Case Digest: Kay Villegas Kami, Inc. v.

COMELEC

G.R. No.: L-32485 Date: October 22, 1970 Ponente: MAKASIAR, J.

Facts of the Case:

Kay Villegas Kami, Inc. (KVK), a non-stock and non-profit corporation, filed a petition for declaratory
relief before the Supreme Court. KVK sought a declaration of its rights and duties under Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 6132, otherwise known as "The 1971 Constitutional Convention Act."

Section 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, in part, states: "No candidate for delegate to the Convention shall
represent or allow himself to be represented as being a candidate of any political party or any other
organization, and no political party, political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional, or
other organization or organized group of whatever nature shall intervene in the nomination of any such
candidate or in the filing of his certificate of candidacy or give aid or support, directly or indirectly,
material or otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election..."

KVK averred that it had printed materials designed to propagate its ideology and program of
government, and that it intended to pursue its purposes by supporting delegates to the Constitutional
Convention who would propagate its ideology. KVK challenged the validity of the first paragraph of
Section 8(a) on several grounds.

Petitioner's Arguments (Kay Villegas Kami, Inc.): KVK contended that Section 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132
violated:

1. The due process clause.

2. The right of association.

3. Freedom of expression.

4. That it constituted an ex post facto law.

KVK argued that the provision, by limiting certain political activities, adversely affected its ability to
mobilize support for candidates in a constitutional process and that it imposed an undue burden on
constitutional rights.

Respondent's Arguments (Implicit, as the Court upheld the law): The thrust of the law, R.A. No. 6132,
was to regulate political activities to prevent the "prostitution of the electoral process" and to safeguard
the principle of equal protection under the law. Section 8(a) and its complementary provisions
(particularly Section 18, the penalty clause, and Section 23, the effectivity clause) were designed to
ensure that all candidates had an equal chance in the electoral process and to mandate the
independence of delegates who must be "beholden to no one but to God, country and conscience." The
government's position, as upheld by the Court, was that these were valid limitations to protect electoral
integrity.

Decisions of the Lower Court: This was a direct petition for declaratory relief filed with the Supreme
Court; thus, there were no decisions from a lower court.

Issue/s:
 1. Whether Section 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 violates the due process clause, the right of association,
and freedom of expression.

2. Whether Section 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 constitutes an ex post facto law, thereby limiting the
state's authority to punish crimes retroactively.

Ruling of the Supreme Court:

The Supreme Court denied the petition and declared Section 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 constitutional.

1. On the violation of due process, right of association, and freedom of expression: The Court
held that the questioned provision is a valid limitation on these constitutional rights. Applying
the balancing-of-interests test, the Court found that the cleansing of the electoral process, the
guarantee of equal chances for all candidates, and the independence of the delegates are
interests that should be accorded primacy. The law is designed to prevent the "clear and present
danger" of the prostitution of the electoral process and the denial of equal protection of the
laws. The Court referenced its previous rulings in Imbong v. Comelec and Gonzales v. Comelec,
which similarly upheld the constitutionality of related provisions.

2. On whether it constitutes an ex post facto law (limitation of state authority to punish crimes):
The Court ruled that the claim of KVK that the challenged provision constitutes an ex post facto
law is untenable. The Court reiterated the definition of an ex post facto law:

o One which makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was
innocent when done, and punishes such an act.

o Aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed.

o Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when committed.

o Alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense.

o Assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or
deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful.

o Deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty.

The Court clarified that the constitutional inhibition against ex post facto laws refers only to criminal
laws which are given retroactive effect. While Section 18 of R.A. No. 6132 penalizes a violation of any
provision of the Act, including Section 8(a), the penalty is imposed only for acts committed after the
approval of the law (August 24, 1970) and not for those perpetrated prior thereto. There is nothing in
the law that remotely suggests retroactive application. Therefore, the law does not fall under the
definition of an ex post facto law, and the state's authority to punish is limited to acts committed after
the law's effectivity.

Doctrine Used by the Supreme Court:

 Clear and Present Danger Rule (implicitly applied): While not explicitly stated as the primary
test for the limitations on freedom of expression, the Court's rationale that the law is "designed
to prevent the clear and present danger of the twin substantive evils, namely, the prostitution of
electoral process and denial of the equal protection of the laws," indicates an underlying
consideration of this doctrine.

 Definition and Application of Ex Post Facto Law: The Court strictly adhered to the established
definition of an ex post facto law, emphasizing that the prohibition applies only to criminal laws
with retroactive effect, thereby limiting the state's power to punish acts that were innocent
when committed.