Lumiqued v. Exevea
Lumiqued v. Exevea
DECISION
ROMERO, J : p
Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel
during an administrative inquiry? cdta
This Office is not about to shift the blame for all these to the drivers
employed by the DAR-CAR as respondent would want us to do."
The OP, however, found that the charges of oppression and harassment, as well
as that of incurring unliquidated cash advances, were not satisfactorily established.
In a "petition for appeal" 17 addressed to President Ramos, Lumiqued prayed that
A.O. No. 52 be reconsidered and that he be reinstated to his former position "with all
the benefits accorded to him by law and existing rules and regulations." This petition
was basically premised on the affidavit dated May 27, 1993, of a certain Dwight L.
Lumiqued, a former driver of the DAR-CAR, who confessed to having authored the
falsification of gasoline receipts and attested to petitioner Lumiqued's being an "honest
man" who had no "premonition" that the receipts he (Dwight) turned over to him were
"altered." 18
Treating the "petition for appeal" as a motion for reconsideration of A.O. No. 52,
the OP, through Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing, denied
the same on August 31, 1993.
Undaunted, Lumiqued filed a second motion for reconsideration, alleging, among
other things, that he was denied the constitutional right to counsel during the hearing. 19
On May 19, 1994, 20 however, before his motion could be resolved, Lumiqued died. On
September 28, 1994, 21 Secretary Quisumbing denied the second motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
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Hence, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus praying for the reversal of
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Committee, the October 22, 1992,
Memorandum of then Justice Secretary Drilon, A.O. No. 52 issued by President
Ramos, and the orders of Secretary Quisumbing. In a nutshell, it prays for the "payment
of retirement benefits and other benefits accorded to deceased Arsenio Lumiqued by
law, payable to his heirs; and the backwages from the period he was dismissed from
service up to the time of his death on May 19, 1994." 22
Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of
his right to counsel during the hearing. They maintain that his right to counsel could not
be waived unless the waiver was in writing and in the presence of counsel. They assert
that the committee should have suspended the hearing and granted Lumiqued a
reasonable time within which to secure a counsel of his own. If suspension was not
possible, the committee should have appointed a counsel de oficio to assist him.
These arguments are untenable and misplaced. The right to counsel, which
cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a
right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. 23 It is not an
absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with
more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right
of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of
his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the proceedings
below. The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order No.
145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under
the law for the complaints filed against him. The order issued by Acting Secretary of
Justice Montenegro states thus:
"In the interest of the public service and pursuant to the provisions of
existing laws, a Committee to conduct the formal investigation of the
administrative complaint for oppression, dishonesty, disgraceful and immoral
conduct, being notoriously undesirable and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service against Mr. ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED, Regional Director,
Department of Agrarian Reform, Cordillera Autonomous Region, is hereby
created . . ." 24
As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating committee was not part of a
criminal prosecution. This was even made more pronounced when, after finding
Lumiqued administratively liable, it hinted at the filing of a criminal case for malversation
through falsification of public documents in its report and recommendation.
Petitioners' misconception on the nature of the investigation 25 conducted against
Lumiqued appears to have been engendered by the fact that the DOJ conducted it.
While it is true that under the Administrative Code of 1987, the DOJ shall "administer
the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof
consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration
of the correctional system," 26 conducting criminal investigations is not its sole function.
By its power to "perform such other functions as may be provided by law," 27
prosecutors may be called upon to conduct administrative investigations. Accordingly,
the investigating committee created by Department Order No. 145 was duty-bound to
conduct the administrative investigation in accordance with the rules therefor.
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to
a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an
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administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature
of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests
on such a body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. 28 In an
administrative proceeding such as the one that transpired below, a respondent (such as
Lumiqued) has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not. This is clear from
the provisions of Section 32, Article VII of Republic Act No. 2260 29 (otherwise known as
the Civil Service Act) and Section 39, paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on Discipline) of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 30 (otherwise known
as the Administrative Code of 1987). Excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes
of the hearings attended by Lumiqued 31 clearly show that he was confident of his
capacity and so opted to represent himself . Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative
in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to
determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public
officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government
service. LibLex
So, we will proceed with the hearing even without your counsel? You are
willing to proceed with the hearing even without your counsel?
DIR. LUMIQUED:
Yes, I am confident . . .
CP BALAJADIA:
Q. (To Director Lumiqued) You really wish to go through with this even
without your counsel?
DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
Let us make it of record that we have been warning you to proceed with
the assistance of counsel but you said that you can take care of yourself
so we have no other alternative but to proceed." 36 (Emphasis supplied)
DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
I was not able to bring a lawyer since the lawyer I requested to assist me
and was the one who prepared my counter-affidavit is already engaged for
a hearing and according to him he is engaged for the whole month of July.
RSP EXEVEA:
We cannot wait. . .
CP BALAJADIA:
Why don't you engage the services of another counsel. The charges
against you are quite serious. We are not saying you are guilty already.
We are just apprehensive that you will go through this investigation without
a counsel. We would like you to be protected legally in the course of this
investigation. Why don't you get the services of another counsel. There
are plenty here in Baguio. . .
DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
I will try to see, Sir. . .
CP BALAJADIA:
Please select your date now, we are only given one month to finish the
investigation, Director Lumiqued.
RSP EXEVEA:
We will not entertain any postponement. With or without counsel, we will
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proceed.
CP BALAJADIA:
Madam Witness, will you please submit the document which we asked for
and Director Lumiqued, if you have other witnesses, please bring them but
reduce their testimonies in affidavit form so that we can expedite with the
proceedings." 37
At the hearing scheduled for July 10, 1992, Lumiqued still did not avail of the
services of counsel. Pertinent excerpts from said hearing follow:
"FISCAL BALAJADIA:
I notice also Mr. Chairman that the respondent is not being represented by
a counsel. The last time he was asked to invite his lawyer in this
investigation. May we know if he has a lawyer to represent him in this
investigation?
DIR. LUMIQUED:
There is none Sir because when I went to my lawyer, he told me that he
had set a case also at 9:30 in the other court and he told me if there is a
possibility of having this case postponed anytime next week, probably
Wednesday so we will have good time (sic) of presenting the affidavit.
FISCAL BALAJADIA:
Are you moving for a postponement Director? May I throw this to the
panel. The charges in this case are quite serious and he should be given a
chance to the assistance of a counsel/lawyer.
RSP EXEVEA:
And is (sic) appearing that the supplemental-affidavit has been furnished
him only now and this has several documents attached to it so I think we
could grant him one last postponement considering that he has already
asked for an extension.
DIR. LUMIQUED:
The hearing was reset to July 17, 1992, the date when Lumiqued was released
from the hospital. Prior to said date, however, Lumiqued did not inform the committee of
his confinement. Consequently, because the hearing could not push through on said
date, and Lumiqued had already submitted his counter-affidavit, the committee decided
to wind up the proceedings. This did not mean, however, that Lumiqued was short-
changed in his right to due process.
Lumiqued, a Regional Director of a major department in the executive branch of
the government, graduated from the University of the Philippines (Los Baños) with the
degree of Bachelor of Science major in Agriculture, was a recipient of various
scholarships and grants, and underwent training seminars both here and abroad. 39
Hence, he could have defended himself if need be, without the help of counsel, if truth
were on his side. This, apparently, was the thought he entertained during the hearings
he was able to attend. In his statement, "That is my concern," one could detect that it
had been uttered testily, if not exasperatedly, because of the doubt or skepticism
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implicit in the question, "You are confident that you will be able to represent yourself?"
despite his having positively asserted earlier, "Yes, I am confident." He was obviously
convinced that he could ably represent himself. Beyond repeatedly reminding him that
he could avail himself of counsel and as often receiving the reply that he is confident of
his ability to defend himself, the investigating committee could not do more. One can
lead a horse to water but cannot make him drink.
The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the
Constitution or the law. In Nera v. Auditor General, 40 the Court said:
". . . There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-
criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without
such representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The
assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal
profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the
participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The
ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only
with a lawyer at his side."
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to explain one's side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation
but also, and perhaps even much more creditably as it is more practicable than oral
arguments, through pleadings. 41 An actual hearing is not always an indispensable
aspect of due process. 42 As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his
interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for
this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. 43 Moreover, this
constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 44 Lumiqued's appeal and his
subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration cured whatever irregularity attended
the proceedings conducted by the committee. 45
The constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty and property.
46 In the early case of Cornejo v. Gabriel and Provincial Board of Rizal 47 the Court held
that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guarantee of due
process of law for it is a public trust or agency. This jurisprudential pronouncement has
been enshrined in the 1987 Constitution under Article XI, Section 1, on accountability of
public officers, as follows:
"Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives."
