Global Policy Volume 1 . Issue 3 .

October 2010
263

The Transformation of Multilateralism

Research Article
UNU-CRIS
world view of Franklin Roosevelt who strove for a world
Abstract founded upon four essential human freedoms: the freedom of
This article presents an analysis of the multilateral expression, the freedom of religion, the freedom from want
system, arguing that multilateralism is going through a and the freedom from fear. For this to be realised,
profound set of changes as a result of: (1) the emergence Roosevelt dreamed of a single organisation at global level
of new multilateral actors; (2) the development of new that would bring all states together in order to maintain
multilateral playing fields; and (3) the rise of new
international peace and security; develop international
concepts of multilateralism. This has consequences for
world politics: the world is moving from unipolarity cooperation in solving common economic, social and cul-
towards a networked form of multipolarity. This article tural problems; and promote and encourage human rights
proposes to grasp these changes through the ‘Web 2.0’ and fundamental freedoms (Jolly et al., 2005).
metaphor, as the existing multilateral system is Roosevelt first suggested the name ‘United Nations’
contrasted with the emerging ‘Mode 2.0’ of which the in 1942 and on 26 June 1945 the UN Charter was signed
main characteristics are: (1) the diversification of and this marked an important date in the history of
multilateral organisations; (2) the growing importance
of nonstate actors such as substate regions and
multilateralism.
supranational regional organisations; (3) the increased Between 1945 and 2000 many other regional and global
interlinkages between policy domains; and (4) the inter-state structures have been created to help to deal with
growing space for citizen involvement. The main the world’s problems. Today what is called the ‘multilateral
upshot is that the multilateral system is moving from a system’ consists of a myriad of agencies and institutions,
closed to an open system. Both states and international but a central place is given to the UN and the so-called
organisations will have to adapt to this new reality. ‘Bretton Woods’ institutions. Of course the principles of
multilateralism go back further than 1945. One can link
them to the emergence of a Westphalian world order built
upon sovereign states and the possibilities and necessities
for those states to cooperate with each other. Westphalia
Policy Implications developed slowly over three and a half centuries and was
never consolidated into one single document. Nor was the
• Policy makers and scholars need to be aware that 1648 Treaty directly responsible for the creation of what
the multilateral system is undergoing radical we now call the modern or liberal constitutional sovereign
changes that affect global policy making.
• These changes bring with them new potentials for
state. The world order based upon a state system should
an increased efficiency and legitimacy of multilater- rather be seen as an unintended consequence of Westphalia
alism. (Valaskakis, 2001, p. 48). It is a result of putting the sover-
• Multilateral organisations, regional organisations eignty principle into practice that states became what they
and states will have to adapt to the new reality and are: territorial entities that exclude external actors from
join forces to further shape the ‘Mode 2.0’ of multi- domestic authority (Krasner, 1999). This in turn opened up
lateralism. room for a body of international law based on treaties
between sovereign states.
Multilateralism was thus created as a form of cooperation
among states which institutionalises intergovernmental
cooperation and replaces anarchy. The starting point for
most scholars who study multilateralism is the definition by
1. Multilateralism as a closed system
Keohane and its expansion by Ruggie. ‘I limit multilateral-
The present system of multilateralism has its origins in the ism to arrangements involving states’ says Keohane (1990,
Second World War and the failure of its precursor, the p. 732, emphasis in original) and that is a core characteris-
League of Nations (Schlesinger, 2003). At its heart lies the tic of most of the academic thinking on the issue.

Global Policy (2010) 1:3 doi: 10.1111/j.1758-5899.2010.00042.x Copyright  2010 London School of Economics and Political Science and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
 17585899, 2010, 3, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2010.00042.x by Readcube (Labtiva Inc.), Wiley Online Library on [23/01/2025]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Luk Van Langenhove
264

