af{e
free-market developing nations.
Some of the smaller nations or territories, such as the
sparsely populated Pacific islands known as Oceania, are Sf~P­
arated by thousands of miles; their total energy needs are
miniscule by world standards and met almost entirely by oil
imports. A few of the island domains are both politically ftnd
economically independent. Fiji, Tonga, Western Samoa,
Vanuatu, the Kiribati (Gilberts), and the Solomons h~ve
recently acquired independence. Per-capita income is low;
the primary sources of hard currency are fishing, canning,
copra, and tourism. Energy is furnished by diesel or gasolint~
generators. Energy uses include imported propane and na·-
 j

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c
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c
0
......
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-~
......
:J
u
LJ.J
l-
o
~
·.;::;
c
Q)
......
0
0...

M
LJ.J
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16 Energy Futures of the Oceans

tural gas for domestic and commercial purposes. Fuel costs in

these remote islands are 30-50 percent higher than costs on
the continent. Major cost factors are transportation and
storage.
Most of the islands have a trustee status or are economi-
cally dependent upon more affluent, industrialized states.
The Cook Islands are dependent upon New Zealand ($4,500
per-capita GNP); the Marshall and Caroline Islands have a
new relationship with the United States ($9,000 per-capita
GNP); and Nauru has a trust relationship with Australia
($7 ,000 per-capita GNP). The remaining islands are posses-
sions, territories, or metropolitan districts of continental or
island states. These include Easter Island (Chile, $1,000 per-
capita GNP); the Galapagos (Ecuador, $800 per-capita
GNP); French Polynesia (France, $7 ,500 per-capita GNP);
Okinawa (Japan, $7,000 per-capita GNP); the Com-
monwealth of the Marianas, Guam, Wake, Howland, Baker,
the Palmyra Islands, and American Samoa- and the
Hawaiian archipelago (United States, $9,000 per-capita
GNP). The socialist countries are, for historical reasons,
underrepresented in access to ocean thermal resources.
Energy needs are small for the Pacific island communities
compared to the entire Pacific region and the world, with the
exceptions of Hawaii, Okinawa, and Guam. Thus OTEC for
domestic use is close to irrelevant for the smaller island com-
munities. Even if a sovereign island nation were given an
OTEC electrical plant, the energy would be in a form impos-
sible to distribute among the many small, separate island
communities. Table 1 lists the maximum probable indigenous
energy consumption for the island domains and the total
OTEC resources available to these communities. This table is
the subjective estimate of the author and is based on a de-
mand of from one-fourth to two-thirds the per-capita, per-
year consumption of the United States. The specific choice
was based on estimates of the rate of growth of each economy
and its needs. Except for Hawaii, the electrical needs of
Oceania are below the threshold of economically viable
OTEC projects (100 to 300 Megawatts). The table also con-
tains extremely rough estimates of the magnitude of the ther-
Energy Futures of the Oceans 17

Table I

Maximum Probable Indigenous Annual Energy Consumption and

Probable Resource Availability
(in quads)

Energy OTEC
Consumption Availability
Pitcairn Island 0.00002 1.0
Wake Island 0.0002 2.5
Commonwealth of Marianas 0.002 6.0
Guam 0.03 2.0
Fiji 0.1 5.0
Hawaii 0.3 12.0
Oceania (less Hawaii) 0.5 300.0+
Puerto Rico 1.0 1.0
West Indies (including Puerto Rico) 5.0 50.0
Philippines 6.0 8.0
Indonesia 20.0 25.0
Japan 35.0 10.0
Continental USA 80.0 1.0
USA (including Trust Territories) 80.0 80.0+

mal energy resources. Except for the major Western Pacific

archipelagos (Indonesia and the Philippines) the energy needs
and OTEC energy availability are inversely related. OTEC
energy must therefore be generated in a form that is export-
able, from the regions in which it can be generated to the
regions where it will be consumed.
OTEC: A Source of Carbon-Free Energy
The fundamental virtue of OTEC is that it can generate hy-
drogen on the high seas without producing carbon or carbon
dioxide as a waste product. This is because the electricity
generated by OTEC can be employed for electrolytic dissocia-
tion of water molecules into hydrogen and oxygen. The com-
parative significance of this fact can be appreciated by exam-
ining the major problems with current energy use. The three
major concerns are: (1) the increase in the atmospheric con-
18 Energy Futures of the Oceans

centration of C02 (carbon dioxide) and other pollutants such

as S02 (sulfur dioxide); (2) the "plutonium overhang" associ-
ated with nuclear power; and (3) the need for hydrogen de-
rived from the water molecule to convert coal into an accept-
able synthetic fuel, or to hydrogenate oil in order to make it a
more efficient fuel.
The first of these problems seems politically and
economically insoluble. Although scientists are never sure,
climatologists are "relatively sure" that the buildup in atmos-
pheric C02 will result in major climatic changes that will be
most detrimental to the Northern Temperate Zone. They
assert that these changes will occur early in the twenty-first
century, based on the current consumption levels of fossil
fuels. Within this time constraint, there appears no signifi-
cant way to reduce the use of hydrocarbons as the major
automotive fuel. However, every effort should be made to re-
duce the amount of C02 that is thereby generated.
A major step in this direction would be a shift from oil- and
coal-fired steam turbines, gas turbines, diesel electric, and
gasoline electric generation to the hydrogen-fueled or
ammonia-fueled fuel cell. OTEC can be a source of carbon-
free fuel for such fuel cells.
The fuel cell for prime electrical power is a recent techno-
logical development that is still in the pilot plant demonstra-
tion stage (albeit successful). Fuel cells are far more efficient
in the conversion of chemical fuels to electrical energy than
conventional power plant systems. This efficiency is not
automatically achieved since fuel cells are most effective
when using hydrogen-rich fuels and fuels that are clean.
Fossil fuels do not automatically qualify as fuel cell fuels, and
energy is required to make them usable. The energy expended
for cleanup and conversion, and the pollutants placed in the
atmosphere by this process, may vitiate the advantages of the
fuel cell. Even so, the fuel cell for peak load and prime elec-
trical power will probably play a substantial role in public
utility power generation because it is clean, attractive, and
safe (e.g., it can be located in the center of an urban complex
without threat of local pollution or nuclear release). As a con-
sequence, much more expensive fuels (higher cost per BTU)
Energy Futures of the Oceans 19

can be economically employed in fuel cell systems. For exam-

ple, an ammonia fuel cell costing three to four times the price
of fossil fuel would, other things being equal, be competitive
with conventional steam or gas turbines. OTEC-generated
ammonia would clearly qualify as such a fuel and would not
generate C02 in the process.
Hydrogen-rich fuels may also be obtained from gas and
oil. Similarly, other methods of power generation can be
employed to produce carbon-free fuels. These other methods
include the electrolytic decomposition of water using hydro-
electric, geothermal, or nuclear power, or biomass-produced
alcohols for which the net C02 balance is essentially zero.
However, these methods will be competitive with OTEC only
in the short run because of (1) the limited quantity of hydro-
electric and geothermal resources, (2) public desire to limit
the growth of nuclear power, and (3) the fact that the gasohol
production process is and for some time will be marginally
productive of net energy. Hence the demand for hydrogen
for fuel cell consumption should provide a ready market for
OTEC hydrogen and hydrogen products.
OTEC and Synthetic Fuel
A more recently recognized use for OTEC is in the
manufacture of synthetic fuel. Even technologists are some-
times surprised to learn that the major barrier to the produc-
tion of synthetic fuel from coal is the deficiency of hydrogen.
The mean value for the molecular ratio of hydrogen to car-
bon in bituminous coal is about 0.8. The mean hydrogen/car-
bon ratio for premium fuels is about 2.0. The conversion of
coal to synthetic fuel thus requires the addition of hydrogen
or the elimination of carbon. A simple calculation demon-
strates that the choice of alternatives has an enormous impact
on the world energy picture.
At the present time it requires two quads of coal to make
one quad of synfuel. The extra quad must be converted to
coke or carbon dioxide or a combination of both. If OTEC
hydrogen were employed for the enrichment of coal, then
only slightly more than one quad of coal (1.1 quads) would be
required for each quad of synfuel. Similar though less drama-
20 Energy Futures of the Oceans

tic ratios exist for the conversion of "coil" (a liquid combina-

tion of coal slurry and crude oil) into synthetic fuel, or the
conversion of heavy crudes into light crudes.
Recently William H. Avery of the Applied Physics Labora-
tory has developed a process for the production of methanol
from OTEC hydrogen, OTEC oxygen, and coke. 7 In essence
his process envisions the pyrolysis (heating in the absence of
oxygen) of coal at the mouth of the mine to extract all avail-
able hydrocarbons (methane, coal oil, and ammonia). The
relatively pure coke that is the residue of the process can be
transported to an OTEC site and burned in the presence of
OTEC oxygen to produce carbon monoxide and energy in the
form of heat. The heat can be converted to electricity for use
in the additional dissociation of water into oxygen and hydro-
gen. The carbon monoxide can be combined with OTEC
hydrogen (with the aid of a catalyst) to produce methanol.
Avery's estimate of cost vs. return is that, depending on the
current market value of methanol, the return realized on the
investment will range from 18 to 94 percent per year. 8
Other factors favoring the production of synfuels from
coal and OTEC hydrogen are the economies of scale associ-
ated with sea-based siting of production plants, the avail-
ability of water for dissociation (roughly 100,000 acre-feet of
water per year for each 5 quads of synthetic fuel), and the use
of water as a process fluid. The Avery study includes a
number of factors which suggest that OTEC-coal synfuels
could be the most competitive of the currently proposed syn-
fuels. These factors include: (1) the low electricity cost at the
OTEC plant site, (2) the increasing efficiency of electrolytic
processes for dissociating hydrogen from water molecules, (3)
the proximity of coal to many seaboards, (4) the already
developed logistical systems for sea-based transport and dis-
tribution of fuels, and (5) the environmental and safety ad-
vantages of sea-based installations.
Many will argue that the world ought to bypass the
development of hydrocarbon-based synthetic fuels and pro-
ceed directly to a hydrogen economy. This might be logically
correct, but it would require draconian measures for its im-
Energy Futures of the Oceans 21

plementation. Thus the development of OTEC synfuel will be

required because the world is unable to make a rapid leap to a
carbon-free energy economy. Such a leap is technologically
feasible if ammonia is substituted for hydrocarbon fuels.
Ammonia has only about half as many BTU's per pound as
gasoline but is a pollution-free fuel that has been used
successfully in tractors, automobiles, and other internal com-
bustion equipment. It has been suggested that an oceanic ar-
chipelago could become energy self-sufficient. This could be
accomplished, for example, with one central OTEC plant (10
kilowatts to 1 Megawatt) employed for producing ammonia.
The ammonia, in turn, could be used in fuel cells for electric-
ity and for the powering of automotive equipment.
The pilot operations for these developments are already
under way. Tokyo Electric has constructed a 100-kilowatt (net
power) OTEC in Nauru. Mitsui-Toshiba is planning the con-
struction of an island OTEC plant for electricity and aquacul-
ture in a Pacific atoll. An American consortium is proposing
a grazing 40-Megawatt ammonia plant and half a dozen other
consortia are proposing various forms of 10-40 Megawatt
electrical energy plants. A pilot project for OTEC synfuels is
under serious study and should be under way when this
monograph is published. It is not too early, then, to speculate
on the probable development process. Four phases can be
identified as follows:
1. The development of a series of prototype plants of from
1 to 40 Megawatts. These plants will probably include a graz-
ing ammonia plant, synthetic fuel plants, several electrical
power plants, and an aquacultural facility. Both open-cycle
and closed-cycle prototypes will probably be developed.
Simultaneously, one or more archipelagos will seek energy
self-sufficiency by employing ammonia fuel cells and modi-
fied ammonia-powered vehicles.
2. The construction of a series of island plants to provide
prime electrical power for Honolulu, Puerto Rico, Okinawa,
etc., and for island industries such as manganese nodule pro-
cessing and aluminum production in the Pacific, and petro-
chemical production in the Caribbean. Prototype develop-

I
22 Energy Futures of the Oceans

ment plantships (grazing plants) and other plants could also

be deployed in the island archipelagos to provide self-
sufficiency.
3. The construction of OTEC plants for the manufacture
and export of synthetic fuels, utilizing coal and OTEC hydro-
gen as resources, and the construction of OTEC plants for
the manufacture of ammonia to be used in fuel cell power
systems for major continental power grids.
4. The ubiquitous use of ammonia in automobiles, the de-
velopment of hydrogen-powered commercial aircraft, and
the transfer of OTEC technology to Third World countries
for their use as a major energy source.
OTEC and Ocean Law
Armed with this understanding of OTEC's future we can
now explore the probable future of the Law of the Sea as it
relates to OTEC. The UNCLOS text is mostly silent on ocean
energy except for the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone
where coastal state sovereignty extends to economic exploita-
tion "such as the production of energy from the water,
currents and wind." 9 Initially, when OTEC plants will be pro-
viding electricity by cable to shore, UNCLOS will be satisfac-
tory for island coastal states. When grazing OTEC ships
become a reality, increasing pressure will be exerted for the
development of a regime similar to the regime for seabed
minerals. This pressure will come from noncoastal, non-
tropical nations seeking the benefits of the oceans' "common
heritage," and from coastal states wanting strict production
controls on the high seas in order to insure a monopoly over
the resource.
Recently it has been argued that the OTEC resource is so
plentiful and tropically ubiquitous that an "OTEC-OPEC" is
not feasible. This is probably not true. The productivity per
unit of capital investment is highly dependent on temperature
differential. The Marshall Islands, for example, have in their
200-mile zone a virtual lock on the highest quality ocean ther-
mal water, provided that grazing OTEC plants could be
eliminated or limited on the high seas.
In addition, there will be a linkage between OTEC power
Energy Futures of the Oceans 23

and manganese nodule processing, since the waters beneath

which nodules rich in metals occur are also rich in thermal
energy. Nations like Kiribati have the potential for dominance
of the OTEC/nodule resource if the Law of the Sea restricts
both OTEC and deep seabed mining in waters beyond na-
tional jurisdiction. This is also the case for OTEC/synfuel
with regard to Indonesia, the Philippines, and other oil strait
nations.

Nuclear Power and the Seas

A discussion of energy futures using ocean thermal energy
would be incomplete without including the Pandora alterna-
tive - nuclear power. Our focus will be on the use of the
oceans for disposal of wastes, but the most important prob-
lem may be the use of the oceans for the siting of nuclear
power plants.
The Westinghouse Corporation has completed the design
and has attained the sophisticated capability to construct
floating plants in an artificial embayment on the continental
shelf. A safety feature common to these plants and to mili-
tary nuclear submarines is that, in the event of reactor catas-
trophe, the power plants can be jettisoned safely in the ocean
without the possibility of a runaway reaction.
Although the Westinghouse plants are designed to carry
electricity to shore, floating nuclear plants can be used to
manufacture hydrogen or ammonia. Thus this source of
energy is exactly equivalent to OTEC energy in the produc-
tion of ammonia or synfuel. Floating nuclear plants can, of
course, be deployed around the world and are not confined to
the tropics. Curiously, the UNCLOS treaty has even less to
say about nuclear-powered facilities than ocean thermal
energy. Presumably, nuclear power for energy is subject to
the sovereign rights of the coastal states. However, a nuclear-
powered, ammonia-producing plantship apparently could
transit economic zones so long as the power is to be used
solely for propulsion during the transit. It is highly unlikely
that a legal regime could be devised that would prevent the
operation of nuclear energy plantships on the high seas.
24 Energy Futures of the Oceans

Whether sea-based nuclear power or OTEC becomes the

dominant user of the sea for production of energy depends
upon the availability of capital to developed and developing
states, the legal regimes adopted for the deployment of each
form of power, and world attitudes toward nuclear power.
Regardless of the relative developments in OTEC and nuclear
power, the problems of nuclear waste storage and disposal
will be present as long as nuclear power is in use. Because the
problems are complex there is a great deal of public mis-
understanding of waste storage and waste disposal.
The need for storage arises from the problem known as
"plutonium overhang." As fuel rods employed in nuclear
reactors are "spent" they can be reprocessed to recover
uranium and other nuclides. The plutonium that is diffused
through the rods will be recovered and concentrated in quan-
tities in excess of any industrial needs. Thus, a store of plu-
tonium will accumulate that is sufficiently close to weapons
grade to be useful in making crude nuclear weapons of
critical mass. This poses a serious security problem.
Storage and security problems associated with plutonium
that is recovered from spent fuel rods are far more difficult
than the same problems associated with unprocessed spent
rods. Hence, at present, most of these rods are simply stored
in "swimming pools" within the reactor compound. As the
rods accumulate, some new storage facilities will be required.
Nearly every study of the problem concludes that the best
storage and security could be achieved on remote ocean
islands. However, the decision to employ an island for this
purpose is presumably the prerogative of the nation that
owns the island. This raises complex political issues that can-
not be resolved without an international agreement.
The problem of waste disposal is of even greater interna-
tional concern. Most studies of waste disposal conclude that
one of the most environmentally safe and secure places for
storage would be suitably designed canisters embedded in the
sediments over a benign tectonic plate (the Pacific plate is
closest to ideal). Many nations hold that less stringent precau-
tions are adequate, although they agree on ocean disposal.
Their persuasion is that water is an excellent shield, diffusion
Energy Futures of the Oceans 25

in the deep water column is slow, and dilution of wastes will

be adequate. Some of these nations are disposing of nuclear
wastes in the oceans at the present time, and (in their view)
in accordance with the United Nations treaty on ocean
dumping.
The process of dumping raises both environmental and
security problems. Given the present state of technology,
waste locations that go unrecorded and become unknown
even to the disposer are probably more secure than those that
are documented. Environmental knowledge is sacrificed for
the security.
The ocean is an effective commons for nuclear wastes. But
the concept of a "commons" implies wide participation in
decisions about its use, and world or regional public policy
may legislate against continuation of this form of waste
disposal. (See Chapter 7 for a more detailed discussion of the
"commons" concept as applied to the oceans.)

