1

BỘ GIÁO DỤC VÀ ĐÀO TẠO

TRƯỜNG ĐẠI HỌC KINH TẾ - ĐẠI HỌC QUỐC GIA HÀ NỘI

BÁO CÁO TỔNG KẾT

ĐỀ TÀI NGHIÊN CỨU KHOA HỌC THAM GIA XÉT GIẢI THƯỞNG
‘’NGHIÊN CỨU KHOA HỌC SINH VIÊN CẤP VIỆN’’ NĂM 2025

< STUDY ABOUT THE POSITION OF VIETNAM IN THE

SEMICONDUCTOR VALUE CHAIN: EVIDENCE ON TRADE >

Sinh viên thực hiện

Dương Văn Quang
Lưu Quang Khải
Nguyễn Phạm Khánh Thư
Hà Thị Khánh An
Giáo viên hướng dẫn
Nguyễn Đức Bảo

Hà Nội, tháng 03/2025

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ABSTRACT

This research, conducted under the topic “Study about the position of Vietnam in
the semiconductor value chain: Evidence on trade,” aims to analyze and demonstrate the
position of Vietnam in the semiconductor value chain through evidence from trade data and
explain how Vietnam should implement its strategy in this context.

We used a quantitative methodology based on secondary data analysis. The primary

data source was collected from the BACI (Base d’Analyse du Commerce International) – a
database by CEPII, covering the period from 2014 to 2023. The research focused on value
chain step-level, product group-level, and Harmonized System (HS) code-level
assessments.

RStudio served as the assistance software utilized during the synthesis and data
analysis process to clean and filter the data, ensuring that only trade transactions involving
Vietnam and semiconductor-related products, as classified by the OECD semiconductor
product classification, were retained. This software was also used to calculate Trade
Performance Indicators (TPIs) and to visualize the results through charts.

As a result, the research indicates that Vietnam experiences a trade deficit in the
upstream stages of the semiconductor value chain, particularly in wafer production (Step
1) and semiconductor production (Step 2), signifying a substantial reliance on imports for
raw materials, inputs, and core components. Conversely, Vietnam achieves a significant
trade surplus in the downstream stages, specifically intermediate electronics (Step 3) and
final electronics (Step 4), underscoring its established role as a major hub for the assembly
and export of consumer electronics, notably mobile phones and communication devices.

The study concludes that while Vietnam has successfully integrated into the global
electronics manufacturing ecosystem, its position remains heavily dependent on foreign
suppliers for crucial semiconductor inputs. Besides, our group also drew some conclusions
and implications for policymakers and industry stakeholders. These recommendations can
be useful tips for a deeper understanding of Vietnam's role in this strategically important
sector.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS 3
LIST OF TABLES 6
LIST OF FIGURES 7
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 8
CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW 9
1.1. Necessity of the research 9
1.2. Research Questions and Objectives 11
1.3. Research Subject and Scope of the Research 11
1.4. Research Methodology 12
1.5. Research Structure 13
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 14
2.1. Conceptual framework 14
2.1.1. Semiconductors 14
2.1.2. Semiconductor Value Chain (SVC) 15
2.1.3. Semiconductor Value Chain in Trade Statistics 20
2.2. Related Research 24
2.2.1. The position of the EU in the semiconductor value chain: Evidence on trade,
foreign acquisitions, and ownership - Ciani, Andrea; Nardo, Michela (2022) 25
2.2.2. China’s interdependent positioning in the semiconductor global value chain -
Grimes and Debin Du (2024) 26
2.2.3. Taiwan and the global semiconductor supply chain - Tung, Chen-Yuan (2024)
27
2.2.4. Analyzing South Korea’s Semiconductor Industry: Trade Dynamics and Global
Position- Hyung-gon JEONG (2024) 28
2.2.5. Vulnerabilities in the semiconductor supply chain, OECD Science, Technology
and Industry Working Papers (2023) 29
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2.2.6. Conclusion of Previous Study 30

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN 32
3.1. Research Process Design 32
3.2. Data Collection 33
3.3. Data Processing 33
3.4. Data Analysis 36
3.4.1. Value Chain Step-Level Analysis 38
3.4.2. Product Group-Level Analysis within Each Step 39
3.4.3. HS Code-Level Assessment 40
3.5. Data Visualization 41
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH RESULT 42
4.1. Position of Vietnam by Semiconductor Value Chain Step 42
4.2. Position of Vietnam in Step 1: Wafer Production 48
4.3. Position of Vietnam in Step 2: Semiconductor Production 50
4.3.1. Position of Vietnam in Outputs 53
4.4. Position of Vietnam in Step 3: Intermediate Electronics 55
4.4.1. Position of Vietnam in Output 2: Intermediate Consumer 57
4.5. Position of Vietnam in Step 4: Final Electronics 60
4.5.1. Position of Vietnam in Output 2: Final Consumer 62
4.6. Result after analyzing data 64
4.7. Result and Connotation of the Topic 66
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 68
5.1. Discussion 68
5.2. Significance 68
5.3. Suggestions 69
5.3.1. Developing Human Resources for Vietnam's Semiconductor Industry 69
5.3.2. Developing a Rare Earth-Based Supply Chain for Semiconductor Manufacturing
72
5.3.3. Developing Vietnam as a Key AI Chip Packaging and Testing Hub 73
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5.3.4. Leveraging Geopolitical Shifts to Position Vietnam as a Secure and Stable

Semiconductor Assembly Hub 74
5.4. Limitation and Further Research 75
REFERENCES 78
APPENDIX 80
APPENDIX 1: PRELIMINARY TRADE DATA AGGREGATION OF EACH SELECTED
HS CODE FOR THE ENTIRE PERIOD 2014–2023 80
APPENDIX 2: THE TOTAL TRADE VALUES AND PERCENTAGE CONTRIBUTIONS
FOR EACH HS CODE IN OUTPUT (STEP 2) 83
APPENDIX 3: THE TOTAL TRADE VALUES AND PERCENTAGE CONTRIBUTIONS
FOR EACH HS CODE IN OUTPUT 2 (STEP 3) 84
APPENDIX 4: THE TOTAL TRADE VALUES AND PERCENTAGE CONTRIBUTIONS
FOR EACH HS CODE IN OUTPUT 2 (STEP 4) 85
APPENDIX 5: DATA CODES 86
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LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1. Description of Key Variables ............................................................................

Table 3.2. HS Code of Semiconductor-related products (by OECD) .......................................

Table 4.1. Total Average Export and Import Value, Trade Balance of Each Step ............

Table 4.2. Trade Data in Step 1..........................................................................................

Table 4.3. Trade Data in Step 2 .........................................................................................

Table 4.4. Trade Data in Step 3 .........................................................................................

Table 4.5. Trade Data in Step 4 .........................................................................................

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1. The Semiconductor Value Chain spans a great number of specialised tasks ......

Figure 2.2. Simplified Depiction of the Semiconductor Value Chain ...................................

Figure 2.3. Measuring goods trade in the semiconductor value chain...................................

Figure 2.4. Goods classification for the semiconductor value chain .....................................

Figure 3.1. Research Process ..................................................................................................

Figure 4.1. Export and Import Shares in Global Semiconductor Trade, Avg 2014-2023 .........

Figure 4.2. Top 10 Exporters in Each Semiconductor Value Chain Step .................................

Figure 4.3. Top 10 Importers in Each Semiconductor Value Chain Step .................................

Figure 4.4. Vietnam's Position by Semiconductor Value Chain Step ...................................

Figure 4.5. Vietnam's Position in Step 1 ................................................................................

Figure 4.6. Vietnam's Position in Step 2 ................................................................................

Figure 4.7. Vietnam's Position in Output (Step 2) .................................................................

Figure 4.8. Vietnam's Position in Step 3 ................................................................................

Figure 4.9. Vietnam's Position in Output 2 (Step 3) ..............................................................

Figure 4.10. Vietnam's Position in Step 4 ..............................................................................

Figure 4.11. Vietnam's Position in Output 2 (Step 4) ............................................................

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

No. Abbreviations Words

1 SVC Semiconductor Value Chain

2 BACI Base d’Analyse du Commerce International

3 HS Harmonized System

4 GVC Global Value Chain

5 IC Integrated circuit

6 IOT Internet of Things

7 IP Intellectual property

8 OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development

9 EDA Electronic Design Automation

10 TPIs Trade Performance Indicators

11 CAGR Compound Annual Growth Rate

12 FDI Foreign Direct Investment

13 APT Assembly, Testing, and Packaging

14 IDM Integrated Device Manufacturer

15 TiVA Trade in Value Added

16 SME Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment

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CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW

1.1. Necessity of the research

In the context of globalization and the continuous development of technology, the

semiconductor industry has become an important pillar in the digital economy.
Semiconductors are considered the “brains” of most modern devices and electronics, from
computer chips to smart sensors. They are the foundation of many advanced industries,
such as artificial intelligence (AI), the Internet of Things (IoT), and electric cars. Annual
sales of semiconductors are staggeringly large: more than half a trillion dollars in 2024.
“The global semiconductor market experienced its highest-ever sales year in 2024, topping
$600 billion in annual sales for the first time, and double-digit market growth is projected
for 2025,” said John Neuffer, SIA president and CEO. More importantly, however, the
semiconductor industry is an irreplaceable enabler of tens of trillions of dollars of annual
economic activity worldwide. In the United States, while semiconductors account for only
0.3% of the GDP, they are an important production input to 12% of the GDP. The rapid
development of this industry is not only a driving force for economic growth but also
determines a country's competitiveness in the international arena. Around the world,
countries such as the European Union, the United States, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and
China have formed an almost monopoly global semiconductor supply chain, which has
successfully built a long-term semiconductor industry development strategy, including
attracting investment, strengthening research and development (R&D), as well as building
a comprehensive industrial ecosystem. Large corporations such as Intel, TSMC, and
Samsung Electronics are constantly increasing their size and global competitiveness.
Meanwhile, since 2020, there have been serious supply shortages of semiconductors across
the entire globe, leading to what is referred to as the “semiconductor shortage crisis”,
prompting many countries to consider investing more aggressively to ensure technological
and economic security. However, investing in the semiconductor industry requires careful
consideration of its semiconductor sector context.

That is the general situation all over the world, but in Vietnam, the semiconductor
industry is still in its infancy. The Government has introduced many preferential policies
to attract foreign investment, especially in the field of high technology. At the end of
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September 2024, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh signed Decision 1018/QD-TTg,
promulgating Vietnam's Semiconductor Industry Development Strategy to 2030 and Vision
2050, showing Vietnam's high determination in the process of integrating into the global
semiconductor supply chain. Besides, the movement of semiconductor giants into Vietnam
(Samsung, Amkor, Nvidia, Qualcomm) and new advances of domestic technology
corporations such as FPT and Viettel in chip design activities show that Vietnam has a lot
of potential to develop the semiconductor industry. According to Guotai Junan Securities
(VN) Research, the revenue in the Semiconductors market of Vietnam is projected to reach
18.23 billion USD in 2024 and is expected to show an annual growth rate (CAGR 2024-
2029) of 11.48%, resulting in a market volume of 31.39 billion USD by 2029. They also
believe that the prospects for developing Vietnam's chip and semiconductor industry are
still very open thanks to Vietnam's outstanding advantages, including strategic
geographical location and the improving internal strength of the economy, a large &
growing high-quality workforce, large rare earth reserves, and Government policies to
promote the semiconductor industry. However, research on semiconductors in Vietnam is
relatively limited, especially in the global value chain (GVC), so the gaps in the research are
hard to avoid in which the research real situation is still limited, mainly a general prediction
about the development potential of Vietnam's semiconductor industry. The analysis is
limited to theoretical scope and has not been conducted on actual data, so the reliability of
the current situation has not been fully reflected. There are still no official studies on the
position of Vietnam in the global semiconductor value chain (SVC). This is a completely
new topic that has created the motivation for our group to choose this topic for research.

For the above reasons, we choose the topic "The position of Vietnam in the
semiconductor value chain: Evidence on trade" to explore the real position of Vietnam in
the global semiconductor value chain. What is Vietnam's position in the trade balance in
each supply chain of semiconductor devices? Also, it will explain the underlying drivers of
Vietnam’s trade surplus or deficit in each of those supply chains. From there, it will serve
as a scientific and reliable basis for organizations and managers of related businesses to
have more insights about the overview of Vietnam’s real position and develop strategies to
further develop the Semiconductor market in Vietnam as well as to export semiconductor
products to foreign markets.
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1.2. Research Questions and Objectives

From the problems presented, the research team posed the following questions:

1. What is the position of Vietnam in the semiconductor value chain, particularly in

terms of trade balance across different value chain steps?

2. What are the key factors driving Vietnam’s trade surplus and deficit in each
segment of the semiconductor value chain?

3. On that basis, what are the strategic recommendations that could enhance
Vietnam’s integration in the semiconductor value chain?

Correlated with the research question, the research paper is conducted with the
following three objectives:

1. Identifying Vietnam's role in semiconductor value chain integration: which

segment to participate in?

2. A deeper understanding of Vietnam's contribution to each segment of the

semiconductor value chain.

3. Propose some actionable strategies for administrators to enhance Vietnam's

integration in the semiconductor industry.

1.3. Research Subject and Scope of the Research

- Research subject: The position of Vietnam in the semiconductor value chain.

- Data Source: The primary source of this research is the BACI (Base d’Analyse du
Commerce International) database, developed by CEPII (Centre d'Études Prospectives et
d'Informations Internationales), which serves as the primary data source for this research.
This database is built upon UN Comtrade data but has undergone additional reconciliation
to ensure consistency between export and import records for each trade flow.

- Regarding the geographical range: This study only focuses on Vietnam as the
primary subject.
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- Execution time: This study is observing the market and was conducted from
December 2024 to March 2025 in Vietnam.

1.4. Research Methodology

This scientific research is conducted by quantitative methods based on secondary

data analysis.

The research is carried out in four phases:

(1) Data Collection: The dataset is sourced from BACI, which provides detailed
bilateral trade statistics at the 4-digit and 6-digit HS code levels of all countries in the world
for the period 2014–2023. The extracted variables include export/import country names,
trade year, product classifications, export values, and global trade data. The dataset ensures
comprehensive coverage of Vietnam’s trade activities in semiconductor-related products.

(2) Data Processing: To refine the dataset, only transactions involving Vietnam and
semiconductor-related products—as classified by the OECD semiconductor product
classification—were retained. The data underwent a cleaning and filtering process using
RStudio, ensuring that only relevant HS codes related to the semiconductor value chain step
were included.

(3) Data Analysis: The research employs a three-tiered analytical approach to assess
Vietnam’s semiconductor trade position: 1) Value Chain Step-Level Analysis: Aggregating
export/import values across different stages of the semiconductor value chain. 2) Product
Group-Level Analysis: Assessing trade performance within key semiconductor product
categories, including growth trends via Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR). 3) HS
Code-Level Assessment: Evaluating the highest contributing products within each value
chain step to determine Vietnam’s strengths and dependencies.

