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Philip Bell
CONFRONTING
T heory
The Psychology of Cultural Studies
Confronting Theory
In olden days a glimpse of theory
Was looked on as something dreary
Now, Heaven knows,
Anything goes!
David Hume
Confronting Theory
The Psychology of Cultural Studies
Philip Bell
Preface 7
References 141
Index 145
Preface
There is not a fixed and yet there is a common, human nature: without the latter there
would be no possibility of talking about human beings, or, indeed, of communication,
on which all thought depends – and not only thought, but feeling, imagination, action.
(Berlin [1986] 2004: 26)
I
n the twenty-plus years since Isaiah Berlin wrote this ‘letter on human nature’, a lot has
changed, including what it means to write a letter. More significantly, of course, the
idea that humans ‘have’ a nature, and that academic disciplines need to understand this
if they are to converse about communication, imagination and feelings, sounds quaintly
‘essentialist’ and indefensibly ‘humanist’ in today’s post-disciplinary academy.
The eight essays in this book address overlapping aspects of the theoretical assumption that
human experience, culture, communication, and ‘life’ itself can be meaningfully understood
without reference to ‘human nature’ (however flexible and non-essentialist that concept
may be). I present arguments against the idea that systematic empirical knowledge about
people, their biology and their psychology, is irrelevant to the domains of the humanities
[sic] and social sciences. I regard it as educationally imperative that students be taught that
it is possible to know objective things about why and how people behave and feel as they
do in particular cultural and social circumstances. I mount this thesis by examining key
concepts and assumptions in post-humanist capital-T Theory: is it epistemologically and
ontologically more tenable, more productive, more useful as the basis for conversing about
cultural life than the episteme that it overturns?
Darwin, Marx, Freud, even in their own different ways, Piaget, Skinner, Levi-Strauss and
Judith Butler – all describe dimensions of social and psychological life and assumed that
human beings were an animal species with certain qualities, capacities, dispositions and
physical limitations. Amongst other things they disagreed about what kinds of explanatory
(and that meant causal) accounts of different human lives needed to be postulated to
understand various human interactions, their biology, social histories, and multiple,
ever-changing cultures. But all these writers assumed that the different phenomena and
processes they were trying to understand were real: they made competing, but contestable
claims about what is the case. They adopted publicly defined terminologies, however novel
7
Confronting Theory
they may have been at the time (e.g. Freud’s ‘cathexes’, Marx’s ‘surplus value’) and were not
immune to theoretical analysis – they were certainly not naïvely anti-theory, not naïve
‘positivists’ (Skinner, perhaps, excluded). For my purposes, however, the most important
methodological assumption that united all those who theorized about people and studied
them empirically within the social and biological sciences, was that they each understood
that they could have been in error, and if so, they could be shown to be in error.
From the1970s at least, European philosophical writings increasingly competed with
empirico-realist epistemologies in Anglo-American humanities and social science curricula.
Few methodological certainties remained by the end of the century as students learned to
question realism, reductionism, essentialism, and Western epistemological ‘foundationalism’.
New ‘-isms’ and ‘-ologies’ peppered academic discourse, questioning the assumed objectivity
of knowledge (‘scientific’ knowledge included). In fact, as will be discussed in this book,
humanities students today are very likely to leave university equipped with an armoury
of arguments against science’s claim to objectivity, whether or not they have attained even
rudimentary knowledge of any particular science during their own studies. (Ironically,
graduates from science faculties are unlikely to know anything at all about these ‘critical
paradigms’).
I believe that post-disciplinary education in what is now called ‘Cultural Studies’ has
not earned the right to such dismissive anti-realist complacency. Theory-inspired Cultural
Studies has shown too little regard for cogency, coherence, truth and evidence. In mounting
its attacks on the very possibility of knowing things about people, Cultural Studies writers
have often ignored the liberating demands of reason and objectivity. As a result they have
denied students the opportunity to converse with each other about common cultural,
political and social issues. If all knowledge is completely language-dependent (or ‘theory-
dependent’) in the strong sense of these terms – if novel realities can be invoked through
words alone – knowledge is quickly reduced to mere belief and high-sounding opinion.
