Why did Russia invade Ukraine?

SID 520174436

INTRODUCTION
The ongoing full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia has been in the limelight of the
international political stage as it has caused human rights breaches, security threats, forced
displacements, and numerous casualties in the past 1.5 years. As one of the major conflicts in
the 21st century, it is important to examine the drivers of this event as Russia is not solely
responsible for the invasion – other global actors also play a significant role in both the
causes of the conflict and seeking a solution for resolving this issue .

This essay argues that this issue is multifaceted and is driven by a web of historical,
geographical, ideological, and domestic political factors through exploring how they have
contributed to the recent full-scale invasion. It begins by highlighting the close historical and
cultural ties between the two countries to provide context for the tense relationship between
Russia and Ukraine, then a discussion is made about how the failed diplomacy between
different powers set the stage for the invasion. Then, the essay considers whether the effects
of the spread of Western liberalist ideas have served as a trigger for the invasion. Lastly,
Russia’s geopolitical strategic interests on a global scale and its domestic political dynamics
under Putin’s leadership are explored to understand Russia’s motivations behind the invasion.

HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL TIES

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was not an impulsive decision. The long historical and cultural
conflict between Russia and Ukraine has laid the base for potential conflict since the 20th
century. As a former superpower, Russia was the leader of the Soviet Union which Ukraine
was forced to join. The Ukraine Soviet-Socialist Republic was only able to declare its
independence due to Russia’s former president Yeltsin, who pushed forth the collapse of the
USSR to gain popularity against his political opponent Gorbachev (McCauley and Lieven,
2019). After having signed treaties that acknowledged Ukraine’s independence, Russia
invaded Ukraine in 2014 and annexed Crimea. The ongoing invasion in 2022, therefore,
marks the continuation of this long-lasting conflict, which is due to Russia’s limited
acknowledgment of Ukraine’s independence. This is exemplified by the dispute over the
Tuzla Island incident which occurred shortly after the signing of the Treaty on the Russia-
Ukraine state border in 2003 (United Nations, n.d.). The treaty had no delineation of land

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borders and contained no details related to maritime borders, which includes the disputed
Tuzla Island where Russia has continued to build the Tuzla dam in the Kerch Strait. The
Kerch Strait is geopolitically significant to both states as it was the only passageway from the
Sea of Azov to the Black sea. Therefore, building the dam without Ukrainian consultation by
the Russians has further heightened tensions between them.

As a result, the Tuzla and Crimea events demonstrate that the tensions between the
two countries up until the invasion are not just a recent occurrence, but run deep in their
shared historical background.

From a cultural perspective, the underlying ethnic and linguistic connections between
Russia and Ukraine have also contributed to the recent invasion. These connections have
been used by Russia as a tool to legitimize their violent actions and proclaim themselves as a
‘defender’. By establishing common ground with largely Russian-speaking/ethnically
Russian populations in eastern Ukrainian regions such as Donetsk and Luhansk, Russia
supported separatist movements and provided financial and military resources (Kingsley and
Sommerlad, 2023). Russia’s provision of ‘aid’ created a passageway for Russian military
forces to enter Ukrainian territory, escalating security tensions and the potential for invasion.
These acts of assistance also showcase Russia’s attempt to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty
by using an excuse of reuniting ethnically Russian people together. The Crimean annexation
further reflects how their long period of shared history has made it difficult for Russia to
accept Ukraine’s independence as Crimea ‘was the birthplace of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet’
and the majority of its population are either ethnically Russian or considered Russian as their
native language (Kendall, 2014). Therefore, these strong cultural ties between Ukrainians and
Russians have served as crucial instruments for Russia to enter Ukrainian land from the East
without much initial Ukrainian military opposition and prepare for an invasion.

FAILED DIPLOMACY
On the other hand, a failure in global diplomacy has also led to the violent invasion of
Ukraine as Russia had failed to achieve its goals through peaceful means of discussion and
negotiation. Consequently, diplomacy no longer functions as an effective channel for
communication and has led Russia to realize its national interest through other means – in
this case, a ‘special military operation’.

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The distrustful relationship between Russia and Ukraine has posed significant obstacles to
diplomatic talks and negotiations between the two states. Since the disintegration of the
Soviet Union, Russia has always been concerned about losing Ukraine from its sphere of
influence and has never genuinely recognized Ukraine’s sovereignty. Despite Russia’s
scepticism, Ukraine has shown itself as a state willing to establish closer relationships with
the West. This is evident in both Ukrainian presidents’ political agendas -- Poroshenko’s and
Zelenskyy’s attempts to integrate with the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO). The former has planned 60 socio-economic initiatives that
would prepare Ukraine to enter the EU (Pifer, 2014), while the latter has approved Ukraine’s
new National Security Strategy, which would facilitate partnership development with NATO
and ultimately gain official NATO membership for Ukraine (NATO, 2022). The above
examples reflect Ukraine’s interest in seeking further cooperation with the West and
maintaining their sovereignty rather than aligning themselves with Russia’s goals.

