Legitimacy: The State and Beyond Wojciech Sadurski

(Editor) download

https://ebookmass.com/product/legitimacy-the-state-and-beyond-wojciech-
sadurski-editor/

Visit ebookmass.com today to download the complete set of

ebooks or textbooks
 We believe these products will be a great fit for you. Click
the link to download now, or visit ebookmass.com
to discover even more!

Poland's Constitutional Breakdown Wojciech Sadurski

https://ebookmass.com/product/polands-constitutional-breakdown-
wojciech-sadurski/

Constitutional Public Reason Wojciech Sadurski

https://ebookmass.com/product/constitutional-public-reason-wojciech-
sadurski/

State, Violence, and Legitimacy in India 1st Edition

Santana Khanikar

https://ebookmass.com/product/state-violence-and-legitimacy-in-
india-1st-edition-santana-khanikar/

Law Beyond the State: Dynamic Coordination, State Consent,

and Binding International Law 1st Edition Carmen E. Pavel

https://ebookmass.com/product/law-beyond-the-state-dynamic-
coordination-state-consent-and-binding-international-law-1st-edition-
carmen-e-pavel/
Agents beyond the State: The Writings of English
Travelers, Soldiers, and Diplomats in Early Modern Europe
Mark Netzloff
https://ebookmass.com/product/agents-beyond-the-state-the-writings-of-
english-travelers-soldiers-and-diplomats-in-early-modern-europe-mark-
netzloff/

The Grounds of Political Legitimacy Fabienne Peter

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-grounds-of-political-legitimacy-
fabienne-peter/

Reconstructing our Understanding of State Legitimacy in

Post-conflict States : Building on Local Perspectives 1st
Edition Ruby Dagher
https://ebookmass.com/product/reconstructing-our-understanding-of-
state-legitimacy-in-post-conflict-states-building-on-local-
perspectives-1st-edition-ruby-dagher/

Trapped: Brides of the Kindred Book 29 Faith Anderson

https://ebookmass.com/product/trapped-brides-of-the-kindred-
book-29-faith-anderson/

Contested World Orders: Rising Powers, Non-Governmental

Organizations, and the Politics of Authority Beyond the
Nation-State Matthew D. Stephen (Editor)
https://ebookmass.com/product/contested-world-orders-rising-powers-
non-governmental-organizations-and-the-politics-of-authority-beyond-
the-nation-state-matthew-d-stephen-editor/
i

LEGITIMACY
ii
iii

Legitimacy
The State and Beyond

Edited by
WO J C I E C H S A D U R S K I
MICHAEL SEVEL
and
K E V I N WA LTO N

1
iv

1
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries
© The several contributors 2019
The moral rights of the authors have been asserted
First Edition published in 2019
Impression: 1
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics
rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
Crown copyright material is reproduced under Class Licence
Number C01P0000148 with the permission of OPSI
and the Queen’s Printer for Scotland
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Control Number: 2018965754
ISBN 978–​0–​19–​882526–​5
Printed and bound by
CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY
Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and
for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
v

Contents

Notes on the Contributors vii

Introduction 1
Wojciech Sadurski, Michael Sevel, and Kevin Walton

PA RT I . T H E O RY O F L E G I T I M A C Y
I. The Control Theory of Legitimacy 7
Philip Pettit
II. Legitimate Political Authority and Expertise 32
Fabienne Peter
III. Another Voluntarism: John Rawls on Political Legitimacy 43
Paul Weithman

PA RT I I . L E G I T I M A C Y O F T H E S TAT E
IV. The Future of State Sovereignty 69
Joseph Raz
V. The Legitimacy of Whom? 82
Nicole Roughan
VI. The Rule of Law and State Legitimacy 106
Martin Krygier
VII. The Nation State’s Legitimation in Post-​National Society: A Social
Systems Perspective of Values in Legality and Power 137
Jiří Přibáň

PA RT I I I . L E G I T I M A C Y B E YO N D T H E S TAT E
VIII. Conceptions of Public Reason in the Supranational Sphere and
Legitimacy beyond Borders 161
Wojciech Sadurski
IX. Who’s Afraid of Suprastate Constitutional Theory?
Two Reasons to be Sceptical of the Sceptics 182
Cormac Mac Amhlaigh
X. Perfectionist Liberalism and the Legitimacy of International Law 206
Michael Sevel
vi

vi Contents
XI. Legitimacy Criticisms of International Courts: Not Only
Fuzzy Rhetoric? 223
Andreas Follesdal

Index 239
vi

Notes on the Contributors

Cormac Mac Amhlaigh, University of Edinburgh
Andreas Follesdal, University of Oslo
Martin Krygier, University of New South Wales
Fabienne Peter, University of Warwick
Philip Pettit, Princeton University/​Australian National University
Jiří Přibáň, Cardiff University
Joseph Raz, Columbia University/​King’s College London
Nicole Roughan, University of Auckland
Wojciech Sadurski, University of Sydney/​University of Warsaw
Michael Sevel, University of Sydney
Kevin Walton, University of Sydney
Paul Weithman, University of Notre Dame
vi
1

Introduction
Wojciech Sadurski, Michael Sevel, and Kevin Walton

Traditionally, discussions of legitimacy have been about states. The present volume
engages with this tradition, but goes beyond it to examine, in addition, the legit-
imacy of suprastate institutions and norms. Yet consideration of legitimacy in these
two contexts obviously raises another issue: what is legitimacy? Part One focuses
on this general inquiry. But every contributor is concerned, even if only implicitly,
with it.
Here is one aspect of this general inquiry: what sort of problem is legitimacy?
Some, most notably Max Weber,1 consider it empirical, some think of it as moral,
and some believe it to be both. Philip Pettit, the author of the first chapter, is among
those for whom it is a moral problem. According to Pettit, a state is legitimate if its
exercise of power over its citizens is morally justified. One contributor who takes
legitimacy to be a matter of social fact is Jiří Přibáň, whose chapter is a sociological
study of the ambiguous role of values in legitimation of the state. Martin Krygier
thinks that both moral and empirical tests must be met for an institution to be
legitimate. For Krygier, the legitimacy of the state depends on the perceptions of its
citizens plus its moral character.
Pettit not only adopts a moral conception of legitimacy; he also separates the issue
of legitimacy from those of justice and authority. The distinction between legitimacy
and justice is familiar. Wojciech Sadurski also makes it in his chapter. On this com-
mon view, a state can be legitimate without being entirely just and can be illegitim-
ate while being broadly just. The question of legitimacy, Pettit explains, is about the
vertical relation between the state and its citizens, whereas the question of justice is
about the horizontal relations established by the state between its citizens. In mak-
ing the further distinction between legitimacy and authority, Pettit gives the former
priority over the latter. He takes the question of legitimacy to be more fundamental
than the matter of authority and, therefore, crucial for any moral obligation owed
to the state by citizens.
What is this moral obligation? It is, Pettit supposes, an obligation on citizens who
contest the law to do so in a way that does not involve changing the regime. But most

1 See Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (Guenther Roth and
Claus Wittich eds, Ephraim Fischoff and others trs, University of California Press 1968) 212–​301.

