READING 1
Still not confident enough: China isn’t likely to move on Taiwan in 2025
19 Feb 2025|
Joe Keary
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/still-not-confident-enough-china-isnt-likely-to-move-on-
taiwan-in-2025/
Despite China’s rapid military improvements, it’s unlikely to use large-scale force against
Taiwan in 2025. The Chinese leadership’s concerns over the quality of military command,
economic weakening, uncertain social stability and effects of the Trump administration will
likely forestall any large scale military manoeuvre.
However, China will continue to ramp up pressure against Taiwan across 2025.
On 6 January, the United States’ new defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, told the Senate Armed
Services Committee he believed a Chinese Communist Party fait accompli invasion of Taiwan
was the pacing risk scenario for the Department of Defense. He reminded the committee that ‘Xi
Jinping has openly expressed his intention to annex Taiwan to mainland China’ and ‘has told his
military to be prepared to use force to achieve such an outcome by 2027’.
Like its successes in artificial intelligence, improvements in China’s military should not be
underestimated. In several areas, China’s military is now reaching standards typical of the US
military. China’s navy is transforming rapidly and by the end of 2025 is expected to have 395
ships, including three operational aircraft carriers. China is also improving its amphibious fleet,
acquiring assault ships that can carry large numbers of landing craft, troops, fixed wing drones,
armored vehicles and helicopters. In early 2025, there were reports of China building special
barges that would support Taiwan landings.
China’s military now has the largest aviation force in the region, with new fighters and stealth
aircraft that expand its ability to operate farther from its shores. It is also increasing its inventory
of nuclear weapons and now has the world’s leading arsenal of hypersonic missiles. The army
has increased the number of troops along the Taiwan Strait and improved its firepower, mobility,
and rapid strike capabilities.
Throughout 2024, China’s military and coast guard continued to exercise Taiwan invasion and
blockade scenarios. In May, following the inauguration of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te,
Beijing launched large-scale military exercises, surrounding Taiwan within two days. In October,
it undertook a second series of drills, taking just one day to implement a mock blockade
or quarantine of Taiwan. In December, China staged its largest show of force in decades,
showing the world how it could repel a foreign force approaching Taiwan.
The military has dramatically improved its ability to conduct a blockade or invasion, but Beijing
will still have doubts. During the release of the 2024 China Military Power Report, senior
Pentagon officials said, ‘despite its rapid progress, the force has not yet demonstrated the type
and scale of sophisticated urban warfare or long-distance logistic capabilities that would likely
be required for operations against Taiwan’. A lack of combat experience is a significant
imposition for a force wanting to undertake complicated operations across the Taiwan Strait.
Exercising will only get you so far.
Serious questions have also been asked about China’s officer corps and their ability to ‘judge
situations, understand higher authorities’ intentions, make operational decisions, deploy troops,
and deal with unexpected situations’. Corruption also remains an endemic issue, with China’s
military experiencing a new wave of corruption-related scandals over the past two years that has
led to the removal of two defence ministers and a high-ranking member of China’s Central
Military Commission.
Domestic factors will also influence any decision to use military force. China is facing adverse
demographic trends, including an aging population and low birth rates. There are other internal
struggles, such as a trend of rising violence, following a string of indiscriminate
mass attacks throughout 2024.
China is also seeking to manage a faltering economy, worsened by ballooning local government
debt, a loss of investor confidence and the gradual collapse of its real estate sector. Beijing has
struggled to stimulate domestic consumption, relying on its growing share of global exports to
drive the economy. Researchers at Rhodium Group estimated that China’s GDP was only 2.4 to
2.8 percent higher in 2024 than a year earlier, well below official claim of 5.0 percent growth.
China’s trade surplus reached a new high of nearly US$1trillion in 2024. Beijing will be wary of
the impact of a potential trade war with the United States. It will want to strengthen its trade
relationships with other partners to reinforce its economy. China has already sought to
recalibrate ties with Japan, India and Australia, while doubling down on its engagement with the
Global South. Within this context, China will want to perform a careful balancing act over
Taiwan. It will not want to damage international relationships by taking unnecessarily aggressive
military actions.
Amid the problems, the leadership nonetheless probably has growing confidence that, if called
upon, the military will be able to ‘resolve the Taiwan issue’. However, Xi probably hasn’t yet
decided to use force against Taiwan.
