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 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

THE LAWS OF THOUGHT

FORMAL LOGIC
A BRIEF, COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE
LAWS AND METHODS OF CORRECT
THINKING

BY

WILLIAM POLAND
Professor of Rational Philosophy in St. Louis University

SILVER, BURDETT & CO., PUBLISHERS

New York BOSTON Chicago

1892
 Copyright, 1892,

By silver, BURDETT & CO.

Typography by J. S. Gushing & Co., Boston.

Presswork by Berwick & Smith, Boston.

 ;

PREFACE.

It may not be unwise to preface the following pages

with a caution regarding their scope and purpose. Such
caution may, indeed, be due not only to the writer lest
his aim be misunderstood ; but also to the reader, who
might otherwise seek in this little book for what it does
not contain.
This book, then, is not a Psychology. It does not
discuss the nature of the soul or of its faculties. It

merely enumerates the principal acts of the intellect

and describes them as far as is necessary for the pur-

pose of this book, which is to lay down briefly and
clearly the process of right thinking. This requires no
encroachment upon the field of psychology.
Questions which should be discussed later on, in the
course of philosophical studies, if introduced into an
outline of correct thinking, only retard progress : firstly,

because they are distracting; but especially because

the mind is not prepared for them. Even after long

discussions they are not understood by one who is just

entering on the study of philosophy.

Many things have been here omitted which would
find a fitting place in an exhaustive treatise on Logic.
3
4
'
PREFACE.

But they are such things as are not necessary to the

purpose of this compendious work. Just as there are

many curious combinations of numbers which might be
introduced, and sometimes are introduced, into an arith-
metic, but which are of no essential service in forming
an accurate and rapid accountant ; so there are many
things — curiosities — which may be introduced into a
Logic, but which are in nowise necessary to prepare
the mind for accurate and ready thought in the study
of philosophy.

On the other hand, this book is not intended as a

sort of a ^^
Logic made easy,^^ or " Logic in twenty lessons

without a master^ In philosophy less than in other

things can we profitably dispense with a master.

Finally, attention is called to the fact that terminology

is strictly adhered to, both for the sake of brevity, and

for ' the sake of the learner's progress, that he may
be obliged to understand each section before passing
further.
 CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY.
PAGE
Article I. Logic.

I. Logic. 2. Formal and Material Logic. 3. Natural Logic.

4. Artificial Logic. 5. Logic as a Science. 6. As an Art .
9

Article II. Three Acts of the Mind.

7. Three Acts. 8. Knowledge Representative.9. Simple
Apprehension, Idea. Judgment. 1
10. Reasoning, Argu- 1 .

ment. 12. Oral Expression. 13. Term. 14. Proposition.

15. Syllogism 11

CHAPTER II. IDEAS — TERiMS.

Article I. Ways of Classifying our Ideas.

17. Abstract, Concrete. 18. Clear, Distinct, Complete,

Comprehensive. 19. Singular, Particular, Collective, Uni-
versal 15

Article II. Classification of Universal Ideas.

20. Form. 21. Reflex Universal. 22. Species. 23. Impor-

tant Observation. 24. Genus. 25. Difterence. 26. Prop-
erty. 27. Accident. 28. Heads of Predicables .... 17

Article III. Subordination of Genera.

29. The Same Form Generic and Specific. 30. Diagram.
31. Highest Genus, Lowest Species, Subaltern Genera . . 22

Article IV. Classification and Use of Terms.

32. Realand Logical Terms. 33. Univocal, Equivocal,
Analogous Terms. 34. Univocal. 35. Equivocal. 36. Anal-
ogous. 37. Supposition or Use Material, Logical, Real ;
.
23
5
 CONTENTS.

CHAPTER III. JUDGMENTS AND PROPOSITIONS.

PAGE
Article I. Definitions. Structure of Propositions.

38. Judgment. 39. Proposition. 40. Subject, Copula,

Predicate. 41 . Logical and Grammatical Predicate ... 27

Article II. Simple and Compound Propositions.

42. Simple. 43. Compound. 44. Various Constructions.
45. Categorical. 46. Conditional. 47. Conjunctive. 48. Dis-
junctive. 49. Remark 28

Article III. Immediate and Mediate Judgments.

50. All Judgments. 51. Immediate. 52. Mediate. 53. The
Process 31

Article IV. Connection between Subject and Predicate.

54. All Judgments. 55. A Priori. 56. A Posteriori. 57. No
Synthetic a Priori 32

Article V. Extension and Comprehension.

58. An Axiom. 59. Extension. 60. Comprehension, 61. Il-

lustration 34

Article VI. Extension of Propositions. Quantity and Quality.

62. Extension. 63. The Subject. 64. Note. 65. The Pred-
icate. 66. Universal Affirmative. 67. One Exception.
68. Universal Negative. 69. Particular Affirmative. 70. Par-
ticular Negative. 71. Two Laws. 72. Affirmative and Neg-
ative. 73. Negative Particle. 74. Quantity and Quality . 36-

Article VII. Related Propositions.

75. Three Relationships. ']^. Conversion, tj. Equiva-
lence. 78. Opposition. 79. Diagram 41

CHAPTER IV. REASONING — ARGUMENT.

Article I. The Syllogism.
80. Reasoning and Argument. 81. Styles of Argument.
82. The Syllogism. 83. Antecedent, Consequent, Prem-
 CONTENTS. 7

PAGE
isses. Consequence.
84. 85. Axioms. 86. Analysis of
Argument. 87. Middle and Extremes 45

Article II. Figures and Moods of the Syllogism.

88. Major, Minor, Middle. 89. First Figiu'e. 90. Second
Figure. 91. Third Figure. 92. Moods of the Syllogism . 48

Article III. Laws of the Syllogism.

93. Scope of the Laws. 94. First Law: Three Terms.

95. Second Law: Extension of Extremes. 96. Third Law:
Extension of Middle Term. 97. Fourth Law Place of :

Middle Term. 98. Fifth Law: Affirmative Conclusion.

99. Sixth Law Negative Conclusion.
: 100. Seventh Law :

No Conclusion. loi. Eighth Law: No Conclusion.

102. Ninth Law: Particular Conclusion. 103. Caution . 54

Article IV. Some Species of the Syllogism.

104. Simple and Compound Syllogisms. 105. Conditional
Syllogisms. 106. Conjunctive Syllogisms. 107. Disjunc-
tive Syllogisms 61

Article V. Other Styles of Argument.

108. Argument Abbreviated. 109. Enthymeme. no. Sori-
tes. II I. Polysyllogism. 112. Epichirem. 113. Dilemma 64

CHAPTER V. TRUTH OF THE PREMISSES.

Article I. Formal and Material Logic.
114. The Form. 115. The Matter. 116. Value of the
Conclusion 68

Article II. The Demonstration.

117. Two Kinds. 118. Direct. 119. Indirect. 120. Sim-
ple, Compound. 121. A Priori. 122. A Posteriori ... 70

Article III. Induction.

123. Deduction and Induction. 124.Complete Induction.

125. Incomplete Induction. 126. Example. 127. Analogy.
128. Caution 72
5 CONTENTS.

PAGE
Article IV. Fallacies.

129. Fallacy. 130. Petitio

Principii. 131. Evading the
Question. Of the Accident. 133. A Dicto Simpliciter.
132.
134. Of the Consequent. 135. Of the Cause. 136. Of the
Question. 137. Of Reference. 138. Of Objections . . . yj

CHAPTER VI. METHOD.

Article I. Scientific Method.
139. Scientific Method. 140. Analysis and Synthesis . . 82

Article II. Definition.

141. Definition. 142. Nominal Definition. 143. Real Defi-

nition. 144. Rules for Definition 83

Article III. Division.

145. Scientific Division. 146. Physical and Metaphysical

Parts. 147. Actual Union. 148. Integral Parts. 149. Logi-
cal Division. 150. Potential Parts. 151. Logical Whole.
152. Importance. 153. How to Divide -87
Article IV. Analysis and Synthesis.
154. The Question. 155. The Answer : Analysis, Synthe-
sis. 156. Analysis. 157. Synthesis. 158. Explanation
Complete. 159. Singular to Universal, and vice versa.
160. Complex to Simple, and vice versa. 161. Discovery
and Instruction. 162. Analytic and Synthetic Sciences.
163. Advice 91

Article V. Science.

164. Science. 165. Object of a Science. 166. Material and

Formal Object. 167. A Delusion. 168. Outline of the
Sciences. Explanation of Outline 96

Points for Practice 100

Index loi
 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.
oJOio

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY.

Article I. Logic.

Logic — Formal and Material Logic — Natural and Artificial Logic.

1. The name Logic comes from the Greek, X0709.

A0709 signifies reaso7i, thought; also oral speech, a word.
But the oral word, oral speech, is merely a sign of what
is in the mind, of the mental word, mental speech,

thought. Logic, therefore, has to do with thought.

2. Formal Logic is so called in opposition to Material

Logic, because it deals solely with the form or structure
of thought, of an argument ; and not with the matter
contained in the structure. In the building of a house
there are different persons or sets of persons concerned.
Besides the architect there are those who supply and
prepare the material, and there are the builders. It is
the business of the architect to see that the material
is supplied and properly prepared by one set and put
together by the other. The builders have not to
question the nature, value or strength of the material.
They have only to see that the pieces fit. They
are concerned only with the shape, the fonn of the
 ;

10 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

structure and of each piece as tending thereto. Now,

apply this to the edifice of knowledge. Formal logic
has to do with the principles for the correct putting
together of the material furnished. The general method
of furnishing the material ready prepared is the sub-
ject of material logic. Hence formal logic we have
in
to work at, to study, only the q,oxxq.qX. form of thought;
not minding whether the examples we take to practice
upon be true or not: just as one wishing to illustrate
the structure of a bridge will take bits of wood, paper,
straw, thread, wire or whatever he may find at hand,
occupied solely, for the moment, with the form; and
not at all concerned about the material.

3. Natural Logic. Natural logic is the innate dispo-

sition all men have to think correctly, to follow certain
rules in the pursuit of knowledge, of truth. We are all,

by nature, logicians.

4. Artificial Logic. However, as sometimes, even with

the best intentions, we are liable to think inaccurately
by reason of complications of notions which arise and
defects which are easily overlooked in the process of
our thought, there has been invented what is called an
artificial logic. Not that there is anything artificial about
it in the sense that it is intended to replace real logic
but, in this sense, that it is made an art whose princi-
ples we can learn and apply, to ensure correct thinking.
The methods which we follow when we think correctly
have been closely observed and have been put together
as a connected system of rules. By learning to apply
them we can acquire the art of logic.
5. Logic as a Science. But logic is not merely an art.
It is primarily a science. For these rules are a system-
 ;

INTRODUCTORY. ll

atized body of fixed laws regarding the reason of cor-

rectness in thought. Hence logic as a science may be
defined :
" The science of those laws which must rule
the acts of the mind in correct thinking."

6. Logic becomes an art when these

Logic as an Art.
laws are presented, or made ready instruments, for use,
to ensure right thinking, to detect false reasoning, and
to mend faulty argument.

Article II. Three Acts of the Mind.

Simple Apprehension ;
Judgment ; Reasoning — Idea ;
Judgment
Argument — Term ; Proposition ; Syllogism.

7. Three Acts of the Mind. To find out the rules which

we must follow in aiming at a knowledge of truth, we
must consider three acts which the mind performs in
obtaining knowledge. They are i. Simple Apprehen- :

sion 2. Judgment;
; 3. Reasoning.

8. Knowledge Representative. All knowledge is repre-

sentative of something real or possible. It is a mental
expression of that something. Hence every act of the
mind by which we know may be considered in two
ways either with reference to the degree of activity
:

called forth or with reference to the degree in which it

is representative.

9. Simple Apprehension.
Simple apprehension is an
actby which the mind simply perceives or apprehends
something without affirming or denying anything about
it. If we consider this act as representative, as a mental
expression of that something, it is called an idea (like-
 :

12 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

ness), a concept (the mind conceiving that something in

itself, in likeness), a notion (the element of knowl-
first

edge). Thus by the act of simple apprehension we may

have a notion, an idea, a concept, of rose, blue, plant,
cloth, beauty, justice, etc.
Remark that when we perceive or apprehend we do
not perceive the idea, but the object which the idea
represents. We do not advert, at least not especially, to
the act of the mind. It is only by a second act of the
mind, called reflection, that we perceive we are per-
ceiving.

10. Judgment. Judgment is that act by which the

mind, having formed two ideas, ai^rms or denies identity
between their Thus TJie rose is a plant, This
objects. :

cloth is not blue.Remark, as for the simple apprehen-

sion, that what we affirm or deny is not about the ideas,
but about the objects which the ideas represent. This
is expressed by saying that we affirm or deny objective

identity. The judgment, as the simple apprehension,

may be regarded as a certain exercise of the activity of
the mind, or as representative of the presence or absence
of objective identity. As an act it is called judgment;
as representative it is also called a judgment or a
declaration. ,

Reasoning. Reasoning is aji act or a series of acts

11.

by which the mind compares (objectively) two cases pro-

nounced upon in two judgments, and in that compari-
son perceiving implied the material for a third judgment,
thereupon forms explicitly such third judgment affirming
or denying according to what was perceived implicitly
through the comparison. This definition will be made
sufficiently clear for present purposes by two examples
 : :

INTRODUCTORY. I3

First example. The judgment makes two declarations

A man is a living being;

Hannibal is a man.

The mind compares these two cases and then declares

explicitly what it perceives implied, namely:

Hannibal is a living being.

Second example. The judgment makes two declara-

^*^"
A horse is a quadriiped;
This feathered being is not a quadruped.

The mind compares these two cases and then declares

explicitly what it perceives implied, namely

This feathered being is not a horse.

In the example the mind worked upon the prin-

first

which two things {^living being,

ciple that, in the sense in
Hannibal) are the same as a third thing {man), in the
same sense are they the same as one another. In the
second example the mind worked upon the principle that,
in the sense in which two things {horse, this feathered
being ) are, the one (horse) the same as ^ third thing
{quadruped), the other {this featJiered being) different
from it, in the same sense are they different from one
another.
As in the simple apprehension and judgment the
action of the mind was also regarded as representative,
so the act of reasoning may be regarded as carrying in
its judgment a new representation of something
third
perceived through the two prior judgments. Considered
as an act it is called reasoning, argumentation, deduction.
In the other sense it is called argument, and also some-
times inference, conclusion.
14 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

12. Oral Expression of Thought. Just as our thoughts

are, as it were, mental words expressing certain objects,
so in written and spoken words do we express our
thoughts as well as the objects represented in our
thought.

13. Term. The oral (spoken) or written word express-

ing an idea is called a term, as, bhte, cloth, j^istice, beauty.

14. Proposition. The terms, oral or written words,

expressing a judgment are called a proposition, as,

Hannibal is a man.

15. Syllogism. The three propositions expressing an

argument are called a syllogism, and also an argument.
 CHAPTER II. IDEAS, TERMS.
16. We shall now proceed, within the limits of the
scope of Formal Logic, to make some considerations
upon ideas, judgments, arguments ; and upon their
respective verbal expressions, terms, propositions, syllo-
gisms. We begin with the most elementary, the idea.

Article I. Ways of Classifying our Ideas.

17. There are many ways of partitioning off into

classes all the ideas we have or may have.
I. Abstract and Concrete. An abstract idea is one
which represents its object as independent of, taken
asunder from {abstracted from), everything else. A con-
crete idea represents its object as coalescing with, in
union with, grown together with {concreted) something
else. Our ideas of blueness, wisdom, are abstract. Our
ideas of blue, zvise, are concrete, because bine, wise, are
thought of as concreted in something else : blice sky, wise
judge.
18. 2. Clear, Distinct, Complete and Adequate or Compre-
hensive. According to the degree of perfection with
which ideas express the characteristics (called notes) of
their object, they are divided into clear, distinct, complete
and adequate or comprehensive.
A clear idea expresses characteristics or notes suf-
ficient to discern the object from others. A distinct
l6 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

idea distinguishes between these notes themselves. A

complete idea expresses all the notes that distinguish the
object /;/ reality from others. A comprehensive or
adequate idea expresses all that can be perceived in the
object : the human intellect has no such idea of any-
thing.
I see an object moving in the distance. I have
an indefinite, obscure idea of something moving. It
approaches. I get an idea of my friend X — just
enough to know that it is X without distinguishing any
marks —
a clear idea. X comes nearer. Yes, there is
the walk and build and countenance of X. My idea is
becoming, distinct. X steps up and shakes hands with
me. I know X intimately and thoroughly. I note all

the points that distinguish him as X from aught else.

