Air University Press
Report Part Title: Complexity and Technology in War
Report Title: Endgame in the Pacific
Report Subtitle: Complexity, Strategy, and the B-29
Report Author(s): G. Scott Gorman
Air University Press (2000)
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Chapter 1
Complexity and Technology in War
Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is
difficult .
—Carl von Clausewitz
Uncertainty is an unavoidable aspect of warfare. War, due
t o i t s c o m p l e x a n d n o n l i n e a r n a t u r e , i s a n i n h e r e n t l y u n p r e-
dictable venture. German military theorist Carl von Clausewitz
aptly noted the inherent uncertainty of war.1 For Clausewitz,
war was a “true chameleon,” ever changing due to the ele-
ments of chance, friction, and the dynamic relationship be-
tween politics and military operations. 2 Only in Clausewitz’s
“absolute war,” a theoretical war devoid of context and in
essence absent the nonlinear relationships of the real world,
could the outcome of war be predicted with any certainty. 3
Real war is not so simple. Dynamic interactions within the
complex process of war do not lend themselves to this unreal-
istic theoretical abstraction. “[An] attribute of military action
is that it must expect positive reactions, and the process of
interaction that results [from the action taken]. . . . The very
nature of interaction is bound to make [war] unpredictable.”4
Greater technological complexity creates greater uncer-
tainty. Innovations in military technology produce quicker,
deadlier, and more destructive ways of interacting within the
military environment. As a military tool, technology cannot be
mechanistically applied within military strategy. The certainty
of a machine in an insulated experimental environment does
not guarantee certainty in the chaotic environment of war.5
Although a technological instrument may theoretically repre-
sent a closed system intended to perform like clockwork, the
environment of war in which it is utilized is an open system
subject to imponderable unforeseen inputs having nonlinear
effects. This “Machiavellian” desire to rationalize warfare is in
part a reflection of the faulty mechanistic view inherited from
Newton and passed down through modern military theorists. 6
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FAIRCHILD PAPER
Airpower planners, given the technical nature of aircraft
and munitions, are particularly susceptible to mechanistic ap-
proaches to warfare. Entranced by the technical nature of
their tools, airpower strategists tend to view airpower planning
as an engineering science, a mere mechanical analysis of
w e a p o n s a n d t a r g e t s . 7 Despite the technical nature of the air
instrument, uncertainty is just as important in applying air-
p o w e r a s i n a p p l y i n g o t h e r m i l i t a r y i n s t r u m e n t s . G e n H a y-
wood S. Hansell Jr. noted the role of uncertainty in the con-
c e p t i o n o f A i r W a r P l a n s D i v i s i o n - 1 (AWPD-1) : “ I n a n y
measurement system involving probabilities, one never
r e a c h e s c e r t a i n t y . T h e m o r e b o m b s y o u d r o p , t h e g r e a t e r b e-
comes the likelihood of getting a hit, but you never reach
absolute certainty.”8 Misled by scientific paradigms and their
doctrinal heritage, airmen frequently overlook the inevitable
uncertainties entailed in the complexities of war. 9
Increased uncertainty demands technological and operational
a d a p t a t i o n to achieve desired military objectives. Systems ad-
aptation is the constant revising and rearranging of the building
blocks of a system to provide advantage over its environ-
m e n t .1 0 Adaptation may involve either a change in the technol-
ogy itself or a change in the way the technology is applied.
Adaptation is more than just passive defense and survival of
the system; it is a proactive measure to meet change head-on.
Adaptation requires both learning and anticipation. Learn-
ing is the gaining of knowledge from the past; anticipation is
presumed knowledge of the future. To adapt effectively, a sys -
t e m m u s t r e c o g n i z e b o t h p a s t f a i l u r e s a n d p r e s e n t o p p o r t u n i-
ties. It must then forecast future conditions to anticipate the
adaptations that will be most effective within this new envi-
ronment. Successful system adaptation requires knowledge of
the past and present combined with cognitive anticipation of
the future. Military adaptation r e q u i r e s l e a r n i n g a b o u t t h e
operational environment, anticipating future changes in that
environment, and acting to effect the necessary adaptation.
W h a t i s i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e i s t h a t h u m a n i n t e r a c t i o n i s r e-
quired. Although machines of the future may change them-
selves to account for environmental conditions, machines of
the past and present do not. Human innovation and ingenuity
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GORMAN
are the wellsprings of adaptation. Success in war requires not
only the mechanical application of technological “rules” but
also the creative ability to come up with alternative solutions
in the face of uncertainty and environmental change. Innova -
tion is the key to success. In war, and especially in the appli-
cation of technology to war, thinking is required.