The Ocean as an Energy Commons

If these ocean energy-development scenarios prove to be
correct, then a dramatic reversal in the availability of the
oceans as an energy commons will be possible. Unlike coal,
oil, oil shale, gas, and uranium, the energy-rich medium of
OTEC (hot and cold water) is not now subject to appropria-
tion. Nations may, under the concept of the Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone (EEZ), act as though they had sovereign control
of the resource through sovereign control of the OTEC plat-
form; but they cannot control grazing plants on the high seas.
These will have a resource available to them as great as or
greater than the resource available in the EEZs. Thus the
economic value of tropical water to coastal states is simply
that which derives from proximity.
As in the case of the manganese nodules, the optimum
strategy for Third World nations in the Tropical Zone is to
help place the ocean thermal energy resource in waters be-
yond their national jurisdiction under some newly created
international authority like the Sea-Bed Authority, and to see
that production limitations are imposed in the international
26 Energy Futures of the Oceans

area. In that event, or in the more likely event that OTEC

plants are most economically deployed in close proximity to
land, the commons status of ocean energy will be greatly
reduced, and the incentives for regional cooperation through-
out the Pacific Basin will be enhanced.
Consider the optimum nature of energy flows for an
OTEC/synfuel energy regime. (Refer to Figures 2 and 3 to
compare OTEC waters with coal and oil sources.) Australian
coal would be transported in a northerly direction eastward
of the Straits of Malacca, the Sunda shelf, and the Philippine
archipelago. The most probable intersection with OTEC
waters will occur in the EEZs of the island nations and terri-
tories that are members of the South Pacific Forum. Synfuels
created there would be most easily transported to the North-
west (Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines).
A second optimum energy flow would begin with Alaskan
coal (also an abundant resource), which would intersect
OTEC waters most directly in Hawaii, the Kiribati, and the
Marshalls. Dissemination of the energy products would be
predominantly westward to meet the energy deficiency of the
Western Pacific region, but a significant fraction of the prod-
ucts would be vectored to the west coast of the North Amer-
ican continent.
A third pattern of energy flow could begin with Indone-
sian and Malaysian crudes (supplemented by Middle East
crudes). These crudes would be transported through the
straits areas to intersect OTEC waters in the vicinity of the
Marianas, the Carolines, the Philippines, the Conins, and the
Ryukyus. Hydrogen-enriched fuels would then become avail-
able for dissemination to ASEAN nations and other nations
on the East Asian continent.
The potentials and the problems of such energy flows, and
their implications for the future of the Pacific Community,
have been well analyzed by Dr. Frances Lai of the National
University of Singapore:

The diversity of perspectives, the fragmentation of market

structure and the predominance of concerns for national in-
terest . . . seem to present a rather pessimistic prospect for
Energy Futures of the Oceans 27

regional cooperation. But this is not necessarily so. ASEAN

itself demonstrated the possibility of cooperation among di-
verse interests. Yet, because of their own experience, ASEAN
countries are hesitant about the viability of the Pacific Com-
munity concept which encompasses a much greater
geographical area with many more diverse cultures and
economies.
It is true that there has been increasing economic inter-
dependence among the Pacific nations through trade, but
does this alone warrant an institutionalized forum? What are
the specific interests and roles of the developed nations, espe-
cially Japan and the United States, in a Pacific Community?
In recent international dialogues which explored the concept
of Pacific Basin cooperation, the supposedly reluctant
ASEAN participants seemed quite ready to suggest regional
issues such as anti-protectionism, adjustment of north-south
relations and stabilization of export earnings of the develop-
ing countries, as plausible topics for a Pacific Community
forum of cooperation. Yet, they are skeptical about the
responses they may get from the more developed countries.
Participants from countries such as Japan usually verbalize
their idealistic goals in illusive terms. Will these countries be
more "cooperative" in a Pacific Community than they have
been in bilateral negotiation? What concrete programs of
cooperation would they propose? ASEAN feels as if it is par-
ticipating in a one-sided dialogue. No wonder the ASEAN
countries have been showing signs of impatience for a deci-
sion from Japan over the kind of organization or program it
envisions.
ASEAN has deliberately avoided politics and security
issues in their declaration of purpose and solidarity, but it is a
known fact that it was political and diplomatic successes that
made ASEAN viable. Now, Japan, the main advocate of the
Pacific Community Concept, likewise has been avoiding the
political and security issues of Pacific Basin cooperation. Is
there enough urgency in today's economic issues that would
make such a Pacific Community forum necessary and viable?
From our discussion of the energy and oil situation in
ASEAN and from a general understanding of the energy
future of the Pacific Basin, . . . it seems that the energy needs
of the region is one issue that may warrant such urgency. The
need for energy is shared by all countries, either for consump-
28 Energy Futures of the Oceans

tion or for foreign exchange and domestic economic develop-

ment. The impact of rapidly rising oil prices is threatening
many nations. If regional stability is the ultimate goal of the
Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept, cooperation in the use
and management of energy resources would be one of the
most crucial areas for joint efforts. In a short term perspec-
tive, an effective emergency oil-sharing scheme and crude
stockpile would likely benefit all countries in the Pacific and
help to buffer them from the drastic effects of oil price/
supply fluctuations. In a long term perspective, joint develop-
ment of alternative energy would be an ideal forum for gen-
uine exchanges and cooperation. In view of the trend in
UNCLOS III of maximizing national interst ... , alternative
energy, such as OTEC, using resources from the ocean com-
mons outside of any national claims, would facilitate
cooperation without being unnecessarily entangled in prob-
lems of overlapping jurisdiction.
Here we are proposing, in a nutshell, two possible ap-
proaches to the evolution of a viable Pacific Basin Coopera-
tion framework. One is the pragmatic approach, whereby in-
terests of potential members are identified and concrete steps
are planned to eliminate conflicts and to maximize each
other's interests through collective arrangements. Another ap-
proach may be called the idealist approach whereby basically
non-conflictual common interests are identified and are used
as the focus of a forum where people in the region can ex-
change their ideas and get to know and work with each other
under a common identity of a Pacific Community. It is hoped
that such a common identity, like that of the EEC or ASEAN,
would be catalytic to an eventual trust and greater coopera-
tion in more delicate matters. It is in this latter approach that
ASEAN expects more initiatives from the developed countries
which have both the technology and financial means. 10
 3
Mineral Futures of the Oceans

Currently, the mineral resources of the Pacific region are

derived almost exclusively from land-based sources. Unlike
the energy flows, hard minerals are much less dependent on
the passage through straits. With a few exceptions, only the
major industrialized nations are associated with the produc-
tion of the major hard minerals used in the Pacific Basin. The
bulk of the iron ores used comes from Tasmania. Pacific alu-
minum comes from Australia, titanium from the USSR, tin
from Indonesia, copper from Chile and Australia, and nickel
from Canada. A non-Pacific country, Zaire, is the major
source of manganese and nickel.
Although there is some inherent dependence on the integ-
rity of the Panama Canal, sources of nearly every major min-
eral located on land are found in some country on the Pacific
rim. However, current estimates suggest that there will be
significant depletion of these high grade hard minerals -
particularly copper, nickel, cobalt, and manganese- by the
turn of the century. (Titanium is already restricted on the
world market by the USSR.) This is why the mineral potential
of the manganese nodules on the deep seabed has attracted
world attention. The ubiquity of the nodules, the rate of ac-
cretion (in excess of world consumption of the accreting
minerals), and the great mineral concentrations suggest that
the mining and processing of these minerals should be com-
mercially feasible today. Although manganese nodules are
found throughout the world's oceans the currently published
results of exploration suggest that nodules richest in cobalt,
copper, and nickel occur in an area associated with the
Clarion-Clipperton fracture zone. This area lies between

29
 • • North Pacific Ocean
United States

·.~·:·.').~·.; ~ ..
:··~~Q~~ :::··::~.~--~::·.·~ ~ .:-.

Percentage of ocean floor

......... ..., covered by nodules
,..,,..It, .W...... b. 75-100

50-75
25-50

FIGURE 4 North Pacific manganese nodule zone

Mineral Futures of the Oceans 31

Hawaii and the Kiribati on the west and Mexico on the east.
But manganese nodule crusts (see Figure 4) and pavements
rich in titanium and cobalt are associated with volcanic island
chains such as the Marianas and the Hawaiian archipelago.

The Non-Law of Seabed Mining

The capital-intensive technology of floating platforms, of
dynamic positioning, of sea-generated energy, of deep sea
drilling, etc., will find ready application in the mining and
processing of manganese nodules. There is fairly uniform
agreement that this mining will not take place until an accept-
able international regime is in place. The last and still un-
resolved issue of UNCLOS relates to the details surrounding
this regime.
Maltese Ambassador Arvid Pardo's original United Na-
tions resolution, which set off the current UNCLOS negotia-
tions in the early 1970s, declared the resources of the ocean to
be "the common heritage of mankind.'' This has been inter-
preted by distinguished jurists of the developing world as
vesting title to the manganese nodules of the deep seabed in
the world community of peoples and as meaning, therefore,
that the United Nations is the only agent which can allocate
these resources.
Equally distinguished jurists in the industrialized democra-
cies, however, take the position that no property right has
been vested (i.e., that the nodules are res nullius), and that
the oceans' resources are therefore available for exploitation
by industrial entrepreneurs whose duty to the common heri-
tage is limited to the payment of royalties. Faced with these
diametrically opposing views, the United Nations Conference
has been attempting to formulate a legal regime for mining
the deep seabed.
Negotiations to date have produced a two-tier system
which provides for a United Nations Authority with regula-
tory powers over mining ventures that may be engaged in
either by independent miners or by a United Nations Enter-
prise. Joint ventures of private entrepreneurs and the Enter-
prise are also permissible.
32 Mineral Futures of the Oceans

Within this framework, three competing interests can be

identified: those of the developing nations that do not possess
land-based mineral resources; those of the nations, developed
and underdeveloped, that are land-based producers; and
those of the developed nations that do not have significant
land-based minerals. The first interest desires a highly effec-
tive United Nations Enterprise with full access to the world's
technology so that it can dominate the world market. Capital-
ist enterprises would be tolerated only in the transition from
the old to the new economic order. The second interest
desires a carefully controlled United Nations cartel in which
seabed resources would meet only shortages, in order to pro-
tect the interests of land-based producers. The third interest
desires a regime in which capital-intensive, competitive, sea-
based private enterprise can compete with land-based pro-
ducers.
The struggle to shape a legal regime that accommodates
these mutually exclusive interests has resulted in one of the
most technically complicated international treaties ever. It
contains, for example, mathematical formulas based on ex-
ponential relationships; it may be the first treaty to incor-
porate a "regression formula" in the body of the text. The
current treaty draft most closely represents the second in-
terest, that of nations favoring a restrictive international
cartel.
Some form of this arrangement will prove acceptable to the
companies of the industrialized democracies that are not pro-
ducers, or major exporters, of land-based minerals (United
States, Japan, Germany), provided they have a seat in the
club. National legislation, pending for some time in the
United States Congress, has finally become law; it provides
unilateral protection for United States miners provided that
seabed operations do not commence prior to 1988. But this
legislation will be superseded by the treaty when and if it
comes into force. Such legislation will virtually ensure that a
U.S. company or companies will be part of the world consor-
tium. Other nations have followed suit with unilateral legisla-
tion, and efforts are now under way among the industrialized
Mineral Futures of the Oceans 33

nations to harmonize their somewhat differing legislative

measures.
The extremely large investment required for ocean mining
or for the extraction of oil from the seabed makes it highly
unlikely that any entrepreneur will engage in this activity
without the protection of some sovereign state or confor-
mance with international law. Although clandestine or illegal
exploitation of the mineral resources of the seabed is highly
unlikely, clandestine and illegal explorations are probably
common practice. A large amount of unreported exploratory
drilling has probably taken place, and will continue to take
place on U.S. continental shelves. This is also true of off-
shore waters in East Asia and Southeast Asia. Researchers
who listen in on ocean channels on a regular basis know that
deliberately generated seismic and acoustic signals are always
present, although it is difficult to determine the location of
the source. It would be naive to believe that all such activity
takes place in conformance with international and municipal
laws and regulations.
Whatever the legalities, there is no doubt that major eco-
nomic entities can acquire information about the location
and quality of oil or mineral resources of the oceans, and that
this information provides them an advantage in negotiating
with sovereignties and authorities.
On a time scale that is at this date quite uncertain, the
recovery of mineral resources from the ocean will shift from
manganese nodules to the recovery of metal sulfides associ-
ated with geothermal vents. The vents are vertical pipes of
molten magma that intrude into the oceans in regions where
the tectonic plates are separating and fracturing. Fractional
distillation of the molten minerals produces a layering and
concentration of high grade mineral deposits. Once dormant,
these vents should be excellent mine sites.
Surveys conducted by the National Ocean Survey have
shown - rather conclusively- that the Clarion-Clipperton
fracture zone is a highly promising geophysical structure for
the location of these dormant vents. The submarine Alvin, on
research dives, has recovered rocks weighing hundreds of
34 Mineral Futures of the Oceans

pounds having copper content as high as 20 percent. Thus

there exist divided opinions as to the most probable
scenario- an ordered prospecting, survey, and development
of mine sites over twenty to twenty-five years, or a short-term
mineral rush.
As fate would have it, the Clarion-Clipperton fracture zone
is roughly 200 miles to sea, intersecting with, impinging
upon, or skirting the EEZs of the Galapagos, Mexico, the
United States, and Canada. It is clear that the present legal
regime for manganese nodule processing, which is based on
very wide distribution of the resource over a large area, will
be inappropriate for management of the vents.

Six Seabed Mining Scenarios

On the initial presumption that the ocean was a commons
with unlimited access, manganese nodule mining companies
began exploring deep seabed resources some fifteen years
ago. The following up-to-date analysis of the policy tangle in
which they now find themselves is taken from Kent Keith's
paper from the June 1981 Tokyo workshop.

By 1975, more than 100 companies around the world were

involved in some aspect of manganese nodule mining. It is es-
timated that over $300 million has now been spent on various
international consortia to explore the ocean floor, to test min-
ing equipment, and to research processing techniques for a
manganese nodule industry. Considering the number of
years, the money invested, and the companies interested, it is
not hard to understand why many experts expected manga-
nese nodule mining to be a reality by the late 1970s. As we
know, of course, the scale-up to commercialization has not
yet begun.
While there are technological problems yet to be overcome,
the root of the present delay appears to be primarily political.
In general, the companies appear to be waiting for a resolu-
tion of the deep seabed mining issues at the United Nations
Third Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). The
United States and West Germany have passed national legis-
lation regarding manganese nodule mining, but this, in and of
Mineral Futures of the Oceans 35

itself, has not been sufficient to stimulate the scale-up to com-

mercialization.
Six scenarios can be drawn to focus the issues and stimulate
discussion on the prospects for marine mining in the 1980s.
These scenarios are:
1. The mining consortia wait until an UNCLOS III treaty
is ratified, and then begin mining under the treaty provisions.
2. While awaiting ratification of an UNCLOS III treaty,
the consortia proceed under unilateral national legislation or
a reciprocating States regime which will be superseded by the
treaty when it comes into force.
3. The governments of a number of States decline to ratify
the UNCLOS III treaty, and mining begins under unilateral
legislation or a reciprocating States regime.
4. The mining consortia enter into agreements with coastal
States and mine nodules, metallic crusts, or metallic brines
within the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones of those
States.
5. The existing mining consortia disband, and conduct no
further activities in the 1980s.
6. All or several of the above.

