IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1743 OF 2024

IN THE MATTER OF:

NEELAM GROVER …PETITIONER
VERSUS
CAMBRIDGE FOUNDATION SCHOOL & ORS. …RESPONDENTS
REPLY ON BEHLAF OF RESPONDENT NO. 1 TO THE WRIT PETITION

MOST RESPECTFULLY SHOWETH:

That Respondent No.1 craves the leave of this Hon’ble Court to raise
preliminary objections with respect to maintainability of the reliefs, as
prayed in the present Writ Petition. Respondent No.1 humbly submits that
the issue of maintainability be considered as a preliminary issue and the
same be adjudicated at the outset. In the event this Hon’ble Court holds
that present Writ Petition is maintainable, Respondent No.1 craves the
leave of this Hon’ble Court to file a detailed reply to present Writ Petition
at a later stage.

PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS

1. That present Writ Petition filed by Petitioner, demanding arrears in terms

of 7th Pay Commission w.e.f. 01.01.2026 alongwith allowances, other
benefits including arrears of salaries and all consequential benefits, is not
maintainable and liable to be dismissed on the ground that it is barred by
delay and laches.

2. That Petitioner was appointed as Typist/Office Assistant in the year 1984

and was subsequently promoted to the post of Senior Office assistant in
Respondent No. 1. Petitioner took voluntary retirement on 06.07.2017.
That the claims which were raised by Petitioner in its Writ petition are
barred by delay and laches. The revised pay scale came in 2016,
however present Writ Petition was filed beyond the period of 3 years and
thus, the same is barred by the law of limitation and Petitioner could
have only claimed for monetary emoluments for a period up to 3 years.
 Further, Appellants are also claiming for payment of their arrears such as
salaries with respect to the recommendations of 7th CPC, however the
said claims are being preferred after the expiry of more than 7 years
which is a far-fetched claim considering the unreasonable delay in
seeking redressal.

3. That reliefs sought by Petitioner pertain to the period which is beyond

three years prior to the date of filing of the Writ Petition, thus, are barred
by delay and laches. Present Writ Petition has been filed on 25.01.2024,
thus Petitioner could have only claimed for monetary emoluments for a
period up to 3 years prior to the date of filing of present Writ Petition i.e.
25.01.2021. However, since the Petitioner in present case has voluntarily
retired from Respondent No. 1 w.e.f. 06.07.2017, therefore as on
25.01.2021, Petitioner was not in services of Respondent No. 1 and thus,
there is no financial liability which accrues in favour of Petitioner and
against Respondent No. 1, 3 years prior to the date of filing the present
Writ Petition.

4. That in this regard, it is well settled by catena of Judgments of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Hon’ble Court, which have uniformly
held that the Petitioner is entitled to monetary claims on account of
payment of salary/arrears of salary, only for a period of 3 years prior to
the date of filing of Writ Petition. Since the Petitioner voluntarily retired
on 06.07.2017 from Respondent No. 1 and the present Writ Petition has
been filed after a period of more than 3 years, there arises no
outstanding dues in favour of the Petitioner, to be paid by Respondent
No. 1, in present instance.

5. That Petitioner has been negligent and failed to provide substantial

reasoning for the delay and refrain from placing any substantial
reasoning on record even at this stage in filing the Writ Petition. The
Petitioner’s casual approach, lack of action, and negligence in pursuing
the case are evident from the record. As per the settled principles of law,
the Hon’ble Court can only condone a delay if there is a sufficient cause
behind such delay. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment in
 “State of Orissa vs. Mamata Mohanty”, (2011) 3 SCC 436 wherein
the Hon‘ble Supreme Court has held that a petition should not be
considered ignoring the delay and laches, in case the Petitioner
approaches the Court after coming to know of the relief granted by the
Court in a similar case as the same cannot furnish as a proper
explanation for delay and laches. A litigant cannot wake up from deep
slumber and claim impetus from the judgment in the cases where some
diligent person had approached the Court within a reasonable time. Even
in “Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T.
Murali Babu”, (2014) 4 SCC 108, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it
is the duty of the Court to scrutinize whether the delay is to be ignored
without any justification.

6. That had the Appellants chosen to file a suit for recovery against
Respondents, the relief therein would have been limited only for a period
three years prior to the date of filing of suit. Thus, provisions of
Limitation Act cannot be allowed to be circumvented by Appellants in the
manner they have opted, by having filed a Writ Petition, instead of a suit
for recovery. Thus, same yardstick in matters of Limitation, would be
applicable while adjudicating present Writ petition, as is applicable to suit
for recovery. Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in “State of
Madhya Pradesh. v. Bhailal Bhai”, AIR 1964 SC 1006, has held in
this reference as follows:

“21. The learned Judges appear to have failed to notice that the
delay in these petitions was more than the delay in the petition
made in Bhailal Bhai case out of which Civil Appeal No. 362 of 62
has arisen. On behalf of the respondents-petitioners in these
appeals (CAs Nos. 861 to 867 of 1962) Mr Andley has argued that
the delay in these cases even is not such as would justify refusal of
the order for refund. We argued that assuming that the remedy of
recovery by action in a Civil Court stood barred on the date these
applications were made that would be no reason to refuse relief
under Article 226 of the Constitution. Learned counsel is right in
his submission that the provisions of the Limitation Act do
not as such apply to the granting of relief under Art 226. It
appears to us however that the maximum period fixed by
the legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in
 a Civil Court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be
a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy
under Article 226 can be measured. The court may consider
the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of
limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy but
where the delay is more than this period, it will almost
always be proper for the court to hold that it is
unreasonable. The period of limitation prescribed for recovery of
money paid by mistake under the Limitation Act is three years from
the date when the mistake is known. If the mistake was known in
these cases on or shortly after January 17, 1956 the delay in making
these applications should be considered unreasonable. If, on the
other hand, as Mr Andley seems to argue, that the mistake
discovered much later this would be a controversial fact which
cannot conveniently be decided in proceedings. In either view of the
matter we are of opinion the orders for refund made by the High
Court in these seven cases cannot be sustained.”
Judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in “State of Madhya Pradesh. v.
Bhailal Bhai” AIR 1964 SC 1006 is annexed herewith and marked as
ANNEXURE R – 1.

