Devie Ann Isaga Fuertes vs. The Senate of the Philippines, et al.
G.R. No. 208162, January 07, 2020
Facts:
Republic Act No. 8049, known as the Anti-Hazing Law, was put to the test in this
case, filed by Devie Ann Isaga Fuertes, a member of the Tau Gamma Sigma
Sorority. Fuertes, along with 45 others, was charged under this law for the death of
Chester Paolo Abracia, which occurred during initiation rites. The incident took place
on August 2, 2008, and an information was filed on October 20, 2008. Fuertes,
alleging her mere presence during the initiation rites without active participation,
challenged the constitutionality of Sections 5 and 14 of the Anti-Hazing Law. She
argued these sections allowed for her conviction despite a lack of direct participation,
thus violating her rights under the Constitution.
The case underwent multiple judicial processes, including Fuertes’ evasion of
arraignment and subsequent filing of a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme
Court. The Court required comments from the respondents, leading to arguments
spanning procedural appropriateness, the presumption of innocence, the legality of
disputable presumption, conspiracy, and cruel, and unusual punishment.
The proceedings elucidated on the procedural journey from the Regional Trial Court
to the Supreme Court, highlighting issues of hierarchy of courts, the ripeness for
adjudication, and pressing constitutional matters that necessitated Supreme Court
intervention.
Issue:
Whether Sections 5 and 14 of the Anti-Hazing Law violate the constitutional right to
presumption of innocence.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed Fuertes’ petition, upholding the constitutionality of
Sections 5 and 14 of the Anti-Hazing Law. The Court reasoned that the disputable
presumption of participation does not violate the presumption of innocence, as it
remains disputable and does not preclude the requirement for the prosecution to
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Additionally, the Court clarified that these
sections do not constitute a bill of attainder, as they do not automatically pronounce
guilt without a judicial trial but allow for due court processes to determine the
participation and culpability of the accused.
The decision reiterated doctrines related to the constitutional presumption of
innocence and the legality of the disputable presumption in criminal law. It
underscored that a statute that creates a disputable presumption does not
necessarily infringe upon constitutional rights, as long as there’s a rational
connection between the fact proved and the fact presumed. Moreover, it reinforced
that the presence of an accused during the commission of a crime can legally be
considered prima facie evidence of participation, subject to rebuttal and the overall
burden of proof remains with the prosecution.
JOSEPH C. CEREZO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 185230 June 1, 2011
Facts:
On September 12, 2002, Joseph Cerezo filed a libel complaint against Juliet Yaneza,
Pablo Abunda Jr., Vicente Afulugencia, and Oscar Mapalo. The Quezon City
Prosecutor’s Office (OP-QC) initially found probable cause and filed charges on
February 18, 2003. However, after a Motion for Reconsideration, the OP-QC
reversed its decision on November 20, 2003 and moved to withdraw the case.
Before this motion was filed, the accused had already been arraigned on November
24, 2003, pleading not guilty.
On March 17, 2004, the RTC dismissed the case, deferring to the prosecutor’s
discretion. Cerezo opposed the dismissal, arguing it was premature due to a pending
DOJ review. The RTC delayed action pending DOJ resolution.
On June 26, 2006, the DOJ reversed the OP-QC’s withdrawal and ordered the
refiling of charges. The RTC then reinstated the case on October 24, 2006, rejecting
the accused’s double jeopardy claim since the dismissal wasn’t final. The court set
further proceedings.
The accused sought reconsideration, which the RTC denied on February 26, 2007.
They then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) under Rule 65,
arguing double jeopardy.
The CA ruled in favor of the accused, declaring the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion and that double jeopardy applied, as all its elements were met: valid
information, arraignment, and dismissal without the accused’s consent. The CA also
noted the DOJ improperly acted on the review petition, violating Department Order
No. 223, which bars appeals once the accused has been arraigned.
Cerezo appealed the CA ruling after his motion for reconsideration was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not there a valid termination of the criminal case that would trigger the
double jeopardy protection afforded to the respondents.
Ruling:
No, there was no valid termination of the criminal case that would trigger the double
jeopardy protection afforded to the respondents.
Under established jurisprudence, for double jeopardy to attach, a valid dismissal or
termination of the case must occur, among other requisites. In this case, the
Supreme Court held that the RTC’s March 17, 2004 Order dismissing the case was
issued with grave abuse of discretion because the trial court failed to make an
independent assessment of whether a prima facie case existed. Instead, it blindly
relied on the prosecutor's recommendation and the later resolution of the DOJ,
abdicating its judicial duty to evaluate the merits of the case.