(4) Data Visualization: Key findings are visualized using bar and line charts in
RStudio, providing a clear representation of trade values, trends, and growth patterns from
2014 to 2023. A combination of bar charts for total export/import values and line charts for
CAGR trends ensures the effective interpretation of Vietnam’s semiconductor trade
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position. This structured approach ensures that Vietnam’s role in the global semiconductor
supply chain is analyzed comprehensively, enabling data-driven insights for policy
recommendations and strategic positioning.

1.5. Research Structure

The research structure includes:

Chapter 1: Overview: Necessity of the research, Research questions and Research

objectives, Research subject and Scope, Research methodology, and Research structure.

Chapter 2: Theoretical framework and Literature Review: Concepts; Related

researches.

Chapter 3: Research Methodology: Research Process, Data Collection, Data

Processing, Data Analysis, Data Visualization.

Chapter 4: Research Result: Position of Vietnam in different analysis levels; Results

after analyzing data; Result and Connotation of Topic.

Chapter 5: Conclusion and Implications: Discussion; Research Significance;

Suggestions; Research limitations and direction in further research.
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE

REVIEW

2.1. Conceptual framework

2.1.1. Semiconductors

Ben G. Streetman and Sanjay Kumar Banerjee (2016) defined Semiconductors as a

group of materials having electrical conductivities intermediate between metals and
insulators, and their conductivity can be varied over orders of magnitude by changes in
temperature, optical excitation, and impurity content. This variability of electrical
properties makes the semiconductor materials natural choices for electronic device
investigations.

Semiconductor devices are electronic components made from semiconductor

materials. These devices are the building blocks of modern electronics, enabling the
development of technologies ranging from radio communication to quantum computing.

The Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), in its 2018 report “Beyond Borders:
The Global Semiconductor Value Chain”, indicates that the key types of semiconductor
devices are: 1. Integrated Circuits (ICs): An integrated circuit is an arrangement of electrical
circuits and components including resistors, capacitors, diodes, and transistors, which are
directly embedded onto the surface of the semiconductor chip. Used in nearly all electronic
devices today, ICs can be subdivided into three categories:

a) Logic semiconductor devices: These perform certain logical or thinking

operations on the inputs provided to them, from which they then produce an output. Micro
components are the most significant type of logic semiconductor devices and include
microprocessors or central processing units (CPUs) used in computers, smartphones, and
similar devices.

b) Memory semiconductor devices: Memory semiconductor devices store

information. They can be volatile (e.g., dynamic random-access memory, or DRAM, used
in personal computers) or nonvolatile (e.g., NAND flash memory, used in USB drives and
solid-state hard drives.

c) 1. Analog semiconductor devices: Analog semiconductor devices are used to

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convert analog (i.e., continuous) information into a digital format (0s and 1s) and vice versa.
When recording a song to an MP3 player, for example, the song (continuous audio
information) is converted to digital form for storage, then converted back to analog form to
listen to it. 2. Discrete Semiconductors: These are single individual semiconductors used in
electronic devices primarily to control electric current. Types include transistors, rectifiers,
and diodes. 3. Optoelectronics and sensors: These semiconductors are mainly used for
generating or sensing light, for example, in traffic lights or cameras.

According to the description of Harmonized System (HS) Codes, the most

representative product categories that relate to semiconductors are primarily classified
under the following chapters:

Chapter 85: Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders
and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and
accessories of such articles.

Chapter 84: Machines and apparatus of a kind used solely or principally for the
manufacture of semiconductor boules or wafers, semiconductor devices, electronic
integrated circuits or flat panel displays; machines and apparatus specified in Note 11 (C)
to this Chapter; parts and accessories.

Chapter 90: Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking,

precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; parts and accessories thereof.

Chapter 28: Inorganic chemicals; organic or inorganic compounds of precious

metals, of rare-earth metals, of radioactive elements or isotopes.

Chapter 27: Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous
substances; mineral waxes.

Chapter 81: Other base metals; cermets; articles thereof.

Chapter 38: Miscellaneous chemical products

2.1.2. Semiconductor Value Chain (SVC)

Akhil Thadani and Gregory C. Allen (2023) described the semiconductor value
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chain as a multistage process encompassing the transformation of economic inputs into

technological outputs. This intricate and globally distributed chain involves a spectrum of
companies, ranging from highly specialized entities to those with diversified roles;
critically, no single nation currently possesses the internal capacity to autonomously
execute all functions across the entire value chain for the diverse range of semiconductors
essential for a modern economy.

In the OECD (2019-12-12), “Measuring distortions in international markets: The

semiconductor value chain” report, the semiconductor value chain is broadly segmented
into three principal phases: Upstream Segment, Midstream Segment, and Downstream
Segment (Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1: The semiconductor value chain spans a great number of specialized tasks

Source: OECD TRADE POLICY PAPER N°234 © OECD 2019

Upstream Segment: Knowledge Generation. This initial phase is characterized by

intensive research and development (R&D) activities. These endeavors are undertaken by
actors spanning the private sector, academia, and governmental bodies, frequently through
collaborative initiatives. The primary objective of this stage is the creation of foundational
knowledge and intellectual property that subsequently underpins competitive innovation
efforts by firms. The semiconductor industry is recognized as one of the most R&D-
intensive sectors, comparable to pharmaceuticals, aerospace manufacturing, and software
development. Governmental support often plays a crucial role in mitigating the inherent
risks and substantial costs associated with R&D in this domain, sometimes through public-
private partnerships.

Midstream Segment: Design, Manufacturing, Testing, and Assembly. This pivotal

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segment encompasses the tangible production of semiconductors through a sequential

series of steps:

- Chip Design: This highly knowledge- and skill-intensive stage involves engineers
utilizing computer-aided design (CAD) software, also known as Electronic Design
Automation (EDA) tools, to develop intricate blueprints of integrated circuits. The output
is a code file containing comprehensive specifications for semiconductor fabrication. Key
inputs at this stage include intellectual property (IP) cores and specialized EDA software.

- Fabrication (Manufacturing): The actual production of chips on silicon wafers

occurs in specialized facilities known as foundries or fabs. This phase demands significant
tangible intermediate inputs, most notably high-purity silicon wafers, and relies on
advanced manufacturing equipment and substantial capital investment. The lithography
process serves as a critical indicator of technological advancement in fabrication. The
industry exhibits two primary business models: Integrated Device Manufacturers (IDMs),
which handle both design and manufacturing (e.g., Intel, Samsung), and the fabless-foundry
model, where companies specialize in design (fabless, e.g., Qualcomm, Nvidia) and
outsource manufacturing to dedicated foundries (pure-play foundries, e.g., TSMC).

- Assembly, Testing, and Packaging (ATP): Following fabrication, individual chips

are diced from the wafer, subjected to rigorous testing to ensure functionality, and then
encapsulated in protective packaging for integration into electronic systems. This stage
generally requires less capital and skill intensity compared to design and fabrication and
has historically seen significant offshoring to regions with lower labor costs.

Downstream Segment: Utilization in Electronic Devices. In this final segment,

packaged semiconductors are integrated into a wide array of electronic devices, including
smartphones, computers, and servers. The demand for these end-use products directly
influences the derived demand for semiconductors. Semiconductors often constitute a
substantial portion of the cost of these electronic devices.

Jan-Peter Kleinhans & Dr. Nurzat Baisakova divided the value chain for the
production of semiconductors into three core stages: design, fabrication, assembly test, and
package (Figure 1). Each stage relies on specific inputs from suppliers and contributes to
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the overall value of the final product.

They also revealed that the semiconductor value chain is defined by high divisions
of labor, highly concentrated niche markets, and pressure to constantly innovate and invest.
No country currently has the entire production stack in its territory. Instead, the
semiconductor value chain relies mainly on collaboration and trade between the United
States, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Europe, and China. Specifically, according to SIA
(2016), Canada, European countries, and the United States tend to specialize in
semiconductor design, along with high-end manufacturing. Japan, the United States, and
some European countries specialize in supplying equipment and raw materials. China,
Taiwan, Malaysia, and other Asian countries tend to specialize in manufacturing,
assembling, testing, and packaging. Canada, China, Germany, India, Israel, Singapore,
South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States are all major hubs for
semiconductor R&D. As a result, the semiconductor value chain is highly innovative and
efficient but not resilient.
Figure 2.2: Simplified Depiction of the Semiconductor Value Chain

Source: Akhil Thadani and Gregory C. Allen, Mapping the Semiconductor Supply Chain

The value chain starts with the design stage, where a blueprint of a chip’s
architecture is sketched out to optimize for certain parameters, including cost, power
consumption, and capacity, based on the needs of the chip in question. Originally, chip
designs were hand-drawn on individual sheets of paper. But as the number of transistors on
a single semiconductor grew to hundreds of thousands, and eventually hundreds of billions,
highly specialized software became necessary to manage the resulting set of complex
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interactions and layers. Certain portions of a chip’s design are built using reusable pieces
of intellectual property (IP), called core IP, that firms license to lessen the burden of the
design process. The design segment includes precompetitive research, design automation
software known as electronic design automation (EDA), and core IP (Kleinhans and
Baisakova 2023).

The next stage of the value chain is devoted to manufacturing chips, which takes
place in “foundries” or “fabs”. This stage consists of printing (or “etching”) the integrated
circuit designed in the previous stage on a silicon wafer. Fabrication/foundry relies on a
large number of complex advanced manufacturing processes, representing about one-
quarter of the value added to semiconductors but almost two-thirds of the physical capital
expenditure (OECD Science 2023).

Companies manufacturing chips can operate as contractors for other companies,

which are only focusing on the design of chips, the “fabless” companies, or exclusively
manufacture chips for their parent companies. Fabless companies emerged recently in the
production chain as a new business method due to the increased specialization and the
relevant costs associated with the design of chips. Fabless companies design and outsource
the production of the most advanced chips (7nm and below) for their applications in
consumer electronics (informatics and smartphones) (Ciani et al., 2022).

Foundries receive inputs from other companies. Among them are the suppliers of
raw materials and the suppliers of semiconductors manufacturing equipment (SME).
Suppliers of raw materials to foundries produce chemical products and/or wafers of
different diameters, which are employed in the lithography process done at foundries.
Silicon wafers are largely employed in the production process, but gallium arsenide (GaAs),
gallium nitride (GaN), and silicon carbide (SiC) wafers are also used for specific
applications. In most cases, the suppliers of raw materials and basic chemicals operate in
the production of inputs for other manufacturing industries (Goodman et al., 2019).
Equipment suppliers manufacture the machines, often automated, employed to produce
semiconductors. Different types of equipment are needed to manufacture integrated
circuits, while even the largest companies in this segment focus their output on machines
for specific phases of the production process (e.g., etching, dying, and testing). The most
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advanced machines for the production of chips, which rely on extreme ultraviolet
lithography technology, are traded for values in the order of a hundred million euros (Ciani
et al., 2022).

The last stage of the value chain is assembling, testing, and packaging of chips. This
stage involves slicing the wafers into individual chips, packaging the chips into frames or
resin shells, and testing them. Assembly, test, and packaging are less skill- and knowledge-
intensive than the core upstream stages, representing only about 5% of the semiconductor
value added but 10-15% of physical capital expenditure (OECD Science 2023). This
segment is characterized by the presence of outsourced semiconductor assembly and test
(OSAT) companies and is more labor-intensive than capital-intensive, contrary to the
preceding segments of the production chain. OSAT companies receive as inputs the
machines for the testing, cutting, and assembly of chips, as well as the lead frames and the
packaging materials. These last stages of the production process can also be done internally
in companies manufacturing chips (Ciani et al., 2022).

The value chain also sees the presence of Integrated Device Manufacturers (IDMs),
which are companies that integrate the three core production stages: the design, the
manufacturing, and the assembling, testing, and packaging of semiconductor devices, while
others are specialized in a single stage.

2.1.3. Semiconductor Value Chain in Trade Statistics

The Semiconductor Value Chain can also be analyzed through the lens of trade
statistics. Even though understanding the value chain through trade statistics presents
significant challenges due to the limitations of existing trade measurement methods whether
measured in gross or in value-added terms as in the Trade in Value Added (TiVA)
database—conventional trade statistics do not readily capture the different stages of the
semiconductor production process, OECD’s report “Measuring Distortions in International
Markets: The Semiconductor Value Chain” proposes a framework for analyzing goods
trade to analyzing semiconductor-related trade flows by categorizing trade activities into
four distinct steps within the semiconductor value chain (Figure 2.2), allowing for a more
granular understanding of trade flows at different stages of the value chain.
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Figure 2.3: Measuring goods trade in the semiconductor value chain

Source: OECD TRADE POLICY PAPER N°234 © OECD 2019

Wafer Production: This step involves the production of silicon wafers, which serve
as the fundamental material for semiconductor manufacturing. It requires raw materials
such as silicon and inputs such as photographic sheets. The manufacturing process relies
on specialized machinery designed to produce and measure wafers.

Semiconductor Fabrication: This stage covers the actual production of

semiconductor chips on silicon wafers through complex fabrication processes. It involves
various inputs, including sheets, mirrors, and lenses, as well as manufacturing equipment
such as fans, heat units, and purifying machinery. The output of this stage is functional
semiconductors that can be integrated into electronic products.

Intermediate Electronics: At this stage, semiconductors are integrated into

intermediate electronic products, which serve as inputs for final electronic goods. These
components, including tubes and transistors, serve as essential inputs for industries such as
automotive, navigation, and consumer electronics. Intermediate electronic products are
subsequently used in the production of final goods.

Final Electronics Production: This step encompasses the manufacturing of finished

electronic products, including consumer and industrial devices that incorporate
semiconductors. These products range from industrial equipment, such as data processing
and computing machines, to consumer electronics, including smartphones and cameras.
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To facilitate the trade analysis of semiconductor products, this classification

identifies key raw materials, intermediate inputs, equipment, and outputs at each stage. The
classification framework, originally developed by the Duke University Global Value
Chains Center, provides a comprehensive mapping of the electronics value chain. The
report's technical appendix further details the Harmonized System (HS) codes associated
with each step.

To systematically analyze trade flows within the semiconductor value chain, the
OECD’s framework identifies key raw materials (where applicable), intermediate inputs,
production equipment, and final outputs for each step. This classification method is based
on country-level studies conducted by Duke University’s Global Value Chains Center,
which provides a structured mapping of the electronics value chain. The OECD report’s
technical appendix specifies the Harmonized System (HS) codes associated with each stage
(shown in Figure 2.3), allowing for a more granular examination of trade patterns.

