New Russia Exam Mid Term
New Russia Exam Mid Term
Determinants of Russia’s Foreign Policy: History and Identity, Location and Resources, Domestic
Politics and Leadership, Regional Dynamics and Global Geopolitics, etc.
Major debates on Russian Foreign Policy
1. How did the historical debate between "Westernizers" and "Slavophiles" influence different
conceptions of Russian national identity and its mission in the world, and how might echoes of
this debate be seen in post-Soviet foreign policy discussions?
The historical debate between "Westernizers" and "Slavophiles" in 19th-century Russia fundamentally
shaped competing visions of Russian national identity and its global role, with enduring echoes in post-
Soviet foreign policy.
2. In what ways did ideas like Pan-Slavism and Russia's self-perception as the "Third Rome" shape
Tsarist foreign policy, particularly towards the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans?
Pan-Slavism and Russia’s self-perception as the “Third Rome” profoundly shaped Tsarist foreign policy
toward the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans, blending religious, ideological, and strategic imperatives:
3. The text argues that the collapse of the USSR and its official Marxist-Leninist ideology left a
"conceptual void" regarding Russia's national identity. How did this void contribute to the foreign
policy debates in the early years of the Russian Federation? [cite: 9989, 9993-9994]
The collapse of the USSR and its Marxist-Leninist ideology created a conceptual void that fueled
contentious foreign policy debates in the early Russian Federation, as competing visions of national
identity clashed over Russia’s global role. This void manifested in three key ways:
1. Ideological Disorientation:
The loss of Marxism-Leninism—which had provided a clear framework for Soviet-era foreign
policy (e.g., anti-imperialism, proletarian internationalism)—left Russian elites without a unifying
doctrine. This absence led to debates between:
○ Atlanticists (Westernizers), who advocated integration into Western institutions (e.g.,
NATO, EU) and adoption of liberal democratic values. Figures like Foreign Minister
Andrei Kozyrev argued that Russia’s future lay in aligning with the West, embracing free
markets, and distancing itself from its imperial past.
○ Eurasianists and Nationalists, who emphasized Russia’s unique civilizational identity
as a bridge between Europe and Asia. They rejected Western hegemony, prioritized
sovereignty over post-Soviet states, and sought to rebuild influence through institutions
like the CIS. Thinkers like Alexander Dugin and policymakers like Yevgeny Primakov
later embodied this strand.
2. Geopolitical Identity Crisis:
The sudden reduction of Russia’s territorial reach and global stature provoked existential
questions: Was Russia a European power, a Eurasian power, or a distinct civilization? This
ambiguity fueled:
○ Tensions over NATO expansion, which Atlanticists initially downplayed but Eurasianists
framed as a betrayal of Russian security interests.
○ Divergent approaches to the “near abroad” (former Soviet states). Atlanticists favored
disengagement, while nationalists pushed for reintegration (e.g., pressure on Ukraine,
support for separatists in Transnistria).
3. Strategic Incoherence:
The absence of a consensus led to erratic policy shifts under Yeltsin. Early pro-Western gestures
(e.g., nuclear disarmament treaties, IMF cooperation) clashed with growing resistance to
Western-led initiatives (e.g., NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999). By the mid-1990s, the rise
of figures like Primakov signaled a pivot toward multipolarity—asserting Russia as a
counterweight to U.S. dominance, reviving ties with China/India, and leveraging energy exports
for geopolitical influence.
The void ultimately allowed pragmatic nationalism to dominate, blending Soviet-era great-power
aspirations with selective Western engagement. This laid the groundwork for Putin’s later emphasis on
sovereignty, spheres of influence, and resistance to Western norms.
4. Compare and contrast the "Atlanticist" and "Eurasianist" viewpoints on Russia's post-Soviet
identity. How did these differing views propose different foreign policy priorities, particularly
concerning relations with the West versus the "near abroad" (former Soviet states)? [cite: 8275,
8276, 10003-10005, 10013-10028]
The "Atlanticist" and "Eurasianist" viewpoints represented divergent visions for Russia’s post-Soviet
identity and foreign policy, reflecting a historical debate between Westernizing modernizers and
proponents of Russia’s unique civilizational role. These perspectives proposed starkly different priorities
for relations with the West and the "near abroad" (former Soviet states):
Atlanticist Perspective
1. Identity:
○ Viewed Russia as a natural part of European civilization, advocating integration into
Western political, economic, and security structures (e.g., EU, NATO, G7).
○ Emphasized liberal democracy, market reforms, and alignment with Western norms (Ch.
5, 7).
○ Rooted in the 19th-century Westernizer tradition, which saw Russia’s future in emulating
Europe (Ch. 2).
2. Foreign Policy Priorities:
○ Pro-West Orientation: Prioritized partnerships with the U.S. and Europe, seeking aid for
economic reforms and acceptance as a "normal" great power (Ch. 7).
○ Downplayed the Near Abroad: Initially treated former Soviet states as independent
actors, avoiding overt interference to avoid alienating the West (Ch. 6).
○ Multilateral Engagement: Supported joining institutions like the WTO and IMF to
integrate into the global economy (Ch. 1, 5).
3. Criticism: Atlanticism faced backlash for perceived subservience to the West, especially after
NATO’s 1999 Kosovo intervention and eastward expansion, which nationalists saw as betrayal
(Ch. 7, 9).
Eurasianist Perspective
1. Identity:
○ Asserted Russia as a distinct civilization bridging Europe and Asia, with a mission to
lead a Eurasian bloc (Ch. 5, 8).
○ Rejected Western liberalism, emphasizing Orthodox traditions, state sovereignty, and a
multipolar world order (Ch. 9, 10).
○ Drew from 19th-century Slavophile ideas and Soviet-era anti-Westernism (Ch. 2, 4).
2. Foreign Policy Priorities:
○ Near Abroad Dominance: Advocated reintegrating former Soviet states through
economic (Eurasian Economic Union), military (CSTO), and cultural tools (Ch. 6).
○ Resistance to Western Influence: Opposed NATO expansion and U.S. hegemony,
framing the West as a threat to Russian interests (Ch. 7, 10).
○ Strategic Autonomy: Sought partnerships with China, India, and the Global South to
counterbalance the West (Ch. 8, 9).
3. Implementation: Under Putin, Eurasianism became dominant, prioritizing control over the near
abroad (e.g., interventions in Georgia, Ukraine) and leveraging energy exports to exert influence
(Ch. 6, 10).
Key Contrasts
Boris Yeltsin's leadership struggled profoundly to define a cohesive national identity for post-Soviet
Russia, which directly undermined the coherence and strategic direction of foreign policy during his
tenure.
1. Ideological Vacuum: The collapse of the USSR left Russia without a unifying ideological
framework. Yeltsin initially embraced a Westernizing "Atlanticist" vision, seeking integration
with Europe and the U.S., but faced fierce opposition from Eurasianists and nationalists who
advocated for Russia’s unique role as a bridge between East and West. This ideological tug-of-
war created ambiguity about Russia’s place in the world.
2. Geographic and Historical Ambiguity: Yeltsin’s government oscillated between accepting
Russia’s reduced post-imperial borders and lingering aspirations to retain influence over former
Soviet states (the "Near Abroad"). His failure to reconcile these tensions left policies toward the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) inconsistent—alternating between neglect and
assertive interventions, as seen in conflicts like the First Chechen War (1994–1996).
3. Economic Dependence on the West: Yeltsin’s reliance on Western aid and market reforms
alienated nationalist factions, who viewed this as subservience. By the mid-1990s, mounting
economic crises (e.g., the 1998 ruble collapse) and NATO expansion into Eastern Europe forced
a pivot toward a more pragmatic Eurasianism, exemplified by Foreign Minister Yevgeny
Primakov’s multipolarity doctrine. However, this shift lacked a foundational identity to anchor it.
● Inconsistency: Without a clear national identity, Yeltsin’s foreign policy vacillated between pro-
Western engagement and confrontational posturing. For example, early cooperation with the U.S.
on arms control (e.g., START II) clashed with later resistance to NATO expansion and
interventions in the Balkans.
● Reactive rather than Strategic: Policy often responded to crises (e.g., Chechnya, NATO
bombing of Serbia) rather than following a long-term vision. Frequent personnel changes in key
roles (e.g., six foreign ministers in eight years) exacerbated this disjointedness.
● Legacy of Unresolved Tensions: Yeltsin’s inability to articulate a unifying identity left critical
questions about Russia’s role in the post-Soviet space and its relationship with the West
unresolved, creating a vacuum later filled by Putin’s assertive nationalism.
In essence, Yeltsin’s failure to forge a coherent national identity left Russian foreign policy adrift,
vulnerable to internal political divisions and external pressures, and set the stage for the more centralized,
ideology-driven approach of his successors.
6. Discuss President Putin's approach to Russian identity, including the emphasis on patriotism,
Russia's unique civilizational path, traditional values, and Orthodoxy. How have these elements
been reflected in Russia's foreign policy and its concept of "soft power"?
Vladimir Putin's approach to Russian identity centers on constructing a distinct civilizational narrative that
emphasizes patriotism, traditional values, Orthodox Christianity, and Russia’s "unique path" as
alternatives to Western liberalism. These elements are deeply interwoven into both domestic ideology and
foreign policy, shaping Russia’s concept of "soft power" and its global engagements.
7. Analyze the concept of the "Russian World" (Russkiy Mir) and its connection to Russia's foreign
policy under Putin, especially concerning the protection of ethnic Russian "compatriots" in the
post-Soviet space.