My idea is complete.

19. 3. Singular, Particular, Collective, Universal. Ideas

may again be divided according to the number of indi-

viduals embraced in the idea and the manner of embrac-

ing them ; that is, according to the extension of the
idea. In this way we divide ideas into singular, par-
ticular, collective, universal.
When one special individual is expressed in a deter-
minate manner, we have a singular idea. Thus : Canada,
" The President,'' to-day, this book.
When the idea expresses in an indeterminate way
some one or other individual or some individuals, it is

called particular. Thus : Some man or other, a man, a

certain man, some men.
When several objects are expressed under one idea
or concept, but in such a way that the idea cannot be
applied to them individually but only as a collection, the
 IDEAS, TERMS. 1/

idea is called collective. Thus : A cjvivd, a fleet. No

individual of the collection crowd or a fleet.
is a
When several objects are expressed by an idea, but in
such a way that the idea not only embraces them all,
but is applied to them distributively and individually,
we have what is called a universal idea. Thus Ma7i, :

horse, gold. I can say, Man is a living being, mean-

ing that all men are living beings ; meaning also that
each individual man is a living being. When I say. The
horse is a quadruped, I mean that all are quadrupeds,
and tJiis horse is a quadruped. When I say. Gold is a
metal, I mean that all gold and that this piece of gold
is metal.
This partition of ideas being made, we have to deal
now, in a special manner, with universal ideas.

Article II. Classification of Universal Ideas.

Species — Genus — Difference — Property — Accident.

Heads of Predicables.

20. Form. Universal ideas are classified according to

the manner which the one idea can be applied to
in

many or, what comes to the same, accord-

individuals ;

ing to the manner in which what the idea represents

belongs to many individuals. This will explain itself as
we proceed. Let us for the purpose of clearness and
brevity introduce a new word, form or formality. We
shall call form or formality whatever can be the object
of an idea. The same thing may have r(\2iny forms (or
determinations) existing in it simultaneously. A ball
may contain the forms of wood, roundness, whiteness,
 8

1 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

elasticity, etc. In man there are the forms of spirit,

matter, orgajtism, sensation, etc.

21. Reflex Universal. Any form or formality may

become the object of my idea. This idea I may reflect
upon, and then regard as applicable not only to the
individual form from which I first got it, but as appli-
cable to an indefinite number of individual cases, actual
or possible, and also as sufficiently representative of the
same formality as it exists or may exist in each of those
cases. I begin to regard the idea as universal, as
applicable to many, by reflecting upon it. The idea, as
so regarded by reflection, is called a reflex universal idea.
Even before I upon it, even as I got it directly
reflected
from the individual /<?r/;z, it was in itself capable of being
applied to the indefinite number of cases. As such,
prior to reflection, it is called a direct universal.

22. Species. If a form constitutes, or if combined

forms constitute, the whole essence of a class of indi-

viduals, so that no individual of the class can be, or
be thought, without said form or combination, then such
form or combination is said to be specific, and the reflex
universal idea representing it is called a specific idea.
Thus the combination of ratiotial and animal in man
constitutes his essence. The complex idea rational
animal regarded as applicable to all possible men is a
specific idea.

23. Important Observation. Now here we have some-

thing curious to note. The idea rational animal is one
idea — complex, but one. Where, when we apply it to
all men actual and possible, has it one object } When
we. speak of tJie rational animal^ of rational animals^ of
 IDEAS, TERMS. I9

humanity, we find ourselves figurinjT; to ourselves a

certain something outside of us which is neither this
man nor that man nor the great collection of all men.
Yet is it something which we do put up before us as the
object of our universal reflex idea, rational aniuial,
Jimnaiiity ; and we talk of it as if it were something, a
man in general. We know that what we say of it is

true of each case where there exists the rational animal,

where there exists Junnanity. What is it .-'
It is a con-
venience invented by the ingenuity of the mind for the
needs of thought. It is consequent upon the innate

tendency of the mind to pursue the most profitable and

expeditious modes of thought. It is something we

create in possessing ourselves of the reflex universal

idea. It is a something that does service for all the
individual cases. We call it the species. I know that
the expression Jinmaii species suggests to us the whole
collection of men, and that naturalists do use the word
species to express collections. But we do not reason upon
collections. We should never get through. Neither do
we reason, when speaking, for instance, of man, upon
thisman or that man. When we say man is mortal, we
speak of man, in general, taken as a species, in the sense
explained.

24. Genus. If the form be something that is found in

all the individuals of two or more classes so as to con-
stitute /«r/ of the essence of such individuals, or briefly,
if the form be found as part of the essence in two or
7nore species, it is called generic, and the reflex universal
idea representing it is called a generic idea. Thus man
and brute agree in this, that they are both animal ; the
formality animal is of the essence of the species man
20 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

and of the species bnite. Animal, therefore, is generic,

and applies to all the individuals of the two species. If
now we put before us that certain something which will
stand as one for all the individuals possessing animal
nature, we shall have what is called a genus.

Difference.
25. Now take two species. They agree
in something that is common to the essences of both.
This, as we have said, is genus. But they differ also in
other essentials. All the individuals of one species have
a formality which is not in any of the individuals of the
other, and which distinguishes all the individuals of one
from all those of the other. The reflex universal idea
of this formality is called a differential idea and as this ;

stands out objectively in the species, it is called a differ-

ence or specific difference.Take the genus animal. It
embraces the two species, rational animal and irrational
animal. Rational and irrational are specific differences.

26. Property or
Inseparable Accident. Sometimes
there found a form in all the individuals of a species,
is

which form, though not of their essence, is still neces-

sarily connected with the essence and flows from it.
The reflex universal idea of a form so considered is said
to be the idea of a property. Such form, considered in
the species, as we have explained species, is named a
property or an inseparable accident. Such may be con-
sidered, for instance, the powers of speech and of
laughter in man.

27. Accident. If, however, a certain form happen to

be common to many individuals, but be in nowise of
their essence nor necessarily connected therewith, and
be such that it can be added or taken away without
 IDEAS, TERMS. 21

affecting the essence, such form is said to be simply

accidental. The universal reflex idea representing it as
so separable is the idea of an accident. The form itself,

in whatever way considered, as thus separable, is called

an accident. Thus the forms, bliiCy green, circular, square,
thick, soft, etc., are separable accidents. We distinguish
the inseparable accidents by the special name of
property.

28. Heads The wide reaching nature

of Predicables.
of the classification which has just been given, will be
seen if we consider that whatever we afifirm or deny of
anything is affirmed or denied as a gejiiis, species, differ-

ence, property or accident. That is to say, whatever

we predicate (affirmatively or negatively) we predicate
(affirmatively or negatively) as the genus, species, etc., of
that of which we predicate it. Thus we say maji is a
rational animal. We predicate rational animal of man.
We predicate it as the species. If we say mail is rational,

we predicate rational as the specific difference. If we

say man is an animal, we predicate animal as the genus.
If we say the man is ivhite, yellow, strong, we predicate
white, yellozv, strong as accidental, as accidents. Hence
genus, species, difference, property, accident, are called
Heads of predicables, because whatever is predicable of
anything comes under one of these heads. There is a
single exception to this general law. The exception is

for the form being. Being applies to whatever can

exist or be thought of. The idea of being is said to be

transcendental. But the predication of beijig (as also of

07ie, true, good) constitutes one of the most subtle dis-

cussions of general metaphysics. We need not speak

of it here.
 :

22 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

Article III. Subordination of Genera.

Highest Genus — Subaltern Genera — Lowest Species — Individuals.

29. The Same Form Generic and Specific. It is to be
remarked that there are cases where the same form
considered as a universal is capable of being regarded
as both genus and
Take, for instance, the form
species.

substance. Since the individuals to which

it extends
can be divided into the two classes, corporeal substance
(body) and incorporeal substance (spirit), it is genus with
reference to them, and they are species embraced by it.

But the form corporeal substance (body) is again a genus

when regarded as universal, for it extends to individuals
that can again be divided into classes, — organic body and
inorganic body. These become species under it. Or-
ganic body, next taken as a universal, becomes 2i genus
with reference to the classes sentient organic body (ani-
mal) and non-sentient organic body (plant). These are
species under it. But animal is also genus with refer-
ence to rational animal and irrational animal.

30. Diagram. The following plan will exhibit this to

the eye
Substance.
\

Corporeal Substance or Body. Incorporeal Substance.

Organic Body. Inorganic Body.

Sentient Organic Body or Animal. Non-sentient.

Rational Animal or Man. Irrational.

J
[Charles, Frederic, Augustus, etc. |
 IDEAS, TERMS. 23

31. Highest Genus, Lowest Species, Subaltern Genera.

In this table it is seen that substance is used as genus

only. Body, organic body and animal are used both

as species and as genus. Maji is used as species only.
When a genus cannot be considered as a species
under a higher genus, it is called highest genus.
When a species under one genus cannot be made a
genus with reference to individuals under it, that is,
when the individuals cannot be classified as species, it is
called lowest species.
The forms that are predicable both as genius and as
species are called subaltern genera.
In the table, Substance (supposing it to be incapable

of being ranged as species under a higher genus) is

highest genus. Man is loivest species. Body, Organic
Body, Animal, are subaltern genera. Charles, Frederick,
Augustus, etc., are merely individuals of the species
man.

Article IV. Classification and Use of Terms.

Real, Logical — Univocal, Equivocal, Analogous — Supposition.
32. Real and Logical Terms. We may now say a word
about terms. Terms are the written or spoken words
that stand for ideas or for the objects of ideas. A term
is called real when it expresses an object as that object
may exist independently of the mind. Thus London,
this man, are real terms. A term is when
called logical
it expresses an object in that kind of existence which

depends entirely on the mind, as man, animal, used in

the universal sense to stand for genus or species, v. gr.,
for animal and man in general. Genus and species as we
24 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

have explained them are mental creations, doing service

as representatives for a class, orwhat is the same, their
existence is logical, dependent on the mind. Hence the
terms expressing them as such are called logical terms.

33. Univocal, Equivocal, Analogous Terms. Leaving

the real terms and concerning ourselves solely with the
logical, we find that, on account of the defects of
language, some terms, doing service as universals, do
not always represent the same ideas nor apply in the
same manner to all the individuals for which we make
them stand. We find terms to be not only univocal,
but also equivocal and analogous.

34. Univocal. That term is called univocal (one word)

which is really but one term in meaning as well as in
sound. That is to say, the univocal term is always
applied with the same signification to each and all of
the inferiors {i.e. species or individuals) to which it can
be applied. Such are the terms, animal, man.

35. But if the same written or spoken

Equivocal.
word, thesame term, comes, in the complexity of
language-growth, to stand for two or more different
ideas and objects of ideas, it is called an equivocal term.
Thus the term pen is equivocal. It is a ivord that
serves equally to express different ideas and objects of
ideas. It stands equally for a zvriting instrument and a

cattle enclosure. The equivocation is sometimes in the

sound only, as boiv (a reverence) and bough. Sometimes
it is in the writing only, as bovo {a reverence) and bow (in
archery).

36. Analogous. Again, there are terms that are ap-

plied to different things neither univocally {i.e. in quite
 IDEAS, TERMS. 2$

the same meaning), nor cqiihwcally {i.e. in quite different

meanings), strictly speaking. The same term is used
on account of some connection between the objects.
The connection is called, in philosophy, analogy. The
terms are called analogous terms.
When the analogy or connectiofi is merely a likeness
between the objects, it is called analogy of proportion.
We make this the ground for the use of the metaphor.
We will call a man a lion on account of his courage.
We merely abbreviate a comparison.
Thereis another analogy where the connection is

closer. We say a healthy man and also (however justly)

a healthy climate, a healthy complexion. We affirm of
the climate (which is the cause) and of the complexion
(which is a natural sign) the attribute which, in its full,

original and proper meaning, belongs only to the man.

We have here again, strictly speaking, figures of speech.
This analogy is mere similitude. It is
closer than the
called analogy of attribution. However, it is specified as
analogy of extrinsic attribution, because the form that
is attributed, health, is intrinsic to man only, belongs to
man only, and is extrinsic to climate and to complexion,
they being but the cause and the sign of man's health.
But we have introduced this question only to come to
what is called the analogy of intrinsic attribution. And
we speak of the analogy of intrinsic attribution only as
an aid to the understanding of a later question, the
subtle question of the attribution of being, referred to
in 28. Therefore —
What is attributed may really exist in all the individu-
als to which it is attributed, and still not in such a way
that it can be attributed univocally, i.e. in the very
game sense and manner. It exists in one independently
26 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

of all the others, but in the others only dependently

upon this one. Thus being is predicated of God and
of created things : of God, independently ; of created
things, only with dependence upon the Creator. Being
is not used nnivocally. It does not apply in the same
sense to Creator and Creation. It cannot be called
gemts. Under genus the species are independent one
of another. But this question will be treated in the
General Metaphysics.

37. . Supposition. The supposition of a term is what is

sub-posed by {put unde?) the term, what is implied by it

or intended to be understood by it. This depends upon

the wish of the one who uses the term. We might
extend this subject and go back over all the various
classifications of ideas and their corresponding objects.
We shall give but three wide divisions of the supposi-
tion and thus close this chapter.
The said to be material when we imply
supposition is

no more than is evident from the mere sound of the

term or its appearance as written. Thus, when we say
or write, Man is a word of one syllable, our use or sup-
position of the term man is material.
If we imply term is used in the universal
that the
sense to stand for genus or species, the supposition is
called logical. In the sentence, Man is a ratio7ial ani-
mal, the supposition of the term man is logical.
When we wish the term to stand for a reality, the
supposition is called real. In the sentence. This man
is temperate, the supposition of the term man is real.
CHAPTER III. JUDGMENTS, PROPOSITIONS.

Article I. Definition and Structure of

Propositions.

38. Judgment. Tho, Judgment, as we have said, is that

act of themind by which we compare two objects of

thought and pronounce upon their identity or agree-
ment, affirming or denying. It is an affirmation or a
denial.
It is not always necessary that any appreciable time
should be taken to compare the terms before passing
sentence. There may be and there are cases where
the verdict is evident at once upon the presentation of

the terms. We see at once the identity or the disagree-

ment. Our daily thoughts are full of instances in
point.

39. Proposition. We have already stated that the

judgment as expressed in spoken or written words is
called a proposition.

40. Subject, Copula, Predicate. A proposition consists

of three parts, subject, copula, predicate. The subject is

that of which something is affirmed or denied. The

predicate is that which is affirmed or denied of the sub-
ject. The copula is a word or words expressive of the
affirmation or denial, the words, namely, is, are, is not,
are not.
27
28 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

SUBJECT. COPULA. PREDICATE.

Man is rational,
Knowledge is not virtue,
Vices are detestable,
Sinners are not saints.

The copula is a convenience of language. It merely

stands for the agreement or disagreement that exists in
the objects agreement or disagreement
; this is perceived
by the mind comparing the ideas, and is finally pro-

nounced upon in the judgment.

41. Logical and Grammatical Predicate. We must be

careful to distinguish between the predicate of the
logician and the predicate of the gramniaria7i. In the
sentence, Birds fly, the grammarian may tell us that^
is the predicate. The logician will resolve the sentence
in such a way as to employ the copula. He will say,
Birds are beings-thatfly ; and with him the predicate is
beings-thatfly. Thus the logician will transform any
sentence to put it into logical shape.

Article II. Simple and Compound Propositions.

Simple — Compound — Copulative — Disjunctive — Conditional —

Causal.

42. A Simple Proposition contains but one principal

subject and one principal predicate. The ship is sailing,
is a simple proposition. We may
add circumstances of
time and place, adjectives, adverbial and relative clauses,
without making it a compound proposition. It will
become complex, but not compound. The ship that zvas
 JUDGMMSTTS, PROPOSITIONS. 29

made last year at New York is sailing amid icebergs that

have floated from Greenland to the coast of Neiufoundland,
is still for the logician a simple sentence though complex.

All that belongs to ship goes in as subject. All that

belongs to sailing goes in as predicate.

43. A Compound Proposition contains two or more

principal subjects and predicates expressed or implied.
Paris and Berlin are beautiful is a compound proposi-
tion and stands for the two simple propositions Paris is

beautiful, Berlin is beautiful. Add another predicate :

Paris and Berlin are large and beautiful. Here we

have four simple propositions in the compound.