Legitimacy: The State and Beyond. First Edition. Edited by Wojciech Sadurski, Michael Sevel, and
Kevin Walton. © Wojciech Sadurski, Michael Sevel, and Kevin Walton 2019. Published 2019 by
Oxford University Press.
Visit https://ebookmass.com today to explore
a vast collection of ebooks across various
genres, available in popular formats like
PDF, EPUB, and MOBI, fully compatible with
all devices. Enjoy a seamless reading
experience and effortlessly download high-
quality materials in just a few simple steps.
Plus, don’t miss out on exciting offers that
let you access a wealth of knowledge at the
best prices!
2

2 Wojciech Sadurski, Michael Sevel, and Kevin Walton

theorists take a different view: they assume that the obligation is to obey the law. For
Sadurski, the majority view is ill-​suited to the supranational realm, where it should
be replaced, in his opinion, by a weaker alternative, according to which those subject
to legitimate norms have a moral obligation merely to respect them.
Among the many theorists for whom the legitimacy of an authority entails a
moral obligation to obey its directives is Joseph Raz, the author of the opening
chapter of Part Two. His earlier work features in the contributions of several others,
most obviously in Fabienne Peter’s response to the objection that Raz’s view of legit-
imate political authority fails to distinguish authority adequately from expertise, in
Michael Sevel’s extension of Raz’s perfectionist-​liberal theory of legitimacy to inter-
national law, and in Andreas Follesdal’s reliance on Raz’s conception of authority in
his chapter on the legitimacy of international courts.
Another theorist who is mentioned in more than one chapter is John Rawls.
Indeed, his treatment of legitimacy in his later work is the exclusive concern of Paul
Weithman’s contribution, which offers an interpretation of his view. More critical
is Sadurski, who dismisses Rawls’s account of public reason as a conception of legit-
imacy in the supranational sphere. Sevel considers his work, too, albeit less directly,
when defending Raz’s perfectionist brand of liberalism against Martha Nussbaum’s
Rawlsian critique.
Besides these general issues and the writings of Raz and Rawls, what else do the
contributors discuss? Short summaries of their chapters follow.
From the perspective of republicanism, which he defends elsewhere, Pettit looks
at theories of state legitimacy of three types: benefit-​, merit-​, and will-​based. Since
benefits can be provided by dictators and the merits of a leader cannot be guaran-
teed, the third, according to which the will of the state must not be dominating
for those who live under it, is best, says Pettit. Yet he does not regard all will-​based
approaches as equal. Of the three that he examines, only the ‘control’ approach
ensures that individuals are not dominated, which means, in his view, that its unwel-
come decisions should not be resented, but viewed instead as just ‘tough luck’.
In her chapter, Peter replies to Stephen Darwall, who accuses Raz of conflating
expertise and legitimate political authority. According to Darwall, such authority
depends on a mode of justification involving mutual accountability, which pub-
lic reason approaches exemplify. The main point of disagreement between Darwall
and Raz, says Peter, is not whether expertise is sufficient for legitimate political
authority—​Raz admits that it is not—​but whether, as Raz thinks but Darwall
denies, it is necessary. Having clarified the debate, Peter defends the possibility of
grounding legitimate political authority in expertise. She thus dismisses Darwall’s
critique. She concludes, however, that the mode of justification on which he insists is
nevertheless important in democratic societies, in which, on many issues, expertise
is not available.
The third chapter is, as stated above, an attempt by Weithman to make sense of
Rawls’s account of legitimacy in his later work. Weithman thinks that the answers to
the questions raised by this account are to be found in Rawls’s claim, familiar from
social contract theory, that political power is the power of the public as a corpor­
ate body. In so claiming, Weithman suggests, Rawls follows Immanuel Kant, not
3

Introduction 3

John Locke. Understood as Kantian, his conception of legitimacy is less puzzling,

says Weithman, even if some questions persist.
Raz’s contribution, which keeps its original character as a talk, is the first of four to
focus on the legitimacy of the state. It starts with a question: Do increasing challenges
to state sovereignty require legal theory to be re-​thought? In response, Raz observes
that, despite these challenges, state sovereignty persists, since no alternative is avail-
able. He argues that the success of the assortment of international organizations that
challenge state sovereignty depends on their ability to attract loyalty, which depends,
in turn, on their ability to recognize the truth of pluralism and respond to diverse
interests, preferences, and traditions. Perhaps such value-​pluralism is best protected
by sovereign states, he says.
In the fifth chapter, Nicole Roughan argues that, to be complete, an account of a
state’s legitimacy must evaluate not only its powers and its institutions, but also its
officials. She gives three reasons for separate consideration of the third: officials are
not only institutional, but also moral agents; important aspects of legitimacy will
be missed unless the legitimacy of officials is examined; and the identity of those
who exercise powers and control institutions is a normative matter. She proceeds to
indicate that, to be legitimate, officials, having claimed a state’s authority, must seek
to improve the legitimacy of both its powers and its institutions and, in exercising
its authority, must try to behave respectfully towards those subject to its powers and
institutions. Roughan finishes by emphasizing that an assessment of the ‘micro-​
legitimacy’ of officials is not all that matters in evaluating the legitimacy of a state as
one among many claimants of authority.
Krygier begins his chapter on the rule of law and state legitimacy by pointing
out that how the rule of law contributes to state legitimacy turns on how the rule
of law is understood. Drawing on earlier work, he recommends looking first to its
point, which is, in his opinion, to temper the arbitrary exercise of power. Such tem-
pering, he thinks, even if Marxists and others do not, is something without which a
state cannot be legitimate. Krygier then queries the assumption of lawyers and legal
philosophers that the rule of law depends simply on the formal rules and proced-
ures of states; it also depends, he insists, on the actual and perceived functioning of
those rules and procedures, on tempering non-​state arbitrariness, and on passing
‘Hobbes’s test’ of effectiveness.
Part Two ends with Přibáň’s inquiry into the legitimation of the nation state in
a post-​national world. He employs systems theory, according to which law is one
of many normative systems and the state is one of many societal organizations, to
make sense of the role of values in the state’s legitimation. He argues that processes
of legitimation are constituted by systemic communication between law and politics
within and beyond the nation state, communication that involves the internaliza-
tion of values that are external to these systems. Yet, stresses Přibáň, such values are
not transcendental foundations; they are instead internally generated expectations
that differentiate between legitimacy and illegitimacies in both politics and law.
Legitimacy beyond the state is the subject of Part Three. In his chapter, Sadurski
contends that legitimacy in this sphere should be understood, given the democratic
deficit of supranational authorities, as a subject-​conferred attribute of specific norms
4