7. That Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Shiv Das v. Union of India”, (2007)

9 SCC 274 held that:

“10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues

from month to month. That, however, cannot be a ground to
overlook delay in filing the petition. It would depend upon the fact of
each case. If petition is filed beyond a reasonable period say three
years normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the relief
which could be granted to a reasonable period of about three years.
The High Court did not examine whether on merit appellant had a
case. If on merits it would have found that there was no scope for
interference, it would have dismissed the writ petition on that score
alone.
11. In the peculiar circumstances, we remit the matter to the High
Court to hear the writ petition on merits. If it is found that the
claim for disability pension is sustainable in law, then it
would mould the relief but in no event grant any relief for a
period exceeding three years from the date of presentation
of the writ petition. We make it clear that we have not expressed
any opinion on the merits as to whether appellant's claim for
disability pension is maintainable or not. If it is sans merit, the High
Court naturally would dismiss the writ petition.”
Judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Shiv Das v. Union of India”
(2007) 9 SCC 274 is annexed herewith and marked as ANNEXURE R –
2.
8. That the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the recent judgment of “Rushibhai
Jagdish Bhai Pathak v. Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation”, 2022
SCC OnLine SC 641 has categorically held that even in the case of
continuing cause of action, the benefits of arrears have to be limited to
three years, before the date of filing of Writ petitions. In this regard, the
relevant paragraphs of judgement are reproduced as under:

“9. The doctrine of delay and laches, or for that matter statutes of
limitation, are considered to be statutes of repose and statutes of
peace, though some contrary opinions have been expressed. The
courts have expressed the view that the law of limitation rests on
the foundations of greater public interest for three reasons, namely,
(a) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in
them; (b) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to
disapprove a stale claim; and (iii) that persons with good causes of
action (who are able to enforce them) should pursue them with
reasonable diligence. Equally, change in de facto position or
character, creation of third party rights over a period of time,
waiver, acquiesce, and need to ensure certitude in dealings, are
equitable public policy considerations why period of limitation is
prescribed by law. Law of limitation does not apply to writ petitions,
albeit the discretion vested with a constitutional court is exercised
with caution as delay and laches principle is applied with the aim to
secure the quiet of the community, suppress fraud and perjury,
quicken diligence, and prevent oppression. Therefore, some
decisions and judgments do not look upon pleas of delay and laches
with favour, especially and rightly in cases where the persons suffer
from adeptness, or incapacity to approach the courts for relief.
However, other decisions, while accepting the rules of limitation as
well as delay and laches, have observed that such rules are not
meant to destroy the rights of the parties but serve a larger public
interest and are founded on public policy. There must be a lifespan
during which a person must approach the court for their remedy.
Otherwise, there would be unending uncertainty as to the rights and
obligations of the parties. Referring to the principle of delay and
laches, this Court, way back in Moons Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Mehar,
President, Industrial Court, Bombay,8 had referred to the view
expressed by Sir Barnes Peacock in The Lindsay Petroleum Company
AND. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewell, and John Kemp, in
the following words:
“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or
a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a
remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that
which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or
where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not
waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which
it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and
delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against
relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay,
that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of
limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles
substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in
such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts
done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a
balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other,
so far as relates to the remedy.”
10. At the same time, the law recognises a ‘continuing’ cause of
action which may give rise to a ‘recurring’ cause of action as in the
case of salary or pension. This Court in M.R. Gupta v. Union of India,
has held that so long as the employee is in service, a fresh cause of
action would arise every month when they are paid their salary on
the basis of a wrong computation made contrary to the rules. If the
employee's claim is found to be correct on merits, they would be
entitled to be paid according to the properly fixed pay scale in future
and the question of limitation would arise for recovery of the arrears
for the past period. The Court held that the arrears should be
calculated and paid as long as they have not become time-barred.
The entire claim for the past period should not be rejected.
11. Relying upon the aforesaid ratio, this Court in the case of Union
of India v. Tarsem Singh, while referring to the decision in Shiv Dass
v. Union of India,12 quoted the following passages from the latter
decision:
“8. …The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to
the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and
public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices, and if writ
jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the
effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also
injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ
jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation
of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which
also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to
exercise such jurisdiction.
xxx
10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues
from month to month. That, however, cannot be a ground to
overlook delay in filing the petition. … If petition is filed beyond a
reasonable period say three years normally the Court would reject
the same or restrict the relief which could be granted to a
reasonable period of about three years.”
12. In Tarsem Singh (supra), reference was also made to Section 22
of the Limitation Act, 1963, and the following passage from
Balakrishna Savalram Pujari Waghmare v. Shree Dhyaneshwar
Maharaj Sansthan, which had explained the concept of continuing
wrong in the context of Section 23 of the Limitation Act, 1908,
corresponding to Section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1963, observing
that: “31…It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an
act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer
of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said
injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there
is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the
act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character
that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes
a continuing wrong. In this connection, it is necessary to draw a
distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what
may be described as the effect of the said injury.”
13. Accordingly, in Tarsem Singh (supra) it has been held that
principles underlying ‘continuing wrongs’ and ‘recurring/successive
wrongs’ have been applied to service law disputes. A ‘continuing
wrong’ refers to a single wrongful act which causes a continuing
injury. ‘Recurring/successive wrongs’ are those which occur
periodically, each wrong giving rise to a distinct and separate cause
of action. Having held so, this Court in Tarsem Singh (supra) had
further elucidated some exceptions to the aforesaid rule in the
following words:
“To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be
rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought
by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an
application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to
the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service
related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted
even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the
date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing
wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an
exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any
order or administrative decision which related to or affected several
others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled
rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For
example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation of pay or
pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect
the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to
seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would render the
claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar
as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is
concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs
will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the
consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three
years 17 prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.” 14. In Tarsem
Singh (supra), the delay of 16 years in approaching the courts
affected the consequential claim for arrears and thus, this Court set
aside the direction to pay arrears for 16 years with interest. The
Court restricted “the relief relating to arrears to only three years
before the date of writ petition, or from the date of demand to date
 of writ petition, whichever was lesser”. Further, the grant of interest
on arrears was also denied. this 15. The aforesaid ratio in Tarsem
Singh (supra) has been followed by Court in State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Yogendra Shrivastava and Asger Ibrahim Amin v. Life
Insurance Corporation of India. 16. In the facts of the present case, it
is accepted that the respondent-Corporation had accepted the
interpretation rendered by the High Court of Gujarat to the Scheme
whereby the appellants, on financial upgradation, would be entitled
to the higher grade pay scale of the next promotional post, which is
Rs. 5,000-8,000/- in the present case. As noted above, the impugned
judgment of the Division Bench accepts the said position and grants
the appellants the said pay-scale but restricts the benefit from the
date of the judgment of the Single Judge in the Writ Petitions filed by
the appellants, that is, with effect from 31st July 2018. The Division
Bench should not have taken the date of the decision/judgment of
the Single Judge for grant of the said benefit in view of the decision
and ratio in Tarsem Singh (supra) which has been followed in several
other decisions. That apart, the date of the decision of the Single
Judge is a fortuitous circumstance. Only the date of filing of the writ
petition is relevant while examining the question of delay and laches
or limitation. The appellants would, in consonance with the case law
referred to above, be entitled to the arrears for three years before
the date of filing of the Writ Petitions.”
The same has direct bearing on the outcome of present case as well.

