201 - G.R. No. L-54110, Generoso Esmeña and Alberto Alba v. Judge Julian B. Pogoy, et al.

(February 20,
1981)

Facts
Petitioners Generoso Esmeña and Alberto Alba were charged with grave coercion for allegedly forcing a
priest to surrender money lost in a card game. After arraignment and repeated postponements due to the
complainant’s absences, the trial court provisionally dismissed the case without obtaining the express
consent of the accused, despite their insistence on proceeding with trial. The prosecution later moved to
revive the case, which the trial court granted, prompting the accused to raise the issue of double jeopardy.

Issue
Whether the revival of a criminal case that was provisionally dismissed without the accused’s express
consent constitutes double jeopardy.

Ruling
Yes, reviving the case violates the accused’s right against double jeopardy, as the dismissal was made
without their express consent.

"We hold that the petitioners were placed in jeopardy by the provisional dismissal of the grave coercion
case... The petitioners did not expressly manifest their conformity to the provisional dismissal. Hence, the
dismissal placed them in jeopardy."

"Even if the petitioners, after invoking their right to a speedy trial, moved for the dismissal of the case and,
therefore, consented to it, the dismissal would still place them in jeopardy... The use of the word
'provisional' would not change the legal effect of the dismissal."

The Supreme Court ruled that the orders reviving the case and denying the motion to dismiss were null and
void, and thus set aside.
202 - Pp. vs. CA and Tangan, GR No. 102612, Feb. 13, 2001

Facts

On December 1, 1984, a road altercation between Navy Captain Eladio Tangan and Generoso Miranda
escalated into a fatal shooting, with conflicting accounts on whether the discharge was intentional or
accidental. Tangan was acquitted of illegal possession of a firearm but convicted of homicide with
mitigating circumstances, receiving a reduced sentence. Both Tangan and the heirs of the victim appealed—
Tangan sought acquittal, while the Solicitor General’s attempt to increase liability was denied due to double
jeopardy, leading to a consolidated Supreme Court review.

Issue

1. Whether the appellate court erred in upholding the trial court’s conviction of Tangan for homicide with
mitigating circumstances.

2. Whether the petition for certiorari by the Solicitor General seeking to adjust the conviction by removing
mitigating circumstances constituted double jeopardy.

Ruling

1. The Court affirmed the trial court’s conviction of Tangan for homicide, rejecting his defense of
accidental firing, determining that during the struggle, Tangan retained possession of the gun and
intentionally discharged it despite the conflictual testimonies.
2. The Supreme Court dismissed the Solicitor General’s certiorari petition to remove mitigating
circumstances, citing it as violative of Tangan’s right against double jeopardy. Procedural bars
prevent the state’s appeal to increase Tangan’s liability post-acquittal of some charges.
203 - G.R. No. 136258, People of the Philippines v. Carlos Feliciano (October 10, 2001)

Facts
Carlos Feliciano, a security guard, was charged with robbery with homicide after Teresita Fuentes was
found bludgeoned to death in Kalibo, Aklan. Feliciano’s co-accused, Rodel de la Cruz, was discharged to
become a state witness despite objections from the defense, although evidence later showed de la Cruz’s
active participation and suspicious conduct. Feliciano was convicted based primarily on de la Cruz’s
testimony, corroborated by other witnesses, though the trial court imposed the death penalty.

Issue
Whether the discharge of an accused (Rodel de la Cruz) to become a state witness, despite signs of equal
guilt and defense objections, violates the rules on termination of a criminal case (i.e., acquittal without
proper basis).

Ruling
No, the discharge of de la Cruz was valid and operates as an acquittal, binding on the State even if he later
appears equally guilty, so long as he fulfilled his duty to testify.

"It is widely accepted that the discharge of an accused to become a state witness has the same effect as an
acquittal. The impropriety of the discharge would not have any effect on the competency and quality of the
testimony, nor would it have the consequence of withdrawing his immunity from prosecution."

"A discharge, if granted at the stage where jeopardy has already attached, is equivalent to an acquittal,
such that further prosecution would be tantamount to the state reneging on its part of the agreement and
unconstitutionally placing the state witness in double jeopardy."

Thus, even though de la Cruz appeared to mitigate his own culpability and seemed equally involved, his
compliance with the agreement to testify truthfully binds the State and renders his discharge final and
equivalent to acquittal. The Court affirmed the conviction of Feliciano but reduced the penalty from death
to reclusion perpetua.
204 - G.R. No. 158157, People of the Philippines and Vilma Campos v. Louel Uy, et al. (September 30,
2005)

Facts
Rabel Campos was found dead with multiple stab wounds on March 23, 2001. Teofilo Panangin confessed
in a sworn statement that he and Louel Uy conspired to kill her, but later retracted his confession. After
trial, the RTC granted the accused’s separate demurrers to evidence and acquitted them, yet held them
civilly liable for ₱35,000, prompting this Rule 65 petition by the People and the victim’s mother.

Issue
Whether the grant of the demurrer to evidence which led to the acquittal of the accused is void due to grave
abuse of discretion that negates the application of the finality-of-acquittal and double jeopardy doctrines.

Ruling
Yes, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, thereby
rendering the acquittal void and not covered by the rule on double jeopardy.

"In fine, since as reflected above, the trial court committed not only gross errors of judgment but also grave
abuse of discretion in the grant of the defense’s demurrer to evidence, no valid judgment was rendered,
preventing jeopardy to attach."

"A remand of the case for further appropriate proceedings is thus warranted and it does not violate the
accused’s right against double jeopardy."

Thus, the Supreme Court set aside the acquittal, held that no valid termination occurred due to grave abuse
of discretion, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
205 - G.R. No. 173089, People of the Philippines v. Hon. Enrique C. Asis and Jaime Abordo (August 25,
2010)

Facts
Jaime Abordo was charged with frustrated and attempted murder after shooting two individuals during an
altercation. The RTC found him guilty only of serious and less serious physical injuries, acquitting him of
the attempted murder charge. The OSG filed a Rule 65 petition assailing the RTC's judgment, arguing grave
abuse of discretion in the downgraded convictions and acquittal.

Issue:
Whether the trial court's judgment acquitting Abordo of one charge and convicting him of lesser offenses
in the others may be annulled via certiorari without violating the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy.

Ruling

"The rule is that 'while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such
an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to
a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.'"

"A reading of the OSG petition for certiorari filed before the CA, however, fails to show that the prosecution
was deprived of its right to due process... Certainly, there was no mistrial."

"What the OSG is questioning, therefore, are errors of judgment. This, however, cannot be resolved without
violating Abordo’s constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy."

Disposition:
The Court partially granted the petition by reversing the CA's ruling that the certiorari petition was the
wrong remedy — affirming that certiorari is proper in exceptional cases. However, it denied the certiorari
petition for lack of merit, holding that no grave abuse of discretion attended the trial court's ruling, and thus
double jeopardy barred further review.