4 Wojciech Sadurski, Michael Sevel, and Kevin Walton

that generates, as previously mentioned, no more than a duty to respect those norms.
The conception of this concept of legitimacy that he favours is a public reason one.
It is not Rawls’s view of public reason in the supranational sphere, which, points out
Sadurski, cannot be understood as a conception of legitimacy. Rather, it is what he
calls Supranational Public Reason sensu stricto, which, he says, not only can be so
understood, but can also be detected in the legitimating strategies of supranational
bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights.
In the ninth chapter, Cormac Mac Amhlaigh replies to critics of attempts to
ground the legitimacy of suprastate institutions in constitutionalism. More specific-
ally, he responds to the objection that suprastate constitutionalism is idealistic due
to the improbability of a demos beyond the state. He makes two points: first, the
objection relies on a normative understanding of the idea of a demos that is itself
potentially idealistic and, second, the objection assumes that idealism in normative
theory is problematic, which might be doubted.
As already indicated, Sevel examines Raz’s perfectionist liberalism, an alternative
to liberal neutrality. Sevel notes that perfectionists, unlike neutralists, have done
little to extend their view beyond the state to international law and institutions.
He wonders whether perfectionist liberalism can be a theory of legitimacy in this
sphere. His discussion focuses on the neutralist worry that the moral pluralism and
the conception of autonomy that are aspects of Raz’s view fail to respect moral diver-
sity and the equal standing of citizens across state boundaries. In particular, he looks
at Nussbaum’s claim that Raz’s liberalism is less stable than Rawls’s because it is
incompatible with the moral views of many people. Sevel argues that this critique is
not persuasive in the state context and, even if it were compelling, it would be less
so in the suprastate context, due to well-​known attributes of international institu-
tions, including their limited jurisdiction and their limited capacity to enforce their
decisions.
Follesdal’s contribution concludes Part Three and the volume as a whole. In it,
he tries to bring some order to debates about the legitimacy of international courts.
His attempt draws on Raz’s conception of authority and on cosmopolitan theory.
Follesdal argues that this approach can reduce apparent confusion about the legit-
imacy of international courts by explaining the significance of considerations such
as states’ consent, states’ compliance, and the legality of courts’ decisions.
These chapters represent a wide diversity of both established and emerging
approaches to the problem of legitimacy. They raise the question of what sort of
problem it is. They also explore whether an account of the legitimacy of states is
adequate for assessing the legitimacy of suprastate institutions. Do the latter have
such distinctive features that a different account is needed? As suprastate institutions
evolve, as they have rapidly over the last half-​century, further reflection will surely be
necessary. That reflection will, we hope, be facilitated by these chapters.
5

PA RT I
T H E O RY O F L E G I T I M A C Y
6
7

I
The Control Theory of Legitimacy
Philip Pettit*

This chapter addresses the problem of legitimacy that every state poses and looks at
different grounds on which a state might be thought to be legitimate. As I use the
term, the problem of legitimacy is that of morally justifying the way a state exercises
monopoly power over its adult, able-​minded, more or less permanently resident
members: in short, its citizens.1 It may be that this exercise of power cannot be justi-
fied, of course, in which case we can only view the state in question, despite any good
qualities it may possess, as an organization on a moral par with a mafia-​like agency.
But most of us think that it is at least possible for states to wield political power in a
more or less legitimate or justifiable way and the challenge is to identify what would
make for their legitimacy.
In focusing on this problem, the chapter assumes that there is no issue about
whether or not the system under which the world is divided into states is itself
justified. History has left us with that system, which is now close to irreversible.
Individual states might choose in principle to renounce their power, but in practice
none dares to do so, for fear that others would take over its population and territory.2
They might choose to fuse into larger states, of course—​at an unlikely limit, a single
world-​state—​or divide into smaller. But those choices would still preserve the sys-
tem. That system would cease to obtain only in the vanishingly unlikely event that
existing states could agree and entrench an arrangement to let world society operate
without anyone exercising political power.
Thus, it makes only speculative sense to ask whether it is justifiable that states
should possess the power that they have under the system of states. We have no

* I was greatly helped in revising this chapter by discussion at the conference in Sydney Law School
in which the volume originated. I learned in particular from the many astute observations of my com-
mentator, Paul Patton.
1 I put aside here the difficult issues as to how the citizenry ought to be determined, how those who
are not adult or able-​minded should be identified, and how the state ought to behave towards them.
2 Thus, to anticipate later discussion, the choice of a state to remain in existence is not voluntary—​
there is no acceptable alternative to its doing so—​and so it does not impose its own will on its mem-
bers and does not dominate them by doing so. See Serena Olsaretti, Liberty, Desert and the Market
(Cambridge University Press 2004); Philip Pettit, On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model
of Democracy (Cambridge University Press 2012); Philip Pettit, Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a
Complex World (WW Norton & Co 2014).