Multilateral arrangements are institutions defined by Keoh- tem in its day-to-day operation. The UN General Assem-
ane as ‘persistent sets of rules that constrain activity, shape bly for instance is sometimes accused of inefficiency as the
expectations and prescribe roles’ (Keohane, 1988, p. 384) in sheer number of states has made it impossible to have real
a purely institutional (rather than normative) manner. Rug- debates. Moreover, it has been calculated that in 2000–01
gie, however, presents a definition that is not only institu- there have been 15,484 meetings in the UN system to
tional but also normative, including behaviour. For Ruggie, which nearly 6,000 official reports were submitted (De
multilateralism is: Senarclens and Kazancigil, 2007, p. 27).
Secondly, when the UN was created, the world was not
an institutional form that coordinates relations as ‘globalised’ as it is today. Trade barriers were high and
among three or more states on the basis of gener- so were transport and communications costs. Today, world
alised principles of conduct … which specify exports have risen to extraordinary levels. Technological
appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without advances have created a new context for connectivity
regard for the particularistic interests of the par- among people, industries and governments. Globalisation is
ties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in the buzzword. However, the benefits and opportunities of
any specific occurrence (Ruggie, 1993, p. 11). globalisation remain highly concentrated among a small
number of states. And while there have been successful
Ikenberry states that multilateralism can emerge from efforts to craft strong rules facilitating the expansion of
the international system’s structural features, the indepen- global markets, the social dimensions of these are far less
dent influence of pre-existing multilateral institutions, well covered by global labour standards (Deacon et al.,
domestic politics and, finally, that multilateralism can be 2010). In other words, the multilateral system is unevenly
traced to agentic sources (Ikenberry, 2009). A common developed. There is a relatively strong institutionalised
feature of these and other contemporary viewpoints is the form of economic multilateralism (cf. the WTO, the IMF
centrality of states: they are regarded as the constitutive and the World Bank) and political multilateralism (cf. the
elements of the multilateral system and it is their interrela- UN Security Council). Its functioning can be critically
tions that determine the form and content of multilateral- assessed and, although as mentioned before there are
ism. This implies, as noted by Schweller (2010, p. 149), some success stories to report, there is also a track record
that international politics is regarded as a closed system in of failures.
at least two ways: it spans the whole world and there are The present crisis of the Doha Development Round and
huge barriers to entering the system. Indeed, the world is the inability to reform the composition and functioning of
today almost fully carved up into sovereign states and this the Security Council are just two examples. Finally, it
leaves little or no room for the creation of new states. This should be noted that the development of multilateralism
is a very different situation as, long after 1648 – seen as has been dominated by seeing international organisations
the birth of the Westphalian world order – large parts of as entities endowed with a specific task. As such, multilat-
the world’s territory did not qualify as sovereign states, eral organisations are pictured as ‘extensions of states,
which implied that there were many possibilities for the doing those things that states cannot do on their own’
creation of new states. Hence, there has been an open inter- (Klabbers, 2005, p. 278). As a result, the multilateral sys-
national system for a long time. But over the years the tem is very management oriented, built upon the premise
whole globe became partitioned into sovereign states. that institutionalised cooperation between sovereign states
Hence, it is a truism to say that the world has changed pro- will solve problems. But, at the end of the day, states
foundly since multilateralism emerged and became institu- remain in the driving seat. They determine how far the
tionalised in its present form. But still it is good to be cooperation goes. Not surprisingly then, one of the domi-
reminded of some of the key elements of those changes. nant perspectives used to study global policy is the state-
First, when the UN was founded, two-thirds of its current centric lens (Koenig-Archibugi, 2010).
members did not even exist as sovereign states as their peo-
ple were still living under colonial rule. In 1948 there
2. The shift to multipolarity
existed only 74 states in the world. Today, we are close to
200 states. Most of those states are relatively small (about Multilateral relations between states are not a game in
half of today’s existing states have a population of less than which all players have equal rights and duties. There are
5 million). The more states participate in the multilateral also power differences between states. Thinking about mul-
system, the more difficult it becomes to govern it. This is tilateralism can hence not be done without referring to the
reflected in the way multilateral institutions such as the world order and to the way international relations are
UN function. Not surprisingly, then, in recent years the organised in terms of power. World order, sometimes also
number of studies and reports dealing with ‘UN Reform’ called ‘international order’, has been defined by Bull (1999,
has greatly increased. A substantive part of these reports p. 8) as ‘a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or
deals with the bureaucratic aspects of the multilateral sys- primary goals of the society of states, or international

Copyright  2010 London School of Economics and Political Science and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Global Policy (2010) 1:3
 17585899, 2010, 3, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2010.00042.x by Readcube (Labtiva Inc.), Wiley Online Library on [23/01/2025]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Multilateralism 2.0
265