Epistemological modesty in the face of recalcitrant reality and contingency is not encouraged
in such an educational environment.
I find it ironic to have written this book. I am at best a ‘lapsed psychologist’, having
taught in the media and cultural fields for almost four decades, the period of the ascent of
post-disciplinary studies. And I have a long history of critically analysing essentialism and
reductionism (for instance, in regard to representations of gender and ‘race’). I have been
consistently critical of the methodological and educational triviality of much of academic
psychology itself.1 I have maintained a consistently anti-reductionist and anti-positivist
position. In fact, forty years ago I wrote an undergraduate essay that argued against the
logical possibility of reducing psychological predicates to physiological descriptors. Mental
phenomena could not be understood nor explained only as physico-chemical phenomena,
but had to be defined relationally. Any coherent account of consciousness had to allow that
consciousness was always ‘of ’ some state of affairs that existed independently of the brain.
Fast forward to the new millennium – today I have been forced to restate these kinds of
arguments in the context of the saturation of what is now called Cultural Studies ‘discourse’
8
Preface
by ad hoc psychological concepts and metaphysical postulates so abstract that only dogs
can hear them, as students often joke. As a university teacher, I have tried to comfort my
bemused and confused charges with counter arguments to the new-fangled idealisms and
metaphysical houses of cards that ‘Theory’-writers have constructed.
As I no longer have teaching responsibilities, nor carry the soul-destroying burden
of administering a large academic unit, I have taken the opportunity to confront several
aspects of ‘Theory’, asking that its proponents justify their methodological assumptions
and metaphysical excesses. I try to break out of the circular corral of textuality and the
question-begging defence of inter-textuality. Instead, I ask what the claims of particular
cultural Theory analyses of psychological issues imply – what could each mean, if anything,
empirically. I briefly outline the relevance of the analyses I canvass to psychological issues
(for example, to questions of human emotions, when I deal with ‘affect’), and sketch some
of the relevant historical contexts from which Theory and Anglo-American academic
psychology both developed.
I have tried to be fair to examples of writing that I admit I sometimes find pretentious and
affected, by taking their authors ‘at their word’, so to speak. I have laboured over many texts
that yielded very little enlightenment, but have done so in good faith, hoping to understand
them before offering my critique. In this I have acknowledged the respective writers’ own
advice that their analyses are not meant to be interpreted figuratively (e.g. metaphorically),
but are intended to be read literally. I have tried not to be dismissive, even though I judge many
analyses found in Cultural Studies to be philosophically naïve. This has meant that I have
included many lengthy quotations from works popular with Cultural Studies academics and
hence likely to be familiar to students. Although I have limited my technically philosophical
arguments, the educational issues that agitate my concern do demand some epistemological
sophistication of my readers at times. So where appropriate I have explained what is at stake
in technical terms, I hope clearly enough for undergraduate readers and their teachers alike
to understand. And I have resisted the temptation to satirize the examples I discuss (well,
mostly), although I have done so elsewhere in less formal contexts, I have to confess.2
It will be clear from the above that this is not a book about culture or cultures. It is
concerned with the psychological and philosophical assumptions woven into what is referred
to today as ‘Theory’. Theory both subtends and ornaments the otherwise prosaic, descriptive
and critical writing that in Anglo-American post-disciplinary education is usually labelled
‘Cultural Studies’.
Although the term ‘postmodernism’ is freely and pejoratively circulated in today’s academy,
I have tried to avoid it. ‘Postmodernity’ as a socio-cultural period, or as a label for computer-
age aesthetics (‘after’ modernism), is misleadingly vague when applied to educational/
philosophical paradigms, even though the examples I deal with have also flourished during
the past quarter of a century. I am interested in Cultural Studies’ complacent disregard of
any technically precise methodology from the fields it cannibalizes and rewrites.
The eight overlapping essays are my attempt to encourage methodological modesty and
to reinstate realist coherence as a ‘default’ position in the post-disciplinary humanities and
9
Confronting Theory
social sciences, at least in regard to what most people would accept to be psychological
matters. By ‘psychological’ I mean pertaining to the mental, emotional and behavioural lives
of (human) beings, although I am aware that other species may offer comparative insights
about human psychology, and even about culture. In fact, one Cultural Studies luminary
discusses perception in relation to honeybees, so I consider this unexpected example in one
chapter.