44. Various
Constructions. There are various kinds
of simple and compound propositions various as the —
grammatical constructions invented to secure brevity in
language, the sometimes cumbersome vehicle of thought.
The propositions receive their names from the construc-
tions. We call attention to a few propositions.
45. Categorical. A categorical proposition is one that
affirms or denies absolutely and directly. It may be
simple or compound. Thus : Man
The soulis rational,

is not material, Prudence ajid Justice are virtues. Camels

and giraffes are not insects.

46. Conditional. A conditional proposition affirms or

denies not absolutely, but on condition. The rain is

comijtg is categorical. But, If the zvind is west, the rain

is coming is a conditional proposition. Remark that
this is really a simple proposition. We do not say, TJie
ivind is west, the rain is coming. We merely affirm con-
ditional connection between the two. The conditional
proposition is also called hypothetical.
30 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

47. Conjunctive. A conjunctive proposition affirms

the simultaneous incompatibility between two cases.
No man can spend all his money on drink and still sup-

port his family. Here we do not affirm or deny the

categorical propositions that he spends his money on
drink, that he supports his family. We affirm only the
incompatibility between the two. The proposition is

simple, however complicated in language. The conjunc-

tive proposition is reducible to the conditional thus : If a
man spends all his money on drink, he cannot support his
family. The conjunctive proposition is therefore a
species of the hypothetical. It is always negative. It

is called conjunctive for the sake of a name, on account

of the conjunctive particle and which connects the
incompatible cases.

48. Disjunctive. A disjunctive proposition is made

up two or more categorical propositions connected
of
in such way by a disjunctive particle that no one is
declared absolutely, but the acceptance of one implies
the rejection of the others. Thus, speaking of a per-
son's age, I may say, He is either Just fifty or under

fifty or past fifty. Suppose I declare categorically that

he is just fifty ; then the two other parts become he is
not imder fifty, he is not past fifty. However, the denial
of one case does not imply the affirmation of the other
two. If I say. He is not just fifty, I may not therefore
affirm both that he is under fifty and tJiat lie is past
fifty. The remaining parts are simply left in the
diminished disjunctive proposition. He is either under
fifty or past fifty. The disjunctive proposition is a
species of the hypothetical, with one part positive and
the other part negative. Thus : If he is just fifty he ^ is
 JUDGMENTS, PROPOSITIONS. 3 I

neither under fifty nor past fifty. As the example given

implies two such conditions, we might class it with the
compound propositions ; but this matters nothing to our
purpose.

49. Remark. Here we complex and

shall leave the
compound propositions. We
have mentioned the con-
ditional, conjunctive and disjunctive, because we shall
have occasion to refer to them when treating of the
varieties of the syllogism.
Henceforth in the present chapter we shall confine
our study to the elementary proposition, the simple cate-
gorical proposition.

Article HI. Immediate and Mediate Judgments.

50. All Judgments. The judgments we form are all

necessarily either immediate or mediate.

51.Immediate. An immediate judgment is one that

is formed without a process of reasoning. If some one
says to me, A ivhole orange is greater than half ati orange,
I do not ask him to prove it. I see the truth immedi-

ately, and pronounce upon i; without having to be led

to see it through the medium of other truths better

known. Again, if I take a piece of heated iron in my
hand, I can and do know and say at once, TJiis iron is
hot. I do not have to go through any other judgment

to arrive at the knowledge that this iron is hot. The

judgment is immediate.
52. Mediate. On the other hand, if some one tells me
that the three angles of a triangle are equal to tivo right
angles, I do not see at once that it is so ; I ask him to
32 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

show me that it is so. And he proceeds to put before

me other propositions through which I see, until it dawns
upon m.e that what he said at first is true. These other
propositions or truths are the mediufn through which I

see that the three angles are equal two right angles.
to

This judgment is therefore called a mediate judgment.

To take another example. I hand a banknote to some
one, as payment. He tells me, This banknote is a coini-
terfeit. I do not perceive that the note is a counferfeit.

He imparts to me some new knowledge, and through the

medinm of that knowledge, I too can see and say, TJiis
note is a counterfeit. My judgment is mediate.
53. The Process. The process by which one judgment,
proposition, is made evident through the medium of
others is This will form the subject
called reasoning.
of the next chapter. We
have still to consider, in this
chapter, two other divisions of judgments or propositions.
This we shall do in the two following articles.

Article IV. Connection between Subject and

Predicate.

A Priori, A Posteriori — Necessary, Contingent — Absolute, H3rpo-

thetical — Metaphysical, Physical — Analytical, Synthetical.
54. All Judgments. If we consider the connection
that exists between the predicate and the subject, we
can classify all judgments as a priori or a posteriori.

55. A Priori. If the predicate is such that it is always

implied in the subject, and in such way that a full under-
standing of what is meant by the subject and predicate
is sufficient, without any experiment upon a particular
 JUDGMENTS, PROPOSITIONS. 33

case, to make us see that the proposition holds in all

cases, absolutely, necessarilyand without possible excep-

tion, the proposition or judgment is called a priori. It is
seen to hold prior to any application to a particular case.
A zvJiole is greater than any of its parts ; no tiling can
sininltancoiisly exist and not exist, —
these are a priori
propositions.
Such propositions are also called necessary, because
an exception is impossible. They are called absolute,
because they hold, absolved from, free from, all condi-
tion. They are called victapJiysical, because their truth
does not depend upon the physical, actual order of
things existing. They are called analytical, because by
analyzing the subject, by taking it asunder into all that
it implies, we will linally arrive at the predicate and see

that the predicate belongs to the subject.

A Posteriori. An a posteriori proposition is one

56.
in which the idea of the predicate is not implied in the
idea of the subject. Some one says to me, TJiis iron is
hot. I may know all that books can teach about the

nature of iron and the nature of heat. But all of it will

not teach me that this iron is hot. I must have experi-

ence of this particular case of iron and heat. After the

test, posterior to the experience, I may affirm, TJiis iron
is hot. Hence the name a posteriori.
Such propositions are also called contingent, as opposed
to necessary, because they may happen to be true or not
true. They are called hypothetical, as opposed to abso-
Inte, because their truth depends upon a supposition, a
hypothesis, which may be wanting. They are called
physical, because they represent facts of the actual,
physical order. Finally, they are called synthetic, as
34 - THE LAWS OF THOUGHT,

opposed to analytic, because they are made up by the

syntJiesis, the putting together, of two ideas, terms,
neither of which is found in the analysis of the other.

57. Synthetic a Priori. We have here to make a re-

mark upon an assertion of Emmanuel Kant which has
caused a great deal of confusion in philosophy. He
asserted that there could be a proposition which would
be at once synthetic and a priori, and he called it the
synthetic a priori. Kant illustrates his discovery with
examples. For draws upon arithmetical
instance, he
addition. The and two are five,
proposition three

3 + 2 = 5, is with him synthetic a priori : a priori, because

it is absolute synthetic, because, he says, the predicate
;

five, 5, adds on a new notion over and above three and

two, 3 + 2. Let us see if the predicate adds a new idea.
We repeat what we said before, that we do not reason
with the mere sound of the voice or the mere appear-
ance of marks on paper. What does the subject mean }

3 means+ + i i i. 2 means i -f 3 +i. 2 means i +

I + + +I 5 I I. means i + i + + +
1 i i. Now put
the meaning of 3 + 2 = 5, and
down you have i + + i i

+ + = + + + +
1 1 1What 1 1 1 1. is there in the
predicate that is not in the subject.''

Article V. Extension and Comprehension.

58. An Axiom. We have delayed to this point a very

important consideration on the subject of ideas and terms.
We have delayed it on account of its immediate use in
the next article. In fact, we do not hesitate to say that
the thorough understanding of the subject of the present
 JUDGMENTS, PROPOSITIONS. 35

article is the key to philosophy. There is an old axiom

in philosophy which runs thus : TJie greater the extejision,
the smaller the compreJiension ; or TJie smaller the com-
preJicnsion, tJie greater tJie extension ; or Widen tJie exten-
sion, and you Expand the
diminisJi the comprehension ; or
comprehension, and yon narrow the extension. All mean
the same thing. But what do they mean .-'

59. Extension. The extension of an idea or a term

refers to the number of individuals to which it can apply.

60. Comprehension. The comprehension of an idea

or of a term refers to the number of ideas or terms im-
plied in said idea or term.

61. Illustration. Take the idea, animal. It can apply

to — that is, it extends to all individuals in which
there is animal nature. But combine it with the idea
rational, so as to have rational animal, or man. At
once you shut out from its application all irrational
animals. You cut them off from its extension. You
narrow its extension. Why.-* Because you have ex-
panded the comprehension. The idea man comprehends
not merely animal but animal + rational. If you expand
the comprehension by adding the term zvhite, so as to
have white man, you will diminish the extension by
cutting off all men who are not white. And so on.
Every new idea added represents a new requisite in the
object that is to correspond. The more you require in
the objects, the fewer will they be found.
Once more take the term animal. What is its com-
prehension .''
What ideas does it imply .''
It implies
sensitive oiganic material substance. Diminish the com-
prehension. Take away the term sensitive. You have
left organic material substance. At once you have
 36 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

widened the extension so as to take in the whole vege-

table kingdom. Diminish comprehension again. Strike
out organic. There remains material substance. The
extension is widened so as to take in all that is matter
whether organic or not. Diminish the comprehension
again. Strike out material. SiLbstance remains. The
extension has been increased so as to reach into the
spiritual world.

.y^ Article VI. Extension of Propositions —

'
Quality.

Universal — Collective — Particular — Singular.

62. Extension. We have just spoken of extension in
the abstract as contrasted with comprehension. In No.
19 we saw that the same idea could be used with varied
compass within the entire range of its extension. It
may be singula?', particular, collective, universal.

63. The Subject. The extension of a proposition de-

pends upon the extension or compass of the subject as
used in the proposition. The proposition is named
accordingly singula?', particular, collective, universal.
The following are examples. Singular : TJiis man is

virtuous. Particular : Some man is virtuous. Some

men are virtuous. Collective : TJie crovud is orderly.
Universal : Angels are spirits.

64. N.B. In speaking of terms and propositions we

shall often not make a distinction between singular, col-
lective and particular, but shall call them indifferently
by the name particular as representing any term or
proposition that is not universal.
 :

JUDGMENTS, PROPOSITIONS. 3/

65. The Predicate. To state clearly what we wish to

say about the predicate, let us take four propositions, —

two universal and two particular, —
and let one of each
kind be an affirmative proposition the other, a nega-;

tive. This will give us, for instance, the following

1. Cats are quadrupeds, (Universal Affirmative.)
2. Birds are not quadruxteds. (Universal Negative.)
3. This field is triangular, (Particular Affirmative.)
4. Some roses are not red. (Particular Negative.)

66. Universal Affirmative. The first proposition is uni-

versal, because its subject is universal, i.e. taken in its
entire extension. As we do
to the predicate, quadruped,
not directly allude to its merely assert
extension. We
that the idea quadruped enters into the comprehension
of the idea cat. And as cat here is universal, taking in
each and every cat, we do quadruped is at
state that
least coextensive with cat.But we do for a fact know
that quadruped has a wider extension than cat, that cat
covers only a part of the extension of quadruped. Only
some quadrupeds are cats. Hence, when we speak
according to our knowledge and say that all cats are
quadrupeds, we wish to say that some quadrupeds are cats,
or the idea, cat, extends to some individuals, not to all
individuals in the extension of quadruped. Quadruped,
therefore, in the discussion of the proposition is to be
regarded as a pajiicular term. As these remarks hold
good for all universal affirmative propositions (one class
excepted), we formulate the law TJie Predicate in a uni-
:

versal affirmative proposition is a particular term.

67. One Exception. The one exception is, when the

predicate is the exact essential definition of the subject.
Thus in the proposition, Man is a rational animal, the
38 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

predicate, rational animal, is the essential definition of

the subject, man. It is synonymous with man. Hence it

is precisely coextensive with the subject.can say, We

Man is a rational animal, or Rational animal is man.
But though we say, Cat is quadrnped, we cannot say.
Quadruped is cat. Qnadruped may be tiger or elephant.
Rational animal, however, cannot be anything but man.

68. Universal Negative. In the second proposition.

Birds are not qitadrupeds, the subject is universal, and
hence, too, the proposition. By denial we separate the
idea qnadruped from the comprehension of the idea bird.
So that wherever the idea bird is applicable, in its entire
extension, there the idea quadruped Now, is excluded.
knowing that quadruped can have its own extension, the
proposition implies that bii'd and quadruped extend to
two distinct classes of individuals. To say that birds are
not quadrupeds is the same as saying that no individual
bird is a quadruped. Not one bird can be found in the
class quadruped. Not one quadruped can be found in
the class bird. If it could, some bird would be a quad-
ruped. What is this but to exclude quadrupeds in its
entire extension, that is, as a universal, from the entire
extension of the subject.-' As the same remarks hold
good for all universal negative propositions, we formulate
the law : The Predicate in a imiversal negative proposi-
tion is a universal teimi.

69. Particular Affirmative. In the third proposition,

This field is triangular, the subject is particular. Hence
the proposition is particular. Referring to our knowl-
edge of things, we shall find that the predicate, triajtgu-
lar, is used in a particular sense. We do not predicate
of this field all that is or may be triangular, the entire
 JUDGMENTS, PROPOSITIONS. 39

extension of triangular; but only this particular case of

triangular. This field is one of the things embraced in
the extension of triangular. Triangular, hence, is used
in the particular sense. These remarks hold good for
every particular affirmative proposition. Hence the
law : TJic Predicate in a particular affirmative proposi-
tion is a particular term.

70. Particular Negative. In the fourth proposition,

Some roses are not red, the extension of the subject, only
some roses, is particular. Hence the proposition is par-
ticular. The predicate red, however, is used in the
universal sense. We affirm that redness is not found
in thecomprehension of some certain roses. No one of
these some certain roses is to be found in the entire
extension of things that are red. We separate the
entire extension of things that are red from these some
certain roses. Hence, in our denial of red as applicable
to some roses, we use it in its entire extension, or as a
universal. These remarks hold good for every particu-
lar negative proposition. Hence the law : The Predi-
cate in a particular negative proposition is a universal
term.

71. Two Laws. Now let us put the four laws together
and make two of them. The first and third will give us
this The predicate in an affirmative proposition is used
:

as a particular term, i.e. according to part of its extension.

The second and fourth law will give us this : TJie pred-
icate in a negative proposition is used as a universal
term, i.e. according to its entij'e extension.

72. Affirmative and Negative. We have not thought

it necessary to state explicitly heretofore that every
proposition must be either affirmative or negative. For
40 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

all needs, up to the present, this was sufficiently implied

in the definitions oi judgment "dsidi proposition.

73. Negative Particle. We call attention now to the

fact that, in the negative proposition, the negative par-
ticle need not necessarily stand between the subject and
the predicate. To say, Bi^^ds are not qitadmipeds, is the
same as saying, No bird is a quadruped. Both are neg-
ative and are understood as such. We have not to
question the arbitrary constructions of language. Still

be it understood that, in order to have a negative proposi-

tion, the language must be capable of such construction
that the negative particle not may be construed with the
copula, is, a7'e, so as to form with it one piece that shall
be, not as a link between subject and predicate, but as
a wall of separation. This is the case in the example
given above. But the following proposition is affirma-
tive : Not to is a mark of a great
complain in adversity
soul. We may indeed say, To complain in adversity -is
not a mark of a great soul ; but the two propositions are
not identical in meaning, for we turn the predicate from
a particular into a universal. However, we may say,
A mark of a great soul is not-to-complain-in-adversity.
Here the negative particle, though next to the copula, is,
does not form one piece with it : it forms a piece of the
predicate. The proposition is affirmative.

74. Quantity and Quality. The extension of a propo-

sition, universal, particular, etc., is referred to as its

quantity. The form, affirmative or negative, is referred

to as its qttality.
 1

JUDGMENTS, PROPOSITIONS. 4

Article VII. Related Propositions.

Conversion — Equivalence — Opposition.
75. Three Relationships. We now pass on to consider
the relations that may exist between certain propositions.
The between two propositions
relation — when there is

any relation at all —

will be one of convertibility, of
equivalence or of opposition.

76. Conversion. A proposition is said to be converti-

ble into another when the subject can be made predicate
and the predicate subject without loss of truth in the new
proposition. Thus the proposition, No man is an angel,

is convertible into No angel is a man. There are three

ways of converting propositions. We may keep the
quantity and quality unchanged ; or we may change
quantity only ; or we may change quality only. The
first is called simple conversion ; the second, conversion
per accidens ; the third, conversion by contraposition.
Without minding these traditional names, we shall
exemplify the three conversions.
Quantity and quality unchanged. This conversion
may take place in propositions where subject and predi-
cate are both universal or both particular — that is, in
universal negative and particular affirmative ; as also, in
propositions where the predicate is the es-sential defini-
nition of the subject, since the two are coextensive.
Thus, No man is an angel is convertible into No angel
is a man. This field is square is converfible into This
square thing Man is a rational animal is con-
is afield.

vertible intoThe rational animal is man.