The concept of the "Russian World" (Russkiy Mir) is a central ideological pillar of Vladimir Putin’s
foreign policy, rooted in historical, cultural, and geopolitical narratives. It emphasizes the unity of Russian-
speaking populations and ethnic Russians across the post-Soviet space, framing Russia as the protector
of a shared civilizational identity. This concept has been instrumental in justifying interventions in
neighboring states, particularly under the pretext of safeguarding "compatriots."
1. Civilizational Unity:
Russkiy Mir posits a transnational community bound by Russian language, Orthodox heritage,
and historical ties to the Tsarist and Soviet empires. It asserts Russia’s responsibility to defend
ethnic Russians and Russian speakers abroad, even beyond its borders. This mirrors historical
Pan-Slavic and imperial ideologies, repurposed for modern statecraft [Chapters 2, 5, 9].
2. Compatriot Protection:
Putin’s regime has institutionalized the protection of ethnic Russians as a foreign policy priority.
Laws and doctrines, such as the 2010 Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation,
explicitly frame Russia’s right to intervene in states where "compatriots" face discrimination or
threats. This rationale underpinned the annexation of Crimea (2014) and support for separatists
in eastern Ukraine, framed as defending Russians from a "fascist" Kyiv regime [Chapters 6, 10].
3. Soft Power and Hard Power Synergy:
Russkiy Mir leverages cultural diplomacy (e.g., funding Russian-language schools, media like RT)
alongside coercive measures. Organizations like Rossotrudnichestvo and the Gorchakov
Fund promote Russian influence, while military interventions in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine
(2014–present) demonstrate willingness to use force to "protect" compatriots [Chapters 5, 8].
Geopolitical Implications:
● Instrumentalization of Identity:
Critics argue that Russkiy Mir is less about genuine cultural solidarity and more about geopolitical
revisionism. The 2014 annexation of Crimea, for example, exploited ethnic ties to redraw borders,
violating international law [Chapters 6, 10].
● Domestic Consolidation:
The ideology bolsters Putin’s legitimacy by casting Russia as a besieged fortress resisting
Western encroachment. This narrative distracts from economic stagnation and authoritarian
consolidation at home [Chapters 5, 9].
Conclusion:
The "Russian World" concept is a flexible tool in Putin’s foreign policy, blending soft power with hard
coercion. It reflects continuity with Tsarist and Soviet-era strategies of leveraging cultural and ethnic ties
to assert influence, now adapted to 21st-century geopolitics. By positioning Russia as the defender of a
civilizational community, Putin justifies interventions that reinforce Russia’s great-power status while
challenging the Western-led international order [Chapters 1, 9, 10].
8. How does the text describe the interplay between civic nationalism (Rossiskii) and ethnic
nationalism (Russkii) in contemporary Russia, and what are the potential foreign policy
implications of this dynamic? [cite: 10070-10071, 10089-10092]
The text describes the interplay between civic nationalism (Rossiskii) and ethnic nationalism (Russkii) in
contemporary Russia as a tension between state-centered inclusivity and ethnocultural exclusivity,
with significant implications for foreign policy. Here’s a breakdown of the dynamics and their
consequences:
● Definition: A territorial, inclusive identity encompassing all citizens of the Russian Federation
regardless of ethnicity. It emphasizes loyalty to the state, shared civic values, and a multinational
"Russian world" (Russkii mir) under Moscow’s leadership.
● State Promotion: The Putin regime has at times promoted Rossiskii to unify Russia’s diverse
population (over 190 ethnic groups) and legitimize its authority. For example, official rhetoric often
frames Russia as a "unique civilization" blending European and Asian influences, transcending
ethnic divisions.
● Foreign Policy Tool: This civic identity is leveraged to justify Russia’s influence in the post-
Soviet space (e.g., Eurasian Economic Union) as a "natural" integration of shared historical and
cultural ties, not just ethnic kinship.
2. Ethnic Nationalism (Russkii)
● Definition: An exclusivist identity centered on ethnic Russians, Orthodox Christianity, and the
cultural-linguistic heritage of ethnic Slavs. It views Russia as the homeland and protector of ethnic
Russians globally.
● Domestic Resonance: Russkii appeals to conservative, anti-liberal segments of society and far-
right groups. It gained traction post-2014, fueled by the annexation of Crimea (framed as reuniting
ethnic Russians with the motherland) and anti-Western sentiment.
● State Ambivalence: The Kremlin selectively co-opts ethnic nationalism to mobilize support but
suppresses its more extreme manifestations (e.g., ultra-nationalist movements) to avoid
destabilizing interethnic relations.
● Strategic Blending: The regime oscillates between the two concepts depending on political
goals. For instance:
○ In Ukraine, Moscow invoked Russkii to justify intervention in Crimea and Donbas as
"protecting compatriots," while using Rossiskii to frame its actions as defending a broader
"Russian world" against Western encroachment.
○ Domestically, civic nationalism is emphasized to maintain stability, while ethnic
nationalism is deployed to rally support for anti-Western policies.
● Tensions: The dual approach risks alienating non-Russian minorities (e.g., Chechens, Tatars)
and exacerbating regional separatism. It also creates ideological friction with neighboring states
(e.g., Kazakhstan, Baltic nations) wary of Moscow’s "compatriot protection" claims.
● Assertive Regionalism: The Russkii narrative legitimizes interventions in neighboring states with
ethnic Russian populations (e.g., Georgia, Ukraine), undermining their sovereignty and fueling
conflicts. This has strained relations with NATO and the EU.
● Civilizational Messaging: By blending Rossiskii (civilizational unity) and Russkii (ethnic
solidarity), Russia positions itself as a counterweight to Western liberalism, appealing to global
conservative movements and authoritarian regimes (e.g., Syria, Hungary).
● Soft Power Challenges: Overemphasis on ethnic nationalism complicates Russia’s appeal in
multicultural regions (e.g., Central Asia), where civic narratives might resonate more. Conversely,
civic rhetoric struggles to compete with the emotional pull of ethnic kinship in zones like
Transnistria or Donbas.
● Sanctions and Isolation: Western sanctions over interventions justified by ethnic nationalism
(e.g., Crimea) have pushed Russia closer to non-Western partners (China, Iran), reshaping its
geopolitical alignments.
Conclusion
The Kremlin’s balancing act between Rossiskii and Russkii reflects a pragmatic effort to maximize
domestic cohesion and foreign influence. However, this duality risks overreach, as interventions justified
by ethnic solidarity invite international backlash, while civic appeals often lack ideological coherence. The
result is a foreign policy that is simultaneously expansionist (in defending the "Russian world") and
defensive (against perceived Western cultural imperialism), with long-term stability contingent on
managing internal ethnic tensions and external geopolitical pressures.
1. The book title refers to "Changing Systems, Enduring Interests." How does the text illustrate the
interplay between historical continuity (e.g., geopolitical interests, pursuit of security/prestige) and
change (e.g., regime type, ideology, international system structure) in shaping Russian foreign
policy from the Tsarist era through the post-Soviet period? [cite: 17, 21, 93-95, 107-109, 1225-
1226]
The text illustrates the interplay between historical continuity and change in Russian foreign policy
through several key themes across different eras:
1. Regime Transitions:
○ Tsarist to Soviet: Marxist-Leninist ideology replaced autocratic monarchy, framing foreign
policy as anti-imperialist but retaining imperial practices (e.g., suppressing Eastern
European dissent).
○ Soviet to Post-Soviet: Shift from communist ideology to nationalist Eurasianism under
Putin, yet maintaining centralized control and suspicion of the West.
2. International System Shifts:
○ Bipolarity (Cold War): USSR balanced against NATO, using proxy wars and arms races.
○ Post-Cold War Unipolarity: Yeltsin’s pro-Western tilt faltered as NATO expanded, leading
to Putin’s multipolarity advocacy (e.g., SCO, BRICS).
○ 21st-Century Multipolarity: Russia leverages partnerships with China and Iran to counter
U.S. dominance, echoing Tsarist-era balancing acts.
3. Ideological Adaptations:
○ Tsarist: Pan-Slavism and Orthodoxy justified Balkan interventions.
○ Soviet: Exporting revolution gave way to realpolitik (e.g., détente).
○ Post-Soviet: “Managed democracy” and conservative values (anti-LGBTQ+,
traditionalism) position Russia as a moral counterweight to Western liberalism.
● Crimea: Annexed by Catherine the Great (1783), transferred to Ukraine under Khrushchev
(1954), and reclaimed by Putin (2014). The rationale shifted from imperial expansion to
“protecting compatriots,” but the strategic aim (Black Sea dominance) persisted.
● Central Asia: Tsarist conquests for resources and buffer zones evolved into Soviet satellite
states, then post-Soviet economic-military blocs (CSTO, EAEU).
● Diplomatic Tactics: Gorchakov’s 19th-century “composing oneself” strategy (retrenchment after
defeat) mirrors Putin’s post-2014 rhetoric of restoring dignity amid sanctions.
Conclusion
The text argues that while Russia’s systems (autocratic, communist, “managed democracy”) and
ideologies (Pan-Slavism, Marxism, Eurasianism) have adapted to global shifts, its core interests—security
through expansion, prestige via great-power recognition, and economic leverage—remain constants.
Changes in the international system (e.g., bipolarity to multipolarity) and domestic structures (centralized
authority) shape tactics but not the underlying pursuit of influence and survival.