society’. For Bull, this included maintaining the sovereignty the new context. Thus, as the world is changing, so must
of states and the absence of war. Within this framework the concept of multilateral governance. The developments
one can picture ‘poles’ (sometimes also labelled as ‘powers’) of recent years have put a severe strain on many of the tra-
as states endowed with the resources, political will and ditional principles and tenets of multilateralism. As already
institutional ability to project their interests at the global mentioned, several authors have pointed to all kinds of dys-
level. functions such as the complexity of the UN system with its
From this perspective, the world has for a long time decentralised, overlapping and incoherent array of councils
been organised around a ‘bipolar’ frame: the deep rift and agencies or to the divides between developed and
between the east and west and its precarious balance built developing countries. But, as Weiss (2008) noted, the core
upon the mutual assured destruction principle. With the problem is systemic and rooted in a mismatch between an
end of the cold war, it was said that the world had become organisation founded to serve and protect sovereign states
‘unipolar’ (Krauthammer, 1990) with the US as a ‘lonely and the actual presence of global problems that go beyond
superpower’. But since 2001 there have been numerous the interest of individual states. The emergence of truly
signs and developments that testify that the unipolar global problems such as climate change, proliferation of
moment of the US has come to an end. This does not nec- weapons of mass destruction and many others have indeed
essarily imply a weakening of the US. As noted by Zakaria led to an increasing paradox of governance: ‘the policy
(2008, p. 2), the current shift to multipolarity can be seen authority for tackling global problems still belongs to the
as largely due to ‘the rise of the rest’: the unprecedented states, while the sources of the problems and potential
economic growth over the past decades in countries all over solutions are situated at transnational, regional or global
the world. ‘Multipolarity’ is indeed the new catchword. level’ (Thakur and Van Langenhove, 2006). As such, the
Others such as Haass speak of a ‘nonpolar’ world, ‘a world building blocks of multilateralism, the states, seem to be
dominated not by one or two several states but rather by less and less capable of dealing with the challenges of glob-
dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of alisation. But because the multilateral world order is so
power’ (Haass, 2008, p. 44), and The Economist even men- dependent on the input of states, multilateralism itself is
tioned the birth of a ‘neopolar’ world.1 Although, given the not functioning well. The drama according to Weiss
increased interconnectivity and interdependences between (2008) is that the UN would never have emerged at all if it
the poles, one could also speak of ‘interpolarity’, as Grevi was not configured as an instrument of state interests.
(2009) does. While it is certainly true that the position of In sum, there seem to be sufficient reasons to claim that
the US has weakened in recent years, this does not mean, ‘the values and institutions of multilateralism as currently
however, that we can now picture the world order as one constituted … are arguably under serious challenge’
where several (super)powers compete with each other for (Newman and Thakur, 2006, p. 531, emphasis in original).
dominance. Impressed by the rapid economic growth of But, as suggested by the same authors, the fundamental
the BRIC countries, it is often assumed that multipolarity principle of multilateralism is not in crisis. What is needed
is already there. But such pronouncements mistake current is an update of the organisational issues in order to be in
trajectories for final outcomes (Brooks and Wohlforth, tune with today’s reality.
2009, p. 55). The reality is that there is still only one state
with a global predominance: the US. The other poles are
3. Web 2.0 as a metaphor for a renewed
(still?) more regional than global (Brazil, India, China and
multilateralism
Russia). A crucial issue in all this is the relationship
between hegemony and regional poles. Acharya has rightly Multilateralism is thus both a normative concept (it is an
pointed to the crucial role of hegemons in defining and or- ideal to promote) and a practice (it refers to a set of exist-
ganising regions and to the centrality of regional security in ing practices and institutions). At both levels it is subject
world politics. He therefore proposes to speak about ‘regio- to change and one can develop ideas on how an updated
polarity’ rather than ‘multipolarity’ (Acharya, 2009, p. 7). global multilateral governance system might look. One
Multilateralism is clearly under challenge in the 21st such vision could be called ‘Multilateralism 2.0’. This is a
century and has been so since the end of the cold war. metaphor as it refers to a jargon used in the ICT world.
More than a reflection of the failure of the concept, this As with all metaphors, it has its limitations. But meta-
crisis is the sign of a changing international context, which phors in science can also serve the purpose of viewing
has rendered anachronistic the traditional intergovernmen- things from new perspectives (Harré, 1976). There is a
tal multilateralism of the immediate post-Second World long tradition within international relations of using meta-
War era. In today’s reality, states play a relatively declining phors such as ‘balance of power’ or ‘concert of nations’
role as protagonists in the security system, as threats have (for an overview, see Little, 2007). And as mentioned by
acquired a system-wide significance. In order to overcome Fry and O’Hagan (2000, p. 10), ‘metaphors that are
this crisis, multilateral institutions, namely the UN, need to deployed to understand world politics should also be seen
adapt to this change, reinventing themselves according to as contributing to the constitution of world politics’. The

Global Policy (2010) 1:3 Copyright  2010 London School of Economics and Political Science and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
 17585899, 2010, 3, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2010.00042.x by Readcube (Labtiva Inc.), Wiley Online Library on [23/01/2025]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Luk Van Langenhove
266