From a theoretical perspective, this approach enables researchers and policymakers

to better understand trade flows across different stages of the semiconductor value chain,
even when standard trade statistics do not provide explicit breakdowns. By identifying the
countries and economic regions involved at each stage, this framework offers insights into
global supply chain dependencies, regional specialization, and trade imbalances in
semiconductor-related goods. Moreover, it helps assess which economies are primarily
engaged in upstream activities (e.g., raw material and wafer production) versus downstream
activities (e.g., final electronics assembly and export), thereby facilitating more informed
trade and industrial policy decisions.
 23

Figure 2.4: Goods classification for the semiconductor value chain

 24

Source: Annex A. Technical appendix, OECD TRADE POLICY PAPER N°234 © OECD 2019

2.2. Related Researches

There have been several foreign research articles on the position of a country in the
semiconductor value chain or empirical studies of semiconductor trade flows of different
researchers around the world. Here are some specific research articles on this topic:
 25

2.2.1. The position of the EU in the semiconductor value chain: Evidence on trade,
foreign acquisitions, and ownership - Ciani, Andrea; Nardo, Michela (2022)

This research is to learn about the European Union's (EU) position in the global
semiconductor value chain, focusing on trade dynamics, foreign acquisitions, and
ownership structures. EU countries increased their integration into the world value chain of
electrical and optical equipment, the sector to which semiconductors belong, over the period
2007-2019 due to an increased reliance on imports of intermediates (i.e., backward
integration) from China, Taiwan, and South Korea, observed from 2016 onwards.

The study uses product-level trade data from Comext, firm-level ownership data
from Orbis-BvD, and foreign direct investment (FDI) data from Zephyr-BvD to assess the
EU’s trade balance, foreign acquisitions, and ownership structures in the semiconductor
sector.

The findings show that the EU is a net importer of critical semiconductor

components, such as transistors, diodes, and electronic integrated circuits, primarily
sourced from China and Taiwan. Conversely, the EU is a net exporter of semiconductor
manufacturing equipment, with key exports directed to leading chip-producing nations like
China, Taiwan, and South Korea. This trade dynamic underscores the EU's reliance on
external suppliers for advanced semiconductor technologies, particularly for the most
cutting-edge chips (10nm and below), which are predominantly produced in South Korea
and Taiwan.

Research shows the EU's strengths lie in upstream segments of the value chain,
particularly in the supply of chemicals, gases, and manufacturing equipment. EU
companies account for 34% of the global turnover in chemical and gas supplies for
semiconductor production and 27% of turnover in semiconductor manufacturing
equipment, closely trailing U.S. firms. However, the EU's presence in downstream
segments, such as chip production and design, is negligible, with Taiwanese and South
Korean firms leading in foundries and U.S. companies dominating fabless design. This
finding aligns with earlier research by De Jong (2020) and Kleinhans and Baisakova (2020),
who emphasize the EU's strengths in input supply but limited presence in advanced
 26

manufacturing and design. From there, making many recommendations for policymakers
and related businesses.

However, the research paper still has many limitations. There is an absence of basic
research related to semiconductors done in universities or other public/private entities. In
addition, the analysis has uneven coverage across jurisdictions, with richer data for Europe
compared to the US and China. This limits the ability to draw a comprehensive global
comparison.

2.2.2. China’s interdependent positioning in the semiconductor global value chain -

Grimes and Debin Du (2024)
This study analyzes China’s evolving positioning within the semiconductor GVC,
highlighting its initial integration as a lower value-added participant in assembly,
packaging, and testing.
Despite China's vast domestic demand for semiconductors and significant state
investment, its local firms continue to struggle with upgrading to higher-value segments
due to challenges in accessing intellectual property and advanced manufacturing
technologies. This finding aligns with research on latecomer economies, which suggests
that while participation in high-tech GVCs fosters industrial upgrading, it also risks
entrenching economies in lower value-added functions (Lee, 2021; Saxenian, 2006).
The study also emphasizes the geopolitical challenges China faces, particularly U.S.
sanctions limiting access to cutting-edge semiconductor technology. While China’s
government has heavily invested in domestic semiconductor production, the study finds
that self-sufficiency remains a long-term challenge due to the industry’s high capital
intensity and globalized supply chains.
The study applies a Global Value Chain (GVC) framework, using trade data and
interviews with industry experts from 2010–2023 to assess China’s role in semiconductor
production, trade, and technology dependencies. The study also provides a methodological
framework for analyzing GVC integration, emphasizing the importance of understanding
how value is added across different segments and locations.
However, the study has several limitations that reduce its applicability to Vietnam
and other emerging economies. China’s semiconductor development has been state-driven
with massive investment, which may not be a feasible model for smaller economies. It also
 27

lacks a detailed breakdown of China’s semiconductor value chain segments, treating the
industry as a whole rather than analyzing specific roles in chip design, wafer fabrication,
ATP, and semiconductor equipment production. This makes it difficult to compare China’s
experience with other nations’ current semiconductor development stages.

2.2.3. Taiwan and the global semiconductor supply chain - Tung, Chen-Yuan (2024)

This research paper provides valuable insights into how Taiwan’s semiconductor
industry has achieved a dominant position, highlighting the significance of a strong
domestic ecosystem, government support, and global integration.

The study utilizes trade data from UN Comtrade and Taiwan’s Bureau of Foreign
Trade to analyze Taiwan’s semiconductor exports, imports, and supply chain linkages. It
also examines policy shifts in major economies to assess their impact on Taiwan’s
semiconductor industry.

Taiwan has emerged as a global leader in semiconductor manufacturing, hosting the

world’s most advanced foundries and packaging and testing facilities. Taiwanese firms
such as Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) and United
Microelectronics Corporation (UMC) dominate the global market, accounting for 63.8% of
foundry production and 58.6% of packaging and testing. Taiwan’s semiconductor industry
is characterized by the presence of world-leading firms such as TSMC, UMC, MediaTek,
and Silicon Motion Technology Corporation. Notably, Taiwan produces approximately
70% of chips under seven nanometers and is at the forefront of two-nanometer process
research. This technological superiority is supported by government initiatives, industry-
academic collaboration, and talent development programs.

The global reliance on Taiwan’s semiconductor production underscores the

vulnerability of the supply chain to disruptions. A significant disruption in Taiwan’s
semiconductor output would have devastating effects on the global economy, highlighting
the importance of supply chain resilience and stability. This context emphasizes the need
for countries to position themselves strategically within the semiconductor value chain,
either as producers, intermediaries, or consumers, to mitigate risks and capitalize on growth
opportunities.
 28

Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs has identified three key areas for
international collaboration in the semiconductor industry: (1) joining Taiwan’s core cluster,
(2) exploring the growing market for semiconductor equipment and materials, and (3)
establishing operations and research centers to tap into the fast-growing Asian market.

However, the study does not propose specific diversification strategies. As

semiconductor supply chains shift, emerging hubs like Vietnam need clearer guidance on
alternative trade partners and supply chain resilience strategies. Moreover, while the study
evaluates U.S. and EU semiconductor policies affecting Taiwan, it does not explore policy
frameworks that could benefit emerging players. For Vietnam, a tailored policy analysis is
crucial in understanding how it can attract investment and upgrade its semiconductor
capabilities.

2.2.4. Analyzing South Korea’s Semiconductor Industry: Trade Dynamics and Global
Position- Hyung-gon JEONG (2024)

The study explores how South Korea, deeply integrated with China in the
semiconductor value chain, faces increasing challenges due to the restructuring of global
supply chains and growing self-sufficiency efforts by major economies like the U.S., China,
and Japan.

The report’s finding is that South Korea’s dependence on China, which absorbs
35.8% of its semiconductor exports and supplies 25.3% of its imports. This reliance exposes
the industry to geopolitical risks, particularly from U.S. sanctions on Chinese technology
firms. Additionally, South Korea faces trade deficits in semiconductor equipment, relying
heavily on Japan, the Netherlands, and the U.S. for advanced manufacturing tools.

The study employs detailed trade data from the Korea Customs Service (2019–2023)
and classifies 381 semiconductor-related products under the 10-digit Harmonized System
(HS). It integrates UN Comtrade data to assess South Korea’s semiconductor trade flows
and market position. This structured approach provides valuable insights into South
Korea’s semiconductor value chain, particularly in tracking export concentration and
supply chain vulnerabilities.
 29

Despite its depth, Jeong (2024) has several key limitations: It lacks historical insights
into how South Korea developed its semiconductor industry, limiting its usefulness for
countries looking to replicate its success.

Secondly, it does not fully differentiate between key stages of the semiconductor
value chain. While it categorizes semiconductors into memory, system, and equipment, it
does not analyze South Korea’s positioning across wafer fabrication, chip design, and ATP
(assembly, testing, and packaging). This omission makes it difficult to assess which parts
of the value chain are most vulnerable to foreign dependence.

2.2.5. Vulnerabilities in the semiconductor supply chain, OECD Science, Technology

and Industry Working Papers (2023)

The study highlights the high geographic concentration of semiconductor

production, with China, Taiwan, and South Korea accounting for 60% of global
semiconductor value-added in 2018. This concentration increases supply chain
vulnerabilities, as disruptions in any of these economies could trigger widespread shortages.

Another key insight is that semiconductors contribute 8% of the total value in ICT
and electronics industries—higher than even primary energy sources. This underscores the
critical role of semiconductors in global manufacturing, particularly in automobiles,
consumer electronics, and telecommunications.

The report also reveals a clear segmentation in semiconductor specialization: China

dominates in Discrete, Analog, and Other (DAO) semiconductors. Taiwan leads in logic
chips, particularly advanced nodes below 7nm. South Korea specializes in memory chips.
This lack of diversification creates systemic risks, as supply chain disruptions in a single
country could significantly impact global production.

The study utilizes Inter-Country Input-Output (ICIO) tables to trace semiconductor

trade flows separately from the broader electronics sector. The Foreign Input Reliance
(FIR) measure quantifies each country's dependence on foreign semiconductor imports.
Additionally, the study uses highly disaggregated UN Comtrade trade data to analyze the
concentration of semiconductor exports and specialized capital goods (e.g., wafer
 30

fabrication equipment).

Despite offering valuable insights, the OECD (2023) study exhibits several notable
limitations. One of the most significant drawbacks of the study is its reliance on ICIO data
from 1995 to 2018. Given the rapid changes in the semiconductor industry, the exclusion
of more recent trade data limits the study’s ability to capture post-2018 trends.

Secondly, while the report provides a strong analysis of major semiconductor-

producing nations, it does not sufficiently address the role of emerging economies like
Vietnam, Malaysia, or Thailand in the semiconductor supply chain. This omission is
particularly problematic given that Vietnam’s semiconductor exports have been growing at
an annual rate of 12% since 2018, driven by increased foreign direct investment (FDI) from
major players such as Intel, Samsung, and Amkor.

Finally, the study does not sufficiently differentiate between key stages of the
semiconductor value chain. While it acknowledges the importance of the sector, it does not
distinguish between chip design, wafer fabrication, ATP, and semiconductor equipment
manufacturing. This omission makes it difficult to assess the role of Vietnam, which is
primarily engaged in ATP rather than high-value segments like design and fabrication.

2.2.6. Conclusion of Previous Study

Previous studies consistently emphasized the strategic importance of the

semiconductor industry as a backbone of modern technology, underpinning advancements
in AI, IoT, 5G, cloud computing, and autonomous vehicles. Studies also agree on the highly
fragmented and specialized nature of the global semiconductor supply chain, where
different regions play distinct roles—the U.S. in R&D and design, Taiwan in advanced
fabrication, South Korea in memory chips, and China in assembly and packaging.
Additionally, research highlighted the vulnerabilities in semiconductor supply chains, trade
dependencies, and geopolitical risks affecting global semiconductor production and
distribution, reshaping global supply chain dynamics and influencing trade flows.

Research on China and South Korea highlights the challenges faced by latecomer
countries in moving up the value chain, particularly in accessing higher value-added
 31

segments like design and advanced manufacturing. This mirrors Vietnam’s current position
and its aspirations to enhance its role in the semiconductor industry. Studies on Taiwan and
South Korea emphasize the critical role of government policies, R&D investment, and
industry-academia collaboration in fostering semiconductor industry growth. This aligns
with our objective of proposing strategic recommendations for Vietnam’s integration into
the semiconductor value chain.

However, previous studies have only looked at discussing supply chain resilience
and often focus on existing industry leaders such as the U.S., Taiwan, South Korea, China,
and Japan, with limited exploration of emerging players like Vietnam and their potential to
integrate into the global ecosystem. This creates a gap in understanding how smaller or
developing economies can effectively integrate into the semiconductor industry or
transition from low-value ATP activities to higher-value segments, such as chip design and
wafer fabrication. Since then, we have found our direction to develop this research.

Therefore, our team believes that this research topic will be different from previous
studies in considering the role of emerging economies like Vietnam in the global
semiconductor value chain. From there, readers will have a more intuitive view of
Vietnam’s current standing in the global semiconductor value chain. This approach will not
only fill a critical gap in the existing literature but also offer practical recommendations for
policymakers and industry stakeholders to strengthen Vietnam’s position in this
strategically important sector.
 32

CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN

3.1. Research Process Design

Research questions and

Research problem
Research objectives

Literature review Research model

Quantitative
Research Data Collection

Data Processing

Data Analysis

Findings Data Visualization

Figure 3.1: Research Process

 33

3.2. Data Collection

The initial input dataset used in this study was collected from BACI, which provides
detailed bilateral trade statistics at both the 4-digit and 6-digit HS code levels for all
countries worldwide from 2014 to 2023.

The variables extracted from BACI are presented in Table 3.1

Table 3.1: Description of Key Variables
Variable Description
exp_name Name of the country exporting the goods.
i Three-letter ISO country code for the exporter.
imp_name Name of the country importing the goods.
j Three-letter ISO country code for the importer.
year The year in which the trade transaction took place.
prod_group4 4-digit classification of the traded product (HS system).
prod_group6 6-digit classification of the traded product (HS system).
description Description of the product at the 6-digit HS level.
v Total export value received by the exporting country for a specific 6-digit HS
product. (1000 USD)
world_trade_all Total global trade value across all product categories. (1000 USD)
world_prod6 Total trade value for a specific 6-digit HS product worldwide. (1000 USD)
world_prod4 Total trade value for a specific 4-digit HS product worldwide. (1000 USD)
exp_allprod Total value of all goods exported by the exporter in a given year. (1000 USD)
exp_prod4 Total export value for a specific 4-digit HS product worldwide. (1000 USD)
exp_prod6 Total export value for a specific 6-digit HS product worldwide. (1000 USD)
imp_allprod Total value of all goods imported by the importer in a given year. (1000 USD)
imp_prod4 Total import value for a specific 4-digit HS product worldwide. (1000 USD)
imp_prod6 Total import value for a specific 6-digit HS product worldwide. (1000 USD)
keep Indicator of data validity (1 for valid, 0 for potential inconsistencies).

3.3. Data Processing

To ensure the relevance of the dataset for analyzing Vietnam’s position in the
semiconductor value chain, the raw trade data underwent a data cleaning and filtering
 34

process. Specifically, only trade transactions involving semiconductor-related products—

as classified by the OECD semiconductor product classification—were retained for further
analysis with the assistance of RStudio software.

The selected HS codes are shown in Table 3.2. This refined dataset enables a more
precise assessment of Vietnam's role within the global semiconductor supply chain by
focusing exclusively on relevant product categories.