2. Chapter 2 focuses on the "Tsarist Roots." How did the historical experience of territorial
expansion, the search for secure borders/warm-water ports, and interactions with other empires
during the Tsarist period establish patterns or identities that arguably influenced later Soviet and
post-Soviet foreign policy thinking? [cite: 376, 430, 621-628, 632]
The Tsarist era established enduring patterns in Russian foreign policy that significantly influenced Soviet
and post-Soviet strategies, particularly in three areas: territorial expansion as a security imperative,
the pursuit of warm-water ports and strategic chokepoints, and great-power competition with
Western empires. These historical dynamics shaped Russia’s geopolitical identity and continue to
resonate in its modern policies.
● Tsarist Pattern: The Russian Empire expanded relentlessly to secure its vast, exposed borders,
absorbing territories like Ukraine, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Siberia. This was driven by a
perceived need for buffer zones against invasions (e.g., from the Mongols, Ottomans, or
European powers). For example, the partitions of Poland (1772–1795) and conquests in Central
Asia aimed to eliminate threats and project power.
● Soviet Continuity: The USSR institutionalized this logic by creating a buffer of satellite states in
Eastern Europe after WWII (the Warsaw Pact), mirroring Tsarist efforts to dominate neighboring
regions. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979) also echoed earlier Central Asian expansion
to preempt foreign influence.
● Post-Soviet Echoes: Russia’s actions in the 21st century—such as the annexation of Crimea
(2014), support for separatists in eastern Ukraine, and military interventions in Georgia (2008)
and Syria (2015)—reflect a revived emphasis on controlling strategic periphery zones. The
concept of a “Russky Mir” (Russian World) to protect ethnic Russians abroad parallels Tsarist
Pan-Slavism.
● Tsarist Ambitions: Peter the Great’s founding of St. Petersburg (1703) and Catherine the
Great’s conquests in the Black Sea (e.g., Crimea, 1783) sought to secure ice-free ports and naval
dominance. The Crimean War (1853–1856) and rivalry over the Bosporus/Dardanelles straits
underscored the importance of maritime access.
● Soviet Priorities: The USSR maintained naval bases in Sevastopol (Crimea) and sought
influence in the Mediterranean (via alliances with Syria and Libya) and the Indian Ocean. The
Cold War buildup of the Soviet Navy under Admiral Gorshkov aimed to challenge U.S. sea power,
echoing Tsarist maritime ambitions.
● Post-Soviet Strategy: Putin’s annexation of Crimea and modernization of the Black Sea Fleet
revive Tsarist-era goals. Russia’s Mediterranean presence in Syria (Tartus naval base) and
partnerships with Iran to access the Persian Gulf reflect ongoing efforts to control critical
chokepoints and project power beyond its immediate borders.
● Tsarist Interactions: Russia’s conflicts with European empires (e.g., the Napoleonic Wars, the
Great Game with Britain in Central Asia) and its role as a “gendarme of Europe” (suppressing
revolutions in 1848) entrenched a worldview of competition with Western powers. The
Congress of Vienna (1815) and alliances with Germany/Austria highlighted both collaboration and
distrust.
● Soviet Ideology: The Cold War framed the U.S.-USSR rivalry as ideological (communism vs.
capitalism) but also continued Tsarist-era realpolitik. The Brezhnev Doctrine (asserting control
over socialist states) mirrored Tsarist interventions to maintain spheres of influence.
● Post-Soviet Resurgence: Putin’s emphasis on multipolarity and opposition to NATO/EU
expansion (e.g., opposing Georgia/Ukraine’s Western integration) reflects Tsarist-era fears of
encirclement. Sanctions diplomacy, cyber interference, and energy coercion (e.g., gas pipelines
to Europe) modernize traditional tools of empire, blending hard power with economic leverage.
● The Tsarist triad of autocracy, Orthodoxy, and nationalism prefigured Soviet centralized
control and post-Soviet authoritarianism. Putin’s invocation of conservative values (e.g., anti-
LGBTQ laws, support for Orthodox Christianity) and suppression of dissent mirror Tsarist appeals
to traditionalism as a unifying force.
● The notion of Russia as a unique civilization—neither fully European nor Asian—persists. The
Eurasianist ideology, revived in post-Soviet times, draws on Tsarist and Soviet precedents to
justify Russia’s role as a bridge between continents and a counterweight to Western hegemony.
In summary, Tsarist expansionism, maritime ambitions, and great-power rivalry established a template for
Russian foreign policy that emphasizes territorial buffers, strategic access, and resistance to Western
dominance. These patterns, adapted to modern contexts, underpin both Soviet and post-Soviet
strategies, illustrating how historical imperatives continue to shape Russia’s geopolitical identity.
3. How did the historical experience of the Bolshevik Revolution and the early Soviet state's hostile
international environment (civil war, intervention) shape the "operational code" and ideological
worldview (e.g., inevitability of conflict, kto-kogo principle) that influenced Soviet foreign policy
identity during the Cold War? [cite: 918-921, 931-934, 939, 1245, 1247-1250]
The Bolshevik Revolution (1917) and the early Soviet state’s tumultuous emergence amid civil war and
foreign intervention profoundly shaped the ideological and operational foundations of Soviet foreign
policy, cementing a worldview marked by inevitability of conflict and the “kto-kogo” principle (who will
defeat whom). These experiences forged a siege mentality and a zero-sum perspective that dominated
Cold War strategies:
4. The text mentions Russian leaders like Primakov and Lavrov invoking historical figures like
Gorchakov. What does this conscious use of historical precedent reveal about contemporary
Russia's foreign policy identity and its aspirations for restoring great power status after periods of
perceived weakness or defeat (like the Soviet collapse)?
The invocation of historical figures like Prince Aleksandr Gorchakov by post-Soviet Russian leaders such
as Yevgeny Primakov and Sergei Lavrov underscores a deliberate effort to anchor contemporary
foreign policy in a narrative of strategic patience, diplomatic pragmatism, and the restoration of
great power stature after periods of perceived decline. This reflects three key aspects of Russia's
foreign policy identity and aspirations:
● Gorchakov, as foreign minister under Tsar Alexander II, is celebrated for rebuilding Russia’s
influence after its defeat in the Crimean War (1853–1856) through diplomacy rather than military
force. By invoking him, modern Russian leaders draw a direct parallel between the post-Crimean
recovery and the post-Soviet era, framing both as periods of strategic retrenchment followed by
resurgence.
● This historical analogy signals that Russia’s post-1991 foreign policy is not a break from tradition
but a revival of enduring imperial and great power aspirations. It reinforces the idea that
Russia’s "natural" role is as a dominant Eurasian power, even after geopolitical setbacks.
● Gorchakov’s famous declaration that Russia was "composing herself" (rather than sulking) after
defeat reflects a focus on strategic patience and non-military tools to regain influence.
Lavrov’s praise for Gorchakov’s ability to restore Russia’s position "without moving a gun" aligns
with contemporary efforts to project soft power (e.g., energy diplomacy, multilateral organizations
like the EAEU, and cultural outreach) while avoiding direct conflict with stronger adversaries like
NATO.
● This approach contrasts with Soviet-era ideological rigidity, instead embracing flexible realism—
prioritizing national interests, balancing between East and West, and exploiting opportunities in a
multipolar world. For example, Russia’s mediation in Syria and partnerships with China and Iran
echo Gorchakov’s alignment with Bismarck’s Germany to offset Western pressures.
Conclusion
The conscious use of Gorchakov as a model reveals a foreign policy identity rooted in historical
exceptionalism and pragmatic statecraft, aiming to restore Russia’s status as an indispensable global
power. By framing post-Soviet recovery as a replay of past resurgences, Russian leaders justify their
assertive yet non-confrontational strategies (e.g., leveraging energy exports, cyber influence, and
multilateral forums) to reclaim influence lost after 1991. This historical narrative also serves domestic
audiences, fostering pride in Russia’s enduring capacity to rebound from defeat through shrewd
diplomacy and strategic patience.
5. How has the historical identity of Russia as a multinational empire, rather than a nation-state,
complicated the formation of a national identity and foreign policy for the post-Soviet Russian
Federation, especially concerning relations with the "near abroad" and the Russian diaspora?
[cite: 9993-9997, 10019]
The historical identity of Russia as a multinational empire, rather than a nation-state, has profoundly
complicated the formation of a cohesive national identity and foreign policy for the post-Soviet Russian
Federation. This legacy shapes Russia’s interactions with the “near abroad” (former Soviet states) and its
approach to the Russian diaspora in three key ways:
The Tsarist and Soviet empires absorbed diverse ethnic groups, leaving post-Soviet Russia with over
100 recognized nationalities and a federal structure reflecting this diversity15. This contrasts with the
European model of nation-states built on ethnic homogeneity. Post-1991 Russia struggled to reconcile its
imperial past with a new civic identity, oscillating between ethnic Russian nationalism and
multicultural statehood. For example, the 1993 Constitution declared Russia a “multinational people,”
yet Putin’s emphasis on Orthodox Christianity and Russkiy Mir (“Russian World”) privileges ethnic
Russians510. This duality fuels domestic tensions and external perceptions of Russia as an imperial
revanchist power.
The collapse of the USSR left 25 million ethnic Russians stranded in newly independent states, creating
a perceived obligation to protect “compatriots”610. Russia’s foreign policy frameworks, such as the
Primakov Doctrine and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), reflect a neo-imperial mindset that
views former Soviet territories as a privileged zone of influence. Military interventions in Georgia (2008)
and Ukraine (2014–present) were justified as protecting Russian speakers, echoing Tsarist-era Pan-
Slavism and Soviet paternalism69. However, these actions clash with the sovereignty aspirations of
neighboring states, destabilizing regional security and drawing Western sanctions.