2027 almost certainly remains a short-term goal for military modernisation, not a date for a
Taiwan invasion. Concerns over the economy and social stability will remain as key priorities for
China’s leadership.
Xi will also want to carefully assess the Trump administration’s resolve on the Taiwan issue.
Trump has hinted at a more transactional approach to Taiwan, suggesting it contribute more to its
own security while still supporting Taipei’s right to self-defence. Trump is already threatening
tariffs on Taiwan’s semiconductors.
In 2025, China’s military will continue to undertake exercises around Taiwan as part of a broader
coercion campaign against Taipei. However, the likelihood of large-scale use of force against
Taiwan in 2025 remains low.
AUTHOR
Joe Keary is a senior analyst at ASPI.
READING 2
'Moderate' chance of 'high impact'
cross-strait war in 2025: Report
01/08/2025 02:03 PM
https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202501080005
Photo of the latest generation of guided-missile destroyer (DDG) of the Chinese Navy taking part
in a Chinese military exercise near Taiwan captured by Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense
on May 24, 2024. Photo courtesy of the MND.
Washington, Jan. 7 (CNA) There is a "moderate" likelihood of a cross-strait war in 2025 that
could have a "high" impact on U.S. interests, a survey by the Council on Foreign Relations
published on Tuesday found for the fifth consecutive year.
"Intensified military and economic pressure by China toward Taiwan" is listed among other "top
conflicts to watch in 2025" as a "Tier I (High Priority)" potential war, said the report by the U.S.
think tank's Center for Preventative Action (CPA).
China's hostile actions towards Taiwan could "precipitate a severe cross-strait crisis involving
the United States and other countries in the region," the CPA report said, warning that such a
scenario could "suddenly ignite."
The report, titled "Preventive Priorities Survey 2025," is based on 680 survey responses from
foreign policy experts collected in November 2024 and "evaluates ongoing and potential
conflicts based on their likelihood of occurring in the coming year and their impact on U.S.
interests."
A potential armed conflict between China and Taiwan has been listed as a "moderate likelihood"
and "high impact" Tier I contingency every year since 2020 in the CPA's annually-published
report.
Other moderate-likelihood and high-impact conflict scenarios listed alongside a possible cross-
strait war in the 2025 report are cyberattacks on U.S. critical infrastructure, "aggressive Chinese
actions" in the South China Sea, and "domestic terrorism and political violence" in the U.S.
The highest-risk potential conflict scenarios -- those listed as high-likelihood and high-impact --
in the 2025 survey include "a continuation of the Israel-Hamas war" and "increased conflict
between Israeli security forces and Palestinians in the West Bank."
They also include "major Russian military gains in Ukraine," "an escalation of the conflict
between Iran and Israel" and heightened "tensions with Mexico."
A humanitarian crisis in Haiti, "accelerated state collapse" in Lebanon, and "increased Russian
military provocations and influence operations in eastern Europe" are further listed as high-
likelihood and moderate-impact potential conflict scenarios.
The Council on Foreign Relations, a non-partisan American think tank based in Washington
D.C., "generates policy-relevant ideas and analysis, convenes experts and policymakers, and
promotes informed public discussion," the report said.
(By James Thompson)
READING 3
WILL CHINA INVADE
TAIWAN? A POTENTIAL
TIMELINE FOR CONFLICT
Global Digest, Traveler Security
Updated: January 3, 2025
https://www.globalguardian.com/global-digest/will-china-
invade-taiwan
Will China take the potentially devastating step of invading
Taiwan—and if so, when can we expect an invasion to
happen?
Amid a tumultuous era of global disorder, where conflicts are on the rise more
than at any point in the last 30 years, one burning question looms large over
the complex geopolitical landscape: Will China invade Taiwan? Regarded by
many as today's most pressing geopolitical quandary, the stakes in East Asia
are so high that an invasion or other violent conflict could be a potential
catalyst for World War III.
Here is the crux of the dilemma: China considers Taiwan a part of its territory
and Chinese President Xi Jinping has long emphasized reunification as a core
objective, while Taiwan operates as a self-governing democracy with its own
government and military.
