Crimes Against Public Order

Rebellion/Insurrection/Coup d’ etat​ 6
ENRILE v SALAZAR (G.R. No. 92163; June 5, 1990)​ 6
ENRILE v AMIN (G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990)​ 10
PEOPLE v DASIG (G.R. No. 100231; April 28, 1993)​ 13
PEOPLE v LOVEDIORO (G.R. 112235, Nov 29, 1995)​ 16
Sedition​ 19
PEOPLE v CABRERA (43 Phil. 64; March 14, 1922)​ 19
Inciting to Sedition​ 22
U.S. v. TOLENTINO (G.R. No. L-1451; March 6, 1906)​ 22
ESPUELAS Y MEDOZA v. PEOPLE (G.R. No. L-2990; December 17, 1951)​ 24
Direct Assault​ 28
MALLARI v. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 224679, 12 February 2020)​ 28
PABLO v. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 231267; February 13, 2023)​ 33
Article 151​ 37
VYTIACO v. COURT OF APPEALS (L-20246, 24 April 1967, 19 SCRA 744)​ 37
Article 156​ 41
ALBERTO v. DELA CRUZ (G.R. No. L-31839; June 30, 1980)​ 41
Article 157​ 45
PANGAN v. GATBALITE (G.R. No. 141718; January 21, 2005)​ 45
Article 160​ 48
PEOPLE v. VILLANUEVA (G.R No. L-32274; April 2, 1984)​ 48
PEOPLE v. BALDOGO (G.R. Nos. 128106-07, January 24, 2003)​ 51
Rebellion/Insurrection/Coup d’ etat

CONTRIBUTOR PONCE, Juan Miguel (1L)

CASE TITLE ENRILE v SALAZAR (G.R. No. 92163; June 5, 1990)

PONENTE NARVASA, J.

KEYWORDS Rebellion, murder

FACTS Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was

arrested by the National Bureau of Investigation on the
warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. The warrant had been issued on an
information charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco
and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime
of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder
allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup
attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator
Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI
headquarters, without bail, none having been
recommended in the information and none fixed in the
arrest warrant. The following morning, he was brought to
Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given
over to the custody of the Northern Police District.

Senator Enrile, through his counsel, filed a petition for

habeas corpus, asserting that his constitutional rights were
infringed upon because he was: (a) held for a crime which
did not exist in law, (b) charged without preliminary
investigation, hence denied due process, (c) denied his
right to bail, and (d) arrested with a warrant issued
without the judge first personally determining probable
cause.
 The Court issued the writ, prayed for and set the plea for
hearing. The Solicitor General filed a consolidated return
for the respondents in this case. Said return urged that the
petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling
because the information in Hernandez charged murders
and other common crimes committed as a necessary means
for the commission of rebellion, whereas the information
against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated
murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance,
of rebellion. Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would
distinguish between the complex crime arising from an
offense being a necessary means for committing another,
which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48,
Revised Penal Code (RPC), and is the subject of the
Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime arising from a
single act constituting two or more grave or less grave
offenses referred to in the first clause of the same
paragraph, with which Hernandez was not concerned and
to which, therefore, it should not apply. The Court, without
passing judgment on the legal issues raised, granted
provisional liberty to Senator Enrile and the Panlilio
spouses.

ISSUE/S Whether the Hernandez doctrine should be abandoned, or

limited to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a
necessary means for the commission of rebellion.

RULING In the view of the majority, the Hernandez doctrine

remains good law, operating to prohibit the complexing of
rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion
thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as
an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes
rebellion. Its substantive and logical bases have withstood
all subsequent challenges and no new ones are presented
here persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal.
 The Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that
Hernandez is, or should be, limited in its application to
offenses committed as a necessary means for the
commission of rebellion and that the ruling should not be
interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with
other common crimes committed on the occasion, but not
in furtherance, thereof. The Court stated that Article 48 of
the RPC cannot be applied. If murder were not complexed
with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished
separately (assuming that this could be done), the
following penalties would be imposable upon the movant,
namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding
P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period,
depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but
never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the
crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present. In other words, in the absence of
aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not
be imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said
penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the
absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said
provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the
prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.

