Think • Vol 23 • No 66 • Spring 2024, 11–15

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1477175623000301

God and the Problem of Evil: Why Soul-Making

Won’t Suffice
Brian D. Earp*
Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, Littlegate House, 16–17 St Ebbe’s Street, Oxford OX1 1PT, UK
*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]

Keywords: God; evil; Hick; Plantinga; theodicy

Abstract
If you believe in the existence of an infinitely good, all-knowing, and all-powerful deity (‘God’), how do
you explain the reality of evil – including the inexpressible suffering and death of innocents? Wouldn’t
God be forced to vanquish such suffering due to God’s very nature? Alvin Plantinga has argued, con-
vincingly, that if the possibility of ultimate goodness somehow necessarily required that evil be allowed
to exist, God, being omnibenevolent, would have to allow it. But as John Hick has noted, the mere
logical possibility of such a situation might not be enough to console the doubting theist. We need a
positive reason to believe that evil as we know it is compatible with God’s existence. So, Hick offers
a ‘soul-making’ theodicy – or vindication – of God, suggesting that the human soul cannot fully progress
to spiritual maturity (a kind of ultimate good on his account) without grappling with evil. In this short
piece I argue that, if we accept Hick’s premises about souls and soul-making, we can indeed make sense
of evil to some extent. But, I suggest, his account cannot justify the type or amount of evil we see in the
world, so his theodicy does not succeed

In his article, ‘Evil and Soul-Making’ (all refer- Anti-theistic philosophers have often employed
ences below are to pages 152–3), John Hick the Problem of Evil in their arguments against the
argues for theism by attempting to reconcile existence of God. They claim that it is logically
belief in the existence of God with the apparent inconsistent to believe the following five things
fact of evil. That is, he tries to explain why an all- all at once:
loving and all-powerful being would knowingly
allow its creatures to suffer evil. Ultimately, he (1) God exists.
only partially succeeds. Although he offers a (2) God is all-good.
plausible explanation for the fact of evil, I will (3) God is all-knowing.
try to show that he fails to provide adequate jus- (4) God is all-powerful.
tification for either the amount or type of evil in (5) Evil exists.
a world created by a supposedly loving God. To
begin, let us consider the problem Hick means Of course, they mean to reject theism on the
to resolve with his theodicy: the so-called assumption that it requires (at minimum) all of
Problem of Evil. those things. In other words, if you claim to be

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 Brian D. Earp

a theist on the basis of believing (1), but you there is not even the possibility of reconciliation
reject one or more of (2)–(5), then the anti-theist between the first four premises and the last.
is not here concerned with you. The briefest But this is far from satisfying. Showing that it
account of the anti-theist’s reasoning is this: an is logically possible to believe in God despite the
all-good, all-knowing, and all-powerful god existence of evil does very little (to use Milton’s
[(1)–(4)] would necessarily eliminate all evil, cre- words) to ‘justify the ways of God to men’. As a
ating a state of affairs which directly contradicts result, theologians such as Hick have gone further
(5). Therefore, says the anti-theist, the theist and developed a specific theodicy by which they
holds a set of beliefs that are internally inconsist- attempt to spell out more fully God’s ‘actual’ rea-
ent and so irrational. sons for allowing evil. They hope thereby to vindi-
A theist could respond to this accusation by cate God’s essential goodness, knowledge, and
pointing out that by these same premises and power in the face of apparent great evil. So what
similar reasoning, God would have to allow evil is Hick’s theodicy?
to exist if it were either necessarily required for, Following Irenaeus, Hick rejects St Augustine’s
or inextricably bound up with, some greater view that humans were created in an initial state
good – a possibility which reconciles (1)–(4) of (human) perfection, ‘fulfilling the divine
with (5). Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defence intention for our human level of existence’ and
shows, conclusively I think, that there is at least then falling away from Eden via original sin.
one valid way both to conceive of such a possibility Instead, he tells this ‘inverse’ story. First, God
and to defeat its likely objectors – though I will not created the physical universe (probably in the
rehearse his arguments here. Thus, the anti-theist Big Bang). Then, over aeons, through the pro-
is foiled (with respect to this particular claim), cess of evolution, organic life emerged, ultim-
since to assert logical inconsistency requires that ately becoming conscious and free willed – that