Quantity chajtged. This kind of conversion may be
applied to universal affirmative and universal negative
42 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

propositions. In the universal affirmative, All plants are

substances, the predicate we make it
is particular. If
subject, we have Some substajues are plants. The uni-
versal negative, No man is an angel, we saw above may
be converted into No angel is a man. This being uni-
each individual in the extension of the
versal, applies to
subject hence we have. This angel is not a man.
;

Quality changed. This kind of conversion may be

used upon the universal affirmative and the particular
negative. The universal affirmative. Cats are quadru-
peds, tells us that cats are altogether within the extension
of quadruped. Outside of the extension of quadruped,
cats are not to be looked for. Hence the proposition is

convertible into What is not quadruped is not a cat. In

the particular negative. Some roses are not red, red is
universal in its extension. Hence outside of the exten-
sion of red there are some roses; or. Some things not
red are roses.

77. Equivalence or EquipoUence. A proposition is said

to be equivalent to (equal in value) or eq?npollent with
(equal in weight) another when it means the same thing
as the other, there being no conversion of subject and
predicate. A proposition is turned into its equipollent
in various ways by the use of the negative particle.
Thus, Every man is mortal is equivalent to No man is

not moj'tal, etc.

78. Opposition. To explain what is meant by opposi-

tion, let us take the universal affirmative proposition.
Every tnan is just. In order merely to contradict this
it would be sufficient to say, Some man is not just.

Now take the universal negative proposition, No man

is just. To contradict this it is enough to say. Some
 JUDGMENTS, PROPOSITIONS. 43

)}ian is just. We have in both cases an opposition

between a universal and a particular, an affirmative and
a negative. There is opposition in both quantity and
quality. The opposition is one of contradiction. Propo-
sitions so related are called contradictories. Both cannot
be true, simultaneously nor can both be false, simulta-
;

neously. If it be true that all men are just, then it is

false that some man is not just.

Opposition in qnality only. When

two universal prop-
ositions are opposed one being affirm-
in quality, i.e.

ative, the other negative, as. All men are Just and No
men are Just, there is not merely a contradiction of a
sweeping statement. There is a sweeping statement to
the contrary. The contradiction covers each individual
in the extension of the opposite proposition. The oppo-
sition is one of contrariety. The propositions are called
contraries. Both cannot be true at the same time, be-
cause each one contradicts every individual case of the
other. However, both may be false. They may both
claim too much in opposite directions.
The particular propositions implied in these two uni-
versals, that is, the particulars, Some mati is Just and
Some man is not Just, as opposed to one another in
quality, are called sitbcontraries. Both may be true,
since their contradictories, the universals, may both be
false, may both assert too much. Both particulars,
however, cannot be false for if both were false, then
;

their contradictories, the universals, would both be true.

Opposition in quantity only. This is the opposition
between a universal and particular affirmative or a
universal and particular negative, as, All men are Just
and Some man is Just ; or N^o man is Just and Some
man is not Just. There is in reality no opposition here.
 ;

44 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

The particular is implied in the universal. It is a

subaltern of the universal. Hence, for the sake of a
name, propositions so related, the universal and its
implied particular, are called subalterns. If the uni-
versal is true, the particular is true. If the universal
is false, the particular may still be true. From the truth
or falsity of the particular we can form no judgment
about the truth or falsity of its universal.

79. Diagram. Now look at the following diagram :

Contrary.
I. All men are just (iZ/wV. ^^.). 2. No man is just {Univ. Neg.^.

^ °4> ^ ^
t-i
X t-i

3. Some man is just (Par^. ^^.). 4. Some man is not just (/*ar^.iV>^.).

SUBCONTRARY.

I and 2 are contraries 3 and 4 are subcontraries

;

1 and 4, also 2 and 3, are contradictories i and 3, also ;

2 and 4, are subalterns {i and 2 being called subalternant,

3 and 4 their subalternates).

It is clear that if i is true, 3 is true and that if 2 is ;

true, 4 is true. But we cannot conclude from 3 to i nor

from 4 to 2.
I and 4 cannot be both false. One must be true, and
the other false. The same is to be said of 2 and 3.
3 and 4 may be both true, or one true and the other
false. Both cannot be false.
 CHAPTER IV. REASONING, ARGUMENT.

Article I. The Syllogism.

Argument — The Syllogism — Analysis of Argument — Middle and
Extremes.

80. Reasoning and Argument. We

have seen how the
idea is the element of the judgment, and thus the term,
the element of the proposition. We have now to see
how an argument is constructed out of propositions.
We defined Reasoning (ii) to be an act, or a series of
acts, by which the mind compares the truths expressed

by two judgments, and in that comparison perceives

implied a third truth, which it accordingly expresses
mentally in a third judgment. This process, we said,
regarded as mere mental working, is called reasoning.
Regarded as knowledge contained in the third judgment,
pronounced as having been implied in the two others,
we called it inference or argument. The propositions
which, taken together, represent in language the knowl-
edge and its process, we also called argument. We
shall use the word argument in this latter sense.

81. Styles of Argument. There are indeed many com-

binations of propositions which are used as language-
representations of the process of reasoning, many styles
of argument. Different names are given to them, accord-
ing to the variety of structure. We have the Syllogism,
45
4-6 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

tke Enthymeme, the Sorites, the Polysyllogism, the Epi-

chirem, the Dilemma. All, however, are reducible to the
which is the nearest approach language can
syllogism,
make towards exhibiting the working of the mind in
reasoning. Not that we alwa,ys, or usually, argue, in
speaking or writing, with completed syllogisms. We
abbreviate. However, we must study the syllogism in
its completeness. We begin with it. A few words at
the end of this chapter will then suffice to explain the
other styles of argument.

82. The Syllogism. The syllogism is an argument

made up of three propositions so connected that if the
first two be admitted, the third must, likewise, be
admitted. Thus,
Every jtlant is a substance;
But the verbena is a jy^cint.
Therefore, The verbena is a substance,

83. Antecedent ; Consequent ; Premisses. The first two

propositions taken together are called the antecedent.
The third proposition is called the consequent. In the
antecedent the evidence is stated. In the consequent
the verdict is given. The two propositions of the ante-
cedent are commonly called premisses (put before). The
first is called the major premiss ; the second, the minor
premiss. For brevity's sake they are styled the major
and the minor. The original meaning of major and
minor, and the reason for the use of the terms, will be
explained in the next article.

84. Consequence. If the consequent does really fol-

low from the premisses, we have what is called a conse-

quence, by which we mean that the assertion contained
 :

REASONING, ARGUMENT. 47

in the consequent is a consequence of what was laid

down in the premisses. If an argument is proposed to
us in which the consequent does not follow as a conse-
quence, the argument must be regarded as faulty.
Hence,
{a) If both the premisses be true, and the argument
be rightly constructed, the consequent, called also the
conclusion, must be true : the consequent must be
admitted.
{b) The conclusion, or consequent, may indeed be a
true proposition, as stated, and taken by itself ; and, still,

on account of a flaw in the structure of the argument, it

may not really follow from the premisses. In this case

we may admit it as an independent proposition. We
admit the consequent, but we deny the consequence.

85. Axioms. We repeat here two axioms stated in

No. II. They are the bases upon which every argu-
ment must rest. If the conclusion is an affirmative
proposition the argument rests upon this axiom /;/ tJie :

sense in wJiicJi two things are the same as a tJiird thing,

in the same sefise are they the same as one another. If
the conclusion is a negative proposition, the argument
rests upon this axiom In the sense in ivhich tzvo things
:

arc, the one the same as a third thing, the other differ-
ent from it, in the same sense are they different from one
another.

86. Analysis of Argument. Now look at the argument

given above, namely

Antecedent
^^'^''>'
P'^"^ '^ ^ substance (Major Premiss),
\
i But the verbena is a plant (Minor Premiss).

Consequent or ^
Therefore, the verbena is a substance (Conse-
CONCLUSION ( quence).
 . —
48 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

You will find

1 That it contains but three terms, plant, substance,
verbena.
2. That one of the terms, plant, occurs twice in the
premisses, — once in the major, and once in the minor.

3. That the two other terms, substance, verbena, occur

each once in the premisses, one in the major, and one in
the minor and that they both occur in the conclusion.
;

4. That the term plant is not found in the conclusion.

5. That thus each term occurs twice in the argument.

6. That the term plant, which occurs twice in the

premisses, is there compared with the two others with ;

one in the major, with the second in the minor.

7. That a certain relationship having been discovered,
in the premisses, between verbetia and substance, by
means of the aforesaid comparison, this relationship is

declared in the conclusion.

87. Middle and Extremes. The term that is used as a

standard of comparison between the two others is called
the middle term; or for brevity, the middle: the two
others are called the extreme terms or the extremes, one
the major and the other the minor extreme. We shall
have to speak of this subject presently.

Article II. Figures and Moods of the

Syllogism.

Major and Minor Premiss — Major and Minor Extreme — Middle

Term.

88. Major ; Minor ; Middle. We spoke, in the last arti-

cle, of major and minor premiss, major and minor ex-

treme, and of the middle. We called the first premiss

 ;

REASONING, ARGUMENT. 49

the major, and the second premiss the minor, and we

shall continue to call them so. But the first premiss is
not always really the major, in the original meaning
attached to the word ; nor, in the same original meaning,
is the second always the minor. According to the orig-
major premiss is the premiss in
inal use of the words, the
which the middle is compared with the major extreme
and the minor premiss is the one in which the middle
is compared with the minor extreme. The major ex-
treme is the one whose extension is greater than that of
the middle. The minor extreme is the one whose exten-
sion is less than that of the middle. This is how the
middle came to be called middle ; because, its extension
isbetween the extensions of the two other terms.
There is only one style of syllogism in which the mid-
dle is a real middle, as just explained. This is in the
most obvious style of construction of the syllogism (No.
89) and it is from this that the names have grown into
;

common use, and are applied to all syllogisms, in the same

way, regardless of construction. We call the premiss
put first, the major that put second, the minor
; and :

we never speak of the extremes as major and minor.

This leads us to the question of figures of the syllo-
gism.
By Figures are meant merely the various combina-
tions of the extremes with the middle, in the premisses.

89. First Figure. The First Figure is the one that we

have just spoken of. In this, the middle is made the
subject of the premiss containing the major extreme, and
this premiss is placed first : it (the middle) is made the
predicate of the premiss containing the minor extreme,
and this premiss is placed second. Thus :
 :

50 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

Anhnals are living beings ; (Major Premiss.)

But lions are animals. (Minor Premiss.)
Therefore, Lions are living beings.

Here the middle, animals, has less extension than

living bei7igs {va2i]or extreme), and greater extension than
{minor extreme). The following squares will show
lio7is

how one is included in the extension of the other, and

how easily the argument proceeds on that account.

LIVING BEINGS

ANIMALS

LIONS
Minor

Extreme

Middle

Major Extreme

As our argument was stated, we proceeded within the

extension of living beings to find animals, and then
within the extension of animals to find lions ; thence to
conclude that lions were within the extension of living
beings, and that living being could be predicated of lion.
The minor premiss might be placed first, and the major

premiss second. Thus

Ziions are animals;

But animals are living beings.
Therefore, Lions are living beings.

In this, we proceed from the minor extreme up through

the middle to the major extreme.
 :

REASONING, ARGUMENT. 51

90. Second Figure. We remark, again, that outside of

the F'irst Figure, what we call middle is really not a
middle, in the true sense, but only in the sense that it is

taken as a term of comparison between two other terms.

Still we keep the name, middle ; and the other terms

are called simply the extremes.

In what we call the Second Figure, the middle term is

used as predicate in both premisses. Thus

Every man is mortal;

li'o angel is mortal.
Therefore, No angel is a man.

Here mortal is the middle. Man

minor with is truly
reference to mortal. But we cannot say that Angel is
major with reference to mortal. Angel is simply ex-
cluded by, and excludes, mortal, and hence, excludes
the minor contained in mortal.

MORTAL

MAN ANGEL

91. Third Figure. In what we call the Third Figure

the term of comparison is the subject of both the first

and second premiss. Thus :

Every plant is substance;

Every 2ilfttit is material.
Therefore, Some substance is material.
52 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

Here the term plant has less extension than either of

the other two. The meaning of middle is lost. The
extremes are both major.

9^

PLANT

Both substance and material cover the extension of

plant,and hence partly coincide, i.e. at least to the
extent of plant. This will suffice on the subject of
Figures.
What we have to remember is this, that in practice
the premiss which stands first we shall call major ; the
premiss that stands second, minor ; the term that is

used as the standard of comparison, middle ; the two

other terms, extremes.

92. Moods of the Syllogism. By moods of the Syl-

logism are meant the various combinations that may be
made in the premisses, of universal, particular, affirma-
tive and negative propositions. We should derive no
practical utility from a discussion of the sixty-four
possible combinations, few of which give a correct
 REASONING, ARGUMENT. 53

argument. For the sake of a completeness, which is

not necessary, we subjoin the following remarks on
figuresand moods.
There is a Fourth Figure, which is little used, and
I.

which it is well to avoid in argumentation. In it the

middle is made predicate of the major proposition and
subject of the minor.

Every tree is organic;

Evertjthiuff organic is substance.
Therefore, Some siihstance is a tree.

This, it will be noticed, is the same as the First Figure

with the position of subject and predicate inverted in
the conclusion, and the proposition accordingly changed
from the universal, Everj/ tree is a substance, to the
implied particular.
2. If now we take the four kinds of propositions.
Universal Affirmative, Universal Negative, Particular
Affirmative and Particular Negative, and make all the
possible combinations of them that can be made in each
of the Four Figures, we shall find that there are sixteen
possible combinations in each figure, or sixty-four in
all, — simply regarding the position of the middle and
taking no account of the validity of the conclusion.
These sixty-four combinations are called the Moods of
the Syllogism. If we take into account the validity of
the conclusion as proceeding from the premisses, we
shall find that only nineteen of the sixty-four combina-
tions make correct arguments. These nineteen Moods
are thus distributed: 4 in the First Figure;
4 in the
Second ; 6
Third and 5 in the Fourth.
in the ;

We be able to decide upon the correctness of any

shall
combination from the laws of the syllogism which follow.
 : : ;:

54 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

Article III. Laws of the Syllogism.

93. Scope of the Laws. We are now prepared to

formulate the laws which must govern the construction
of the correct syllogism. These laws have reference to
the number of terms, the extension of terms, the place
of the middle term, the quantity and quality of premisses
and conclusion.

94. First Law. Three Terms. There must be three,

and only three, terms, and they mitst be only tJu^ee in

meaning. This is evident from what has been said
that the conclusion of a syllogism is simply a declaration
of identity or difference between two terms (objectively),
which identity or difference was implied by the compari-
son of these terms (objectively) with a third term in the
premisses. It is not enough, therefore, to have the
terms three in mere sound or written appearance. They
must be three in meaning (objectively). Our reasoning
is not upon sounds of the voice or upon printed letters

it is upon that which is represented both by the idea and

by the spoken and written word. If we say

Stores are tvareJiouses,

Stores can be eaten,
Therefore, Warehouses can he eaten,

we have three terms in sound and writing ; but we have

four in meaning; and thus there is no syllogism. If
we say
Eye is the organ of sight,
I is a personal j^^^onoun,
Therefore, The organ of sight is a personal pronoun,
 : ^

REASONING, ARGUMENT. 55

the terms are three in sound, but four in meaning, as in

writing. There is no syllogism. If we say

Andrew Jachson is one of the Presidents

Franklin Pierce is one of the Presidents,
Therefore, Andretv tfackson is Franklin Pierce,

we have four terms, in meaning; because, One-of-the-

Prcsidents is taken in two di\'iiQXQXi\. particular senses.

95. Second Law. Extension of Extremes. Neither ex-

treme may have a greater extension in the conclusion tJian
it had in the premisses. This is a consequence, or an
application, of the first law. For if a term in the conclu-
sion embraces more individuals than it did in the prem-
isses, it is really a fourth term, because it stands for
something not meant in its first use. In the following,

Tobacco is a j)lant,
Tobacco is narcotic,
Therefore, Plants are narcotic,

the term plant, as predicate of an affirmative proposi-

tion in the major, is a particular term ;
whilst, in the
conclusion, as subject of the universal proposition, it is

taken according to its entire extension. There are four

terms : hence no syllogism.