The Court rules further that the information filed against

the petitioner does in fact charge an offense. Disregarding
the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion
with murder and multiple frustrated murder, that
indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion.

DOCTRINE The Hernandez doctrine remains a binding doctrine

operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any
other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a
means necessary to its commission or as an unintended
effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.

In the present case, the argument of the petitioner's counsel

that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the
statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court
has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other
offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore
be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the
context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge
the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the
Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
CONTRIBUTOR PORRAS, Nathalie Danielle (1L)

CASE TITLE ENRILE v AMIN (G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990)

PONENTE GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

KEYWORDS Complexed rebellion, PD 1829

FACTS Together with filing of an information charging Senator

Juan Ponce Enrile as having committed rebellion
complexed with murder, another information charged him
for violation of PD 1829 – unlawfully, feloniously, willfully
and knowingly obstruct, impede, frustrate or delay the
apprehension of said Ex.-Lt. Col. Gregorio "Gringo"
Honasan by harboring or concealing him in his house."

March 2, 1990: Enrile filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold

in abeyance the issuance of a warrant of arrest pending
personal determination by the court of probable cause, and
(b) to dismiss the case and expunge the information from
the record.

March 16, 1990: Respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as

pairing judge of respondent Judge Omar Amin, denied
Senator Enrile's Omnibus motion on the basis of a finding
that "there (was) probable cause to hold the accused Juan
Ponce Enrile liable for violation of PD No. 1829."

March 21, 1990: Enrile filed a Motion for Reconsideration

and to Quash the Information because: (a) The facts
charged do not constitute an offense; (b) The respondent
court's finding of probable cause was devoid of factual and
legal basis: and (c) the pending charge of rebellion
complexed with murder.

May 10, 1990: Denied MR.

 Hence the present petition for Certiorari, imputing that
respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the grounds
of:
[...]

(ii) The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen.

Enrile of Col. Honasan [...] is absorbed in, or is a
component element of, the "complexed" rebellion
presently charge against Sen. Enrile as alleged
co-conspirator of Col. Honasan; [and]

(iii) The orderly administration of Justice requires

that there be only one prosecution for all the
component acts of rebellion.

ISSUE/S Whether or not the petitioner could be separately charged

for violation of PD No. 1829 not withstanding the rebellion
case earlier filed against him.

RULING NO.

Petitioner entertained and accommodated Col. Honasan by

giving him food and comfort in his house. Knowing that
Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile
allegedly did not do anything to have Honasan arrested or
apprehended. And because of such failure the petitioner
prevented Col. Honasan's arrest and conviction in
violation of Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.

As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting

the rebellion charge constitute or include the very incident
which gave rise to the charge of the violation under
Presidential Decree No. 1829.
 The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that
harboring or concealing a fugitive is punishable under a
special law while the rebellion case is based on the Revised
Penal Code; hence, prosecution under one law will not bar
a prosecution under the other. This argument is specious in
rebellion cases.

All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or

general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or
committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the
crime of rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as
separate crimes in themselves.

DOCTRINE Acts committed in furtherance of the rebellion though

crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in the one
single crime of rebellion.

If a person cannot be charged with the complete crime of

rebellion for the greater penalty to be applied, neither can
he be charged separately for two (2) different offenses
where one is a constitutive or component element or
committed in furtherance of rebellion.
CONTRIBUTOR TOLETE, Kyrelle Dianne (1L)

CASE TITLE PEOPLE v DASIG (G.R. No. 100231; April 28, 1993)

PONENTE Nocon, J.

KEYWORDS Rebellion; traffic; sparrow unit

FACTS In the afternoon of August 4, 1987, Private First Class

(PFC) Redempto Manatad, PFC Ninah Tizon, and PFC
Rene Catamora were tasked by their commanding officer
to assist in canning the traffic at M.N. Briones and
Bonifacio Streets in Mandaue City, where PFC Manatad
was specifically tasked to man the traffic, while Tizon
controlled the traffic lighting facility and Catamora acted
as a backup and posted himself at Norkis Trading
Building.