Table 3.2: HS Code of Semiconductor-related products (by OECD)

HS Code Description
280461 Silicon high purity
284920 Silicon carbide
282560 Germanium
370130 Photographic plates and film
370199 Photographic plates and film
370790 Photographic goods
811290 Gallium Arsenide
848610 Machines for the manufacture of semiconductor boules or wafers
848690 Parts and accessories
903082 Instrument for measuring or checking semiconductor wafers or devices
903141 Optical instruments for inspecting semiconductor wafers
381800 Silicon wafers
900120 Sheets of semiconductor
900190 Lenses for semiconductor
900211 Objective lenses
900220 Optical filters
900290 Mirrors
901210 Electron microscopes for semiconductor inspection
901290 Parts of electron microscopes
903082 Instruments for measuring semiconductor devices
903141 Optical instruments inspecting semiconductor devices
841459 Fans for cooling microprocessors
841950 Heat exchange units
842121 Liquid filtering or purifying machinery
 35

842139 Filtering or purifying machinery and apparatus

842199 Parts of filtering for semiconductor manufacturing
848620
Machines for the manufacture of semiconductor
848640
848690 Parts and accessories
8542 Integrated circuits
854231 Processors and controllers
854232 Memories
854233 Amplifiers
854239 Others
854290 Micro assemblies
852351 Non-volatile storage
852352 Smart cards
852359 Solid-state storage
853290 Passive: Electrical capacitors
853310 Passive: Electrical resistors
8534 Printed circuits
8540 Tubes
854110 Electrical apparatus; diodes
854121
Electrical apparatus transistors
854129
851190
852729 Automotive Ignition or starting equipment
854430
901210
Microscopes
901290
901490 Navigational instruments
902490 Machines accessories for those testing hardness
902790 Microtomes
902890 Meters
902990 Meters and counters
903090
Instruments, for measuring electrical quantities
903190
 36

903290
Regulating or controlling instruments
903300
8473 Machinery; parts and accessories
851761 Base stations
851762
Communication apparatus
851769
851890 Microphones, headphones, earphones, amplifier
852290 Sound or video recording apparatus
852990 Transmission apparatus
900690 Photographic flashlight apparatus
Computers and office
8470 Calculating machines
8471 Automatic data processing machines
8472 Office machines; not elsewhere classified
Industrial equipment
8526 Radar apparatus, radio navigational
9014
Navigational instruments
9022
9027 Gas or smoke analysis apparatus, for physical or chemical analysis
9028 Meters; gas, supply
9029 Meters and counters
9030 Instruments for measuring or detecting ionizing radiations
851712 Telephones for cellular networks or for other wireless networks
851718 Telephone sets n.e.c. in item no. 8517.1
Apparatus for the transmission or reception of voice, images or other data,
851770 via
85181 Microphones and stands therefor
852580 Transmission apparatus for radio-broadcasting or television
8528 Monitors and projectors, not incorporating television reception apparatus
9006 Cameras, photographic
950430
Games; video game consoles and machines
950450

3.4. Data Analysis

 37

Once the dataset was processed, key Trade Performance Indicators (TPIs) were
computed to assess Vietnam’s trade position within the semiconductor value chain. The
analysis was conducted in a three-tiered approach:

1. Value Chain Step-Level Analysis

Computation of the total average export and import values of semiconductor-

related products at each value chain step, aggregated annually over the period
2014–2023.

The calculation of trade balance to assess whether Vietnam exhibited a trade

surplus or deficit in each step of the semiconductor value chain.

2. Product Group-Level Analysis within Each Step

Computation of total average export and import values for product groups
within each value chain step, aggregated annually from 2014 to 2023.

Computation of the Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) for each

product group to assess long-term growth trends.

3. HS Code-Level Assessment

Computation of total average export and import values for individual HS

products on an annual basis over 2014–2023.

Calculation of the percentage contribution of each HS product to the total

trade value within its respective product group.

Before computing the trade performance indicators at different analytical levels, a

Preliminary Trade Data Aggregation analysis of the selected semiconductor-related
products was conducted. The following key calculations were performed:

1. The computation of the total export and import values for each selected HS
code was aggregated annually from 2014 to 2023.

2. The average total export and import values of each selected HS code were
 38

computed for the entire period of 2014–2023, providing a baseline measure

of Vietnam’s trade activity in semiconductor-related products.

3. The CAGR was calculated for each selected HS code to assess long-term
trade growth trends and identify high-growth segments within Vietnam’s
semiconductor trade.

This preliminary data processing ensured a structured and data-driven foundation

for the subsequent analysis of Vietnam’s trade performance across different levels of the
semiconductor value chain. The specific results are presented in APPENDIX 1 at the end
of the report.

The next section will detail the methodologies and formulas applied to compute
these trade indicators.

3.4.1. Value Chain Step-Level Analysis

To assess Vietnam’s trade position across different stages of the semiconductor

value chain, the selected HS codes were first categorized into distinct Value Chain Steps,
as defined by the OECD semiconductor product classification. The following calculations
were then applied:

1. Aggregation of Trade Values by Step

Only 6-digit HS codes were retained for analysis. The total average export
and import values of all selected HS codes within each Value Chain Step
were computed for the entire period 2014–2023, using the formula:

where:

N is the number of HS codes classified under a given Value Chain Step.

 39

Avg Export and Avg Import are the annual average export/import values for
each HS code over 2014–2023.

Values are converted to Billion USD for standardization.

2. Trade Balance Calculation

The Trade Balance for each Value Chain Step was derived by computing the
difference between total exports and total imports:

These calculations provide a high-level overview of Vietnam’s trade performance

across different stages of the semiconductor value chain, setting the foundation for further
in-depth analysis at the Product Group-Level and HS Code-Level.

3.4.2. Product Group-Level Analysis within Each Step

To further investigate Vietnam’s position in each step within the semiconductor

value chain, a more granular analysis was conducted at the product group level. This
approach allows for the assessment of trade performance across different categories of
goods, as classified by the OECD semiconductor product classification.

First, all HS codes classified under Steps were filtered based on the OECD-defined
semiconductor product list. The selected HS codes were then grouped into four distinct
categories within each step: Step 1: Wafer Production (Raw Materials, Inputs, Equipment,
Outputs); Step 2: Semiconductor Production (Inputs, Equipment, Outputs); Step 3:
Intermediate Electronics (Inputs, Output 1: Intermediate Industry, Output 2: Intermediate
Consumer); Step 4: Final Electronics (Output 1: Final Industry, Output 2: Final Consumer).

For each product category, the following calculations were then applied:

1. Aggregation of Trade Values by Product Category

The average total export and import values of all selected HS codes were
computed over the period 2014–2023 using the following formulas:
 40

where:

N is the number of HS codes classified under a given product category in Step

Avg Export and Avg Import represent the annual average export/import
values for each HS code over 2014–2023.

Values are converted to Billion USD for comparability.

2. Calculation of Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR)

For each product category, the average CAGR across all included HS codes
was calculated for both exports and imports using the formula:

Where: N is the number of HS codes in the product category.

3.4.3. HS Code-Level Assessment

HS Code-Level Assessment focuses on the highest-contributing product category

within each value chain step, allowing for a more detailed comparison of trade performance
across specific semiconductor-related goods.

Within each value chain step, the product category with the highest trade value share
was identified. Only HS codes belonging to this selected category were retained for further
analysis, based on the OECD semiconductor product classification.
 41

For each HS code in the selected product category, the following calculations were
then applied:

1. Comparison of the average total export and import values of each HS code
were computed for the entire period 2014–2023, which have been pre-
calculated in the Preliminary Trade Data Aggregation.

2. Contribution of Each HS Code to the Selected Product Category

To assess the relative importance of each HS code within the selected product
category, the percentage contribution to the total export and import values
was calculated as follows:

where: Total Export_Category and Total Import_Category represent the total

average export and import values of all HS codes in the selected product
category within the value chain step.

3.5. Data Visualization

To enhance the interpretation of Vietnam’s trade performance in the semiconductor

value chain, key findings were visualized, also using RStudio.

Appropriate chart types were selected to effectively represent the trade patterns and
trends. Mostly a combination of bar and line charts to illustrate trade values and growth
trends simultaneously. Bar charts were used to represent the average total export and import
values. Line charts were overlaid to display the Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR)
of both exports and imports over the period 2014–2023. Custom color schemes were
applied to distinguish between different trade indicators. Titles, subtitles, and axis labels
were added for clarity.
 42

CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH RESULT

4.1. Position of Vietnam by Semiconductor Value Chain Step

This section presents findings from the Value Chain Step-Level Analysis, which
evaluates Vietnam’s trade performance across different stages of the semiconductor value
chain. The results are derived from the average total export and import values over the
period 2014–2023, as well as the corresponding trade balance for each stage. Table 4.1
provides detailed numerical results. However, before delving into the step-level assessment,
it is crucial to first examine Vietnam’s overall integration into the global semiconductor
value chain to extract some first insights.

At the global level, as illustrated in Figure 4.1, the semiconductor trade remains
highly concentrated among a few dominant economies, with China, Taiwan, South Korea,
and the United States leading both exports and imports. Between 2014 and 2023, China
accounted for 29.24% of global semiconductor exports, followed by Taiwan (10.29%),
South Korea (8.85%), and the United States (6.64%). On the import side, Hong Kong SAR
was the largest market, accounting for 14.34%, followed by China (13.8%) and the United
States (11.8%).
Figure 4.1: Export and Import Shares in Global Semiconductor Trade, Avg 2014-2023
Export and Import Shares of Countries in Global Semiconductor Trade
Shares of world exports (left) and imports (right) in value, %, average 2014−2023 data

China 29.24 China, Hong Kong SAR 14.34

Taiwan 10.29 China 13.8
Rep. of Korea 8.85 USA 11.8
USA 6.64 Other 8.83
Japan 5.82 Singapore 5.05
Malaysia 5.46 Rep. of Korea 4.64
Viet Nam 5.24 Taiwan 4.53
Singapore 4.27 Japan 4.12
Germany 3.59 Germany 4.06
Other 3.1 Viet Nam 2.91
Netherlands 2.52 Mexico 2.62
Mexico 1.95 Malaysia 2.45
Philippines 1.79 Netherlands 2.38
Thailand 1.65 United Kingdom 1.82
China, Hong Kong SAR 1.13 India 1.73
France 0.95 France 1.58
Ireland 0.9 United Arab Emirates 1.33
United Kingdom 0.82 Thailand 1.3
Czechia 0.74 Canada 1.18
United Arab Emirates 0.62 Czechia 1.06
Italy 0.62 Poland 1.02
Israel 0.52 Philippines 1
Poland 0.48 Italy 0.99
India 0.44 Spain 0.82
Sweden 0.41 Russian Federation 0.78
Hungary 0.4 Brazil 0.76
Austria 0.37 Australia 0.69
Canada 0.33 Hungary 0.67
Romania 0.31 Indonesia 0.65
Belgium 0.28 Sweden 0.58
Slovakia 0.26 Belgium 0.52
0 10 20 30 0 10 20 30
Export Share (%) Import Share (%)

Source: Our analysis result

 43

Within this global landscape, Vietnam emerged as a notable player with an average
export share of 5.24% and an import share of 2.91% from 2014 to 2023, positioning
Vietnam among the top ten semiconductor-exporting nations. This trade pattern suggests
that Vietnam has been increasingly integrated into the global semiconductor supply chain.

However, a high export share alone does not necessarily imply strong domestic
semiconductor production capabilities. The data does not provide direct evidence of
Vietnam’s involvement in high-value-added activities such as wafer fabrication and chip
design, which require advanced technological capabilities and capital-intensive
infrastructure. Instead, the country’s trade structure raises the possibility that Vietnam’s
role is predominantly centered around lower-value segments of the supply chain, such as
assembly, testing, and packaging (ATP)—a common entry point for emerging economies
in the semiconductor industry.

Furthermore, while Vietnam’s export share significantly exceeds its import share,
suggesting an export-driven production model, this does not inherently indicate the
existence of a fully developed domestic semiconductor ecosystem. The observed trade
surplus may reflect the presence of foreign direct investment (FDI)-led manufacturing,
where multinational corporations leverage Vietnam as a production hub while critical
upstream processes—such as raw material sourcing, wafer fabrication, and chip design—
remain concentrated in other countries. This quantitative overview establishes a foundation
for further investigation into Vietnam’s specific role at different stages of the
semiconductor supply chain, providing a necessary context for evaluating its position in the
global value chain.

To further examine Vietnam’s role in different steps of the semiconductor

production process, Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 present Vietnam’s export and import shares
across different value chain steps compared to the top 10 countries. These figures provide
a more detailed perspective on Vietnam’s trade structure by distinguishing between key
stages, namely: Step 1 (Silicon Wafer Production), Step 2 (Semiconductor Fabrication),
Step 3 (Intermediate Electronics Incorporating Semiconductors), and Step 4 (Final
 44

Electronics Products).

Figure 4.2: Top 10 Exporters in Each Semiconductor Value Chain Step

Top 10 Export Share by Country in Each Semiconductor Value Chain Step

Step_1 Step_2
China China
Japan Japan
USA USA
Singapore Singapore
Taiwan Taiwan
Rep. of Korea Rep. of Korea
Malaysia Malaysia
Germany Germany
Netherlands Netherlands
Israel Philippines
Country

0 5 10 15 20 25 0 5 10 15
Step_3 Step_4
China China
Japan Japan
USA USA
Viet Nam Viet Nam
Taiwan Taiwan
Rep. of Korea Rep. of Korea
Mexico Germany
Malaysia Netherlands
Germany United Arab Emirates
Netherlands China, Hong Kong SAR
0 10 20 30 0 20 40
Export Share (%)

Step_1 Step_2 Step_3 Step_4

Source: Our analysis result

Figure 4.2 displays the top 10 exporters in each step of the semiconductor value
chain. No presence in Step 1 confirms that Vietnam does not participate in the earliest stage
of semiconductor manufacturing, which is dominated by countries such as Japan, the United
States, South Korea, and Taiwan—all of which have advanced capabilities in wafer
production and raw material processing. In Step 2, which involves wafer processing and
chip manufacturing, remains concentrated in Taiwan, South Korea, the United States, and
China. Vietnam’s absence in this category underscores its lack of advanced fabrication
infrastructure and technological capacity for chip production. Vietnam appears in Step 3
and Step 4 Vietnam appears in these stages, indicating that its semiconductor trade activity
is closely linked to downstream electronics manufacturing rather than core semiconductor
production.
 45

Figure 4.3: Top 10 Importers in Each Semiconductor Value Chain Step

Top 10 Import Share by Country in Each Semiconductor Value Chain Step

Step_1 Step_2
China China
USA USA
Taiwan Taiwan
China, Hong Kong SAR China, Hong Kong SAR
Singapore Singapore
Rep. of Korea Rep. of Korea
Japan Japan
Germany Germany
Netherlands Malaysia
Malaysia Viet Nam
Country

0 5 10 15 20 0 5 10 15 20
Step_3 Step_4
China China
USA USA
China, Hong Kong SAR China, Hong Kong SAR
Singapore Rep. of Korea
Rep. of Korea Japan
Japan Germany
Germany United Arab Emirates
Mexico Viet Nam
Netherlands United Kingdom
United Kingdom India
0 5 10 15 0 5 10 15
Import Share (%)

Step_1 Step_2 Step_3 Step_4

Source: Our analysis result

Figure 4.3 presents the top 10 importers across the same value chain steps. Unlike
key semiconductor-producing countries such as Taiwan, South Korea, and the United
States, Vietnam does not feature prominently in the import of raw wafers or semiconductor
fabrication equipment. This suggests that Vietnam does not host large-scale wafer
fabrication plants, further reinforcing the notion that its role is limited to the later stages of
the supply chain. Vietnam imports significant amounts of semiconductors for use in
intermediate and final electronic products. This is consistent with the presence of major
multinational electronics manufacturers operating in Vietnam, such as Samsung and Intel,
which depend on imported chips for local assembly and testing processes.

