EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-19748. September 13, 1962.]

PAULINO J. GARCIA , petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY and JUAN SALCEDO, JR., in his capacity as Acting
Chairman of the National Science Development Board, respondents.

DECISION

BARRERA, J : p

This is a petition filed by petitioner, Dr. Paulino J. Garcia, Chairman of the

National Science Development board created by Republic Act 2067 otherwise known as
the "Science Act of 1958" against the respondent Executive Secretary and Juan
Salcedo, Jr., the latter in his capacity as Acting Chairman of the same National Science
Development Board, in the form of quo warranto and prohibition with preliminary
injunction, with prayer that the further preventive suspension of petitioner beyond the
maximum period of 60 days, provided in Section 35 of the Civil Service Act of 1959
(Rep. Act 2260), be declared illegal and void, and that respondent Juan Salcedo, Jr. be
likewise declared guilty of unlawfully holding and exercising the functions of the office of
Chairman of the National Science Development Board since April 19, 1962, date of the
expiration of the said 60-day period.
Succinctly stated, the pertinent facts of this case are as follows:
Upon the enactment on June 13, 1958 of Republic Act 2067, creating the
National Science Development Board for the avowed purpose of implementing the
declared policy of the State to integrate, coordinate, promote and intensify scientific and
technological research and development and to foster invention and utilize scientific
knowledge as an effective instrument for the promotion of national progress, petitioner
herein, Dr. Paulino J. Garcia, was appointed by the President of the Philippines, which
appointment was duly confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, as the first
Chairman of the National Science Development Board for a fixed term of six years,
pursuant to Section 6 of the Science Act. Accepting such appointment, petitioner duly
qualified assumed the performance of the functions of the office on July 15,1958, and
organized and since then built up the Board into a real effective instrument for scientific
advancement that it is today.
As a result of the last national elections held in November, 1961, a change of
administration took place. Shortly thereafter, or on February 9,1962, after petitioner
declined to heed what respondents admit as the new Assistant Executive Secretary
Rodrigo Perez's "friendly gesture of advising petitioner to resign from his position in
order to avoid the unpleasant consequences of having to face an administrative action
for violation of the Revised Administrative Code on the basis of evidence then on hand",
respondent Executive Secretary required petitioner in writing to explain charges for
alleged electioneering based on the affidavits of four individuals. On February 15,
petitioner submitted his written explanation denying under oath the said charges
claiming them to be false, malicious and unsubstantial. On the following day, February
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 16, respondent Executive Secretary advised petitioner, by authority of the President,
that his explanation was found unsatisfactory, and immediately ordered his preventive
suspension from office effective upon receipt of the communication. Thus, the
preventive suspension took effect on Monday, February 18, 1962. On the day previous,
or on Sunday, February 17, 1962, the respondent Juan Salcedo, Jr. was designated by
the President as Acting Chairman of the National Science Development Board.
By Administrative Order No. 5 dated February 17, 1962, an investigating
committee was created. On February 23, another charge of dishonesty in office was
filed with the investigating committee against petitioner. On February 27, the
investigating committee commenced the investigation of the administrative charges and,
after some delays cause by the unpreparedness of the prosecution, the hearing was
indefinitely postponed because of the departure for abroad, on March 19, 1962, on an
extended vacation, of one of the members of the committee (former Justice Ramon San
Jose) who, before his appointment, appraised the President thereof but was advised he
could go as the investigation could be postponed during his absence.
In view of his indefinite suspension, petitioner, on May 5, 1962, filed the present
petition praying in effect that the 60-day period prescribed in the Civil Service law for
preventive suspension having already expired on April 19, 1962, he be reinstated in the
service pursuant to Section 35 of the said Act.
The clear-cut issue, therefore, before us is the effect and scope of the
aforementioned Section 30 of the Civil Service Act, which reads:
"SEC. 35. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative
Investigation. — When the administrative case against the officer or employee
under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the Commissioner of Civil
Service within the period of sixty (60) days after the date of suspension of the
respondent, the respondent shall be reinstated in the service. If the respondent
officer or employee is exonerated, he shall be restored to his position with full
pay for the period of suspension."
Contrary to the contention of petitioner that the provisions of the above-quoted
section are mandatory and applicable to him, respondents sustain that the compulsory