At about 4 o’clock in the afternoon, PFC Catamora noticed

eight (8) persons, of which include appellants Rodrigo
Dasig and Edwin Nuñes (+), acting suspiciously. Catamora
noticed that one of them was giving instructions to two (2)
of the men to approach Manatad to which he urgently
followed. When the men sensed that they were being
followed, they immediately proceeded in the middle of the
road and engage Catamora in a gun battle. The latter then
heard a series of shots from the other group of men and
thereafter saw Manatad on the ground. Consequently,
Catamora sought refuge in a nearby BIR Office from where
he saw two (2) persons take Manatad’s gun and fire at him
again to ensure that he was indeed dead, while the rest of
the group, including Nuñes, acted as a backup.

Following this event on August 16, 1987, two teams of

police officers were tasked to conduct surveillance on a
suspected safehouse of members of the sparrow unit
 situated in Peace Valley, Cebu City and there they saw both
Dasig and Nuñes trying to escape. Successfully capturing
Nuñes, Dasig, on the other hand, threw a grenade at his
pursuers, headed by Sgt. Arnejo and was unfortunately
shot on his left upper arm during the same. That being, he
was brought to Camp Lapulapu Army Hospital for
medical treatment, while Nuñes was turned over to the
Metrodiscom for further investigation. On August 19, 1987,
Dasig was interrogated at his hospital bed by M/Sgt. Ira of
the PC Criminal Investigation Service, and was
subsequently represented by Atty. Parawan following the
military’s request.

During the said interrogation, Dasig confessed that he and

the group of Edwin Nuñes killed PFC Manatas and
admitted that they were members of the sparrow unit,
bearing the aliases “Armand” and “Mabi” respectively.
The said sparrow unit is known to be the liquidation squad
of the New People’s Army (NPA) with the primary
objective of overthrowing the duly constituted
government.

Dasig, Nuñes, and six (6) others were charged with the
crime of murder with direct assault due to PFC Manatad’s
death, a policeman in the performance of his official duties.
Dasig contends that he should instead be convicted of the
crime of simple rebellion. The Office of the Solicitor
General subsequently agrees with his contention and
argues that the lower court erroneously convicted Dasig of
Murder with Assault upon a person in authority instead of
Rebellion.

ISSUE/S Whether or not appellant Dasig committed simple

rebellion, and not murder with direct assault.
RULING YES, the Court held that appellant Dasig committed
simple rebellion punishable under Article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code.

The Court held that it cannot be deemed as a Murder with

direct assault, as the act of killing PFC Manatad, a police
officer, knowing too well that he was a person in authority
is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act
done in furtherance of the rebellion and thus, it cannot be
made a basis of a separate charge. Furthermore, Dasig’s
extra-judicial admission during the interrogation that he is
a member of the sparrow unit as the liquidation squad of
the New People’s Army makes him liable for rebellion,
satisfying the requisite of having an objective, that is, to
overthrow the duly constituted government, in this case.

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast

movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and
plots. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion through
crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in one single
crime of rebellion.

DOCTRINE Rebellion, in accordance with Article 135 of the Revised

Penal Code, is committed by taking arms against the
government, among other means. In this case, Dasig not
only confessed voluntarily to his membership with the
sparrow unit but also to his participation in the killing of
PFC Manatad while he was manning the traffic in
Mandaue City. The sparrow unit mentioned here is the
liquidation squad of the New People’s Army (NPA) to
overthrow the duly constituted government, and the
killing of Manatad was committed as a means to or in
furtherance of the NPA’s subversive ends.
CONTRIBUTOR YLANAN, Harvey Enrique (1L)

CASE TITLE PEOPLE v LOVEDIORO (G.R. 112235, Nov 29, 1995)