This import-export pattern highlights Vietnam’s varying role across different steps
of the semiconductor production process. Specifically, Vietnam exhibits a trade deficit in
the upstream stages of semiconductor production while achieving a trade surplus in
downstream stages (Figure 4.4).
 46

Figure 4.4: Vietnam's Position by Semiconductor Value Chain Step

Vietnam's Position by Semiconductor Value Chain Step

Total Average Export, Import Value & Trade Balance (2014−2023)

40

Surplus
Billion USD

Deficit

20

Export
Import

Step 1: Step 2: Step 3: Step 4:

Wafer Production Semiconductors Intermediate Electronics Final Electronics

Source: Our analysis result

To better understand these dynamics, Table 4.1 presents the total average export and
import values, along with the corresponding trade balance, for each stage of the
semiconductor value chain.

Table 4.1: Total Average Export and Import value, Trade Balance of Each Step
Total Average Export Total Average Import Trade Balance
Step
(Billion USD) (Billion USD) (Billion USD)
1 0.4031325 1.038322 -0.6351892
2 19.5296486 28.151280 -8.6216313
3 17.0243154 6.089054 10.9352612
4 55.6914544 16.133686 39.5577687

Source: Our analysis result

Looking at Vietnam’s total trade performance across the four semiconductor value
chain steps, the country recorded an average total export value of $92.65 billion and an
average total import value of $51.41 billion over the 2014–2023 period. This resulted in an
 47

overall trade surplus of $41.24 billion, highlighting Vietnam’s strong position as a net
exporter of semiconductor-related products. However, the figures confirm that Vietnam’s
strength in the semiconductor value chain lies primarily in downstream activities such as
electronic assembly and testing, rather than in core semiconductor manufacturing.

In Step 1: the production of silicon wafers, Vietnam plays a negligible role in wafer
production, with exports valued at only $0.4 billion while imports reached $1.04 billion.
This resulted in a trade deficit of -$0.64 billion. Wafer production is a highly specialized
and capital-intensive process dominated by countries such as Taiwan, Korean, Japan, and
China. According to the Global Wafer Capacity Report 2021-2025, as of December 2020,
Taiwan led the global wafer capacity with a 21.4% share, followed by South Korea (20.4%),
while Japan and China each held approximately 15.3%. Vietnam’s minimal participation
in this stage suggests a lack of domestic production capabilities and heavy reliance on
imported silicon wafers for downstream manufacturing.

In Step 2: the fabrication of semiconductors, Vietnam exported $19.53 billion worth

of products but imported $28.15 billion, leading to a trade deficit of -$8.62 billion. This
deficit highlights Vietnam’s dependence on external sources for semiconductor
manufacturing. While the country has attracted investments from companies like Intel and
Samsung for assembly and testing, it has yet to develop a strong domestic semiconductor
fabrication industry.

In Step 3: the use of semiconductors in intermediate electronics, Vietnam's position

strengthens significantly. The country exported $17.02 billion worth of products while
importing only $6.09 billion, resulting in a trade surplus of +$10.93 billion. This surplus
indicates Vietnam’s growing role in the assembly of intermediate electronic components.
The country has leveraged its cost-effective manufacturing environment to become a key
supplier to global electronics producers, particularly those based in China, South Korea,
and the United States, such as Samsung, Intel, and Amkor Technology. Furthermore,
Nvidia has recently signed agreements with several partners to shift part of its production
chain from other countries to Vietnam, with a committed investment of $4–4.5 billion over
the next four years.
 48

In Step 4: the production of final electronics incorporating semiconductors, Vietnam

achieves the highest trade surplus in final electronics, indicating its strength as a global
manufacturing hub for finished electronic products. Exports in this category reached $55.69
billion, while imports stood at $16.13 billion, leading to a trade surplus of +$39.56 billion.
Vietnam’s strength in this sector is largely attributed to foreign direct investment from
multinational corporations such as Apple, Samsung, and Foxconn. The country has
developed into a major electronics assembly hub, benefiting from competitive labor costs,
strong export infrastructure, and favorable trade agreements with major economies.

4.2. Position of Vietnam in Step 1: Wafer Production

This section presents the findings of the Product Group-Level Analysis for Step 1:
Wafer Production, which evaluates Vietnam’s trade performance across different product
categories. The full dataset with numerical details is provided in Table 4.2, and the
visualized result is shown on Figure 4.5.
Table 4.2: Trade Data in Step 1

Total Average Total Average

Category CAGR Export CAGR Import
Export (Billion USD) Import (Billion USD)
Raw Material 0.028376907 0.206688858 -0.452517693 0.433556131
Inputs 0.02681247 0.080614319 -0.182382 0.080791759
Equipment 0.087004976 0.181694191 0.043395532 0.171936303
Outputs 0.13864126 0.455213552 0.975583221 0.588789062

Source: Our analysis result

Vietnam's participation in this step remains limited, with imports significantly

outweighing exports across all categories. The total average export value is low, while
imports are much higher, reflecting the country's dependence on foreign suppliers for
wafer-related materials and equipment.

Raw material exports remain negligible, with an average of only $0.028 billion,
while imports are significantly higher at $0.207 billion. The compound annual growth rate
(CAGR) of exports has been negative at -45.25%, indicating a decline in Vietnam’s raw
material exports over time. Meanwhile, imports have surged with a CAGR of +43.36%,
 49

suggesting increasing dependence on foreign suppliers.

Similar to raw materials, Vietnam faces a trade deficit in semiconductor inputs. The
country exported an average of $0.027 billion while importing $0.081 billion. The CAGR
of exports stands at -18.24%, showing a downward trend, whereas imports have grown at
a rate of +8.08%. This reflects Vietnam’s reliance on external sources for essential
semiconductor inputs required in wafer production.

Wafer production equipment has seen a modest export increase, with an average
export value of $0.087 billion and a CAGR of +4.34%. However, imports have grown more
rapidly, reaching an average of $0.182 billion, with a higher CAGR of +17.19%. This
highlights Vietnam’s role as a consumer rather than a producer of advanced semiconductor
manufacturing equipment.

Among all categories, wafer outputs show the most promising growth. Exports in
this category have reached an average of $0.139 billion, with an impressive CAGR of
+97.56%. This indicates Vietnam’s growing capability in certain aspects of wafer
production. However, imports remain substantially higher at $0.455 billion, with a CAGR
of +58.88%. While the country is improving in exporting wafer-related outputs, it still relies
heavily on imported products to meet domestic demand.
 50

Figure 4.5: Vietnam's Position in Step 1

Vietnam's Position in Step 1: Wafer Production

Total Average Export, Import Value & CAGR (2014−2023)
1.0
Billion USD / CAGR

0.5
CAGR Export
CAGR Import

Total_Export
0.0
Total_Import

−0.5
Raw Material Inputs Equipment Outputs
Product Category

Source: Our analysis result

The visual representation in Figure 4.2 confirms the numerical trends observed in
the data. Imports dominate all product categories, reinforcing Vietnam’s reliance on foreign
suppliers for wafer production. The export growth rate is weak or negative in raw materials
and inputs, while it shows strong positive growth in wafer outputs.

CAGR trends highlight that, despite positive growth in output exports, Vietnam
remains far from self-sufficiency in wafer production. The steady increase in imports across
all categories, particularly in raw materials and equipment, further supports the notion that
Vietnam is dependent on external sources for the majority of its semiconductor
manufacturing needs.

4.3. Position of Vietnam in Step 2: Semiconductor Production

This section presents the findings of the Product Group-Level Analysis for Step 2:
Semiconductor Production, focusing on Vietnam’s trade performance across different
product categories. The numerical results are summarized in Table 4.3, and the visualized
 51

data is shown on Figure 4.6.

Table 4.3: Trade Data in Step 2

Total Average Total Average CAGR Export CAGR Import

Category
Export (Billion USD) Import (Billion USD) (%) (%)
Inputs 0.1454518119 0.8953022231 11.81383077 7.461752674
Equipment 0.5093176174 0.7047764738 15.52314289 5.922500500
Outputs 18.7277046555 26.0320909876 13.70005978 10.704223738

Source: Our analysis result

Vietnam's position in this step is characterized by a significant trade deficit, where

imports vastly outweigh exports across most product categories. The data suggests that
Vietnam remains a net importer of semiconductor materials and equipment, reflecting its
limited domestic production capabilities in semiconductor manufacturing. The country is
highly dependent on imported inputs, equipment, and semiconductor outputs for further
assembly and processing.

Vietnam’s exports of semiconductor inputs remain minimal compared to imports,

leading to a substantial trade deficit. The total average export value for inputs was $0.15
billion, while imports reached $0.9 billion. Although exports have grown at a CAGR of
+11.8%, imports have also increased at +7.5%, maintaining a significant gap. This suggests
that while Vietnam is increasing its role in the global supply chain, it is still highly reliant
on foreign suppliers for semiconductor inputs.

Semiconductor fabrication requires advanced machinery, which Vietnam continues

to import at high levels. The total average export value of equipment stood at $0.5 billion,
compared to an import value of $0.7 billion. However, exports in this category have shown
strong growth at a CAGR of +15.5%, while imports have grown at a lower rate of +5.9%.
This indicates that Vietnam is gradually developing domestic capabilities in semiconductor
equipment production, and if this trend continues, the country could move towards a more
balanced trade position in this category.

Semiconductor outputs, which include processed semiconductor components,

 52

account for the largest trade volume within this step. Vietnam’s exports in this category
reached an average of $18.73 billion, while imports stood higher at $26.03 billion. Exports
have grown at a strong CAGR of +13.7%, whereas imports have increased at +10.7%. This
suggests that while Vietnam is improving its capacity to export semiconductor outputs,
domestic demand for semiconductor components in its electronics manufacturing sector
remains high, driving substantial import volumes.

Figure 4.6: Vietnam's Position in Step 2

Vietnam's Position in Step 2: Semiconductor Production

Total Average Export, Import Value & CAGR (2014−2023) − Selected Categories
30 100

75

20 CAGR Export
Billion USD

CAGR (%)
CAGR Import

50

Total_Export
10
Total_Import
25

0 0

Inputs Equipment Outputs

Product Category

Source: Our analysis result

In visualized data, we can see that Imports remain significantly higher than exports
across all product categories, reinforcing Vietnam’s reliance on foreign suppliers for
semiconductor fabrication. The largest trade volume occurs in semiconductor outputs,
highlighting the importance of semiconductor fabrication to Vietnam’s broader electronics
industry.

Notably, the CAGR for exports is growing faster than imports in equipment and
outputs, suggesting that Vietnam is gradually enhancing its domestic capabilities in these
areas. However, inputs remain a critical weakness, as imports continue to dominate with
 53

limited progress in export growth.

4.3.1. Position of Vietnam in Outputs

This section presents the key findings from the HS Code-Level Assessment for Step
2: Semiconductor Production, focusing on Vietnam’s trade performance for the highest-
contributing product category. The analysis at the HS Code level allows for a deeper
understanding of Vietnam’s role in semiconductor manufacturing by identifying key
product categories that drive exports and imports. Detailed numerical results are shown in
APPENDIX 2, are visualized in Figure 4.7.

Figure 4.7: Vietnam's Position in Output (Step 2)

Vietnam's Contribution in Step 2 (Outputs)

Total Average Export, Import Value & Contribution (2014−2023)
91.7%

15

45.1%
Billion USD

10 37.1%

Export
Import

5
13.5%

5.7%
2.1% 1.5%
1.1% 0.4% 0.2% 0.8%
0.3% 0.3%
0.1% 0%0.1% 0%0.1% 0%0%
0

854231 854239 854232 854290 854233 852351 852352 852359 853290 853310
HS Code

Source: Our analysis result

Figure 4.4 shows that processors and controllers dominate Vietnam’s semiconductor
exports, reinforcing the country’s position as a major player in semiconductor assembly
and packaging. At the same time, imports of memory chips and other semiconductor
devices remain high, emphasizing Vietnam’s reliance on foreign suppliers for these
components. Furthermore, the data highlights that Vietnam maintains a negative trade
balance in multiple semiconductor categories, particularly in memory chips, micro
assemblies, and amplifiers, indicating areas where further domestic investment could help
 54

reduce dependency on imports.

HS 854231 - Processors and Controllers represent the most significant

semiconductor product in Vietnam’s export profile, accounting for 91.7% of total
semiconductor exports. The total export value in this category reached $17.17 billion,
highlighting Vietnam’s strong capabilities in the assembly and manufacturing of
processors. This trend is likely driven by foreign direct investment (FDI) from multinational
semiconductor firms that have established manufacturing and assembly operations in
Vietnam. On the import side, processors and controllers also constitute a substantial portion
of semiconductor imports, making up 45.1% of total semiconductor imports, with a total
import value of $11.73 billion. This indicates that Vietnam imports a significant quantity
of processors, likely for further assembly, packaging, and re-export.

HS 854239 - Other Semiconductor Devices make up 5.67% of Vietnam’s

semiconductor exports, with a total export value of $1.06 billion. However, on the import
side, these components account for 37.13% of total semiconductor imports, with an import
value of $9.67 billion. The large discrepancy between export and import values suggests
that Vietnam primarily imports these semiconductors for integration into electronics rather
than manufacturing them domestically.

HS 854232 - Memory Chips remain minimal, contributing only 1.08% of

semiconductor exports, with a total export value of $0.20 billion. Meanwhile, imports in
this category are significantly higher, accounting for 13.46% of total semiconductor
imports, with an import value of $3.50 billion. This highlights a substantial trade imbalance,
indicating Vietnam’s strong reliance on imported memory chips for its semiconductor and
electronics manufacturing sector.