9. That Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court in “Preeti Sharma v. Ganga

International School”, LPA 143 of 2017 upheld the judgment of
Single Judge in “Preeti Sharma v. Ganga International School”,
W.P. (C) No. 7792 of 2015, wherein the Hon’ble Single Judge held that:

“6. That Limitation Act does not strictly apply to writ

petitions, but principles of Limitation Act do apply by
application of doctrine of delay and laches in a writ petition
is no longer res integra and has been so held by the
Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty,
(2011) 3 SCC 436. Paras 52 to 54 of the judgment in the case of
Mamata Mohanty (supra) are relevant and these paras read as
under:
“52. In the very first appeal, the respondent filed writ petition
on 11.11.2005 claiming relief under the Notification dated
6.10.1989 w.e.f. 1.1.1986 without furnishing any explanation
for such inordinate delay and on laches on her part. Section 3 of
the Limitation Act 1963, makes it obligatory on the part of the
court to dismiss the Suit or appeal if made after the prescribed
period even though the limitation is not set up as a defence and
there is no plea to raise the issue of limitation even at appellate
stage because in some of the cases it may go to the root of the
matter.
 53. Needless to say that Limitation Act 1963 does not apply in
writ jurisdiction. However, the doctrine of limitation being
based on public policy, the principles enshrined therein
are applicable and writ petitions are dismissed at initial
stage on the ground of delay and laches. In a case like
at hand, getting a particular pay scale may give rise to a
recurring cause of action. In such an eventuality, the
petition may be dismissed on the ground of delay and
laches and the court may refuse to grant relief for the
initial period in case of an unexplained and inordinate
delay. In the instant case, the Respondent claimed the relief
from 1.1.1986 by filing a petition on 11.11.2005 but the High
Court for some unexplained reason granted the relief w.e.f.
1.6.1984, though even the Notification dated 6.10.1989 makes
it applicable w.e.f. 1.1.1986.
54. This Court has consistently rejected the contention that a
petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches in
case the petitioner approaches the Court after coming to know
of the relief granted by the Court in a similar case as the same
cannot furnish a proper explanation for delay and laches. A
litigant cannot wake up from deep slumber and claim impetus
from the judgment in cases where some diligent person had
approached the Court within a reasonable time.”
7. The reasoning of the case of Mamata Mohanty (supra) is
that if a suit to claim the same relief is time barred and has
to be dismissed, then at that stage a writ petition cannot be
filed and the limitation period provided by the Limitation Act
be circumvented. Under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India orders are passed for the purposes of applying the
laws of this country and not defeating the laws of this
country including the Limitation Act. If limitation period is
held not at all to apply to writ petitions as such, then a suit
which is time barred will be filed as a writ petition for being
entertained. Also, doctrine of delay and laches in their application
to a writ petition are considered in a liberal manner, however, such
doctrine of delay and laches is considered on principles equivalent
as contained either in Section 14 of the Limitation Act or similar to
acknowledgments of liability under Sections 18 and 19 of the
Limitation Act i.e there is a ground for extension of limitation period
beyond the period provided under the schedule of the Limitation
Act.
xxx
9. Petitioner will be entitled to her salary in terms of the
Sixth Pay Commission Report up to a period of three years
prior to 1.4.2015 i.e w.e.f. and after 1.4.2012. Petitioner
resigned from her services with the respondent no. 1/school
on 17.6.2013, and therefore, petitioner will be entitled to
her salary as per the Sixth Pay Commission Report from
 1.4.2012 till 17.6.2013, provided such amount is not already
paid to the petitioner. It is held that for the period of dues
prior to 1.4.2012, the same would be time barred and hence
would not be payable to the petitioner in terms of the
reasoning given above and the ratio of the judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of Mamata Mohanty (supra).”
Judgment of Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court in “Preeti Sharma v.
Ganga International School” LPA 143 of 2017 and Single Judge of
this Hon’ble Court in “Preeti Sharma v. Ganga International School”
W.P. (C) No. 7792 of 2015 is annexed herewith and marked as
ANNEXURE R – 3 and ANNEXURE R – 4 respectively.

10. That this Hon’ble Court in “Pooja Kapoor v. Director of Education &
Ors.”, W.P. (C) 7214 of 2012 vide its Order dated 09.09.2016 has held
that:

“2. In my opinion, para 4 of the order of this Court dated 6.9.2013

would only mean that liability of the respondent no.2-school is to
pay in accordance with law. Law is that the payments can be
claimed only for three years prior to filing of the legal
proceedings and which is because of Article 7 of the
Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963 which states that when
wages are claimed, the wages would become due for
limitation only for three years from when the wages become
due. Putting it in anther words, the wages claimed for a
period beyond three years of initiating legal proceedings
would be time barred.
3. The Supreme Court in the judgment in the case of State of Orissa
and Anr. Vs. Mamata Mohanty (2011) 3 SCC 436 has held that
though Limitation Act strictly does not apply to writ proceedings,
however, principles of Limitation Act still apply by applying the
doctrine of delay and laches. Supreme Court has effectively held in
this judgment in the case of Mamata Mohanty (supra) that
entitlement for any money claimed would only be for three
years prior to filing of the writ petition. Counsel for the
respondent no.2 has also rightly placed reliance upon
another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Shiv
Dass Vs. Union of India and Others (2007) 9 SCC 274 and
which judgment with respect to wages states that when a
writ petition is filed, then, relief which has to be granted is
restricted only for upto three years of the filing of the writ
petition.
4. In view of the above, this application for clarification is disposed
of by observing that when in para 4 of the order dated 6.9.2013,
petitioner was held entitled to reliefs of wages in terms of
6th Pay Commission Report, the same was only upto and
 commencing from three years before filing of the writ
petition and thereafter i.e not for any period prior to three
years of filing of the writ petition.”
Order dated 09.09.2016 of this Hon’ble Court in “Pooja Kapoor v.
Director of Education & Ors.” W.P. (C) 7214/2012 is annexed
herewith and marked as ANNEXURE R – 5.