PONENTE J. Kapunan

KEYWORDS Political motive, rebellion, common crime

FACTS
●​ Incident: On July 27, 1992, at around 5:30 p.m.,
off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking
along Burgos Street, Daraga, Albay, away from the
public market. A man, later identified as Elias
Lovedioro y Castro, approached, drew a .45 caliber
gun, and shot Lucilo in the right ear. An accomplice
fired four additional shots at the fallen policeman,
and the group took Lucilo’s gun before fleeing in a
tricycle.
●​ Eyewitness Testimony: Nestor Armenta, a
25-year-old welder, witnessed the incident from nine
meters away and identified Lovedioro, his nephew,
as the primary shooter. Armenta was acquainted
with the victim, a resident of Bagumbayan.
●​ Medical Findings: An autopsy by the municipal
health officer determined that Lucilo died from
hypovolemic shock due to massive blood loss from
multiple gunshot wounds to the face, chest, and
other body parts.
●​ Charges: On November 6, 1992, the Albay provincial
prosecutor charged Lovedioro with murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, alleging
 treachery and premeditation in conspiracy with
Gilberto Longasa and three unidentified individuals.
●​ Trial Court Decision: The trial court convicted
Lovedioro of murder as the principal offender,
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua with civil and
moral damages to Lucilo’s heirs. His co-accused
remained at large.
●​ Appellant’s Defense: Lovedioro appealed, claiming
his membership in the NPA and arguing that the
killing was politically motivated to further
subversive ends, thus constituting rebellion under
Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code, not
murder. He claimed he acted only as a lookout.

ISSUE/S
Whether the killing of SPO3 Jesus Lucilo should be
classified as murder or rebellion, based on the presence or
absence of a political motive.

RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s conviction of
Elias Lovedioro y Castro for murder, not rebellion. The
Court ruled that rebellion requires clear evidence of a
political motive, which the defense failed to substantiate.
Mere membership in the NPA or claims of political intent,
as asserted by Lovedioro, were insufficient without proof
of a public uprising or collective action against the
government. The burden of proving political motive rested
with the defense, and Lovedioro’s actions—shooting an
off-duty policeman and taking his gun—lacked the
 necessary political context. The Court found the killing
was a common crime committed with treachery and
premeditation, upholding the murder conviction under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and the sentence of
reclusion perpetua.

DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court held that for a crime to be classified as
rebellion under Philippine law, there must be clear
evidence of a political motive. Mere membership in a rebel
organization, such as the New People’s Army (NPA), does
not automatically confer political motivation to a crime.
The burden of proving such motive rests with the defense.
If political intent is not established, the act is treated as a
common crime, such as murder, rather than rebellion.
Rebellion requires a public uprising and collective action
against the government, and acts committed in furtherance
of rebellion are absorbed into the crime only if politically
motivated. Acts driven by private purposes remain
common crimes and are punishable separately.
Sedition

CONTRIBUTOR ADRIANO, Anselmo Madeus V (1L)

CASE TITLE PEOPLE v CABRERA (43 Phil. 64; March 14, 1922)

PONENTE MALCOLM, J.

KEYWORDS Philippine Constabulary

FACTS The case stemmed from a friction between the Manila

police officers and the Philippine Constabulary. The police
arrested a woman who is a member of the household of a
Constabulary soldier. One day, Mojica (a policeman) was
patrolling when he encountered several soldiers.
Commotion took place, and Macasinag (a soldier) was shot
and mortally wounded. This engendered resentment
among the soldiers in the Sta. Lucia Barracks. Word had
gotten out that Macasinag died, and that Mojica was
allowed to continue his duty in Intramuros. Thereafter, a
corporal persuaded a private in charge of a quarter to be
let out of the window. They sawed out the window bars
and brought rifles and ammunition. They decided to attack
police officers. On Calle Real, 10-12 soldiers attacked two
policemen. They also fired shots against a civilian car,
killing the driver and three passengers. They also killed the
assistant chief of police. A police patrol went to the place
and was also gunned down by the soldiers. On Calle
General Luna, another platoon of soldiers fired upon a
police motorcycle on its way to Calle Real. They also fired
indiscriminately in one police station. The Chief of the
Constabulary rounded up the soldiers, who then came
back one by one to the barracks. No list of the soldiers was
released, but an investigation was made finding that there
were around 74 soldiers who participated. According to
 one soldier, the wife of a soldier was arrested and abused
by the policemen, after which, they gave her to an
American, followed by the unjustified arrest of two
soldiers, and then the killing of the soldier Macasinag.