Russia’s compatriot policies and use of “passportization” (granting citizenship to diaspora communities)
blur the line between domestic and foreign policy. For instance, Crimea’s annexation was framed as
reuniting ethnic Russians with the homeland610. Organizations like Rossotrudnichestvo and the
Gorchakov Fund promote Russian language and culture abroad, but such efforts are often seen as
tools for hybrid warfare810. This approach alienates neighboring states (e.g., Baltic nations) while
reinforcing Russia’s self-image as a civilizational guardian distinct from the West.
4. Ideological Contradictions
Post-Soviet Russia vacillates between Eurasianist and Westernizing ideologies. Eurasianists, inspired
by Tsarist expansionism and thinkers like Alexander Dugin, advocate a distinct civilizational identity that
legitimizes dominance over Central Asia and resistance to NATO expansion69. Conversely,
Westernizers seek integration into Europe, but this vision is undermined by Russia’s inability to shed its
imperial reflexes. The resulting policy incoherence—combining partnerships with China and Iran while
asserting “Great Power” status—reflects unresolved identity tensions910.
Conclusion
Russia’s imperial past complicates its post-Soviet identity by perpetuating a schizophrenia between
civic and ethnic nationalism. This fuels confrontational policies in the near abroad, alienates potential
partners, and traps Russia in a cycle of geopolitical competition. As the book notes, Putin’s emphasis on
“traditional values” and Orthodox identity seeks to paper over these contradictions but ultimately
reinforces perceptions of Russia as an unreconstructed empire10[Epilogue]. Until Russia resolves its
identity crisis, its foreign policy will remain torn between integration and imperial nostalgia.
6. Discuss how historical grievances or interpretations of events (e.g., NATO expansion, Kosovo
intervention, perception of Western 'encirclement' or 'interference') have shaped Russia's identity
as a power seeking respect and resisting perceived Western hegemonism under Putin.
Russia's foreign policy under Vladimir Putin has been profoundly shaped by historical grievances and
perceptions of Western actions, which have fostered a narrative of resisting Western hegemony and
asserting Russia's status as a respected global power. Key events and interpretations include:
1. NATO Expansion
● Perceived Betrayal: Post-Cold War NATO enlargement into Eastern Europe and the Baltic
states (e.g., Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic in 1999; Baltic states in 2004) was viewed by
Russia as a breach of informal assurances made during German reunification. This fueled a
sense of strategic encirclement and marginalization1[Ch. 1, 7].
● Security Threat: Moscow interpreted NATO's eastward push as a direct challenge to its sphere
of influence, undermining its historical role as a guarantor of security in Eurasia. The 2008
Bucharest Summit’s suggestion of eventual Ukrainian and Georgian membership exacerbated
tensions, contributing to the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and the 2014 annexation of Crimea2[Ch.
6, 9].
Conclusion
Putin’s Russia has weaponized historical grievances to construct an identity centered on sovereignty,
multipolarity, and civilizational exceptionalism. By framing NATO expansion, Western interventions,
and democratic promotion as systemic threats, Moscow justifies its assertive policies—from military
interventions to ideological warfare—as necessary to resist hegemony and reclaim its rightful place as a
global power
7. According to the text, what lessons from Russian history (e.g., the Time of Troubles, Crimean
War, Russo-Japanese War, World War I) illustrate the potential dangers of foreign policy
overextension or war for Russia's internal stability and regime survival?
Russian history offers several examples of how foreign policy overextension and war have jeopardized
the country's internal stability and regime survival:
Key Lessons
These historical episodes illustrate recurring dangers for Russia:
1. Chapter 5 states that domestic factors constrain foreign policy through resource allocation
choices ("guns vs. butter") and internal political contests ("Kto-kogo" - Who prevails over whom?).
How does the text illustrate these constraints affecting Russian foreign policy decisions in the
post-Soviet era?
The text illustrates how domestic factors—specifically resource allocation ("guns vs. butter") and internal
political contests ("Kto-kogo")—constrained and shaped Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet era
through several key examples:
● Post-Soviet Economic Collapse: After the USSR’s dissolution, Russia’s economic crisis
(hyperinflation, capital flight, and reliance on IMF loans) forced severe cuts to military spending.
By the mid-1990s, Russia’s military was a "hollow shell," with unpaid soldiers, decaying
infrastructure, and outdated equipment. This degradation limited Moscow’s ability to project
power, as seen in the disastrous First Chechen War (1994–1996), where a weakened military
struggled against insurgents1.
● Oil-Driven Recovery: Under Putin (2000–2008), rising oil prices enabled increased defense
spending, funding military modernization (e.g., partnerships with European firms for advanced
equipment). This allowed Russia to assert itself in Georgia (2008) and later in Crimea (2014).
However, the economy’s dependence on raw materials (over 75% of exports) made it vulnerable
to oil price swings and sanctions, as seen post-2014, when falling oil prices and Western
sanctions depleted reserves, forcing austerity and limiting foreign policy options.
● Sanctions and Prioritization: Post-2014, sanctions over Ukraine and Syria strained Russia’s
economy, yet Putin prioritized "guns" over social spending. Military interventions in Syria (2015)
and Ukraine continued despite economic contraction, reflecting a strategic choice to sustain
geopolitical influence despite domestic welfare trade-offs.
● Yeltsin’s Era: Political instability under Yeltsin—marked by clashes with parliament (1993),
oligarchic rivalries, and shifting alliances—led to incoherent foreign policy. For example, Yeltsin
oscillated between pro-Western "Atlanticism" (e.g., seeking NATO partnership) and nationalist
rhetoric to appease opposition, resulting in inconsistent engagement with the West and post-
Soviet states.
● Putin’s Centralization: Putin’s consolidation of power (e.g., weakening regional governors, co-
opting oligarchs, and marginalizing liberals) centralized foreign policy decision-making. This
ended the Yeltsin-era chaos and enabled a cohesive strategy focused on restoring Russia’s
great-power status. Initiatives like the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and interventions in
Syria/Ukraine reflected Putin’s dominance over competing factions (e.g., siloviki vs. liberals).
● Public Opinion and Nationalism: Domestic political survival increasingly tied to nationalist
sentiment. Putin’s annexation of Crimea (2014) and anti-Western rhetoric boosted his approval
ratings, illustrating how internal political contests (appealing to conservative, nationalist bases)
drove assertive foreign policy. Conversely, economic protests in 2017–2018 pressured the
Kremlin to balance military spending with social stability.
3. Ideological Debates
● Westernizers vs. Eurasianists: Post-Soviet foreign policy was shaped by ideological struggles
between pro-Western reformers (e.g., Andrei Kozyrev) and Eurasianists/nationalists (e.g.,
Yevgeny Primakov). Yeltsin initially leaned Western but pivoted to Primakov’s "multipolarity"
framework after nationalist backlash, prioritizing ties with China and India.
● Putin’s Pragmatic Nationalism: Putin blended Eurasianist ideas with conservative values
(Orthodoxy, anti-liberalism) to legitimize his rule. This ideological shift, driven by domestic political
needs, justified actions like supporting separatists in Ukraine and aligning with authoritarian
regimes (e.g., Syria’s Assad).
Conclusion
Domestic resource constraints and political power struggles fundamentally shaped Russia’s foreign policy
trajectory. Economic fragility under Yeltsin forced accommodation with the West, while oil wealth under
Putin enabled military assertiveness—though sanctions reintroduced "guns vs. butter" dilemmas.
Internally, Putin’s victory in the "Kto-kogo" contest centralized authority, allowing sustained geopolitical
ambitions despite economic and social costs. These dynamics underscore how Russia’s post-Soviet
foreign policy remains deeply intertwined with domestic economic realities and elite political survival.
2. According to the text, how has the institutional framework for foreign policy decision-making
evolved from the Soviet period (with dominant CPSU structures) to the post-Soviet Russian
Federation (with a strong presidency)? [cite: 2157-2177, 2194-2213]
The institutional framework for foreign policy decision-making in Russia underwent significant
transformation from the Soviet period to the post-Soviet era, shifting from Communist Party dominance
to a president-centric system:
3. What role do the post-Soviet "power ministries" (Defense, Interior, FSB, SVR) play in foreign
policy formulation, according to the text, and what challenges (like reform, politicization,
corruption) have affected the military's influence?
The post-Soviet "power ministries" (Defense, Interior, FSB, SVR) play significant but evolving roles in
shaping Russian foreign policy, particularly under Putin’s leadership. Their influence stems from their
control over security, intelligence, and military capabilities, which are leveraged to assert Russia’s
geopolitical interests. Key points from the text include:
4. How does the text assess the influence of the Russian Federal Assembly (parliament), political
parties, and public opinion on the conduct of foreign policy, particularly considering the
constitutional powers granted to the President? [cite: 2485-2523, 2616-2643]
The text assesses the influence of the Russian Federal Assembly, political parties, and public opinion on
foreign policy as largely subordinate to the President’s constitutional dominance, with formal checks
and balances existing on paper but limited in practice. Here’s the breakdown:
2. Political Parties:
3. Public Opinion:
● Instrumentalized, Not Determinative:
Public sentiment is monitored by the Kremlin, particularly on issues like NATO expansion or
sanctions, but is often shaped by state-controlled media rather than shaping policy. The
President’s high approval ratings (e.g., Putin’s post-Crimea surge) are leveraged to legitimize
assertive foreign policies.
○ Example: The text cites the government’s use of patriotic narratives to rally support
during crises (e.g., Syria intervention, Ukraine annexation), but notes that public opinion
is not a primary driver of strategic decisions.
● Constrained Mobilization:
Civil society and independent media have limited capacity to challenge the executive’s foreign
policy monopoly, especially after laws restricting NGOs and dissent.