As tensions escalate and strategic posturing continues, the international
community must grapple with the uncertainty surrounding the delicate
relationship between China and Taiwan. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would
likely lead not only to thousands of deaths but could open the floodgates for a
wider, violent conflict between the U.S., China and others, as well as
cataclysmic global economic shock.
Will China take the potentially devastating step of invading Taiwan—and if so,
when can we expect an invasion to happen?
WHEN WILL CHINA INVADE TAIWAN?
It’s not clear to anyone if, much less when, there will be an all-out military
conflict between China and Taiwan.
The uncertainty around when China will invade Taiwan boils down to a myriad
of internal and external factors. China is considering its own military readiness
and that of the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan; perceived global reactions; the
overall regional military balance of power, and the United States' political
appetite for intervention. There's no clear timeline because international
events don't follow a predictable script. Security experts and analysts are
reviewing the moving parts without a definite answer on when, and what type
of action China will take on Taiwan. It's like playing chess: We know China’s
end goal, but its next big move hasn't been made yet.
In December 2024, the Chinese People's Liberation Army quietly carried out a
sweeping military operation in the Western Pacific and around Taiwan—its
largest naval deployment since the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. This show of
force simulated the interdiction of hostile ships seeking to break a Taiwan
blockade. The PLA Navy warships and aircraft simulated attacking foreign
ships while the coast guard practiced intercepting commercial vessels as well
as blockading Taiwan’s maritime trade routes. This massive show of force
highlights the PLA’s capability to project power eastward into the First Island
Chain and was meant as a strong message to the incoming U.S.
administration.
While a full-scale, imminent Chinese invasion of Taiwan may not be certain,
various trigger points highlight potential windows of vulnerability or tension in
the coming years. Three years ago, Admiral Phil Davidson, the former
commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, told Congress that China could be
ready to pursue its goal of taking control of Taiwan by 2027. This "Davidson
window" has since become a key point of discussion in US defense
strategy regarding China. Currently, Global Guardian thinks that the window
for conflict or a blockade is now open, with that window most
likely remaining open between 2024-2028. If China will invade Taiwan, it
will likely be during this timeframe.
TIMING AND PROBABILITY OF CONFLICT: A CLOSING WINDOW
In a webinar on the Taiwan question from Global Guardian, Senior
Intelligence Analyst Zev Faintuch noted the following trigger points for a
China-Taiwan conflict:
In 2025, when Taiwan’s military predicts China will be ready to invade:
The year 2025 is marked by strategic significance, as Taiwan's military
predicts that China could be prepared to execute an invasion by then.
This projection underscores the importance of assessing the geopolitical
landscape during this period, as the perceived readiness of China could
influence regional dynamics and prompt preemptive measures from
Taiwan and its allies.
When China’s People’s Liberation Army marks its centennial in
2027: The centennial of China's People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 2027
is a symbolic milestone. The PLA's commemoration of a hundred years
could potentially coincide with strategic moves or displays of military
strength, shaping perceptions both domestically and internationally and
influencing China's approach to regional affairs.
When the U.S. likely nears semiconductor sovereignty, likely around
2030—reducing its dependence on Taiwan: Anticipating the year 2030
is crucial, particularly concerning semiconductor production. As the U.S.
progresses toward semiconductor sovereignty, reducing reliance on
Taiwan for critical technology components, the dynamics in the Asia-
Pacific region may shift. This shift could impact the strategic importance
of Taiwan in the eyes of both the U.S. and China.
Of course, it's important to acknowledge the inherent uncertainty. An invasion,
if one is to happen, remains a looming question mark. The element of surprise
would likely be in China’s best interest if they do move forward with invading
Taiwan.
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A
TAIWAN INVASION
As we approach the possibility of invasion, it’s important to acknowledge that
many factors can impact China’s decision-making. These factors are varied,
and include everything from perceived U.S. and Taiwanese provocations to
sea levels of the Taiwan Strait.
Here are the key considerations that Global Guardian is looking out for during
the foreseeable future:
A perception of U.S. distraction. A crisis on the Korean peninsula the
Middle East involving the U.S. military could tip the scale in favor of
action. China is closely monitoring the strain the Ukraine war has and
maritime mission off the coast of Yemen puts on the United States’
arsenal and whether this pressure would force the United States to
“blink” in a standoff with China.