Scenario #1: Waiting for the Treaty

Waiting for the treaty may be the scenario adopted by those
companies which are multinational or transnational in their
activities. Companies which are now doing business in the
Third World may want to stay on good terms with the less
developed States at UNCLOS III. The existing investments
and enterprises of these multinational companies may simply
be too great to set at risk over deep-sea mining. One thing
they may not wish to set at risk is oil. It is significant that one
of the three owners of Ocean Mining Associates is Sun Oil
Company; two of the owners of Ocean Minerals Company
are Standard Oil of Indiana (Amoco) and Royal Dutch Shell;
and British Petroleum has a 53 percent interest in Standard
Oil of Ohio (Sohio), which has recently taken over Kennecott
Copper. The oil industry is bigger than marine mining is likely
to be for many decades. This perspective may be persuasive
for some corporate leaders.
Waiting for the treaty may also be the policy of developed
States dependent on less-developed States for their current
supply of strategic metals. The developed State may be in-
36 Mineral Futures of the Oceans

terested in developing marine minerals as a new source of sup-

ply, but not be capable of marine mining for many years. In
the meantime, it could not afford to be cut off by land-based
suppliers. By supporting the treaty, the developed State sig-
nals that it will only begin mining under treaty terms accept-
able to the less-developed States. Presumably, there would
thus be little reason for the less-developed States to cut off
supplies to the developed State in the scale-up period before
mining begins.
Waiting for the treaty may also be the position of the finan-
cial communities of developed States. National unilateral leg-
islation may provide for the establishment of claims, and a re-
ciprocating States regime would resolve conflicts between the
companies of different States. While some security is thereby
provided, the question hovers in the background: If an
UNCLOS III treaty is ratified, will the International Sea-Bed
Authority recognize the claims established under a reciprocat-
ing States regime? If not what is the point of proceeding? Un-
til the Authority accepts the claim, the investment risk may be
too high. Security of tenure depends on a successful transition
from the validation of claims by reciprocating States to vali-
dation by the Authority. Since that transition cannot be
assured, the financiers may prefer to wait.
One disadvantage of waiting for the treaty is that the treaty
may be unfavorable to the mining companies. In both public
and private statements, many members of the consortia have
been critical of the Draft Convention of the Law of the Sea
currently being discussed at UNCLOS III. In general, those
States with the technology and capital available to develop
deep ocean mining technology are those States with free
enterprise or modified capitalist systems. In those systems,
companies generally compete with each other, while the gov-
ernment plays the role of referee or guide. The proposed
international regime for deep seabed mining under an
UNCLOS III treaty is alien to these companies. Under pro-
posed treaty provisions, a company would have to contribute
a share of profits to develop "the common heritage" for the
benefit of mankind, especially the developing States; it would
have to live within certain quotas, which would give it less
flexibility in responding to the market; it would have to trans-
fer technology which may be its prime asset in market compe-
tition; and most unusual of all, if would have to compete with
Mineral Futures of the Oceans 37

an Enterprise which is the organ of its regulator. The Interna-

tional Sea-Bed Authority will set the rules, and may set them
to the advantage of one of the competitors, the Enterprise.
Another disadvantage of waiting is that waiting does not
assure an UNCLOS III treaty. There may never be one, or it
may have too few parties to enter into force, or too few par-
ties to be effective after entering into force. Even with success
assured, the wait could be very long. International experience
with treaty-making is not encouraging. One commentator
suggests that 80 parties will be necessary for an UNCLOS III
treaty to be a success. However, the multilateral treaties
which entered into force from 1947-1971 averaged only 30-48
parties. Even large, relatively non-controversial treaty-
making efforts have not resulted in a large number of ratify-
ing parties. For example, the 1968-69 Vienna Conference on
the Law of Treaties was attended by 110 States; the final text
was accepted by 79, and it was signed by only 47. By 1980, ten
years later, only 33 States had ratified or acceded to the
treaty, two short of the number needed to enter into force.
Fifteen ocean-related treaties which came into force after
1946 were still in force by 1979. Most of these treaties were
narrowly focused and relatively unimportant. Only three
achieved more than 80 parties-the IMCO Convention, the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, and
the International Convention on Loadlines. The proposed
UNCLOS III treaty, of course, is far broader in scope than
these treaties. A more meaningful comparison is with the four
1958 Geneva Conventions and Optional Protocol. States
could sign the individual conventions; only 14 signed all five.
Since all five together are equivalent to the UNCLOS III
treaty, there is some doubt as to whether UNCLOS III will at-
tract the 36-50 parties to enter into force or the 80 to become
a success.
If the treaty does enter into force, it could take many years
to do so. It took an average of six years for the four Geneva
Conventions to enter into force. The Territorial Sea Conven-
tion was signed by forty three States, less than half of those at
the Conference. Only half of those forty three have ratified
the treaty in the twenty years since then. The least controver-
sial Convention, the Convention on the High Seas, took thir-
teen years to obtain fifty parties.
Achieving agreement on the proposed UNCLOS III treaty
 38 Mineral Futures of the Oceans

is a monumental task, unparalleled in the number of States

involved and the breadth of issues included. It has taken
seven years so far, and seeing it through ratification could
take another decade or more. The disadvantage of waiting for
the treaty is thus that the wait will be long and the outcome is
not certain.

Scenario #2: Unilateral Action or a Reciprocating States

Regime While Waiting for the Treaty
The desire to preserve industry momentum may lead to
commercialization and even mining under unilateral legisla-
tion or a reciprocating States regime while awaiting the ratifi-
cation of an UNCLOS III treaty. The Deep Seabed Hard
Mineral Resources Act which was enacted on June 28, 1980 in
the United States and the Act on Interim Regulation of Deep
Seabed Mining which was promulgated on August 16, 1980 in
the Federal Republic of Germany both provide that commer-
cial mining may begin before the ratification of an UNCLOS
III treaty. However, both laws provide that commercial min-
ing shall not be permitted before January 1, 1988. This gives
UNCLOS III seven years to obtain ratification of a treaty
before U.S. or West German companies begin commercial
operations. Each law allows the creation of a reciprocating
States regime while the treaty moves toward ratification.
--- This scenario provides a fallback position in the event a
treaty does not enter into force. This scenario would also be
attractive if a company could be assured of mining its chosen
sites for five to ten years before a treaty takes effect. That
period of time could be sufficient to recover capital costs and
obtain a return on investment. However, while it could take
ten years for the treaty to be ratified, industry needs seven or
eight years just to scale up for commercial operations. Add-
ing ten years for commercial activity means seventeen to eigh-
teen years, and the ratification of the treaty may not take that
long.
Another attractive aspect of moving ahead before an
UNCLOS III treaty enters into force is the fact that a recipro-
cating States regime could serve as a model for the Authority.
Permit procedures, conflict resolution, and a range of multi-
lateral administrative agreements would be in operation as
part of a reciprocating States regime. Their effectiveness will
be influential, and the established system could be adopted in
Mineral Futures of the Oceans 39

whole or in part by the Authority. This could give developed

States a role in shaping a regime which is suitable to them.
The disadvantage of this approach is that it does not elim-
inate the risk that the Authority which comes into existence
will not recognize the claims established under the reciprocat-
ing States regime. This risk could be allayed by national legis-
lation providing insurance or compensation, an approach
which was rejected by the Congress in passing the U.S.
legislation and the Bundestag in passing the West German
legislation.

Scenario #3: Unilateral Action by, or a Reciprocating States

Regime Among Those not Party to the Treaty
A number of states may decline to ratify the treaty. Uni-
lateral action by the States with mining technology might lead
quickly to a multilateral treaty or reciprocating States regime.
A multilateral treaty among those nations capable and in-
terested in manganese nodule mining would be consistent
with the pattern of international law over the past centuries.
Those nations with the ability to conduct deep ocean mining
would negotiate a treaty to protect their own claims. A recip-
rocating States regime might involve only a handful of
countries-U.S., Germany, Britain, Japan, France, the
Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy. But since these are the ma-
jor countries whose governments and companies are involved
in deep ocean mining development, an agreement among
these States could establish a workable international regime.
This agreement could be reached after each government has
declined to ratify an UNCLOS III treaty. States may oppose
specific treaty terms, and may also believe that much of what
is good in the treaty has already become accepted and may
even be customary international law. The acceptance of an
Exclusive Economic Zone is an example of a major new con-
cept which benefits many coastal States and is not likely to be
challenged even if it is not specifically ratified in the form of
an UN CLOS III treaty.
No doubt, technologically advanced nations have
something to lose, either ideologically or practically, by
rejecting the treaty. Presumably, they would not be at the
bargaining table unless they felt there was something to gain.
However, technologically advanced nations are vulnerable to
a shut down of their entire economies if critical metals are not
40 Mineral Futures of the Oceans

available. The U.S., for example, is dependent upon imports

for overwhelming percentages of many critical metals. It is no
surprise that one of the most active consortia today is Ocean
Mining Associates, which is partly owned by U.S. Steel. U.S.
Steel needs manganese as a scavenger and alloy in steel pro-
duction. The U.S. imports 98 percent of its manganese. While
the total amount needed is not large and might be supplied by
a single ocean mining operation, the metal is critical to U.S.
industry.
This scenario may be adopted by developed States which
are willing to risk conflict in order to obtain a stable source of
supply of critical metals. The disadvantages are uncertain.
The prospects for a reciprocating States regime which has re-
jected the treaty are clouded by the fact that a treaty could be
ratified by the less-developed States and be considered by
them to be in full force and effect. The Authority would be
brought into existence, and would be in direct conflict with
the activities of a reciprocating States regime which consisted
of States rejecting the treaty. Should a situation such as this
come to pass, the Authority would be obliged to assert its
regulatory control, since it would otherwise have no one to
regulate and no profits to share as the common heritage of
mankind. In response, the governments of the reciprocating
States regime would be obliged to protect the interests of their
nationals. At best, this conflict could lead to the negotiating
table for more years of discussion. The rejection of the treaty
and establishment of a reciprocating States regime could thus
give those reciprocating States a better bargaining position in
achieving a final resolution many years further down the
road. However, the conflict could also lead to retaliation,
such as boycotts, cartel action, the cutting off of land-based
supplies, and other "economic warfare." At worst, the con-
flict could lead to incidents of actual warfare. Retaliatory ac-
tion by less developed States would be modified by the need
of some States to continue selling products - including land-
based metals- to developed States, or the need of some less
developed States to obtain capital from developed States for a
variety of projects.
A further disadvantage is that not all States passing unilat-
eral legislation may become part of a reciprocating States
regime. Differences in national legislation may preclude
reciprocal recognition. This could create confusion and result
Mineral Futures of the Oceans 41

in conflicting claims. Also, in the same way that "flags of con-

venience" have affected marine shipping, "permits of conve-
nience" may affect marine mining. As one commentator
notes, ". . . if nations initiate deep seabed mining under
reasonable regulatory programmes on the basis that such
mining is a freedom of the high seas, there is an inherent risk
that other nations may abuse this freedom." If they do, an in-
clusive reciprocating States regime may not be possible.

Scenario #4: Marine Mining Within Exclusive

Economic Zones
The mining consortia with an immediate need for critical
metals may move to exploit the marine minerals within
200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). Within each
EEZ, the mining consortia would not have to wait ten years
for ratification of an UN CLOS III treaty, or take the risk of
operating under a reciprocating States regime which conflicts
with or is superseded by an Authority. The advantage to the
coastal State is that it may be able to negotiate a favorable ar-
rangement to obtain a share of the profits for itself, rather
than sharing the profits among the entire common heritage of
mankind. This would not violate the spirit of the proposed
UNCLOS III treaty, since that treaty would establish exclu-
sive economic zones for purposes such as this.
There are several disadvantages to this approach. First of
all, the richest known deposits of manganese nodules are in
the deepest ocean waters, far beyond most EEZs. Deposits
within the EEZs may not be as valuable. Second, deposits
within 200-mile zones may be in the form of multi-metallic
crusts or metallic brines rather than nodules. Mining these
deposits would require a reworking of the mining technology.
Also there is the simple fact that surveying, sampling, and
analyzing prospective marine mining sites can take many
years. Surveying and sampling in the Clarion-Clipperton frac-
ture zone has been going on for a decade, and companies are
only now finalizing the sites for which they would like to file
mining claims. It would take a number of years to evaluate
the metallic deposits within the EEZs of countries interested
in doing business. Mining in the EEZs may thus be several
years behind the state of the art for deep-sea mining in the
Clarion-Clipperton fracture zone.
Yet three examples indicate the potential of this approach.
42 Mineral Futures of the Oceans

First of all, Chile has issued a notice that it will welcome bids
for manganese nodule mining within its 200-mile zone around
an offshore island known as Juan Fernandez Island. Another
area of interest is found within the 200-mile zone around Mex-
ico's Revillagigedo archipelago, 800 km west of the mainland.
Perhaps more instructive is the agreement already reached by
Preussag Aktiengesellschaft, a German company, to mine
metalliferous sediments in the Red Sea. Preussag intends to
begin mining this summer backed by Arabian oil money and
with the permission of the coastal State. Thus, the first major
marine mining operation will in fact be within an EEZ, but it
will not be a manganese nodule mining operation.

Scenario #5: The Existing Nodule Mining Consortia

Give Up
International mining ventures are often joint ventures
established to share the risks and accumulate capital for
specific projects. These appear to be two of the major reasons
the existing consortia were formed. Much of the attention of
the consortia has been focused on security for their in-
vestments, in order to obtain capital from the money mar-
kets. A single mining operation could require a capital invest-
ment of anywhere between $900 million and $1.4 billion in
today's dollars, and the mining consortia may not be able to
obtain this kind of money without investment banker sup-
port. This is not an especially large amount of money, com-
pared to other mining projects. Money may be hard to come
by, however, since a treaty could be unfavorable to a return
on investment; a reciprocating States regime pending a treaty
could end in the non-recognition of the investment by a new
Authority; a reciprocating States regime among States not
party to the treaty could lead to conflict; and it may not be
feasible to rework the mining technology and obtain satisfac-
tory agreements with coastal States for mining in the EEZs.
Thus, a sufficient amount of money may not be available in
the coming decade under the four scenarios discussed above.
If so, the existing consortia may decide to defer action or give
up and write off their losses.
Even if money becomes available, the companies involved
in these consortia have many economic opportunities outside
of marine mining. Other opportunities may have an earlier
payback period, and be less risky. In addition to money, the
Mineral Futures of the Oceans 43

consortia have assigned key personnel from their own staffs

and have kept them at work for a number of years. These
people are valuable, and along with the money, may be re-
assigned to more promising and more immediate opportuni-
ties. Once reassigned, it is unlikely that all of these personnel
would be available again in the near future. A new team
would have to be formed, and much of the previous experi-
ence could be lost in the process. Companies may be willing to
do this, however, in order to make more productive use of
their funds and personnel in the interim. While one or two
years of start-up time would be added due to the need to as-
semble and train a new team, this second start would only be
made when there was much greater assurance that mining
would indeed take place in the very near future.
For the existing consortia, disbanding may not even mean
the forfeiture of each company's leadership position. In light
of the head start which the existing consortia have over new
entrants into the market, a new entrant with major financing
could require three or four years to catch up. The existing
consortia would have the same period of time to reactivate
their teams or form new teams to continue work based on
previous company experience.
For the consortia themselves, the disadvantages of giving
up is not only loss of experience on the part of their teams,
but the fact that they remain vulnerable to price escalation or
the cutoff in supply of metals critical for industry in the
developed States. Even if individual companies are willing to
risk price escalation or a cutoff in supply, it is not clear that
governments are. The governments of the U.S., Germany,
and Japan, for example, are likely to encourage and promote
the development of the marine mining industry by their pri-
vate sectors in order to support national strategic interests in
metals. Which particular company goes forward may not be
at issue; it will be in each developed State's interest that at
least one of its companies do so.
"Giving up" may not last beyond the eighties. While sup-
plies of land-based ores may still be large, existing mines will
become exhausted or uneconomical. The percentage of value
metals in the ores has been decreasing, and the amount of
land withdrawn into wilderness or unavailable for technical
or environmental reasons has also increased. The cost of
land-based mining will thus continue to rise. As for new
44 Mineral Futures of the Oceans

mines, the record to date in laterite ore processing is not en-

couraging. In short, marine minerals will eventually be mined
because they will become economically competitive, and are
the only major long-term alternative to today's land-based
mining.