96. Third Law. Extension of the Middle Term. The

middle term must be used once, at least, according to its

entire extension, i.e. as jiniversal. The reason : for if

it be twice a particular, each use may embrace totally

different sets of individuals, totally distinct sections of
the entire extension. This would give two different
 : :

56 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

meanings for the middle, and hence, four terms. If

we say
Tigers are animals,
Lions are animals,
we may not conclude

Therefore, Lions are tigers.

The middle term, animals, is twice particular, covering

distinct sections of the entire extension, animals. It is
really two terms.
An objection. How, then, can the middle term be
used once universally, and once particularly } Will not
this give us four terms } No ; because what is said of
the term taken universally, i.e. standing for all individ-
uals, and for each and every individual in the extension,

can also be said of this or that individual taken sepa-

rately. An example
Spirit is indivisible;
The soul is spirit.
Therefore, The soul is indivisible.

In the major, spirit is universal. We say that all

spirits are indivisible ; hence, that each particular spirit
is indivisible. In the minor, we simply call one particu-
lar spiritby its name. In the major we said ajiy spirit.
In the minor we make the choice that has been offered
us directly in the major. There are only three terms.
Of course the middle may be used twice universally.
In this case, both premisses will have to be affirmative,
and the conclusion will be particular. Thus :

All fishes are sensitive ;

All fishes are shy.
Therefore, Some things sensitive are shy.
 REASONING, ARGUMENT. 5/

In these premisses the extremes are predicates of affir-

mative propositions, and hence are particular. There-

fore,by the second law, they must have a particular ex-
tension in the conclusion. This last example belongs to
the Third Figure.

97. Fourth Law.

Place of the Middle Term. The mid-
dle term must not be found in the eonelusion. This is
evident from the nature of the syllogism. Two terms
are compared, separately in the premisses, with a third
term, in order that their identity, or disparity, may be
expressed in the conclusion ; the middle term being
rejected, after its use as a standard of comparison.

98. Fifth Law. Affirmative Conclusion. Tiuo affirma-

tive demand an affirmative eonelusion. For if,
premisses
in the premisses, we implicitly affirm the identity of the
extremes, we cannot deny that identity, explicitly, in the
conclusion.

99. Sixth Law. Negative Conclusion. One premiss affir-

mative and one premiss negative demaiid a negative
conclusion. For, in the premisses, we implicitly deny
identity between the extremes, by declaring that one is
identical with the middle, and that the other is not.
Hence we have but to deny their identity, explicitly, in
the conclusion.

100. Seventh Law. No Conclusion. From two negative

premisses zve can drazv no conclusion. If we say,

Scipio is not a carpenter,

Scipio is not a Russian,

there is no conclusion to be drawn. We have done

nothing but to place Scipio outside the extension of the
 ;

58 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

two extremes but there

; is nothing from which to infer
whether there be, or be not, Russians among the car-
penters, or carpenters among the Russians. All we can

Carpenters Russians

say is what has been affirmed explicitly, that Scipio is

neither a Russian nor a carpenter.
The same holds if the premisses are two negative uni-
versal propositions. All the terms will be universal.
The middle term, in its entire extension, will be outside
the entire extension of each extreme.

No star is an elephant;
No elephant is a tvJieelbarrow.
No conclusion.

101. Eighth Law. No Conclusion. F;^^. two particu-

lar premisses we can draw no conchLsion. For they will
be either, i, both negative; or 2, both affirmative; or 3,
one affirmative and one negative.
First case: both negative. This is settled by the
seventh law.
Second case : both affirmative. In this case the sub-
jects are particular, as we have particular propositions
and the predicates are particular because the proposi-
tions are affirmative (No. 71). Hence the middle term
is not taken once universally, and the third law is
broken.
Third case : one affirmative and one negative. Then,
according to the sixth law, the conclusion will have to
 : : ;

REASONING, ARGUMENT. 59

be negative. The predicate of the conckision will thus

be universal (No. 71). As this predicate is one of the
extremes, it must, by the second law, be universal in the
premisses. But in the premisses there is only one place
for a universal term ; that is, as predicate of the negative
premiss. The particular affirmative premiss cannot have
a universal term, and the subject of the particular nega-
tive premiss must be particular. Now if this one place
in the premisses where a universal term can be, be taken
by one of the extremes, the middle term will not be,
cannot be, used universally at all. Hence this third
case an impossibility, and the eighth law holds.
is

We must here make an exception for the case w^here

both premisses are singular. In this case there may be
a conclusion. Thus
Mars is a planet;
Mars is uninhabited.
Therefore, One planet is uninhahited.

The reasonis that the term, Mars, being applicable

to one individual only must be used in its entire exten-

sion, and hence, as subject in both premisses, has the
value of a universal so that the two premisses may be
:

treated as universals.

102. Ninth Law. Particular Conclusion. If one premiss

be particular, the conclusion must be particular. Of course,
by the eighth law, one premiss must be universal. The
possible cases with one premiss universal, and one par-
ticular, are
With both premisses affirmative
1. ;

With one premiss affirmative, the other negative

2.

and in the second case we have an alternative. We

may take a universal affirmative and a particular nega-
 ..

6o THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

tive ; or we may take a universal negative and a par-

ticular affirmative.
1. Making both premisses affirmative, we shall have,

Universal Affirmative (with subject utiiversal and predicate

particular) ;

Particular Affirmative (with subject particular and predicate

particular)

There is but one place for a universal term. This

must be for the middle The extremes
{TJm'd Law).
are both particulars in the premisses. Hence the subject
of the conclusion must be particular {Second Law) and ;

the conclusion, a particular proposition.

2. Making one premiss negative and one affirmative,
we shall have either

Universal Affirmative (with subject universal and predicate

particular) ;

Particular Negative (with subject particular and predicate

universal) .

Or,

Universal Negative (with subject universal and predicate

universal) ;

Particular Affirmative (with subject particular and predicate

particular)

In either case there are two places for a universal.

One place must be for the middle {Third Law), The
other place will be for the extreme which is predicate of
the conclusion ; the conclusion being negative, since
one premiss is The subject of the conclusion
negative.
must therefore be an extreme, used particularly in the
premisses. It must be particular in the conclusion

{Second Law), and will make the conclusion a particular

proposition.
 1

REASONING, ARGUMENT. 6

103. Caution. Here we leave the laws of the syllo-

gism. Certain correct syllogisms may be adduced which
may seem to contravene the laws. But if the propo-
sitions of the syllogisms thus presented be examined,
it will be seen that certain propositions, apparently
particular, are really universal ; and certain propositions,
apparently negative, are really affirmative, or vice versa.
But let it be kept in mind that we reason not with mere
words as they sound or appear on paper, but with what
they stand for and words, by tricks of grammar, may
;

be made to obscure a thought in the presentation. In

the same way, syllogisms with ill-drawn conclusions
may be made to appear in keeping with the laws. But
study the sense of the propositions.

Article IV. Some Species of the Syllogism.

Conditional — Conjunctive — Disjunctive.
104. Simple and Compound Syllogisms. We have hith-
erto, for the sake of clearness, given examples of syllo-
gisms composed of simple categorical propositions only.
Such syllogisms component propositions,
are, as their
called simple.One compound premiss is sufficient to
make the syllogism compound and equal to as many
simple syllogisms as there are simple categorical propo-
sitions compounded into that premiss. We do not
propose to treat of compound syllogisms. We should
never end. Attention is called here to three complexi-
ties in the syllogism, to which we alluded in No. 49.

105. Conditional Syllogisms. In these the major is a

conditional proposition (46); for instance, this, If tJiey
 : : :

62 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

are studying logic, they are training their minds. The

first member of the conditional proposition is called the
condition ; the second, the consequent. The minor may
affirm the condition categorically :

They are studying logic.

Then the conclusion must affirm the consequent cate-

gorically :

They are training their tninds.

Or the minor may deny the consequent

TJiey are not training tlieir minds.

Then the conclusion denies the condition

They are not studying logic.

Note. i. The denial of the condition will not necessitate the

denial of the consequent. This (the consequent) may be true for
other reasons. In the present instance they might be studying
grammar or geometry without logic ; and they would still be train-
ing their minds.
2. Hence affirmation of the consequent does not always necessi-
tate affirmation of the condition. There may, as we said, be other
conditions from which it (the consequent) would follow. They may
in the present instance be training their minds by studying other
matters than logic.

106. Conjunctive Syllogisms. In these, two incompati-

ble propositions are proposed in the major by means
of a conjunctive proposition (47). The minor denies
one, and the conclusion affirms the other. Example
N'oman can spend all his money on drink and still

support his family ;

But he spends all his inoney on drink.
Therefore,

Se does not support his family.

 ; :

REASONING, ARGUMENT. 6^

What we said about looking into the meaning of the

proposition and not being deceived by tricks of construc-
tion is of service here. The conjunctive proposition is

really equivalent to a conditional, thus. If a man spends

money on drink, he is unable to support his fafnily;
all his
and with regard to affirmation and denial of condition
and consequent must be treated as such.

107. Disjunctive Syllogisms. In these the major puts

all the alternatives of a case in the disjunctive proposi-
tion (48). If theminor makes choice of one, the conclu-
sion will be the denial of all the others. If the minor
denies all but one, that one will be affirmed in the
conclusion, etc.

Example : He is either just fifty or under fifty or past

fifty;
But he is just fifty
Therefore, He neither under fifty nor past fifty
is
Or JBut he is neither under fifty nor 2>nst fifty ;
Therefore, He is just fifty :
Or But he is not just fifty ;
Therefore, He is either under fifty or jyast fifty.

In the last case, as we have three possibilities, and the

minor denies one only, the two others remain as a dis-
junctive proposition in the conclusion. This form of
syllogism may also be reduced to the conditional with
one member positive and the other negative. If he is
under fifty, he is neither just fifty nor past fifty.
The conjunctive syllogism is useful in controversy and
investigation. But it is, at the same time, capable of
treacherous application for the spread of error in history
and physical science, by the use of disjunctive majors
which are not complete. The disjunction should state
 : ;

64 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

all the possibilities of the case. The members should

have marked lines of division, and not run into one
another. All the members may not be true; neither
may all be false.

Article V. Other Styles of Argument.

Enthymeme — Sorites — Polysyllogism — Epichirem — Dilemma.
Argument Abbreviated.
108. We said (No. 81) that
when we write and speak we do not always, nor even
usually, carry on an argumentation with completed
syllogisms. We abbreviate. The various methods of
abbreviation give us various styles of argument, which
have, respectively, their proper names.

109. Enthymeme. If we drop one premiss in the syllo-

gism, the argument is called an enthymeme. Example
All liquids will flow ;
Therefore, This tar will flow.

We have dropped one evident premiss, this tar is liquid,

to avoid being tiresome.
Enthymemeoriginally meant a probable argument
but, by a mistake as to its derivation, it came to be
applied to the argument where one premiss is kept in
the mind. In this sense alone is the word now used.

110. Sorites. {Piled-np argument.^ When we put

down more premisses and, then, one conclusion
three or
following from them, the argument is called a Sorites.
It abbreviates by dropping intermediate conclusions. It
presumes the evidence of the conclusion after the first
two premisses, and adds a third premiss as a minor to
 : ::

REASONING, ARGUMENT. 65

the second premiss considered as a major then a fourth ;

premiss as a minor to the third premiss considered as a

major, etc. Thus
He who desjyonds ceases to labor;
He who ceases to labor makes no progress ;
He who maUes no progress does not reach the end.
Therefore,
He tvho desponds does not reach the end.

It is easy to see that this is an abbreviation of two

syllogisms. Thus
He ivho desponds ceases to labor;
He who ceases to labor makes no jtrogress.
Therefore,
He ivho desponds makes no progress.
The next syllogism begins with this conclusion as a
major

He who desponds m,akes no jrrogress ;

He who makes no progress does not reach the end.

Therefore,
He tvho desponds does not reach the end.

As the Sorites involves so much argument, and pro-

ceeds so rapidly, we must be cautious with an adversary
who uses it. The Sorites may be drawn out to any
length. Each implied syllogism must observe the laws
of the syllogism.

111. Polysyllogism. If we argue with a chain argu-

ment, as in the Sorites, but in such a way that we bring
out the intermediate conclusions, not explicitly tzvice as

above, but once, to be used, simultaneously, as conclusion

 : ; :

66 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

to the two preceding premisses, and as major to a follow-

ing minor, our argument is called a Polysyllogis7n. The
preceding example, as a polysyllogism, will be

He who desponds ceases to labor

He who ceases to labor inaTces no progress.
Therefore,

He who desjionds makes no jyrogress;

He who makes no 2)rogress does not reach the end.

Therefore,

He who desponds does not reach the end.

112. Epichirem. If a premiss, or even each premiss,

requires proof, and the proof is attached toit immedi-

ately, whether in substance or in full, the argument is

called an Epichirem {taking in hand the doubted premiss

at otice). Example
One who denies the existence of God and a future
life cannot be trusted in society ; because he ad-
mits no inotive to restrain him frotn evil when
he can do the evil without tetnporal inconven-
ience.
But the atheist denies the existence of God and a
future life.

Therefore,

He cannot be trusted in society.

113.Dilemma. The Dilemma is a double argument

in the compass of a single syllogism. It may be even
triple, quadruple, etc. The major is a disjunctive prop-
osition. The minor takes up each member of the dis-
junction, separately, and an equally satisfactory conclu-
 :

REASONING, ARGUMENT. 67

sion is drawn from whichever member is chosen. Thus

a schoolboy might argue, to escape his evening study

To-inorrow morning it tvill he either raining or not

raining.
Jf it he raining, I will liave an excuse to stay at
home. If it he not raining, I can use my per-
mission to take a day at the fair.
Therefore,

Wliatever the weather may he, I shall not have to

go to school; and hence I need not study my
lessons to-night.

The Dilemma is sometimes a very useful form of

argumentfor a summary refutation of false theories.
CHAPTER V. TRUTH OF THE PREMISSES.

Article I. Formal and Material Logic.

114. We have seen what is required in the

The Form.
qualityand quantity of the premisses, and in the exten-
sion of middle and extremes, in order that a given
conclusion may be taken as lawfully drawn from given
premisses. If I say,

Every stea^nhoat is a sunflower,

Every sunflower is a violin,
Therefore, Every steamboat is a violin,
and suppose the premisses to be true, I have to accept
the conclusion, inevitably, from the premisses. The
conclusion is in perfect accord with all the laws of the
syllogism. All that formal logic has shown us to be
necessary in quality, quantity and extension has been
— supposing the premisses true — strictly attended to.

Yet every proposition in the strange argument is false.

This leads us to speak of the matter of the premisses,

as affecting the acceptance of the conclusion. We shall
say something, therefore, on the truth of the premisses.
It may be urged that the subject does not belong strictly
to the /(?;''/«(^/ logic. The formal logic has to deal, strictly
speaking, only with the form, or structure, of argument
necessary to have a conclusion rightly drawn from pre-
misses; — the matter, or truth, of the premisses being
 TRUTH OF THE PREMISSES. 69

left out of consideration. And for this reason is it called

formal logic. By this is it distinguished from material
logic.

115. The Matter. Material logic will teach us what

care must be taken in the use of the various means we
have of arriving at the truth, that is in the use of our
various faculties ; and when we may cease examining,
and rest reasonably secure in mind as to the truth or
falsity of what is expressed in a proposition. So that, if
we should meet with a syllogism such as the following,

is made of brass,
Every timepiece
organic matter,
All brass is

Therefore, Every timepiece is made of organic matter,

material logic would have to tell us how to use our

faculties, — that is, how far to trust the various faculties
— in our search for truth in the propositions. It is only
when we have decided as to how far we are to admit
the propositions that the work of formal logic begins.
Nevertheless, we begin the study of philosophy with
formal logic, because we have had so much practical
experience in the use of our faculties, that we already
hold securely that many propositions are true, many
others false, and many, again, doubtful and we want, ;

at once, a safe and systematic rule for arguing from the

known to the unknown. Therefore we study formal
logic first.

However, we shall here make a short consideration

upon the truth and falsity of the premisses, and upon
the corresponding adhesion of mind which we can give
to the conclusion. Yet we shall do this in such a way
as not to touch the question of the means we have for
arriving at the truth.
 :

70 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

116. Value of the Conclusion. We cannot hold to the

conclusion any more firmly than we
hold to the prem-
isses. Supposing the form of the syllogism to be correct,
if we are certain of the truth of the major and minor,

we may be certain of the conclusion. If we have a

lingering doubt as to the truth of either major or minor,
that doubt will cling to the conclusion. If either major or
minor be false, the conclusion is false and the argument ;

is called a sophism or a fallacy. Sophism or fallacy is

in the matter, not in the form. A defect in the form is

called 2l paralogism. This has been abundantly treated

in the preceding chapter (Nos. 80-102).
When the major and minor are both truths of which
we are certain, the argument is called a demonstratioji.
Leaving aside the probable argument, we shall treat
of the demojistratiou and of fallacies.