HS 852351 - Non-Volatile Storage makes up a small portion of Vietnam’s

semiconductor trade. However, unlike other categories, Vietnam maintains a trade surplus
in this segment. The total export value of non-volatile storage reached $0.15 billion,
surpassing the total import value of $0.08 billion. This suggests that Vietnam has some
domestic production capabilities in this segment, albeit at a smaller scale.
 55

Vietnam’s trade in other semiconductor categories remains limited but still

contributes to the overall semiconductor ecosystem. HS 854290 (Micro Assemblies):
Imports ($0.54 billion) are significantly higher than exports ($0.07 billion), reflecting
continued dependence on foreign suppliers; HS 854233 (Amplifiers): Exports in this
category remain small at $0.04 billion, while imports are much higher at $0.39 billion,
highlighting a clear trade imbalance; HS 852352 (Smart Cards): Exports ($0.02 billion) and
imports ($0.08 billion) remain at modest levels, suggesting Vietnam has yet to establish a
strong foothold in smart card production; HS 852359 (Solid-State Storage): With exports
and imports both below $0.02 billion, this segment plays a minor role in Vietnam’s
semiconductor trade.

4.4. Position of Vietnam in Step 3: Intermediate Electronics

This section presents the key findings from the Product Group-Level Analysis for
Step 3: Intermediate Electronics, focusing on Vietnam’s trade performance across different
product categories. The numerical results are summarized in Table 4.4, and the data is
visualized in Figure 4.8.

Table 4.4: Trade Data in Step 3

Total Average Total Average CAGR Export CAGR Import

Category
Export (Billion USD) Import (Billion USD) (%) (%)
Inputs 0.1400249251 0.4854031076 7.394748439 10.303278518
Output 1:
Intermediate 3.0440170690 0.7770713657 12.109786115 6.304443187
Industry
Output 2:
Intermediate 13.8402734062 4.8265796800 16.111778440 3.995663268
Consumer

Source: Our analysis result

Vietnam’s role in this step is significantly stronger than in the previous steps, with
exports far exceeding imports. Indicating that Vietnam plays a strong role in intermediate
electronics production, particularly in the manufacturing and assembly of semiconductor-
 56

based components.

Vietnam’s imports of semiconductor inputs for intermediate electronics remain high,

significantly exceeding exports. The total average export value for inputs was $0.14 billion,
while imports reached $0.49 billion. With a trade deficit in this category, Vietnam relies on
external sources for materials required in intermediate electronics production. Additionally,
the higher CAGR for imports (+10.30%) compared to exports (+7.39%) suggests that this
dependency is increasing over time, making Vietnam vulnerable to fluctuations in global
supply chains.

Vietnam maintains a strong trade surplus in the industrial segment of intermediate

electronics. The total average export value in this category stood at $3.04 billion, while
imports were significantly lower at $0.78 billion. This indicates that Vietnam has developed
a strong production capacity for intermediate electronic components used in industrial
applications. Furthermore, the faster growth rate of exports (+12.1% CAGR) compared to
imports (+6.3% CAGR) highlights Vietnam’s increasing global competitiveness in this
category.

Vietnam is highly competitive in the consumer electronics segment, where exports

are almost three times higher than imports. The total average export value reached $13.84
billion, while imports stood at $4.83 billion. The high CAGR of exports (+16.11%)
indicates that Vietnam is rapidly expanding its role in producing intermediate electronic
components for consumer products. Additionally, the significantly lower CAGR for
imports (+3.99%) suggests that Vietnam is becoming less dependent on foreign imports in
this category over time, further solidifying its position as a key supplier in global consumer
electronics manufacturing.
 57

Figure 4.8: Vietnam's Position in Step 3

Vietnam's Position in Step 3: Intermediate Electronics

Total Average Export, Import Value & CAGR (2014−2023)
20 100

15 75

CAGR Export
Billion USD

CAGR (%)
CAGR Import

10 50

Total_Export
Total_Import
5 25

0 0

Inputs Output 1: Intermediate Industry Output 2: Intermediate Consumer

Product Category

Source: Our analysis result

Figure 4.8 shows that Vietnam has a significant trade surplus in both industrial and
consumer intermediate electronics, reinforcing its role as a key production hub. However,
imports of inputs remain high, highlighting the country’s continued reliance on foreign
suppliers for raw materials. Additionally, the CAGR for exports is consistently higher than
imports across all output categories, confirming Vietnam’s increasing competitiveness in
intermediate electronics production. Notably, the largest trade volume occurs in
intermediate consumer electronics, suggesting that Vietnam’s production capacity is
heavily geared toward consumer markets.

4.4.1. Position of Vietnam in Output 2: Intermediate Consumer

This section presents the key findings from the HS Code-Level Assessment for Step
3: Intermediate Electronics, focusing on Vietnam’s trade performance for the highest-
contributing product category. The total trade values and percentage contributions for each
HS code over 2014–2023 are shown in APPENDIX 3, and visualized in Figure 4.9.
 58

Figure 4.9: Vietnam's Position in Output 2 (Step 3)

Vietnam's Contribution in Step 3 (Output 2: Intermediate Consumer)

Total Average Export, Import Value & Contribution (2014−2023)
61.3%

6
Billion USD

34.2%

Export
4
Import
67.1%

16.7%
11.5%
0.9% 1.8%3.4% 1.5%
0.8% 0.2%0.6% 0% 0%
0

851762 852990 851890 851761 851769 852290 900690

HS Code

Source: Our analysis result

First, communication apparatus dominates Vietnam’s export profile, reinforcing the

country’s strong role in assembling and exporting communication devices. Second, imports
of transmission apparatus are significantly higher than exports, emphasizing Vietnam’s
reliance on foreign-sourced communication components. Third, base stations show a
relatively balanced trade profile, indicating emerging capabilities in this category. Lastly,
Vietnam maintains a trade surplus in communication apparatus but a deficit in audio-related
products, showing an uneven development of the communication electronics sector.

HS 851762 - Communication Apparatus: Vietnam has established itself as a major

exporter of communication apparatus, with total exports reaching $8.49 billion. This
category contributes over 61% of total exports in communication equipment, highlighting
Vietnam’s strong manufacturing and assembly capabilities. The relatively low import value
of $0.80 billion suggests that Vietnam is more self-reliant in this segment compared to
others, benefiting from foreign direct investment (FDI) and integration into global supply
chains.
 59

HS 852990 - Transmission Apparatus Components: While transmission apparatus

ranks as the second-largest export category, contributing 34.24% of exports with a total
export value of $4.74 billion, it is also the largest import category, accounting for 67.06%
of total imports, with an import value of $3.24 billion. This indicates that while Vietnam
exports significant volumes of transmission components, it still depends on foreign
suppliers for raw materials and advanced components needed for domestic manufacturing
and assembly.

HS 851761 - Base Stations: Vietnam’s trade in base stations is relatively balanced,

with exports totaling $0.25 billion and imports reaching $0.16 billion. While this category
only accounts for 1.83% of total exports and 3.37% of total imports, it suggests that
Vietnam has emerging capabilities in manufacturing base station equipment. This
represents a potential growth area where Vietnam could expand its role in the global
telecommunications supply chain.

HS 851769 - Other Communication Apparatus: Vietnam has a modest presence in

this category, with exports of $0.21 billion and imports of $0.04 billion. The low import
volume (0.83% of total imports) suggests that Vietnam has developed some level of self-
sufficiency in producing these devices compared to other communication equipment
categories.

HS 851890 - Microphones, Headphones, Earphones, and Amplifiers: In contrast to

its strengths in communication equipment, Vietnam runs a trade deficit in audio equipment,
with exports totaling only $0.12 billion, while imports stand at $0.55 billion. This category
represents 11.49% of total imports, indicating that Vietnam still relies heavily on foreign
suppliers for high-quality audio components.

HS 852290 - Sound or Video Recording Apparatus: Trade in this category remains

relatively insignificant, with both exports and imports below $0.03 billion. Vietnam’s
minimal involvement in this sector suggests that it has not prioritized sound or video
recording equipment in its industrial strategy.

HS 900690 - Photographic Flashlight Apparatus: This category shows no recorded

 60

trade activity, indicating that Vietnam neither produces nor imports these products in
significant quantities.

4.5. Position of Vietnam in Step 4: Final Electronics

This section presents the key findings from the Product Group-Level Analysis for
Step 4: Final Electronics, focusing on Vietnam’s trade performance across different product
categories. The numerical results are summarized in Table 4.5, then are visualized in Figure
4.10.

Table 4.5: Trade Data in Step 4

Total Average Total Average CAGR Export CAGR Import

Category
Export (Billion USD) Import (Billion USD) (%) (%)
Output 1: Final
0.1941401503 0.3432530734 15.29708258 9.882891926
Industry
Output 2: Final
55.6914544472 16.1336857089 28.14013782 11.291354255
Consumer

Source: Our analysis result

Vietnam has a dominant role in this stage, with exports significantly surpassing
import, confirming Vietnam’s strong position as a major hub for final electronics
manufacturing, particularly in consumer electronics.

Vietnam’s participation in final industrial electronics remains limited, with

relatively low export values compared to other categories. The total average export value
in this segment was $0.19 billion, while imports reached $0.34 billion. This trade deficit
suggests that Vietnam is still dependent on imports for specialized industrial electronics.

Despite the trade deficit, the sector shows promising signs of growth. The compound
annual growth rate (CAGR) for exports stands at +13.65%, which is higher than the CAGR
for imports at +8.83%. This indicates that Vietnam is gradually developing its capabilities
in industrial electronics and has the potential to expand its role in this category over time.

Vietnam has established itself as a dominant force in final consumer electronics

 61

manufacturing. Exports in this category reached an average of $55.69 billion, while imports
stood at $16.13 billion. This significant trade surplus highlights Vietnam’s strong position
as a key supplier of consumer electronics to global markets.

The export sector in final consumer electronics is also experiencing rapid expansion,
with a CAGR of +28.14%. In comparison, the import CAGR stands at +11.29%, indicating
that Vietnam is becoming increasingly self-sufficient in this segment. The rapid growth in
exports demonstrates Vietnam’s ability to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and
integrate into global supply chains, particularly in consumer electronics assembly and
manufacturing.

Figure 4.10: Vietnam's Position in Step 4

Vietnam's Position in Step 4: Final Electronics

Total Average Export, Import Value & CAGR (2014−2023)
60 100

75

40 CAGR Export
Billion USD

CAGR (%)
CAGR Import

50

Total_Export
20
Total_Import
25

0 0

Output 1: Final Industry Output 2: Final Consumer

Product Category

Source: Our analysis result

From Figure 4.10, we can see that Vietnam maintains a substantial trade surplus in
final consumer electronics, confirming its role as a global manufacturing hub. However,
exports of industrial electronics remain relatively low, suggesting room for further
development in high-value industrial applications.

The data also highlights that the CAGR for exports in final consumer electronics is
 62

significantly higher than imports, signaling that Vietnam is strengthening its

competitiveness in this sector. The slower growth in imports further suggests that domestic
production capabilities are improving, reducing reliance on imported consumer electronics
products.

4.5.1. Position of Vietnam in Output 2: Final Consumer

This section presents the key findings from the HS Code-Level Assessment for Step
4: Final Electronics, focusing on Vietnam’s trade performance for the highest contributing
product category. The total trade values and percentage contributions for each HS code over
2014–2023 are shown in APPENDIX 4 and visualized in Figure 4.11.

Figure 4.11: Vietnam's Position in Output 2 (Step 4)

Vietnam's Contribution in Step 4 (Output 2: Final Consumer)

Total Average Export, Import Value & Contribution (2014−2023)
40 68.9%

30
Billion USD

20
Export
Import
25.1%
74.5%

10

21.8%
4.8%
3.3% 0.9%
0.2% 0.2%
0.1% 0%0.1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
0

851712 851770 852580 950450 851718 950430 8528 9006 85181

HS Code

Source: Our analysis result

Vietnam is a global leader in mobile phone manufacturing, but high import

dependence on transmission apparatus. While gaming electronics exports are growing,
limited participation in cameras, monitors, and high-tech components presents
opportunities for expansion.

HS 851712 - Telephones for Cellular Networks or Other Wireless Networks:

 63

Vietnam has solidified itself as a global leader in mobile phone assembly and
manufacturing, with exports of telephones for cellular networks reaching $38.35 billion.
This category accounts for nearly 69% of total final electronics exports, underscoring
Vietnam’s crucial role in the global supply chain. The relatively low import value of $3.51
billion indicates that Vietnam produces a substantial portion of the mobile phones it exports,
rather than relying on imported finished products. This dominance is largely driven by
foreign direct investment (FDI) from multinational firms such as Samsung and Apple,
which have established major production facilities in Vietnam.

HS 851770 - Apparatus for Transmission or Reception of Voice, Images, or Data

play a crucial role in Vietnam’s electronics sector. While exports in this category amount
to $14.00 billion, imports are significantly high at $12.03 billion, making up 74.55% of
total imports. This suggests that Vietnam exports large volumes of transmission
components but still depends heavily on foreign suppliers for raw materials and advanced
parts. This reliance on imported components indicates an opportunity for Vietnam to
develop domestic production of high-value semiconductor components.

HS 852580 - Transmission Apparatus for Radio-Broadcasting or Television:

Although a smaller segment, Vietnam exports $2.69 billion worth of broadcasting
transmission equipment, while imports stand at $0.53 billion. The country maintains a
positive trade balance in this category, suggesting that it has some capabilities in
manufacturing broadcasting transmission devices.

HS 950450 - Video Game Consoles and Machines: Vietnam is also involved in the
gaming electronics market, with exports reaching $0.53 billion, while imports remain
significantly lower at $0.03 billion. This positive trade balance indicates that Vietnam has
a growing role in assembling and exporting gaming hardware. However, the scale of
exports remains relatively small compared to the mobile phone sector.

HS 851718 - Other Telephone Sets: Vietnam exports $0.12 billion worth of other
telephone sets, while imports stand at $0.02 billion. Although this is a relatively minor
category, Vietnam maintains a trade surplus, suggesting domestic production capabilities
in specialized telecommunication devices.
 64

HS 950430 - Other Video Game Consoles and Machines: Unlike the previous
gaming hardware category, Vietnam imports more than it exports in this segment, with
imports at $0.021 billion and exports at just $0.003 billion. This results in a trade deficit,
indicating that Vietnam does not yet have strong manufacturing capabilities in this segment.

HS 8528, HS 9006, HS 85181 - Monitors, Cameras, and Microphones show no

recorded trade activity in these categories, indicating that it does not significantly
participate in the production or trade of these products.

4.6. Result after analyzing data

- By having a look at the trade balance across different steps, we can comprehend
that Vietnam remains highly dependent on imports for upstream semiconductor processes
(Steps 1 & 2), especially in wafer production and semiconductor manufacturing. The
country’s trade performance improves significantly in downstream stages (Steps 3 & 4),
where Vietnam achieves strong trade surpluses due to its established role in assembling and
exporting intermediate and final electronic products. The sharp contrast between deficits in
upstream stages and surpluses in downstream stages indicates that Vietnam is positioned
more as an assembler than a producer of core semiconductor components.

- By having a look at the trade performance at the product group level in Step 1, we
can conclude that Vietnam’s current role in wafer production is limited, with a heavy
reliance on imported raw materials, inputs, and equipment. The negative CAGR in exports
of raw materials and inputs suggests that Vietnam is moving away from developing its own
supply base in these critical areas. Although wafer output exports have shown strong
growth, the country remains a consumer rather than a producer in wafer production.