Scenario #6: All or Several of the Above

The strategic interests of States and the activities of their
companies vary sufficiently that none of the above scenarios
may describe what all of the States or consortia will do. For
example, Ocean Management, Inc. is partly owned by INCO
[Ltd.] [International Nickel Corporation] of Canada, which
has a substantial portion of the world's nickel supply. The
Kennecott Copper Group is led by Kennecott, which has a
substantial portion of the U.S. copper market. Both of these
consortia are largely inactive at present. Since they have sig-
nificant supplies of land-based ores, they can afford to "give
up" for now. They are in a defensive position-if someone
else moves in to mine, they can reactivate to defend their
market positions.
On the other hand, Ocean Mining Associates (OMA) may
move ahead to secure manganese for U.S. Steel. Ocean
Minerals Company (OMCO) may also move ahead. OMCO is
partly owned by Standard Oil of Indiana, whose subsidiary,
Amoco Minerals Company, has embarked upon a broad pro-
gram of minerals acquisition. OMA and OMCO may push
for a reciprocating States regime pending an UNCLOS III
treaty. If the U.S. declines to become a party to the treaty,
these companies may seek compensation provisions to pro-
ceed under unilateral legislation or a reciprocating States
regime composed of States which are not parties to the treaty.
The existing consortia, of course, may split up. Preussag,
for example, is a member of the OMI [Ocean Management,
Inc.] group, but has ventured on its own to mine metallifer-
ous sediments in the Red Sea. Deep Ocean Mining Company
(DOMCO) of Japan, also an OMI member, may wait for a
treaty. The Japanese government announced last year that it
was launching a seven year research program to survey sites, a
program which is consistent with the timetable for a treaty.
Passage of unilateral legislation which would be superseded
by a treaty would allow Japanese companies to participate
in a reciprocating States regime, which could recognize
Mineral Futures of the Oceans 45

and establish DOMCO claims while waiting for treaty

ratification. 11

Seabed Mining and the Commons

As a result of the review of the UNCLOS treaty by the
Reagan Administration, international speculation has fo-
cused on the alternative scenarios described by Keith. Ambas-
sador T.T.B. (Tommy) Koh, president of the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, puts it this way:

A further possible outcome of the United States review

might be the conclusion that the United States ... was not in
favour of a treaty, that its national interests were taken care
of by State practice and customary international law in so far
as deep seabed mining was concerned, and that it would be
preferable to persuade its industrial partners . . . Japan, the
United Kingdom, Belgium, and France ... to enact national
legislation with reciprocating provisions ... a "mini-treaty."
If that option became a reality . . . the developing and the
socialist countries might proceed to adopt this treaty, and
become party to it . . . with the result that . . . under interna-
tional law there would be ... a mini-treaty signed ... by
some five industrial States ... and a maxi-treaty ... signed
by over 100 States. If the developing countries decided to take
the matter to the International Court of Justice ... the
Court might rule in favour of the maxi-treaty side holding
that the national laws in question were contrary to interna-
tional law. In that event ... those who had developed the ex-
pensive seabed mining technology involving major economic
investments would obtain the kind of legal security
which . . . was . . . necessary . . . for risking the venture
capital. 12

In light of these scenarios and predictions we might ask

which, if any, fit within the concept of a marine commons.
Certainly it is neither desirable nor necessary that a commons
be unregulated. Indeed such lack of regulation would insure
one kind of "tragedy of the commons." 13 In this instance the
tragedy would most probably be the flooding of the world
mineral markets and the financial collapse of the investing
46 Mineral Futures of the Oceans

entrepreneurs. Three elements appear necessary to satisfy the

notion of a global commons: (1) guaranteed access to the
resource for all duly constituted economic entities, (2) pro-
duction limitations in response to world need and demand,
and (3) suitable principles for the granting of licenses, as-
sessment of royalties, and apportionment of production limi-
tations. Proponents of UNCLOS III would argue that the
proposed text is just such an arrangement. Proponents of a
reciprocating states regime argue that their kind of mini-
treaty would most closely approximate the ideal. In either
event the utilization of this resource in any manner will re-
quire some acceptable regime to enable investors to risk the
huge amounts of capital required for exploitation.
 4
Living Resource Futures
of the Oceans

The problems that must be resolved in achieving a

regulated and equitable commons in the oceans can be seen
most clearly in the case of living resources. Although the
economic value of these resources does not match the value
of the oceans' use for transportation, energy, defense, or
(potentially) mineral resources, the social and political impor-
tance of satisfying food needs and dietary preferences makes
the status of living marine resources a major international
issue. The complexities of ocean energy and mineral recovery
may prove to be simplistic when compared to the regimes
now developing for the living resources of the sea.

The Diversity of Fisheries

Fishing as an international resource as opposed to a local
one was not of significance until the invention of salt preser-
vation in the fourteenth century. Since that time there has
been a steady world increase in the annual harvest of marine
protein, based on the general notion of the ocean as a com-
mons and the assumption that supply would always exceed
demand. In Melville's novel Moby Dick, an entire essay is
devoted to the inexhaustibility of the world's supply of
whales. Even when the error of this assumption became ap-
parent, a similar assumption was made about most other
ocean life and was believed to be true until the mid-1940s.
Shortly after World War II scientific concern was directed
to the possible exhaustibility of the oceans' living resources.

47
48 Living Resource Futures of the Oceans

In 1955, Dr. John Ryther of the Woods Hole Oceanographic

Institute estimated that the maximum sustainable yield per
year of fish protein (caught by conventional means and from
conventional resources) was 55 million metric tons. Last year
(1981) and for the past several years, the world catch has been
in excess of 70 million metric tons. Overfishing on a world-
wide basis has been much in the news as a serious interna-
tional policy issue. Techniques used by Russian and Japa-
nese fleets have demonstrably depressed populations of fish
in a number of traditional fishery areas, particularly off
the northeast coast of the United States, and have exac-
erbated fears about the adequacy of the world's fishery re-
sources.
Fish are of course not evenly distributed throughout the
ocean. The normal temperature density structure of the
ocean is such that the nutrients required to sustain a standing
crop of animals sink into the deep water below the photic
zone. Only in places of natural upwelling are the deep,
nutrient-rich waters returned to the surface, providing food
for a rich fishery. These areas of upwelling are found in (1)
two belts above and below the equator, (2) the Arctic and
Antarctic, and (3) wherever major currents (for example, the
Gulf Stream, Kuroshio, Japanese Current, and Humboldt
Current) intersect the coastlines. Thus the Grand Banks; the
coasts of Chile, Ecuador, and Peru; Taiwan; and the Alaskan
archipelago are among the areas most abundant in fish. (See
Figure 5.)
Much of the world's seafood is not fish but arthropods,
mollusks, and even reptiles. For all these groups the type of
species affects the locale of the resource. Sedentary demersal
species of shrimps, oysters, clams, crabs, and lobsters stay
more or less fixed within a coastal jurisdiction. Pelagic fish
such as the various species of tuna (albacore, yellow fin, big
eye), the wahoo, the mahi mahi, and the billfish make regular
migrations across the ocean, following paths of high nutrient
concentration. The anadromous fish such as salmon begin
their life in freshwater streams, move out into the open sea,
and return unerringly to the stream from whence they came.
Strange but valuable creatures such as the oceanic eel spawn
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50 Living Resource Futures of the Oceans

in unknown regions, spend their lives as elvers in a limited

number of coastal waters, and are either impounded in aqua-
farms or return to the open sea as they reach maturity.
The Hawaiian green sea turtle begins its life in a United
States wildlife bird sanctuary. The few newly hatched turtles
that escape from the protected birds enter the waters of
Hawaii. Three miles out they are in waters governed by the
FCMA (Fisheries Conservation Management Act); for the
next two hundred miles they are under the full protection of
the endangered species act. They then enter unprotected in-
ternational waters and are fair game and good eating for any
vessel not returning to a U.S. port. In their long migration
they swim into and out of international, federal, and state
waters under varying degrees of protection (in state waters
they may be taken by native Hawaiians for subsistence), until
they end up in the soup in Kiribati (the Gilberts).
The greatest impact of changes in the Law of the Sea is felt
by traditional fishermen, especially those operating in "dis-
tant waters" (as worded in the UNCLOS III treaty). Initially,
mutual protection for both the resource and the industry was
obtained by regional treaties. These treaties have in general
been negotiated for exploitation of fishing resources that re-
quire large capital expenditure (tuna, whale). However, only
a few nations have fished these resources.
Nonsignatory nations have tacitly agreed not to enter ter-
ritorial waters. Nonetheless, at times a nation with a quota
limit has sold its fishing vessels to a nonsignatory that in turn
has harvested the resource in excess of the quota for sale in
the ports of the signatory nation.
Within the 200-mile economic zone proposed by the
UNCLOS treaty, the harvest of fish is to be managed by the
coastal state. Under the treaty terms, the coastal state may
reserve to itself that proportion of the maximum sustainable
yield of each species that it is capable of harvesting with its
fleet of fishing vessels. The excess (if any) must be allocated
to other nations with priority to adjacent coastal states and to
states that are zone-locked or land-locked by the coastal state
having jurisdiction.
Living Resource Futures of the Oceans 51

U.S. Fishery Management Dilemmas

U.S. fishery problems stem from the diversity of the
fishing interests and fisheries. The major distant water fishery
is that of the San Diego tuna fleet, whose interest is to pursue
the tuna wherever they go. The fleet maintains the right to
fish within three miles of any coastal state. For more than
two decades the nations of Chile, Ecuador, and Peru have
been arresting and fining crews of U.S. tuna boats that ven-
ture within their declared 200-mile limits, and the U.S. tax-
payer has been paying the fines. The tuna fishermen thus op-
pose the application of the 200-mile zone to tuna and support
such organizations as the Eastern Tropical Tuna Organiza-
tion, which regulates the catch on a regional basis.
Economically as valuable as the tuna fleet, but with less
political clout, is the shrimp fishery. A large portion of its
catch is taken in the coastal waters of Brazil and Mexico. The
remainder is concentrated in waters of the Gulf. The shrimp-
men want to exclude foreigners from the U.S. 200-mile zone
while preserving the traditional three-mile zone in South
America. This is in contrast to the position taken by coastal
fishermen of the Northeast, who are unanimous in their dedi-
cation to an Exclusive Economic Zone.
To further complicate matters, the salmon fishermen pro-
pose that their ocean fishery be unfished, so that the salmon
may be harvested upon their return to protected northwest
waters shortly before their breeding time.
Alaska has yet another perception. Alaskan fishermen
share with New England the desire for an Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone for the king crab and demersal species. One of
their richest resources, the pollack, has little commercial
value on the mainland but is extremely popular in Japan. A
regime is thus sought to assure the availability of the species
to the Japanese market and profit to the U.S. entrepreneur.
The varied interests of the United States are embodied in
the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act (FCMA).
This act was intended to be a model for the UN, but was a
model the UN did not follow. It extends U.S. jurisdiction for
52 Living Resource Futures of the Oceans

the management of fisheries to 200 miles. Two kinds of com-

missions are established- regional and scientific. Acting on
the advice of the scientific commissions, the regional commis-
sions establish for each species a "maximum sustainable
yield" and an "optimal sustainable yield." They also assess the
U.S. fishing industry's capability for each species. The excess
is to be allocated to foreign fleets on the basis of their re-
quests, taking account of their prior use of the fisheries.
In principle, the plans and the allocations are made by the
secretary of commerce. In practice, the regional commissions
(composed of politicians, fishermen, fish processors, and
port officials) provide the basic plan. The basic plan satisfies
the control desires of the coastal fishermen and the negotia-
tion requirements of the shrimpmen. To placate the tuna fish-
ermen the act specifically defines pelagic fish as only tuna-
and then exempts them from the act. To satisfy the salmon
fishermen, jurisdiction over salmon that originate in U.S.
waters is extended to cover them beyond 200 miles, wherever
they may be. The act is thus all things to all fishing interests.
The difficulties in execution are already apparent. The
most fundamental problem is the estimate of maximum sus-
tainable yield. Marine biologists are simply not capable of
making such an estimate, except for a few species such as cor-
als (which grow like trees) or live bearers (such as sharks).
The simple and basic model assumes that the annual recruit-
ment is proportional to the size of the stock; it is fallacious.
Only a small fraction of the fish that spawn will survive in the
open ocean. The fraction is highly dependent upon oceano-
graphic and climatic conditions and can vary from year to
year. Thus the annual recruitment and the size of the stock
may not be proportional at all. The late John Isaacs of
Scripps Institution has shown that the season-to-season ap-
pearances of stocks of sardine and anchovy in the vicinity of
Monterey Bay are related to long-term temperature cycles,
and the economically disastrous drop in population of the an-
chovetta off the coast of Chile is now thought to be related to
the abnormal behavior of El Nino, the equatorial wind. 14
Despite these uncertainties, the law requires that the scien-
tific commissions determine the "maximum sustainable"
Living Resource Futures of the Oceans 53

yield. This is at best a bad guess by frustrated scientists. The

commissions must then employ environmental, social, and
economic criteria to arrive at an "optimal yield," which may
be less than, equal to, or in excess of the "maximum sus-
tainable yield." The temptation to yield to political con-
siderations in making an uncertain determination is often
irresistible.
A case in point arises from the desire of the Hawaii
regional commission to eliminate or drastically reduce
Japanese tuna fishing within the 200-mile zone. This is both a
legal and policy proscription of the Act. However, a fact of
fishing life is that the catch of tuna will include an incidental
catch of billfish. The scientific commission has concluded
that the catch of billfish in the economic zone is so small that
no quota is justified. Nevertheless, the regional commission is
proposing a "billfish plan" whose net effect is to further
restrict tuna fishing in the 200-mile zone.
In administering the FMCA, cost constraints must be
added to the scientific difficulties. For several small species
the cost of preparing the management plan has exceeded the
value of the catch. The total cost of administering the act is
more than the fees received from fishing licenses. Enforce-
ment and the cost of enforcement are major problems yet to
be faced. The Coast Guard and the Department of Com-
merce are officially confident that the act is working effec-
tively. Currently, there are official observers on about 20 per-
cent of the foreign ships in the 200-mile zone. It is too early to
assess the government's ability to keep a cadre of inspectors
continuously at sea as the sole (and adverse) "alien" observers
on ships with hard-working officers and crew. Interviews
with a few of the young people who have been on such a mis-
sion as inspectors and observers reveal that they had an in-
teresting experience they would not want to repeat. Arrests of
crews of ships fishing illegally in the zone have been made
and at least one major case of underreporting has been un-
covered. In all cases stiff fines were successfully levied, but
the arrest, detention, and diplomatic costs were high.
A number of other disturbing factors are present. There
are many more license requests than are realistic for the exist-
54 Living Resource Futures of the Oceans

ing quotas; foreign nations have not utilized a significant por-

tion of the quotas; and catches reported "outside" zones of
national jurisdiction have dramatically increased.

The Pelagic Game

Only the United States has devised and promulgated such a
complex and sophisticated regime as that of the FMCA.
Many other nations (altogether 89 of the 120 coastal nations)
have established economic zones of 200 miles in which fish
are regulated. In all of these zones, the management includes
pelagic fish as they pass through the zones. Island nations
without the capital or technical infrastructure to exploit their
own resources are eager to sell fishirig rights in the zone.
Negotiations have already taken place between the Federated
States of Micronesia and the Japanese, and they are under
way between U.S. interests and various island entities in the
South Pacific. In view of the migratory nature of tuna as the
major resource, their journey through international waters,
and the large number of island nations seeking hard currency,
the fishing nations and their major commercial fishers are
driving hard bargains (as seen from the island perspective).
This has been a factor in uniting the nations of the South
Pacific Forum in an attempt to create a regional organization
that would have complete management control of the South
Pacific tuna stocks. These stocks are as yet underutilized and
are therefore of great interest to distant water commercial
fishing interests.
If one draws 200-mile circles around the islands of the
South Pacific Forum (see Figure 6), most but not all of the
South Pacific waters of interest will be seen to fall within the
combined 200-mile jurisdictions. The dilemma of the Forum
is bimodal: (1) the island nations can create a regime that is
completely regional but must then allow the United States,
Japan, Korea, and other "distant water fishing states" in the
Pacific Basin to become parties to the agreement; or, (2) they
can create a regime with overlapping and disputed 200-mile
zones. In the former instance there will be an opportunity for
56 Living Resource Futures of the Oceans

cooperation with the fishing nations to secure capital invest-

ment in canneries and the assets and technology for enforce-
ment. In the latter instance, there will be a substantial
irregularly shaped hole in the center of a doughnut that is in-
ternational water, and such large quantities of tuna may be
"caught in the international zone" that inspection and
enforcement will be nonexistent. In either event, the
opportunity for fishing nations and economic entities to par-
ticipate in the harvest of the resource will be substantial.
Fortunately, the game of "access to the resource" is not a
zero-sum game. Many techniques exist or have the potential
for being developed to increase the quantity of the resource
and the ease with which it is harvested. Among these are the
development of fish-aggregating (passive) and fish-attractant
(active; sound, odor, light) buoys; the development of
atypical habitats (such as tropical reefs and cages), genetic
breeding to develop new migratory patterns for salmon; tech-
niques for spawning, breeding, and growing juveniles in
hatcheries to guarantee adequate annual recruitment for a
wide variety of species; development of techniques of artifi-
cial upwelling; and utilization of other protein sources such
as krill. It has been estimated that total productivity of the
ocean could be raised to 2,000 million metric tons per year.
These technological and capital-intensive techniques will not
be developed unless the developer has access to the resource.
But availability of capital and know-how will be a powerful
incentive for port states and coastal jurisdictions to negotiate
arrangements suitable to the developer.