core of the metaphor advanced here is an implicit refer- structing the American-led liberal hegemonic order. The
ence to what is now called ‘Web 2.0’, a concept currently third is seen by Ikenberry as a post-hegemonic liberal
used to describe the second phase in the development of internationalism that ‘has only partially appeared and whose
the World Wide Web. It describes the change from a full shape and logic is still uncertain’ (Ikenberry, 2009, p.
‘web’ consisting of individual websites to a full platform of 73). But he sees the 3.0 liberal order as one where ‘author-
interactive web applications to the end users on the World ity would move toward universal institutions’ (Ikenberry,
Wide Web. The Multilateralism 2.0 metaphor tries to 2009, p. 81) and as one where there is a further erosion of
grasp how the ideals and practices of multilateralism are norms of Westphalian sovereignty as well as the continuing
currently undergoing a similar transformation. It is par- rise of the notion of ‘responsibility to protect’. In my view,
tially a descriptive metaphor as it tries to capture what is Ikenberry overemphasises the differences between the varie-
going on. But it is also a normative metaphor that points ties of liberal internationalism he describes. I would rather
to what is possible and desirable. speak of versions 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2, as they all have the cen-
trality of states in common. And he also underestimates
the current changes and change drivers that are affecting
From Multilateralism Mode 1.0 to Multilateralism
multilateralism as an institutional practice.
Mode 2.0
A related concept to Multilateralism 2.0 is ‘new multilat-
Using ‘Web 2.0’ as a metaphor in thinking about gover- eralism’. This concept has been proposed by Björn Hettne
nance is, however, not totally new. Even more, ‘Web 2.0’ in the context of a United Nations University Project (cf.
practices are today influencing practices of governance as Cox, 1997) in order to emphasise the importance of a par-
they are increasingly finding their way into public gover- ticipative civil society in building up multilateralism from
nance. ‘Government 2.0’ is a concept that attempts to cap- below. Others, such as Solingen (1995), have used the
ture the integration of the social networking and concept to emphasise the entanglement of domestic and
interactive advantages of Web 2.0 approaches into the systemic levels. But these authors do not stress the multi-
practice of governments. As noted by Potter (2008, p. variate network of actors that I see as essential for Mode
121), ‘Web 2.0 has the potential to change fundamentally 2.0 multilateralism.
how foreign ministries manage knowledge and communi- The essence of introducing the ‘Web 2.0’ metaphor in
cate’. Eggers (2005) wrote that there is a need for govern- international relations lies indeed in stressing the emergence
ments to move away from industrial approaches and into of network thinking and practices in international relations
the information age. In other words, move away from the and in the transformation of multilateralism from a closed to
bureaucratic ideal to the networked organisations. But this an open system. In Multilateralism 1.0 the principal agents
implies more than just adopting Web 2.0 tools. It is also in the inter-state space of international relations are states.
about recognising that conventional governments are National governments are the ‘star players’. Intergovern-
unable to address society’s challenges alone. For Eggers mental organisations are dependent agents whose degrees of
(2005), the shift to Government 2.0 implies that the days freedom only go as far as the states allow them. The primacy
of government – be it national or local – acting as singular of sovereignty is the ultimate principle of international rela-
actors are over. The new paradigm is one of collaboration tions. In Multilateralism 2.0, there are players other than
between governments at different levels (including subna- sovereign states that play a role and some of these players
tional governments) and between governments with all challenge the notion of sovereignty and that makes the
other relevant actors in society. The shift from Web 1.0 to system much more open. The trend towards multipolarity is
Web 2.0 also offers new opportunities for online public more than just a redistribution of power at the global level.
diplomacy in terms of advocacy and policy developments It is also about a change in who the players are and how the
between governments and citizens across the globe to playing field is organised. There are signs that Multilatera-
address cross-national policy challenges (Potter, 2008, lism 2.0 is partially already there. But of course there are also
p. 125). This in turn has consequences for how multilater- strong forces to continue with Multilateralism 1.0. As such
alism is organised. it is not even certain that a fully fledged multilateral system
Ikenberry (2009) was the first to propose for interna- version 2.0 will ever appear.
tional relations a somehow similar metaphor in an article
on ‘liberal internationalism’ and America. He identifies
Multilateralism 2.0 in a renewed multipolar world
three major versions or models of liberal international
order
order: versions 1.0, 2.0 and 3.0. The first is associated with
Woodrow Wilson’s ideas of an international order organ- A first characteristic of Multilateralism 2.0 is the diversifi-
ised around a global collective security body in which sov- cation of multilateral organisations. In recent years there has
ereign states act together to uphold a system of territorial been a dramatic rise of all kinds of international organisa-
peace. The second is the more Rooseveltian idea of the US tions and regimes. According to Schiavone (2001), the
taking the lead in the post-1945 reconstruction and con- number of intergovernmental organisations has grown from

Copyright  2010 London School of Economics and Political Science and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Global Policy (2010) 1:3
 17585899, 2010, 3, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2010.00042.x by Readcube (Labtiva Inc.), Wiley Online Library on [23/01/2025]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Multilateralism 2.0
267