Legitimacy: The State and Beyond. First Edition. Edited by Wojciech Sadurski, Michael Sevel, and
Kevin Walton. © Philip Pettit 2019. Published 2019 by Oxford University Press.
8

8 Philip Pettit
practical as distinct from theoretical interest in arguing that the system of states
ought or ought not to be in place—​that the state ought or ought not to exist, as it is
often put—​since there is no corresponding ‘can’; there is no agent to which we can
address a suitable prescription.3 It makes good practical sense, by contrast, to ask
whether a particular state is justified in how it exercises the power it has under the
system of states. We have a practical interest in knowing the answer, after all, since
here there is a ‘can’ that answers to the implied ‘ought’: in saying that it ought to exer-
cise its power in a certain manner, we assume that it can be made to do so.
As the focus on morally justifying how a state exercises its power is distinct from
an interest in whether the existence of the state is justified, so it is distinct from a con-
cern with how far the social structure that the state uses its power to establish is mor-
ally appealing or just. It is possible for a legitimate state not to establish a fully just
order and for an illegitimate state to establish an order that is just in broad outline.4
And so, the two concerns are relatively distinct. Both may be expressed, of course,
as concerns with justice. But ours is a concern for the political or vertical justice of
the state exercising monopoly power over its citizens, the other a concern with the
social or horizontal justice of the relations that the state sets up among its citizenry.5
This chapter is in three progressively longer sections. The first distinguishes the
legitimacy of a state from the authority that is sometimes ascribed to the state and
explains the sort of obligation—​the sort of political obligation—​that legitimacy
imposes on citizens. The second sketches the case for what I describe as a will-​based
approach to the problem of legitimacy, indicating its advantages over benefit-​based
and merit-​based alternatives. And the third looks at the different forms that this
approach may assume.
This last and longest section argues in favour of a version of the will-​based approach
that has two characteristics: it takes the state to be a proper agency, not just an appar-
atus that mediates the agency of individuals; and it takes legitimacy to require not
that citizens individually consent to the state or enjoy collective command over the
state, but that they share equally in imposing a controlling discipline on what the
state does in their name. I have defended this control theory elsewhere on premises
drawn from the republican tradition of thought.6 The aim here is not to recapitulate

3 Of course, we might conceivably want to know whether we should welcome the existence of the
system of states on the ground that if it is not the best possible system, it is at least better than the state
of nature. It is possible to read Kant’s discussion of the state in The Doctrine of Right on these lines. See
Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy (Harvard University Press
2009); Kyla Ebels-​Duggan, ‘Kant’s Political Philosophy’ (2012) 7 Philosophy Compass 896.
4 See A John Simmons, ‘Justification and Legitimacy’ (1999) 109 Ethics 739; Philip Pettit, ‘Justice,
Social and Political’ in David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, and Steven Wall (eds), Oxford Studies in Political
Philosophy, vol 1 (Oxford University Press 2015); Anna Stilz, ‘The Value of Self-​Determination’ in
David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, and Steven Wall (eds), Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, vol 2
(Oxford University Press 2016).
5 As Martin Krygier points out, the word ‘arbitrary’ is often used to indict a system of law on both
counts: on the one side, for being imposed on an unjustified, wilful basis; on the other, for having an
unjustified character or content. See Martin Krygier, ‘The Rule of Law: Pasts, Presents, and Two Possible
Futures’ (2016) 12 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 199.
6 See Pettit, On the People’s Terms (n 2); Pettit, Just Freedom (n 2); Philip Pettit, ‘The General Will,
the Common Good, and a Democracy of Standards’ in Yiftah Elazar and Geneviève Rousselière (eds),
Republicanism and the Future of Democracy (Cambridge University Press 2019).
9

The Control Theory of Legitimacy 9

that defence so much as to show that the theory compares favourably with both the
alternatives outside and the alternatives inside the will-​based family of theories.

A. Legitimacy, Authority, and Political Obligation

1. Legitimacy and authority

The problem of whether a state’s exercise of monopoly power is justified or legitim-
ate is distinct from the question as to whether it has the right, on an independent
basis, to exercise such power: that is, the right to coerce its citizens into obeying its
laws, punish them for disobedience, tax them for resources, and do all of this to
the exclusion of any competitor. If its exercise of power can be morally justified, of
course, then it may be right that the state should act as it does. And under one or
another morally justified system of rights, it may be said then to have the right or
authority to impose on members in that particular way. But that is not to ascribe
an independent right or authority to the state, only a right relative to that system of
rights and that justification.7
I take the issue of whether the state’s exercise of monopoly power is justified or
legitimate, not only to be distinct from the question of whether the state has the
independent right to exercise such power, but also to be more basic. On this assump-
tion, the state has a certain authority because it is legitimate, and not the other way
around. The assumption marks a difference from any approaches that first try to
establish the authority of the state and then aim to derive its legitimacy from its
authority.8
Those who want to put authority first often do so out of a wish to argue that
on that same independent basis citizens have a certain duty or obligation to their
state: that they have a duty akin to the directed obligation debtors have to their cred-
itor, or children to their parents. But even if the state is an agent in its own right, as
I argue later, the idea that citizens have this sort of independent obligation or duty
towards it is not immediately intuitive. They may have a duty of obligation to the
state, as we shall now see, only to the extent that the state is legitimate.

2. Legitimacy and political obligation

Suppose that the state exercises its monopoly power legitimately or justifiably; put
aside for the moment the fact that legitimacy is bound to come in degrees. What
follows about how citizens morally ought to behave: about how it is right that they
should treat the state and the state’s initiatives? What is the political obligation that
goes with the legitimacy of a state?

7 See Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-​Determination: Moral Foundations for International
Law (Oxford University Press 2002).
8 See Fabienne Peter, ‘Political Legitimacy’ in Edward N Zalta (ed), The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (summer 2017 edn) <https://​plato.stanford.edu/​archives/​sum2017/​entries/​legitimacy/​>
accessed 16 March 2018.
10

10 Philip Pettit
One possibility is particularly salient, and commonly invoked in the literature.9
We might say that other things being equal the citizens of a legitimate state ought to
obey its laws: that while they may not be obligated towards the state in the directed
manner associated with an independent authority, they are obliged in a more general
sense to display obedience. The idea is that if the way the state makes and applies law
is legitimate, then the compliance of citizens with that law is required pro tanto—​
required other things being equal. On this account, political obligation is nothing
more than legal obligation: the obligation to obey the law.
The identification of political with legal obligation is hardly persuasive, how-
ever. For the legal obligation of citizens seems to derive from the character of the
laws imposed rather than from the legitimacy of the state that imposes them. Even
if the state failed to be legitimate, citizens would be plausibly required pro tanto to
obey established, relatively fair laws. The fairness of the laws would argue in itself
for conformity; and this, all the more so, when those laws provide a basis for mutual
expectation and coordination among the citizenry. Indeed, if the laws established by
a legitimate state were unfair—​if they imposed unjust or unequal requirements—​
then it is not clear that citizens would necessarily be required to obey them; if they
were required to obey, that could only be because the unfairness was not significant
and the laws played an important coordinating role.10
The pairing of legal obligation with the fairness of the laws rather than with the
legitimacy of the state is further supported by the fact that non-​citizens who reside
in the state are obliged equally with citizens to obey the law. There is a sense in which
a state does not impose monopoly power on such non-​citizens, since they are for-
mally free to leave, assuming they are citizens of another state. And so, we should not
expect the legitimacy of the state to be relevant to whether or not they are obliged to
obey the law of the country they live in. In their case, then, it is more likely to be the
fairness of the established laws, or their role in establishing mutual expectations, that
grounds an obligation to obey the law. And if that is the ground of the obligation in
their case, it is plausibly the ground in the case of citizens too.11
If the state exercises its monopoly power in a way that is justified, then, is there
any more distinctive obligation than the obligation to obey the law supported by
this legitimacy? Under almost any conceivable political regime, people are going to
differ in how far they are satisfied with the laws imposed, having rival interests in
what laws there should be and diverging in their opinions about the justice or fair-
ness of competing candidates.12 The circumstances of politics, as Jeremy Waldron