ISSUE/S Whether or not the accused soldiers committed sedition?

Yes.

RULING The accused members of the Philippine Constabulary were

held guilty of sedition. The object of the public and
tumultuous uprising is to inflict an act of hate or revenge
upon the person of police officers. Sedition, in its more
general sense, is the raising of commotions or disturbances
in the State. The Philippine law on the subject (Act No. 292)
makes all persons guilty of sedition; those who rise
publicly and tumultuously in order to obtain by force or
outside of legal methods any one of the objects, including
that of inflicting any act of hate or revenge upon the person
or property of any official or agent of the Insular
Government or of a Provincial or Municipal Government.
Counsel's contention that in order for there to be a
violation of subdivision 3 of section 5 of Act No. 292 that it
is necessary that the offender should be a private citizen
and the offended party a public functionary, and that what
really happened in this instance was a fight between two
armed bodies of the Philippine Government, is absolutely
without foundation. The assailed provision of the Treason
and Sedition Law makes no distinction between the
persons to which it applies.

DOCTRINE The Court affirmed that the law on sedition makes no

distinction on who can be held liable. In this case, the
defendant’s argument that the offender, in the crime of
sedition, needs to be private citizens is of no merit. What is
important is that there is a public uprising to incite or
inflict any act of hate or revenge upon the person or
property of any official or agent of the Insular Government
or of a Provincial or Municipal Government.
Inciting to Sedition

CONTRIBUTOR ESPINO, Gabriel Alfonso S. (1H)

CASE TITLE U.S. v. TOLENTINO (G.R. No. L-1451; March 6, 1906)

PONENTE Carson, J.

KEYWORDS Inciting to Sedition, Theatrical Play

FACTS Aurelio Tolentino was convicted by the lower court for

creating and presenting "Kahapon, Ngayon at Bukas", a
theatrical play, on May 14, 1903. Tolentino was charged for
using the play to utter seditious, inflammatory speeches,
and scurrilous libels against the United States and the
Insular Government of the Philippine Islands. That the
work of Tolentino tends to incite rebellion, riots, and
hatred toward the lawful authorities, which can disturb
public peace and governmental order. The prosecution was
able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
wrote the drama and the announcement thereof.

ISSUE/S Whether or not, in writing, publishing, and uttering the

drama, the accused is guilty of sedition?

RULING YES. The Court found the accused guilty of a violation of

section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission
which provides that:

“Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches,

write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the
Government of the United States or the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands, or which tend to
disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his
office, or which tend to instigate others to cabal or meet
together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite
rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which tend to stir up the
 people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the
peace of the community, the safety and order of the
Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil
practices, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two
thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding two
years, or both, in the discretion of the court.”

Considering that the public presentation of the drama took

place in May, 1903, less than two years after the
establishment of the Civil Government, the smouldering
embers of a wide-spread and dangerous insurrection were
not yet entirely extinguished. The Court ruled that the play
was more than a mere literary or artistic production
because of the allegorical figures and historical references
intended as a political statement aimed at inciting dissent
or unrest, rather than serving purely as entertainment.

DOCTRINE The manifestation of intentions to incite rebellion, obstruct

official duties, and disturb peace and order through
speech, writing, or any form of expression constitutes
sedition. In this case, the Court found that Tolentino’s
theatrical play went beyond mere literary expression for it
tended to incite the people against the government.
CONTRIBUTOR ESTILLORE, Juan Miguel (1H)

CASE TITLE ESPUELAS Y MEDOZA v. PEOPLE (G.R. No. L-2990;

December 17, 1951)

PONENTE Bengzon, J.

KEYWORDS Inciting to Sedition (Art. 142, RPC)

Fake Suicide

FACTS Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza, was convicted under Article

142 of the Revised Penal Code for writing, publishing, and
circulating a scurrilous libel against the Government of the
Philippines. The case originated from the Court of First
Instance of Bohol, and the conviction was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.