4. Presidential Supremacy:
● The Constitution centralizes power in the presidency, enabling the executive to bypass
parliamentary or public opposition through decrees, control of security agencies, and patronage
networks.
● Example: The text emphasizes that key decisions (e.g., military interventions, alliances) are made
by the President and a small circle of advisors, with the Federal Assembly and parties playing
secondary roles in ratification or symbolic support.
Conclusion:
The text portrays a system where formal institutions and public opinion are subordinate to
presidential authority, reflecting Russia’s “managed democracy.” While the Federal Assembly and
parties provide a veneer of pluralism, the President’s constitutional powers and political infrastructure
ensure that foreign policy remains a top-down process, insulated from meaningful legislative or societal
constraints.
5. The book describes the rise of powerful financial-industrial groups and oligarchs in the 1990s.
How did these domestic economic actors attempt to influence foreign policy, for example,
concerning energy (like Gazprom) or arms sales, and how did the state under Putin respond?
In the 1990s, Russia's transition to a market economy led to the rise of powerful financial-industrial
groups and oligarchs who exerted significant influence over foreign policy, particularly in energy and arms
exports. Under Boris Yeltsin, privatization allowed oligarchs to gain control of key industries, including
energy giant Gazprom and arms manufacturers. These actors leveraged their economic power to shape
foreign policy to serve their commercial interests:
1. Energy (Gazprom):
○ Oligarchs and corporate leaders pushed for energy deals that prioritized profit over state
strategy. Gazprom, though state-controlled, operated with considerable autonomy,
negotiating pipeline agreements and gas contracts with European countries
independently. This often led to ad hoc arrangements that prioritized short-term revenue,
sometimes undermining cohesive energy diplomacy.
○ For example, Gazprom’s leadership lobbied for pipelines bypassing Ukraine (e.g., Nord
Stream) to secure transit fees and market dominance in Europe, influencing Russia’s
geopolitical stance toward Eastern Europe.
2. Arms Sales:
○ Oligarchs controlling arms firms pressured the government to prioritize exports to
lucrative markets, including unstable regimes or U.S.-adversarial states (e.g., Iran,
China), to maximize profits. This complicated Russia’s relations with Western countries
and international nonproliferation norms.
○ Decentralized arms export agencies competed against each other, leading to inconsistent
policies and corruption, as private actors prioritized personal gain over national security.
Putin’s Response:
Upon taking office, Vladimir Putin systematically reasserted state control over these sectors to align them
with strategic foreign policy goals:
● Energy: Gazprom was brought under tighter Kremlin oversight, with state-appointed leadership.
Energy exports became a tool of statecraft, such as using gas supply cuts to pressure Ukraine
(2006, 2009) or promoting pipelines (e.g., TurkStream) to deepen ties with Turkey and undermine
EU unity.
● Arms Exports: Putin centralized control under state agencies like Rosoboronexport,
consolidating arms sales as an instrument of geopolitical influence. Sales were directed toward
allies (e.g., India, Vietnam) to counter U.S. alliances, while avoiding deals that risked major
diplomatic blowback.
● Oligarch Curbing: Putin weakened oligarchic autonomy through selective prosecutions (e.g.,
Mikhail Khodorkovsky of Yukos) and exile of dissenters. This ensured that economic actors
aligned with state interests or faced consequences.
In summary, Putin transformed energy and arms sectors from oligarch-driven profit centers into pillars of
Russia’s strategic foreign policy, leveraging them to project power and resist Western influence.
6. How did the leadership styles and domestic political challenges faced by Yeltsin versus Putin
affect the consistency and implementation of Russian foreign policy? [cite: 2249-2250, 2647-
2654]
The leadership styles and domestic challenges faced by Boris Yeltsin (1991–1999) and Vladimir Putin
(2000–present) led to stark contrasts in the consistency and implementation of Russian foreign policy:
Key Contrasts
● Yeltsin’s Legacy: A fragmented, reactive foreign policy shaped by domestic turmoil and identity
confusion.
● Putin’s Legacy: A centralized, assertive strategy leveraging domestic stability to rebuild Russia
as a "great power" challenging Western norms.
The text underscores that Putin’s ability to consolidate power and harness nationalism allowed Russia to
pursue a more coherent and aggressive foreign policy, whereas Yeltsin’s tumultuous tenure left Russia
sidelined on the global stage1
7. Discuss the significance of Russian nationalism as a domestic factor. How have concerns for the
Russian diaspora, national pride, and debates about Russia's unique identity influenced foreign
policy goals and assertiveness? [cite: 2019, 2044-2049, 2106-2122, 2132-2141]
Russian nationalism has been a pivotal domestic factor shaping Moscow's foreign policy, driving
assertiveness through concerns for the Russian diaspora, national pride, and debates over Russia's
unique identity. These elements collectively reinforce a foreign policy aimed at restoring Russia’s global
influence and defending its perceived civilizational distinctiveness.
The Kremlin has consistently framed itself as the protector of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers
abroad, particularly in post-Soviet states. This narrative justified interventions such as the 2014
annexation of Crimea, where Putin invoked the need to safeguard Crimea’s "compatriots" from perceived
threats after Ukraine’s pro-Western Euromaidan revolution. Similar rhetoric has been deployed in Georgia
(2008) and eastern Ukraine, leveraging diaspora concerns to legitimize territorial expansion or
destabilization efforts. The concept of the Russkiy Mir ("Russian World")—a cultural and civilizational
sphere encompassing Russian-speaking communities—has been institutionalized through state-backed
initiatives like the Rossotrudnichestvo agency, blending soft power with geopolitical goals.
Post-Soviet humiliation, including NATO expansion and economic decline, fueled a collective desire to
restore national pride. Putin’s regime capitalized on this sentiment, framing foreign policy successes (e.g.,
Syria intervention, Crimea annexation) as evidence of Russia’s return to great-power status. Military
modernization, nuclear posturing, and high-profile projects like the 2018 World Cup or Arctic militarization
serve as symbols of resurgence. Polls showing overwhelming public support for Crimea’s annexation
(86% in 2014) underscore how national pride legitimizes assertive policies, even amid Western sanctions.
Domestic debates about Russia’s identity—whether it belongs to Europe or a distinct Eurasian civilization
—have directly influenced foreign policy alignment. Eurasianists, like Alexander Dugin, advocate for a
anti-Western bloc with China and Central Asia, reflected in institutions like the Eurasian Economic Union
(EAEU) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Conversely, Westernizers (marginalized
post-1990s) pushed for integration with Europe, but NATO’s eastward expansion and color revolutions
discredited this approach. Putin’s synthesis—a civilizational state with a "unique" path—justifies
distancing from Western norms (e.g., rejecting LGBTQ+ rights as "degenerate") and fostering
partnerships with authoritarian states.
Conclusion
Russian nationalism acts as both a tool for regime consolidation and a driver of foreign policy
assertiveness. By intertwining diaspora protection, historical grievances, and civilizational exceptionalism,
the Kremlin legitimizes aggressive actions while marginalizing liberal opposition. This domestic-nationalist
foundation ensures that foreign policy remains oriented toward reclaiming influence, resisting Western
norms, and positioning Russia as a pole in a multipolar world order.
8. How did the state of the Russian economy (e.g., decline in the 1990s, recovery fueled by energy
exports, vulnerability to sanctions) act as a domestic constraint or enabler for foreign policy
ambitions under Yeltsin and Putin? [cite: 140, 195-196, 201-228, 2656, 3835, 4240-4245, 4358,
4601-4602, 4748, 6928-6932, 7100-7105, 7246-7247]
The Russian economy significantly influenced foreign policy under both Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin,
acting as both a constraint and an enabler depending on the era and economic conditions:
Conclusion
● Yeltsin: Economic collapse constrained ambitions, necessitating Western alignment and limiting
military capacity.
● Putin: Energy wealth initially enabled resurgence but created vulnerabilities. Sanctions and
commodity volatility later constrained economic stability, though Putin leveraged nationalism to
sustain assertive policies despite costs
9. The text mentions specific domestic events like the war in Chechnya or terrorist attacks like
Beslan. How did such internal security challenges influence both domestic political consolidation
and foreign policy priorities (e.g., relations with neighbors, counter-terrorism cooperation)? [cite:
2101, 2539-2540, 2553-2556, 2878-2885, 3444-3445, 3867, 6597-6604]
Internal security challenges, particularly the wars in Chechnya and terrorist attacks like Beslan, profoundly
shaped Russia’s domestic political consolidation and foreign policy priorities. Here’s how these events
influenced both spheres:
In summary, Chechnya and Beslan catalyzed Putin’s authoritarian consolidation at home and a foreign
policy prioritizing territorial control, counter-terrorism alliances, and resistance to Western influence.
These events became linchpins in justifying both domestic repression and assertive international actions.
1. How did the main locus of foreign policy decision-making shift from Communist Party institutions
(Politburo, Secretariat) in the Soviet era to the Presidency in the post-Soviet Russian Federation?
[cite: 2157-2177, 2194-2213]
The shift in the locus of foreign policy decision-making from Communist Party institutions to the Russian
presidency reflects the broader transformation from a one-party authoritarian system to a presidential
republic. Here’s a structured analysis:
Soviet Era: Communist Party Dominance
1. Politburo and Secretariat Control:
○ Foreign policy decisions were centralized within the Communist Party’s Politburo and
Secretariat, which operated as the supreme decision-making bodies. The General
Secretary (e.g., Stalin, Khrushchev) held ultimate authority, with the Politburo collectively
deliberating on strategic issues.
○ Ideological alignment with Marxist-Leninist principles guided policy, and the Party
maintained strict control over state institutions, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
which executed decisions rather than formulating them.
