MARS MARS Report 392 | June 2025
In this bulletin…
MARS 202524 MARS 202526
Docking difficulty Uncontrolled release of lifeboat
MARS 202525 MARS 202527
Ghost in the machine III Green water on deck
MARS 202524
Challenging berth location and
questionable tug services adds
to docking difficulty
A cargo vessel was berthing under pilotage and
with tug assistance. The berth was in a confined
waterway with strong currents and shallow
waters. The operation was further complicated by
local regulations prohibiting tugs from fastening
to the vessel, limiting them to push-assist
manoeuvres only.
On the approach to the berth, the vessel was
making 4.8 knots before corrective actions were
initiated. Despite multiple engine manoeuvres
and the eventual deployment of the port anchor,
the vessel contacted the pier at a speed of 0.9
knots. Lessons learned
Damage to the vessel was concentrated at The importance of comprehensive pre-
the starboard bow and the aft starboard quarter. berthing planning and preparation should not
The company investigation found, among other be underestimated.
things, that a combination of environmental, Open and continuous communication
operational, and systemic factors contributed between the Master, pilot, and tug operators
to the incident. Strong currents and shallow is essential for addressing the dynamic
waters were significant contributors, impeding challenges associated with berthing
the vessel’s manoeuvrability and amplifying the operations.
challenges posed by the angular design of the Regular drills focusing on emergency
pier. These natural challenges were compounded responses, such as timely anchor deployment
by local regulations, which restricted tug and adaptive manoeuvring, are vital to
operations to push-assist only, eliminating their ensuring that crews are prepared for similar
ability to provide ‘pull’ support. scenarios.
Communication gaps between the vessel’s
bridge team, the pilot, and the tug operators were
also identified as a critical factor. Additionally, the
delayed deployment of the port anchor limited
its capacity to counteract the vessel’s swing
to starboard during the final moments of the
approach.
www.nautinst.org/seaways June 2025 | Seaways | 17
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Mariners’ Alerting and Reporting Scheme
MARS 202525 familiarisation and emergency drills were carried
out before departure, including an abandon
The ghost in the machine, part 3 ship drill. While a lifeboat was being lowered to
sea level, the brake release wire became stuck.
A new tanker (2024-built) was preparing for The brake band remained open and the lifeboat
departure from the berth. Once the pilot was on descended to the water in an uncontrolled
board the unberthing operation began. As the manner. Luckily, there were no injuries and no
vessel cleared the berth the pilot requested the damage.
dead slow ahead (25 RPM) and started a turn to The company investigation found, among
starboard. The pilot then requested slow ahead, other things, that:
but the RPM would not increase beyond 25. The lifeboat wires were well maintained and
The pilot and Master attempted several engine greased at the time of the vessel’s delivery.
settings to progress through the critical RPM The vessel’s records indicated the last abandon
band, (30-37) but with no success. ship drill with lifeboat lowering had taken place
The Chief Engineer explained that the funnel about six weeks earlier with the previous crew.
emissions were too high, and the computer While the lifeboat wire was being paid out, the
auto-control system would not allow the engine remote brake release wire got stuck on its drum
increase until the emissions were within tolerance and began to coil backwards, keeping it under
levels. According to the Chief Engineer there was tension, and thus keeping the brake in an open
no override to this. position. The remote wire eventually parted, and
In this instance the problem was not critical, the port lifeboat dropped to sea level.
but it could have been if they needed more It was found that the remote release wire
power to clear the berth. And imagine being at had been improperly stored on its drum as a
anchor near a lee shore and you start dragging result of poor handling by the previous crew.
anchor! The wire was stuck within the storage drum
and coated entirely in grease, which obscured
Lessons learned the view and prevented early detection of the
To use shipboard equipment effectively, crews issue. Furthermore, it was noted that the system
must know how to operate that equipment had remained unused for a prolonged period,
during routine and emergency situations. contributing to this condition.
This incident demonstrates that new
technology can introduce unintended Lessons learned
consequences. A wide range of vessel Equipment and systems on newly acquired
functions may now be subject to automated vessels under a company’s management must
control, and crew need to have a thorough undergo comprehensive, close-up inspections
understanding of the peculiarities of each and testing to identify potential defects or issues,
device or system. ensuring safe and reliable operations.
Editor’s note: The title ‘The ghost in the machine,
part 3’ refers to past MARS reports (202003 and
202004) where we underline how new devices
intended to make work easier can introduce new MARS 202527
risks. In this incident we can observe the same
phenomenon. New technology has given the Green water on deck has fatal
engine controller decisional control and cannot consequences
be overridden. This seems to run against the
necessity of an emergency. A cargo vessel completed loading and left port in
the early morning hours. By about 0400, the pilot
departed the vessel, and the Master notified the
deck crew to ensure that the berthing stations
MARS 202526 were secured for the passage; heavy weather
was forecast. At 0415 the second officer notified
Uncontrolled release of lifeboat the bridge that all aft lines and machinery were
stowed and secured. Five minutes later, the bosun
A new operator took delivery of a vessel notified the bridge that all was secured at the
from a previous operator, and the crew were forward mooring station. In fact, it was not. He
changed over. had decided to leave the deck to rest, intending
The vessel was at anchor, and crew to come back later and finish securing.
18 | Seaways | June 2025 www.nautinst.org/seaways
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Mariners’ Alerting and Reporting Scheme
View of seas encountered (one hour after accident)
The vessel encountered increased swell crew member received treatment on board for
activity, causing it to slam. This woke the Master, minor injuries.
and he instructed the officer of the watch (OOW)
to reduce speed and alter course to minimise Lessons learned
the slamming effects. By midday, the swell had This report screams ‘fatigue,’ yet this was not
increased. Wave heights were now more than brought out in the official report. Why else
three metres. would the bosun and his team decide not only
After lunch, the chief officer informed the OOW to mislead the bridge team about the state of
that he was going on deck for a safety check. the forward mooring station after departure, but
At around the same time, the bosun and some also to ‘get some sleep first’ before securing the
deck crew, having slept through the morning forward deck?
to recuperate, made their way forward to finish Fatigue reduces performance in many insidious
the job of securing the forward mooring station. ways including:
The vessel was struck by a series of large waves, Reducing problem-solving ability;
breaching the forecastle and washing the crew off Causing one to forget or ignore normal checks/
their feet. procedures;
As the chief officer arrived on the forecastle, Reducing situational awareness;
he found two injured crew members. He raised Increasing propensity to take risks.
the alarm and then discovered two other injured Measures were taken to mitigate the slamming,
crew members further aft. The Master came to but at no point was the company’s heavy weather
the bridge and decided to alter course for the checklist used, nor was access to the open deck
nearest port. The injured crew members were restricted.
transferred to the ship’s hospital and a request
for med-evac was made, but no helicopter was As edited from Bahamas Maritime
available. Paramedics finally boarded the vessel authority report published
that evening. Of the four crew members injured, 5 Feb 2024
two were declared deceased while another
member required emergency surgery. The fourth
www.nautinst.org/seaways June 2025 | Seaways | 19
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