9 See Christopher Heath Wellman and A John Simmons, Is There a Duty to Obey the Law? For and
Against (Cambridge University Press 2005).
10 There may be a range of reasons apart from the fairness of the laws and their role in grounding
mutual expectations for why citizens and other residents should obey the law. See Buchanan, Justice,
Legitimacy, and Self-​Determination (n 7).
11 Admittedly, there is another possible ground of obligation in the case of non-​citizen residents. It
may be said that those who choose to reside in a state where they are not citizens, with the permission of
the authorities, commit implicitly to conforming with the local laws and regulations. In that case, their
commitment to conform would help to explain why they are obliged to obey the laws, and perhaps even
to obey unfair laws.
12 See Thomas Nagel, ‘Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy’ (1987) 16 Philosophy and Public
Affairs 215.
1

The Control Theory of Legitimacy 11

says, are circumstances of disagreement.13 That raises a question about the obliga-
tions that fall on citizens who disagree with some laws and are disposed to contest
them. And it is plausible that the legitimacy of the state has implications for the
obligation of citizens in this domain.
If the state were illegitimate, so that its exercise of monopoly power were not
justified, then we might say that other things being equal—​collateral costs being
intuitively acceptable, for example—​it would be permissible for citizens to look
for radical regime change. If the state was legitimate, however, then changing the
regime would seem to be ruled out: it would amount to overthrowing a body that
by hypothesis was justified in how it acted. And so, a plausible proposal is that the
legitimacy of a state imposes on citizens the conditional obligation, if they contest
the law, to contest it within the system: that is, to contest it in a manner that does
not require regime change.14
We have been putting aside the fact that legitimacy is bound to come in degrees.
Taking that fact into account, the proposal supported here is that to the extent to
which the state is legitimate, there is an obligation on citizens to contest any public
laws or decisions they regard as unjust—​or indeed illegitimate in their particular
genesis—​only within the system. I shall assume in what follows that this conditional,
contestatory obligation is the correlate for citizens of any legitimacy enjoyed by their
state. That this is the correlated obligation does not presuppose that people ought to
contest the laws or decisions with which they disagree, but merely that such contest-
ation is unobjectionable or permissible. And, as noted, it does not presuppose that
people ought to seek the overthrow of any illegitimate regime; collateral costs might
argue for trying to work for change within the system rather than outside it.
In presupposing the permissibility of contesting a legitimate state only within the
system, the proposal naturally suggests that the more or less legitimate state ought
to establish ways in which citizens may contest the laws that it enacts or proposes.
While any plausible regime will offer citizens many different ways in which they may
challenge its laws, there is always one mode of contestation—​civil disobedience—​
that any system is required by its very design to leave in place. This might consist
in publicly breaking the law to which you object, and not protesting about your
conviction and punishment; such behaviour would communicate, on the basis of
shared assumptions, that you oppose the law in question and hold that it should be
changed. Or, in a slight variant, it might consist in publicly breaking some other law,
not protesting your conviction or punishment, and communicating explicitly that

13 Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford University Press 1999).

14 See Pettit, On the People’s Terms (n 2) ch 2. Overthrowing the state and achieving radical regime
change need not involve armed rebellion. It might take the form, for example, that it took when the
American founders proposed the new constitution of 1787 and established it with popular, electoral
support; no such change of constitution was possible under the regime as it stood: that is, under the
Articles of Confederation that had united the states. But it is possible to take a narrower or wider view of
the processes for amending a constitution that are allowed within it. Thus, while a narrower view would
suggest that the US constitution can only be amended under Article 5, Akil Amar argues that it would
not amount to a rejection of that constitution to amend it under a countrywide majority vote. See Akil
Amar, ‘Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution outside Article V’ (1988) 55 University of
Chicago Law Review 1043.
Visit https://ebookmass.com today to explore
a vast collection of ebooks across various
genres, available in popular formats like
PDF, EPUB, and MOBI, fully compatible with
all devices. Enjoy a seamless reading
experience and effortlessly download high-
quality materials in just a few simple steps.
Plus, don’t miss out on exciting offers that
let you access a wealth of knowledge at the
best prices!
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
 The Project Gutenberg eBook of Medley
Dialect Recitations, Comprising a Series of the
Most Popular Selections in German, French,
and Scotch
 This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United
States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with
almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away
or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License
included with this ebook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you
are not located in the United States, you will have to check the
laws of the country where you are located before using this
eBook.

Title: Medley Dialect Recitations, Comprising a Series of the

Most Popular Selections in German, French, and Scotch

Editor: George M. Baker

Release date: February 2, 2016 [eBook #51108]

Most recently updated: October 22, 2024

Language: English

Credits: Produced by Richard Tonsing, David Edwards and the

Online
Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net
(This
file was produced from images generously made
available
by The Internet Archive)