11. That several other judgements on the point of delay and laches, are as
follows:

a. State of Orissa vs. Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436 (paras 52, 53,
54, 68) (Supra)

b. M.R. Gupta vs. UOI, (1995) 5 SCC 628 (para 5)

c. Asger Ibrahim Amin vs. LIC, (2016) 13 SCC 797 (paras 4, 21)

d. Banda Dev. Authority vs. Moti Lal Agarwal, (2011) 5 SCC 394 (paras
16, 17, 18)

e. State of M.P. vs. Yogendra Shrivastava, (2010) 12 SCC 538 (paras 8, 9)

f. Avinash Sharma vs. Tata Power, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 4904 (paras 26,
27)

g. Savitri Sahni vs. L.G. of NCTD, 2006 SCC OnLine Del 593 (para 21 11)

h. Kamlesh Gopal vs. UOI, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 9668 (paras 2, 4)

i. Dr. Y. S. Parmar Univ. v. Satish Chand, 2016 SCC OnLine HP 4796

(paras 14, 16, 17, 18, 19)

12. That in “Kirti Jain vs. Kulachi Hansraj Model School and Ors.”, LPA
690 of 2017, Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court upheld the decision of
Ld. Single Judge whereby claim of Appellant therein was restricted to 3
years before filing of W.P.(C) No. 3573 of 2015, titled “Kirti Jain vs.
Kulachi Hansraj Model School and Ors.” and relied on judgements of
Hon’ble Apex Court in Tarsem Singh (Supra) and Mamata Mohanty while
observing as follows:

“3. We have heard learned counsels for the parties. We may note
that the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition filed by
the appellant in part and has restricted the claim of the appellant to
three years before filing of the writ petition. This aspect has been
 dealt with in para 8 (i) and (ii) of the judgment which read as under:
8. (i) The fact that schools in Delhi have to pay the teachers’ salaries
as per the 6th Pay Commission Report cannot be doubted in view of
the order of the DOE dated 11.2.2009, and therefore, petitioner will
be entitled to her salary from the date when 6th Pay Commission
Report became applicable to private schools in Delhi including the
respondent no.1/school, and therefore the respondent no.1/school is
directed to pay all the arrears which are due and payable to the
petitioner by giving monetary emoluments in terms of 6th Pay
Commission Report. However, since principles of the Limitation Act,
1963 apply to writ petitions by virtue of the judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa and Another Vs. Mamta
Mohanty (2011) 3 SCC 436 accordingly petitioner will only be
entitled to amounts of arrears for a period of three years i.e from the
date of three years before filing of the writ petition and which has
been filed on 9.4.2015 and till the date of resignation of the
petitioner on 25.3.2015.
(ii) I cannot agree with the contention urged on behalf of the counsel
for the petitioner that since representations were made by the
petitioner on 14.2.2011 and 11.5.2012, hence petitioner is entitled
to extend the period of limitation, inasmuch as, mere pendency of
the representations will not extend the period of limitation unless
there was an acknowledgment by the respondent no.1/school that
representations were pending favorable consideration. xxx 6. Having
regard to the aforesaid decisions, we find no infirmity in the
judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. We find no merit in
this appeal. The appeal along with C.M.38540/2017 is dismissed.
xxx
6. Having regard to the aforesaid decisions, we find no infirmity in
the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. We find no merit
in this appeal. The appeal along with C.M.38540/2017 is dismissed.”

Judgment in “Kirti Jain vs. Kulachi Hansraj Model School and Ors.”,
LPA 690 of 2017 is annexed herewith and marked as ANNEXURE R –
6.

13. That similarly in “Prem Thakran vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and
Ors.”, LPA 381 of 2018, Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court upheld
decision of Ld. Single Judge of restricting claim of Appellant therein to 3
years before filing of W.P.(C) No. 584 of 2017, titled “Prem Thakran vs.
Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Ors.” and observed as follows:

“4. We have heard learned counsels for the parties. We may note
that the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition filed by
the appellant in part and has restricted the claim of the appellant to
three years before filing of the writ petition. This aspect has been
dealt with in paras 5 and 6 of the judgment which read as under: “5.
Upon hearing and on perusal of material on record and the decision
cited, I find that the application of doctrine of delay and laches in a
writ petition is to be considered in a liberal manner. That is to say, if
there is any ground for extension of limitation, it has to be
considered liberally. 6. In the instant case, respondent-School in its
communication of 5th February, 2011 (annexure P-4) had
undertaken to pay the arrears of Sixth Pay Commission to the
regular staff with effect from 1st January, 2006. On the strength of
that undertaking, petitioner ought to have approached the Court
within three years i.e., in the year 2014. The lack of diligence is
apparent from the fact the petitioner had not even made a
Representation in the year 2014 to seek the arrears of Sixth Pay
Commission with effect from 1st January, 2006 and only in the year
2017, writ petition has been filed. Therefore, in view of the decision
in Preeti Sharma (Supra), the benefit of Sixth Pay Commission to 24
petitioner prior to 2013 cannot be extended.”
5. In the case of Union of India and others vs. Tarsem Singh reported
in (2008) 2 SSC (L&S) 765, it was held as under: “7. To summarise,
normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the
ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ
petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to
the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule
is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related
claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if
there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date
on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing
wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an
exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any
order or administrative decision which related to or affected several
others also, and if the re-opening of the issue would affect the
settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained.
For example, if the issue relates to payment or re fixation of pay or
pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect
the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to
seniority or promotion etc., affecting others, delay would render the
claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. In so far
as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period,
the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a
consequence, High Courts will restrict the consequential relief
relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the
date of filing of the writ petition.” 6. In the case of State of Orissa
and others vs. Mamata Mohanty reported at (2011) 3 SCC 436 it was
held as under: “52. In the very first appeal, the respondent filed writ
petition on 11- 11-2005 claiming relief under the Notification dated
6-10 1989 w.e.f. 1-1-1986 without furnishing any explanation for
such inordinate delay and on laches on her part. Section 3 of the
Limitation Act, 1963, makes it obligatory on the part of the court to
 dismiss the suit or appeal if made after the prescribed period even
though the limitation is not set up as a defence and there is no plea
to raise the issue of limitation even at the appellate stage because
in some of the cases it may go to the root of the matter. (See
Lachhmi Sewak Sahu v. Ram Rup Sahu [AIR 1944 PC 24] and
Kamlesh Babu v. Lajpat Rai Sharma [(2008) 12 SCC 577].
53. Needless to say that the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply in
writ jurisdiction. However, the doctrine of limitation being based on
public policy, the principles enshrined therein are applicable and writ
petitions are dismissed at initial stage on the ground of delay and
laches. In a case like at hand, getting a particular pay scale may
give rise to a recurring cause of action. In such an eventuality, the
petition may be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches and
the court may refuse to grant relief for the initial period in case of an
unexplained and inordinate delay. In the instant case, the
respondent claimed the relief from 1-1-1986 by filing a petition on
11-11-2005but the High Court for some unexplained reason granted
the relief w.e.f. 1-6-1984, though even the Notification dated 6-10-
1989 makes it applicable w.e.f. 1-1-1986.
54. This Court has consistently rejected the contention that a
petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches in case
the petitioner approaches the Court after coming to know of the
relief granted by the Court in a similar case as the same cannot
furnish a proper explanation for delay and laches. A litigant cannot
wake up from deep slumber and claim impetus from the judgment in
cases where some diligent person had approached the Court within
a reasonable time. (See Rup Diamonds v. Union of India [(1989) 2
SCC 356 : AIR 1989 SC 674] , State of Karnataka v. S.M. Kotrayya
[(1996) 6 SCC 267 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1488] and Jagdish Lal v. State
of Haryana [(1997) 6 SCC 538 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1550 : AIR 1997 SC
2366] .)”
7. Having regard to the aforesaid decisions, we find no infirmity in
the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. We find no merit
in this appeal. The same is accordingly dismissed.”