The health of the Chinese president. Xi, who is 71 years old, triggered
speculation about his health when he skipped a major speech at the
BRICS summit in South Africa in August with no explanation. He may
want to cement his legacy as the one to reunify China before it’s too
late.
A change in the United States’ China/Taiwan policy. This would be
marked by a shift from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity.
Provocative trips by high-ranking U.S. officials to Taiwan. When then
U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022,
Beijing responded with forceful and coercive military, economic, and
diplomatic measures, including large-scale military exercises around
Taiwan.
Game-changing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. And/or Taiwanese short-
range ballistic missile tests.
WHAT COULD HAPPEN IF CHINA INVADES TAIWAN?
Examining potential Chinese military actions against Taiwan in the coming
years reveals several conceivable scenarios.
One possibility is the implementation of a blockade of Taiwan, a measure that
would effectively isolate Taiwan from the international community.
Alternatively, China might opt for more aggressive approaches such as taking
over Taiwan’s most outlying islands right off the mainland’s coast. The most
extreme possibility involves a full-scale amphibious invasion, characterized by
bombardment and ground troops landing and systematically seizing strategic
locations, including ports, government buildings and airfields. An attack would
likely extend to preemptive strikes on American bases in Guam, the
Philippines and Japan, thereby posing risks to U.S. military personnel.
In the event of an invasion, the implications would be profound, both at a local
and global level. Humanitarian concerns would escalate, endangering the
safety and well-being of the Taiwanese population and potentially leading to a
humanitarian crisis.
The economic ramifications of a Taiwan invasion would resonate globally,
disrupting trade, supply chains, and financial markets. The interconnected
nature of the global economy would see the shockwaves from such an event
transcending the immediate theater of conflict, influencing international trade
dynamics and global economic stability on a broader scale.
In the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, the international community,
with the U.S. at the forefront, would likely deploy a combination of diplomatic
and potentially military measures. Diplomatically, concerted efforts would
focus on condemning the invasion and advocating for a peaceful resolution to
the conflict. Simultaneously, the U.S. and its regional allies would likely come
to the defense of Taipei, implement sanctions on China, and the U.S. could
use its naval superiority to constrict China's access to energy and other
resources by interdicting China-bound ships. This dual approach of diplomacy
and potential military action would shape the trajectory of global responses to
this critical geopolitical event.
For a comprehensive assessment of the potential shockwaves and
consequences in the aftermath of a China-Taiwan conflict, explore Global
Guardian’s Taiwan Shock Index. This analytical tool evaluates various
indicators to show how a conflict could destabilize a given country.
HOW LIKELY IS A CHINESE INVASION OF TAIWAN?
Global Guardian experts put the likelihood of an all-out invasion at around
35%, and consider the possibility of a diplomatic solution to the conflict at
about 5%. That means the most likely scenario (with about 60% certainty) is
some kind of limited conflict—likely meaning: a blockade that disrupts Taiwan
and prevents normal economic, supply chain, and communications
operations, with the intent of isolating the island.
A de facto blockade is considered a logical continuation of the current
situation, and it could potentially escalate into a full-blown conflict between
China and the U.S. The advantage for Beijing is that the costs of a blockade
are considerably lower compared to an outright war, providing decision-
makers with the flexibility to ramp up or de-escalate tensions based on Taipei
and Washington's actions. This strategy puts China in the driver's seat,
allowing them to control the unfolding situation.
The primary objective of a blockade wouldn't necessarily be to besiege
Taiwan and cut off essential supplies; instead, it would aim to send a
message to both Taiwan and the global community that China holds
sovereignty over the region. In practical terms, a de facto blockade could
involve the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) restricting specific
maritime vessels or aircraft from entering or leaving Taiwanese ports. Beijing
might frame this as a quarantine, emphasizing its intent to block the
movement of "contraband" (weapons destined for Taipei) rather than an
outright act of war.
What about that 5% chance of diplomatic resolution? As unlikely as this path
appears, it might entail both parties engaging in sincere and transparent
dialogue, seeking common ground and compromise on issues that have long
fueled discord. This could involve international mediation, fostering an
environment conducive to peaceful negotiations. While the odds may appear
slim, the prospect of diplomatic solutions should not be dismissed outright. In
a world with many existing violence conflicts and challenges, we should
always hold out hope for dialogue and compromise.