Confronting Theory may be read as a series of independent analyses of constellations of
related concepts nowadays fashionable within Cultural Studies. Or it can be used as a set
of critical arguments in which the educational implications of Theory-speak and the plea
for a reinvigorated humanist realism in the humanities and social sciences are the linking
themes. So I have countenanced some repetitions to allow Chapters 2 to 7 each to be
read separately. My concerns are educational, and therefore necessarily methodological
or philosophical.
Thanks are due to many students (especially my chronically-confused Honours level
students from seminars dealing with methodological issues in Media/Cultural Studies), and
to those colleagues prepared to debate the assumptions ingrained in their own work (which
is not a lot, unsurprisingly). Dr Mark Milic and Dr Fiona Hibberd have been especially
encouraging and insightful. Fiona Hibberd’s rigorous and comprehensive Unfolding Social
Constructionism (2005) has become an invaluable resource for me during the preparation
of my book. It forensically dissects perennial debates about language, psychology and
epistemology, arguing for the necessity of realism against language-dependent relativisms.
These are issues I necessarily canvass as part of my analyses of Theory’s ambitious metaphysics,
but I have other, more recent debates to address, and I do not pretend to emulate Hibberd’s
philosophical sophistication.
My research has been supported by the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, at the
University of New South Wales, Sydney. Marie McKenzie’s diligence and professionalism
as my research assistant have been invaluable, and Dr John Golder has subjected my every
sentence to sophisticated editorial scrutiny (I now think I know when to use dashes rather
than parentheses, as a result). Of course, any errors of fact or limitations of argument are
mine, and I look forward to discussion of the issues I raise by those consoled, provoked or
offended by what I hope is a rigorous series of analyses. Above all, I hope that students who
have found themselves marooned on the island of Cultural Studies will use this book to
build a dwelling sturdy enough to withstand the tidal waves of idealist fashion. They might
even discover that the tsunami that intimidates them is no more than a sea mirage after all.
Readers of Confronting Theory may be confounded by many of the novel terms that currently
circulate in Cultural Studies. Wherever possible I have implicitly (or explicitly) defined
these. I hope that I have conveyed the import of the various neologisms and novel uses
10
Preface
of conventional English words by locating them as carefully as space allows in their post-
disciplinary contexts.
Where I refer to an established academic discipline, like Psychology or Biology, I have
capitalized its name. And, of course, I follow the post-disciplinary convention of calling the
kind of writing I discuss as capital-T Theory (‘Theory’ for short).
Australian spelling follows (generally) British conventions rather than North American.
However, I have not altered quotes, nor felt it necessary to note this in every case. I have tried
to resist the temptation to exclaim ‘sic’ (thus, or ‘as in the original’ text that I am considering,
however startling an excerpt or neologism) but I have had to include occasional warnings to
remind readers that I have not fabricated the texts I criticize.
Notes
1. Psychology is good: true/false, Australian Psychologist, 1978, 13(2), 211–218; P Bell and P Staines
Logical Psych: Reasoning, Explanation and writing in Psychology, 2001, Sydney, UNSW Press, 2001.
Published in UK and USA by Sage Publications, UK, as Evaluating, Doing and Writing Research in
Psychology, 2001, (with J Michell).
2. For example, What’s Left of Theory? Deleuzians of Grandeur (available from [email protected]).
11
Chapter 1
The desire to understand the world is, they think, an outdated folly.
Bertrand Russell
The Problem of ‘Theory’
F
ive hundred years have elapsed since Erasmus complained that the writings of his
contemporaries were ‘[f]ull of big words, and newly invented terms … [a] wall of
imposing definitions, conclusions, corollaries, and explicit and implicit propositions
protects them’ (Erasmus [1509]2008). Clearly, a Renaissance scholar could not have
anticipated the rise of the empirical sciences, including social sciences such as Psychology.
On the other hand, Erasmus might not have been surprised to learn that obscure rhetoric
and opaque neologisms confound students in the twenty-first century as readily as they did
in the sixteenth.