Exhortations in the Draft Treaty

One might well conclude from this sketch that the ocean as
a commons for living resources has disappeared, and that its
restoration is at best problematical. A de facto commons
may, however, evolve from the regime of the Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone as a result of technological, economic, political,
and social pressures. The language of exhortation in
UNCLOS III clearly calls for such a regime:
Living Resource Futures of the Oceans 57

Article 62
Utilization of the Living Resources
3. In giving access to other States to its exclusive economic
zone under this article, the coastal State shall take into ac-
count all relevant factors, including, inter alia, the signif-
icance of the living resources of the area to the economy of
the coastal State concerned and its other national interests,
the provisions of articles 69 and 70, the requirements of
developing States in the subregion or region in harvesting part
of the surplus and the need to minimize economic dislocation
in States whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone or
which have made substantial efforts in research and iden-
tification of stocks. 15

Article 69
Right of Land-locked States
1. Land-locked States shall have the right to participate,
on an equitable basis, in the exploitation of an appropriate
part of the surplus of the living resources of the exclusive
economic zones of coastal States of the same subregion or
region, taking into account the relevant economic and geo-
graphical circumstances of all States concerned and in con-
formity with the provisions of this article and of articles 61
and 62. 16

Article 70
Rights of States with Special Geographical Characteristics
1. States with special geographical characteristics shall
have the right to participate, on an equitable basis, in the ex-
ploitation of an appropriate part of the surplus of the living
resources of the exclusive economic zones of coastal States of
the same subregion or region, taking into account the relevant
economic and geographical circumstances of all the States
concerned and in conformity with the provisions of this arti-
cle and of articles 61 and 62. 17

Although these rights are easily defeated by coastal states

that invoke the harvesting-capability provision of the treaty,
most developing countries do not in fact have such capabili-
58 Living Resource Futures of the Oceans

ties. Thus, most coastal states will have to enter joint-venture

agreements with one or more of the few technologically
capable fishing nations. These nations need access to the
resource in order to meet their own dietary requirements and
preferences. If economic stress is equated to equitable access
and if coastal states are willing to provide full access to
economically capable nations, then the ideal of the regulated
commons will have been approached. However, it is doubtful
that the priorities, the yields, or the equities will be estab-
lished with international fairness as the prime criterion.

Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit

Two contrasting perceptions - that of Korea, a distant
water fishing nation, and that of the South Pacific Forum, a
regional administration whose jurisdiction encompasses a sig-
nificant portion of the South Pacific tuna resource - high-
light the gap between reality and rationalization.
Dr. Choung 11 Chee of Korea contributed to the Pacific
Basin workshop in Tokyo a paper entitled "Sharing of Fish-
eries Resources between the Coastal and Other States:
Towards Equity." He puts the case this way:

The final triumph for the claim of coastal fisheries jurisdic-

tion came when UNCLOS III ... adopted the Draft Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea in 1980 ... whereby the
coastal state is given a sovereign right to control its resources
within 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones. Thus an evolu-
tion in the unilateralism of coastal state rights over natural
resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone became f ait ac-
compli. It was a remarkable evolution, in that it has taken
place at the expense of the right of other states whose distant
water fishing fleets used to operate in the Exclusive Economic
Zone of the coastal state. The lack of balance in the fishing
rights between the coastal and noncoastal states is evident
under the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea: the dis-
tant water fishing nations are now deprived of their fishing
grounds due to the adoption of a 200-mile fishing zone by
coastal states, where coastal states are to exercise sovereign
Living Resource Futures of the Oceans 59

rights over natural resources. This is quite contrary to justice

and equity for the noncoastal states whose fishing interests
should have been adequately safeguarded under law. Now
that the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea is in a final
stage and that state practices of a 200-mile fishing zone have
become f ait accompli, it may be difficult to restore a proper
balance for the rights of noncoastal states. But a reflection on
the needs for equitable balance in the fishing interests of both
coastal and noncoastal states may serve a useful purpose for
the development of rule of law in the interest of international
community. 18
The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea that has fi-
nally emerged under UNCLOS III after seven years of work
has not brought out a balanced version of resource sharing
between the coastal and noncoastal states. The Convention as
a whole tilts towards favoring the fishing interests of the
coastal state at the expense of the rights of noncoastal states
by recognizing the sovereign rights of coastal states to natural
resources within their EEZ. The regime of EEZ is declared as
the specific legal regime under Article 55 of the Draft Con-
vention. The coastal state has the right to determine not only
the allowable catch, but also the harvesting capacity of the
fisheries resources in the EEZ. Noncoastal states are only
allowed their access to the surplus of fisheries resources after
the coastal state has determined the allowable catch and its
harvesting capacity. Thus the unilateralism of the coastal
state's right to natural resources within its EEZ is so complete
that the right of noncoastal states to the EEZ of the coastal
state is no longer a right of any substance. 19
An equitable sharing of fisheries resources requires that the
countries whose dependence on fisheries for the supply of
more than 50 percent of animal protein should be given a
special consideration in their demand for an access to the
EEZs of other states. Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan,
and many countries of South and Southeast Asia belong to
countries of such category. The Draft Convention on the Law
of the Sea does make a reference to such situation by pro-
viding that "the nutritional needs of the population of the
respective States" should be taken into account in giving ac-
cess to certain countries under Articles 69 and 70 of the Con-
vention, but such provisions are confined to the land-locked
60 Living Resource Futures of the Oceans

states and states with special geographical characteristics, and

they did not go far enough to cover other distant water fishing
nations. 20
Current development on the law of the sea demonstrates
that the rights of the coastal state have progressively ex-
panded to an almost exclusive right to control fisheries within
its EEZ. On the other hand, the access right of other states
has been correspondingly diminished and it has now become
restricted to the "surplus" resources. Movement toward this
development could be traced to the combination of multiple
factors, such as the notion of "adjacency," special depen-
dence on fisheries, and an effective control of fisheries
resources. But with the exception of the "adjacency" concept,
these criteria are equally applicable to the noncoastal states
interested in access to the EEZs of the coastal states. Thus any
argument of equity in justification of coastal state sovereign
rights to control fisheries resources could also be applied to
the noncoastal states. It should be pointed out in this connec-
tion that the developing distant water fishing nations are just
as dependent on fisheries for their economic livelihood and
the supply of food as the coastal states. Between the de-
veloped distant water fishing nations and the developing
ones, it became fairly clear that developing nations should
receive favorable considerations, which may constitute pref-
erential treatment in resource sharing based on equitable
principle.
Unfortunately, current state practices demonstrate that
they are much more strict in their policy of restricting the ac-
cess right of the noncoastal states than what has been pro-
vided under the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea. It is
quite probable that such state practices would be crystallized
into the rule of customary international law even before the
Law of the Sea Convention comes into effect. In light of this
development, it may serve a useful purpose to place fisheries
interests and the legal rights of noncoastal states in a true
perspective.
If the issue of equitable sharing of fisheries resources is to
revolve around an impartial determination instead of
unilateral determination on the distribution of fisheries
resources, such determination should have been entrusted in
the law to an impartial third party machinery. It is for this
reason that the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea
Living Resource Futures of the Oceans 61

should have created a Commission on Fisheries, whose func-

tion would have been similar to that of the Commission on
the Limit of the Continental Shelf, under the Draft Conven-
tion of the Law of the Sea. Such Commission would deter-
mine, on appeal, the issues of allowable catch, harvesting
capacity, and the amount of surplus resource in the EEZ. 21

Peter Wilson, representing Papua New Guinea and speak-

ing of the common interest of the island nations and ter-
ritories of the South Pacific Forum, presented a very dif-
ferent perspective to the Tokyo workshop. It is his view that
the concept of "Pacific Community" introduced by Prime
Minister Ohira legitimized the more limited regional com-
munity concept embodied in the concept of the South Pacific
Forum. He notes that in 1969 "the independent Pacific island
states decided to form their own organization as they felt they
were being dominated by the metropolitan powers and
needed to form their own group which could better serve
their joint objectives. Thus the South Pacific Forum came
into existence."22
If one presumes that the concept of "Pacific Community"
is a long-range goal that will evolve from the coalescence of
regional communities then it can be said, as Peter Wilson has
said, that Ohira's initiative has placed the idea of institu-
tionalizing regional cooperation on the international agenda
and that the organization of the South Pacific Forum was a
significant and anticipated event.
It is in this vein that Wilson cites the concept of a regional
fisheries organization, first introduced by the Prime Minister
of Fiji, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, at the Seventh South Pacific
Forum at Nauru in July 1976. For a period of three years the
Forum nations debated the composition of a proposed fish-
ing agency, deciding whether it was to be limited to Forum
nations and to their 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones, or
whether it was to include the "hole in the doughnut" and thus
allow participation by distant water fishing nations. Wilson's
Tokyo paper continues the story: Having opted for the more
restrictive membership, the South Pacific Forum limited its
62 Living Resource Futures of the Oceans

membership to

the following independent states: Australia, Cook Island,

Fiji, Kiribati (Gilbert Islands), Nauru, New Zealand, Niue,
Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu,
Vanuatu and Western Samoa.
Participating as observers are the Federated States of
Micronesia, Marshall Islands, and Palau, the former Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands. This gives a total of sixteen
countries. It might also be appropriate to name those islands
who do not belong. They are the United States possessions of
Hawaii, Saipan, Guam, American Samoa, and part of the
Line Islands, the French Polynesian Islands, New Caledonia,
and Wallis, and Futuna. Easter Island, a possession of Chile
in the Eastern Pacific and a few others account for most of
the balance.
The ocean mass encompassed within the South Pacific
Forum region would total some ten million square miles or
most of the Western and Central Pacific below 10°N latitude.
Total catches of tuna from this region increased from 156,200
metric tons in 1970 to 554,000 metric tons in 1979 ....
As the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency only recently
became operational it has not yet been possible to achieve the
goals of unification and harmonization envisaged by the
Leaders of the region.
As a consequence, each of the Member States in whose
waters the Distant Water Fishing Nations wish to operate
have to negotiate with experienced fisheries personnel who
have access to all catch data interpreted in any number of
ways which favour their views.
Forum Members trying to get a fair payment for the fish
taken from their fisheries zones thus feel frustrated and
cheated, as to my knowledge none of them have felt they were
actually receiving fair payment for the fish taken within their
zones. This feeling is not unjustified.
As stated, some 400-500 million dollars of tuna is being
taken from the Forum region each year. If a 'fair' price of 5
percent were paid to the countries in whose waters the fish
was taken some 20-25 million in fishing fees would be paid
into the region. Such is not the case.
Palau receives $300,000, the Federated States of Micro-
nesia get 2.5 million, the Marshalls receive a million and
Living Resource Futures of the Oceans 63

Kiribati just got another million. Papua New Guinea received

in per-boat fees 1.3 million. So only 6.3 million has actually
been received by those countries in whose waters most of the
fish is harvested. This comes to only 1.2 percent of the value
of the fish harvested.
Papua New Guinea for example received under a per-vessel
license system 2. 7 percent of the value of the fish harvested in
its zone by Japanese vessels. This is not satisfactory to Papua
New Guinea government officials and the Japanese have just
been so advised.
Papua New Guinea's views on what constitutes fair pay-
ment are based on what the fishing companies working in the
country say they can pay. Two companies, one Japanese and
one American have exported up to 50,000 metric tons of
frozen tuna a year and paid 7 .5 percent of the f.o.b. value for
that tuna to the government.
The Solomon Islands have exported some 15,000 metric
tons of skipjack and paid 10 percent export duty to the
Solomon Island Government.
The one complaint all locally based companies seem to
have in common is that the governments in whose waters they
are fishing and developing the resources should not allow ac-
cess to those waters by foreign based fishermen at rates which
are below what the local boats pay.
This seems 'fair' to Papua New Guinea. 23

Probably it is fair to say that two perspectives highlight

the equities and inequities associated with the Exclusive
Economic Zones:
1. The distant water fishing fleet faces economic bank-
ruptcy because of the ever-increasing fuel costs, the amortiza-
tion of fines and penalties "unjustly" imposed, the costs of
regulatory license fees, accountancy and bureaucracy, and
the denial of access to the resource.
2. The coastal zone state pays the capital and operating
costs to develop and maintain the fishery, develops an eco-
nomic dependency on the profits from the resource and the
resource products, pays the costs of regulation and enforce-
ment, and has to face the political problems of competition
with its own people. Moreover, the coastal zone state must
guard against economic blackmail resulting from monopolies
64 Living Resource Futures of the Oceans

or near-monopolies of technology and harvesting capability,

and must cope with the unfair competition from fishermen
who harvest the resource legally in the ocean commons or il-
legally in the economic zone of the coastal state. Under such a
regime both parties are victims of a classic negative-sum
game: "my enlightened greed, your unenlightened greed."
 5
Transportation Futures
of the Oceans

The discussions on energy, mineral, and living resources in-

cluded the tacit assumption that the ocean has remained an
unregulated commons for transportation. Indeed it has been
an assumption if not a determination on the part of the in-
dustry that transportation is set apart from other uses of the
sea, and that its independence is sacrosanct except for self-
imposed regulation.
This notion appears to be embodied in the text of
UNCLOS III. Article 17 says: "Subject to this Convention,
ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the
right of innocent passage through the territorial sea." 24 Arti-
cle 21 :2 adds: "Such laws and regulations [of the Coastal
State] shall not apply to the design, construction, manning or
equipment of foreign ships unless they are giving effect to
generally accepted international rules or standards." 25
The realities of vessel-source pollution and the extensive
damage that can be done to the environment and the coastal
zone as a result of accidents at sea, the realities of high-speed
navigation and high traffic density in accepted sea lanes and
in straits and port entries, and the capabilities of modern
technology have eroded- and ought to erode- many of the
traditional freedoms of transportation. Although the inde-
pendence of the user community is protected with respect to
pollution-protection measures by limiting enforcement to the
"flag state" (i.e., the state that grants nationality and registra-
tion to a ship) and the "port state," (i.e., the state or port to
which a ship is bound), Article 220 provides specific "coastal

65
66 Transportation Futures of the Oceans

state" opportunities for enforcement as in paragraph 2 of the

Article:

2. Where there are clear grounds for believing that a vessel

navigating in the territorial sea of a State has, during its
passage therein, violated laws and regulations of that State
adopted in accordance with this Convention or applicable in-
ternational rules and standards for the prevention, reduction
and control of pollution from vessels, that State, without pre-
judice to the application of the relevant provisions of Part II
section 3 may undertake physical inspection of the vessel
relating to the violation and may, where the evidence so
warrants, institute proceedings, including detention of the
vessel, in accordance with its laws, subject to the provisions
of section 7. 26

And in paragraph 6 of the same Article the jurisdiction of the

coastal state is further broadened to include the EEZ.