When the dispute concerns one's constitutional right to security of tenure,
however, public office is deemed analogous to property in a limited sense; hence, the
right to due process could rightfully be invoked. Nonetheless, the right to security of
tenure is not absolute. Of equal weight is the countervailing mandate of the Constitution
that all public officers and employees must serve with responsibility, integrity, loyalty
and efficiency. 48 In this case, it has been clearly shown that Lumiqued did not live up to
this constitutional precept.
The committee's findings pinning culpability for the charges of dishonesty and
grave misconduct upon Lumiqued were not, as shown above, fraught with procedural
mischief. Its conclusions were founded on the evidence presented and evaluated as
facts. Well-settled in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that findings of fact of administrative
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agencies must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence,
even if such evidence is not overwhelming or preponderant. 49 The quantum of proof
necessary for a finding of guilt in administrative cases is only substantial evidence or
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. 50
Consequently, the adoption by Secretary Drilon and the OP of the committee's
recommendation of dismissal may not in any way be deemed tainted with arbitrariness
amounting to grave abuse of discretion. Government officials are presumed to perform
their functions with regularity. Strong evidence is not necessary to rebut that
presumption, 51 which petitioners have not successfully disputed in the instant case. LexLib
Footnotes
6. Rollo, p. 123.
7. Ibid., p. 131.
23. Article III, Section 12(1), 1987 Constitution. Custodial investigation has been defined as ". .
. any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is only
after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins
to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries
out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that
the rule (on the right of an accused to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel of his choice) begins to operate (People v.
Marra, 236 SCRA 565 [1994]).
24. A copy of this Department Order is found in the folder of photocopies of the transcript of
stenographic notes that the Office of the Solicitor General furnished the Judicial
Records Office of this Court.
25. In his motion for reconsideration dated December 17, 1992, Lumiqued charged the
investigating committee with having viewed the case against him "from purely tenuous
technical angle" thereby leading the Secretary of Justice to arrive at his
recommendation "contrary to the spirit if not to the letters of Revised Penal Code and
the Administrative Code and COA Rules and Regulations" (sic).
28. Bancroft v. Board of Governors of Registered Dentists of Oklahoma, 210 P. 2d 666 (1949).
29. "Sec. 31. Disciplinary Action. — No officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed
or suspended except for cause as provided by law and after due process: Provided,
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That a transfer from one position to another without reduction in rank or salary shall not
be considered disciplinary when made in the interest of public service: Provided, further,
That no complaint against a civil service official or employee shall be given due course
unless the same is in writing and subscribed and sworn to by the complainant: And
provided, finally, That the respondent shall be entitled to a formal investigation if he so
elects, in which case he shall have the right to appear and defend himself at said
investigation in person or by counsel, to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him, and to have the attendance of witnesses and production of documents in
his favor by compulsory process of subpoena or subpoena duces tecum. (Emphasis
supplied)
Either party may avail himself of the services of counsel and may require the attendance
of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence in his favor through the
compulsory process of subpoena or subpoena duces tecum. . . ." (Emphasis supplied)
31. Infra.
32. "Section 21. Formal charge. — When the Commission finds the existence of a prima facie
case, the respondent shall be formally charged. He shall be furnished copies of the
complaint, sworn statements and other documents submitted by the complainant,
unless he had already received the same during the preliminary investigation. The
respondent shall be given at least seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of said formal
charge to submit his answer under oath, together with the affidavits of his witnesses
and other evidence, and a statement indicating whether or not he elects a formal
investigation. He shall also be informed of his right to the assistance of a counsel of his
choice. If the respondent has already submitted his comment and counter-affidavits
during the preliminary investigation, he shall be given the opportunity to submit
additional evidence." (Emphasis supplied).
40. 164 SCRA 1 (1988), cited in Feeder v. International Line, Pte., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 197
SCRA 842 (1991).
41. Concerned Officials of MWSS v. Vasquez, 310 Phil. 549, citing Mutuc v. Court of Appeals,
190 SCRA 43 (1990).
42. Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM) v. Civil Service Commission, 311 Phil. 573.
43. Legarda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94457, October 16, 1997.
45. Rubenecia v. Civil Service Commission, 314 Phil. 612; T.H. Valderama & Sons, Inc. and/or
Roberto Tinsay v. Drilon, 181 SCRA 308 (1990).
50. Office of the Court Administrator v. Bucoy, 235 SCRA 588 (1994), citing Tolentino v. Court
of Appeals, 150 SCRA 26 (1987) and Biak-na-Bato Mining Company v. Tanco, Jr., 193
SCRA 323 (1991).