Of the various strands of meta-theory in Anglophone interdisciplinary writing that melds
the humanities and the social sciences, anti-realist epistemology, arbitrary relativisms and,
most recently, the assumption of ‘new realities’ have re-emerged as the most dominant. Today,
students of Cultural Studies are asked to read and write about ‘infra-empirical’ phenomena,
about processes of such abstraction that they seem to refer to no material entities, such
as ‘affect’, ‘becomings’ and ‘intensities’. Sometimes these terms are referred to as ‘concepts’,
although they often lack precise definition. They sound like many terms found in the
vocabulary of academic psychology, but they are seldom used in psychologically realist ways
– or so I propose to argue in the pages that follow.
I want to begin with a paragraph of prose by a prominent Cultural Studies Theorist. I am
aware that I am presenting it out of context, and I shall return later to consider its source in
detail. For the moment it is meant only to illustrate the linguistic ecstasy that is common in
‘Theory’ writing – writing that purports to be about real psychological processes, situations
and events, and therefore to refer to actual phenomena. The author appears to be discussing
emotion and ‘affect’. And it is not unfair, I think, to say that he invokes psychological-
sounding terms to create a kind of incantatory effect. His field is perennial issues in academic
psychology: here he defines what, following the philosophers Spinoza and Deleuze, he calls
‘affect’. Now, please read on, but slowly:
Reserve the term ‘emotion’ for the personalized content, and affect for its continuation.
Emotion is contextual. Affect is situational: event fully ingressive into context. Serially
so: affect is trans-situational. As processional it is precessional, affect inhabits the passage
… It [affect] is pre- and post-contextual, pre- and post-personal, an excess of continuity
invested only in the ongoing: its own. Self-continuity across the gaps. Impersonal affect is
15
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
degree of contraction, either in a disyllabic thesis, or in the complete
coalescence of two syllables. The former takes place if the final
unaccented vowel of a polysyllable is run into the following
unaccented word consisting of, or beginning with, a vowel, e.g.:
For mány a mán | so hárd is óf his hérte.
Chauc. Prol. 229.
Nowhér so bísy a mán | as hé ther nás. ib. 321.
Wél coude she cárie a mórsel | ánd wel képe. ib. 130.
With múchel glórie | and grét solémpnitée. id. Kn. T. 12.
Oh! háppy are théy | that háve forgíveness gótt.
Wyatt 211.
My kíng, my cóuntry I séek, | for whóm I líve.
ib. 173.
Sórry am Í | to héar what Í have héard.
Shakesp. 2 Henry VI, II. i. 193.
In cases like these it cannot be supposed that there is actual elision
of a syllable, by which many a, busy a, carie a, glorie and, happy
are, country I, sorry am, would be reduced to regular disyllabic feet.
In several of the instances such an assumption is forbidden not only
by the indistinctness of pronunciation which it would involve, but
also by the caesura.
Further, we find both in Middle and in Modern English poetry many
examples of similar sequences in which there is neither elision nor
slurring, the syllable ending with a vowel forming the thesis, and the
following syllable beginning with a vowel forming the arsis. Hiatus of
this kind has always been perfectly admissible in English verse.
And yít he wás but ésy óf dispénse. Chaucer, Prol. 441.
Mówbray’s síns so héavy ín his bósom.
Shakesp. Rich. II, I. ii. 50
§ 109. The second possibility, viz. complete amalgamation of two
syllables, may occur if a word with an initial vowel or h is preceded
by a monosyllabic word, standing in thesis, e.g. th’estat, th’array
Chauc. Prol. 716; th’ascendent ib. 117; t’allege (to allege) Kn. T.
2142; nys (ne ys) ib. 43. Even in Modern English poetry such
contractions occur rather frequently: Th’altar Sur. 118; t’assay Wyatt
157; N’other ib. 21; often also the words are written in full, although
the first vowel is metrically slurred or elided: the͡ ónly darling
Shakesp. All’s Well, II. i. 110. Yet in all such cases the entire loss of
the syllable must not be assumed unless the distinctness of the
pronunciation—which must be the only guide in such matters, not
the silent reading with the eyes—be sufficiently preserved.[137]
Accordingly words like the, to are not so often contracted with the
following word, as ne, the amalgamation of which, with the verb to
which it belongs, is in accordance with normal Middle English usage:
nas = ne was, nil = ne wil, nolde = ne wolde, noot = ne woot, niste
= ne wiste, e.g.:
There nas no dore that he nolde heve of harre.