Furthermore, the unsuccessful implementation of the Minsk Agreements in 2014 and

2015 also led to the 2022 invasion as they prolonged Russia and Ukraine’s distrustful
relationship. The Minsk Agreements were aimed at ending the Donbas war, where Russia-
backed Donetsk and Luhansk separatists fought against the Kyiv troops. Both Russia and
Ukraine failed to commit to these Agreements -- Russia had continuously denied its
involvement in the Donbas region, while Ukraine has rejected Russia’s requests in for
creating Kremlin-aligned governments in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, thus justifying
their non-compliance to the agreements (Demirjian, 2015). Furthermore, the measures of the
Minsk Agreements are sequentially dependent on each other. For example, the reinstatement
of full control of the state border (including the conflicted Donetsk and Luhansk regions) to
the Ukrainian government is dependent on the withdrawal of all military
equipment which relies on a complete ceasefire between both countries (United Nations
Peacemaker, 2015).

In addition, the Minsk II Agreement was perceived as unequal in terms of concessions

between the two countries which led to its unsuccessful implementation. After the agreement,
Ukraine had to amend its constitution to recognize the special status of the Donetsk and
Luhansk regions, which gives Russia opportunities to interfere in political matters within
Ukrainian borders. Despite Ukraine’s agreement to the above condition, Russia’s request to
maintain Ukraine’s neutrality towards NATO was rejected by Ukraine (Powirska, 2022).
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Russia did not have to concede any of its sovereignty or make any long-term policy changes.
As a result, the Agreement continued to be breached and ceased to exist over time and failed
to achieve any progress in mending the relationship between Russia and Ukraine.

Therefore, Russia and Ukraine’s mistrustful relationship due to their conflicting

interests failed to create any potential opportunities for genuine cooperation and diplomacy.

Another distinct example of failed diplomacy was the ineffective security talks held
between President Biden and Putin in December 2021, two months before the invasion.
These security talks have proved that, from Putin’s point of view, diplomacy was no longer a
suitable tool for realizing Russia’s interests. No consensus was reached between the two
leaders. During the phone call, the United States questioned the intentions of Russia’s
increasing military activity on Ukraine’s borders, while Putin denied any chance of invasion
and called for legally binding guarantees which would limit NATO expansion in Ukraine and
Eastern Europe as an attempt to ban Ukraine from becoming a full member of NATO
(Tétrault-Farber and Balmforth, 2021). Both parties reiterated their stances and refused to
accept the other’s demands. Therefore, instead of reaching an agreement on how each
country would act towards Ukraine, tensions between the United States and Russia only
intensified. Therefore, the US has played a significant role in influencing the political
dynamics regarding Ukraine, thus failing to mitigate the possible dangers of Russia utilizing
military force to achieve its goal of maintaining its sphere of influence.

GEOPOLITICAL SECURITY CONCERNS AND STRATEGIC INTERESTS OF

RUSSIA
Ukraine’s critical geographical position as a buffer zone between Russia and burgeoning
NATO influence in Eastern Europe has posed security concerns towards Russia. These
prolonged fears of NATO expansion has led to the invasion of Ukraine as Russia may have
felt threatened by expanding Western military influence towards its borders, therefore it
decided to retaliate against NATO expansion and defend its scope of influence.

Ukraine’s strategic importance to Russia is undeniably high as NATO’s expansion

has allowed Eastern Europe to ‘slip away’ from Russia’s grip on its former territory. By
2022, Belarus and Ukraine are the only non-NATO members out of the 6 European countries
that Russia shares a border with (NATO, n.d.). Additionally, NATO expansion in Ukraine
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would challenge Russia’s military dominance in the Black Sea, further reducing Russia’s
sphere of influence. Therefore, from Russia’s perspective, in order to maintain its status as a
global power, the risk of the consequences of invading Ukraine to combat NATO expansion
outweighs the repercussions, reflecting how Russia is ultimately desperate to keep Ukraine as
one of its buffer states.

This long-standing security concern first came to light at the 2008 Bucharest Summit,
where NATO agreed that ‘these countries (Ukraine) will become members of NATO’
(NATO, 2008) and promised support for Ukraine’s application for full membership. This
triggered an immediate warning by Putin that ‘Moscow would view any attempt to expand
NATO as a direct threat’ (Dawar, 2008). This shows that Russia fears NATO’s eastward
expansion as it may establish military bases in Ukrainian territory and place troops and
missiles in the proximity of Russia’s borders, threatening Russia’s military status as a great
power and its influence on its neighbouring countries. Therefore, it is obvious that Russia
strongly refuses to allow Ukraine to fall under Western influence, and would even invade the
country despite hefty costs and international condemnation.

