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 Another Random Document on
Scribd Without Any Related Topics
 Each of these cities has its parallel in
The Just Man is happy in
an individual citizen. The individual
and through his Justice,
citizen corresponding to the first is
however he may be treated
happy — he who corresponds to the
by others. The Unjust Man,
last is miserable: and so proportionally
miserable.
for the individual corresponding to the
three intermediate cities. He is happy or miserable, in and through
himself, or essentially; whether he be known to Gods and men or
not — whatever may be the sentiment entertained of him by
others.289

289 Plato, Republic, ix. p. 580 D. ἐάν τε λανθάνωσι

τοιοῦτοι ὄντες ἐάν τε μὴ πάντας ἀνθρώπους τε καὶ
θεούς.

There are two other lines of argument (continues Sokrates)

establishing the same conclusion.

1. We have seen that both the

Other arguments proving
collective city and the individual mind
the same conclusion —
are distributed into three portions:
Pleasures of Intelligence
Reason, Energy, Appetite. Each of
are the best of all
these portions has its own peculiar
pleasures.
pleasures and pains, desires and
aversions, beginnings or principles of action: Love of Knowledge:
Love of Honour: Love of Gain. If you question men in whom these
three varieties of temper respectively preponderate, each of them
will extol the pleasures of his own department above those
belonging to the other two. The lover of wealth will declare the
pleasures of acquisition and appetite to be far greater than those of
honour or of knowledge: each of the other two will say the same for
himself, and for the pleasures of his own department. Here then the
question is opened, Which of the three is in the right? Which of the
three varieties of pleasure and modes of life is the more honourable
or base, the better or worse, the more pleasurable or painful?290 By
what criterion, or by whose judgment, is this question to be
decided? It must be decided by experience, intelligence and rational
discourse.291 Now it is certain that the lover of knowledge, or the
philosopher, has greater experience of all the three varieties of
pleasure than is possessed by either of the other two men. He must
in his younger days have tasted and tried the pleasures of both; but
the other two have never tasted his.292 Moreover, each of the three
acquires more or less of honour, if he succeeds in his own pursuits:
accordingly the pleasures belonging to the love of honour are
shared, and may be appreciated, by the philosopher; while the lover
of honour as such, has no sense for the pleasures of philosophy. In
the range of personal experience, therefore, the philosopher
surpasses the other two: he surpasses them no less in exercised
intelligence, and in rational discourse, which is his own principal
instrument.293 If wealth and profit furnished the proper means of
judgment, the money-lover would have been the best judge of the
three: if honour and victory furnished the proper means, we should
consult the lover of honour: but experience, intelligence, and rational
discourse, have been shown to be the means — and therefore it is
plain that the philosopher is a better authority than either of the
other two. His verdict must be considered as final. He will assuredly
tell us, that the pleasures belonging to the love of knowledge are the
greatest: those belonging to the love of honour and power, the next:
those belonging to the love of money and to appetite, the least.294
 290 Plato, Republic, ix. p. 581.

291 Plato, Republic, ix. p. 582 A. ἐμπειρίᾳ τε καὶ

φρονήσει καὶ λόγῳ.

292 Plato, Republic, ix. p. 582 B.

293 Plato, Republic, ix. p. 582 C-D. λόγοι δὲ τούτου

μάλιστα ὄργανον.

294 Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 582-583.

2. The second argument,

They are the only pleasures
establishing the same conclusion, is as
completely true and pure.
follows:— No pleasures, except those
Comparison of pleasure
belonging to philosophy or the love of
and pain with neutrality.
wisdom, are completely true and pure.
Prevalent illusions.
All the other pleasures are mere
shadowy outlines, looking like pleasure at a distance, but not really
pleasures when you contemplate them closely.295 Pleasure and pain
are two conditions opposite to each other. Between them both is
another state, neither one nor the other, called neutrality or
indifference. Now a man who has been sick and is convalescent, will
tell you that nothing is more pleasurable than being in health, but
that he did not know what the pleasure of it was, until he became
sick. So too men in pain affirm that nothing is more pleasurable than
relief from pain. When a man is grieving, it is exemption or
indifference, not enjoyment, which he extols as the greatest
pleasure. Again, when a man has been in a state of enjoyment, and
the enjoyment ceases, this cessation is painful. We thus see that the
intermediate state — cessation, neutrality, indifference — will be
some times pain, sometimes pleasure, according to circumstances.
Now that which is neither pleasure nor pain cannot possibly be
both.296 Pleasure is a positive movement or mutation of the mind: so
also is pain. Neutrality or indifference is a negative condition,
intermediate between the two: no movement, but absence of
movement: non-pain, non-pleasure. But non-pain is not really
pleasure: non-pleasure is not really pain. When therefore neutrality
or non-pain, succeeding immediately after pain, appears to be a
pleasure — this is a mere appearance or illusion, not a reality. When
neutrality or non-pleasure, succeeding immediately after pleasure,
appears to be pain — this also is a mere appearance or illusion, not
a reality. There is nothing sound or trustworthy in such appearances.
Pleasure is not cessation of pain, but something essentially different:
pain is not cessation of pleasure, but something essentially different.

295 Plato, Republic, ix. p. 583 B. οὐδὲ παναληθής

ἐστιν ἑ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονὴ πλὴν τῆς τοῦ φρονίμου, οὐδὲ
καθαρά, ἀλλ’ ἐσκιαγραφημένη τις, ὡς ἐγὼ δοκῶ μοι
τῶν σοφῶν τινὸς ἀκηκοέναι.