14. That in “Ritika Sharma vs. DAV Public Primary School and Ors.”,
LPA 32 of 2021, the Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court upheld the
decision of the Ld. Single Judge of dismissing W.P.(C) No. 51 of 2021,
titled “Ritika Sharma vs. DAV Public Primary School and Ors.” filed by the
Appellant therein, on the ground of being barred by delay and laches and
made the following observations:

“6. We have considered the contentions urged by Mr. Khagesh Jha.

In writ jurisdiction, the Limitation Act, 1963 does not strictly apply,
but its principles do apply by application of the doctrine of delay and
laches. Thus, in cases where there is unexplained and inordinate
delay, the court may refuse to grant relief. The facts, as they
emerge in the present petition, do indicate gross delay and laches
on the part of the appellant. The factual position remains
uncontroverted. Indisputably, till the filing of the representation with
the respondents, the appellant had indeed not made any grievance
in respect of her service conditions and especially regarding the
benefits of the pay scale. This demonstrates that there has been a
complete lack of initiative on the part of the petitioner to take
remedies under law in respect of the reliefs which she sought in the
petition. Since there is an inordinate delay on the part of the
appellant, we are unable to find any perversity in the discretion
exercised by the Learned Single Judge. It must be remembered that
the decision of the Court to entertain or not entertain a particular
action under its writ jurisdiction, particularly having regard to the
nature of dispute in the instant case, is fundamentally discretionary.
The Court while exercising the writ jurisdiction has to take into
consideration the entire conspectus of the case and the reasoning
assigned for dismissing the writ petition is quite reasonable and
logical. We may also state that while exercising our jurisdiction
under the Letters Patent Appeal, the scope of interference is limited
and since we perceive no infirmity or manifest illegality or patent
error in the view taken by the learned Single Judge, we find no
reason to interfere with their exercise of discretion in refusing to
entertain the writ petition.
7. We may further add that this is also a settled position in law that
a writ jurisdiction cannot to be invoked for recovery of dues,
particularly if the same are otherwise barred by limitation, and it is
only a violation of a right which this Court can settle under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. The appellant always has other
efficacious remedies for recovery of her salary dues, if any.
Therefore, while we decline to entertain the present appeal, we may
only clarify that the appellant would be at liberty to avail her
remedies under the civil proceedings for the recovery of dues, if
any, with respect to the period which is not barred by limitation.
8. There is no merit in the present appeal, hence dismissed.”
 PARAWISE REPLY

1. That contents of Para 1 of Writ Petition are and denied. The School is
committed to implement the 7th CPC from 1-1-2016, subject to being
allowed to increase its Fee that would lead to availability of sufficient
funds. The School’s only source of funds is through collection of Fee from
the parents of the School in respect of their ward(s).

2. That contents of Para 2 are matter of record and needs no reply.

3. The contents of Para 3 of Writ Petition are matter of record and needs no
reply.

4. That contents of Para 4 of Writ Petition are wrong and denied. The
Petitioner was appointed as Typist/Office Assistant in July 1984 at a
consolidated pay of Rs. 600/-, her pay was fixed at post of Office Assistant
in July 1986 in the pay scale of 1200-30-1560-EB-40-2040. During the
course of her service she was promoted to Sr. Office Assistant in July
1992 in the pay scale of 1400-40-1600-50-2300-EB-60-2600. Her pay was
fixed in the Post of Office Assistant in July 1986 in the pay scale of 1200-
30-1560-EB-40-2040. Her pay revised to 18090=13490+4600. During her
service at the School she was granted all lawful promotions/upgradations.

4.1. That the contents of Para 4.1 of the Writ Petition are matter
of record and needs no reply on behalf of Respondent No. 1.

4.2. That the contents of Para 4.2 are wrong and denied. The
School implemented the 7th CPC with fixation of pay for the
existing regular staff of the School w.e.f 01.07.2024, without
payment of arrears to the existing regular staff or the regular
staff that had resigned or retired on superannuation since
01.01.2016.

The Department had issued Order No. DE.15

(318)/PSB/2016/19786 dated 17-10-2017, with regard to
submitting fee increase proposals for implementation of the
recommendations of the 7th Central Pay Commission w.e.f. 1-
1-2016. (Annexure A)

The School initiated the implementation of the 7th CPC after

complying with the directions of the said Order. However, the
Department issued another bearing No.
DE.15(318)/PSB/2016/21392-401, dated 2-1-2018 (Annexure
B) withdrawing the Order of implementation of the
recommendations of the 7th CPC and directed the Schools to
refund any excess amount taken from the parents on account
of the fee increased due to the implementation of the 7 th
CPC.

Thereafter, there has been no specific Order regarding the

implementation of the 7th CPC.

The Department also issued orders that no School may

increase its Fee w.e.f. session 2016-2017 without the
approval of the Department, whereby the School has not
been able to increase its Fee from the Session 2016-2017
upto the current session 2024-2025.

Prior to 2016-2017, the School would increase its Fee based

on the estimated budget and the approval of the Managing
Committee by about 9 – 10% every session, which balanced
out the increased cost of paying salaries, implementing DA
increase twice a year, annual increments, meeting gratuity
and leave encashment expenses and also maintaining the
infrastructure and the school building in the best interest of
the students.

The School was however permitted to increase its Fee twice:

(a) By 10% for the year 2019-2020, to be implemented from

1-7-2022, without collection of arrears vide Order No.
F.DE.15(492)/PSB/2022/2295/2299, dated 27-04-2022.
(Annexure C).