37 to well over 400 in the period between 1990 and 2000 of its ‘breakthrough ideas’ for 2010 the concept of ‘inde-
(see also Higgott, 2006). While mostly operating on an pendent diplomacy’ (Ross, 2010). In that article the ques-
intergovernmental basis, some of them have acquired con- tion was raised: why pretend that only nation states shape
siderable autonomy in the exercise of their competences or international affairs?
even have a ‘legal personality’ just as states (Ip, 2010). And Thirdly, next to the increased relations between ‘vertical’
increasingly these organisations look more to networks than levels of governance, there is a growing interconnectivity
to formal (bureaucratic) organisations. In line with a ‘trans- between policy domains horizontally. Finance cannot be
nationalisation of policies’ (Stone, 2004) one can state that divorced from trade, security, climate, etc. A distinctive
Multilateralism 2.0 implies the rise of transnational policy characteristic of Multilateralism 2.0 is thus that the bound-
networks (Djelic and Quach, 2003; Stone, 2008). aries between policy domains (and the organisations dealing
Secondly, there is a growing importance of nonstate actors with them) are becoming more and more permeable. Instead
at the regional rather than global level. States have by now of clear separated areas of policy concern treated within
created a large number of global and regional institutions separate institutions, there are now communities of different
that have themselves become players in the international actors and layers which form together a global agora of
order. Some of these new players, although not states, do multiple publics and plural institutions (Stone, 2008).
resemble states. An institution such as the EU illustrates Finally, the involvement of citizens is in Multilateralism
this trend (one can point for instance to its presence as 1.0 largely limited to democratic representation at the state
observer in the UN, its coordination strategy at the Inter- level. The supranational governance layer does not foresee
national Monetary Fund, its membership at the G8, etc.). direct involvement of civil society or of any other nongov-
Other regional organisations are – although not to the ernmental actors. In Multilateralism 2.0 there is increased
same extent as the EU – following suit. As a result, one room for nongovernmental actors at all levels. This is per-
can say that we are currently witnessing a transition from a haps the most revolutionary aspect of Multilateralism 2.0
world of states to a world of states (including the BRICS but also the most difficult one to organise. This is related
as new global powers) and regions (Van Langenhove, 2007, to the state-centric and institutional focus of classical mul-
2008). This trend is further reinforced by the phenomenon tilateral organisations. In such a closed system there is
of devolution whereby national powers are in some states hardly any room for open debate, let alone for the involve-
transferred to subnational regions. Some of these subna- ment of citizens. But as Klabbers (2005) argued, there is
tional regional entities even have growing ambitions to be evidence that an alternative is emerging, that of multilateral
present on the international stage as well. It is a fascinating institutions functioning not so much as an organisation but
phenomenon: both supranational and subnational gover- rather as an agora, that is ‘a public realm in which institu-
nance entities are created by states and can therefore be tional issues can be debated and perhaps, be decided’
regarded as ‘dependent agencies’ of those states. However, (Klabbers, 2005, p. 382).
once created, these entities begin to have a life of their Organising multilateralism in a state-centric way has
own and are not always totally controllable by their found- only been possible through the postulate of all states
ing fathers. The sub- and supra-entities have a tendency being treated as equal. This means that irrespective of
to behave ‘as if’ they were states. All of this challenges sov- the differences in territorial size, the size of their popula-
ereignty as both the supranational and subnational regions tions, their military power or economic strength, all states
to some extent indeed possess statehood properties. Again, have the same legal personality. Or, in other words, the
the EU is illustrative as it is the only international organi- Westphalian principle of sovereign equality implies the
sation that gives citizenship to the citizens of its member principle of one state, one vote. This postulate does not
states (Hoeksma, 2009). Together these factors have weak- of course correspond with reality. In Multilateralism 2.0
ened the Westphalian relation between state and sover- this can be balanced by a more flexible system that com-
eignty. In Europe, Flanders has perhaps more autonomy in pares actors along certain dimensions (such as economic
Belgium than Luxembourg in the EU. Yet, Luxembourg is power) regardless of the type of actors they are. In other
considered to be a sovereign state, while Flanders is not. In words, one can for instance compare large states with
classical multilateralism the principal agents in the inter- regions or small states with subnational regions. As such,
state space of international relations are states. National one can picture Multilateralism 2.0 as an ad hoc order in
governments are the ‘star players’. Intergovernmental which no single institution or organisation is the centre,
organisations are only dependent agents whose degrees of no one framework ideal. This is what Haass called ‘à la
freedom only go as far as the states allow them. The pri- carte multilateralism’. Or as Zakaria (2008, p. 242) noted,
macy of sovereignty is the ultimate principle of interna- ‘the UN might work for one problem, NATO for
tional relations. In Multilateralism 2.0, there are players another, the OAS for a third’. This allows not only a
other than sovereign states and some of these players now more flexible form of multilateralism, but it could perhaps
challenge the notion of sovereignty. It is symptomatic of also lead to a more just system with a more equal bal-
this trend that the Harvard Business Review chose as one ance of powers.