296 Plato, Republ. ix. pp. 583 E-584 A. Ὃ μεταξὺ ἄρα

νῦν δὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἔφαμεν εἶναι, τὴν ἡσυχίαν, τοῦτό
ποτε ἀμφότερα ἔσται, λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή … Ἦ καὶ
δυνατὸν τὸ μηδέτερα ὂν ἀμφότερα γίγνεσθαι; Οὔ μοι
δοκεῖ. Καὶ μὴν τό γε ἡδὺ ἐν ψυχῇ γιγνόμενον καὶ τὸ
λυπηρὸν κίνησίς τις ἀμφοτέρω ἔστον; ἢ οὔ; Ναί. Τὸ δὲ
μήτε ἡδὺ μήτε λυπηρὸν οὐχὶ ἡσυχία μέντοι καὶ ἐν
μέσῳ τούτων ἐφάνη ἄρτι; Ἐφάνη γάρ. Πῶς οὖν ὀρθῶς
ἔστι τὸ μὴ ἀλγεῖν ἡδὺ ἡγεῖσθαι, ἢ τὸ μὴ χαίρειν
ἀνιαρόν; Οὐδαμῶς. Οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ
φαίνεται, παρὰ τὸ ἀλγεινὸν ἡδὺ καὶ παρὰ τὸ ἡδὺ
ἀλγεινὸν τότε ἡ ἡσυχία, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς τούτων τῶν
φαντασμάτων πρὸς ἡδονῆς ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ γοητεία τις.
 Take, for example, the pleasures of
Most men know nothing of
smell, which are true and genuine
true and pure pleasure.
pleasures, of great intensity: they
Simile of the Kosmos —
spring up instantaneously without
Absolute height and depth.
presupposing any anterior pain — they
depart without leaving any subsequent pain.297 These are true and
pure pleasures, radically different from cessation of pain: so also
true and pure pains are different from cessation of pleasure. Most of
the so-called pleasures, especially the more intense, which reach the
mind through the body, are in reality not pleasures at all, but only
cessations or reliefs from pain. The same may be said about the
pleasures and pains of anticipation belonging to these so-called
bodily pleasures.298 They may be represented by the following
simile:— There is in nature a real Absolute Up and uppermost point
— a real Absolute Down and lowest point — and a centre between
them.299 A man borne from the lowest point to the centre will think
himself moving upwards, and will be moving upwards relatively. If
his course be stopped in the centre, he will think himself at the
absolute summit — on looking to the point from which he came, and
ignorant as he is of any thing higher. If he be forced to return from
the centre to the point from whence he came, he will think himself
moving downwards, and will be really moving downwards, absolutely
as well as relatively. Such misapprehension arises from his not
knowing the portion of the Kosmos above the centre — the true and
absolute Up or summit. Now the case of pleasure and pain is
analogous to this. Pain is the absolute lowest — Pleasure the
absolute highest — non-pleasure, non-pain, the centre intermediate
between them. But most men know nothing of the region above the
centre, or the absolute highest — the region of true and pure
pleasure: they know only the centre and what is below it, or the
region of pain. When they fall from the centre to the point of pain,
they conceive the situation truly, and they really are pained: but
when they rise from the lowest point to the centre, they misconceive
the change, and imagine themselves to be in a process of
replenishment and acquisition of pleasure. They mistake the painless
condition for pleasure, not knowing what true pleasure is: just as a
man who has seen only black and not white, will fancy, if dun be
shown to him, that he is looking on white.300

297 Plato, Republic, ix. p. 584 B.

298 Plato, Republic, ix. p. 584 C.

299 Plato, Republic, ix. p. 584 C. Νομίζεις τι ἐν τῇ

φύσει εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἄνω, τὸ δὲ κάτω, τὸ δὲ μέσον;
Ἔγωγε.

300 Plato, Republic, pp. 584 E-585 A. Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα

πάσχοι ἂν πάντα διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔμπειρος εἶναι τοῦ ἀληθινῶς
ἄνω τε ὄντος καὶ ἐν μέσῳ; … ὅταν μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν
φέρωνται, ἀληθῆ τε οἴονται καὶ τῷ ὄντι λυποῦνται,
ὅταν δὲ ἀπὸ λύπης ἐπὶ τὸ μεταξύ, σφόδρα μὲν οἴονται
πρὸς πληρώσει τε καὶ ἡδονῇ γίγνεσθαι, ὥσπερ δὲ πρὸς
μέλαν φαιὸν ἀποσκοποῦντες ἀπειρίᾳ λευκοῦ, καὶ πρὸς
τὸ ἄλυπον οὕτω λύπην ἀφορῶντες ἀπειρίᾳ ἡδονῆς
ἀπατῶνται;

Hunger and thirst are states of

Nourishment of the mind
emptiness in the body: ignorance and
partakes more of real
folly are states of emptiness in the
essence than nourishment
mind. A hungry man in eating or
of the body —
drinking obtains replenishment: an
Replenishment of the mind
ignorant man becoming instructed
imparts fuller pleasure than obtains replenishment also. Now
replenishment of the body. replenishment derived from that which
exists more fully and perfectly is truer
and more real than replenishment from that which exists less fully
and perfectly.301 Let us then compare the food which serves for
replenishment of the body, with that which serves for replenishment
of the mind. Which of the two is most existent? Which of the two
partakes most of pure essence? Meat and drink — or true opinions,
knowledge, intelligence, and virtue? Which of the two exists most
perfectly? That which embraces the true, eternal, and unchangeable
— and which is itself of similar nature? Or that which embraces the
mortal, the transient, and the ever variable — being itself of kindred
nature? Assuredly the former. It is clear that what is necessary for
the sustenance of the body partakes less of truth and real essence,
than what is necessary for the sustenance of the mind. The mind is
replenished with nourishment more real and essential: the body with
nourishment less so: the mind itself is also more real and essential
than the body. The mind therefore is more, and more thoroughly,
replenished than the body. Accordingly, if pleasure consists in being
replenished with what suits its peculiar nature, the mind will enjoy
more pleasure and truer pleasure than the body.302 Those who are
destitute of intelligence and virtue, passing their lives in sensual
pursuits, have never tasted any pure or lasting pleasure, nor ever
carried their looks upwards to the higher region in which alone it
resides. Their pleasures, though seeming intense, and raising
vehement desires in their uninstructed minds, are yet only phantoms
deriving a semblance of pleasure from contrast with pains:303 they
are like the phantom of Helen, for which (as Stesichorus says) the
Greeks and Trojans fought so many battles, knowing nothing about
the true Helen, who was never in Troy.
 301 Plato, Republic, ix. p. 585 B. Πλήρωσις δὲ
ἀληθεστέρα τοῦ ἧττον ἢ τοῦ μᾶλλον ὄντος; Δῆλον ὅτι
τοῦ μᾶλλον. Πότερα οὖν ἡγεῖ τὰ γένη μᾶλλον καθαρᾶς
οὐσίας μετέχειν, τὰ οἷον σίτου καὶ ποτοῦ καὶ ὄψου καὶ
ξυμπάσης τροφῆς, ἢ τὸ δόξης τε ἀληθοῦς εἶδος καὶ
ἐπιστήμης καὶ νοῦ καὶ ξυλλήβδην ξυμπάσης ἀρετῆς;