Because this dismissal was not the result of the trial court’s own judicial
determination but merely followed the prosecution’s inconsistent positions, it was
deemed void and without legal effect. As such, it did not constitute a valid termination
of the case for purposes of double jeopardy.
Consequently, one of the essential elements of double jeopardy valid and legal
dismissal or termination without the accused’s consent was not satisfied. Therefore,
double jeopardy had not attached, and the case may be properly remanded for
judicial evaluation of probable cause.
LEONARDO A. VILLALON vs. AMELIA CHAN
G.R. No. 196508 September 24, 2014
Facts:
Amelia Chan wed Leon Basilio Chua in a civil ceremony on May 6, 1954. She
claimed that Leon Basilio Chua and Leonardo A. Villalon were the same person.
During his marriage to Amelia, Villalon, under the alias of Chua, purportedly married
Erlinda Talde on June 2, 1993. The case arose when Amelia, residing in the U.S.,
delegated to Benito Yao Chua and Wilson Go the task of filing a bigamy complaint in
the Philippines on her behalf on September 13, 2003, leading to an Information
being filed against the Villalons (docketed as Criminal Case No. 05-30485). Despite
Villalons’ not-guilty plea, the trial court allowed Amelia’s representation by Atty.
Apollo V. Atencia, which was contested by Villalon in an omnibus motion, arguing
Amelia’s non involvement in the complaint filing.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC), in its March 3, 2006 resolution, granted Villalon’s
motion, disqualifying Atty. Atencia. Despite Amelia’s petition for certiorari and the CA
issuing a TRO, the RTC proceeded, culminating in a September 5, 2006 order
dismissing the case for lack of evidence.
Issue/s:
1. Whether the CA’s decision violates the petitioners’ constitutional right to due
process and the legal proscription against double jeopardy.
2. Whether the petitioner’s right against double jeopardy is violated by the CA’s
decision to remand and re-raffle the bigamy case.
Ruling:
1. The petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals (CA) violated their right
against double jeopardy by remanding and re-raffling the bigamy case after
the RTC's September 5, 2006, order, which they claim had already become
final. However, the Court found no merit in their argument.
The CA's review was not limited to the March 3, 2006 resolution of the RTC,
but encompassed all subsequent actions in the bigamy case, including the
September 5, 2006 order. The petitioners' claim that the September 5, 2006
order became final was incorrect because the CA's certiorari petition
addressed the entire proceedings, including that order. The RTC’s September
5, 2006 order did not attain finality, and as such, the CA's decision to remand
and re-raffle the case did not violate the petitioners' right against double
jeopardy.
Additionally, the RTC’s September 5, 2006 order was issued in defiance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) issued by the CA on April 19, 2006, which
prohibited further proceedings. Since the RTC violated the TRO and issued an
order without jurisdiction, that order was void and could not serve as a basis
for double jeopardy.
Thus, there was no violation of the petitioners' constitutional right to due
process or their protection against double jeopardy because the September 5,
2006 order was not final, and the CA acted within its authority to review and
remand the case.
2. The petitioners argue that the CA's decision to remand and re-raffle the
bigamy case violates their right against double jeopardy, as they contend that
the September 5, 2006 order from the RTC had already finalized the case.
The Court rejected this argument, stating that the RTC's September 5, 2006
order was issued in defiance of the CA’s TRO, which meant it was without
legal force. Therefore, the remand and re-raffling by the CA did not constitute
a second jeopardy as no valid and final disposition had taken place.
Double jeopardy only attaches when: A valid indictment is made; the accused
is arraigned and enters a valid plea; or the case is dismissed or resolved in a
way that precludes further prosecution without the consent of the accused.
Since the September 5, 2006 order was void due to the RTC’s violation of the
TRO, it did not legally terminate the case. Consequently, the petitioners’ right
against double jeopardy was not violated by the CA’s remand and re-raffle
decision.
The CA’s actions did not violate the petitioners' constitutional right to due
process or double jeopardy because the September 5, 2006 order did not
constitute a final, valid dismissal of the case.