Global Policy (2010) 1:3 Copyright  2010 London School of Economics and Political Science and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
 17585899, 2010, 3, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2010.00042.x by Readcube (Labtiva Inc.), Wiley Online Library on [23/01/2025]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Luk Van Langenhove
268

The Multilateralism 1.0 world order is often pictured as increase the level of participation of civil society in global
a stratified space of layers of governance from local to glo- governance.
bal. Advocates of the principle of subsidiarity argue that all
governance should be done at the lowest level possible.
Conclusions
Others stress that cooperation between the different layers
is needed to promote ‘multilevel’ governance. But recent The main difference between the two modes of multilater-
reality is much more complex than a single bottom-up alism described above is their degree of openness. Whereas
hierarchical line of governance. First of all, there is no sin- the classical mode of multilateralism is a closed system, the
gle ‘top’ level in Multilateralism 2.0. The UN and Bretton emerging 2.0 is much more open to the extent that there
Woods institutions together with new forums such as the are a constantly changing number of actors of different
G20 stand for a plurality of top levels. types. These actors form, through their interactions, differ-
Secondly, at the regional level there is no perfect match ent overlapping networks. On top of this, the actors them-
between a regional territory and a regional organisation. selves become much more an agora than an organisation.
On the contrary, one can identify in most cases many dif- For Schweller (2010), the closed system of multilateralism
ferent regional organisations that cover more or less the is – metaphorically – subject to the second law of thermo-
same territory. Thirdly, there is not a fixed set of poles but dynamics. Hence, the entropy increases and the system
there are diverse and shifting poles at the level of conti- moves towards more disorder. The ongoing shift from uni-
nents, regions or states. Fourthly, as the multilateral theatre polarity to multipolarity is seen as the manifestation of that
is no longer uniquely the playground for states, this opens trend (see also Haass, 2008, p. 52). But entropy is only a
the possibility for an increased civil society participation in useful concept to understand a closed system. If, as argued
global governance. And, finally, states are not necessarily above, multilateralism is evolving towards a more open sys-
the lowest level and in some cases subnational entities can tem, then multipolarity brings with it the promise of new
have their own direct relations with the regional or global (temporary) balances in the world order.
level without passing through the state level. The result is But world orders do not change overnight. It took three
a complex web of relations between four types of actor with and a half centuries to develop the Westphalian system
statehood properties (global institutions, regional organisa- into how it looks today. And, equally important, it never
tions, states and subnational regional entities) together with became consolidated into one single document. Further-
nonstate actors such as nongovernmental organisations or more, Multilateralism 1.0 and the related idea of a liberal
transnational policy networks. international order is a still relatively young child of
The transformation from Multilateralism 1.0 to Multi- Westphalia. Meanwhile, globalisation now challenges that
lateralism 2.0 is currently happening and all actors (old and Westphalian world order.
new) involved will have to further shape it and adapt to it. However, neither states nor multilateral organisations are
In the past, subsidiarity has been a powerful normative passively undergoing the forces of globalisation and the
principle in trying to organise relations between the differ- many technological changes that are altering the face of the
ent levels of governance. The complexity of Multilateralism world. They are changing themselves and they are stimulat-
2.0, however, calls for a new normative ideal to be used as ing changes in governance by inventing or introducing new
guidance for good governance. Such a principle could be practices and norms. Some multilateral organisations have
that of mutuality. According to this principle, ‘it should be moved away from the old-fashioned organisational forms,
the obligation of each level of government as it participates as for instance holding a General Assembly meeting lasting
in joint decision-making to foster the legitimacy and capac- for weeks. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation
ity of the other’ (Landy and Teles, 2001, p. 414). Applied and Development (OECD) is an exemplar for this trend
to Multilateralism 2.0, this would mean that rather than and could become a model for other international organisa-
asking the question of whether this or that policy item is a tions as it is based upon relatively flexible peer-reviewed
regional, federal, European or global issue, the question to bottom-up approaches and the involvement of networks of
ask is ‘what conditions are necessary to enable a certain experts and civil servants (Schäfer, 2006).
level of government to contribute to managing the issue The problem is that there does not yet seem to be an
and how can the other levels foster those conditions?’ In overall normative policy framework to guide actions. Of
other words, governance at different levels should not be course, one cannot hope that one single set of ideas could
seen as competing activity. Instead, the different levels ever be a ‘solution’ to all current problems. Working
should act towards mutual strengthening. towards such an ideology would certainly be counterpro-
But whatever the efficient principles used to organise ductive and perhaps even dangerous. But it cannot be
multilateral relations, the main problem remains the legiti- denied that normative concepts and clear visions of where
macy of global governance. Or as Lamy (2010) recently to go are an important element of any strategy change pro-
put it, ‘global governance is a challenge for democracy’. cess. It is not without reason that in organisational reform
The trend towards Multilateralism 2.0 has the potential to so much emphasis is placed on the development of organi-