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 Think • Vol 23 • No 66 • Spring 2024

is, recognizably human. At this point, a ‘second

stage’ of God’s creative process began, in which ‘[T]heologians such as
these biological creatures start to evolve spiritually
into a state of personal likeness to God, to be fully
Hick have …
realized in some future perfection. The idea is that
through engaging with evil in the world (e.g. over-
developed a specific
coming temptations to do great harm), humans are theodicy by which
able to build truly moral character and progress
towards spiritual maturity. Hick explains that they attempt to spell
this spiritual evolution cannot be effectuated by
‘divine fiat’, but ‘only through the uncompelled out more fully God’s
responses and willing co-operation of human indi-
viduals in their actions and reactions in the world “actual” reasons for
in which God has placed them’. See how this state-
ment elucidates some of the central components
allowing evil. They
of Hick’s theodicy: hope thereby to
1. ‘ … uncompelled responses …’ Hick is, by vindicate God’s
his own admission, making a ‘value judge-
ment’ here in which he assumes that one essential goodness,
who has freely chosen to do good in the
face of temptations to bring about evil is knowledge, and power
somehow ‘better’ or more ‘valuable’ than
one who is good because she was pro- in the face of apparent
grammed only to do right by her creator.
This leads to a second main component:
great evil.’
2. Moral evil exists in the world because
moral good also exists. This is how the So far, Hick’s theodicy seems at least plausible
Free Will Defence works: the existence and is adequately broad in scope: it offers reasons
of free moral agents is the greater for both moral and natural evil, and it even takes
good with which the existence of evil in into account modern cosmology and evolution-
the world is inextricably linked. ary science. The question is, what sort of world
Therefore, in order to bring about this do these components imply? What type or degree
great good, God must allow for the exist- of evil does his theodicy suggest should exist? Is it
ence of evil. Finally: the same as the actual world, and the evil we do
3. ‘ … reactions in the world in which God experience? Or does it fail fully to account for
has placed them …’ This indicates the such evil, as I am arguing? Hick writes: ‘If God’s
source of another sort of evil (besides aim in making the world is “the bringing of
moral evil as a result of free choice): ‘nat- many sons to glory,” that aim will naturally deter-
ural’ evil. Natural evil is not caused by the mine the kind of world that He has created.’ So,
human exercise of free will (set aside dis- what kind of world should God create, given
asters due to human-caused climate that some amount of evil or suffering is to be
change, etc.), but is simply part of the seen as an essential ingredient in the worthy
world in which God has placed God’s crea- cause of ‘bringing sons to glory’?
tures, giving them obstacles in their envir- Hick dismisses those who think that a loving
onment with which they must engage to God would create a world with no evil or suffer-
more fully effect their moral evolution. ing. In Hick’s view, we should not see ourselves
This could be taken as an implicit defence as helpless gerbils, expecting to be primped and
of natural evil. pampered and given a fluffy benign world to