Noel Navaja Vs. Hon. Manuel A. De Castro
G.R. No. 180969, September 11, 2017
Facts:
The case involves a preliminary investigation proceeding initiated by DKT Philippines
against its former Regional Sales Manager for Visayas for the crime of falsification of
a private document. The petitioner, who is the former Regional Sales Manager's
husband, allegedly obstructed justice by misrepresenting to a material witness that
her attendance in a scheduled hearing was no longer needed and presenting a
notarized affidavit in support of his wife's counter-affidavit. Criminal complaints were
filed against him for obstruction of justice, and he filed a motion to dismiss/quash the
information, arguing that the charge pending before one court should have been
absorbed by the charge pending before another court, considering that the cases
arose from a single preliminary investigation proceeding, involving the same set of
facts and circumstances, and flowed from a single alleged criminal intent.
The MCTC-Jagna denied petitioner's Motion to Quash for lack of jurisdiction over his
person. The MCTC-Jagna and MTCC-Tagbilaran have two separate cases, one with
only one accused and the other with two, and the places of commission are different.
The RTC denied the petition, which the CA affirmed, citing that petitioner allegedly
committed violations of different provisions of PD 1829, in distinct places and
locations, thus warranting two separate crimes. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied, and he filed a petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the criminal case will result to double jeopardy if not dismissed.
Ruling:
Yes. Consequently, the criminal case in MCTC-Jagna must be dismissed; otherwise,
petitioner will be unduly exposed to double jeopardy, which the Court cannot
countenance.
The Supreme Court ruled that the criminal case in MCTC-Jagna must be dismissed
to avoid double jeopardy, as the petitioner had already been convicted for the same
offense in MTCC-Tagbilaran. The acts attributed to the petitioner—preventing a
witness from testifying and presenting a false affidavit—were both aimed at
obstructing a single preliminary investigation (I.S. Case No. 04-1238). Unlike in the
Regis case, where distinct criminal acts were committed with different intents, the
petitioner’s actions were driven by one continuous criminal intent, thus qualifying as
a "delito continuado" or continuous crime. As such, only one charge should be
filed under Presidential Decree No. 1829, not multiple ones in different venues.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGELIO L. LUIS
G.R. NO. 164577 July 5, 2010
Facts:
On November 23, 1999, officials Victorino A. Basco, Romeo S. David, and Rogelio L.
Luis were charged under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for allegedly
favoring certain contractors and causing government losses through overpriced road
contracts awarded without public bidding. Despite the Ombudsman’s insistence on
proceeding with the case, and the initial denial of demurrers to evidence, the
Sandiganbayan eventually dismissed the case in 2004. The dismissal was based on
insufficient evidence, particularly on the element of overpricing, the lack of personal
knowledge by key witnesses, and a prior Court of Appeals ruling validating the
contracts. The court found no probable cause and cited related administrative
findings to support its conclusion.
Issue:
Whether or not the Petitioner’s appeal should be dismissed because it will violate
double jeopardy principles
Ruling
The Court ruled that the petitioner’s appeal should be dismissed because it would
violate the principle of double jeopardy. The petitioner, in filing a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45, resorted to an improper remedy. Under Section 1 of Rule
122, an appeal in criminal cases is generally prohibited if it would place the accused
in double jeopardy. This is because an appeal opens the entire case for review,
which could lead to a second trial for the accused for the same offense. The Court
clarified that while the rule barring appeals from judgments of acquittal is not
absolute, exceptions exist when the prosecution is denied due process or when the
trial court commits grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, such as in cases where a demurrer to evidence is granted, leading to a
dismissal of the case. However, the petitioner’s reliance on Rule 45, which is meant
for raising purely legal questions, was deemed incorrect. The Court emphasized that
the proper remedy in such a case would have been a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65, not an appeal under Rule 45. Since the dismissal of the case
following the demurrer to evidence was tantamount to an acquittal, reopening the
case through appeal would violate the double jeopardy protection, which prevents an
individual from being tried twice for the same offense. Moreover, the Court noted that
certiorari and appeal are mutually exclusive remedies, and while certiorari can be
pursued in cases of grave abuse of discretion, an appeal could result in double
jeopardy. The petitioner failed to prove that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave
abuse of discretion, thus failing to justify the appeal. As a result, the Court dismissed
the petition, reiterating that the correct remedy was certiorari, not an appeal.
Therefore, the petition was dismissed.
People of the Philippines, et al. vs. Panfilo M. Lacson.
G.R. No. 149453 April 1, 2003
Facts:
The Supreme Court faced the task of resolving the motions filed by respondent
Panfilo M. Lacson in connection to the Supreme Court’s April 29, 2003 Resolution
which granted the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, leading to various legal and
procedural questions in the course of the case.