Article II. The Demonstration.

Direct — Indirect — Simple — Compound — A Priori — A Posteriori.

117. Two Kinds. A is an argument in

demonstration
which the conclusion isdrawn from premisses of whose
truth we are certain. It may be direct or indirect ; and
either kind may be a priori or a posteriori.

118. Direct. In the direct demonstration we draw the

conclusion we desire, directly from the premisses where
we have compared its subject and its predicate with a
middle term. Thus
Tixe soul can thinks
flatter cannot think.
Therefore, The soul is not matter.
 TRUTH OF THE PREMISSES. /I

119. Indirect. In the indirect demonstration, instead

of drawing our conclusion as coming directly from
premisses in a syllogism, we show that the contradictory
cannot be true, by exhibiting the absurd consequences
that would follow from such contradictory. The indi-

rect demonstration is of frequent use in geometry,

where we show absurd consequences that would follow
from not admitting the theorem laid down.

120. Simple ; Compound. A demonstration is called

simple when the whole argumentation is finished clearly
and satisfactorily with a single syllogism. If, however,

itbe necessary to bring forward new syllogisms to prove

the major or minor or both —
which may not be clear,
or may be called in question —
and, perhaps, again, new
sollogisms to prove the new majors or minors, the
demonstration is called compound. All the longer theo-
rems in geometry are illustrations in point.

121.A Priori. An argument is called a priori when

it advances from premisses which state truths that are
prior in the nature of things to the truth stated in the
conclusion. Thus we may advance from what we know
about the nature of a cause or agent, to establish some
conclusion regarding the nature of the effect it may
produce. The name a priori is used, also, for an argu-
ment where we advance from principles in their wider
extension to an application of the same principles in a
less wide extension ; as, for instance, from principles
regarding the whole animal kingdom to conclusions
respecting elephants and kangaroos. Likewise, when-
ever we advance from principles to facts, as from the
general truths about triangles to the exhibition of the
truths applied in a particular given triangle.
 !

72 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

122. A Posteriori. The a posteriori demonstration

proceeds in the opposite direction. It advances from
what is posterior in the nature of things to what is prior
in the nature of things. From the existence of an effect
it concludes to the existence of a cause ; from the nature
of an effect to the nature of the cause. It rises from a

given fact to the principle that must explain the fact.

We have an illustrious example of the a posteriori argu-

ment in the discovery of the planet Neptune. After a
quarter of a century of observations made upon the
planet Uranus, discovered by Sir W. Herschel, it was
found that its movement did not correspond with the
known upon it, especially from
forces of gravity acting
Jupiter and There
Saturn. was a fact movement. :

The movement must have a cause. The cause must

be a heavenly body. The movement was of such a
character, said Leverrier, that if it came from a single
heavenly body, that body, at a given time would be
found in a given point of the heavens. The telescope
is directed, at the given time, to the given point; and

there is found the planet Neptune

Article III. Induction.

Complete and Incomplete Induction — Example — Analogy.

123. Deduction and Induction. We add here a special
article about a peculiar kind of a posteriori argument,
which, by custom, has been allowed to appropriate, as
it were, the name Every a posteriori argu-
Induction.
ment is, indeed, an induction, as opposed to the a priori
argument, which is a deduction. Deduction means the
 TRUTH OF THE PREMISSES. 73

drawing out of a particular proposition or conclusion

from the universal premiss. Induction, on the contrary,
is a leading back to the universal from the particular.

Every process of thought from the particular to the

universal is inductive. We wish to speak of induction,
in the usual and limited acceptation of the word, as
signifying an argument which passes from a uniform
experience of several individual cases to a universal
conclusion covering them all. The induction may be,
as it is termed, complete or incomplete.

124. Complete Induction. The induction is called

complete when after having really made an examination
of all the cases of which there is question, and having
found that the same proposition, varying only the sub-
ject, is applicable to each case individually, we draw a

conclusion in which we include them all in a single

universal proposition. If, for instance, I, an American,

step into a railway car and finding there five men. A,

B, C, D, E, I discover gradually that A is an Ameri-
can, that B is an American, that each of the five is
an American, and conclude that all the men in the
car are Americans, I go through the process of a
complete induction. The complete induction is the
exact reverse of a detailed deduction, in which, from the
universal, that all the men in the car are Americans, I
would conclude A is an American, B is, C is, D is, E
:

is, I am an American.

We may sometimes think we have a complete induc-

tion when, in reality, we have not. We are liable to
overlook particular cases. Moreover, sometimes even
when the greatest care is taken in the observation of
facts in certain branches of the natural sciences, when
74 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

all the known facts have been classified under a general

proposition, some new discovery will show that the
general proposition is untrue, and that the induction was
not as complete as it was believed to be.

125. Incomplete Induction. It is to the inco^nplete in-

duction, which bears the name in the strictest sense, that

we wish to call particular attention. It is a process by

which, from experience of a limited number of cases, we

pass on to formulate a universal law. Thus we formu-
late the laws of gravitation, of equilibrium, of reflection,
of refraction, from a very limited number of cases ; and
we hold these laws to be applicable, as universal propo-
sitions, to cases tried and untried. Is the process law-
ful .?

We inquire more particularly into the matter because

some modern logicians, of the school of experimentalists,
make the study of induction the chief business of logic.
The process of thought m.ay be accepted as lawful, — the
experiments having been rightly conducted, —
but, upon
one condition. The condition is, that we admit the
reality of such a thing as cause. This very condition,
which is absolutely necessary to the validity of the process
of induction, is not accepted by the great champion of
induction among the experimentalists, Mr. J. Stuart Mill.
The process, then, is lawful if we admit true causality;
namely, that whatever begins to be, depends for its exist-
ence upon some real influence exercised by something
else in bringing it about. In other words, Every effect
demands a cause.
Recognizing this, we may set to work with experiment
and observation at the process of induction. If we find,
by repeated test, that the same consequent follows the
 TRUTH OF THE PREMISSES. 75

same antecedent constantly and uniformly in whatsoever

circumstances or adjuncts of time, place, quality or rela-

tion the antecedent may be tried, and in all the variations

of circumstances by composition, opposition, etc. ; if we
find, on the other hand, that, suppressing the one ante-
cedent in question, whilst leaving all the circumstances
and adjuncts the same, the said consequent does not
make its appearance in any of the cases when the ante-
cedent is so suppressed ; if, again, varying the antece-
dent, in the various cases, in quantity, intensity, direction,
etc., we find that the consequent varies proportionally in
quantity, intensity, direction, etc. ; in other words, if we
find that said consequent follows said antecedent only,
but always, and in regular proportion, we are bound to —
recognize as really existing in said antecedent a certain
power whereby it brings into existence the said conse-
quent ; and, also, in said consequent, a certain real
dependence for its existence upon the antecedent. We
perceive the two to be related as cause and effect. But
yet more. We perceive that the antecedent is cause by
reason of something inherent to its very nature ; for we
have made our observations, tests, experiments, abstract-
ing from it everything but its essential, inherent nature.
But the essential, inherent nature of that thing must be
present always where that thing is the same yesterday, ;

to-day, to-morrow. Hence we conclude that the same

thing will produce the same effect to-morrow as to-day.
We formulate a universal law which reaches to the
future. Mr. J. Stuart Mill has, of all writers, written
best upon the manner of making the tests for an induc-
tion. But as he does not recognize the reality of cause,
as he puts no real connection hetwetn fore o-oin^ zxi^ fol-
lowing, his conclusion is universal only to the extent of
^6 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

the tests actually made. What he builds up with one

hand he tears down with the other.

126. Example. Allied to induction is what is some-

times called the argument from example. It concludes
to the universal from a few cases ; and, even, it may be,
from a single case, without the tests and observations
prescribed for induction. Its value is rather in discovery
than in proof. A superior, well trained and vigilant
mind will often suspect, and even detect, the universal
law in a single case but it will be necessary to go
;

through the various tests, to make the law acceptable to

the ordinary intelligence. In general use it is an argu-
ment weak in point of logic. Logically, it suggests at
most the possibility of a case. It is resorted to in ora-
torical discussion. The orator has the advantage of
forcing his listeners on without giving them time to
examine, and urges them to act under the impression of
a possibility.

127. Analogy. The argument from analogy is still

less reliable, logically, than the argument from example.

It is a pure figure of rhetoric, a parallel between two
cases of quite different orders. It is useful to persuade
an audience that cannot listen to dry argument, but can
listenvery well to a story, and then follow out the appli-
cation of the story, in all its details, to the question
under treatment.
128. Caution. In philosophical argument be wary in
the use of example and analogy. It is so easy to give

illustrations and to make comparisons. Therefore have

we so many self-styled " scientists," to-day, setting them-
selves up as professional discoverers, and flying to con-
clusions which the slow, careful processes of induction
do not warrant.
 :

TRUTH OF THE PREMISSES. JJ

Article IV. Fallacies.

Begging the Question — Evading the Question — Accident — A Dicto

Simpliciter, etc. — Consequent — Cause — Question — Reference —
Objections.

129. Fallacy. We have distinguished the Fallacy or

Sophism from the Paralogism. The paralogism is an
argument with a flaw in the form. A conclusion, true
in itself, may be found in a syllogism which is faulty in
the form. The may
be true, indeed, but it
conclusion
has not been proved. We
have previously considered
arguments, with regard to the correctness of the form
(Laws of the Syllogism). This article has reference to
the matter of the conclusion. Any argument with a
false conclusion is a fallacy. The word, however, is
applied, in its special sense, to falsely concluding argu-
ments which have so much the appearance of correct-
ness as easily to deceive the unwary or to silence those
whose limited knowledge or intelligence does not enable
them to detect the deceit. We shall not consider any
fallacy which is an evident violation of the laws of the
syllogism. Every equivocation is such, since it uses a
word in two senses, and thus gives us four terms in the
syllogism. We subjoin some fallacies arising from the
matter.

130. Petitio Principii or Begging the Question. This is

to insert cleverly and covertly into the premisses the

very thing that has to be proved. This is a favorite
demagogues haranguing listeners whose hearts
fallacy of
are already in the conclusion.Communistic gatherings
echo with arguments like this
78 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

"All men are born into the world, equal, with equal
rights to live, equally, upon the earth and to enjoy an
equal share of the spontaneous productions of the earth.
So that by Nature herself are they justified in asserting
their equality against all comers.
" But all the existing laws of society are in open con-
flict with the equal rights of men and are framed only
to increase the inequality.
" Therefore, as we cannot get the rights of our equal-
ity from society, we are by Nature herself justified in
overturning governments and helping ourselves."
Here, you see, the right to plunder is assumed covertly
in order to justify plunder.
The circulns vitiosus {vicioiLS circle) is of the same
order as Xh^ petitio prmcipii. We prove, for instance, the
fall of the apple from the tree by gravitation ; and, later
on, we establish gravitation by the fall of the apple.

131. Evading the ftuestion {ignorantia elenchi). Under

this head may be ranged all those tricks of argument by
which one tries to make the best of his case without
offering proof; or to shirk an objection without showing
it to be invalid. This may be done by assuming for
proof or disproof something similar or analogous to the
point in question or by attacking an opponent on the
;

ground that he is not to be regarded as an authority on

the subject {argumentmn ad hominem), thus arousing
prejudice against his argument or by appealing to the
;

passions of the reader or listener or by trying to shame

;

an opponent out of the debate by citing against him

authorities that have the respect of the listeners.
This is an utterly illogical way of proceeding, but it
may be followed with great effect.
 TRUTH OF THE PREMISSES. 79

132. Fallacy of the Accident. This consists in assum-

ing as essential what is purely accidental. Thus a man
might argue against Christianity because some who pro-
fess it are not exemplary in their conduct. However,
evil-doers are never such by reason of Christianity they ;

may be, in spite of it.

133. A Dicto Simpliciter ad Dictum Secundum Quid, and

vice versa. This is the fallacy of arguing from an un-
qiialified statement to the same statement qualified, or vice
versa. This fallacy pervades daily conversation. From
the unqualified statement that a man is learned the
popular mind jumps to the conclusion that he is learned
in particular matters to which, perhaps, he has never
given any attention. How many a man
"learned" truly
has had to pay for his name
by being as "learned"
consulted as though he were an encyclopaedia.'' This
fallacy works with equal success in the opposite direc-
tion. An exhibition of some knowledge in a few partic-
ular matters is soon made the basis for the conclusion
that the exhibitor is "learned."

134. Fallacy of the Consequent. This consists in a

misuse of the conditional syllogism. Thus some one
says If the gale is strong to-night, the toiver ivill fall.
:

In the morning the tower is found to have fallen. The

fallacy infers that the gale was strong. The truth is

that the tower may have fallen under other agencies.

135. Fallacy of the Cause. lies in assuming as the
This
cause of something that which merely an accompany- is

ing or preceding circumstance, or at most an occasion.

Thus we sometimes read in the newspapers that the
political principles of a party in power are the cause of
all the fluctuations in trade. Therefore, to secure steady
80 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

business, the administration must be changed. And

when the administration is changed, and the same diffi-

culties occur, the responsibility is shifted to the opposite,

principles of the new party in power. Or we read that
the cause of a bank robbery was the insecure system of
bolts put on by a certain safe company, thus shifting the
responsibility from the want of vigilance on the part of
the authorities, and from that education of the head
without the education of the heart, so prolific in evil-

doers.

136. Fallacy of the Question. This consists in asking

a number which are evidently to be
of questions all of
answered in the same way, by yes or no and then very ;

deftly inserting one question whose answer should be

the opposite, but which is made to pass along with the
others, as answerable in the same way. Thus the com-
munistic orator: "Are we poltroons.'' Shall we reject
the equality nature has bestowed upon us .''
Shall we
see the products of the earth, which nature intended for
all, piled up for the use of a few } Can we, as nature's
freemen, refuse to vindicate our equality .''
Is there
anything to prevent us from destroying } They refuse
us a share in their millions. Shall we refuse them a
share in our poverty .''
etc. Therefore, etc."

137. Fallacy of Reference. This is untruth — the

inventing of false references for the support of a propo-
sition. People do not usually verify references, and
hence may be easily deceived by a long array of author-
ities [.''] cited at the foot of the page.

138. Fallacy of Objections. This consists in pouring

forth a volume of objections, one immediately after
 1

TRUTH OF THE PREMISSES. 8

another before giving opportunity for reply. The adver-

sary's time may be more than taken up in trying to
answer one of them. Even then his long, careful answer
may not be as effective with the audience (or reader) as
the terse, captious objection ; and besides, the other
objections will be carried away unanswered.
 ;

CHAPTER VI. METHOD.

Article I. Scientific Method.

139. Scientific Method. Supposing the premisses to be

true and the form of correct argumentation to be fully-

understood and rigorously applied, there are still differ-

ent methods which may be followed in the search for
conclusions, in the pursuit of truth. Moreover, methods
which may have proved most satisfactory to our own
minds in the search for, and discovery of truth, we may
find less satisfactory for communicating the same truth
fully, briefly, and clearly to others.

We do not refer here to the mere variations of order

in which a number of truths, such as dates of events in
history, may be learned or communicated, one after
another. But we refer to methods of arriving at the
knowledge of even one truth as a conclusion, i.e. in such
a way as to possess, together with the truth, also the
reasons for it. We speak of scientific methods which
give us scientific knowledge. Science.

140. Analysis and Synthesis. There are two kinds of

scientific method, the analytic and the synthetic. The
analytic proceeds by way of analysis or taking apart
the synthetic, by way of synthesis or putting together.
To take a broad example the chemist analyzes, when
:

he proceeds to find out the nature and proportions of the

82
 —
METHOD, ^3

various elements in a lump of crude matter brought him

from the mines he synthetizes, when he puts together
;

various chemical elements for the purpose of discovering

some new law of combinations. Thus analysis proceeds
from the whole to the parts ; synthesis, from the parts
to the whole.
Before considering the methods of synthesis and
analysis we shall touch upon two other points, defini-
tion and division^ — the understanding of which will
enable us to speak more briefly and more clearly about
the methods.

Article II. Definition.

Nominal — Real — Descriptive — Genetic — Essential — Physical —

Metaphysical — Rules.