(b)By 15% for the year 2022-2023, to be implemented from

1-4-2023, again without collection of arrears vide Order
No. F.DE.15(1332)/PSB/2023/3214-3218, dated 13-04-
2023. (Annexure D)

It may kindly be noted that both Fee Increase Orders

mentioned above clearly mandated –

“AND WHEREAS, it is relevant to mention charging of

any arrears on account of fee for several months from
the parents is not advisable.”

The 2nd Fee increase enabled the School to implement the

recommendations of the 7th CPC only for the existing staff on
the strength of the School by fixation of pay w.e.f 1-7-2023.
However, even with the allowed increase in Fee of 10% and
15% it is not possible to pay arrears to the regular staff of the
School.

Based on the School’s current financial position it is not

 viable to disburse arrears to its regular staff as well regulars
that have resigned/retired since 1-1-2016.

Due to curtailing the nominal Fee increase every year by the

Department the Fee increase has accumulated to about 48%
and whereas, the total arrears to be paid to the regular staff
on the rolls of the School as well as those that have retired or
resigned since 1-1-2016 has accumulated to about Rs. 13
Crores. Since the School is entirely dependent on the Fees
paid by the parents for meeting its expenses, it is not
possible to for the School to pay any arrears, unless the
Department permits the School to increase its Fee as
accumulated over the years since 2016-2017. Status of Fee
Proposals is tabled below:

2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

Session – – – – – – – – –
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
10% 15% Respo Resp
Covid
Fee Wef Wef nse onse
0% 0% 0% period, No
Status 1-7- 1-4- Await Awai
Hike
2022 2023 ed ted

In both cases of approval of Fee Increase i.e. in 2019-2020

and 2022-2023, collection of arrears was not permitted.

4.3. That the contents of Para 4.3 are wrong and denied. It is
denied that undertaking given by Respondent No. 1 had to
pay the arrears of salary, gratuity, leave encashment and
other benefits as and when the benefits of the 7 th Pay
Commission were extended to the other employees in the
Respondent No. 1.

4.4. The status of the School’s Fee Structure is depicted in the

table below:
Year Date of Filling Proposed Whether Remarks
Documents U/s Fee Increase Audit has
17(3) and by the been
180(1) Managing done by
Committee the
Departme
nt and its
Decision
thereof
2017-18 A full statement 10% increase Rejected In response to
of the fee filed on the the Rejection
on 31st March proposed fee (No order, the
2017, of 2016-17 Increase) School
while Returns Management
and Documents has filed a
filed on 31st July petition in
2017 (Seven Hon’ble High
documents). Court of Delhi.
The next date
of hearing is 2-
8-2024.
2018-19 A full statement 10% increase Rejected In response to
of the fee filed on the the Rejection
on 31st March proposed fee (No order, the
2018 while of 2017-18. Increase) School
returns and management
documents filed has filed a
on 31st July 2018 review petition
(Seven for the session
documents). 2018-19 vide
Ref. No.:
CFS/054/2022-
 2023, dated 8-
6-2022, which
is still pending
for disposal
2019-20 A full statement 10% increase Approved In response to
of the fee filed on the by 10% the Rejection
on 31st March proposed fee wef 1-7- order, the
2019 while of 2018-19. 2022 School
returns and without management
documents filed collection submitted its
on 31st July of arrears compliance
2019 (Seven and with vide Ref. No.:
documents). some Ref. No.: CFS/
conditions. 046 / 2022-
2023, dated
30-05-2022
2020-21 A full statement 10% increase Infructuou As published in
of the fee filed on the s as per the leading
on 31st March proposed fee DOE order newspaper and
2020 while of 2019-20. dated directorate of
returns and 08.06.202 education
documents filed 2 circular dated
on 31st July 08.06.2022.
2020 (Seven (No The fee hike
documents). Increase) proposal for
the session
2020- 21 has
become trivial
based on High
Court order WP
(C) 3140 of
2020.
2021-22 A full statement 10% increase Decision Purposed fee
 of the fee filed on the Pending at structure for
on 31st March proposed fee the end of the session
2021 while of 2020-21. Departme 2021-22 is
returns and nt awaited for
documents filed approval of the
on 31st July 2021 (No Department
(Seven Increase) though all the
documents). necessary
documents as
per provisions
of section 17(3)
of the Act and
Rule 180(1)
DSER were
submitted as
per scheduled
date.
2022-23 A full statement 10% increase Approved The Director of
of the fee filed on the 15% wef Education has
on 31st March proposed fee 1-4-2023 accepted the
2022 while of 2021-22 without proposal
returns and collection submitted by
documents filed of arrears the school and
on 28th July and with allowed an
2022 (Seven conditions increase in fee
documents). by 15% based
on the fee
structure
followed since
2015-16 till
date. It is
recommended
to be effective
 from 1-4-2023
Oct’2022
rather
01.04.2022.
2023-24 A full statement 10% increase The audit Proposed fee
of the fee filed on the has been structure for
on 31st March proposed fee done by the session
2022 while of 2022-23 the 2023-24 is
returns and departmen awaited for
documents filed t but the approval of the
on 31st July approval is Department
2023 (Seven still though all the
documents) awaited. necessary
documents as
(No per provisions
Increase) of section 17(3)
of the Act and
Rule 180(1)
DSER were
submitted as
per scheduled
date
A personal
hearing in was
held on 25-04-
2024 but no
further
directions or
response has
been received
as yet.
2024-25 A full statement 10% on the It is still The proposal so
of the fee filed proposed fees pending. submitted is
 on 31st March structure for still pending
2022. the academic with the
Documents year 2023-24. department.
regarding Rule
180 submitted
online in the
month of April
2024.

4.5. The School’s only source of income is the Fee collected from
the parents. The School has no other source of income. Due
to the non-increase in the Fee since 2016-17 as tabled below,
the financial status of the School has suffered a serious
setback.