6. Where there is clear objective evidence that a vessel

navigating in the exclusive economic zone or the territorial sea
of a State has, in the exclusive economic zone, committed a
violation, referred to in paragraph 3, resulting in a discharge
causing major damage or threat of major damage to the
coastline or related interest of the coastal State, or to any
resources of its territorial sea or exclusive economic zone, that
State may, subject to the provisions of section 7, provided
that the evidence so warrants, institute proceedings, including
detention of the vessel, in accordance with its laws. 27

Dr. Edgar Gold expanded upon this theme of commons

pollution and traffic in his conference presentation entitled
"Marine Transportation in the Pacific." Specifically he re-
ferred to commons accidents, regulatory measures, and traf-
fic control systems, outlining both his views and develop-
ments thus:

One of the most important factors affecting shipping in the

last one and a half decades has been the discernible trend to
protect the marine environment. Although at least 90 percent
Transportation Futures of the Oceans 67

of all marine pollution originates from land-based sources,

the major concentration, at least until very recently, has been
against the remaining 10 percent. . . . However, the overall
effect of this trend on shipping is, and will be, felt as keenly in
the Pacific as elsewhere. Apart from the SHOWA MARU
grounding, the region has so far been preserved from major
tanker disasters of the AMOCO CADIZ dimension and
notoriety. That has been due to luck more than anything else.
The "Asian rim" oil transportation to Japan from the Middle
East has to transit several danger spots, ranging from the
shallows of the Straits of Malacca, the currents of the Sunda
and Lombok channels to the traffic density and high accident
rate of the Japanese waters. In addition, some of the oil and
LNG loading facilities in Indonesia, Borneo, and Sarawak are
in shallow, tricky, and dangerous navigable waters. Finally,
seasonal, meteorological phenomena, such as monsoon
strength and the prevalence of tropical revolving storms, such
as typhoons, further contribute to the fact that a statistical
time bomb is ticking away on a very major Pacific tanker
disaster. The preventative response from Pacific littoral states
ranges from Canada (and to a lesser extent, the U.S.A.), with
some of the strictest marine pollution regulations in the world,
to states in the South Pacific which have none at all ....
The Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organiza-
tion (IMCO), which commenced life as a small technical/
advisory United Nations body, but has now become a 121
member organization devoted to the principle of "clean seas
and safe ships," can now react with regulatory patterns, prob-
ably more restrictive than they might have been or needed to
be ....
First, the ships themselves will have to be safer and, thus,
also more expensive. New anti-pollution technology, clean
ballast systems and double bottoms will soon be mandatory.
This will eventually drive the fly-by-night companies, often
operating out of Hong Kong and Singapore and utilizing very
elderly tonnage, from the seas ... Secondly, on the human
front, IMCO's tightening of training standards for seamen
and officers will also bring about changes. The Pacific area,
particularly Indonesia, Philippines, Hong Kong, and Taiwan,
has, for some time, been a major supplier of ship personnel.
Some have been highly skilled seamen, but others have been
68 Transportation Futures of the Oceans

used as cheap labour. The new standards will even out these
differences and may force some states into a more organized
marine training system, perhaps on a regional, cooperative
basis. This human element should not be dismissed lightly.
Statistics show us that some 90 percent of all marine accidents
occur because of human error.
Thirdly, the most comprehensive change to traditional
marine transportation in the Pacific area will be the establish-
ment of new marine traffic control systems, particularly in
areas of high traffic density such as the Sea of Japan and
other semi-enclosed seas on the west Pacific rim. These will
range from "full control systems" (akin to air traffic control)
in port approaches and narrow straits, to traffic separation
zones, where warranted by traffic. It can be conceded that
this innovation is, of course, an almost complete abrogation
of the hallowed freedom-of-the-seas principle, which osten-
sibly gave a master power "between God and the sea" to take
his ship where and how he wished. However, the ever-
increasing curve of the burgeoning world fleet, dissected by
ever-increasing shipping accidents, has convinced IMCO
that, some half century after compulsory air traffic control,
an embryonic similar system for maritime transport was
indicated.
As expected, resistance by the shipping states has been
strong, and IMCO's lowest common denominator approach
has been unsatisfactory for a number of coastal states, such
as Canada, the U.S.A., and the Malacca Straits countries.
This has resulted in a certain amount of unilateralism which
has, nevertheless, set the pattern for things to come. On the
Canadian-U .S. west coast, the jointly administered Puget
Sound traffic system has operated successfully for some
years, and the Malacca Strait system, due to go into full oper-
ation later this year, is expected to provide the type of vessel
safety control that has reduced accidents in the English Chan-
nel by 45 percent. The Malacca Strait states are assisted by the
Malacca Strait Council, which basically attempts to achieve a
compromise between the hard line anti-pollution policies of
littoral states and the Japanese interests in the Malacca life-
line. Without doubt, marine traffic control will quickly estab-
lish itself as its safety statistics will speak for themselves. It can
be foreseen that further marine traffic control systems will be
established in the Hawaiian archipelago, on the Australian
Transportation Futures of the Oceans 69

coast, in all the enclosed seas off the Asian mainland, in the
main Indonesian straits, as well as the Indonesian and Philip-
pine archipelagic zones, and in the approaches to the Panama
Canal. It is unlikely that the systems will be extended beyond
200-mile exclusive economic zones in the foreseeable future.
On the other hand, the costs of the new system can be con-
siderable, and coastal states will inevitably not only require
these systems to be established where warranted but will also
ask the users to pay for them. 28

This "creeping jurisdiction"of coastal states designated in

UNCLOS III- on the one hand preventive medicine against
commons pollution and accidents, and on the other, a con-
scious limitation of transportation freedoms - not only con-
verges with the self-regulatory mechanism of IMCO but also
that of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment (UNCTAD). Gold, in his conference presentation,
expounded in this vein with a knowledgeable "shipping
weather prognosis," 29 stating his views as follows:

The Pacific marine transportation pattern is, of course,

closely allied to existing international trading relationships. In
this context, we must speak of blocks of nations - such as the
U.S.A. and Japan; Australia/New Zealand and Canada;
China and the Southeast and East Asian states; the South
Pacific islands and Latin American Pacific states, in order of
maritime and trading importance. When the actual, estab-
lished shipping routes are examined, it is found that over 50
percent of Pacific shipping moves on the Asian rim -
particularly from the Middle East to Japan; about 30 percent
moves in true trans-Pacific fashion from the west coast of
North America to Central America, and after transiting the
Panama Canal, to Asia, Australia, and Oceania. The re-
mainder consists of cross-trading, local shipping, and tramp
shipping. It is unlikely that this pattern is going to change
greatly in the foreseeable future ....
First and foremost, Japan's insatiable energy and resource
hunger will increase further. ... This need is fed by Japan's
general economic prosperity, which has become almost inde-
pendent of world economic conditions. In other words, the
"shipping pipeline" along the Asian coast from the Middle
70 Transportation Futures of the Oceans

East to Japan will increase rather than abate. Furthermore,

oil and gas from Indonesia, coal and other minerals from
Australia and Canada and from the U.S. via Panama to
Japan, will continue to keep shipowners very happy. In the
other direction, Japan's mighty industrial output will provide
manufactured goods cargoes to all parts of the world. There
is likely to be intensification of bulk resource exports from
Australia to Japan. In addition, U.S. and Canadian coal ex-
ports to Japan will, due to Japanese investment, also increase
further. Also, the further development of Indonesian oil and
the likely opening up of energy resources in Papua/New
Guinea will give additional incentives to the shipping of these
cargoes- again, mostly to Japan. The present slump in the
LNG (liquid natural gas) trade between Indonesia and Japan
is of a momentary nature. It will soon swing back to full pro-
duction once oil prices have achieved some discernible stabili-
zation. On the Eastern rim, maritime transport developments
will be much slower as there is traditionally little trade down
the American coast-north and south. However, the consoli-
dation of Pemex in Mexico as a world oil-trading concern,
and the development of the Ecuadorian oil fields, might spur
some discernible developments in shipping in the region.
Regular liner trades, using the latest-generation, super con-
tainer vessels, are probably saturated for the foreseeable
future. It is quite likely that the present overtonnaging might
even result in the reduction of services. The acceptance of the
UNCTAD Liner Trade Code of Conduct 40:40:20 cargo-
sharing principle will certainly hurt some traditional shipping
lines based in the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, and
Norway, but will benefit the expanding Soviet cargo liner
fleets as well as those of Korea, People's Republic of China,
Indonesia, Philippines, and possibly, Australia. It must also
be borne in mind that the world's most formidable corporate
concentration of shipping is now resident in the Singapore/
Hong Kong axis, and it remains to be seen what UNCTAD's
attempt to phase out "flags of convenience" or "open
registries" - at present almost violently resisted by
UNCTAD's "B-group" (OECD [Nuclear Energy Agency,
U.S.A.] group), will mean. Unfortunately, the UNCTAD
versus status-quo shipping industry confrontation will have
no winners, as commercial intransigence by one group has
already led to political inflexibility in the other. There is no
Transportation Futures of the Oceans 71

doubt that if UN CLOS III is the law-reform movement of the

"public" uses of the ocean, then, in a more subdued way,
UNCTAD is attempting to realign the control of world ship-
ping in a more equitable way. For the 200-odd million tons of
shipping in the Pacific trade, the repercussions could be prob-
lematic if the continuing lack of understanding by the
UNCT AD B-group prevails. It has to be remembered that
very important resource countries, such as the People's
Republic of China, Indonesia and Mexico, are highly visible
members of the Group of 77 at UNCTAD.Jo

In summary of the commons transportation and pollution

issues we conclude that it may be characteristic of human so-
ciety that preventive action will be taken only after disaster
occurs and not before. Yet the technology now exists for safe
ships, for full routing and traffic control throughout ocean
space, for accurate navigation on the high seas, and for con-
tinuous and high-volume communications through oceanic
space. Advantages do accrue, and will increasingly accrue, to
operators who will pay the cost of a strictly regulated regime
in return for a monopoly within a given transportation net-
work. This has been true for a number of years in the United
States where the Jones Act limits shipping to U.S. flag ships
built in the United States and manned by U.S. crews.
 6
Ocean Technology Futures

The ability to use the ocean as a commons, or to deny its

use, is very largely a function of the state of technology. This
is amply demonstrated in our consideration of energy,
minerals, living resources, and transportation. Technology
also permeates every other phase of ocean use-for military
purposes, for recreational purposes, as a sink for waste dis-
posal, as a medium for aesthetic enjoyment, for psycho-
logical attachment, or simply as open space. A general under-
standing of new developments in ocean technology may thus
provide additional insight about the future management of
the Pacific Marine Commons.
Two types of technological developments are foreseeable:
technology for everyone's use (that is, available to indigenous
economies), and technologies that are capital-intensive and
require capital and technology transfer in order to be used by
developing nations.

Small-Scale, Indigenous Technologies

At the indigenous level the most significant technological
advances are the following:

• Development of low-cost, long-lived materials and f ab-

rication techniques for construction of ships and struc-
tures. Most prominent is fiberglass for use as a primary
structural material for boat hulls, tanks, hatcheries,
containers, and perhaps more significantly, as a
coating for repair, preservation, and protection from
corrosion, biological fouling, toxic materials, etc.

73
74 Ocean Technology Futures

• Development of plastic materials, especially the poly-

mers (polyurethane, polyethylene, and polypropylene).
Plastic pipes, valves, pumps, etc., are an absolute re-
quirement for biological systems to avoid toxicity or
the introduction of metal contaminants into the food
chain. Polymers, acrylics, and other plastics, such as
Teflon and nylon, have major application for noncor-
rosive coatings, transparent hulls and ports, ropes and
connectors, and bushings. A major and most signifi-
cant development is in foams that provide buoyancy
and nonsinkable properties for hulls and equipment.
The lightweight, buoyant surfboard is, for example, a
highly developed structural sandwich of fiberglass,
laminates, and buoyancy foams in an optimized
hydrodynamic configuration. With proper training, in-
water personnel can use it as a sophisticated sea sled.
• Development and availability of satellite navigation
and communication systems. Now, and in the near
future, increasingly sophisticated weather and climate
maps and advisories should be available on a world, re-
gional, and local basis by means of satellite communi-
cations. Technical advisory services and seminars are
in embryonic form (as in the Hawaii-based educational
satellite system called PeaceSat) but are rapidly devel-
oping on a global basis. Satellite navigation is also
widely available, but the currently available commercial
receivers are oversophisticated and, as a consequence,
needlessly expensive. Another part of the communica-
tion revolution is the development of short-range, line-
of-sight, accurate, and high-bit-rate navigation and
communication systems. Precision location of nets,
traps, buoys, etc., is now economically feasible. When
coupled with transponder systems, these navigation
and communication systems can provide security as
well as efficiency in the harvesting of common prop-
erty resources.
• Development and availability of low-cost high-bit-rate
computer systems. This revolution applies to almost
Ocean Technology Futures 75

every aspect of personal, local, regional, national, and

international life and cannot be ignored in projecting
the future of any human system. When combined with
a telecommunications network (even as unsophisti-
cated as the local telephone system), the computer ter-
minal, coupled with central and peripheral computers
and sensors, provides means to manage and monitor
the entire oceanic system. Catastrophe, predation, and
disease are costly to fishery and oceanographic opera-
tion. A communication-computer network can provide
information and warnings that greatly reduce these
costs. This is true also for television-monitoring
systems. Costs are decreasing for these technologies
and thus their use will soon be ubiquitous.
• Sensors and life-support equipment. A host of sensors
and life-support equipment for humans as well as for
use with marine animals and other organisms are com-
mercially available. The underwater swimmer has an
ever-growing array of scuba equipment and life-
support systems- diver vehicles, communication
equipment, wet suits, decompression facilities, swim-
mer support vehicles, etc. Sophisticated diving capabil-
ities to a depth of 50 to 60 meters are thus available.
The black coral and abalone fisheries have employed
divers, but the use of divers in other ocean applications
has been needlessly limited. To dive deeper than 60
meters requires mixed gas and probably is too sophisti-
cated to be introduced at the indigenous, small scale
level. But the techniques for monitoring dissolved oxy-
gen, pH, water chemistry, free oxygen, other gases,
pollutants, etc., are well developed and commercially
available.
• Developments in energy sources and power plants.
Relatively few of the developments in power and
energy will be available at the indigenous level. For
tropical countries (i.e., most developing nations) it
should be possible to manufacture alcohol without a
net deficit in oil imports. The commercial availability
76 Ocean Technology Futures

of engines designed and modified to use gasohol or

alcohol as a result of the U.S. energy program or the
Brazil alcohol program could provide a net energy
benefit. (This will be particularly true if power systems
are available for low-proof alcohols.)
• Development of OTEC with resulting changes in the
indigenous energy picture. As previously discussed in
detail, ammonia is a suitable fuel for automotive
equipment (with only slight modifications), and the
ammonia fuel cell would be a simple, easily maintained
source of central power for the smallest of rural power
systems. Even a small (100 Megawatt) OTEC system
would provide energy self-sufficiency for most Pacific
oceanic archipelagos (Fiji, Tonga, Cook Islands,
Kiribati, etc.).

New Understanding of Ocean Processes

The technological developments just outlined go hand in
hand with a new understanding of ocean processes, which of
course contributes to the development of the new technol-
ogies.
1. Better environments for living resources. There is new
understanding of the environmental conditions required for
spawning, survival of the spawn, hatching, survival of larvae,
survival of juveniles, growth of young adults, maturation,
etc. Organisms of a number of species have been carried
through their life cycles in the laboratory (Macrobrachium
rosenbergii, mullet, milkfish, salmon, mahi mahi, oysters,
clams), and others have been carried through substages that
permit farming (Penneus japonicus, Penneus marginatus,
sturgeon, yellowtail, unagi). The possibilities are increasing
rapidly, species by species. Technologies that are needed in-
clude hatcheries, holding pens, and- where the cost of feed-
ing is prohibitive- open-sea cages or pond and bay environ-
ments in which predators and disease can be controlled.
2. Fish behavior. There is also new understanding of
pelagic and migratory fish behavior. We are increasing our
Ocean Technology Futures 77

understanding of migratory patterns, the role of temperature

and of temperature gradients, the role of flotsam in congre-
gating and aggregating behavior, and the role of symbiotic
animals- bait fish, dolphins, sea birds- in the schooling and
migratory process.
Better knowledge spawns better technology, such as fish-
aggregating buoys. The density of fish that collect around
these buoys is great enough to have commercial significance.
A number of innovative designs and deployments are certain
to follow; the tuna yield in the Philippines has already sub-
stantially increased as a result of evolutionary development
of raft and line aggregation devices. Future related develop-
ments include the use of fish attractants, bait fish, and
modified configurations to enhance both attraction potential
and multispecies potential of the buoys. Further evolution of
purse-seining techniques can also be expected. The current
technology of winches, blocks, tackle, nets, launchers, seines,
etc., already employs modern materials and structures.
Techniques have been developed for permitting and en-
couraging captured porpoises to escape before the seine is
closed.
Such improvements in seining and in long liningpole and
bait fishing are, however, evolutionary changes from old
techniques. The fullest understanding of the herding and ag-
gregating process will permit substitution of mechanical gate
and enclosure devices that are more closely matched to exist-
ing on-board storage and processing techniques.
3. Management of nutrients. There is new understanding
of the assimilation process for wastes and of the aggregation
and dilution of nutrients in ocean environments. As a result
of environmental concerns, a better understanding of the ef-
fects of waste discharge in ocean waters is emerging. From re-
cent studies conducted by the Southern California Water
Resources Research Project (SCWRRP), Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institute, and the University of Hawaii,
marine biologists now recognize that with appropriate atten-
tion to waste system inputs and with the proper outfall con-
figurations, waste effluents can greatly enhance food-fish
populations.
78 Ocean Technology Futures

The problem of viral contamination, which currently limits

the use of sewage for feeding shellfish and other filter
feeders, may soon be solved by sterilization techniques. In
that event, sewage and waste systems can be developed in
conjunction with aquaculture, fish-attractants, and fish-
farming techniques.
A further supplement to nutrition can be obtained in many
tropical and subtropical areas through pumping of deep
ocean water to the surface. Novel, low cost devices such as
the Isaacs wave pump are available for pumping this water to
the surface. A number of schemes have been developed for
the use of this water in shellfish culture and in cultivation of
opihi, Irish moss, algae, and salt-tolerant plants by using the
"trickle" condensate on pipes carrying the deep ocean water.
4. Safety and predictability. Other processes whose
enhanced understanding will aid fisheries and oceanography
include air/sea interaction as it relates to the forecasting of
weather and climate, geophysical and oceanographic condi-
tions that pinpoint the location of an animal or mineral
resource, and new methods of food processing and preserva-
tion. Modern technology for use in coastal waters and the
coastal zone is advancing at the indigenous level and will
greatly benefit resource development in remote or hazardous
sea environments. As the present handicaps of remoteness
and peril are reduced, fishery and oceanic alternatives to
land-based food production and resource development
become more attractive to a developing society.