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MEDLEY DIALECT

RECITATIONS, COMPRISING A SERIES OF THE MOST POPULAR
SELECTIONS IN GERMAN, FRENCH, AND SCOTCH ***
 STANDARD ELOCUTIONARY BOOKS
FIVE-MINUTE READINGS FOR YOUNG LADIES.
Selected and adapted by Walter K. Fobes. Cloth. 50
cents.
FIVE-MINUTE DECLAMATIONS. Selected and adapted
by Walter K. Fobes, teacher of elocution and public
reader; author of "Elocution Simplified." Cloth. 50
cents.
FIVE-MINUTE RECITATIONS. By Walter K. Fobes. Cloth.
50 cents.
Pupils in public schools on declamation days are limited to five
minutes each for the delivery of "pieces." There is a great complaint
of the scarcity of material for such a purpose, while the injudicious
pruning of eloquent extracts has often marred the desired effects. To
obviate these difficulties, new "Five-Minute" books have been
prepared by a competent teacher.
ELOCUTION SIMPLIFIED. With an appendix on Lisping,
Stammering, and other Impediments of Speech. By
Walter K. Fobes, graduate of the "Boston School of
Oratory." 16mo. Cloth. 50 cents. Paper, 30 cents.
"The whole art of elocution is succinctly set forth in this small
volume, which might be judiciously included among the text-books
of schools."—New Orleans Picayune.
ADVANCED READINGS AND RECITATIONS. By Austin
B. Fletcher, A.M., LL.B., Professor of Oratory, Brown
University, and Boston University School of Law. This
book has been already adopted in a large number of
Universities, Colleges, Post-graduate Schools of Law
and Theology, Seminaries, etc. 12mo. Cloth. $1.50.
"Professor Fletcher's noteworthy compilation has been made with
rare rhetorical judgment, and evinces a sympathy for the best forms
of literature, adapted to attract readers and speakers, and mould
their literary taste."—Prof. J. W. Churchill, Andover Theological
Seminary.
THE COLUMBIAN SPEAKER. Consisting of choice and
animated pieces for declamation and reading. By
Loomis J. Campbell, and Orin Root, Jun. 16mo. Cloth. 75
cents.
Mr. Campbell, as one of the editors of "Worcester's Dictionaries," the
popular "Franklin Readers," and author of the successful little work,
"Pronouncing Hand-Book of 3,000 Words," is well known as a
thorough scholar. Mr. Root is an accomplished speaker and instructor
in the West, and both, through experience knowing the need of such
a work, are well qualified to prepare it. It is a genuine success.
VOCAL AND ACTION-LANGUAGE, CULTURE AND
EXPRESSION. By E. N. Kirby, teacher of elocution in
the Lynn High Schools. 12mo. English cloth binding.
Price, $1.25.
"Teachers and students of the art of public speaking, in any of its
forms, will be benefited by a liberal use of this practical hand-
book."—Prof. Churchill.
KEENE'S SELECTIONS. Selection for reading and
elocution. A hand-book for teachers and students. By J.
W. Keene, A.M., M.D. Cloth. $1.
"An admirable selection of practical pieces."
LITTLE PIECES FOR LITTLE SPEAKERS. The primary
school teacher's assistant. By a practical teacher.
16mo. Illustrated. 75 cents. Also in boards, 50 cents.
Has had an immense sale.
THE MODEL SUNDAY-SCHOOL SPEAKER. Containing
selections in prose and verse, from the most popular
pieces and dialogues for Sunday-school exhibitions.
Illust. Cloth. 75 cents. Boards, 50 cents "A book very
much needed."
LEE AND SHEPARD Publishers Boston
 Baker's Dialect Series

MEDLEY DIALECT
RECITATIONS
COMPRISING A SERIES OF

THE MOST POPULAR SELECTIONS

In German, French, and Scotch

EDITED BY

GEORGE M. BAKER

COMPILER OF "THE READING CLUB AND HANDY SPEAKER,"

"THE PREMIUM SPEAKER," "THE POPULAR SPEAKER," "THE
PRIZE SPEAKER," "THE HANDY SPEAKER," ETC.
 BOSTON
LEE AND SHEPARD, PUBLISHERS
NEW YORK
CHARLES T. DILLINGHAM
1888
 Copyright, 1887,
By GEORGE M. BAKER.
Medley Dialect Recitations.

RAND AVERY COMPANY,

ELECTROTYPERS AND PRINTERS,
BOSTON.
CONTENTS
 PAGE
Hans Breitmann's Party Charles G. Leland 5
The Deutsch Maud Muller Carl Pretzel 6
The Dutchman's Serenade 7
Dyin' Vords of Isaac Anon. 9
Lookout Mountain, 1863—
George L. Catlin 10
Beutelsbach, 1880
Der Shoemaker's Poy 12
Der Drummer Charles F. Adams 13
The Yankee and the Dutchman's
14
Dog
Setting a Hen 16
"What's the Matter with that
Our Fat Contributor 17
Nose?"
Keepin' the De'il oot Mrs. Findley Braden 19
The Puzzled Census-Taker John G. Saxe 22
Dutch Security 23
The Frenchman and the Rats 24
Charles G. Leland, from the
Heinz von Stein 26
German
The Solemn Book-Agent Detroit Free Press 27
The Mother-in-Law Charles Follen Adams 28
Schneider's Tomatoes Charles F. Adams 29
Dutch Humor 30
Squire Houston's Marriage
31
Ceremony
Dot Delephone 31
The United Order of Half-Shells 33
Why no Scotchmen go to Heaven 35
Yawcob Strauss C. F. Adams 36
Leedle Yawcob Strauss—what he
Arthur Dakin 37
says
Isaac Rosenthal on the Chinese
Scribner's Monthly 38
Question
Question
"Der Dog und der Lobster" Saul Sertrew 39
"Der Wreck of der Hezberus" 41
Signs and Omens 43
A Dutchman's Answer 44
The Vay Rube Hoffenstein sells 45
A Dutch Recruiting Officer 46
Dot Baby off Mine 47
Dot Leetle Tog under der Vagon 49
Schnitzerl's Velocipede Hans Breitmann 50
The Latest Barbarie Frietchie 51
Mr. Hoffenstein's Bugle 52
Fritz and his Betsy fall out George M. Warren 54
Cut, Cut Behind Charles Follen Adams 57
Tickled all Oafer 58
An Error o' Judgment 59
Sockery Kadahcut's Kat 61
I vash so Glad I vash Here! 63
Dot Shly Leedle Raskel 64
A Jew's Trouble Hurwood 65
Der Mule shtood on der
Anon. 66
Steamboad Deck
Teaching him the Business 67
Der Good-lookin Shnow 69
How Jake Schneider went Blind 71
The Dutchman and the Raven 72
The Dutchman who gave Mrs.
74
Scudder the Small-Pox
Ellen McJones Aberdeen W. S. Gilbert 76
A Dutch Sermon 78
Shacob's Lament 79
Mr. Schmidt's Mistake Charles F. Adams 81
John and Tibbie Davison's
Robert Leighton 82
Dispute
Fritz und I Charles F. Adams 84
A Tussle with Immigrants Philip Douglass 86
A Doketor's Drubbles George M. Warren 86
Charlie Machree William J. Hoppin 90
A Dutchman's Dolly Varden Anon. 91
The Frenchmen and the Flea-
92
Powder
The Frenchman and the Sheep's
94
Trotters
I vant to Fly 96
The Frenchman's Mistake 98
"Two Tollar?" Detroit Free Press 100
A Frenchman on Macbeth Anon. 101
James Whitcomb Riley, in
Like Mother used to Make 101
New-York Mercury
John Chinaman's Protest 102
The Whistler 104
Mother's Doughnuts Charles Follen Adams 105
Over the Left W. C. Dornin 106
A Jolly Fat Friar 107
The Enoch of Calaveras F. Bret Harte 107
Curly-Head B. S. Brooks 109
Warning to Woman 111
An Exciting Contest 112
A Laughing Philosopher 114
In der Shweed Long Ago Oofty Gooft 117
Dot Stupporn Pony Harry Woodson 118
Spoopendyke opening Oysters Stanley Huntley 119
To a Friend studying German Charles Godfrey Leland 122
Tammy's Prize 124
The Scotchman at the Play 128
An Irish Love-Letter Geo. M. Baker 133
MEDLEY DIALECT RECITATIONS.
HANS BREITMANN'S PARTY.
Hans Breitmann gife a party: dey had piano playin'.
I felled in lofe mit a Merican frau; her name vos Matilda Yane.
She had haar as prown as a pretzel bun; her eyes were himmel-
blue;
And ven she looket into mine she shplit mine heart into two.