Copyright  2010 London School of Economics and Political Science and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Global Policy (2010) 1:3
 17585899, 2010, 3, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2010.00042.x by Readcube (Labtiva Inc.), Wiley Online Library on [23/01/2025]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Multilateralism 2.0
269

sation visions and mission statements as the basis of strate- Grevi, G. (2009) The Interpolar World: A New Scenario. ISS Occasional
gic planning processes. This was also the case when multi- Paper no. 79. Paris: EU-ISS.
Haass, R. (2008) ‘The Age of Nonpolarity: What will follow US
lateralism was originally shaped.
Dominance?’, Foreign Affairs, 87 (3), pp. 44–56.
In sum, the signs are there that multilateralism is moving Harré, R. (1976) ‘Images of the World and Societal Icons’, in K. D.
from a 1.0 mode to a 2.0 mode. But, as mentioned above, Knorr, H. Strasser and H. G. Zilian (eds), Determinants and Con-
states have been the architects of Multilateralism 1.0 and trols of Scientific Development. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 257–283.
they crafted a form of multilateralism that is in tune with Higgott, R. (2006) ‘International Political Institutions’, in R. Rhodes,
state interests. The big challenge today is whether nonstate S. Binder and B. Rockman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political
actors will have the power and degree of liberty to be Institutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 611–632.
Hoeksma, J. (2009) ‘Voorbij federatie en confederatie: de EU als unie
involved in crafting Multilateralism 2.0. Regional organisa-
van burgers en lidstaten’, Internationale Spectator, 63 (2), pp. 83–86.
tions could be in a position to contribute to such a new Ikenberry, G. J. (2009) ‘Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the
regionalised world order. Bull (1977, p. 261) already ima- Dilemmas of Liberal World Order’, Perspectives on Politics, 7 (1),
gined such a ‘more regionalised world system’. More pp. 71–87.
recently, Katzenstein (2005, p. 1) stated that ‘ours is a world Ip, E. (2010) ‘The Power of International Legal Personality in Regio-
of regions’. And Slaughter (2004) described a ‘disaggregated nal Integration’. UNU-CRIS Working Paper W-2010 ⁄ 4.
world order’ where the model is in many ways the EU, which Jolly, R., Emmerij, L. and Weiss, T. G. (2005) The Power of UN
Ideas: Lessons from the First 60 Years. New York: United Nations
has indeed the ambition to be involved in such an operation.
Intellectual History Project.
By embracing the principle of ‘effective multilateralism’, the Katzenstein, P. J. (2005) A World of Regions: Asia, Europe and the
EU has clearly indicated that it is willing to contribute to American Imperium. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
reforming multilateralism. But the paradox might be that its Keohane, R. O. (1988) ‘International Institutions: Two Approaches’,
own member states with their own 1.0 forms of diplomacy International Studies Quarterly, 32, pp. 379–396.
are perhaps not ready yet for such a move. Keohane, R. O. (1990) ‘Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research’,
International Journal, 45 (XLV), pp. 731–764.
Klabbers, J. (2005) ‘Two Concepts of International Organisations’,
Notes International Organisations Law Review, 2, pp. 277–293.
Koenig-Archibugi, M. (2010) ‘Understanding the Global Dimensions
The views expressed in this article are personal and do not reflect the of Policy’, Global Policy, 1 (1), pp. 16–28.
views of the UN. The research leading to these results has received Krasner, S. D. (1999) Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy. Princeton, NJ:
funding from the European Community’s Seventh Framework Princeton University Press.
Programme (FP7 ⁄ 2007–2013) under grant agreement no. 225722 Krauthammer, C. (1990) ‘The Unipolar Moment’, Foreign Affairs, 70
(EU-GRASP Project). (1), pp. 23–33.
Lamy, P. (2010) ‘Global Governance is a Challenge for Democracy
1. Quoted in Acharya, 2009. See also Scholte (2008) for an overview (but an EU Opportunity)’, Europe’s World, 14, pp. 48–52.
of labels that try to capture the complexity of contemporary gover- Landy, M. and Teles, S. M. (2001) ‘Beyond Devolution: From Sub-
nance. Koenig-Archibugi (2010) speaks of a polycentric perspective. sidiarity to Mutuality’, in K. Nicolaidis and R. Howse (eds.), The
Federal Vision. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 413–427.
Little, R. (2007) The Balance of Power in International Relations: Meta-
References phors, Myths and Models. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Newman, T. and Thakur, R. (2006) Multilateralism under Challenge?
Acharya, A. (2009) Regional Worlds in a Post-hegemonic Era. Bordeaux:
Power, International Order and Structural Change. Tokyo: United
Spirit Working.
Nations University Press.
Brooks, S. and Wolhforth, W. (2009) ‘Reshaping the World Order’,
Potter, E. (2008) ‘Web 2.0 and the New Public Diplomacy: Impact
Foreign Affairs, 88 (2), pp. 49–63.
and Opportunities’, in J. Welsh and D. Fearn (eds.), Engagement:
Bull, H. (1977) The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Poli-
Public Diplomacy in a Globalised World. London: Foreign and Com-
tics. New York: Columbia University Press.
monwealth Office, pp. 120–133.
Bull, H. (1999) The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Poli-
Ross, C. (2010) ‘Independent Diplomacy’, Harvard Business Review,
tics. New York: Columbia University Press.
88 (1), p. 57.
Cox, R. W. (1997) The New Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism
Ruggie, J. G. (1993) Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of
and World Order. London: Macmillan.
an Institutional Form. New York: Columbia University Press.
Deacon, B., Van Langenhove, L., Macovei, M.-C. and Yeates, N.
Schäfer, A. (2006) ‘A New Form of Governance? Comparing the Open
(eds) (2010) World–Regional Social Policy and Global Governance.
Method of Coordination to Multilateral Surveillance by the IMF
London: Routledge.
and the OECD’, Journal of European Public Policy, 13 (1), pp. 70–
De Senarclens, P. and Kazancigil, A. (2007) Regulating Globalization:
88.
Critical Approaches to Global Governance. Tokyo: UNU Press.
Schiavone, G. (2001) International Organisations: A Dictionary and
Djelic, M. L. and Quach, S. (2003) Globalisations and Institutions.
Directory. New York: Palgrave.
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Schlesinger, S. C. (2003) Art of Creation: The Founding of the United
Eggers, W. D. (2005) Government 2.0. London: Rowman & Littlefield.
Nations. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Fry, G. and O’Hagan, J. (2000) ‘Contending Images of World Poli-
Scholte, J. A. (2008) ‘Recontructing Contemporary Democracy’, Indi-
tics: An Introduction’, in G. Fry and J. O’ Hagan (eds), Contending
ana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 15 (1), pp. 305–350.
Images of World Politics. Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 1–20.