- By having a look at the trade performance at the product group level in Step 2, we
can conclude that Vietnam remains dependent on imported semiconductor inputs and
equipment, reflecting a gap in domestic supply chain capabilities. The country has made
significant strides in semiconductor output production, but imports still outweigh exports,
suggesting Vietnam plays a key role in assembly and processing rather than full-scale
fabrication.
• By analyzing trade performance at the HS code level in Step 2, we can
 65

conclude that Vietnam's semiconductor trade is heavily concentrated in processors and

controllers (HS 854231), suggesting a specialization in chip assembly and processing rather
than diversified semiconductor production. Despite high processor exports, imports remain
substantial, highlighting Vietnam's reliance on foreign inputs for semiconductor
manufacturing. Memory chips (HS 854232) and other semiconductor components have a
significant import dependency, indicating potential gaps in domestic production
capabilities.

- By having a look at the trade performance at the product group level in Step 3, we
can conclude that Vietnam has established itself as a major exporter of intermediate
electronics, with a trade surplus of over $10 billion in this step. While imports of inputs
remain high, Vietnam’s strong growth in industrial and consumer intermediate electronics
exports demonstrates its expanding role in global supply chains. The consumer electronics
segment, in particular, has been the most dominant, with export growth far outpacing
import growth, indicating Vietnam’s strength in supplying electronic components for
consumer goods manufacturing.
• By analyzing trade performance at the HS code level in Step 3, we can
conclude that Vietnam has successfully positioned itself as a leading manufacturer and
exporter of communication apparatus (HS 851762), driven by foreign investment and
global supply chain integration. However, its reliance on imported transmission apparatus
components (HS 852990) suggests that Vietnam’s domestic supply chain is not yet fully
developed. The country also exhibits moderate capabilities in base stations (HS 851761)
and other communication devices, indicating potential areas for further growth. Despite
these strengths, Vietnam still struggles with a trade deficit in audio equipment, showing a
lack of competitive domestic production in this segment. Additionally, the limited role of
video and sound recording devices in Vietnam’s trade profile suggests that the country has
yet to develop expertise in these areas.

- By having a look at the trade performance at the product group level in Step 4, we
can conclude that Vietnam’s role in the final electronics stage of the semiconductor value
chain is highly competitive, particularly in consumer electronics manufacturing. The
country has developed a strong export-driven model, with a significant trade surplus of
nearly $40 billion in this category. This success is largely attributed to foreign direct
 66

investment from global electronics firms, which have established large-scale production
facilities in Vietnam. While Vietnam excels in consumer electronics, its presence in
industrial electronics is still developing. The trade deficit in this category suggests that
Vietnam has yet to establish a strong domestic industry for high-tech industrial applications.
However, the positive growth rate in exports indicates a potential opportunity for expansion
in this area.
• By analyzing trade performance at the HS code level in Step 4, we can
conclude that Vietnam is a dominant exporter of mobile phones (HS 851712), reinforcing
its role as a global smartphone production hub. Imports of transmission apparatus
components (HS 851770) remain high, highlighting Vietnam’s dependence on foreign
suppliers for essential communication components. Vietnam has a positive trade balance in
video game consoles (HS 950450) but a deficit in other gaming hardware (HS 950430),
indicating a specialized role in gaming electronics manufacturing. Certain product
categories, such as cameras, monitors, and microphones, show no trade activity, suggesting
Vietnam does not yet have a significant footprint in these areas.

4.7. Result and Connotation of the Topic

After having the analysis result, we can conclude that Vietnam plays a significant
role in the global semiconductor value chain, particularly in the final electronics and
intermediate electronics stages. The country has established itself as a major hub for mobile
phone and consumer electronics manufacturing, largely driven by foreign direct investment
(FDI) from multinational corporations such as Samsung, Apple, and Intel.

Vietnam’s export performance is strongest in final consumer electronics,

particularly in smartphones and communication devices, where it maintains a large trade
surplus. The intermediate electronics sector is also highly competitive, with Vietnam
supplying critical components for global supply chains. However, in earlier stages of the
value chain, such as wafer production and semiconductor fabrication, Vietnam remains
highly dependent on imports, particularly for processors, memory chips, and transmission
apparatus components.

The connotation of this result is that while Vietnam has successfully integrated into
the global electronics manufacturing ecosystem, its position remains heavily reliant on
 67

foreign suppliers for key semiconductor inputs. This indicates a need for further investment
in domestic semiconductor production, R&D capabilities, and high-tech workforce
development.
 68

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

5.1. Discussion

The research “Study about The position of Vietnam in the Semiconductor Value
Chain” almost achieved the research goals. Successfully forming a comprehensive research
framework that evaluates Vietnam’s role in different stages of the semiconductor value
chain, mapping Vietnam’s trade performance across different steps in the semiconductor
value chain, from wafer production to final electronics, and identifying key product
categories and HS codes that contribute significantly to Vietnam’s semiconductor trade.

Through this research, we have gained valuable insights into Vietnam’s competitive
advantages in final and intermediate electronics manufacturing, as well as its dependencies
on imports for wafer production and semiconductor fabrication. The analysis highlights
how foreign direct investment (FDI) plays a crucial role in Vietnam’s semiconductor sector,
enabling it to become a major exporter of consumer electronics and communication
devices. However, it also underlines the challenges Vietnam faces in advancing further up
the value chain, particularly in the areas of semiconductor design, fabrication, and material
supply.

On top of that, our group would also like to list some recommendations for
policymakers, industry stakeholders, and investors to enhance Vietnam’s position in the
global semiconductor value chain.

5.2. Significance

Through the above results, the research paper has a wide range of significance and
value in terms of scientific theory and practical application.

- Theoretically, this study provides a comprehensive analytical framework for

evaluating a country’s role in a highly complex and dynamic global supply chain. By
integrating quantitative trade analysis with value chain assessment, this research offers a
structured approach that can be applied to other industries beyond semiconductors.
Additionally, the findings contribute to the growing academic discourse on emerging
economies' integration into high-tech industries, particularly in the context of Vietnam’s
 69

industrial and trade development.

- In terms of reality, research results provide valuable insights for policymakers,

industry stakeholders, and investors to make informed decisions regarding Vietnam’s
semiconductor industry development. By identifying trade imbalances, competitive
advantages, and strategic gaps, this study helps guide policy recommendations. Moreover,
related business owners can develop better business strategies. (Specific recommendations
are in section 5.3).

5.3. Suggestions

5.3.1. Developing Human Resources for Vietnam's Semiconductor Industry

- Why propose this solution?

The semiconductor industry is the backbone of the digital economy, driving

innovation across multiple sectors. With a young and technologically adept workforce,
Vietnam has significant potential to integrate into the global semiconductor supply chain.
However, a skilled workforce is crucial to unlocking this potential. Recognizing this, the
Vietnamese government has set an ambitious target: by 2030, Vietnam aims to train at least
50,000 highly skilled workers in the semiconductor field (Vietnam Law Magazine).

Investing in human capital is a strategic and cost-effective approach, especially

given Vietnam’s current constraints in capital, infrastructure, and access to advanced
technology transfers. Developing local talent early will position Vietnam as a competitive
destination for semiconductor investments, particularly as geopolitical shifts prompt a
restructuring of global supply chains. The urgency of this initiative was reaffirmed at the
"Vietnam Proactively Developing the Semiconductor and AI Industry in the New Era"
Policy Forum (March 2025), where Deputy Minister Nguyễn Đức Tâm emphasized
Vietnam’s commitment to semiconductor integration.

Vietnamese engineers have already demonstrated strong adaptability, problem-

solving abilities, and innovation—key assets for high-tech industries. For instance, Vietnam
ranks 46th globally in research publications, with 119,308 international scientific papers
from 1996 to 2022, many of which focus on STEM and high-tech fields (Ministry of
 70

Science and Technology). Moreover, Vietnam has actively expanded STEM education to
over 60 schools, fostering critical thinking from an early stage. The country’s consistent
success in global competitions, such as Intel ISEF and International Olympiads, further
highlights its talent potential.

While these strengths form a solid foundation, Vietnam must transition from a
workforce primarily engaged in assembly and testing to higher-value activities such as chip
design, R&D, and manufacturing.

- How to implement this solution?

1) Establish Specialized Semiconductor Training Programs

Vietnam must collaborate with universities, research institutions, and industry

leaders to create curricula aligned with industry demands. The National Innovation Center
(NIC) has already taken steps by launching training programs focused on microchip design.
Expanding such initiatives is crucial for bridging the skill gap.

2) Strengthen Public-Private Partnerships in Education

Effective workforce development requires coordination between the government,

private sector, and academia. Companies like Siemens have partnered with Saigon Hi-Tech
Park to support talent cultivation. Expanding such collaborations will ensure training
programs remain relevant and industry-driven.;

3) Enhance Practical Training & Industry Exposure

Internships and hands-on experience are vital for preparing students for real-world
challenges. Companies and training institutions must co-develop internship programs that
provide exposure to semiconductor fabrication, chip design, and advanced manufacturing
techniques.

4) Attract International Experts & Leverage Overseas Vietnamese Talent

Vietnam should invite leading semiconductor experts to contribute to workforce

 71

training through teaching, consulting, and technology transfer. Additionally, creating

incentives for overseas Vietnamese professionals to return and contribute will accelerate
industry growth. The U.S. has already supported Vietnam in this effort through policy
workshops and investment initiatives.

5) Invest in Educational & Research Infrastructure

Developing a skilled workforce requires state-of-the-art research facilities and

laboratories. Expanding the NIC’s role in training and R&D support will be crucial in
equipping Vietnam’s semiconductor industry with cutting-edge capabilities.

- The stakeholders involved in implementing this solution include: 1) Government:

Formulates supportive policies, provides funding, and creates an enabling environment for
human resource development; 2) Domestic and international enterprises: Participate in the
training process, offer internship opportunities, and employ graduates; 3) Educational
institutions and research centers: Design and implement training programs and conduct
research that meets industry requirements; 4) Experts and overseas Vietnamese
professionals: Contribute knowledge, experience, and networks to support industry
development.

- The solution should be implemented across Vietnam, focusing on regions with

existing or potential semiconductor industry clusters, such as Ho Chi Minh City, Hanoi,
and Da Nang. The NIC has been active in organizing events and training programs in these
areas to bolster the semiconductor workforce.

- The implementation should follow a phased approach: 1-3 years: Develop

specialized training programs, establish partnerships, and launch pilot training courses; 4-
7 years: Expand training programs, strengthen international collaborations, and enhance
training quality; 8-10 years: Achieve a highly skilled workforce capable of meeting the
demands of both domestic and international semiconductor industries.

- What are the expected results? 1) Establish a highly skilled workforce that meets
the semiconductor industry's requirements; 2) Enhance Vietnam's competitiveness in the
global semiconductor supply chain; 3) Attract investments from major technology
 72

corporations, driving national economic and technological development; 4) Contribute to

building an innovative ecosystem, fostering research and development in the semiconductor
field; 5) Developing a highly skilled workforce for the semiconductor industry is essential
for Vietnam to integrate deeper into the global value chain and assert its position in the
digital technology era.

5.3.2. Developing a Rare Earth-Based Supply Chain for Semiconductor Manufacturing

- Why propose this suggestion?

Vietnam possesses the second-largest rare earth reserves in the world (estimated at 22
million tons), yet it’s rare earth extraction and processing capabilities remain
underdeveloped. Rare earth elements (REEs) such as neodymium, dysprosium, and terbium
are critical materials for semiconductor manufacturing, particularly in Step 1: Wafer
Production and Step 2: Semiconductor Fabrication.

Currently, Vietnam exports raw rare earth materials at low value while importing
refined and processed rare earth materials for high-tech manufacturing. By developing a rare
earth processing and supply chain, Vietnam can reduce import dependency in semiconductor
production, enhance its strategic positioning in global supply chains, and attract high-tech
investments in semiconductor manufacturing.

- The implementation should include: 1) Establish rare earth processing plants to

refine raw materials into high-purity oxides and metals for semiconductor applications; 2)
Develop a domestic supply chain for producing rare earth-based semiconductor components
(e.g., polishing powders for wafers, magnetic materials for chip production); 3) Leverage
Vietnam’s trade agreements (CPTPP, EVFTA) to attract foreign investment in rare earth-
based semiconductor manufacturing.

- The stakeholders in implementing this solution include: Vietnamese government

agencies (Ministry of Industry and Trade, Ministry of Science and Technology) to create
policies and incentives; Vietnam Rare Earth Joint Stock Company (VTRE) and other local
mining firms to manage extraction and processing; Foreign semiconductor and materials
companies (e.g., from Japan, South Korea, and the US) to invest in technology transfer and
 73

industrial applications; Vietnamese universities and research institutes to develop expertise

in rare earth refining and applications in semiconductor manufacturing.

- This solution should be implemented in Bắc Nậm Xe (Lai Châu) and Đông Pao (Lào
Cai) – areas with Vietnam’s largest rare earth reserves. And high-tech parks in Ho Chi Minh
City, Hanoi, and Da Nang – to establish rare earth processing and component manufacturing
facilities.

- The strategy should be rolled out in phases over the next 5-10 years: Short-term (1–
3 years): Develop policies, attract investment, and establish pilot rare earth refining facilities;
Medium-term (3–7 years): Scale up rare earth processing, integrate refined materials into
semiconductor supply chains; Long-term (7–10 years): Develop Vietnam-based rare earth
semiconductor component manufacturing and become a regional leader in rare earth-based
high-tech production.

- What are the expected results? 1) Increased value addition from rare earth mining,
shifting from raw material exports to high-value semiconductor applications; 2) Attraction of
high-tech investments in semiconductor manufacturing, boosting domestic capabilities in
Step 1 (Wafer Production) and Step 2 (Semiconductor Fabrication); 3) Stronger geopolitical
positioning, as Vietnam becomes a key supplier of rare earth materials for semiconductor
production in the global market.

5.3.3. Developing Vietnam as a Key AI Chip Packaging and Testing Hub

- Why propose this solution? Vietnam lacks semiconductor fabrication capabilities

but has strengths in electronics assembly. AI-driven semiconductors, particularly AI
processors and accelerators (HS 854231, HS 854239), are in high demand. Focusing on
packaging and testing AI chips aligns with Vietnam’s current infrastructure, workforce
skills, and FDI strategy.

- How to implement this solution? 1) Attract global AI chip firms (NVIDIA, AMD,
Google, Intel, Qualcomm) to establish packaging and testing operations; 2) Also offer tax
incentives, infrastructure support, and streamlined regulations; 3) Develop AI
semiconductor industrial zones dedicated to AI chip processing; 4) Enhance workforce
 74

training programs in AI chip assembly and testing.

- Who involves in implementing the solution? 1) Government: Provides incentives,

policies, and infrastructure; 2) Global AI chip firms: Invest in packaging and testing
facilities; 3) Local firms (FPT, Viettel, Vingroup): Support production and supply chain; 4)
Universities and R&D centers: Train AI chip specialists.