2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

Session – – – – – – – – –
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
10% 15% Respo Resp
Covid
Fee Wef Wef nse onse
0% 0% 0% period, No
Status 1-7- 1-4- Await Awai
Hike
2022 2023 ed ted

The School at present has 2041 students on its rolls out of

which 497 are students studying under the EWS/DG & CWSN
Category in compliance with RTE Act, 2009. The School is
reimbursed by only 5% of the expenditure incurred on the
students studying under the RET Act, 2009. The School had
also approached the Hon’ble Lt. Governor of Delhi, when
there was no prospective response received by the
Department of Education on various representations sent by
the School. The School submitted the following prayer to the
Hon’ble Lt. Governor:
1. Pending fee proposals before Directorate of Education,
and review petitions thereof, be disposed off.
2. Schools be allowed a fee hike of 15% to implement 7th
CPC and pay salary to the staff as per section 10(1) of the
Income Tax Act, 1961.
3. Arrears of 7th CPC to be paid to the school staff,
calculated by school and verified by the Directorate of
Education, be reimbursed to the school by Directorate of
Education whose utilization shall be duly audited by the
Directorate of Education for its proper and righteous use.
4. As an interim relief, the amount so deposited with
Registrar of High Court of Delhi in lieu of stay granted to
maximum public schools in order to implement the order of
Justice Anil Dev Singh committee (JASDC, now Hon’ble Delhi
High Court Committee) to assess the implementation of
recommendations of VIth pay commission be released to the
respective schools.
5. All the pending litigations and court cases be withdrawn
by the respective parties, thus, promoting an amicable and
growth oriented school education environment for all i.e.
parents, students, schools, Directorate of Education and
society as a whole.
6. From session 2022-23, a fee hike of 10% be allowed
every year to take care of the increasing staff expenses,
inflation index and development of school education system
7. Constitution of a ‘Fee Anomaly’ committee by the
respected Lt. Governor which shall work directly under the
supervision of your respected office.
8. Any hike in fee above 10% shall be properly applied to
the ‘Fee Anomaly’ Committee which shall approve the same
only if considered proper and appropriate.
9. The decision of the ‘Fee Anomaly’ committee be
communicated, after giving school a reasonable opportunity
to be heard, before the commencement of the academic
session.

The School in its petition also proposed:

1. To eradicate the system of seeking approval of the
Director of Education. Delhi Govt. on the basis of Audit of
Accounts of the schools to ensure that the education is not
commercialized.
“As the Private Recognized Unaided School are clearly
dependent only on the Fee. Any regulations or order which
seek to restrict or in definitely postpone their power to collect
normal and usual fees as is sought to be done by the
impugned orders is bound to create grave financial prejudice
and harm to the schools.”
2. The Audit of the accounts which are regularly submitted
by school in March and July of the ensuing year to the
Department of Education are to be Audited immediately
through proper mechanism. Whereas there is no proper staff
to Audit the Accounts of nearly 2500 schools in Delhi.
3. The Director of Education deployed engaged external
chartered accountants and audit firms. These agencies are
not acquainted with the relevant provisions of the Act & Rules
and as a result the Audit of Accounts is left on their whims
and fancies.
4. There are no proper guidelines, directions and
instructions from the Director of Education giving superfluous
powers to back entry for obtaining approval with variations of
percentage.
5. The matter be examined, screened on priority basis
enabling to streamline the charges of fee structure amongst
all the RPUSs in Delhi to bring uniformity.
6. The levy of fee may be determined on the line of action
 of other state Governments.
7. At least 10% tuition fee be allowed to increase, with
15% in annual charges and 15% in Development Fund in
compliance of the directions of the Supreme Court.
8. In case any commercialization is noticed in any of the
schools their Accounts be Audited.
9. For the session 2023-2024 the Department of Education
did not Audit the Accounts of all the school except a few
schools which directly approached the Department and as a
result many schools are left thereby losing their confidence in
the Department of Education.
10. The matter be treated on priority basis and the fee
structure may be decided from next session i.e. 2024-2025
enabling all the stakeholders of the school to appreciably act
accordingly, which will help reduce the Uncontrolled Authority
of the Department of Education, interference of the political
system, and haphazard Accounts Audits which are conducted
without any proper instructions and directions.

4.6. The contents presented in Para 4.2 is wrong and denied. It is

submitted that Respondent School’s only source of income is
fee collected from students and in the situation where DoE
has been enumerable powers to adjudicate whether a private
school can increase its fee or not; it is very difficult for
schools to manage its expenses without any autonomy. TMA
Pai
4.7. That the contents of Para 4.7 are wrong and denied. It is
submitted that reply to accompanying paragraph has been
briefly replied to in the above paragraphs and the same is
not repeated herein for the sake of brevity.

4.8. That contents of Para 4.8 are wrong and denied. It is

denied that Respondent No. 1 has till date has not acted
upon the representation or reminders of Petitioner. It is
submitted that Respondent No. 1 replied to Petitioner as
 and when the representation was received from
The School has already submitted its justification of facts
via letter dated 1-9-2023 – Annexure E

5. That in these circumstances, the present writ petition is being

filed inter-alia on the following amongst others:

5.1. No Comment

5.2. The Respondent had initiated for the implementation of 7 th

CPC as per the directions/instructions issued by the
Directorate of Education vide Order No. DE.15
(318)/PSB/2016/19786 dated 17-10-2017 and proper
procedure in compliance with the said directions/instructions
was adopted by the School. Before the School could begin
collection of arrears or issue fee bills with the approved Fee
increase, the Department withdrew the aforementioned
Order through Order No. DE.15(318)/PSB/2016/21392-401,
dated 2-1-2018, and thereafter there have been no specific
instructions from the Directorate of Education regarding the
implementation of the 7th CPC wef 1-1-2016.

5.3. No Comment

5.4. The School is committed to pay arrears accrued due to

implementation of the 7th CPC wef 1-1-2016, to the petitioner
as per the pay scale attached to the Post of Sr. Office
Assistant as soon as sufficient funds are available with the
School which is in the empowerment of Department of
Education by way of giving approval for the increase in Fee
Structure by 48% whereas the School has been allowed to
increase its Fee only by 10% in the Session 2019-2020 wef 1-
7-2022 and 15% in the Session 2022-2023 wef 1-4-2023.
5.5.
The School has not violated the provisions of the DSEA&R,
1973, as the School has already implemented the
recommendations of the 7th CPC wef 1-7-2023. However due
to limited funds the implementation has been only for the
regular employees on the rolls of the School by fixation of
pay. The arrears will be disbursed to all regular employees of
the School once the financial position improves, contingent
upon an increase in the fee structure as proposed by the
School under Rule 17(3) of the DSER, 1973.

5.6.

It is categorically denied that the School has breached

Section 10 of the DSE Act, 1973, which states that the
employees working in the recognized unaided private schools
of Delhi, which includes the Respondent school are entitled
for salary and all allowances as well as pay scale equivalent
to their counterparts working in a government school. It is
submitted that the reply may kindly be read along with Para
4.2

5.7.
Same verbatim of facts.

5.8.
The Department had issued orders vide Order No. DE.15
(318)/PSB/2016/19786 dated 17-10-2017, with regard to
submitting fee increase proposals for implementation of the
recommendations of the 7th Central Pay Commission w.e.f.
1-1-2016. (Annexure A)
However, subsequently the Department issued another
bearing No. DE.15(318)/PSB/2016/21392-401, dated 2-1-
 2018 (Annexure B) withdrawing the Order of implementation
of the recommendations of the 7th CPC and directed the
Schools to refund any excess amount taken from the parents
on account of the fee increased due to the implementation of
the 7th CPC.
Thereafter, there have been no specific Orders regarding the
implementation of the 7th CPC.
5.9.