Global Policy (2010) 1:3 Copyright  2010 London School of Economics and Political Science and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
 17585899, 2010, 3, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2010.00042.x by Readcube (Labtiva Inc.), Wiley Online Library on [23/01/2025]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
Luk Van Langenhove
270

Schweller, R. L. (2010) ‘Entropy and the Trajectory of World Politics: Van Langenhove, L. (2007) ‘Globalisation and the Rise of a
Why Polarity has become Less Meaningful’, Cambridge Review of Neo-Westphalian Worldorder of States and Regions’, in D.
International Affairs, 23 (1), pp. 145–163. Steinmetzová, Conference Proceedings: Globalisation Challenges and
Slaughter, A.-M. (2004) A New World Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton New Trends of Governance. Prague: University of Economics, pp.
University Press. 19–34.
Solingen, E. (1995) ‘The New Multilateralism and Nonproliferation: Van Langenhove, L. (2008) ‘Power to the Regions, but not yet Fare-
Bringing in Domestic Politics’, Global Governance, 1, pp. 205–227. well to the Nation State’, Europe’s World, 8, pp. 113–115.
Stone, D. (2004) ‘Transfer Agents and Global Networks in the Weiss, T.G. (2008) What’s Wrong with the United Nations and How to
‘‘Transnationalisation’’ of Policy’, Journal of European Public Policy, Fix it. London: Polity Press.
11, pp. 545–566. Zakaria, F. (2008) The Post-American World and the Rise of the Rest.
Stone, D. (2008) ‘Global Public Policy, Transnational Policy Commu- London: Penguin.
nities and their Networks’, Journal of Policy Sciences, 36 (10), pp.
19–38.
Thakur, R. and Van Langenhove, L. (2006) ‘Enhancing Global Gov- Author Information
ernance through Regional Integration’, Global Governance: A
Luk Van Langenhove, Director of the Comparative Regional
Review of Multilateralism and International Organisations, 12 (3),
Integration Studies Institute of the United Nations University
pp. 233–240.
(UNU-CRIS) in Bruges and Representative of the Rector at
Valaskakis, K. (2001) ‘Long-Term Trends in Global Governance:
UNESCO in Paris.
From ‘‘Westphalia’’ to ‘‘Seattle’’’, in Governance in the 21st Century.
Paris: OECD, pp. 45–66.

Copyright  2010 London School of Economics and Political Science and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Global Policy (2010) 1:3