Military systems improve their chances of success by in -
creasing their ability to adapt in a dynamically complex envi-
ronment. Those that adapt in the face of dynamic complexity
survive and prosper; those that fail to adapt do not thrive,
often suffering the catastrophic consequences of systemic break-
down. Military failure is essentially the failure to cope with
complexity. 1 1 Eliot Cohen a n d J o h n G o o c h , in Military Misfor-
tunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War, s t r e s s t h a t m i l i t a r y
failures are not individual failures, but systemic failures. Mis-
f o r t u n e i n w a r is not usually the failure of individuals to act;
rather, it is the failure of the system to adequately function
within its environment. 1 2
Anticipation is particularly difficult because actions within
war are aimed at a similarly thinking and adapting enemy.
Like other living systems, the military system must contend
with an opposing system that is also adaptive and is, in the
creative dance of coevolution, seeking to gain an advantage
over its opponent.1 3 Successful adaptation requires not only
efficacy but also speed. A military system has to functionally
adapt to its dynamic surroundings, and do it quicker than its
adversary. Military operations are not aimed at static, unchang-
i n g adversaries; they are aimed at dynamic, thinking, similarly
a d a p t i n g s y s t e m s t h a t h a v e h o s t i l e i n t e n t i o n s . 1 4 Competition
motivates adaptation as systems seek to gain advantage over
other systems in their environment in what pre-World War II
p l a n n e r s identified as the “inevitable interplay of challenge
a n d r e s p o n s e . ”1 5
This systemic coevolution is clearly evident in the applica-
tion of technology to warfare. The introduction of new technol-
ogy often instigates a counterresponse from the enemy that
negates the intended effects of the new technology. The tech-
nical devices of war will be opposed whenever possible by
other devices specifically designed against them. Often, the
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FAIRCHILD PAPER
very success of new technology spawns those factors that
result in its eventual downfall. In a cycle of “action – reaction,”
enemy forces focus efforts on countermeasures to neutralize
whatever devices are most threatening to their existence.
Thus, to be continually successful, technology must continu -
a l l y a d a p t t o c h a n g i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 1 6 Failures of technology
in war are frequently due to failures in adapting to dynamic
and complex environments.
Military strategists must recognize the complex and dynamic
nature of war. Having identified the desired end-states, mili-
tary strategists should then allow for uncertainty and adapta-
tion in applying the means to achieve these desired ends.
E n d - s t a t e s a r e i n e x t r i c a b l y l i n k e d t o t h e m e a n s u s e d t o p u r-
sue them; one cannot be isolated from the other. Clausewitz
a ffirmed the coevolutionary relationship between ends and
means:
But in war, as in life generally, all parts of the whole are
interconnected and thus the effects produced, however small their
cause, must influence all subsequent military operations and modify
their final outcome to some degree, however slight. In the same way,
every means must influence even the ultimate purpose.17
In prescribing the employment of technological means, stra-
tegists should recognize not only the complex and uncertain
nature of warfare; they should also consider the potential im -
p a c t s o f t h o s e m e a n s u p o n p l a n n e d o u t c o m e s . 18 S t r a t e g i s t s
should plan for adaptation to meet the inevitable uncertainties
of war.
Having laid a theoretical foundation, we will now present
the experience of the B-29 in the Pacific a g a i n s t J a p a n . T h e
B-29 story will serve as a case study in the application of new
military technology. It details the complexity of the strategic
problem facing the United States in the war against Japan
from late 1944 until the summer of 1945, and it examines the
role of the B-29 in solving this problem. In analyzing the B-29
story, this essay asks the following questions:
Did uncertainties and unanticipated consequences accom-
pany the introduction of this emerging technology?
Did these uncertainties further “complexify” the strategic
problem?
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GORMAN
What manner of adaptations (technological, operational,
strategic) were required by the introduction of this increased
complexity?
To achieve desired ends, adaptive action must outpace the
complex of problems generated by the introduction of new
military means. In the war against Japan, US adaptations
outpaced the added complexities generated by the introduc-
tion of the B-29 in the Pacific.
(US Air Force photo)
A Hurricane-Hunting Superfortress. This B-29, serving as a “Hurricane
Hunter,” is taking off on the first leg of a 14-hour mission.