Between June 9 and June 24, 1947, in Tagbilaran, Bohol,

Espuelas had his photograph taken, depicting him as if he
were hanging lifeless from the limb of a tree, when in truth
and in fact, he was standing on a barrel. He sent copies of
this photograph to several newspapers and weeklies, both
local and international, accompanied by a suicide note
written under the pseudonym "Alberto Reveniera",
translation of which letter or note in hereunder
reproduced:

Dearest wife and children, bury me five meters deep. Over

my grave don't plant a cross or put floral wreaths, for I
don't need them. Please don't bury me in the lonely place.
Bury me in the Catholic cemetery. Although I have
committed suicide, I still have the right to buried among
Christians. But don't pray for me. Don't remember me, and
don't feel sorry. Wipe me out of your lives. My dear wife, if
someone asks to you why I committed suicide, tell them I
did it because I was not pleased with the administration of
Roxas. Tell the whole world about this. And if they ask
why I did not like the administration of Roxas, point out to
them the situation in Central Luzon, the Leyte. Dear wife,
write to President Truman and Churchill. Tell them that
here in the Philippines our government is infested with
many Hitlers and Mussolinis. Teach our children to burn
pictures of Roxas if and when they come across one. I
committed suicide because I am ashamed of our
government under Roxas. I cannot hold high my brows to
the world with this dirty government. I committed suicide
because I have no power to put under Juez de Cuchillo all
the Roxas people now in power. So, I sacrificed my own
self.

The note expressed dissatisfaction with the administration

of President Roxas, calling the government "dirty" and
comparing its officials to Hitler and Mussolini. It urged
readers to burn pictures of Roxas and to inform foreign
leaders like President Truman and Churchill about the
alleged corruption and dictatorship in the Philippines. The
note also referenced the Hukbalahaps, Julio Guillen, and
banditry in Leyte, suggesting that the government's actions
justified rebellion.

Espuelas admitted to writing the note, impersonating

Alberto Reveniera, and causing its publication in various
periodicals, including the Free Press, Evening News, and
Bisaya.

The letter was deemed a scurrilous libel against the

government, as it contained malicious and inflammatory
language aimed at inciting public dissatisfaction and
rebellion.
ISSUE/S Whether the publication of the suicide note, and
photograph constituted a violation of Article 142 of the
Revised Penal Code, which prohibits scurrilous libels
against the government.

Whether the appellant's actions were protected under the

constitutional right to freedom of speech.

RULING The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Oscar

Espuelas y Mendoza under Article 142 of the Revised
Penal Code. The Court held that the publication was a
scurrilous libel against the government and that it had the
tendency to incite rebellion and stir up public discontent.
The appellant's actions were not protected under the
constitutional right to freedom of speech, as they went
beyond constructive criticism and amounted to an
invitation to disloyalty and violence.

The Supreme Court reasoned that the fundamental right

to the freedom of speech secured by the Constitution "does
not confer an absolute right to speak or publish without
responsibility whatever one may choose." It is not an
"unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible
use of language and prevents the punishment of those who
abuse this freedom." So, statutes against sedition have
always been considered not violative of such fundamental
guaranty, although they should not be interpreted so as to
unnecessarily curtail the citizen’s freedom of expression to
agitate for institutional changes.

DOCTRINE Writings which tend to overthrow or undermine the

security of the government or to weaken the confidence of
the people in the government are against the public peace
and are criminal not only because they tend to incite to a
breach of the peace but because they are conducive to the
destruction of the very government itself.

The essence of seditious libel may be said to be its

immediate tendency to stir up general discontent to the
pitch of illegal courses; that is to say to induce people to
resort to illegal methods other than those provided by the
Constitution, in order to repress the evils which press upon
their minds
Direct Assault

CONTRIBUTOR GAMOLO, Noel Victor Agustin (1H)

CASE TITLE MALLARI v. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 224679, 12 February 2020)

PONENTE Leonen, J.