2. Collective Leadership vs. Personality:
○ While the General Secretary dominated during periods like Stalin’s rule, the Brezhnev era
saw more collective decision-making. However, the Party’s monopoly on power ensured
that foreign policy remained insulated from public or legislative influence.
2. Analyze the role and influence of the President (specifically referencing Yeltsin and Putin) as the
central actor in shaping Russian foreign policy, considering their constitutional powers, staff
structure (e.g., foreign policy advisor), and leadership styles. [cite: 2194-2213, 2239-2248, 2647-
2654]
The President of Russia, as established by the 1993 Constitution, serves as the central actor in shaping
foreign policy, wielding extensive constitutional powers. Under both Boris Yeltsin (1991–1999) and
Vladimir Putin (2000–2008, 2012–present), the presidency consolidated authority over foreign policy
through institutional design, leadership style, and strategic use of advisory structures.
● The President holds exclusive authority to appoint/dismiss the Foreign Minister (subject to
parliamentary approval), approve military doctrine, and direct negotiations with foreign
states (Chapter 5). Both Yeltsin and Putin exploited these powers to centralize decision-making,
bypassing bureaucratic resistance. For example, Yeltsin unilaterally negotiated the Belavezha
Accords (1991) dissolving the USSR, while Putin personally orchestrated the annexation of
Crimea (2014) through covert operations.
● The Security Council, chaired by the President, became a critical tool for both leaders. Yeltsin
used it to sideline parliamentary critics during the First Chechen War (1994–1996), while Putin
expanded its role to coordinate intelligence agencies and military interventions (e.g., Syria in
2015).
● Yeltsin relied on a shifting cadre of advisors, reflecting his erratic leadership style. Pro-Western
liberals like Andrei Kozyrev (Foreign Minister, 1991–1996) initially dominated, but Yeltsin pivoted
to nationalist pragmatists like Yevgeny Primakov (Foreign Minister, 1996–1998) after NATO
expansion and domestic backlash. This volatility created policy incoherence, exemplified by the
oscillation between pro-Western engagement and Eurasianist rhetoric.
● Putin systematized advisory structures, appointing loyalists like Sergei Ivanov (Defense Minister,
2001–2007) and Nikolai Patrushev (Security Council Secretary, 2008–present). The Presidential
Administration’s Foreign Policy Directorate, under Putin, became a shadow foreign ministry,
enabling direct control over initiatives like the Eurasian Economic Union (2015) and hybrid
warfare tactics in Ukraine.
● Yeltsin’s personalized diplomacy and reactive approach often undermined strategic coherence.
His deference to U.S. demands in the 1990s (e.g., NATO enlargement, economic "shock
therapy") eroded domestic legitimacy, while his reliance on oligarchic clans fostered corruption.
The 1996 reelection campaign, backed by oligarchic media, prioritized political survival over
long-term foreign policy planning.
● Putin’s authoritarian pragmatism emphasized restoring Russia’s global influence through
calculated assertiveness. He centralized control over energy exports (e.g., Gazprom’s
dominance), modernized military capabilities post-2008 Georgia War, and exploited Western
divisions via cyber operations and disinformation campaigns. His conservative ideological
turn (e.g., anti-LGBT laws, Orthodox Church alignment) framed foreign policy as a civilizational
struggle against Western liberalism.
Impact of Personality
● As per Greenstein’s framework (Chapter 1), both leaders operated in environments "admitting
restructuring": Yeltsin during state collapse and Putin amid post-Soviet instability. Yeltsin’s
impulsive decision-making (e.g., shelling parliament in 1993) contrasted with Putin’s
methodical centralization. The latter’s KGB background ingrained a preference for secrecy and
indirect coercion (e.g., Novichok poisonings, Wagner Group deployments).
In summary, while constitutional powers provided the foundation, Yeltsin and Putin’s contrasting
leadership styles—chaotic vs. controlled—determined Russia’s foreign policy trajectory. Putin’s fusion of
institutional authority, ideological messaging, and hybrid tactics has entrenched presidential dominance,
whereas Yeltsin’s tenure highlighted the risks of personalism without strategic vision.
3. What formal and informal roles does the Russian Security Council play in foreign and defense
policy, and how has its influence fluctuated based on the individuals serving as its Secretary (e.g.,
Lebed, Putin, Patrushev)?
The Russian Security Council (SC) plays a significant role in shaping foreign and defense policy, with its
influence shaped by both formal mandates and informal power dynamics, particularly depending on the
individuals serving as its Secretary. Here’s an analysis based on the institutional framework and
leadership transitions:
1. Power Consolidation:
○ The SC acts as a tool for the president to centralize control over the "power ministries"
(Defense, FSB, etc.). Its informal influence often depends on the Secretary’s proximity to
the president and ability to mediate bureaucratic rivalries.
2. Agenda-Setting:
○ Influential Secretaries can shape policy debates by prioritizing specific issues (e.g.,
counterterrorism, cybersecurity) and sidelining competing viewpoints.
3. Personality-Driven Influence:
○ The Secretary’s background and political clout determine whether the SC operates as a
rubber-stamp body or a proactive policy driver. For example:
■ Alexander Lebed (1996): A former general and political rival to Yeltsin, Lebed’s
tenure was brief and contentious. His push for military reform and criticism of the
Chechen War clashed with Yeltsin’s inner circle, leading to his dismissal. The
SC’s influence waned during this period due to infighting.
■ Vladimir Putin (1999–2000): As Secretary under Yeltsin, Putin used the role to
consolidate power ahead of his presidency. He revitalized the SC as a hub for
coordinating the Second Chechen War and sidelining opponents. His tenure
marked a shift toward assertive security policies, leveraging the SC to project
authority.
■ Nikolai Patrushev (2008–present): A longtime Putin ally and former FSB
director, Patrushev has institutionalized the SC’s role in crafting hardline policies
(e.g., anti-Western rhetoric, hybrid warfare strategies). His deep ties to security
agencies and loyalty to Putin have made the SC a key node for implementing the
Kremlin’s geopolitical agenda, including interventions in Ukraine and Syria.
● Lebed’s Tenure: His reformist agenda and independent stance led to clashes with Yeltsin,
limiting the SC’s effectiveness. The body was sidelined as Yeltsin relied more on informal
advisors.
● Putin’s Tenure: The SC became a springboard for Putin’s rise, centralizing decision-making and
enhancing its role in security policy. This established a precedent for the SC as a tool of
presidential authority.
● Patrushev’s Tenure: Under Patrushev, the SC has gained operational influence, particularly in
hybrid warfare and information security. His long tenure reflects Putin’s trust, enabling the SC to
act as a shadow policymaking body, often bypassing formal ministerial channels.
Conclusion
The Security Council’s formal role as a coordinating body is amplified or diminished by the Secretary’s
political weight. Under strong leaders like Putin and Patrushev, it has become a cornerstone of Russia’s
security apparatus, driving assertive policies. In contrast, during periods of bureaucratic conflict (e.g.,
Lebed’s tenure), its influence receded. The SC’s evolution mirrors Putin’s centralization of power,
blending formal mandates with informal networks to advance the Kremlin’s strategic objectives.
4. Discuss the evolution and influence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Foreign Minister
(mentioning figures like Kozyrev, Primakov, Lavrov). How does its role compare to that of the
President or other powerful ministries?
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and its leadership have played a pivotal but evolving role in shaping
Russia’s post-Soviet foreign policy, often reflecting broader ideological shifts and the centralization of
power under the presidency. Key figures like Andrei Kozyrev, Yevgeny Primakov, and Sergei Lavrov
exemplify distinct phases in this evolution, with the MFA’s influence fluctuating relative to the presidency
and other power centers.
● Policies: Kozyrev, Russia’s first post-Soviet foreign minister, pursued a pro-Western "Atlanticist"
agenda, prioritizing integration with Europe and the U.S. He supported disarmament, NATO
partnership, and economic liberalization, aligning with Boris Yeltsin’s early reformist vision.
● Criticism & Decline: Kozyrev faced backlash from nationalists and conservatives for perceived
subservience to the West, particularly after NATO’s 1994 expansion talks and the Chechen War
(1994–1996). His tenure symbolized the MFA’s initial subordination to Yeltsin’s pro-Western
stance but also highlighted its vulnerability to domestic political pressures.
● Multipolarity & Assertiveness: Primakov, a former KGB officer and advocate of a "multipolar
world," reoriented Russian foreign policy to counter U.S. hegemony. He strengthened ties with
China, India, and the Middle East, opposed NATO expansion into Eastern Europe, and revived
Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet space (e.g., mediating the 1997 Armenia-Azerbaijan
conflict).
● Institutional Clout: Primakov elevated the MFA’s role as a counterweight to Western-centric
policies, aligning with emerging security institutions like the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO). However, his vision remained constrained by Russia’s economic frailty
and Yeltsin’s erratic leadership.
● Pragmatic Conservatism: Lavrov, serving under Putin and Medvedev, has emphasized
realpolitik, defending Russia’s interests against Western "interference" (e.g., opposing NATO
enlargement, the 2008 Georgia War, and the 2014 Ukraine crisis). His tenure reflects the MFA’s
role in legitimizing Putin’s assertive policies, including the use of "soft power" tools like the
Gorchakov Fund for public diplomacy.
● Ideological Alignment: Lavrov has promoted a conservative, anti-liberal narrative, framing
Russia as a guardian of traditional values against Western "decadence." This aligns with Putin’s
Eurasianist vision, as seen in initiatives like the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).