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 Brian D. Earp

inhabit. Instead, we are like children and God is Hick is right to suggest that a world analogous to
like a parent. Hick writes: the first scenario would be hedonistic and
ill-suited to moral and/or spiritual develop-
It is clear that a parent who loves his chil- ment. But then, why didn’t God create a world
dren, and wants them to become the best like the second picture – one in which humans
human beings that they are capable of were a threat to their own safety by virtue
becoming does not treat pleasure as the of ‘misusing equipment’ in a relatively neutral
sole and supreme value … we do not desire physical world (where, by virtue of free
for them unalloyed pleasure at the expense social interaction, certain evils could come to
of their growth in such even greater values pass, but also certain important goods)? What
as moral integrity, unselfishness, compas- reason does Hick attribute to God’s creating a
sion, courage, humor, reverence for the world like the third, in which morally good peo-
truth, and perhaps above all the capacity ple may suddenly be hit by lightning, or die of
for love. cancer, or be crushed by debris in an
earthquake?
Here I must register my first objection. It is true That is not the sort of environment a loving
that a loving parent does not wish to smother a parent creates for her child. God could poten-
child with ‘unalloyed pleasure’. However, the tially have created a world which was not hedon-
question is what kind of environment would a istic but which also had less evil in it than this
loving parent create for her child? If God created one: it isn’t all or nothing. In this respect I do
a world in which there were no natural evils (nat- not think that Hick’s theodicy properly accounts
ural disasters, say, or deadly epidemics uncaused for natural evils which arbitrarily destroy inno-
by human choices), why couldn’t free will alone cent life – such evils do not seem necessary for
provide ‘enough’ evil to build character – or spir- “soul-making” and, indeed, may be soul-
itually mature souls, for that matter? Or what crushing. What is their justification?
about free will plus some natural evils or environ- My second objection has to do with
mental risks, but not the unfathomable range and the degree of evil experienced, and its uneven dis-
magnitude of such evils we encounter in the tribution in the world. If evil is meant to be a
actual world? device to help in soul-making, it seems unreason-
Consider this analogy. I want to provide a play able that some individuals should experience evil
space for my two (hypothetical) children whom I on top of evil, leading to complete despair or sui-
love. Here are some choices: cide rather than spiritual growth, and others
hardly any evil at all. One potential response to
1. I can make sure to cover everything with this is that perhaps it is not the individual’s spir-
thick, cushy pads so no one gets hurt, itual growth that God is concerned with but
feed them ice cream and cookies all day, rather the spiritual perfection of the human spe-
and install a large TV with their favourite cies. On this view, the disparity between indivi-
movies playing on repeat. duals would seem to ‘even out’ over decades or
2. I can create a relatively neutral environment centuries as each generation learned from the
where perhaps there is a ball and bat among moral experiments of the last. But Hick rejects
other toys – items which, if misused, could this view:
be very dangerous (for example, one of my
children could get angry and start to hit Because this is a pilgrimage within the life of
the other with the bat), but which, if used each individual rather than a racial evolu-
responsibly, do not entail any overt threat tion, the progressive fulfillment of God’s
to their safety or happiness. purpose does not entail any corresponding
3. I could arbitrarily poison their food every progressive improvement in the moral
so often, so that one of them gets very state of the world … it is thus probable
sick or dies. that human life was lived on much the

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 Think • Vol 23 • No 66 • Spring 2024

same moral plane two thousand years ago in the world, or for the fact that some individuals
or four thousand years ago as it is today. experience evil to a humanly unbearable degree,
quashing any hope for spiritual perfection. And

‘I do not think that what of the child who dies of cancer? Surely he
cannot complete the ‘pilgrimage’ – but by no
Hick’s theodicy fault of his own. That does not seem consistent
with an all-loving, all-powerful God, either.
properly accounts for To conclude, Hick does offer a coherent, if pre-
liminary, answer to the question why an all-loving,
natural evils which all-powerful God might knowingly allow its crea-
tures to suffer. He suggests that evil exists both
arbitrarily destroy as a product of human free choice and ‘naturally’

innocent life – such in the environment (as created by God) – in

both cases to provide individuals with a morally
complicated world with which to grapple for the
evils do not seem benefit of their spiritual evolution. Unfortunately,
necessary for though, Hick fails to explain why God would
allow so much suffering, or suffering which cannot
“soul-making” and, be used for soul-making due to its overwhelming
the spirit, or suffering which is so unevenly distrib-
indeed, may be uted, or suffering due to horrific natural disasters
or diseases. Hick’s theodicy offers an interesting
soul-crushing.’ way to think about the Problem of Evil, but does
very little to resolve the tension one has who is try-
Since this is Hick’s position, he does not seem to ing to reconcile belief in God with the realities of
account for the wildly uneven distribution of evil so much evil in the world.

References
Hick, John, ‘Evil and Soul-Making’, in Louis J. Pojman (ed.), Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, 4th
edn (Toronto: Wadsworth, 2003), 152–6.
Plantinga, Alvin, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1974).

Brian D. Earp
Brian D. Earp is Senior Research Fellow, Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, Honorary Faculty, Department of Experimental
Psychology, and William Golding JRF, Brasenose College, University of Oxford.

Cite this article: Earp BD (2024). God and the Problem of Evil: Why Soul-Making Won’t Suffice. Think 23, 11–15. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1477175623000301

© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Royal Institute of Philosophy. This is an Open Access article, distributed under
the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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