lifting of the preventive suspension pending administrative investigation provided in this
section, applies only to officers or employees whose administrative cases are to be
decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service, and that with respect to any officer
appointed by the President, there is no provision of law regulating the duration of the
preventive suspension pending investigation of charges against such officer, as is the
case of petitioner. In other words, it is respondents' contention that Section 35 of the
Civil Service Act does not apply to officers appointed by the President answering
administrative charges against them.
At the outset, let it be said that Section 35 is a new provision in our Civil Service
law. In the Revised Administrative Code, in its Article VI on "Discipline of Persons in
Civil Service", we find the same power of preventive suspension exercisable by the
President and the chief of a bureau or office with the approval of the proper head of
department, as is now provided in Section 34 of Republic Act 2260, but there is no
counterpart in the Administrative Code, of Section 35 of Act 2260 regarding the lifting of
preventive suspension pending administrative investigation. This insertion for the first
time in our Civil Service law of an express provision limiting the duration of preventive
suspension is significant and timely. It indicates realization by Congress of the evils of
indefinite suspension during investigation, where the respondent employee is deprived
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 in the meantime of his means of livelihood, without an opportunity to find work
elsewhere, lest he be considered to have abandoned his office. It is for this reason that
it has been truly said that prolonged suspension is worse than removal. And this is
equally true whether the suspended officer or employee is in the classified or
unclassified service, or whether he is a presidential appointee or not. Having in mind
the remedial purpose of the law, is respondents' contention justifiable that Section 35 of
the Civil Service Act is applicable only to employees whose administrative cases are
submitted to the Commissioner of Civil Service? Except for the insertion of the clause
"is not finally decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service" (which would presently be
discussed), there is nothing in Section 35 which distinguishes between the preventive
suspension of an officer appointed by the President and the suspension of subordinate
officers or employees undergoing administrative investigation. Note that the phrase
"officer or employee" used in Section 35, is not modified by the word "subordinate" as
employed in Section 34 when speaking of the preventive suspension ordered by the
chief of a bureau or office. In fact, the last sentence of Section 35 which provides that,
"if the respondent officer or employee is exonerated, he shall be restored to his position
with full pay from the period of suspension", is undeniably applicable to all officers and
employees whether suspended by the President or by the chief of office or bureau, or
investigated by the Commissioner of Civil Service, or by a presidential investigating
committee.
The first sentence of Section 35 stating that "when the administrative case
against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by
the Commissioner of Civil Service within the period of 60 days after the date of
suspension of the respondent, the respondent shall be reinstated in the service", merely
demonstrates, we believe, the feeling of Congress that, in line with its policy of
strengthening the Civil Service of the nation and protecting it from the inroads of
partisan political considerations, pursuant to the spirit of the Constitution, all disciplinary
administrative cases should pass through the impartial scrutiny of the Commissioner of
Civil Service, even though the final decision on the matter may not be his, as an appeal
from such decision of the Commissioner to the Civil Service Board of Appeals is
expressly authorized by Section 36 of the same law. So also, it may be conceded
without deciding, may the President, in the exercise of his power of control and
supervision over all offices and departments, of the executive branch of the
government, revise, review, or revoke the decisions of the Commissioner of Civil
Service and of the Civil Service Board of Appeals. Put this power has nothing to do with
the preventive suspension, because this is not intended to be a penalty. As explained
by Senator Francisco A. Rodrigo, sponsor of the bill which later became the Civil
Service Act of 1959 (Rep. Act 2260), "suspension cannot be more than 60 days —
preventive suspension. Even if the case drags on for six months or a year, after 60 days
of preventive suspension, the suspended employee is reinstated." (Senate
Congressional Record, Vol. II, No. 69, p. 2001). It may be noted that Senator Rodrigo
did not make any distinction between the preventive suspension of officers by the
President and that by the chief of office or bureau, and Section 35 as passed did not
contain any such distinction. Neither is such distinction justifiable, for there is no cogent
reason — and none has been suggested — why the protection granted to subordinate
employees is not to be applied to more important public officers. As this Court has ruled
in the case of Severino Unabia vs. The Hon. City Mayor, et al. (53 O.G., No. 1, pp 133-