302 Plato, Republic, ix. p. 585 E.

303 Plato, Republic, ix. p. 586.

The pleasures belonging to the Love

Comparative worthlessness
of Honour (Energy or Passion) are no
of the pleasures of Appetite
better than those belonging to the Love
and Ambition, when
of Money (Appetite). In so far as the
measured against those of
desires belonging to both these
Intelligence.
departments of mind are under the
controul of the third or best department (Love of Wisdom, or
Reason), the nearest approach to true pleasure, which it is in the
nature of either of them to bestow, will be realised. But in so far as
either of them throws off the controul of Reason, it will neither
obtain its own truest pleasures, nor allow the other departments of
mind to obtain theirs.304 The desires connected with love, and with
despotic power, stand out more than the others, as recusant to
Reason. Law, and Regulation. The kingly and moderate desires are
most obedient to this authority. The lover and the despot, therefore,
will enjoy the least pleasure: the kindly-minded man will enjoy the
most. Of the three sorts of pleasure, one true and legitimate, two
bastard, the despot goes most away from the legitimate, and to the
farthest limit of the bastard. His condition is the most miserable, that
of the kingly-minded man is the happiest: between the two come
the oligarchical and the democratical man. The difference between
the two extremes is as 1: 729.305

304 Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 586-587.

305 Plato, Republic, ix. p. 587 E.

I have thus refuted (continues

The Just Man will be happy
Sokrates) the case of those who
from his justice — He will
contend — That the unjust man is a
look only to the good order
gainer by his injustice, provided he
of his own mind — He will
could carry it on successfully, and with
stand aloof from public
the reputation of being just. I have
affairs, in cities as now
shown that injustice is the greatest
constituted.
possible mischief, intrinsically and in
itself, apart from consequences and apart from public reputation:
inasmuch as it enslaves the better part of the mind to the worse.
Justice, on the other hand, is the greatest possible good, intrinsically
and in itself, apart from consequences and reputation, because it
keeps the worse parts of the mind under due controul and
subordination to the better.306 Vice and infirmity of every kind is
pernicious, because it puts the best parts of the mind under
subjection to the worst.307 No success in the acquisition of wealth,
aggrandisement, or any other undue object, can compensate a man
for the internal disorder which he introduces into his own mind by
becoming unjust. A well-ordered mind, just and temperate, with the
better part governing the worse, is the first of all objects: greater
even than a healthy, strong, and beautiful body.308 To put his mind
into this condition, and to acquire all the knowledge thereunto
conducing, will be the purpose of a wise man’s life. Even in the
management of his body, he will look not so much to the health and
strength of his body, as to the harmony and fit regulation of his
mind. In the acquisition of money, he will keep the same end in
view: he will not be tempted by the admiration and envy of people
around him to seek great wealth, which will disturb the mental polity
within him:309 he will, on the other hand, avoid depressing poverty,
which might produce the same effect. He will take as little part as
possible in public life, and will aspire to no political honours, in cities
as at present constituted — nor in any other than the model-city
which we have described.310

306 Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 588-589.

307 Plato, Republic, ix. p. 590 B-C.

308 Plato, Republic, ix. p. 591 B.

309 Plato, Republic, ix. p. 591 D-E. καὶ τὸν ὄγκον τοῦ
πλήθους οὐκ, ἐκπληττόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ τῶν πολλῶν
μακαρισμοῦ, ἄπειρον αὐξήσει, ἀπέραντα κακὰ ἔχων …
Ἀλλ’ ἀποβλέπων γε, πρὸς τὴν ἐν αὑτῷ πολιτείαν, καὶ
φυλάττων μή τι παρακινῇ αὐτοῦ τῶν ἐκεῖ διὰ πλῆθος
οὐσίας ἢ δι’ ὀλιγότητα, οὕτω κυβερνῶν προσθήσει καὶ
ἀναλώσει τῆς οὐσίας, καθ’ ὅσον ἂν οἷός τ’ ᾖ.

310 Plato, Republic, ix. p. 592.

The tenth and last book of the

Tenth Book — Censure of
Republic commences with an argument
the poets is renewed —
of considerable length, repeating and
Mischiefs of imitation
confirming by farther reasons the
generally, as deceptive —
sentence of expulsion which Plato had
Imitation from imitation.
already pronounced against the poets
in his second and third books.311 The Platonic Sokrates here not only
animadverts upon poetry, but extends his disapprobation to other
imitative arts, such as painting. He attacks the process of imitation
generally, as false and deceptive; pleasing to ignorant people, but
perverting their minds by phantasms which they mistake for
realities. The work of the imitator is not merely not reality, but is
removed from it by two degrees. What is real is the Form or Idea:
the one conceived object denoted by each appellative name
common to many particulars. There is one Form or Idea, and only
one, known by the name of Bed; another by the name of Table.312
When the carpenter constructs a bed or a table, he fixes his
contemplation on this Form or Idea, and tries to copy it. What he
constructs, however, is not the true, real, existent, table, which
alone exists in nature, and may be presumed to be made by the
Gods313 — but a something like the real existent table: not true Ens,
but only quasi-Ens:314 dim and indistinct, as compared with the
truth, and standing far off from the truth. Next to the carpenter
comes the painter, who copies not the real existent table, but the
copy of that table made by the carpenter. The painter fixes his
contemplation upon it, not as it really exists, but simply as it
appears: he copies an appearance or phantasm, not a reality. Thus
the table will have a different appearance, according as you look at it
from near or far — from one side or the other: yet in reality it never
differs from itself. It is one of these appearances that the painter
copies, not the reality itself. He can in like manner paint any thing
and every thing, since he hardly touches any thing at all — and
nothing whatever except in appearance. He can paint all sorts of
craftsmen and their works — carpenters, shoemakers, &c. without
knowledge of any one of their arts.315

311 Plato, Republic, x. p. 607 B. The language here

used by Plato seems to imply that his opinions adverse
 to poetry had been attacked and required defence.