Hans Breitmann gife a party: I vent dar, you'll be pound.

I valzt mit der Matilda Yane, and vent shpinnin' round and round,—
De pootiest fraulein in de house: she weighed two hoondert pound.

Hans Breitmann gife a party: I tells you it cost him dear.

Dey rollt in more as seven kegs of foost-rate lager-bier;
And fenefer dey knocks de shpickets in, de Deutschers gife a cheer;
I dinks so fine a party not come to a hend dis year.

Hans Breitmann gife a party: dere all vas Saus and Braus.
Ven de sooper coom in, de gompany did make demselfs to house;
Dey eat das Brod und Gansebrust, Bratwurst, und Broten fine,
And vash deir Abendessen down mit four barrels of Neckar wein.

Hans Breitmann gife a party: ve all cot trunk as pigs.

I put mine mout' to a parrel of bier, and schwallowed up mit a
schwigs.
And den I kissed Matilda Yane, and she schlog me on de kop;
And de gompany fight mit taple-legs till de conshtoble made us
shtop.

Hans Breitmann gife a party: vere is dat party now?

Vere is de lofely golten cloud dat float on de mountain's prow?
Vere is de Himmelstrahlende Stern, de star of de spirits' light?
All goned afay mit de lager-bier, afay in de Ewigkeit.

Charles G. Leland.
THE DEUTSCH MAUD MULLER.
Maud Muller, von summer afternoon,
Vas dending bar in her fadder's saloon.
She solt dot bier, und singed "Shoo Fly,"
Und vinked at der men mit her lefd eye.
But, ven she looked oud on der shdreed,
Und saw dem gals all dressed so shweed,
Her song gifed oud on a ubber note,
Cause she had such a horse in her troat;
Und she vished she had shdamps to shpend,
So she might git such a Grecian Bend.
Hans Brinker valked shlowly down der shdreed,
Shmilin at all der gals he'd meed.
Old Hans vas rich, as I've been dold,
Had houses und lots und a barrel of gold.
He shdopped py der door; und pooty soon
He valked righd indo dot bier saloon.
Und he vinked ad Maud, und said, "My dear,
Gif me, if you pblease, a glass of bier."
She vend to the pblace vere der bier-keg shtood,
Und pringed him a glass dot vas fresh and goot.
"Dot's goot," said Hans: "dot's a better drink
As effer I had in mine life, I dink."
He dalked for a vhile, den said, "Goot tay;"
Und up der shdreed he took his vay.
Maud hofed a sigh, and said, "Oh, how
I'd like to been dot old man's frow!
Such shplendid close I den vood vear,
Dot all the gals around vood shdare.
In dot Union Park I'd drive all tay,
Und efery efenin go to der pblay."
Hans Brinker, doo, felt almighty gweer
(But dot might been von trinkin bier);
Und he says to himself, as he valked along
Humming der dune of a olt lofe-song,
"Dot's der finest gal I efer did see;
Und I vish dot my vife she cood be."
But here his solilligwy came to an end,
As he dinked of der gold dot she might shbend;
Und he maked up his mind dot, as for him,
He'd marry a gal mid lots of "din."
So he vent right off dot fery day,
Und married a vooman olt und gray.
He vishes now, but all in vain,
Dot he was free to marry again,—
Free as he vas dat afdernoon,
When he met Maud Muller in dot bier-saloon.
Maud married a man mitoud some "soap;"
He vas lazy, too; bud she did hope
Dot he'd get bedder ven shildren came:
But ven they had, he vas yoost the same.
Und ofden now dem dears vill come
As she sits alone ven her day's work's done,
Und dinks of der day ven Hans called her "My dear,"
Und asked her for a glass of bier;
But she don'd complain nor efer has:
Und oney says, "Dot coodn't vas."

Carl Pretzel.
THE DUTCHMAN'S SERENADE.
Vake up, my schveet! Vake up, my lofe!
Der moon dot can't been seen abofe.
Vake oud your eyes, und dough it's late,
I'll make you oud a serenate.

Der shtreet dot's kinder dampy vet,

Und dhere vas no goot blace to set;
My fiddle's getting oud of dune,
So blease get vakey wery soon.

O my lofe! my lofely lofe!

Am you avake ub dhere abofe,
Feeling sad und nice to hear
Schneider's fiddle schrabin near?

Vell, anyvay, obe loose your ear,

Und try to saw if you kin hear
From dem bedclose vat you'm among,
Der little song I'm going to sung:

* * * * *

O lady, vake! Get vake!

Und hear der tale I'll tell;
Oh, you vot's schleebin' sound ub dhere,
I like you pooty vell!

Your plack eyes dhem don't shine

Ven you'm ashleep—so vake!
(Yes, hurry up, und voke up quick,
For gootness cracious sake!)

My schveet imbatience, lofe,

I hobe you vill oxcuse:
I'm singing schveetly (dhere, py Jinks!
Dhere goes a shtring proke loose!)
O putiful, schveet maid!
Oh, vill she efer voke?
Der moon is mooning—(Jimminy! dhere
Anoder shtring vent proke!)

Oh, say, old schleeby head!

(Now I vas getting mad—
I'll holler now, und I don't care
Uf I vake up her dad!)

I say, you schleeby, vake!

Vake oud! Vake loose! Vake ub!
Fire! Murder! Police! Vatch!
Oh, cracious! do vake ub!