KEYWORDS ●​ resistance
●​ disobedience
●​ physical force

FACTS An Information was filed on May 31, 2007, accusing Jonah

Mallari of assaulting PO2 Richard Navarro, by grabbing
his collar, slapping his cheek, and kicking his legs. Mallari
pleaded not guilty. On January 12, 2007, police responded
to a report of a fight at GenX Billiard Hall in Olongapo.
They found two groups of women brawling, including a
drunk Mallari. After stopping the fight, officers asked them
to go to the station. Mallari refused, shouted, and attacked
PO2 Navarro, who restrained her and brought her to the
patrol car. Mallari testified she and her co-workers were
singing at a karaoke bar when a fight broke out with
another group. Police later arrived and told them to board
the patrol car. She claimed PO2 Navarro forcibly pushed
and pulled her back into the car, causing her to fall and
injure herself.

At the station, she was surprised by the accusation of

Navarro and sought medical attention. Her medical report
showed multiple bruises, an abrasion, and hand swelling.
Mallari filed a complaint against PO2 Navarro and SPO3
 Merza for maltreatment and physical injuries, among
others, but the Office of the Prosecutor dismissed it. On
September 5, 2013, the Municipal Trial Court found Mallari
guilty of direct assault. It emphasized her admission of
kicking and grabbing PO2 Navarro while he was on duty
and gave weight to positive testimony of the prosecution
over her denial. The Regional Trial Court affirmed the
conviction, finding that all elements of the offense were
proven. It found the prosecution credible and the defense
of Mallari as weak and unsupported. On October 27, 2015,
the Court of Appeals upheld the testimony of PO2 Navarro
and ruled Mallari was the aggressor.

She then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the

Supreme Court. However, the Office of the Solicitor
General concluded that Mallari was the aggressor, and all
elements of direct assault were met, as Navarro was
performing official duties when assaulted.

ISSUE/S Whether or not the petitioner Jonah Mallari is guilty of

direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority?

RULING The court ruled in the negative.

The petitioner should not be convicted of direct assault but

of resistance or disobedience under Article 151 of the
Revised Penal Code. Article 148 defines direct assault as
using force or intimidation, without public uprising, to
pursue rebellious aims or to attack, seriously intimidate, or
resist a person in authority or their agent while performing
official duties. It can be committed either through seditious
acts or serious attacks on authority figures.

The petitioner was charged under the second mode. Its

elements are: (1) an attack, serious force, intimidation, or
resistance; (2) against a person in authority or their agent;
(3) during or because of official duties; (4) with knowledge
of the victim’s authority; and (5) no public uprising.

Here, PO2 Navarro, a uniformed officer performing his

duty, was clearly an agent of authority. The petitioner
knew this, fulfilling all but the first element—there was no
serious force or aggression. Past rulings clarify that for
direct assault, the force used must be significant. Since the
petitioner’s actions lacked the necessary seriousness, they
qualify as resistance or disobedience under Article 151.

In US v. Cox, the accused grabbed a policeman by the

throat, threw him down, and beat him with a club—clearly
direct assault. In Rivera v. People, the accused threatened,
insulted, and punched a police officer, who sustained an
upper lip injury needing five to seven days to heal. Other
officers had to help subdue him, which supported a
conviction for direct assault. As explained in People v. Breis,
if physical force against agents of persons in authority is
not serious, the offense is resistance or disobedience under
Article 151, not direct assault. The seriousness is based on
the circumstances, motives, and significance of the act.
Here, the pushing of IO1 Mangili was resistance and not
direct assault.
Article 151 penalizes resistance or serious disobedience.
Two elements must be present: (1) the agent was
performing official duties or issued a lawful order, and (2)
the offender resisted or seriously disobeyed. In US v.
Tabiana, the Court emphasized that simple resistance
involves some level of force, but not of the gravity required
for direct assault.