Chauc. Prol. 550.
Neither in Middle English nor in Modern English poetry, however, is
there any compulsion to use such contractions for the purpose of
avoiding the hiatus, which never was prohibited. They merely serve
the momentary need of the poet. Forms like min and thin, it is true,
are regularly used by Middle English poets before vowels, and my
and thy before consonants, and Chaucer applies—according to ten
Brink—from, oon, noon, an, -lych, -lyche before vowels, and fro, a,
o, no, -ly before consonants. But many examples of epic caesura
show that ten Brink goes too far in maintaining that hiatus was
strictly avoided, e.g.: Whan théy were wónnë; | and ín the Gréete
sée Prol. 59. This is still more clearly shown by verses in which the
final -e forms a necessary thesis before a vowel, e.g.:
Fro the senténcë | óf this trétis lýte.
Chauc. Prol. 550.Sir Thopas 2153.
Than hád yóur tálë | ál be tóld in váyn.
Chauc. Prol. 550.N. Pr. Prol. 3983
§ 110. Slurring or contraction is still more frequently the result of
indistinct pronunciation or entire elision of a vowel in the interior of a
word. This is especially the case with e (or another vowel) in the
sequence: conson. + e + r + vowel or h, where e is slurred over or
syncopated: e.g. And báthed év(e)ry véin Chauc. Prol. 3; Thy
sóv(e)rein témple wól I móst honóuren Kn. T. 1549; and év(e)ry trée
Sur. 9; the bóist(e)rous wínds Sur. 21; if ám(o)rous fáith Wyatt 15; a
dáng(e)rous cáse Sur. 4, &c. The full pronunciation is, of course,
here also possible: and dángeróus distréss Sur. 150. Slurring of a
vowel is also caused by this combination of sounds formed by two
successive words: a bétre envýned mán Chauc. Prol. 342; Forgétter
of páin Wyatt 33. Other words of the same kind are adder, after,
anger, beggar, chamber, silver, water, &c.[138] The same rule
applies to the group e + l + vowel or h (also l + e + vowel or h):
hire wýmpel͡ ipynched was Chauc. Prol. 151; At mány a nóble͡ arríve
ib. 60; nóble͡ and hígh Wyatt 55; the néedle his fínger prícks Shak.
Lucrece 319.
If a consonant takes the place of the vowel or h at the end of such a
group of sounds, we have a disyllabic thesis instead of slurring: With
hórrible féar as óne that gréatly dréadeth Wyatt 149; The cómmon
péople by númbers swárm to ús Shak. 3 Hen. VI, IV. ii. 2. Similar
slurrings are to be found—although more seldom and mainly in
Modern English poetry—with other groups of sounds, e.g.: én’mies
sword Sur. 137; théat’ner ib. 162; prís’ners ib. 12. The vowel i, also,
is sometimes slurred; Incónt(i)nent Wyatt, 110; dést(i)ny ib. 8, &c.
In all these cases we must of course recognize only slurring, not
syncopation of the vowel; and in general these words are used with
their full syllabic value in the rhythm of a verse.
Another kind of slurring—occurring almost exclusively in Modern
English poetry—is effected by contraction of a short vowel with a
preceding long one, so that a disyllabic word becomes monosyllabic,
e.g., flower, lower, power, tower, coward, prayer, jewel, cruel,
doing, going, being, seeing, dying, playing, praying, knowing, &c.:
Whose pówer divíne Sur. 118; prayer: prayr Wyatt 26; His crúel
despíte Sur. 7.
All these words are, of course, not less frequently used as disyllables
sometimes even when their usual pronunciation is monosyllabic,
e.g.:
How óft have Í, my déar and crúël foe. Wyatt 14.
I’ll práy a thóusand práyërs fór thy death.
Shak. Meas. III. i. 146.