SPREAD OF WESTERN LIBERALIST IDEAS

Apart from the substantial military expansion by NATO, the spread of Western liberalist and
democratic ideals through the US and European Union (EU) has also been regarded as a
perceived ideological provocation by Russia which has led to the invasion.

The spread of Western ideology is highly evident in the Revolution of Dignity in 2013,
where U.S. government officials supported the overthrowing of Ukraine’s rightfully elected
pro-Russian president and replaced the vacancy with a pro-West prime minister which
favoured democracy and adopted harsh policies toward Moscow (Mearsheimer, 2014). The
Revolution, along with the aforementioned historical conflict, triggered the Crimea
annexation in 2014, which reflects how Russia wishes to contain the spread of the liberalist
international order and keep it away from its borders (Mearsheimer 2014, 2022). The
provocation continues with Ukraine and the EU’s strengthening relationship, which includes
the ratification of the European Union-Ukraine Association Agreement in 2017. Under this
agreement, Ukraine commits to reforming its economic and judicial system towards those of
EU standards in exchange for the EU’s financial and political support (Peter, 2014). These
measures help to facilitate the spread of democratic ideals in Ukraine and threaten Russia’s
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already faltering ideological dominance in Eastern Europe. Therefore, Russia perceives the
above events as dangers to its status as a prominent power and decides to defend itself by
destabilizing Ukraine through violent invasion.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF RUSSIA

Russia’s President Vladimir Putin plays a big role in deciding to mobilize Russian military
forces to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, his foreign policy is not only
shaped by external factors such as possible military and ideological challenges by the West
but also by the internal political dynamics of Russia and his ethnocentric patriotic ideals for
Russia.

Firstly, due to his falling domestic popularity in the years leading up to the invasion,
Putin needed to divert public attention from domestic affairs by implementing a strong
foreign policy. The signing of a pension age law, which increases women’s retirement age by
8 years and that of men’s by 5 despite protests, has caused his trust levels to plummet from
59% in 2017 to 39% in 2018 (The Moscow Times, 2018). Following these protests, COVID-
19 has caused significant negative impacts on Russia’s economy, exemplified by a 5.4%
GDP decrease and a large reduction in investment due to the government’s restrictive
measures, which is already under heavy foreign economic sanctions (Ranov, 2020). All these
events have increased public discontent and urged the Putin-centric government to seek other
means to regain the trust of its people. Therefore, Putin may have decided to invade Ukraine
as a measure to distract its citizens from domestic politics and rally support for his regime.

Moreover, the spread of Putin’s idea of Russian irredentism and his nationalistic
ambitions also play a significant role in shaping Putin’s ultimate choice to launch an
offensive on Ukraine. Irredentism is a subjective perception that ‘specific international
borders fail to delimit national territory’ (Diener, 2015). The article that Putin published ‘On
the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians’ (2017) even questions the existence of
Ukrainians, by using phrases such as ‘modern Ukraine is entirely a product of the Soviet era’
and ‘it (Ukraine) was shaped on the lands of historical Russia’ to claim that Russians and
Ukrainians are ‘one people’. The extensive usage of such language reflects Putin’s (perhaps)
nostalgic attitude toward the former Soviet superpower, and his determination to revive it by
promoting ethnocentric patriotism (Simonsen, 2000) through ‘reclaiming’ borders which he
considers should be a part of modern Russia. Hence, Russia, under Putin’s strong grip on
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policy-making, invaded Ukraine as an attempt to realize their leader’s nationalistic attempt to
restore a level of influence in Europe similar to that of the USSR.

CONCLUSION
The Russian invasion of Ukraine is escalating with no end in sight. With its underlying
intricate geopolitical dynamics, historical and cultural complexities, and failing diplomacy, it
is unlikely for the conflict to end anytime soon. This essay has also examined how perceived
Western provocation and the domestic political dynamics of Russia shaped by Putin has
contributed to his decision to invade Ukraine. Most importantly, all these factors are
intertwined and work together to contribute to the continuous intensification of conflict over
the years.

In light of this issue, I would like to propose one hypothetical outcome that would put
an end to the ongoing war: Russia and the West should work together in making Ukraine a
neutral, self-sufficient state who depends on and serves the interests of neither Russia nor the
West. Therefore, it is necessary to implement, perhaps the only feasible solution to put an end
to the loss of Ukrainian civilians.

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