Notes
1. Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of
War,” International Security 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992/93): 59–90. Beyerchen
writes that Carl von Clausewitz understood that “seeking exact analytical
solutions does not fit the nonlinear reality of the problems posed by war,
and hence our ability to predict the course and outcome of any given
conflict is severely limited.”
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FAIRCHILD PAPER
2. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1984, 158. Clausewitz clearly
identified the nonlinear nature of war and the complex nature of
interactions in war. “But in war, as in life generally, all parts of the whole
are interconnected and thus the effects produced, however small their
cause, must influence all subsequent military operations and modify their
final outcome to some degree, however slight. In the same way, every means
must influence even the ultimate purpose.”
3. Beyerchen, 1 7 2 .
4. Clausewitz, 139.
5. Ibid., 167. “In war . . . all action is aimed at probable rather than at
certain success.”
6. John F. Schmitt, “Command and (Out of) Control: The Military
Implications of Complexity Theory,” Marine Corps Gazette ( S e p t e m b e r
1998), 55–56. Since the enlightenment of the eighteenth century, Western
theory has centered on scientific interpretations of the world. Specifically,
Newtonian physics has shaped Western understanding of cause and effect.
Taken from the world of physical mechanics and applied across the
academic and social disciplines from psychology to government, Newtonian
models speak mechanistically of “the clockwork universe,” describing
efficient social systems as “well-oiled machines.” Military theory is not
exempt. Thanks in large part to the nineteenth century fathers of modern
military thought, Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine de Jomini, modern
military theory also rests upon physical concepts borrowed from the
Newtonian paradigm: friction, centers of gravity, geometric points and lines,
and mechanical synchronization of military operations. The Newtonian
paradigm dominates modern military theory.
7. Barry D. Watts, The Foundation of U.S. Air Doctrine: The Problem of
Friction in War (Maxwell Air Force Base [AFB], Ala.: Air University Press,
1984), 22–23.
8. Haywood S. Hansell Jr., The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler (Atlanta,
Ga.: Longino & Porter, Inc., 1972), 10.
9. Watts, 43–58. Watts points out the tendency of American airmen to
ignore “the complex amalgam that Clausewitz called ‘friction in war’.”
10. Mitchell M. Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge
of Order and Chaos (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 146.
11. Watts, 47. “The sine qua non of a successful military organization is
the capacity to adapt to changing conditions better than the enemy, the
implication being that sound theory can do much to facilitate such
adaptation.”
12. Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of
Failure in War (New York: Free Press, 1990), 94. Cohen and Gooch identify
three reasons for military failure: failure to learn, failure to anticipate, and
failure to adapt. Of these three elements, they identify adaptation as the
most important capability for a military organization. “Indeed, the ability to
adapt is probably most useful to any military organization and most
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GORMAN
characteristic of successful ones, for with it, it is possible to overcome both
learning and predictive failures.”
1 3 . S u n T z u , The Art of War, trans. Ralph D. Sawyer (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1994), 193. The ancient Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu recognized
the significance of coevolution in military systems when he wrote of the
importance of shaping oneself in accordance with the enemy. “Water
configures its flow in accord with the terrain; the army controls its victory in
accord with the enemy. One who is able to change and transform in accord
with the enemy and wrest victory is termed spiritual.”
14. Clausewitz, 77, 149. “War is always the collision of two living forces.”
In declaring war as neither science nor art, Clausewitz writes, “The
essential difference is that war is not an exercise of the will directed at
inanimate matter, as is the case with the mechanical arts, or at matter
which is animate but passive and yielding, as is the case with the human
mind and emotions in the fine arts. In war, the will is directed at an
animate object that reacts.”
15. Hansell, 49. “A highly resourceful enemy such as the Germans
found it possible to design effective countermoves. Key areas, for example,
could be skillfully defended, dummy factories could be built, camouflage
and smoke screens used, air to air defenses strengthened, repair methods
improved and refined, and very vital points hardened by putting them
underground. During the planning phase, we sensed this inevitable
interplay of challenge and response and, as later events proved, we
somewhat overestimated our challenge and underestimated their response.”
16. Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), 2 7 – 2 8 .
17. Clausewitz, 158.
18. Ibid., 92. “The original political objectives can greatly alter during
the course of the war and may finally change entirely since they are
influenced by events and their probable consequences.”
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