141. Definition. Correct definition is a thing always

to be prized and discourse, even for its effec-
in writing
tiveness in concentrating vague thought and shortening
discussion. A universal habit of correct definition would
be fatal to false argument and would put an end to
much debate that is carried on to tiresome lengths. But
the habit of correct definition belongs to the trained
master mind. And as most minds are not such, and
as most men shirk the search and labor demanded by
correct definition, therefore have we so much, in phi-
losophy as in other things, that is written all around a
subject instead of about it. But here we are called upon
to give a definition of a definition. Therefore A defini- :

tion is the expression in zvords of the meaning attached to

a term ; or, a definition is the expression in zvords of the

nature of an object. That is to say, there are two kinds
 —
'84 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

of definition. If we fix our attention on the word, to

make it known in its character as a sign, we have the
nominal definition. If we fix our attention on the thing,
to define what it is, we have the real definition.

142. Nominal Definition. We give a nominal definition,

(i) When we make known the sense in which we are
using a term for the case in question ; (2) When we
make known the meaning usually and generally given
to a term (3) When we declare the true literal mean-
;

ing of a term according to its derivation. Thus, infinite,

from the Latin in (a negative particle) and finis (a
limit), means zvitJiout limit.

143. Ileal Definition. This may also be threefold,

descriptive, genetic, essential.
The descriptive definition is nothing more than a
description. It does not enter into the essence of the
object. It gives such a combination of accidental fea-
tures, circumstances, etc., as may suffice to make the
object recognizable. Its treatment belongs to works on
composition and style.

The genetic definition (from genesis, origin) gives the

process by which a thing is produced. A genetic
definition of a circle would be : A plane surface gene-
rated by revolving a straight line about one of its extremi-
ties fixed.

The essential definition names the essential parts of

an object that is, those without which the object can
;

neither be nor be thought of. According to the way

in which we look at an object, we may find it made up
of separable essential parts which, taken together, will
•give us the whole essence; or of inseparable essential
parts which, considered as taken together, will also give
 ;

METHOD. 85

US the whole essence. Such separable parts are called

physical parts, and enumeration of them is the
the
real essential physical definition. Such non-separable
parts are called metaphysical parts, and the enumeration
of them is the real essential metaphysical definition.
Thus, in man, spiritual soul and organic body are essen-
tial parts ; they embrace all that is essential ; they are
actually separable; taken together, they give us the
essence. Hence to say that man is a being co)nposed of
a spiritual soul and an organic body, is to give an essen-
tial physical definition of man. Again, in man, animal
nature and rational nature are essential parts ; they
embrace all that is essential; taken together, they give
us the entire essence. But they are not physically, that
is actually, separable.Take away rational nature, and
you have not animal nature left, but only a dead body
for the principle of life is gone. Such parts are sepa-
rable only in the consideration of the mind that is, in an ;

order of things outside the real physical order, — or, in

the metaphysical order. They are called metaphysical

parts. Hence to say that man is a rational animal, is

to give the essential metaphysical definition of man.

This is the true definition in logic. It classifies accord-
ing to those logical considerations spoken of in Chapter
H., Article H. It gives the species by combining the

two essentials of proximate genus and final difference;

and there is no mistaking a thing thus defined. It is —
the perfect definition.

144. Eules for Definition. We may summarize the

requisites of a good definition :

I. The terms of the definition should convey a more

definite idea than the single term expressing the thing
 ;

86 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

defined. This does not mean that every term in the

definition should always be at once better known by
everybody than the single term. When we define a
circle tobe a plane stirface luith a single ciwvcd line for
a boundary every point of ivhick is equally distant from one
fixed point in the surface, our definition is less intelli-
gible to an ignorant person than is the term circle. But
one who learns the meaning of the terms in the defini-
tion will getfrom it a more definite idea than he had
before possessing the definition of a circle.

2. Make the definition such that it may be convert-

ibleby simple conversion (No. 76) with the term express-
ing the object defined. Thus: if a circle is a plane
surface . . . etc., then a plane surface . . . etc. (as above)
is a circle.

3. Do not define by a negation, by saying what a

thing is not. However, sometimes a negative term
comes up for definition. In this case separate it into its

negative and positive parts, and define the positive part.

For instance, injustice is the absence of justice. Now
^Q.'ax\.Q, and you shall have defined injustice.
justice,

4. Use words in their exact literal meaning ; and

when there is a choice of words, use such as are most
commonly understood.
5. In philosophical matters insist upon the essential
metaphysical definition. It may sometimes be useful
to begin with or to work upon the physical definition
but never lose sight of the metaphysical.
 METHOD. 87

Article III. Division.

145. Scientific Division. Definition, the perfect logical

definition, regards the comprehension of a term (Chapter
III., Article V.). Division, the perfect logical division,
regards the extension. This difference we must exam-
ine into as being of serious importance in all scientific

study. A
few words, however, first, upon division in
general and on certain divisions which are precisely
the inverse of the essential definition whether physical
or metaphysical.

146. Parts, Physical and Metaphysical. We saw that

essential definition (No. 143) is the enumeration of the
essential parts, as taken together to form the zvJwle.

Division, in general, is a separation of zuJiatever may be

regarded as a ivJiole, a unit, into its parts. If we regard
an essence as a whole, a unit, made up of the parts
enumerated in the essential physical definition, we have
what is called a physical whole, which is divisible by
physical, actual division into physical parts. Thus man,
considered as a physical whole, is divisible actually into
the physical parts, spiritual soul and organic body. If,

however, we regard an essence as a whole, a unit, made

up of the parts enumerated in the essential metaphysical
definition, we have what is called a metapJiysical whole,
which is divisible by metaphysical, mental division into
metaphysical parts. Thus 7nan, considered as a meta-
physical whole, is divisible into the metaphysical parts,
animal nature and rational nature.

147. Actual Union. The union of parts in both cases

is an actual union. The physical parts, however, are
really separable ; the metaphysical parts, only mentally.
88 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

148. Integral Parts. Parts which are really separable

but which are not essential, i.e. not absolutely necessary
for the existence of the whole, though belonging to its
integrity or entirety, are called integral parts. A hand
or a foot is an integral part of man.
To summarize, therefore A whole, regarded in its :

essence as made up of real parts actually existing, may

be considered as made up of physical parts, really sepa-
rable ; or of metaphysical parts not really separable.
Physical parts which, though belonging to the normal
state of the whole, to its integrity, yet can be separated
without destroying the essence, are called integral.
Thus : a hand or a foot in man.

149. Logical Division. To return now to logical divis-

ion : the parts we are especially concerned with, in this
article, and which we are to get at by logical division,
are not such as are bound together in actual union by
an actual bond of unity, so as to make a real, actual
something. We are concerned with another kind of
parts, those, namely, which are embraced by, and go to
make up the extension of an idea or term, not those
which are found in comprehension. We said that the
perfect definition was the enumeration of notions con-
tained in the comprehension. The perfect division is

the enumeration of, the partitioning off of what can be

reached by the extension of a term. This logical divis-

ion is therefore the enumeration, the dividing up, of

species under genus, or of individuals under species.
A genus is a logical whole ; the species under it and
their subdivisions are logical parts. A species is a
logical whole ; the individuals it extends to are logical
parts.
 :

METHOD. 89

The following diagram will explain better than words

the precise distinction between logical definition and
logical division. To define animal, we go upwards,

Substance
A
Material

Organic
A
Sentient
A
pefinition

ANIMAL =

Rational (Man). Irrational.

I

Charles, Frederic, Augustus, Hannibal, Scipio, etc. Vertebrata, Articulata, MoUusca, Radiata.
I | |

I
\ ^,_J ^
taking in the various notions in the comprehension
sentient, organic, material, substance. To divide animal,
we go downwards, classifying all that can be reached by
the extension of the term.

150. Potential Parts. Every term taken in the reflex

universal sense (Nos. 21, 23) expresses a whole which is

divisible by this kind of division into the parts of its

extension. As thus divisible it is called a potential

whole, because it extends not only to what really exists,
but also to what exists only in potcntia; that is, to what-
ever of the same kind may exist. All the birds in the
universe might be destroyed, still bird would express a
potential whole embracing all birds past and all birds
possible in the present and the future though they shall
not all exist, —
embracing them all as potential parts
90 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

into which it {bird^ is capable of being divided by logi-

cal division.

151. Logical Whole. This kind of whole, then, is the

logical whole ; because, being the object of a reflex uni-
versal idea, it does not exist as a unit in reality, but
only by consideration of the mind. Thus man, consid-
ered as the object (Nos. 21, 23) of the reflex universal
idea, is not a one something that can actually be torn
asunder into separate men ; nor can substance, taken as
the object of a reflex universal idea, be really split up
into material and immaterial substance. Yet in the
mysterious process of thought, man, substance, do logi-
cally embrace all men, all substances, actual and
possible.

152. Importance of Division. It is the logical division

which we must be careful to have special regard for, in

philosophizing. Philosophy deals with the universal.

It isfrom beginning to end a combination and correla-
tion of thecomprehension and extension of ideas. The
advantage of correct logical division in the study of a
subject is evident. It maps out the whole question

before us, at the start and saves us from time-losing,

;

wandering discussions, as well as from incomplete treat-

ment of the matter in hand.

153. How to Divide. To divide correctly :

1. Let the sum of the parts be exactly equal to the

whole.
2. Therefore see that no single member of the divis-
ion is equal to the whole. A
bad division of plants
would be into those that grow and those that bear fruit.
The first member is equal to the whole.
 METHOD. 91

3. Do not make one member to include another or

part of another. This would happen if substance were
divided into inunatcrial, material, living and organic.
Living enters into material and immaterial. Organic
enters into living and material.
4. Divide first into proximate and immediate mem-
bers, and then, if possible, subdivide. The meaning of
this is that we should first seek the widest general
grand divisions and then see if we cannot regard these
as new wholes to be subdivided, etc.
5. In scientific matters prefer the logical division.
See if the whole may not be regarded as a genus.
Mark off the species. See, again, if any species, thus
found, may be regarded, in its turn, as a genus (Chapter
II., Article III.) ; and do not go on to divide into indi-
viduals until a species cannot be regarded as a new
genus. (See Diagram No. 30).

Article IV. Analysis and Synthesis.

154. The Question Put. We may now go on to the

explanation of the methods referred to above (Nos. 139,
140). A
proposition is presented to us in study, reflec-
tion, reading, conversation, debate. Is it true or false .-*

We make an assertion. We do not doubt the truth of

our proposition, but how shall we proceed to place it in
evidence, by means of demonstration An adversary .''

advances a false statement. How shall we prove it to

be false } A single object of thought is offered us for
investigation. What propositions shall we formulate
regarding it } What shall we predicate of it .-'
Of what
may it be predicated .*
92 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

The Answer Analysis and Synthesis. Our inves-

155. :

tigation of any single object of thought must begin by-

analysis or synthesis, and must advance by one or the
other, either purely by analysis or purely by synthesis,
or by changing about, as circumstances may prompt,
from one Let the object of thought pre-
to the other.
sented for investigation be animal. We must begin by
trying to make animal the subject or the predicate of a
proposition. If we begin by making it a subject, we are
using analysis we are beginning by the analytic method.
;

If we begin by trying to use it as a predicate, we are

using synthesis we are beginning by the synthetic
;

method. Again, an entire proposition is presented to

us : Animal is substance, or Animal is not mineral. We
have to test the truth of the proposition. We must
begin by studying the subject or the predicate. If we
begin with the subject, we are using analysis ; if with
the predicate, we are using synthesis. The meaning of
all this and the reasons for the terminology will best be
seen in the case of a complete proposition.

156. Analysis. Take the propositions, Animal is sub-

stance, Animal is not mineral. Are they true t We
know that in an affirmative proposition the form (No.
2o) of the predicate is included in the comprehension of
the subject (No. 66) ; and that in the negative propo-
sition the form of the predicate is excluded from the
comprehension of the subject (No. 68). Suppose we
begin by a study of the subject. To see whether the
forms, substance, mineral, are comprehended in a?timal,
we must take animal apart into all the forms implied in
its comprehension. We must analyze it. We do this
by taking it as a metaphysical ivhole, proceeding upward
 METHOD. 93

(No. 149) from the metaphysical whole, rt'wm^/, through

allthe forms, parts, of its comprehension. There we
find substance embraced in the comprehension, but not
viiueral. Hence animal is substance, animal is not
mi)icraL The process is nothing more than logical
definition.

157. Synthesis. On the contrary, if we begin by the

study of the predicate, since we know that in an affir-

mative proposition the predicate expresses some form

that is contained in the comprehension of the subject,
we shall — if the predicate be not merely the essential
definition the subject (No. 66)
of we shall have to —
keep adding on to it what is compatible with it until we
shall have gathered together all the forms embraced in
the comprehension of the subject. Thus (No. 149) we
keep on adding material, organic, sentient, one after
another, to substatice, until we get a combination that
gives us animal. This is synthesis. The process is that
of logical division. In the case of a negative proposi-
tion, — if it be true, — we may keep on adding to the
predicate forever, and we shall never find a combination
giving us the subject. This proves that the negative
proposition is true. If in an affirmative proposition
we fail to find the subject, this shows the proposition to
be false.

158. The Explanation Complete. These few words

cover all the essentials of synthesis and analysis as sci-

entific methods. The words analysis and synthesis are

sometimes used in ways that are apt to confuse the
mind. Reduce every mode of expression back to that
of comprehension, remembering that it varies inversely
with extension, and the confusion will disappear.
94 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

159. Singular to Universal, and Vice Versa. It is said

that analysis proceeds from the singular, or particular, or

less universal, to the more universal ; and that synthesis
proceeds from the more universal to the less universal.
This would seem to contradict all that we have been

saying. But remember that reference is here made

to the extension, which varies inversely, with the com-
prehension. When we proceed from animal up to
substance, we go from the less universal to the more
universal in exteitsion, though from the wider to the less
wide comprehension. Hence there is analysis in both
cases.

160. Complex to Simple, and Vice Versa. It is said that

analysis goes from the complex to the simple ; synthesis,
from the simple to the complex. Understand this of
comprehension. This manner of expression is applied to
the process from particular concrete facts to the universal
law, for analysis; and from the law to
to the process
particular applications, for synthesis. But how is the
single fact complex and the universal law simple You .-'

will see it in an illustration. You argue from the par-

ticular concrete facts regarding matter, to a universal
law regarding matter. The single fact is complex. The
matter you have is this or that kind of matter, organic,
inorganic, vegetable, animal, mineral, gaseous, liquid,
etc. You have a complex comprehension. You have
to analyze the separate cases, and cut away from the
comprehension, until you arrive at the simpler form,
matter, simpler in comprehension, more universal in
extension, to make your general law about all matter,
without specifying this or that particular kind of matter.
Induction is analytic. Deduction is synthetic.
 : ;

METHOD. 95

161. Discovery and Instruction. The modern growing

natural sciences groiv by analysis. The sciences that
have been explored to satisfaction and present a com-
plete whole, as also growing sciences, —
botany, chemis-
try, etc., —so far as they have been explored and classified,
are best taught by the synthetic method. Analysis
is best for discovery. Synthesis is, in general, more
satisfactory for instruction. The two methods may be
used alternately, in the same treatment of the same
subject. A change is sometimes useful in the treatment
to rouse attention.

162. Analjrtic and Synthetic Sciences. A science is

called analytic or synthetic from the method chiefly

used in its development. If, however, both methods
enter very largely on account of the nature of the
subject-matter, we have the mixed method, properly so
called. Logic and geometry are synthetic. The vari-
ous branches that make up the modern physics are
analytic. Civil engineering, taken as a whole, is mixed
it implies the synthetic mathematics and also the result

of analytic observation on material to be used, as well as

climatic conditions, etc. — In book we have
this little
mingled analysis whenever it seemed useful for clear-
ness or interest.

163. Advice. With what has been said, the student

will be enabled to follow up the complete working of
synthesis and analysis by attention to the processes
pursued in standard treatises on the various sciences.
If you find yourself confronted with the burden of
proof or investigation, observe the following
1. Work cautiously.
2. Consult your actual knowledge. The general out-
96 THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

line of your actual knowledge may determine your

method. Particulars may be so scanty that you will see
your way to lie only through general principles, by syn-
thesis. Or facts may be in such abundance that you
may set towork at once by analysis.
3. Beware of being unconsciously betrayed into a
fallacy.

4. Be on the alert for the moment when you can

formulate a definition of terms.
5. In distributing and classifying, keep in view the
logical division.
6. When you have found something by analysis, go
over it again by synthesis. This will map it out in your
memory.