● Presidential Dominance: Since Putin’s rise, foreign policy has been centralized under the
presidency. The Security Council, led by the president, often eclipses the MFA in strategic
decisions (e.g., Crimea’s annexation in 2014, Syria intervention in 2015). Lavrov executes rather
than shapes grand strategy, unlike Primakov’s more autonomous influence.
● Competing Ministries: The Defense Ministry (e.g., Sergei Shoigu) and security agencies (FSB,
SVR) wield significant clout in military and covert operations, reducing the MFA’s monopoly over
diplomacy. Economic ministries (e.g., Energy) also drive policy through resource diplomacy (e.g.,
gas exports to Europe).
● Public Diplomacy: The MFA under Lavrov has expanded its role in hybrid warfare, using media
(RT, Sputnik) and cyber tools to project influence, though these efforts are coordinated with the
Kremlin’s United Russia party and security services.
Conclusion
The MFA’s influence has shifted from Kozyrev’s idealism to Primakov’s balancing act and Lavrov’s
instrumental role in Putin’s centralized system. While the ministry remains a key diplomatic actor, its
autonomy is subordinate to presidential priorities and competing power centers, reflecting Russia’s
broader transition from pluralistic foreign policy debates to authoritarian consolidation.
5. According to the text, what has been the role and influence of the military establishment (Ministry
of Defense, General Staff) in post-Soviet foreign policy, considering challenges like reform,
politicization, and its relationship with civilian leadership?
The military establishment, including the Ministry of Defense and General Staff, has played a complex
and evolving role in post-Soviet Russian foreign policy, shaped by institutional challenges, reform efforts,
and shifting dynamics with civilian leadership:
● Economic Collapse and Hollowed Capacity: After the USSR’s dissolution, Russia inherited a
military in disarray. Budget shortfalls, unpaid wages, and decaying infrastructure led to a "hollow
shell" of the Soviet military, with morale plummeting and conscripts facing dire conditions. The
Chechen Wars (1994–1996, 1999–2000) exposed severe operational weaknesses, including
poor training and equipment12.
● Failed Reforms Under Yeltsin: Early attempts to shift toward a professional army were stymied
by economic crises. Defense Minister Igor Rodionov’s dismissal in 1997 highlighted Yeltsin’s
frustration with the military’s inability to modernize1.
● Alignment with Kremlin Objectives: Under Putin, the military became a key tool for asserting
Russia’s geopolitical ambitions. Operations in Crimea (2014) and Syria (2015–present) were
executed with strategic coordination between the General Staff and civilian leadership, blending
military action with information warfare to project strength34.
● Institutional Subordination: Unlike the Soviet era, where the military enjoyed significant
autonomy, Putin’s regime tightened civilian control. The 2008 Serdyukov reforms reduced officer
ranks and aimed to curb institutional resistance, though backlash from traditionalists persisted3.
● Security Doctrine Integration: The military’s role is codified in strategic documents like the
National Security Strategy and Military Doctrine, which emphasize countering NATO
expansion and protecting "compatriots" abroad. The General Staff shapes operational plans for
interventions, as seen in Syria’s air campaign4.
● Hybrid Warfare and Soft Power: The military collaborates with intelligence agencies (FSB,
GRU) and private entities (e.g., Wagner Group) to advance foreign policy goals, blending
conventional force with cyber operations and disinformation campaigns4.
● Reform Backlash: Efforts to modernize faced resistance from conservative factions within the
military-industrial complex (MIC). For example, Serdyukov’s reforms were partially rolled back
after his 2012 ouster, reflecting MIC lobbying3.
● Civilian-Military Synergy: While the military lacks Soviet-era political clout, its leadership (e.g.,
Sergei Shoigu) operates within Putin’s centralized framework. The military’s success in Crimea
and Syria bolstered domestic legitimacy, reinforcing its role as a pillar of Putin’s "great power"
narrative34.
In summary, post-Soviet Russia’s military has transitioned from a weakened institution to a revitalized
instrument of state power under Putin, closely aligned with civilian leadership’s geopolitical aims. While
challenges like reform resistance persist, the military’s integration into hybrid warfare strategies and its
symbolic role in national prestige underscore its enduring influence on foreign policy.
6. How do the intelligence and security services (like the FSB and SVR, successors to the KGB) act
as players in the foreign policy process, both in providing intelligence and potentially influencing
decisions, especially given the backgrounds of some key political figures?
The intelligence and security services of Russia, such as the FSB (Federal Security Service) and SVR
(Foreign Intelligence Service), play a significant role in the country's foreign policy process. These
agencies, successors to the Soviet-era KGB, are involved both in gathering intelligence and influencing
decision-making, especially given the backgrounds of key political figures like Vladimir Putin, who himself
is a former KGB officer.
Strategic Objectives
● The overarching goal of these agencies is to restore Russia’s status as a global power. This
involves countering Western influence, securing strategic interests in regions like Eastern Europe
and Central Asia, and promoting a multipolar world order where Russia plays a leading role1.
● The intelligence services also serve as instruments for advancing Russia's ideological narrative,
portraying the country as a bastion of traditional values against Western liberalism1.
In summary, the FSB and SVR are not only providers of critical intelligence but also active players in
shaping Russia's foreign policy. Their influence is amplified by the backgrounds of political leaders like
Putin, who have deep ties to these institutions. This dynamic underscores the intertwining of security
apparatuses with statecraft in contemporary Russian governance.
7. While the President dominates, what limited influence do other actors like the Prime Minister, the
Parliament (State Duma and Federation Council), and regional leaders exert on foreign policy
matters? [cite: 2298-2315, 2485-2518, 2549-2558]
While the President of Russia, particularly under Vladimir Putin, wields significant authority in foreign
policy, other actors such as the Prime Minister, Parliament (State Duma and Federation Council), and
regional leaders exert limited but notable influence within certain constraints.
Prime Minister
The Prime Minister’s role in foreign policy is secondary to the President’s. While the Prime Minister
primarily focuses on domestic economic and administrative issues, they may influence foreign policy
indirectly through economic diplomacy or by overseeing ministries involved in international trade and
cooperation. For example, during Dmitry Medvedev's tenure as Prime Minister under Putin, his role in
managing economic sanctions and trade policies indirectly impacted Russia's foreign relations.
Parliament (State Duma and Federation Council)
The Parliament’s influence on foreign policy is limited but constitutionally significant. The State Duma can
ratify or reject international treaties, approve declarations of war, and oversee the budget for foreign
policy initiatives. The Federation Council, as the upper house, has a more direct role in approving military
deployments abroad. However, in practice, both houses largely align with the President’s directives due to
the dominance of pro-Putin parties like United Russia. This alignment minimizes their independent impact
on shaping foreign policy.
Regional Leaders
Regional leaders have minimal direct influence on foreign policy but can impact it through their control
over local resources and cross-border relations. For instance, governors of border regions may engage in
regional diplomacy or manage trade with neighboring countries. However, their activities are closely
monitored by the federal government to ensure alignment with national policies.
Constraints on Influence
● Presidential Dominance: The President’s constitutional powers allow them to dominate foreign
policy decision-making.
● Centralized System: Russia’s political system centralizes power in Moscow, limiting the
autonomy of other actors.
● Party Loyalty: The dominance of United Russia ensures that parliamentary actions rarely
diverge from presidential preferences.
In summary, while the President dominates Russia's foreign policy framework, other actors like the Prime
Minister, Parliament, and regional leaders exert limited influence within tightly controlled parameters.
Their roles are largely supportive or reactive to the President's agenda.
8. Chapter 5 discusses non-state domestic actors. How have powerful economic interest groups
(such as energy companies like Gazprom, oligarchs, and the defense industry) sought to
influence specific foreign policy decisions or relationships?
Powerful economic interest groups in Russia, such as energy companies like Gazprom, oligarchs, and the
defense industry, have played significant roles in influencing foreign policy decisions and relationships.
Chapter 5 of The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests highlights several ways
these actors exert their influence:
Energy Companies
● Gazprom: As Russia's largest state-controlled energy company, Gazprom has been instrumental
in shaping foreign policy through its dominance in natural gas exports. It uses energy supplies as
a tool of economic coercion to influence neighboring countries, particularly in Europe and the
post-Soviet space. For example, Gazprom has been involved in disputes over gas pricing and
supply with Ukraine, which have had broader geopolitical implications. By controlling pipelines
and gas flows, Gazprom has supported Russia's strategic goal of maintaining influence over
former Soviet states and limiting Western access to alternative energy routes1.
● Pipeline Diplomacy: Gazprom's involvement in projects like Nord Stream and TurkStream
pipelines reflects Russia's broader foreign policy strategy to bypass transit countries like Ukraine
and consolidate direct energy ties with Europe. These projects are designed to enhance Russia's
leverage over European energy security1.
Oligarchs
● Russian oligarchs, many of whom control vast economic resources in key industries such as
energy, metals, and finance, often act as informal intermediaries between the Kremlin and foreign
entities. Their wealth enables them to fund initiatives aligned with state interests abroad. For
instance:
○ Lobbying Efforts: Oligarchs have been known to lobby for favorable policies in Western
capitals that align with Russian interests.
○ Sanctions Evasion: Some oligarchs play a role in mitigating the impact of Western
sanctions by leveraging their international business networks to maintain access to
critical markets1.
Defense Industry
● The defense industry is another major player influencing Russian foreign policy. Arms exports
serve both economic and strategic purposes. Russia is one of the world's largest arms exporters,
supplying weapons to countries like India, China, Syria, and Venezuela. These exports help
foster alliances and maintain influence in regions critical to Russian interests1.