312 Plato, Republic, x. p. 596 A-B. Βούλει οὖν ἔνθενδε

ἀρξώμεθα ἐπισκοπούντες, ἐκ τῆς εἰωθυίας μεθόδου;
εἶδος γάρ πού τι ἓν ἕκαστον εἰώθαμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ
ἕκαστα τὰ πολλά, οἷς ταὐτὸν ὄνομα ἐπιφέρομεν …
θῶμεν δὴ καὶ νῦν ὅτι βούλει τῶν πολλῶν· οἷον, εἰ
θέλεις πολλαί πού εἰσι κλῖναι καὶ τράπεζαι … Ἀλλ’ ἰδέαι
γέ που περὶ ταῦτα τὰ σκεύη δύο, μία μὲν κλίνης, μία δὲ
τραπέζης.

313 Plato, Republic, x. p. 597 B-D. 597 B: μία μὲν ἡ

ἐν τῇ φύσει οὖσα, ἣν φαῖμεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, θεὸν
ἐργάσασθαι.

314 Plato, Republic, x. p. 597 A. οὐκ ἂν τὸ ὂν ποιοῖ,

ἀλλά τι τοιοῦτον οἷον τὸ ὄν, ὂν δὲ οὔ.

315 Plato, Republic, x. p. 598 B-C.

The like is true also of the poets.

Censure of Homer — He is
Homer and the tragedians give us talk
falsely extolled as educator
and affirmations about everything:
of the Hellenic world. He
government, legislation, war, medicine,
and other poets only
husbandry, the character and
deceive their hearers.
proceedings of the Gods, the habits
and training of men, &c. Some persons even extol Homer as the
great educator of the Hellenic world, whose poems we ought to
learn by heart as guides for education and administration.316 But
Homer, Hesiod, and the other poets, had no real knowledge of the
multifarious matters which they profess to describe. These poets
know nothing except about appearances, and will describe only
appearances, to the satisfaction of the ignorant multitude.317 The
representations of the painter, reproducing only the appearances to
sense, will be constantly fallacious and deceptive, requiring to be
corrected by measuring, weighing, counting — which are processes
belonging to Reason.318 The lower and the higher parts of the mind
are here at variance; and the painter addresses himself to the lower,
supplying falsehood as if it were truth. The painter does this through
the eye, the poet through the ear.319

316 Plato, Republic, p. 606 E.

317 Plato, Republic, x. pp. 600-601 C. 601 B: τοῦ μὲν

ὄντος οὐδὲν ἐπαΐει, τοῦ δὲ φαινομένου. 602 B: οἷον
φαίνεται καλὸν εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ μηδὲν εἰδόσι,
τοῦτο μιμήσεται.

318 Plato, Republic, x. pp. 602-603.

319 Plato, Republic, x. p. 603 B.

In the various acts and situations of

The poet chiefly appeals to
life a man is full of contradictions. He is
emotions — Mischiefs of
swayed by manifold impulses, often
such eloquent appeals, as
directly contradicting each other. Hence
disturbing the rational
we have affirmed that there are in his
government of the mind.
mind two distinct principles, one
contradicting the other: the emotional and the rational.320 When a
man suffers misfortune, emotion prompts him to indulge in extreme
grief, and to abandon himself like a child to the momentary tide.
Reason, on the contrary, exhorts him to resist, and to exert himself
immediately in counsel to rectify or alleviate what has happened,
adapting his conduct as well as he can to the actual throw of the
dice which has befallen him.321 Now it is these vehement bursts of
emotion which lend themselves most effectively to the genius of the
poet, and which he must work up to please the multitude in the
theatre: the state of rational self-command can hardly be described
so as to touch their feelings. We see thus that the poet, like the
painter, addresses himself to the lower department of the mind,
exalting the emotional into preponderance over the rational — the
foolish over the wise — the false over the true.322 He introduces bad
government into the mind, giving to pleasure and pain the sceptre
over reason. Hence we cannot tolerate the poet, in spite of all his
sweets and captivations. We can only permit him to compose hymns
for the Gods and encomiums for good men.323

320 Plato, Republic, x. p. 603 D. μυρίων τοιούτων

ἐναντιωμάτων ἅμα γιγνομένων ἡ ψυχὴ γέμει ἡμῶν …
604 B: ἐναντίας δὲ ἀγωγῆς γιγνομένης ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ
περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα δύο τινέ φαμεν ἐν αὐτῷ ἀναγκαῖον
εἶναι.

321 Plato, Republic, x. p. 604 C. Τῷ βουλεύεσθαι περὶ

τὸ γεγονὸς καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν πτώσει κύβων πρὸς τὰ
πεπτωκότα τίθεσθαι τὰ αὐτοῦ πράγματα, ὅπῃ ὁ λόγος
αἱρεῖ βέλτιστ’ ἂν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ προσπταίσαντας,
καθάπερ παῖδας, ἐχομένους τοῦ πληγέντος ἐν τῷ βοᾶν
διατρίβειν, &c.

322 Plato, Republic, x. p. 605.

323 Plato, Republic, x. pp. 605-606-607. 605 B: τὸν

μιμητικὸν ποιητὴν φήσομεν κακὴν πολιτείαν ἰδίᾳ
ἑκάστου τῇ ψυχῇ ἐμποιεῖν, τῷ ἀνοήτῳ αὐτής
χαριζόμενον … 607 A: εἰ δὲ τὴν ἡδυσμένην μοῦσαν
παραδέξει ἐν μέλεσιν ἢ ἔπεσιν, ἡδονή σοι καὶ λύπη
 βασιλεύσετον ἀντὶ νόμου τε καὶ τοῦ κοινῇ ἀεὶ δόξαντος
εἶναι βελτίστου λόγου.

This quarrel between philosophy and

Ancient quarrel between
poetry (continues the Platonic
philosophy and poetry —
Sokrates) is of ancient date.324 I myself
Plato fights for philosophy,
though his feelings are
am very sensible to the charms of
strongly enlisted for
poetry, especially that of Homer. I
poetry.
should be delighted if a case could be
made out to justify me in admitting it
into our city. But I cannot betray the cause of what seems to me
truth. We must resist our sympathies and preferences, when they
are incompatible with the right government of the mind.325

324 Plato, Republic, x. p. 607 B. παλαιά τις διαφορὰ

φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ ποιητικῇ.