Large-Scale, Capital-Intensive Technologies

At the other end of the spectrum- that of large-scale
capital investment-marine technology now will permit the
development of major support systems for society that ap-
pear to be economically competitive and environmentally
sound. Because they will be sea-based, they can be introduced
into a developing society without the necessity for also devel-
oping an expensive land-based infrastructure or capital base,
and they will probably cost less and consume less energy than
their land-based counterparts.
Ocean Technology Futures 79

These oceanic systems include: (1) oceanic energy produc-

tion systems; (2) ocean energy processing and transportation
systems; (3) sea-based industrial systems; (4) open-sea mari-
culture and fishing systems; (5) ocean mining systems; (6)
marine transportation systems for bulk, containerized, liq-
uid, dry, and gaseous cargoes; (7) urban mass transit systems;
(8) riverine and sea-based public works and public utility
systems; (9) sea-based waste disposal systems; (10) floating
hotels, condominiums, office complexes, and shopping cen-
ters; and (11) sea-based park and recreation systems.
The most significant technical development-stable ocean
platforms - has decoupled sea systems from the surface of
the sea and, as a consequence, has eliminated or alleviated the
debilitating motions associated with sea-based operations.
The development is significant because it accommodates
equipment, techniques, and life styles previously suited only
to a low-motion, land-based environment. Not only the dis-
comforts but also the perils of the sea are nearly eliminated
by this development.
Five mechanisms have been employed to achieve this
result:
1. The use of very large conventional carriers and conven-
tional displacement forms. For displacement of not less than
40,000 tons-ideally 100,000 tons or more-conventional
hull forms will provide a platform sufficiently stable for
nearly every social or industrial process (except billiards) in
all but extreme sea conditions.
2. The use of semisubmerged (small waterplane area) plat-
forms and semisubmerged ships. For displacements of 1,000
to 10,000 tons they will provide a sufficiently stable platform
for nearly every social or industrial process in all but extreme
sea conditions.
3. The use of semisubmerged platforms with displace-
ments of 10;000 tons or more. The stability of these plat-
forms is satisfactory for nearly every social or industrial
process (including billiards) in all weather conditions.
4. The use of incidence-control hydrofoils or fin-stabilized
semisubmersibles controlled by a control system with sea-
surface sensors. These structures can support a mobile plat-
80 Ocean Technology Futures

form of satisfactory stability for high-speed (50 knots) trans-

fer of goods and people with adequate comfort.
5. The use of submarines at a depth of 500 feet or more.
These submersibles will support platforms of adequate sta-
bility for nearly every social or industrial process in all sea
conditions.
Accompanying the development of the stable platform has
been the development of prestressed concrete for very large
structures. This development has appeared in large semisub-
mersible structures designed for oil storage and processing in
the North Sea. The construction of these structures and their
successful deployment in one of the most hazardous of ocean
environments demonstrates that large ocean structures
(1,000,000 tons) can be manufactured at one site for use in a
remote location.
The possible uses for such stable platforms and barges are
legion. Japanese industry has already built a power plant and
a paper mill on barges in Japan for use on a river in Brazil.
(Symbolically, the deployment was antipodal.) In its river
operation in Brazil the project has demonstrated that no ma-
jor modifications have been required from the previous land-
based mill operation to the new river-based operation. The
wood is floated to the barge, and the processed paper is car-
ried away by a transport barge to the distribution port. This
paper mill could just as easily have been a fish-processing
facility and cannery.
As already mentioned, the Westinghouse Electric Corpora-
tion has been attempting to develop barge-mounted, sea-
based nuclear power plants. Offshore Power Systems, a joint
venture of Westinghouse Electric Corporation and Westing-
house International Power Systems Company, Inc., was
established in Jacksonville, Florida, to manufacture and
secure licensing of eight floating nuclear power plants. Con-
tracts were signed with New Jersey's Public Service Electric
and Gas Company in September 1971 for construction of the
first two plants and in November 1973 for two more plants. A
combination of environmental, political, and financial pres-
sures, along with estimates of reduced growth in demand for
electricity, led to the cancellation of those initial orders in
Ocean Technology Futures 81

December 1978. Although Offshore Power Systems currently

has no further orders, it continues to work toward licensing
of a standardized manufacturing process for the production
of floating nuclear power plants.
Other systems developed for mounting on barges and semi-
submersibles include plants for liquefying natural gas and
drilling rigs for scientific and commercial use.
Complementing the semisubmerged platform is the semi-
submerged platform (SSP) ship. The high-speed, low-drag,
stable-surface ship sacrifices above-water payload for its
superior performance in sea-keeping energy conservation,
i.e., eliminating the energy penalty caused by wave-making
For most missions, except bulk cargo transport, the above-
water payload capacity of the surface ship is underutilized.
This is particularly true for car and passenger ferries. The
SSP is thus ideal for deep-river, bay, port, coastal, and inter-
island transportation of light freight, cars, and passengers.
When supported by high-speed hydrofoils for passenger
transport and barges for bulk, liquid and dry freight, the
total sea-based transportation network in many coastal envi-
ronments is superior to its land-based counterpart.
It is the large-scale technologies that have made OTEC
both feasible and commercially attractive. In its most ad-
vanced form, the open-cycle system OTEC will produce large
quantities of fresh water as well as power and a supply of arti-
ficially upwelled nutrients. Depending upon the develop-
mental perspective, OTEC can be conceived as a major power
system with aquaculture and fresh water as by-products, or as
a mariculture system with power and fresh water as by-prod-
ucts, or as a freshwater producer with power and mariculture
as by-products. In a larger, longer-range context, these three
ingredients added to the stable space available on large-scale
platforms provide the fundamental ingredients for a com-
munity on the high seas beyond the areas of national jurisdic-
tion.
Floating or slowly mobile communities operating on the
high seas will raise new sets of jurisdictional problems. Who
is entitled to the increased productivity in the vicinity of the
community, when such productivity has been occasioned by
82 Ocean Technology Futures

the increase in nutrient concentration and improved habitat

provided by the community itself? What forms of pollution
control or "zones of mixing" associated with each community
will be tolerable on a world basis? What are the "rules of the
road" for these communities vis-a-vis conventional shipping
and other slowly mobile and relatively uncontrollable com-
munities? To what extent is this use of ocean space an entitle-
ment of the Pacific commons, and does this entitlement apply
to every class of economic, social, or sovereign entity? The
list of questions is long and provides the grist for many future
workshops and international fora.
 7
The Ocean Commons:
Try Again in the Pacific?

Our understanding of the technological and physical

nature of the Pacific Marine Commons leads to consideration
of its institutional implications.
The content of the ocean-as-a-commons metaphor has
undergone a dramatic transformation over the past decade.
In Garrett Hardin's original concept 31 the "tragedy of the
commons" develops when no regime emerges to inhibit
private party raids on the commons, the public land that
everyone has right to. In a vivid example Hardin shows what
the inevitable outcome will be when overgrazing occurs (par-
allel to our ocean-grazing but land-based- the commons is a
pasture). Unless there are clear sanctions to force every
farmer to limit the size of his own herd, the only choice an in-
dividual farmer has when the quality of his herd deteriorates
is to increase the number of animals. Such action by indi-
vidual farmers leads to depletion of the commons resource as
a whole, which leads in turn to disaster for the people who de-
pend on the commons for their livelihood and sustenance.
When serious attention turned to the management of ocean
resources, only a decade or so ago, the fear of depletion of
ocean resources quickly became "received wisdom." The
question asked was not how marine animals and plants, sea-
bed minerals, and energy resources should be distributed, but
whether humankind could avoid depleting them as a whole.
But the lesson of the past decade, codified in the conclusions
of the Tokyo workshop in June 1981, is that the distribution
of resources is, in fact, the primary issue. The real question

83
84 The Ocean Commons: Try Again in the Pacific?

is: Who is going to reap what proportion of the yield of the

seas at what cost?
The new "tragedy of the commons" is the tendency to chop
the commons into manageable pieces, thereby risking its
resources not being exploited for the benefit of humankind,
but instead being wasted; intensifying preexisting inequities
and providing a whole set of new occasions for international
conflict.
Coastal states now proceed to regulate fishing catches,
claim the oil resources, and jealously guard their seabeds and
transportation routes. The result may well have to be another
but different attempt to create a Pacific marine commons
during the 1980s.
In fact, only a very few coastal states now can claim the
capacity to police their 200-mile zones, and their efforts are
partly symbolic. Even the United States and Japan have dif-
ficulty in effectively guarding their waters. Fishing fleets
regularly move in and out of 200-mile zones. Only multi-
national oil companies appear to have control of the informa-
tion and technology associated with offshore exploration. A
very few companies, based in even fewer countries, have the
capacity to harvest seabed minerals-and they face so uncer-
tain a legal environment in the ocean commons that they are
bound to be hesitant about investing the huge sums involved.
Above all the "sea grab" has greatly extended the zones of
conflict between coastal states. This is true, for example,
among the ASEAN states. Presently many states confront
each other's borders directly.
Hence new international rivalries, unregulated operations
of multinational companies, and most nations' foreknowl-
edge that they will not be able to exploit "their" resources in
the foreseeable future, are likely to lead to a growing convic-
tion that a real ocean commons is after all more beneficial to
nearly all concerned.
Since this has not been accomplished for the world as a
whole, maybe there is now a strong case for negotiating a
viable regime for the Pacific Commons. The Pacific is not
only the largest ocean, but also the richest in resources rele-
vant to the twenty-first century. The next step, which goes
The Ocean Commons: Try Again in the Pacific? 85

beyond the "multilogue" at our Tokyo workshop and beyond

the scope of this book-will be to invent, consult about, and
eventually negotiate a Pacific Commons that blunts the
clearly foreseeable conflict points, enhances needed economic
growth in the Pacific region, and spreads the benefits of that
growth equitably among the Pacific peoples-"South" as well
as "North."
In any event, the idea of the oceans as a commons will not
go away. Nor will it be relevant only to "holes in
doughnuts" - that is, what is left after all the seaward exten-
sion of land-based jurisdictions. Nations have an inherent
obligation to exercise their jurisdiction in ways that take the
interests of their neighbors into account. That obligation will
increasingly be translated into law, whether by customary
acts or by formal pacts.
 Appendix A
Workshop Participants

Participants in the workshop on "The Management of the Pacific

Marine Commons" at the International House of Japan, Tokyo,
25-28 June 1981, were as follows.

Professor Roger Benjamin, Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Pub-

lic Affairs, 909 Social Science Tower, 267 19th Avenue South,
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455
Ms. Eugenia Bennagen, Chief Researcher, Strategy Research Divi-
sion, Natural Resources Management Center, Manila, Philip-
pines
Dr. Choung 11 Chee, Apartment 503, A-dong San-ik Mansion,
Yoido, Yongdongpo-ku, Seoul, Korea
Professor Harlan Cleveland, Director, Hubert H. Humphrey Insti-
tute of Public Affairs, 909 Social Science Tower, 267 19th
Avenue South, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN
55455
Dr. John P. Craven, 4921 Waa Street, Honolulu, HI 96822
Dr. Edgar Gold, Director of Ocean Studies, Dalhousie University,
1321 Edward Street, Halifax, Nova Scotia B3H 4 9
Professor Julian Gresser, Law School, Harvard University,
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Mr. Yasushi Hara, Senior Writer, Asahi Shimbun Publishing Com-
pany, 3-2 Tsukiji 5-chome, Chuo-ku, Tokyo 104, Japan
Mr. Michael Hirschfeld, 74 Weld Street, Wadestown, Wellington,
New Zealand
Mr. Kent M. Keith, Department of Planning & Economic Develop-
ment, Manganese Nodules, State of Hawaii, 250 South King
Street, P.O. Box 2359, Honolulu, HI 96804
Dr. Frances Lai, Department of Political Science, National Univer-
sity of Singapore, Kent Ridge, Singapore 0511, Republic of
Singapore

87
88 Appendix A

Dr. Hahn Been Lee, Chairman, The Korea Advanced Institute of

Science and Technology, P.O. Box 150, Chongyang, Seoul 131,
Korea
Dr. Jorge A. Lozoya, El Colegio de Mexico, A.C., Camino Al
Ajusco No. 20, Mexico 20, D. F.
Mr. Mochtar Lubis, 17 Jalan Bonang, Jakarta Pusat, Indonesia
Professor Keiichi Oshima, c/o Technova, Inc., 13th Floor,
Fukoku-Seimei Building, 2-2-2 Uchisaiwai-cho, Chiyoda-ku,
Tokyo 100, Japan
Dr. Choon-ho Park, Culture Learning Institute, The East-West
Center, Honolulu, HI 96848
Dr. Herbert Passin, Special Advisor, Aspen Institute for Humanis-
tic Studies, Home: 25 Claremont Avenue, New York, NY 10027
Professor K. S. Sandhu, Director, Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Pasir Panjang, Singapore
0511, Republic of Singapore
Dr. Seizaburo Sato, Department of Political Science, Faculty of
General Education, University of Tokyo, 865 Kowaba, Meguro-
ku, Tokyo, Japan
Dr. Phiphat Tangsubkul, 2230-14th Soi Phayakaporm, Chan
Road, Yanava, Bangkok, Thailand
Mr. Masataka Watanabe, National Institute for Environmental
Studies, Yatabe, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305, Japan
Mr. Peter Wilson, Box 123, Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea
 Appendix B
Workshop Papers

The following papers were read at the workshop on "The Man-

agement of the Pacific Marine Commons," held in Tokyo, 25-28
June 1981.

Chee, Choung 11. Sharing of Fisheries Resources Between the

Coastal and Other States: Towards Equity.
Craven, John P. The Ocean as a Commons with Emphasis on
Energy.
Gold, Edgar. Marine Transportation in the Pacific.
Keith, Kent M. Marine Mining: Six Scenarios for the Eighties.
Lai, Frances. ASEAN's Perspectives on Managing Pacific Basin
Marine Resources: The Case of Energy Development.
Wilson, Peter. The Views of the Pacific Island Nations on the
Development of the Fisheries Resources of the Western and
Central Pacific Ocean.

89
 Appendix C
Chee Plan

At the conference on "The Management of the Pacific Marine

Commons" in Tokyo a good deal of attention was given to listing
and defining the ocean-linked questions faced by the countries in
the Pacific Basin. These questions have been examined earlier in
this monograph and collectively suggest, when one reflects on the
development of Atlantic-based institutions over the past 100 years,
that we are very likely just at the beginning of an explosion of
Pacific-centered activity on all the fronts discussed in this volume.
For example, policy questions concerning fishing (e.g., protection
of stocks, and rights of those who fish versus the rights of countries
contiguous to the fishing grounds) are going to be more, not less,
serious in the near future. Is it possible to monitor the fishing areas
from the perspective of the Pacific Commons as a whole? For in-
stance, could user-based taxes on fishing fleets, shipping industries,
etc., be fairly imposed, enforced and collected, and used to main-
tain and improve the fishing areas? Could modest resources be used
to finance a center that would focus on position studies and specific
policy recommendations concerning the import of the issues and
trends charted in this study?
One of the participants at the conference, Dr. Choung 11 Chee,
proposed an imaginative outline for a center for ocean develop-
ment. The distinctiveness of Dr. Chee's plan rests on the assump-
tion that all Pacific Basin countries do share an interest in redefin-
ing, perhaps functionally, the dimensions of the Pacific Commons;
self-interest warrants development of Pacific-wide perspectives on
the vexing bilateral and multilateral questions that are before us
already. The Chee Plan is reprinted here as a beginning- the kernel
of a comprehensive idea that warrants consideration.