There ís no pówer ín the tóngue of mán.
id. Merch. IV. i. 241
§ 111. Other groups of sounds which allow slurring are: vowel + r +
vowel, where the second vowel may be slurred, e.g., spirit, alarum,
warrant, nourish, flourish, &c.; My fáther’s spírit in árms! Shak.
Haml. I. ii. 255; flóurishing péopled tówns id. Gentl. V.iv. 3; I wárrant,
it wíll id. Haml. I. ii. 243. In the group vowel + v + e(i)+cons. the v
is slurred, if a consonant appears as the initial sound of the following
word, and e(i) if the following word begins with a vowel. Such words
are: heaven, seven, eleven, devil, even, ever, never, &c.; e.g., and
é’en the whóle Wyatt 80; had néver his fíll id. 108; disdáin they né’er
so múch Shak. 1 Hen. VI, V. iii. 98; and drível on péarls Wyatt 195.
These words have, of course, not less frequently their full syllabic
value: Of Héaven gátes Wyatt 222; Then sét this drível óut of dóor
Sur. 79. Also th between vowels may be subjected to slurring, as in
whether, whither, hither, thither, either, neither, rather, further, &c.;
e.g., go ásk him whíther he góes Shak. 1 Hen. VI, II. iii. 28; Good Sír,
say whéther you’ll ánswer mé or nót, id. Caes. V. iv. 30; Whether
óught to ús unknówn id. Haml. II. ii. 17.
When a syllabic inflexional ending forms one thesis with a following
syllable, as in The ímages of revólt Shak. Lear, II. iv. 91; I hád not
quóted him id. Haml. II. i. 112, &c., it is preferable to assume a
disyllabic thesis rather than a slurring. Sometimes, however, the -ed
of past participles (rarely of preterites) of verbs ending in t is
actually cut off, as torment instead of tormented Wyatt 137; deject
instead of dejected Shak. Haml. III. i. 163.
Contractions of another kind—partly to be explained by negligent
colloquial pronunciation—are: ta’en (=taken) Wyatt 182; I’ll (=I will)
Shak. Tempest, II. ii. 419; carry ’em (=carry them) id. 2 Hen. VI, I. iv.
76, &c.; Ma(d)am id. Gent. II. i. 6; in’s (=in his), doff (=do off), dout
(=do out), o’ the (=of the), w’us (=with us), let’s (=let us), thou’rt
(=thou art), &c., &c.
Finally, we have to mention the apocopation, for metrical reasons, of
unaccented prefixes, as ’bove (above), ’cause (because), ’longs
(belongs), &c., which on the whole cannot easily be
misunderstood.[139]
§ 112. A contrast to these various forms of shortening is presented
by the lengthening of words for metrical purposes, which we have
already in part discussed in the preceding chapter (see for examples
§ 87). Disyllabic words are made trisyllabic by inserting an e (or
rarely i) between mute and liquid, e.g., wond(e)rous, pilg(e)rim,
count(e)ry, breth(e)ren, ent(e)rance, child(e)ren, Eng(e)land,
troub(e)lous, light(e)ning, short(e)ly, jugg(e)ler, &c.[140]
Among the monosyllabic words or accented endings of words which
admit of a disyllabic pronunciation for the sake of metre we have
mainly to consider such as have a diphthong in their root, as our,
sour, devour, hour, desire, fire, ire, sire, hire, squire, inquire, &c., or
such as approach diphthongal pronunciation and therefore admit of
being treated as disyllables, e.g., dear, fear, hear, near, tear, clear,
year. The disyllabic use of words of the latter class is very rare,
though a striking example is afforded by the rhyme see her: clear
Mrs. Browning, iii, p. 57. Some other words, phonetically analogous
to these, but popularly apprehended as containing a simple long
vowel, as fair, fare, are, here, there, rare, sphere, were, more, door,
your, are added to the list by Abbott, but with doubtful correctness
(cf. Metrik, ii. 115–17).
CHAPTER VIII
WORD-ACCENT
DIVISION II
Verse-forms Common to the Middle and
Modern English Periods
CHAPTER IX
LINES OF EIGHT FEET, FOUR FEET, TWO FEET,
AND ONE FOOT
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