● Military Modernization: The defense sector's push for modernization has influenced Russia's
assertive foreign policy stance, including interventions in Ukraine and Syria. These actions
showcase Russian military capabilities while securing markets for advanced weaponry1.
● Economic Coercion: Energy companies like Gazprom use supply disruptions or price hikes to
pressure countries into aligning with Russian policies.
● Strategic Partnerships: Arms exports strengthen ties with key allies while ensuring dependency
on Russian military technology.
● Soft Power: Oligarchs contribute to public diplomacy by funding cultural or humanitarian
initiatives abroad that promote a positive image of Russia.
In summary, these domestic non-state actors are deeply intertwined with the Kremlin’s foreign policy
apparatus, leveraging their economic power to advance national interests on the global stage
Based on the two provided articles, here's an analysis of the author's approach:
1. Theoretical Framework:
● Analytical: The author adopts an analytical tone, attempting to explain complex situations by
breaking them down into contributing factors and historical context.
● Comparative/Analogical: Uses historical comparisons and analogies as key structuring devices
(Colour Revolutions as a recurring phenomenon, comparing Trump's US situation to Gorbachev's
USSR).
● Geopolitical Vocabulary: Frequently employs terms specific to international relations and
geopolitics ("sphere of influence," "soft power," "Near Abroad," "hub-and-spoke system," "imperial
overstretch," "multipolarity," "neo-mercantilism").
● Presents Multiple Perspectives (but frames them): Acknowledges different viewpoints (e.g.,
Western vs. Russian views on Colour Revolutions) but often frames them within the dominant
geopolitical struggle narrative.
● Focus on Structure and System: Tends to explain events as outcomes of larger systemic
pressures and historical patterns rather than solely individual agency, although leaders' actions
are shown as significant responses or accelerators.
● Great Power Politics: The author clearly favors analyzing events through the interactions and
rivalries of major states. The perspectives and strategic calculations of the US, Russia, and China
are central.
● Structural Explanations: Favors explaining events based on underlying structural conditions
(geography, economic pressures, costs of maintaining power, historical patterns) over purely
ideological or personality-driven accounts.
● Skepticism towards Intervention/Idealism: Shows a degree of skepticism regarding the stated
idealistic goals of interventions (like democracy promotion via Colour Revolutions) and the
sustainability/benefits of the expansive US global role post-Cold War.
● Emphasis on Challenges/Decline: Both articles highlight challenges to existing power
structures – the limits and failures of Colour Revolutions and Western influence in the first, and
the potential decline/overstretch of US power in the face of internal issues and external rivals
(China) in the second.
● Realpolitik over Moralism: The analysis prioritizes power, interests, and consequences over
moral judgments about the actors or systems involved. The focus is on how the system works
and changes, rather than should it work.
Donald Trump and his options to end Russia-Ukraine War (A. Singh Article, Jan 16, 2025,
Firstpost)
● The article addresses the significant uncertainty surrounding how a potential Donald Trump
presidency (starting Jan 20, 2025) would impact the Russia-Ukraine war.
● Trump has claimed he can end the war "instantly," but it's unclear if this is serious policy or
rhetoric.
● His potential presidency is anticipated to be highly impactful, potentially reshaping US global
relationships, especially concerning European security.
● Primary Focus: Economic implications for the US. The article notes the US commitment of $175
billion to Ukraine since 2022 as a likely point of concern for Trump.
● Lack of Deeper Understanding: The article suggests Trump lacks a deep understanding of the
war's origins, its implications for European security, democratic values, or Ukraine's motivations.
● "Peace Through Strength" Philosophy: This is cited as Trump's core idea of peace. The article
argues this approach ultimately favors Vladimir Putin due to Russia's perceived strength and
patience.
●
● Unyielding Stance: Putin has not changed his core objectives: "denazification," guarantees
against Ukraine joining NATO, and Ukraine relinquishing claims to territory Russia occupies
(including Crimea, annexed in 2014).
● Battlefield Advantage: Conditions on the ground favour Russia, with slow but steady territorial
gains mentioned.
● Negotiation Terms: Putin is only willing to negotiate based on the "realities on the ground" (i.e.,
current front lines), rejecting other terms.
●
● View of Trump: Putin reportedly finds Trump's desire to end the war "sincere." Trump has also
spoken positively about Putin, suggesting mutual respect.
●
● Strategic Patience: Russia is portrayed as having successfully used strategic patience to
withstand Western sanctions and attempts to achieve its strategic defeat.
● Maximalist Demands: Ukraine insists on the restoration of its post-Soviet borders, meaning
regaining all lost territory, including Crimea.
● Rejection of Quick Deals: Any ceasefire based on current front lines is seen as detrimental,
cementing territorial losses.
● Alternative Proposals (mentioned):
○ Swapping US and Ukrainian soldiers on the front lines.
○ Offering US companies access to mineral resources and reconstruction contracts
(transactional approach).
○ Seeking a non-nuclear strategic deterrent package deployed in Ukraine.
○ Strong desire for an invitation to join NATO.
● Heightened Insecurity: Europe is portrayed as potentially facing greater insecurity under Trump,
possibly "sleepwalking to a disaster."
● Strained Transatlantic Link: The traditional US-Europe security connection via NATO is
described as being under "severe stress."
● Search for Alternatives: European nations might be forced to look for security structures beyond
the existing NATO framework.
● A Trump-led approach, focusing on strength and potentially seeking a quick resolution based on
ground realities, stands to benefit Putin.
● Russia's military position and strategic patience give it leverage in potential negotiations under
these conditions.
● Any rapid ceasefire based on current front lines would represent a significant loss for Ukraine's
stated objectives.
Central Thesis: The article draws a parallel between the situation facing Donald Trump and the United
States today, and the circumstances surrounding Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet Union in the 1980s. It
speculates that Trump's potential policies could lead the US down a path similar to the USSR's decline,
resulting in a diminished global role.
● Premise: Comparing Trump and Gorbachev might seem surprising due to different contexts
(social, political, international).
● Justification: Despite differences, there are commonalities in the issues faced (economic
distress, internal division, external overstretch) and the affective environment.
●
● Purpose of Comparison: Using the historical example of Gorbachev's USSR (with hindsight) to
understand the present situation of Trump's US (speculative) and potentially guide future
expectations.
● US Situation Facing Trump: An "almost identical crisis" concerning the US-led post-WWII liberal
international order.
● Contributing Factors to US Problems:
○ Economic Inequality: Post-Cold War neoliberal policies and globalization led to
"grotesque inequality" within the US.
○ Public Resentment: Growing economic disparity fuels public anger against
globalization.
○ Job Losses: Loss of blue-collar jobs to less developed Asian countries.
○ Foreign Policy Weariness: Fatigue with US foreign interventionism.
● Political Consequences: Fueled the rise of populist leaders like Trump; highlighted a divide
between globalization beneficiaries and those feeling "left behind." Economic discontent seen
paving the path for Trump's potential second term.
● Structure of US "Empire":
○ Hub-and-spoke system: US is the epicenter.
○ Extensive network of formal/informal alliances.
○ US provides military protection and economic market access to allies.
○
● Costs of Empire:
○ Requires material resources (military spending, foreign aid).
○ Incurs trade deficits to maintain the international economic structure.
○ Domination requires a continuing economic surplus.
● Current State: The American Empire has been under severe stress for over a decade;
sustainability is increasingly difficult.
●
● Trump's Potential Impact: His policy statements ("noises") are seen as potentially expediting
the liquidation process of this empire.
● Economic Challenge:
○ International division of labor shifting.
○ China and others are climbing global value chains.
○
○ US role as technological leader is challenged, particularly by China in 4th Industrial
Revolution "sunrise industries."
○
● Trump's "Make America Great Again" (MAGA): Viewed as a response to these domestic
problems, resembling Gorbachev's experiments.
● Trump's Worldview: Believes current US trade and foreign policies do not serve the national
interest and require a "complete overhaul."
●
● Questioning Institutions: Trump views established structures like the WTO, EU, NATO, and the
broader 1945 US-led international system as not infallible.
● NATO Parallel: Trump questions NATO's strategy and necessity, similar to Gorbachev's doubts
about the Warsaw Pact.
●
● Trump's Belief: European and East Asian allies have been "mooching off" US security
guarantees via NATO.
● Ideological Clash: Trump's foreign policy choices are seen as incompatible with the "rituals and
ideas" the US has developed and defended for 70 years.
● Shift in Perception (within Trump Admin): Realization that the world is moving towards
multipolarity, but US foreign policy is perceived as stuck in a unipolar mode.
● Quote (Marco Rubio): Acknowledges the US took on a "global government" role post-Cold War
due to being the sole superpower, but recognizes (citing Charles Krauthammer) that the "unipolar
moment" was temporary.
● "Imperial Overstretch": The article suggests the US is a victim of this phenomenon – expanding
influence beyond its economic capacity to support it, leading to decline.
● Quote (Terry Bradshaw): "All great empires die from within." (Used to emphasize internal
factors in decline).
● Opportunity: India should tap the potential decline of the "American Empire" based on its own
strength.
● India's Trajectory: Has aimed to rise since the Soviet collapse, becoming the 5th largest
economy, but still needs significant progress on socio-economic indicators.
● Recent Challenge: Mentions recent "repatriation of its citizens from the US under condemnable
conditions" as a setback requiring dialogue.
● Strategic Need: India must engage with the US and explore strategies like "China plus one."
● Future Outlook: The world faces potential "cataclysmic changes," with the international
economic order possibly being "rejigged" by the "Trump-Musk duo." India leveraged the post-
Soviet changes and must be part of the upcoming shifts.