325 Plato, Republic, x. pp. 607-608.

To maintain the right government

Immortality of the soul
and good condition of the soul or mind,
affirmed and sustained by
is the first of all considerations: and will
argument — Total number
be seen yet farther to be such, when
of souls always the same.
we consider that it is immortal and
imperishable. Of this Plato proceeds to give a proof,326 concluding
with a mythical sketch of the destiny of the soul after death. The
soul being immortal (he says), the total number of souls is and
always has been the same — neither increasing nor diminishing.327
 326 Plato, Republic, x. pp. 609-610.

327 Plato, Republic, x. p. 611 A.

I have proved (the Platonic Sokrates

Recapitulation — The Just
concludes) in the preceding discourse,
Man will be happy, both
that Justice is better, in itself and
from his justice and from
intrinsically, than Injustice, quite apart
its consequences, both
from consequences in the way of
here and hereafter.
reward and honour; that a man for the
sake of his own happiness, ought to be just, whatever may be
thought of him by Gods or men — even though he possessed the
magic ring of Gyges. Having proved this, and having made out the
intrinsic superiority of justice to injustice, we may now take in the
natural consequences and collateral bearings of both. We have
hitherto reasoned upon the hypothesis that the just man was
mistaken for unjust, and treated accordingly — that the unjust man
found means to pass himself off for just, and to attract to himself
the esteem and the rewards of justice. But this hypothesis concedes
too much, and we must now take back the concession. The just man
will be happier than the unjust, not simply from the intrinsic working
of justice on his own mind, but also from the exterior consequences
of justice.328 He will be favoured and rewarded both by Gods and
men. Though he may be in poverty, sickness, or any other apparent
state of evil, he may be assured that the Gods will compensate him
for it by happiness either in life or after death.329 And men too,
though they may for a time be mistaken about the just and the
unjust character, will at last come to a right estimation of both. The
just man will finally receive honour, reward, and power, from his
fellow-citizens: the unjust man will be finally degraded and punished
by them.330 And after death, the reward of the just man, as well as
the punishment of the unjust, will be far greater than even during
life.

328 Plato, Republic, x. p. 612 B-C.

329 Plato, Republic, x. pp. 612-613.

330 Plato, Republic, x. p. 613 C-D.

This latter position is illustrated at some length by the mythe with

which the Republic concludes, describing the realm of Hades, with
the posthumous condition and treatment of the departed souls.
CHAPTER XXXVI.
 REPUBLIC — REMARKS ON ITS
MAIN THESIS.

Summary of the preceding

The preceding Chapter has
chapter.
described, in concise abstract, that
splendid monument of Plato’s genius,
which passes under the name of the Πολιτεία or Republic. It is
undoubtedly the grandest of all his compositions; including in itself
all his different points of excellence. In the first Book, we have a
subtle specimen of negative Dialectic, — of the Sokratic cross-
examination or Elenchus. In the second Book, we find two examples
of continuous or Ciceronian pleading (like that ascribed to Protagoras
in the dialogue called by his name), which are surpassed by nothing
in ancient literature, for acuteness and ability in the statement of a
case. Next, we are introduced to Plato’s most sublime effort of
constructive ingenuity, in putting together both the individual man
and the collective City: together with more information (imperfect as
it is even here) about his Dialectic or Philosophy, than any other
dialogue furnishes. The ninth Book exhibits his attempts to make
good his own thesis against the case set forth in his own antecedent
counter-pleadings. The last Book concludes with a highly poetical
mythe, embodying a Νεκυία shaped after his own fancy, — and the
outline of cosmical agencies afterwards developed, though with
many differences, in the Timæus. The brilliancy of the Republic will
appear all the more conspicuous, when we come to compare it with
Plato’s two posterior compositions: with the Pythagorean mysticism
and theology of the Timæus — or with the severe and dictatorial
solemnity of the Treatise De Legibus.

The title borne by this dialogue —

Title of the Republic, of
the Republic or Polity — whether
ancient date, but only a
affixed by Plato himself or not, dates at
partial indication of its
least from his immediate disciples,
contents.
Aristotle among them.1 This title hardly
presents a clear idea either of its proclaimed purpose or of its total
contents.

1 See Schleiermacher, Einl. zum Staat, p. 63 seq.;

Stallbaum, Proleg. p. lviii. seq.

The larger portion of the treatise is doubtless employed in

expounding the generation of a commonwealth generally: from
whence the author passes insensibly to the delineation of a Model-
Commonwealth — enumerating the conditions of aptitude for its
governors and guardian-soldiers, estimating the obstacles which
prevent it from appearing in the full type of goodness — and
pointing out the steps whereby, even if fully realised, it is likely to be
brought to perversion and degeneracy. Nevertheless the avowed
purpose of the treatise is, not to depict the ideal of a
commonwealth, but to solve the questions, What is Justice? What is
Injustice? Does Justice, in itself and by its own intrinsic working,
make the just man happy, apart from all consequences, even though
he is not known to be just, and is even treated as unjust, either by
Gods or men? Does Injustice, under the like hypothesis, (i.e. leaving
out all consideration of consequences either from Gods or from
men), make the unjust man miserable? The reasonings respecting
the best polity, are means to this end — intermediate steps to the
settlement of this problem. We must recollect that Plato insists
strongly on the parallelism between the individual and the state: he
talks of “the polity” or Republic in each man’s mind, as of that in the
entire city.2

2 Plato, Repub. ix. p. 591 E. ἀποβλέπων πρὸς τὴν ἐν

αὑτῷ πολιτείαν. x. p. 608 B: περὶ τῆς ἐν αὑτῷ
πολιτείας δεδιότι, &c.