The Hon’ble Court in the said case had also recommended the
formation of a Committee -

Quote

200. In the interest of justice, this Court is directing the

Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi to constitute
a ‗High-Powered Committee' unless the same is already
constituted, to supervise the implementation of
recommendations and guidelines prescribed in the 6 th and
7th CPC with regards to the salaries and arrears thereto,
retirement/terminal benefits, arrears of allowances etc. and to
draw up a plan of action which may help in achieving results
at the ground level.

201. The various stakeholders are also directed to render full

cooperation to the aforesaid High-Powered Committee bearing
in mind that the issues being examined is the one which
concerns all and sundry.

202. Since the facts and circumstances are peculiar to each

stakeholder, therefore, the said Committee before passing any
order, is directed to scrutinize the various aspects and only
after due assessment of the eligibility, validity of appointment,
amount, period of calculation, revision of fee etc., it shall pass
the orders. The Committee shall undertake an exercise of
identification of the issues and claims of the stakeholders
individually.

203. The objectives of the Committee are summarized herein

below:

 The Committee must ensure that the staff of the school

should not be left on a wing and a prayer. It must be ensured
that the rightful dues of the staff should be paid to them
without any further delay.
 The Committee must devise a mechanism that the staffs of
the schools are being paid their dues irrespective of the fact
that the schools do not have the requisite funds.  The
Committee must ensure that the grievances of the
superannuated employees of the schools are also being
addressed by it. Moreover, the Committee must ensure that
the retirement/terminal benefits to which the employees are
entitled to shall be duly paid to them.
 The Committee must look into the aspect that whether the
staff of the schools who have been illegally appointed are
entitled to the arrears of the 6th and 7th Pay Commissions. 
The Committee shall ensure that there is a mechanism that in
future too if any dispute arises pertaining to the
implementation of recommendations of Pay Commission, the
same may be addressed by way of the High-Powered
Committee. Hence, the Committee shall ensure that there is a
redressal of not merely the present disputes but also of the
future dispute, that may arise.

204. In view of the above, the High-Powered Committees shall

be constituted at two levels, first at the ‗Central level' and
second at the ‗Zonal level'. Details of the said Committees are
as follows:
1. Zonal level-
(i) Members -

 Zonal head of the concerned zone, i.e., the Zonal Education

Officer.

 One representative of the schools.

 One reputed Chartered Accountant recommended by the

Institute of Chartered Accountants of India.

(ii) This Committee shall deal with the issue of fee hike;
salaries and other benefits due in terms of 7th CPC; arrears of
salaries and other benefits due in terms of 6th CPC; arrears of
retirement/terminal benefits due in terms of 6th CPC and
7th CPC.

(iii) It is directed that the Zonal level Committee shall convene

the first meeting within eight weeks and shall, after hearing
the parties, decide the claims of the various stakeholders in
accordance with the observations made by this Court
hereinabove and also in accordance with the law,
expeditiously, preferably within eight weeks of receiving the
claim.

(iv) This Committee shall recommend its findings to the

Committee constituted at the Central level for final decision.

2. Central level-

(i) Members -

 The Secretary of Education shall be the head of this

Committee.

 The Director of Education, DoE.

  One reputed Chartered Accountant recommended by the
Institute of Chartered Accountants of India.

 One representative from the schools.

 A reputed academician appointed by the Secretary in

consultation with the other members. In the case of any
disagreement on the appointment of the concerned
academician, the recommendation of the Secretary shall
prevail.

(ii) This Committee, after receiving the recommendations of

the Zonal level Committee shall decide the issue
recommended to it, expeditiously, preferably within six weeks
from the date of receiving the said recommendation.

205. The DoE is directed to issue a notification within two

weeks from the date of pronouncement of this judgment, for
the purpose of convening zonal committee, wherein, various
stakeholders including teaching and non- teaching staff of
several schools, who are aggrieved by the non -
implementation of the Pay Commission shall file their claim
before the concerned Zonal Committee.

However, the School has not received any further information

in this regard.

5.10.
It is correct that the School has implemented the
recommendations of the 7th CPC wef 1-7-2023. But the
implementation is only on fixation of pay for the regular
employees on the rolls of the School. No arrears have been
paid to the regular employees or to those that have resigned
or retired since 1-1-2016. It is further submitted that the
school will disburse arrears to all regular employees of the
 school, once the financial position improves, contingent upon
an increase in the fee structure as proposed under Rule 17(3)
of the DSER, 1973.

5.11. The School is committed to pay arrears accrued due to

implementation of the 7th CPC wef 1-1-2016, to the
petitioner as per the pay scale attached to the Post of Sr.
Office Assistant as soon as sufficient funds are available
with the School which is in the empowerment of Department
of Education by way of giving approval for the increase in
Fee Structure by 48% whereas the School has been allowed
to increase its Fee only by 10% in the Session 2019-2020
wef 1-7-2022 and 15% in the Session 2022-2023 wef 1-4-
2023.
6. That the Petitioner has no other equally efficacious or alternative
remedy available to them except to approach the extraordinary
jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
No comments

7. That the Petitioner has not filed any other similar writ against
the

impugned actions in any Hon’ble High Court.

No comments

8. That this Hon’ble Court has the requisite jurisdiction to

adjudicate upon the issue in dispute and grant the petitioners the
reliefs as prayed for in as much as the subject matter is
situated within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court.
No comments
 PRAYER

In the premise aforesaid, the Petitioner most humbly pray that this
Hon’ble

Court may be pleased to:

(i) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ(s),

order(s) or direction(s), directing the Respondent no. 1 to fix
the pay of the Petitioner in terms of the 7th pay commission
w.e.f. 01.01.2016 and pay the Petitioner pay, allowances, other
benefits including arrears of salaries and all the consequential
benefits;

(ii) issue any appropriate writ(s), order(s) or direction(s), directing

the Respondent No.2/Director of Education to take action in
accordance with the provisions of Section 10 of the Delhi School
Education Act, 1973 against the Respondent/School for aforesaid
failures on the part of the Respondent/School;

(iii) pass any other, order(s), or direction(s), or such further orders as

may be deemed just and appropriate, in the facts and
circumstances of the

case and also in the interest of justice, in favour of the petitioners; and

(iv) allow the present writ petition with cost, in favor of the Petitioner.