Article V. Science.

164. Science. With a clear understanding of what is

required for correct thought, and with some insight into

methods of procedure, we may go in pursuit of knowl-
edge. Every perception of any truth is knowledge. If
this perception be through a demonstration, it is called
scientific knowledge. The perception, through demon-
stration, of a complete body of related truths regarding
a given object, is called science.

165. Object of a Science. The same may be

object
the object of more than one science. For we may con-
sider the same object under different aspects; and
obtain, regarding it, different sets-of-connected-truths —
each set complete without the other. In other words,
we may consider different forms, or formalities, found
in the totality of the comprehension of the object.
 METHOD. 97

166. Material and Formal Object. The object, taken

in the totahty of its comprehension, is called the mate-
rial object of a science. The particular formality consid-
ered, or this formality as affecting the material object —
abstraction made from all the other formalities compre-
hended —
is called the fonnal object of the science. The
whole corporeal universe is the material object v.gr. of
both astronomy and chemistry. But the formal object
of the science of astronomy is the mass, magnitude,
distance, co-ordinated motions, etc., of the various masses
of matter, called heavenly bodies, which make up the
corporeal universe ; whilst the formal object of chemis-
try is the substantial distinction between elements of
matter and their respective capacities for substantial
union with one another. Again, various things, even of
different orders, may be united into one science by
reason of a formality running through them all. Thus,
spirit, matter, substance, accident, all contain in their
comprehension, the formality of beitig ; and can be
taken all together as the material object of the science
of being. They can all be considered in the same
science, under the aspect of being, and this will give us
the science of Ontology.
167. A Delusion. Knowledge acquired by scientific
processes is scientific knowledge. The possession of
such knowledge is the possession of science. No other
knowledge has a right to the name. Children in pri-
mary schools who are obliged to memorize a few facts
about rocks or animals or flowers, are often instructed
to a false acceptation of the word by being told that
they are " studying science " ! ! Thus they come to
regard geology, zoology, botany, any and every science,
as merely a list of facts, and the acquisition of a science
to be an affair of memory and not of reason.
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 :

EXPLANATION OF OUTLINE. 99
In the preceding table or "Outline of the Sciences" we have advanced from
the term of least comprehension and greatest extension, namely, the term, Being.
That which is represented by the term or concept Being supplies the subject-
matter for Ontology, the Science of Being.
We go on trying to increase the comprehension and diminish the extension
by adding the terms, Finite and Infinite, to Being. The division is not one
of genus into species, as we have seen when speaking of analogy (Nos. 28, 36),
yet it serves us for this very broad outline. Infinite Being is the subject-matter
of the science called, in philosophy, Natural Theology.
Continuing with Finite Being, increasing comprehension and diminishing ex-
tension, we have, in a perfect division, Substantial Finite Being and Acciden-
tal Finite Being. Ontology extends thus far, defining the notions of Infinite
and Finite, and treating of Substance and of all that is not Substance, that is of
Accident; quantity, quality, action, time, space, etc. It is general philosophy.
Again dividing, and increasing comprehension, we have Material Substan-
tial Finite Being and Spiritual Substantial Finite Being. We do not treat
of bodiless spirit under the Finite, in philosophy. But taking the Material, in the
wide sense of the term, we have the subject-matter of the science, Cosmology.
Increasing the comprehension, again, by adding ANIMATE and Inanimate, we
get in the Animate Material, etc., the subject-matter of the science, Biology, as
general science of life. If we take the other subdivision. Inanimate M.-\tekial,
etc., we find that range of sciences which treat of inanimate, inorganic matter
Physics, etc.
We leave the Inanimate; and we divide the Animate, by adding to the com-
prehension, into the Rational and the Irrational. The Irrational divided by
adding to comprehension, gives us Sensitive and Non-Sensitive (the brute
and the plant), with the sciences. Sensation, etc.. Vegetation, etc.
Returning to RATIONAL Animate, etc., we find here the science of Man
in general, or Anthropology. From this point forward we are engaged
solely with Man. We can no longer divide into species. W^e use such divisions
as will give us a complete and clear view of the subject, Man.
By actual physical essential division (No. 146) we can divide MAN into
Soul and Animal Body. The Animal Body, for general principles, we refer
over to Sensation. Soul is the subject-matter of the Science, Psychology.
Psychology will treat of the Nature of the Soul and the Fo'cvers of the Soul.
The Powers of the Soul, we group under three headings Fozuer of actuating
:

sense-perception, etc. ; Intellect ; Free- Will.

Intellect, we consider in its its Method of Work; its Supply of
A'ature ;
Material. The Method of Work constitutes the object (or subject-matter) of
the .Science, Formal Logic. The Supply of Material for true thought gives
us the object of the Science, Material Logic
Under the heading of Free Will we treat of the Existence a7id Nature of Free
Will; of the Norma or Rule of the Free Act; and oi Practical Morality. 77ie
Existence and Nature of Free Will, we may readily refer to the treatise on the
Powers of the Soul. In this way, accepting Free Will from Psychology, we have,
left, the A^orma of Free Act and Practical Morality. These last two, Norma and
Practice, taken together, form the subject-matter of the Science, Ethics.
This is one presentation of the philosophical and subsidiary sciences. In study-
ing, we begin upon the lowest line with Formal Logic. Next, we take up Material
Logic. Thus equipped, we go back to Ontology, and follow do^n through the
Finite until we reach the border line of Ethics. Here, we turn back to take up
the study of Natural Theology, which we had omitted and for which we are now
prepared. At length, with what philosophy can teach us of God and man and of
the wide universe about us, we study, in Ethics, the practical conclusions to be
drawn from the whole, to guide the actions of the free, intelligent being, Man.

<
 POINTS FOR PRACTICE. —
The practical utility of Formal
Logic, and the mental training to be derived from it, depend alto-
gether upon the skill acquired in readily discerning the comprehen-
sion and extension of terms. The Laws of the Syllogism —
Definition,
Division, Synthesis, and Analysis —
are all to be learned by the care-
ful study of Extension and Comprehension. Special attention should
be given to these two correlated points. Original illustrations should
be sought for as a proof that those in the book have been understood.

(9) Name objects of the simple apprehension or of the idea. (10) Give
examples of judgments. (11) Upon what two principles does the mind
work in reasoning? (13-15) What is a term, a proposition, a syllogism?
(17-19) Give three classifications of ideas. (19) Examples of singular,
particular, collective, universal ideas. (20) How are universal ideas classi-
fied? What meant by form, formality, or determination, in reference to
is

ideas? (21-27) Examples of species, genus, difference, property, accident.

(29) Name some forms that may be used both as generic and specific.
(30) Give illustrations of highest genus, lowest species, subaltern genera.
Tables of contents in scientific works will furnish examples. (32) Exam-
ples of real and logical terms. (33-35) Univocal and equivocal terms.
(36) What is an analogous term ? and why is the question of analogy
introduced here? (37) Examples of the material, logical, real supposition
of terms. (40) Examples of propositions, pointing out the subject, copula,
and predicate. (41) Examples showing the difference between the logical
and the grammatical predicate. (42) Examples of simple. (43) Com-
pound. (45, 46) Categorical, conditional. (47, 48) Conjunctive and dis-
junctive propositions. Show how they are reducible to the conditional.
(54, 55) Examples of a priori and a posteriori judgments. Show why the
a priori are called necessary, absolute, metaphysical, analytical; and the
a /cij^,?re'(7r2, contingent, hypothetical, physical, synthetical. (59-61) What
is meant by the extension and comprehension of terms or ideas? (62-63)
What does the extension of a proposition depend upon? Examples of the
four extensions of propositions. (65-70) Explain the laws which declare
the extension of the predicate in universal and particular propositions,
both affirmative and negative. Name and illustrate the one exception for
the universal affirmative. (73) State what is absolutely necessary that a
proposition may have the force of a negation. (76) Examples of the
conversion of propositions, retaining and changing quantity and quality.
(78) Of opposition in quantity and quality. (84) Explain the difference
between consequent and consequence. (86) Give the analysis of an
(original) argument. (88) Explain the true, primary meaning of Middle
Term. (92) What is meant by the Moods of the Syllogism? (94-102) Nine
Laws of the Syllogism. Compose faulty arguments or syllogisms, and show
how each law may be violated. (104-107) Examples of syllogisms. Show
how the conjunctive and disjunctive are reduced to the conditional.
(108-113) Examples of enthymeme, sorites, polysyllogism epichirem, ,

dilemma. (i 14-122) Difference between formal and material logic;

between direct and indirect demonstration; between simple and com-
pound; between the a priori and the a posteriori. (124) Example of
complete induction. (125) What is required for the validity of the incom-
plete induction? (129-138) Examples of various fallacies. (145) What
is the essential distinction between logical definition and logical division?
(146) What is meant by physical and metaphysical parts? (149-153) What
is a logical whole? logical division? What are logical parts?

100
 ALPHABETICAL INDEX.
Numbers refer to Paragraphs.

Abstract idea, 17. Cause, fallacy of the, 135.

Accident, inseparable and separable, Caution, 103.

26, 27. Clear idea, 18.

fallacy of, 132. Collective idea, 19.

Accidental form, 27. Collective proposition, 63.
Adequate idea, 18. Complete idea, 18.
A dicto simpliciter, fallacy, 133. Compound demonstration, 120.
Affirmative proposition, 72. Comprehension and extension of
Analogy, argument from, 127. terms, axiom regarding, 58.
Analogous terms, 33, 36. of idea and term, 60, 61.
Analysis, 140, 155, 156. in analysis and synthesis, 156, 157.

explanation of terminology in regard Comprehensive idea, 18.

to, 159, 160. Concept, 9.

in discovery and instruction, 161. Conclusion, 11, 86.

Antecedent in syllogism, 83. value of, 116.

Apprehension, simple, 9. Concrete idea, 17.

as an act, 9. Consequence, S4.
as representative, 9. Consequent, fallacy of, 134.
A prion demonstration, 117, 121. in syllogism, 83.
judgment, 55. Conversion of propositions, 76.
A posteriori demonstration, 117, 122.
judgment, 56.
Argument, 11, 15, 80. Declaration, 10.
analysis of, 86. Deduction, 11, 123.
basis of, II, 85. Definition, 141.
styles of, 81. nominal, 142.
Argumentation, 11. real, descriptive, genetic, essential,
Axioms, for extension and compre- physical, metaphysical, 143.
hension of terms, 58. logical, 143, 156.
for argument, 11, 85. logical, diagram of, 149.
logical and division, difference be-
Begging the question, 130. tween, 145.
Being, predication of, 28, 36. rules for, 144.
science of, 166. Delusion, a, 167.

loi
102 ALPHABETICAL INDEX.

Demonstration, ii6. Form (formality or determination),

direct, 117, 118. 20.
indirect, 117, 119. specific, 22.
simple and compound, 120. generic, 24.
a priori and a posteriori, 117, 121, accidental, 27.
122. v/hen both generic and specific, 29.
Determination or form, 20. Formal logic, 2, 114, 115.
Diagram of figures in syllogism, 89,
90, 91. Genera, subaltern, 31.
of genus, species, etc., 30. Generic, 24.
of logical definition and division, 149. idea, 24.
of propositions, 79. and specific, the same form, 29.
of sciences, 168. Genus, 24.
of seventh law for syllogism, 100. highest, 31.
Difference, specific, 25. Grammatical predicate, logical and,
Differential idea, 25. 41.
Dilemma, 81, 113.

Direct demonstration, 117, 118. Herschel, Sir W., 122.

universal idea, 21. Highest genus, 31.
Discovery by analysis and synthesis,
161. Idea, 9.
Distinct idea, 18. characteristics of, 18.

Division, 145. classifications of ideas, 17-19.

physical, metaphysical, mental, 146. comprehension of, 60, 61.

logical, 150, 151, 156. differential, 25.

logical, diagram of, 149. extension of, 59, 61.

importance of, 152. generic, 24.
rules for, 153. object of universal reflex, 23.
specific, 22.

Elenchi, ignorantia, 131. Ignorantia elenchi, 131.

Enthymeme, 81, 109. Indirect demonstration, 117, 119.
Epichirem, 81, 112. Induction, 123.
Equipollence of propositions, 77. complete, 124.
Equivalence of propositions, 77. incomplete, 125.
Equivocal terms, 33, 35. Inference, 11.
Example, argument from, 126.
Extension of terms and ideas, 59, 61. Judgment, 10, 38.
of terms, axiom, 58. as an act, 10.
of predicate, 66, 71. as representative, 10.
Extremes, extreme major term, ex- immediate, 51.
treme minor term, 87, 88. mediate, 52.
Evading the question, 131. a priori, necessary, absolute, meta-
physical, analytical, 55.
Fallacies, 130-138. a posteriori, contingent, hypotheti-
Fallacy, 116, 129. cal, physical, synthetical, 56.

Figures of syllogism, 88-91. synthetic a priori, 57.

 ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 103

Kant, 57. Paralogism, ri6.

Knowledge, representative, 8. Particular idea, 19.

proposition, 63.
Parts, physical, metaphysical, separa-
Laws of extension of predicate, 71.
ble, inseparable, integral, union
of syllogism, 93-102.
of, 146-148.
Leverrier, 122.
potential, 150.
Logic, artificial, 4.
Petitio principii, 130.
as an art, 6.
Polysyllogism, 81, iir.
as a science, 5.
Predicables, heads of, 28.
formal, 2, 114, 115.
Predicate of a proposition, 40, 65.
material, 2, 114, 115.
logical and grammatical, 41.
natural, 3.
laws of extension, 66-71.
the name, i.
Premisses in syllogism, 83.
Logical and grammatical predicate,
major, 83.
41.
minor, 83.
supposition of terms, 37.
Principii petitio, 130.
Lowest species, 31. .

Property, 26.
Proposition, 14, 39.
Major extreme, 87, 88.
simple, complex, 42 ; compound,
premiss, 83, 88.
43-
Material logic, 2, 114, 115.
possible varieties of, 44.
Material supposition of terms, 37.
categorical, 45.
Method, advice regarding, 163.
conditional or hypothetical, 46.
analytic, 154-162.
conjunctive, 47.
mi.\ed, 162.
disjunctive, 48.
scientific, 139.
extension of, singular, particular,
synthetic, 154-162.
collective, universal, 62. 63.
Mill, J. Stuart, 125.
use of name " particular," 64.
Mind, three acts of, 7.
extension of predicate in, 66-71.
Minor extreme, 87, 88.
affirmative, negative, 72.
premiss, 83, 88.
quality and quantity of, 74.
Moods of syllogism, 92.
relations of, conversion, equivalence
or equipollence, opposition, 75-78.
Negative particle, 73.
proposition, 72. Question, begging the, 130.
Notion, 9. fallacy of the, 136.

Object of a science, 165, 166. Real supposition of terms, 37.

material, 166. Reasoning, 11, 80.
formal, 166. as an act, as representative, two
Objections, fallacy of, 138. working principles, 11.

Objective, identity, 10. process of, 53.

Ontology, 166. Reference, fallacy of, 137.

Opposition of propositions, 78. Reflex universal idea, 21.

Oral expression of thought, 12. object of, 23.
I04 ALPHABETICAL INDEX.

Science, 164. explanation of terminology in re-

object of a, 165. gard to, 159, 160.
material and formal object, 166. in discovery and instruction, 161.
Simple apprehension, 9. Synthetic a priori judgment, 57.
demonstration, 120.
Singular idea,
Term, 13.
19.
proposition, 63.
classification and use, 32.
univocal, equivocal, analogous, 33-
Sophism, 116.
36.
Sorites, 81, no.
Species, 22, 23.
comprehension and extension, 59-
61.
Specific, 22.
extreme, extreme major, extreme
difference, 25.
minor, middle, 87.
idea, 22.
supposition of, real, material, logi-
and generic, the same form, 29.
cal, 37.
Subaltern genera, 31.
Thought, form of, 2.
Subject of a proposition, 40.
material of, 2.
Supposition of terms, real, material,
oral expression of, 12.
logical, 37.
Syllogism, 15, 81, 82.
Universal idea, 19.
antecedent, major and minor prem- idea, direct, 21.
iss, consequent in, 83, idea, reflex, 21.
consequence in, 84. idea, reflex, object of, 23.
figures of, 88-91.
proposition, 63.
moods of, 92. Univocal terms, 33, 34.
laws of, 93-102.
simple, compound, conditional, con- Whole, logical, 151.

junctive, disjunctive, 104-107. metaphysical, 146, 156.

Synthesis, 140, 155, 157. physical, 146.
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