The case originated from the provisional dismissal of criminal cases against Lacson
by Judge Wenceslao Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999, for lack of probable cause. The
dismissal purportedly did not have the express consent of Lacson nor notice to the
offended parties as required by Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure (RRCP). The Department of Justice refiled the criminal charges on June
6, 2001, beyond the two-year bar mandated by the new rule which took effect on
December 1, 2000.
Respondent Lacson filed motions challenging the validity of the refiling and whether
it violated his constitutional right to speedy trial and the due process clause, among
other concerns. The legal journey included Lacson’s initial appeal to the Court of
Appeals (CA) invoking the right against double jeopardy. After an unfavorable
decision in the CA (which addressed Section 8, Rule 117 of the RRCP), he brought
the matter to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court initially decided in favor of Lacson on May 28, 2002, resolving to
uphold the two-year time-bar and ordering the remand to the trial court to determine
if due process was observed in the provisional dismissal of the original cases.
However, upon the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, the Court’s April 29, 2003
Resolution reversed its initial stance, leading to Lacson filing various motions
including the Omnibus Motion, the Motion for Reconsideration, the Supplement to
Motion for Reconsideration, and the Motion to Set for Oral Arguments.
Issue:
Whether Lacson’s constitutional rights to speedy trial and due process were violated
by the revival of the criminal cases beyond the two-year bar.
Ruling
The Court ruled that Senator Lacson's constitutional rights to due process and a
speedy trial were violated when criminal cases previously dismissed were revived
after more than two years without valid justification. Applying the four-factor test
(length of delay, reason, assertion of the right, and prejudice), the Court found the
delay unreasonable, as the evidence used to reopen the case had long been
available, and no real barriers had prevented earlier action. Although Lacson couldn't
assert his right during the dismissed period, the prolonged uncertainty still caused
him significant harm. The Court concluded that the refiling of charges was politically
motivated and constituted persecution, not legitimate prosecution, and dismissed the
cases accordingly.
Disini Jr. et al. vs. The Secretary of Justice, et al.:
G.R. No. 203335 February 11, 2014
Facts:
A series of petitions were filed with the Philippine Supreme Court challenging the
constitutionality of various provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, also known as
the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012. The petitions, filed by different groups
including internet users, journalists, and lawmakers, aimed to declare several
provisions of the Act unconstitutional on the grounds that these provisions violated
free speech, due process, equal protection, and privacy rights among other
fundamental liberties.
R.A. 10175 sought to address crimes committed through the internet by establishing
a legal framework for identifying, stopping, and prosecuting such offenses. However,
concerns were raised about specific sections that appeared to suppress
constitutionally protected rights or lacked the necessary clarity, leading to worries
about arbitrary enforcement. The petitions focused heavily on provisions related to
illegal access, data interference, cybersquatting, online libel, child pornography, and
unsolicited communications, as well as the acts of aiding or abetting cybercrimes.
As the case progressed through the legal system, it garnered widespread attention
due to its potential impact on freedom of expression online. The Supreme Court
temporarily restrained the implementation of the law and deliberated on the issues
raised.
Issue:
Whether specific provisions of R.A. 10175 infringe upon the constitutional rights to
freedom of expression, due process, privacy, equal protection, due process, privacy
and correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press.
Ruling:
The Philippine Supreme Court held several provisions of R.A. 10175 unconstitutional
while upholding others.
Unconstitutional Provisions:
Section 4(c)(3) on unsolicited commercial communications,
Section 12 on the real-time collection of traffic data without proper court
authorization,
Section 19 allowing the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to
computer data.
Partially Unconstitutional:
Section 4(c)(4) on online libel, which the Court found valid only in relation to
the original author but not for those who simply receive or react to the post.
Constitutional Provisions:
The Court upheld various other sections, including those penalizing acts like
illegal access, data interference, cybersquatting, and child pornography,
among others, emphasizing the legislative intent to combat cybercrime
effectively.
The decision on online libel and aiding or abetting cybercrimes highlighted the
Court’s effort to balance the need for cybercrime legislation against the
constitutional rights to free speech and privacy.
The decision reinforced the doctrine of striking a balance between addressing
modern challenges posed by cybercrimes and respecting constitutional rights,
particularly freedom of expression and privacy. It clarified the extent to which
legislation could go in regulating online behavior without overstepping
constitutional boundaries.