The Republic, or Commonwealth, is

Parallelism between the
introduced by Plato as being the
Commonwealth and the
individual man “writ large,” and
Individual.
therefore more clearly discernible and
legible to an observer.3 To illustrate the individual man, he begins by
describing (to use Hobbes’s language) the great Leviathan called a
“Commonwealth or State, in Latin Civitas, which is but an artificial
man, though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for
whose protection and defence it was intended”.4 He pursues in much
detail this parallel between the individual and the commonwealth, as
well as between the component parts and forces of the one, and
those of the other. The perfection of the commonwealth (he
represents) consists in its being One:5 an integer or unit, of which
the constituent individuals are merely functions, each having only a
fractional, dependent, relative existence. As the commonwealth is an
individual on a large scale, so the individual is a commonwealth on a
small scale; in which the constituent fractions, Reason, — Energy or
Courage, — and many-headed Appetite, — act each for itself and
oppose each other. It is the tendency of Plato’s imagination to
bestow vivid reality on abstractions, and to reason upon
metaphorical analogy as if it were close parallelism. His language
exaggerates both the unity of the commonwealth, and the partibility
of the individual, in illustrating the one by comparison with the other.
The commonwealth is treated as capable of happiness or misery as
an entire Person, apart from its component individuals:6 while on the
other hand, Reason, Energy, Appetite, are described as distinct and
conflicting Persons, packed up in the same wrapper and therefore
looking like One from the outside, yet really distinct, each acting and
suffering by and for itself: like the charioteer and his two horses,
which form the conspicuous metaphor in the Phædrus.7 We are thus
told, that though the man is apparently One, he is in reality Many or
multipartite: though the perfect Commonwealth is apparently Many,
it is in reality One.

3 Plato, Repub. ii. p. 368 D.

“New presbyter is but old priest writ large.” — (Milton.)

4 This is the language of Hobbes. Preface to the

Leviathan. In the same treatise (Part ii. ch. 17, pp.
157-158, Molesworth’s edition) Hobbes says:— “The
only way to erect such a common power as may be
able to defend men from the invasion of foreigners and
the injury of one another, is to confer all their power
and strength upon one man or one assembly of men,
that may reduce all their wills by plurality of voices to
one will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one
man or assembly of men to bear their person. This is
more than consent or concord: it is a real unity of
them all in one and the same person, made by
covenant of every man with every man. This done, the
multitude so united in one person, is called a
 Commonwealth, in Latin Civitas. This is the generation
of that great Leviathan,” &c.

5 Plato, Republic, iv. p. 423.

6 Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 420-421.

7 Plato, Republic, ix. p. 588, x. p. 604, iv. pp. 436-

441. ix. p. 588 E: ὥστε τῷ μὴ δυναμένῳ τὰ ἐντὸς
ὁρᾷν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔξω μόνον ἔλυτρον ὁρῶντι, ἓν ζῶον
φαίνεσθαι, ἄνθρωπον.

Of the parts composing a man, as

Each of them a whole,
well as of the parts composing a
composed of parts distinct
commonwealth, some are better,
in function and unequal in
others worse. A few are good and
merit.
excellent; the greater number are low
and bad; while there are intermediate gradations between the two.
The perfection of a commonwealth, and the perfection of an
individual man, is attained when each part performs its own
appropriate function and no more, — not interfering with the rest. In
the commonwealth there are a small number of wise Elders or
philosophers, whose appropriate function it is to look out for the
good or happiness of the whole; and to controul the ordinary
commonplace multitude, with a view to that end. Each of the
multitude has his own special duty or aptitude, to which he confines
himself, and which he executes in subordination to the wise or
governing Few. And to ensure such subordination, there are an
intermediate number of trained, or disciplined Guardians; who
employ their force under the orders of the ruling Few, to controul
the multitude within, as well as to repel enemies without. So too in
the perfect man. Reason is the small but excellent organ whose
appropriate function is, to controul the multitude of desires and to
watch over the good of the whole: the function of Energy or
Courage is, while itself obeying the Reason, to assist Reason in
maintaining this controul over the Desires: the function of each
several desire is to obey, pursuing its own special end in due
harmony with the rest.

The End to be accomplished, and

End proposed by Plato.
with reference to which Plato tests the
Happiness of the
perfection of the means, is, the
Commonwealth. Happiness
happiness of the entire commonwealth,
of the individual.
— the happiness of the entire
Conditions of happiness.
individual man. In order to be happy, a
commonwealth or an individual man must be at once wise, brave,
temperate, just. There is however this difference between the four
qualities. Though all four are essential, yet wisdom and bravery
belong only to separate fractions of the commonwealth and separate
fractions of the individual: while justice and temperance belong
equally to all the fractions of the commonwealth and all the fractions
of the individual. In the perfect commonwealth, Wisdom or Reason
is found only in the One or Few Ruling Elders:— Energy or Courage
only in the Soldiers or Guardians: but Elders, Guardians, and the
working multitude, alike exhibit Justice and Temperance. All are just,
inasmuch as each performs his appropriate business: all are
temperate, inasmuch as all agree in recognising what is the
appropriate business of each fraction — that of the Elders is, to rule
— that of the others is, to obey. So too the individual: he is wise
only in his Reason, brave only in his Energy or Courage: but he is
just and temperate in his Reason, Courage, and Appetites alike —
each of these Fractions acting in its own sphere under proper
relations to the rest. In fact, according to the definitions given by
Plato in the Republic, justice and temperance are scarce at all
distinguishable from each other — and must at any rate be
inseparable.

Now in regard to the definition here

Peculiar view of Justice
given by Plato of Justice, which is the
taken by Plato.
avowed object of his Treatise, we may
first remark that it is altogether peculiar to Plato; and that if we
reason about Justice in the Platonic sense, we must take care not to
affirm of it predicates which might be true in a more usual
acceptation of the word. Next, that even adopting Plato’s own
meaning of Justice, it does not answer the purpose for which he
produces it — viz.: to provide reply to the objections, and solution
for the difficulties, which he had himself placed in the mouths of
Glaukon and Adeimantus.

These two speakers (in the second

Pleadings of Glaukon and
Book) have advanced the position
Adeimantus.
(which they affirm to be held by every
one, past and present) — That justice is a good thing or a cause of
happiness to the just agent — not in itself or separately, since the
performance of just acts is more or less onerous and sometimes
painful, presenting itself in the aspect of an obligation, but —
because of its consequences, as being indispensable to procure for
him some ulterior good, such as esteem and just treatment from
others. Sokrates on the other hand declares justice to be good, or a
cause of happiness, to the just agent, most of all in itself — but also,
additionally, in its consequences: and injustice to be bad, or a cause
of misery to the unjust agent, on both grounds also.