134) —
". . . There is no reason for excluding persons in the unclassified service
from the benefits extended to those belonging to the classified service. Both
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 are expressly declared to belong to the Civil Service; hence, the same rights
and privileges should be accorded to both. Persons in the unclassified service
are so designated because the nature of their work and qualifications are not
subject to classification, which is not true of those appointed to the classified
service. This can not be a valid reason for denying privileges to the former that
are granted to the latter."
To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer appointed by the President,
facing administrative charges, can be preventively suspended indefinitely, would be to
countenance a situation where the preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty
itself without a finding of guilt after due hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the
Constitution 1 and the Civil Service law. 2 This, it is believed, is not conducive to the
maintenance of a robust, effective and efficient civil service, the integrity of which has,
in his jurisdiction received constitutional guarantee, as it places in the hands of the
Chief Executive a weapon that could be wielded to undermine the security of tenure of
public officers. Of course, this is not so in the case of those officers holding office at the
pleasure of the President. But where the tenure of office is fixed, as in the case of
herein petitioner, which according to the law he could hold "for 6 years and shall not be
removed therefrom except for cause", to sanction the stand of respondents would be to
nullify and render useless such specific condition imposed by the law itself. If he could
be preventively suspended indefinitely, until the final determination of the administrative
charges against him (and under the circumstances, it would be the President himself
who would decide the same at a time only he can determine) then the provisions of the
law both as to the fixity of his tenure and the limitation of his removal to only for cause
would be meaningless. In the guise of a preventive suspension, his term of office could
be shortened and he could in effect, be removed without a finding of a cause duly
established after due hearing, in violation of the Constitution. This would act at naught
the laudable purpose of Congress to surround the tenure of office of the Chairman of
the National Science Development Board, which is longer than that of the President
himself, with all the safeguards compatible with the purpose of maintaining the office of
such officer, considering its highly scientific and technological nature, beyond
extraneous influences, and of insuring continuity of research and development activities
in an atmosphere of stability and detachment so necessary for the fulfillment of its
mission, uninterrupted by factors other than removal for cause.
Upon these considerations, there is unanimity of opinion among the members of
this Court that the preventive suspension in the case of officers, although appointed by
the President but with a fixed term and removable only for cause, cannot be indefinite.
To some of the members, the provisions of Section 35 limiting the duration to 60 days is
applicable to herein petitioner, as, in their view, it evinces a legislative policy that
preventive suspension of a public officer is not lightly to be resorted to, but only after a
previous serious and thorough scrutiny of the charges and that the prompt and
continued hearing thereof should not be hampered, both in justice to the suspension
officer who is without salary during suspension, and in the interest of public service to
avoid as much as possible the interruption of the efficient functioning of the office that
the suspended official holds. Other justices, however are of the opinion that while said
period may not apply strictly to cases of presidential appointees facing administrative
charges to be decided by the President, the preventive suspension shall nevertheless
be limited to a reasonable period, and in the circumstances of the present case, they
too believe that the further suspension of herein petitioner, who has been under
preventive suspension since February 18, 1962, would no longer be reasonable.
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered holding petitioner Dr. Paulino J.
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 Garcia entitled to immediate reinstatement to his position as Chairman of the National
Science Development Board, without prejudice to the final outcome of the investigation
of the charges against him on which no opinion is here expressed. Respondent Juan
Salcedo, Jr. is hereby ordered to immediately vacate and cease to exercise the
functions of the said office and to deliver the same to herein petitioner Paulino J.
Garcia. No costs. So Ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Dizon and
Makalintal, J.J., concur.
Paredes and Regala, JJ., took no part.

Footnotes
1. No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause as provided by law. (Act XII, Sec. 4, Constitution of the Philippines).
2. No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause as provided by law and after due process. (Sec. 32, Rep. Act 2260).

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