90
Chee Plan 91

CHEE PLAN
Proposed Organization Scheme for the
Pacific Marine Commons

I. Names for the Organization

A. Pacific Center for Ocean Development
B. Pacific Center for Ocean Development and Cooperation
C. Pacific Commission for Ocean Development and
Cooperation
II. Proposed Site for the Organization
A. Manila. This city is not only ideally located in the Pacific,
but it also houses the Asia Development Bank and
ICLARM (International Center for Living Aquatic Re-
sources Management). ICLARM is concerned with the fish-
eries problems in the South Pacific and Southeast Asia. Its
cooperation with the proposed organization should be very
beneficial to the organization.
B. Alternate sites: Guam, Saipan, Hawaii, and Tokyo
III. Structure
A. Plenary meeting of all member states with associate mem-
ber states participating in the deliberations of the meeting
without a right to vote. This meeting could be called either
the Plenary Meeting or the Council. Each member state will
send two delegates, hence have two votes; the delegate pair
should include one from the government and the other from
the industrial sector. Delegates could vote individually or as
a unit.
B. Secretariat
1. Department of Planning for Technical Assistance and
Cooperation. This body would deal with cooperative and
technical assistance planning for needy states.
2. Department of Living Resources
a. North Pacific
b. South Pacific
3. Department of Nonliving Resources
a. North Pacific
b. South Pacific
4. Department of Energy and Pollution
IV. Membership
A. Full membership: United States, Japan, Canada, Australia,
92 AppendixC

New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Philippines, Indonesia,

Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore
B. Associate members: 16 microstates in the Pacific
C. Observers: Any non-Pacific states interested may send their
observers to the deliberations of the organization.
D. Others. Because of politically delicate relations between the
PRC and Taiwan governments, their participation in the or-
ganization may be somewhat premature at this stage of the
proceedings. Nevertheless, if the member states so concur,
both governments could be invited to send observers or be-
come full members. However, their joint representation in
the proposed organization is inconceivable, and the organi-
zation should be prepared to accept one state as a member
to the exclusion of the other. The proposed organization
should avoid, at all costs, a politicized image.
V. Objectives
A. The basic purpose of the activity for the proposed organiza-
tion would be to facilitate economic, cultural, and other co-
operation for the benefits of all participating states. Such
objective goals of the Center emphasize long-range cooper-
ation; nor are short-term and immediate material gains to
be expected. Patience and endurance will ensure slow and
evolutionary development of the cooperative scheme.
B. In concrete terms, the objective of the proposed organiza-
tion would not simply be confined to helping reduce the
conflict among states in the Pacific. Rather, it should de-
vote its energies to helping microstates in the context of
North-South relations. In addition, the desired goal is mu-
tual cooperation among developed states in the Pacific on
matters of ocean resources, such as investment in fisheries
and the mineral resources within the Exclusive Economic
Zones (200-mile limits) of the coastal states in the Pacific.
C. In the initial phase of the proposed organization, the United
States and Japan would take the major initiative in the crea-
tion of the proposed organization as major contributors to
its funding. Simultaneously, other interested states would
assume their share of financial contributions on an equi-
table basis. Perhaps the funding of the organization would
be the most problematic, yet essential, ingredient for the
succcess of the organization. Adequate consultation on this
issue must commence before the proposed organization
becomes reality.
 Notes

1. Refer to Appendixes A and B for complete listings of Tokyo

conference participants and the papers presented.
2. Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science 162
(1968): 1234-48.
3. Res communes-in civil law, things in common.
4. Res nullius- res nul/ius naturaliter fit primi occupantis: thing
which has no owner naturally belongs to the first finder.
5. First conference in a series of five, included in the Pacific
Basin Research Project. The first workshop in Tokyo, held 25-28
June 1981, was entitled "The Management of the Pacific Marine
Commons" (hereafter abbreviated MPMC.) This first workshop
was jointly sponsored by the International House of Japan, the
Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, and the Hubert H. Hum-
phrey Institute of Public Affairs.
6. J. F. Kirk, "Energy Problems and Growth Prospects of the
Pacific Basin," p. 5. Paper read at the Fourteenth General Meeting
of the Pacific Basin Economic Council in Hong Kong, 4-7 May
1981. Kirk is chairman and managing director of Esso Australia,
Ltd.
7. William H. Avery, "OTEC Methanol: A New Approach," p.
1. Paper read at International Resource Conference on Pacific
Resources, Honolulu, Hawaii, 13-15 Oct. 1981.
8. Ibid., p. 8.
9. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(hereafter abbreviated UNCLOS III), Draft Convention on the Law
of the Sea, 1Oct.1981. (A Conf. 62/L.78) Reproduced by Office of
Ocean Law and Policy, Department of State, Washington, D.C.
10. Dr. Frances Lai, "ASEAN's Perspectives on Managing
Pacific Basin Marine Resources: The Case of Energy
Development," pp. 20-23. Paper read at MPMC workshop.

93
94 Notes

11. Kent M. Keith, "Marine Mining: Six Scenarios for the

Eighties," pp. 1-8. Paper read at MPMC workshop.
12. Quote by Ambassador T.T.B. (Tommy) Koh, taken from a
press release entitled Press Conference by President of Law of the
Sea Conference, 17 April 1981, p. 2. Ambassador Koh is currently
Singapore's ambassador to the United Nations as well as President
of the UNCLOS III negotiations.
13. Hardin, "Tragedy of the Commons," pp. 1234-48.
14. Daniel Behrman, Genius of the Sea: John Isaacs (New York:
Simon & Schuster, forthcoming), p. 256.
15. UNCLOS III, Article 62:3, p. 24
16. UNCLOS III, Article 69:1, p. 27
17. UNCLOS III, Article 70:1, p. 28
18. Dr. Choung II Chee, "Sharing of Fisheries Resources Be-
tween the Coastal and Other States: Towards Equity," p. 2. Paper
read at MPMC workshop.
19. Ibid., pp. 5-6.
20. Ibid., pp. 9-10.
21. Ibid., pp. 12-13.
22. Peter Wilson, "The Views of the Pacific Island Nations on
the Development of the Fisheries Resources of the Western and
Central Pacific Ocean," p. 2. Paper read at MPMC workshop.
23. Ibid., p. 5-7.
24. UN CLOS III, Article 17, p. 6.
25. Ibid., Article 21:2, p. 8.
26. Ibid., Article 220:2, p. 91.
27. Ibid., Article 220:6, p. 92.
28. Edgar Gold, "Marine Transportation in the Pacific," pp.
6-9. Paper read at MPMC workshop.
29. Ibid., p. 2.
30. Ibid., pp. 3-6.
31. Hardin, "Tragedy of the Commons," p. 1244.
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1981.
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Passin, H., and Iriye, A., eds. 1979. Encounter at Shimoda: search
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 Abbreviations

Amoco Standard Oil of Indiana (U.S.A.)

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BTU British thermal unit
DOMCO Deep Ocean Mining Company (Japan)
EEC European Economic Community
EEZ 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation (U.S.A.)
FCMA Fisheries Conservation Management Act (U.S.A.)
GNP gross national product
ICLARM International Center for Living Aquatic Resources
Management (Manila, Philippines)
IMCO Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization (Canada)
INCO Ltd. International Nickel Corporation (Canada)
LNG liquid natural gas
mile nautical mile
MPMC "The Management of the Pacific Marine Com-
mons," Tokyo Workshop, 25-28 June 1981
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development
OMA Ocean Mining Associates (U.S.A.)
OMCO Ocean Minerals Company (U.S.A.)
OMI Ocean Management, Inc. (Canada)
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OTEC ocean thermal energy conversion
PRC People's Republic of China
quad one quadrillion British thermal units
SCWRRP Southern California Water Resources Research
Project (U.S.A.)
Sohio Standard Oil of Ohio (U.S.A.)

99
Abbreviations JOO

SSP semisubmerged platform or semisubmerged plat-

form ship
TRW TRW Inc. (U.S.A.) (formerly Thompson-Ramo-
Wooldridge)
UNCLOS III Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment
 Index

Act on Interim Regulation of "Coil," 20

Deep Seabed Mining, 38 "Common heritage" concept, 2,
Alvin (submarine), 33 22, 31
Ammonia, 21, 22, 23 Convention on the High Seas, 37
Amoco. See Standard Oil of Craven, John, xiii
Indiana
Amoco Minerals Company, 44. d'Arsonval, Arsene, 12
See also Standard Oil of Deep Ocean Mining Company
Indiana (DOMCO), 44-45
Antarctic treaty, 8 Deep Seabed Hard Mineral
ASEAN. See Association of Resources Act, 38
Southeast Asian Nations DOMCO. See Deep Ocean
Aspen Institute for Humanistic Mining Company
Studies, xii Draft Convention on the Law of
Association of Southeast Asian the Sea, 58-61
Nations (ASEAN), xi-xii Dunbar, Lyle, 14
oil and, 10-11
Pacific commons and, 27, 28 Eastern Tropical Tuna
Australia, xi-xii Organization, 51
Avery, William H., 20 EEZs. See Exclusive Economic
Zones
Benjamin, Roger, xiii Electricity. See Ocean thermal
Biomass, xvi-xvii energy conversion
British Petroleum, 35 Energy
carbon-free sources, 17-19,
Chee, Choung Il, xiii, 58, 90 20-21
Chee Plan, xvii, 90-92 flow, 10, 26-28
Chile futures, 5-28
mining and, 42 ocean as source, xv-xvii, 11,
China. See People's Republic of 12, 25-28. See also Ocean
China; Taiwan thermal energy conversion
Clarion-Clipperton fracture zone, pollution and, 17-18
29, 31, 33-34, 41 research and development, 13
Claude, Georges, 12 technology and, 75-76
Coal, 6 thermal. See Ocean thermal
synthetic fuels from, 10-11, energy conversion
19, 20 transition, 5-6, 13-14, 20-21

JO]
102 Index

Energy, cont. Gold, Edgar, xiii, 66, 69

See also Coal; Natural gas;
Nuclear power; Ocean Hardin, Garrett, 83
thermal energy conversion; Hirschfeld, Michael, xiii
Oil Hubert H. Humphrey Institute
"Energy Problems and Growth of Public Affairs, xii
Prospects of the Pacific Hydrogen economy, 18-21
Basin," 10
Exclusive Economic Zones IMCO. See Inter-Governmental
(EEZs), xiv, xvii, 2, 3(fig.), Maritime Consultative
22, 25, 39, 84 Organization
fisheries and, 51-56, 58-64 INCO Ltd., 44
mining in, 41-42 Inter-Governmental Maritime
vessel-source pollution in, 66 Consultative Organization
(IMCO), xv, 37, 67-69
FCMA. See Fisheries International Convention for the
Conservation Management Safety of Life at Sea, 37
Act International Convention on
Federal Republic of Germany Loadlines, 37
mining and, 38, 43 International House of Japan,
Fisheries, 47-56, 90 xiii
distribution of, 48, 49(fig.) International Nickel
Exclusive Economic Zones Corporation. See
and, 51-56, 58-64 INCO Ltd.
management, 51-54, 56 International Sea-Bed Authority,
migratory, 51, 54, 76-77 36, 37
pelagic, 54, 56 Isaacs, John, 52
population, 48, 50
technology and, 77-78 Japan, xi-xii
treaties and, 50 fishing practices, 48
UNCLOS and, 50, 56-59 mining and, 43, 44
world catch, 48 oil storage in, 9
Fisheries Conservation Pacific commons and, 27
Management Act (FCMA), technology in, 80
50, 51-52, 53 Jones Act, 71
Fossil fuels. See Coal; Natural
gas; Oil Keith, Kent, xiii
Fraser, Malcolm, xi Kennecott Copper, 35, 44
Fuel cells, 18-19 Kirk, J. F., 10-11, 93(n6)
Koh, T.T.B., 45, 94(nl2)
Geneva conventions, 37 Korea. See Republic of Korea
Geothermal vents, 33-34
Germany. See Federal Republic Lai, Frances, xiii, 26
of Germany Law of the Sea. See Draft
Index 103

Convention on the Law of United Nations and, 31-32

the Sea; Third United "Mini-OTEC," xv, 12
Nations Conference on the Mitsui-Toshiba, 21
Law of the Sea
Living resources National Academy of
artificial environments for, 76 Engineering, 11
futures, 47-64 National Ocean Survey, 33
technology and, 76-78 Natural gas, 19
UNCLOS and, 50, 56-59 offshore deposits, 7(fig.)
See also Fisheries Nuclear power
offshore plants, 23, 80
"Management of the Pacific waste disposal, 24-25
Marine Commons, The,"
4, 90, 93(n5) Ocean commons. See Pacific
Manganese nodules, xiv-xv, Commons
23, 25, 33-34 Ocean Management, Inc. (OMI),
location of, 29, 30(fig.) 44
title to, 31 Ocean Minerals Company
See also Minerals; Mining (OMCO), 35, 44
Mara, Ratu Sir Kamisese, 61 Ocean Mining Associates
"Marine Transportation in the (OMA), 35, 40, 44
Pacific," 66 Ocean platforms, 23, 79-82
Masataka Watanabe, xiii semisubmerged, 81
Metal sulfides, 33 Ocean processes, 76-78
Methane, xvi-xvii Ocean thermal energy conversion
Methanol, 20 (OTEC), xv-xvii, 6, 11-23,
Mexico 76
mining and, 42 access to, 14, 15(fig.), 16-17,
Minerals l 7(table)
futures, 29-46 by-products of, xvi-xvii, 20
See also Manganese nodules energy flows, 26-28
Mining, xiv-xv, 31-46 implications of, 12-17
companies, 35, 38, 41, 42-43, investigating companies, 13
44, 84 Law of the Sea and, 22-23
in Exclusive Economic Zones, potential of, 13
41-42 prototype plants, 21-22
exploration, 33, 41 resonance availability,
international consortia, 42-44 17(table)
reciprocating states regime, technology and, 81
38-41 utilization zone, 14, 15(fig.)
scenarios, 34-45 Offshore Power Systems, 80
treaties, 32, 34-41, 45-46 Ohira, Masayoshi, xi, 61
UNCLOS and, 31, 34-41, 44, Oil, 6-11, 19
45-46 ASEAN nations and, 10-11
104 Index

Oil, cont. air, 17-18

companies, 35, 84 UNCLOS and, 9
energy flow, 10 vessel-source, 65-67
futures, 35 Preussag Aktiengesellschaft, 42,
in Middle East, 10 44
offshore deposits, 6, 7(fig.), 8
OTEC and, 20 "Refining Synthetic Liquids from
spills. See Pollution, vessel- Coal and Shale," 11
source Republic of Korea, xi-xii, 58
storage of, 9 Royal Dutch Shell, 35
transport of, 8-9, 13, 67 Russia. See Soviet Union
OMA. See Ocean Mining Ryther, John, 48
Associates
OMCO. See Ocean Minerals SCWRRP. See Southern
Company California Water Resources
OMI. See Ocean Management, Research Project
Inc. "Sea grab." See Exclusive
Optional Protocol, 37 Economic Zones
OTEC. See Ocean thermal Semisubmerged platforms. See
energy conversion Ocean platforms,
OTEC belt. See Ocean thermal semisubmerged
energy conversion, Semisubmerged platform (SSP)
utilization zone ships, 81
"Sharing of Fisheries Resources
Pacific Basin 'Project between the Coastal and
workshops, xii-xiii, 4, 90, Other States: Towards
93(n5) Equity," 58
Pacific Commons, xi-xii, xiv, Shipping
4, 61 communications technologies,
ASEAN nations and, 27, 28 74
Chee Plan, xvii, 90-92 construction technologies,
future of, 26-28 73-74
institutional implications, environmentalism and, 66-69
83-85 navigation technologies, 74
Japan and, 27 routes, 3(fig.), 8-9, 69-70
Pacific Community. See Pacific training standards and, 67-68
Commons UN CLOS and, 70-71
Pacific Islands, xii UNCTAD and, 70-71
energy consumption in, 14, Sohio. See Standard Oil of Ohio
16-17, 17(table) Southern California Water
OTEC and, 14 Resources Research Project
Pardo, Arvid, 31 (SCWRRP), 77
People's Republic of China, xii South Pacific Forum, 54-56,
"Plutonium overhang," 18, 24 55(fig.), 58, 61-63
Pollution Fisheries Agency, 62
Index 105

Soviet Union traffic control systems, 68-69

fishing practices, 48 UNCLOS and, 65-66
SSP. See Ocean platforms, Treaties, 1
semisubmerged; effectiveness of, 37
Semisubmerged platform fisheries and, 50
ships mining, 32, 34-41, 45-46
Standard Oil of Indiana, 35, 44 nuclear waste and, 25
Standard Oil of Ohio, 35 violations of, 2, 4
Sun Oil Company, 35 See also Third United Nations
Synthetic fuels Conference on the Law of
coal-derived, 10-11, 19-20 the Sea
OTEC-produced, 19-22
UNCLOS III. See Third United
Taiwan, xii Nations Conference on the
Technology Law of the Sea
computer, 74-75 UNCTAD. See United Nations
energy-related, 75-76, 81 Conference on Trade and
futures, 73-82 Development
indigenous, 73-76 United Nations
large-scale, 78-82 mining and, 31-32
life-support, 75 United Nations Conference on
living resources and, 76-78 the Law of the Sea. See
shipping and, 73-74 Third United Nations
weather, 78 Conference on the Law of
Territorial Sea Convention, 37 the Sea
Thermal energy. See Ocean United Nations Conference on
thermal energy conversion Trade and Development
Third United Nations Conference (UNCTAD), xv, 69, 70-71
on the Law of the Sea United States, xi-xii
(UNCLOS III), xiv, xv, 1-2, fisheries management, 51-54
4, 8, 9 mining and, 32, 38, 43, 44, 45
fisheries and, 50, 56-59 shipping and, 71
mining and, 31, 34-41, 44, U.S. Steel, 40, 44
45-46
pollution and, 9 Vienna Conference on the Law
shipping and, 70-71 of Treaties, 37
text of, 2, 4, 22, 57
transportation and, 65-66 Waste discharge, 24-25, 77
Tokyo Electric, 21 Westinghouse Electric
"Tragedy of the commons," l, Corporation, 23, 80
45-46, 83-84 Westinghouse International
Transportation Power Systems Company,
futures, 65-71 80
of oil, 8-9, 13, 67 Wilson, Peter, xiii, 61