Suppose (we have seen it urged by Glaukon and Adeimantus) that

a man is just, but is mis-esteemed by the society among whom he
lives, and believed to be unjust. He will certainly be hated and ill-
used by others, and may be ill-used to the greatest possible extent
— impoverishment, scourging, torture, crucifixion. Again, suppose a
man to be unjust, but to be in like manner misconceived, and
treated as if he were just. He will receive from others golden
opinions, just dealing, and goodwill, producing to him comfortable
consequences: and he will obtain, besides, the profits of injustice.
Evidently, under these supposed circumstances, the just man will be
miserable, in spite of his justice: the unjust man will, to say the
least, be the happier of the two.

Moreover (so argues Glaukon), all fathers exhort their sons to be

just, and forbid them to be unjust, admitting that justice is a
troublesome obligation, but insisting upon it as indispensable to
avert evil consequences and procure good. So also poets and
teachers. All of them assume that justice is not inviting for itself, but
only by reason of its consequences: and that injustice is in itself easy
and inviting, were it not for mischievous consequences and penalties
more than countervailing the temptation. All of them either
anticipate, or seek to provide, penalties to be inflicted in case the
agent commits injustice, and not to be inflicted if he continues just:
so that the treatment which he receives afterwards shall be
favourable, or severe, conditional upon his own conduct. Such
treatment may emanate either from Gods or from men: but in either
case, it is assumed that the agent shall be known, or shall seem, to
be what he really is: that the unjust agent shall seem, or be known,
to be unjust — and that the just shall seem also to be what he is.

It is against this doctrine that the

The arguments which they
Platonic Sokrates in the Republic
enforce were not invented
professes to contend. To refute it, he
by the Sophists, but were
the received views anterior sets forth his own explanation, wherein
to Plato. justice consists. How far, or with what
qualifications, the Sophists inculcated
the doctrine (as various commentators tell us) we do not know. But
Plato himself informs us that it was current and received in society,
before Protagoras and Prodikus were born: taught by parents to
their children, and by poets in their compositions generally
circulated.8 Moreover, Sokrates himself (in the Platonic Apology)
recommends virtue on the ground of its remunerative consequences
to the agent in the shape of wealth and other good things.9 Again,
the Xenophontic Sokrates, as well as Xenophon himself, agree in the
same general doctrine: presenting virtue as laborious and
troublesome in itself, but as being fully requited by its remunerative
consequences in the form of esteem and honour, to the attainment
of which it is indispensable. In the memorable Choice of Heraklês,
that youth is represented as choosing a life of toil and painful self-
denial, crowned ultimately by the attainment of honourable and
beneficial results — in preference to a life of easy and inactive
enjoyment.10

8 Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 363-364.

9 Plato, Apolog. Sokrat. p. 30 B.

λέγων ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ’ ἐξ

ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τἄλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις
ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσίᾳ.

Xenophon in the Cyropædia puts the following

language into the mouth of the hero Cyrus, in
addressing his officers (Cyrop. i. 5, 9). Καίτοι ἔγωγε
οἶμαι, οὐδεμίαν ἀρετὴν ἀσκεῖσθαι ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων, ὡς
μηδὲν πλέον ἔχωσιν οἱ ἐσθλοὶ γενόμενοι τῶν πονηρῶν·
ἀλλ’ οἵ τε τῶν παραυτίκα ἡδονῶν ἀπεχόμενοι, οὔχ ἵνα
μηδέποτε εὐφρανθῶσι, τοῦτο πράττουσιν, ἀλλ’ ὡς διὰ
ταύτην τὴν ἐγκράτειαν πολλαπλάσια εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα
χρόνον εὐφρανούμενοι, οὕτω παρασκευάζονται, &c.

The love of praise is represented as the prominent

motive of Cyrus to the practice of virtue (i. 5, 12, i. 2,
1).

Compare also Xenophon, Cyropæd. ii. 3, 5-15, vii. 5,

82, and Xenophon, Economic. xiv. 5-9; Xenophon, De
Venatione, xii. 15-19.

10 Xenophon, Memorab. ii. 1, 19-20, &c. We read in

the ‘Works and Days’ of Hesiod, 287:—

Τὴν μέν τοι κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδὸν ἔστιν ἐλέσθαι

Ῥηϊδίως· λείη μὲν ὁδός, μάλα δ’ ἐγγύθι ναίει.
Τῆς δ’ ἀρετῆς ἱδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν
Ἀθάνατοι· μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶμος ἐπ’ αὐτήν,
Καὶ τρῆχυς τοπρῶτον· ἐπὴν δ’ εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηαι,
Ῥηϊδίη δ’ ἠπειτα πέλει, χαλεπή περ ἐοῦσα.

It is remarkable that while the Xenophontic Sokrates

cites these verses from Hesiod as illustrating and
enforcing the drift of his exhortation, the Platonic
Sokrates cites them as misleading, and as a specimen
of the hurtful errors instilled by the poets (Republic, ii.
p. 364 D).
 We see thus that the doctrine which the Platonic Sokrates
impugns in the Republic, is countenanced elsewhere by Sokratic
authority. It is, in my judgment, more true than that which he
opposes to it. The exhortations and orders of parents to their
children, which he condemns — were founded upon views of fact
and reality more correct than those which the Sokrates of the
Republic would substitute in place of them.

Let us note the sentiment in which

Argument of Sokrates to
Plato’s creed here originates. He
refute them. Sentiments in
desires, above every thing, to stand
which it originates.
forward as the champion and
Panegyric on Justice.
panegyrist of justice — as the enemy
and denouncer of injustice. To praise justice, not in itself, but for its
consequences — and to blame injustice in like manner — appears to
him disparaging and insulting to justice.11 He is not satisfied with
showing that the just man benefits others by his justice, and that
the unjust man hurts others by his injustice: he admits nothing into
his calculation, except happiness or misery to the agent himself: and
happiness, moreover, inherent in the process of just behaviour —
misery inherent in the process of unjust behaviour — whatever be
the treatment which the agent may receive from either Gods or
men. Justice per se (affirms Plato) is the cause of happiness to the
just agent, absolutely and unconditionally: injustice, in like manner,
of misery to the unjust — quand même — whatever the
consequences may be either from men or Gods. This is the extreme
strain of panegyric suggested by Plato’s feeling, and announced as a
conclusion substantiated by his reasons. Nothing more
thoroughgoing can be advanced in eulogy of justice. “Neither the
eastern star nor the western star is so admirable” — to borrow a
phrase from Aristotle.12
 11 Plato, Republic, ii. p. 368 B-C. δέδοικα γὰρ μὴ οὐδ’
ὅσιον ᾖ παραγενόμενον δικαιοσύνῃ κακηγορουμένῃ
ἀπαγορεύειν καὶ μὴ βοηθεῖν, &c.