* * * * *

Dot girl she schleebed—dot rain it rained,

Und I looked shtoopid like a fool,
Vhen mit my fiddle I shneaked off
So vet und shlobby like a mool!
 DYIN' VORDS OF ISAAC.
Vhen Shicago vas a leedle villages, dher lifed dherein py dot Clark
Sdhreet out, a shentlemans who got some names like Isaacs; he
geeb a cloting store, mit goots dot vit you yoost der same like dhey
vas made. Isaacs vas a goot fellers, und makes goot pishness on his
hause. Vell, thrade got besser as der time he vas come, und dose
leetle shtore vas not so pig enuff like anudder shtore, und pooty
gwick he locks out und leaves der pblace.
Now Yacob Schloffenheimer vas a shmard feller; und he dinks of he
dook der olt shtore, he got good pishness, und dose olt coostomers
von Isaac out. Von tay dhere comes a shentlemans on his store, und
Yacob quick say of der mans, "How you vas, mein freund? you like to
look of mine goots, aind it?"—"Nein," der mans say. "Vell, mein
freund, it makes me notting troubles to show dot goots."—"Nein; I
don'd vood buy sometings to-tay."—"Yoost come mit me vonce, mein
freund, und I show you sometings, und so hellup me gracious, I
don'd ask you to buy dot goots."—"Vell, I told you vat it vas, I don'd
vood look at some tings yoost now; I keebs a livery shtable; und I
likes to see mein old freund Mister Isaacs, und I came von Kaintucky
out to see him vonce."—"Mister Isaacs? Vell, dot ish pad; I vas sorry
von dot. I dells you, mein freund, Mister Isaacs he vas died. He vas
mein brudder, und he vas not mit us eny more. Yoost vhen he vas on
his deat-ped, und vas dyin', he says of me, 'Yacob, (dot ish mine
names), und I goes me ofer mit his petside, und he poods his hands
of mine, und he says of me, 'Yacob' ofer a man he shall come von
Kaintucky out, mit ret hair, und mit plue eyes, Yacob, sell him dings
cheab;' und he lay ofer und died his last."
Anonymous.
LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN, 1863—
BEUTELSBACH, 1880.
"Yah, I shpeaks English a leetle: berhaps you shpeaks petter der
German."
"No, not a word."—"Vel den, meester, it hardt for to be
oonderstandt.
I vos drei yahr in your country, I fights in der army mit Sherman—
Twentiet Illinois Infantry—Fightin' Joe Hooker's commandt."

"So you've seen service in Georgia—a veteran, eh?"—"Vell, I tell you

Shust how it vos. I vent ofer in sixty, und landt in Nei-York;
I sphends all mine money, gets sick, und near dies in der Hospiddal
Bellevue:
Ven I gets petter I tramps to Sheecago to look for some vork."

"Pretty young then, I suppose?"—"Yah, svansig apout; und der

peobles
Vot I goes to for to ask for some vork, dey hafe none for to geef;
Efery von laughs; but I holds my head ope shust so high as der
steeples.
Only dot var comes along, or I should have die, I belief."

"Ever get wounded? I notice you walk rather lame and unsteady.
Pshaw! got a wooden leg, eh? What battle? At Lookout! don't say!
I was there too—wait a minute—your beer-glass is empty already
Call for another. There! tell me how 'twas you got wounded that
day."

"Vell, ve charge ope der side of her mountain—der sky vos all smoky
and hazy;
Ve fight all day long in der clouds, but I nefer get hit until night—
But—I don't care to say mooch apout it. Der poys called me foolish
and crazy.
Und der doctor vot cut ofe my leg, he say, 'Goot'—dot it serf me
shust right.

"But I dinks I vood do dot thing over again, shust der same, and no
matter
Vot any man say."—"Well, let's hear it—you needn't mind talking to
me,
For I was there, too, as I tell you—and Lor'! how the bullets did
patter
Around on that breastwork of boulders that sheltered our Tenth
Tennessee."

"So? Dot vos a Tennessee regiment charged upon ours in de

efening,
Shust before dark; und dey yell as dey charge, und ve geef a hurrah,
Der roar of der guns, it vos orful."—"Ah! yes, I remember, 'twas
deafening,
The hottest musketry firing that ever our regiment saw."

"Und after ve drove dem back, und der night come on, I listen,
Und dinks dot I hear somepody a callin'—a voice dot cried,
'Pring me some vater for Gott's sake'—I saw his pelt-bate glisten,
Oonder der moonlight, on der parapet, shust outside.

"I dhrow my canteen ofer to vere he lie, but he answer

Dot his left handt vos gone, und his right arm proke mit a fall;
Den I shump ofer, und gife him to drink, but shust as I ran, sir,
Bang! come a sharp-shooter's pullet; und dot's how it vos—dot is
all."

"And they called you foolish and crazy, did they? Him you befriended
—
The 'reb,' I mean—what became of him? Did he ever come 'round?"
"Dey tell me he crawl to my side, und call till his strength vos all
ended,
Until dey come out mit der stretchers, und carry us off from der
ground.

"But pefore ve go, he ask me my name, und says he, 'Yacob Keller,
You loses your leg for me, und some day, if both of us leefs,
I shows you I don't vorget'—but he most hafe died, de poor feller;
I nefer hear ofe him since. He don't get vell, I beliefs.
 ee ea o e s ce e do t get e , be e s

"Only I alvays got der saddisfachshun ofe knowin'—

Shtop! vots der matter? Here, take some peer, you're vite as a sheet
—
Shteady! your handt on my shoulder! my gootness! I dinks you vos
goin'
To lose your senses avay, und fall right off mit der seat.

"Geef me your handts. Vot! der left one gone? Und you vos a soldier
In dot same battle?—a Tennessee regiment?—dot's mighty queer—
Berhaps after all you're—" "Yes, Yacob, God bless you old fellow, I
told you
I'd never—no, never forget you. I told you I'd come, and I'm here."

George L. Catlin.
Welcome to our website – the perfect destination for book lovers and
knowledge seekers. We believe that every book holds a new world,
offering opportunities for learning, discovery, and personal growth.
That’s why we are dedicated to bringing you a diverse collection of
books, ranging from classic literature and specialized publications to
self-development guides and children's books.

More than just a book-buying platform, we strive to be a bridge

connecting you with timeless cultural and intellectual values. With an
elegant, user-friendly interface and a smart search system, you can
quickly find the books that best suit your interests. Additionally,
our special promotions and home delivery services help you save time
and fully enjoy the joy of reading.

Join us on a journey of knowledge exploration, passion nurturing, and

personal growth every day!

ebookmasss.com