- The solution also should be implemented in existing high-tech zones and industrial
parks that already have a strong electronics and semiconductor presence: Bắc Ninh, Bắc
Giang: Near Samsung’s ecosystem, Hồ Chí Minh City, Bình Dương: Established tech hubs;
Đà Nẵng: Emerging AI and semiconductor hub.

- The implementation also should follow a phased approach over the next 5-10 years:
1-3 years: Secure FDI, develop policies, start pilot projects; 4-7 years: Build large-scale
AI chip packaging and testing plants; 8-10 years: Expand into AI chip testing and design.

- What are the expected results? 1) Enhance Vietnam’s role in AI semiconductor

manufacturing; 2) Attract leading AI companies, boosting investment and high-tech jobs;
3) Strengthen Vietnam’s competitiveness in the AI and semiconductor industry.

5.3.4. Leveraging Geopolitical Shifts to Position Vietnam as a Secure and Stable

Semiconductor Assembly Hub

- Why propose this solution?

Global geopolitical tensions, especially US-China trade disputes and supply chain
diversification efforts, have prompted major tech firms to relocate manufacturing away
from China. Vietnam, with its strategic location, existing electronics infrastructure, and
trade agreements (CPTPP, RCEP, EVFTA), can capitalize on this shift by attracting
semiconductor assembly and testing investments from firms seeking a stable and neutral
production base.

- How to implement this solution? 1) Offer tax incentives and regulatory advantages
to attract semiconductor firms relocating from China; 2) Enhance Vietnam’s role in US and
EU-friendly supply chains by aligning trade policies with CHIPS Act-related incentives; 3)
Develop industrial zones specialized in semiconductor assembly and testing, ensuring
 75

secure and politically neutral production environments; 4) Strengthen supply chain security
by partnering with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan for semiconductor materials and
equipment.

- Who involves in implementing the solution? 1) Vietnamese government:

Negotiates trade agreements, provides infrastructure and incentives; 2) Global
semiconductor firms (TSMC, Intel, Qualcomm, Amkor, ASE): Seeking China+1
manufacturing strategies; 3) Local firms (FPT, Vingroup, Viettel): Potential partners in
semiconductor assembly; 4) Strategic allies (Japan, South Korea, EU, US): Suppliers of
semiconductor equipment and materials.

- The solution should be conducted in Bắc Ninh, Bắc Giang, and Thái Nguyên which
are near existing electronics and semiconductor clusters.
When is the solution conducted?

- The implementation should implement with a long-term goal: 1-3 years: Secure
investment deals, develop regulatory frameworks, establish pilot semiconductor assembly
projects; 4-7 years: Expand capacity, integrate Vietnam into secure semiconductor supply
chains; 8-10 years: Establish Vietnam as a key alternative hub in global semiconductor
assembly.

- What are the expected results? 1) Vietnam becomes a preferred location for
semiconductor assembly amid geopolitical shifts; 2) Attraction of high-value FDI from
semiconductor giants diversifying beyond China; 3) Greater integration into secure
semiconductor supply chains, reducing geopolitical risks.

5.4. Limitation and Further Research

However, research about Vietnam’s semiconductor industry is still limited, which

means our research is still new and imperfect. Therefore, there are still many mistakes in
this dissertation. Some of them can be:

Firstly, the primary limitation of this report or trade statistics approach lies in its
 76

inability to capture the true domestic value added, as export figures may reflect assembly
and testing activities rather than high-value manufacturing or design. Additionally, trade
data does not distinguish between foreign direct investment (FDI)-led production and
domestic industry development, potentially overstating Vietnam’s technological
capabilities.

Secondly, this research focus on Vietnam in isolation without sufficient comparison

in each semiconductor value chain step to key partners such as China, Taiwan, South Korea,
Japan, the EU, the US, or another Southeast Asian country with a strong semiconductor
industry such as Malaysia. As well as not being able to exploit Vietnam's important trading
partner.

Thirdly, the research primarily relies on quantitative trade data and lacks an in-depth
examination of Vietnam’s specific policy frameworks, investment trends, and government
initiatives. The effectiveness of Vietnam’s incentives—such as tax breaks, subsidies, and
infrastructure development—was not analyzed in detail, making it difficult to assess
whether they are adequately supporting the country’s transition from low-value assembly
to high-value semiconductor production.

Finally, the study focuses on data from 2014 to 2023, which may not be a good
predictor of future trends in the Vietnamese semiconductor industry.

Given the limitations identified in this study, our future research should aim to
address these gaps to provide a more comprehensive and strategic understanding of
Vietnam’s position in the semiconductor value chain.

One critical direction for future research is conducting a comparative assessment of

Vietnam’s semiconductor industry relative to key partners in the world and key regional
partners. A cross-country comparison would allow for a clearer understanding of Vietnam’s
competitive advantages and disadvantages in semiconductor manufacturing, trade, and
policy implementation.

Another essential avenue for further research is a comprehensive evaluation of

Vietnam’s industrial policies, investment incentives, and government initiatives in the
 77

semiconductor sector. Future research will focus on: Assessing the impact of existing
policy measures: Are current tax breaks and subsidies attracting the right kind of
semiconductor investments? How do these incentives compare to those offered by
competing nations? Evaluating Vietnam’s transition from assembly to higher-value
production: What policy interventions are needed to move Vietnam beyond low-value
assembly into advanced semiconductor manufacturing and design? Examining the role of
R&D and innovation: How effective are Vietnam’s universities, research institutions, and
government-backed initiatives in advancing semiconductor technology?

Instead of merely reporting trade figures, future research will delve deeper into the
underlying economic and industrial factors driving these trends. Conducting in-depth
interviews to have qualitative insights from industry experts, policymakers, and business
leaders and case studies to capture first-hand perspectives on Vietnam’s semiconductor
challenges and opportunities.
 78

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 80

APPENDIX

APPENDIX 1: PRELIMINARY TRADE DATA AGGREGATION OF EACH

SELECTED HS CODE FOR THE ENTIRE PERIOD 2014–2023

HS Average Average CAGR CAGR

Step Category
Code Export Ixport Export Import
280461 25441.6021 2132.3827 9.496461357 16.22416801
Raw
284920 2891.92298 203426.4617 Inf 116.6506708
Material
282560 43.38239929 1130.013206 -100 -2.807999534
370130 23009.6492 35330.85969 8.035335884 18.36245063
370199 3544.913317 36461.24551 -30.01231327 9.449753298
Inputs
370790 257.9070967 8822.213614 -32.73762268 -3.574676241
1
811290 - - - -
848610 2336.262899 51656.75099 -11.95054381 33.68803989
848690 78663.44736 71997.18314 22.98105648 10.69445016
Equipment
903082 4795.95121 43788.46925 3.187659913 12.81225119
903141 1209.314107 14251.78793 3.140040248 11.5797799
Outputs 381800 138641.2598 455213.5525 97.55832209 58.87890625
900120 13224.54673 368774.5538 26.74642057 24.00057495
900190 71108.43327 327998.0395 15.26186087 21.68561143
900211
900220 9069.861461 22498.15017 -9.777043903 -3.886215449
Inputs 900290 51401.29384 169018.4864 8.723724238 -4.930934103
901210 195.0692994 6269.161114 -2.64056609 3.154309492
901290 452.6072982 743.8321012 32.56858892 4.747169718
2 903082 4795.95121 43788.46925 3.187659913 12.81225119
903141 1209.314107 14251.78793 3.140040248 11.5797799
841459 374770.5973 140498.8721 17.57039297 8.646574326
841950 12272.4898 88846.89012 2.888632109 -1.918718045
842121 - - - -
Equipment
842139 54728.02831 192936.3379 33.47375645 1.748729106
842199 50118.97667 131670.3162 6.853656973 7.315349041
848620 17427.52526 150824.0574 16.82927597 13.82056807
 81

848640 122296.8481 114110.7701 22.27568194 12.17497797

848690 78663.44736 71997.18314 22.98105648 10.69445016
8542 18552806.3 25835952.53 22.705456 14.5331347
854231 17172506.13 11732846.02 23.7385579 25.89236235
854232 202577.1902 3503133.783 19.44992418 17.60326588
854233 44351.38108 394736.1181 6.247800441 26.73745654
854239 1062113.077 9666855.287 12.50457286 5.052208326
854290 71258.52511 538381.3166 4.262839607 4.319243876
Outputs
852351 146938.4705 76548.41388 39.81003454 6.677365957
852352 19251.49633 80939.7096 6.358114023 13.39427591
852359 8117.531005 15967.87243 -4.047338243 -5.873757918
853290 590.8576966 22682.46429 14.97603276 2.535592717
853310 - - - -
8534 - - - -
8540 - - - -
854110 64458.81581 204547.3309 16.64939268 3.407074253
Inputs
854121 6332.56861 59711.22701 -9.548283893 18.6401374
854129 69233.54063 221144.5497 15.08313653 8.8626239
851190 19863.7793 15187.33163 1.942023287 0.691003171
852729 13502.52987 8375.783309 20.00107421 -7.607678819
854430 2700909.753 121075.7896 5.087647956 7.964610203
901210 195.0692994 6269.161114 -2.64056609 3.154309492
901290 452.6072982 743.8321012 32.56858892 4.747169718
3 901490 905.1997927 4607.014749 7.056399735 5.686071959
Output 1:
902490 3469.353987 4502.61577 28.2791154 8.458548809
Intermediate
902790 15889.11085 68627.40386 15.87611803 10.44144225
Industry
902890 128402.7567 52448.91242 8.553455795 7.642450121
902990 6498.219318 16012.72117 24.51436362 0.956669162
903090 37648.91245 157768.552 13.46971669 22.88533809
903190 38974.97734 176296.3023 4.138389188 7.13528926
903290 28138.41109 121349.8637 4.858948585 7.469970474
903300 49814.06525 30819.0753 11.54018088 3.929603557
8473 - - - -
 82

851761 253055.0065 162697.779 23.4959555 -20.21963804

851762 8488522.644 804035.449 33.75997763 10.88649763
Output 2: 851769 209314.053 39932.22888 24.59879031 6.831636328
Intermediate 851890 121950.4281 554547.029 2.571380541 3.908999037
Consumer 852290 28136.74139 28771.3939 -9.571641801 15.05857133
852990 4739294.533 3236595.8 21.81620845 7.507913319
900690 - - - -

8470 - - - -
8471 - - - -
8472 - - - -
- - - -
Output 1:
8526 - - - -
Final
9014 905.1998 4607.015 7.0564 5.686072
Industry
9022 - - - -
9027 15889.1108 68627.404 15.876118 10.4414423
9028 128402.7567 52448.912 8.553456 7.6424501
4 9029 6498.2193 16012.721 24.514364 0.9566692
9030 42444.8637 201557.021 12.243386 19.4388498
851712 38351906.29 3510063.768 10.2956636 20.58283044
851718 118564.4024 15136.21899 15.08262819 -6.589830397
851770 14004459.13 12027586.84 11.176748 -1.40196615
Output 2: 85181 - - - -
Final 852580 2685764.977 533699.1503 4.712354133 -6.821529535
Consumer 8528 - - - -
9006 - - - -
950430 3503.980152 21125.65 48.18436418 16.43579369
950450 527255.6599 26074.08536 79.38906882 45.54282748
 83

APPENDIX 2: THE TOTAL TRADE VALUES AND PERCENTAGE

CONTRIBUTIONS FOR EACH HS CODE IN OUTPUT (STEP 2)

HS Average Average Export Import

Code Description Export Import Contribution Contribution
854231 Processors and controllers 17.17250613 11.73284602 91.69573337 45.0707015
854239 Others 1.062113077 9.666855287 5.671346793 37.13437884
854232 Memories 0.20257719 3.503133783 1.081697912 13.45698194
852351 Non-volatile storage 0.14693847 0.076548414 0.784604804 0.294054035
854290 Micro assemblies 0.071258525 0.538381317 0.380497912 2.068144725
854233 Amplifiers 0.044351381 0.394736118 0.236822301 1.516344263
852352 Smart cards 0.019251496 0.08093971 0.102796881 0.310922813
852359 Solid-state storage 0.008117531 0.015967872 0.04334504 0.061339185
Passive: Electrical
0.000590858 0.022682464 0.003154993 0.087132702
853290 capacitors
Passive: Electrical
0 0 0 0
853310 resistors
 84

APPENDIX 3: THE TOTAL TRADE VALUES AND PERCENTAGE

CONTRIBUTIONS FOR EACH HS CODE IN OUTPUT 2 (STEP 3)

HS Average Average Export Import

Description
Code Export Import Contribution Contribution
Communication
851762 8.488522644 0.804035449 61.3320445 16.65849322
apparatus
852990 Transmission apparatus 4.739294533 3.2365958 34.24278115 67.05775134
851761 Base stations 0.253055007 0.162697779 1.828396009 3.370871089
Communication
851769 0.209314053 0.039932229 1.5123549 0.827340094
apparatus
Microphones,
851890 headphones, 0.121950428 0.554547029 0.881127305 11.48944109
earphones, amplifier
Sound or video
852290 0.028136741 0.028771394 0.203296138 0.596103158
recording apparatus
Photographic flashlight
900690 0 0 0 0
apparatus
 85

APPENDIX 4: THE TOTAL TRADE VALUES AND PERCENTAGE

CONTRIBUTIONS FOR EACH HS CODE IN OUTPUT 2 (STEP 4)

HS Total Total Export Import

Description
Code Export Import Contribution Contribution
Telephones for cellular
851712 networks or for other 38.35190629 3.510063768 68.8649752 21.75611842
wireless networks
Apparatus for the
transmission or
851770 reception of voice, 14.00445913 12.02758684 25.14651354 74.54952981
images or other data,
via
Transmission apparatus
852580 for radio-broadcasting 2.685764977 0.53369915 4.82258006 3.307980333
or television
Games; video game
950450 0.52725566 0.026074085 0.946744281 0.161612702
consoles and machines
Telephone sets n.e.c. in
851718 0.118564402 0.015136219 0.212895145 0.09381749
item no. 8517.1
Games; video game
950430 0.00350398 0.02112565 0.006291773 0.130941252
consoles and machines
Monitors and
projectors, not
8528 incorporating 0 0 0 0
television reception
apparatus
 86

APPENDIX 5: DATA CODES

v Representative data opened in RStudio
 87

v Representative filtered data

 88

v Preliminary Trade Data Aggregation analysis

 89

v Trade Data by Step

v Trade Data by Category in Step 1

 90

v Trade Data by Category in Step 2

v Trade Data by Category in Step 3

 91

v Trade Data by Category in Step 4

v Trade Data by HS Code in Step 2

 92

v Trade Data by HS Code in Step 3

v Trade Data by HS Code in Step 4

 93

v Preliminary Trade Data Aggregation analysis for all countries (HS 6)

 94

v Preliminary Trade Data Aggregation analysis for all countries (HS 4)

 95

v Export and Import Shares of Countries in Global Semiconductor Trade,

Avg 2014-2023 data (Representative data)
 96

v Export and Import Shares of countries by Step