12 Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. v. 3 (1), 1129, b. 28. οὔθ’

ἕσπερος οὔθ’ ἑῷος οὕτω θαυμαστός.

Plato is here the first proclaimer of the doctrine afterwards so

much insisted on by the Stoics — the all-sufficiency of virtue to the
happiness of the virtuous agent, whatever may be his fate in other
respects — without requiring any farther conditions or adjuncts. It
will be seen that Plato maintains this thesis with reference to the
terms justice and its opposite injustice; sometimes (though not
often) using the general term virtue or wisdom, which was the
ordinary term with the Stoics afterwards.

The ambiguous meaning of the word

Different senses of justice
justice is known to Plato himself (as it
— wider and narrower
is also to Aristotle). One professed
sense.
purpose of the dialogue called the
Republic is to remove such ambiguity. Apart from the many other
differences of meaning (arising from dissentient sentiments of
different men and different ages), there is one duplicity of meaning
which Aristotle particularly dwells upon.13 In the stricter and
narrower sense, justice comprehends only those obligations which
each individual agent owes to others, and for the omission of which
he becomes punishable as unjust — though the performance of
them, under ordinary circumstances, carries little positive merit: in
another and a larger sense, justice comprehends these and a great
deal more, becoming co-extensive with wise, virtuous, and
meritorious character generally. The narrower sense is that which is
in more common use; and it is that which Plato assumes
provisionally when he puts forward the case of opponents in the
speeches of Glaukon and Adeimantus. But when he comes to set
forth his own explanation, and to draw up his own case, we see that
he uses the term justice in its larger sense, as the condition of a
mind perfectly well-balanced and well-regulated: as if a man could
not be just, without being at the same time wise, courageous, and
temperate. The just man described in the counter-pleadings of
Glaukon and Adeimantus, would be a person like the Athenian
Aristeides: the unjust man whom they contrast with him, would be
one who maltreats, plunders, or deceives others, or usurps power
over them. But the just man, when Sokrates replies to them and
unfolds his own thesis, is made to include a great deal more: he is a
person in whose mind each of the three constituent elements is in
proper relation of controul or obedience to the others, so that the
whole mind is perfect: a person whose Reason, being illuminated by
contemplation of the Universals or self-existent Ideas of Goodness,
Justice, Virtue, has become qualified to exercise controul over the
two inferior elements: one of which (Energy) is its willing
subordinate and auxiliary — while the lowest of the three (Appetite)
is kept in regulation by the joint action of the two. The just man, so
described, becomes identical with the true philosopher: no man who
is not a philosopher can be just.14 Aristeides would not at all
correspond to the Platonic ideal of justice. He would be a stranger to
the pleasure extolled by Plato as the exclusive privilege of the just
and virtuous — the pleasure of contemplating universal Ideas and
acquiring extended knowledge.15

13 Aristotel. Eth. Nikom. v. 2 (1), 1129, a. 25. ἔοικε δὲ

πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀδικία.
 Also v. 3 (1), 1130, a. 3. διὰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ
ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ δικαιοσύνη, μόνη τῶν
ἀρετῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἕτερον ἐστιν· ἄλλῳ γὰρ τὰ
συμφέροντα πράττει, ἢ ἄρχοντι ἢ κοινῷ.

This proposition — that justice is ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν

— is the very proposition which Thrasymachus is
introduced as affirming and Sokrates as combating, in
the first book of the Republic.

Compare also Aristotle’s Ethica Magna, i. 34, p.

1193, b. 19, where the same explanation of justice is
given: also p. 1194, a. 7, where the Republic of Plato is
cited, and the principle of reciprocity, as laid down at
the end of the second book of the Republic, is
repeated. We read in a fragment of the lost treatise of
Cicero, De Republicâ (iii. 6, 7):— “Justitia foras spectat,
et projecta tota est atque eminet. — Quæ virtus,
præter cæteras, tota se ad alienas porrigit utilitates
atque explicat.”

14 This is the same distinction as that drawn by

Epiktetus between the φιλόσοφος and the ἰδιώτης
(Arrian, Epiktet. iii. 19). An ἰδιώτης may be just in the
ordinary meaning of the word. Aristeides was an
ἰδιώτης. The Greek word ἰδιώτης, designating the
ordinary average citizen, as distinguished from any
special or professional training, is highly convenient.

15 Plato, Republic, ix. p. 582 C. τῆς δὲ τοῦ ὄντος

θέας, οἵαν ἡδονὴν ἔχει, ἀδύνατον ἄλλῳ γεγεῦσθαι
πλὴν τῷ φιλοσόφῳ.
 The Platonic conception of justice or
Plato’s sense of the word
Virtue on the one side, and of Injustice
Justice or Virtue — self-
or Vice on the other, is self-regarding
regarding.
and prudential. Justice is in the mind a
condition analogous to good health and strength in the body —
(mens sana in corpore sano) — Injustice is a condition analogous to
sickness, corruption, impotence, in the body.16 The body is healthy,
when each of its constituent parts performs its appropriate function:
it is unhealthy, when there is failure in this respect, either defective
working of any part, or interference of one part with the rest. So too
in the just mind, each of its tripartite constituents performs its
appropriate function — the rational mind directing and controuling,
the energetic and appetitive minds obeying such controul. In the
unjust mind, the case is opposite: Reason exercises no supremacy:
Passion and Appetite, acting each for itself, are disorderly, reckless,
exorbitant. To possess a healthy body is desirable for its
consequences as a means towards other constituents of happiness;
but it is still more desirable in itself, as an essential element of
happiness per se, i.e., the negation of sickness, which would of itself
make us miserable. On the other hand, an unhealthy or corrupt body
is miserable by reason of its consequences, but still more miserable
per se, even apart from consequences. In like manner, the just mind
blesses the possessor twice: first and chiefly, as bringing to him
happiness in itself — next also, as it leads to ulterior happy results:17
the unjust mind is a curse to its possessor in itself, and apart from
results — though it also leads to ulterior results which render it still
more a curse to him.
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