In this case, it was established that petitioner Jona Mallari

grabbed Navarro’s shirt, then slapped and kicked him
multiple times after he and PO3 Merza tried to pacify a
street commotion and invited both parties to the station.
Mallari shouted, resisted arrest, and physically attacked
Navarro despite him being in uniform. Navarro testified he
was slapped on the cheek and kicked on both legs multiple
times, though he admitted the kicks were “not really
hard.”

Both police officers stated in a joint affidavit that Mallari,

smelling of alcohol, showed disrespect, refused to
cooperate, and assaulted Navarro, causing injury and
public embarrassment. Mallari herself admitted grabbing
and kicking Navarro, even though he was merely
approaching her and not acting aggressively. Given these
facts, the Court ruled that while force was used, it was not
sufficiently serious, grave, or dangerous to amount to
direct assault. Accordingly, Mallari was convicted of
resistance or disobedience under Article 151 of the Revised
Penal Code.
DOCTRINE For an act to qualify as direct assault under Article 148 of
the Revised Penal Code, the use of force or intimidation
against an agent of a person in authority must be serious in
nature. Minor or less serious acts of violence or resistance
fall instead under resistance or serious disobedience under
Article 151.In this case, while Jonah Mallari did use
physical force— such as grabbing PO2 Navarro’s collar,
slapping his cheek, and kicking his legs—the Court found
these actions lacked the seriousness or gravity required for
direct assault. The kicks were not forceful, and there was
no grave threat or injury.

In short, while her actions met all other elements of direct

assault (e.g., against an agent of authority, in the
performance of duty, with knowledge), the force was
insufficiently serious.
CONTRIBUTOR LAO, Adrian D. (1H)

CASE TITLE PABLO v. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 231267; February 13, 2023)

PONENTE Hernando, J

KEYWORDS Direct Assault

FACTS On November 2, 2012, while traffic was being redirected due

to All Soul’s Day activities, traffic enforcers TE George
Barrios y Nieto (TE Barrios) and TE Rolando Belmonte y
Balaguer (TE Belmonte), both in full uniform and clearly
identifiable as personnel of the City Transportation
Management and Development Office (CTMDO), were
stationed at the Marikina Bridge in Barangay Sto. Niño.
During this time, a taxi driver named Celso Pablo y
Guimbuayan (Pablo) was stopped for entering a road
marked with a "No Entry" sign, a clear traffic violation.
When TE Barrios asked for his driver’s license to issue a
violation ticket, Pablo refused and said "Tikitan mo na lang
ako pero hindi ko ibibigay ang aking lisensya sa inyo!" The
situation escalated when Pablo allegedly drew his licensed
.45 caliber pistol, pointed it at the enforcers, and threatened
them by shouting, “Subukan n’yo! Magkakaputukan tayo!”
In response to the threat, police officers PO2 Bernard
Medenilla and PO2 Noe Oro arrived at the scene, conducted
a search on Pablo, and seized his firearm along with
magazines and bullets.

The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) initially found Pablo

guilty of the lesser offense of Resistance and Disobedience as
defined under Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code.
 However, this decision was overturned by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), which found Pablo guilty of the more serious
offense of the second form of Direct Assault. The RTC based
its decision on Pablo’s threatening statement, "Subukan n'yo!
Magkakaputukan tayo!" which it interpreted as more than
mere resistance or disobedience, especially when the same
was coupled with pulling and aiming of his gun to said
enforcers. The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC’s
ruling, concluding that all the necessary elements to establish
guilt for Direct Assault were sufficiently proven.

ISSUE/S Whether or not Pablo is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

Direct Assault under Art. 148 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING Yes. According to the Supreme Court to prove the violation

for the second form of Direct Assault, the following elements
must be present: (1) That the offender makes an attack,
employs force, makes a serious intimidation, or makes a
serious resistance; (2) That the person assaulted is a person in
authority or his agent; (3) That at the time of the assault the
person in authority or his agent is engaged in the actual
performance of official duties, or that he is assaulted by
reason of the past performance of official duties; (4) That the
offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in
authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties; (5) That
there is no public uprising.

In this case, the Supreme Court found that all the essential
elements of Direct Assault were established. First, Pablo
committed serious intimidation by pointing a gun at Traffic
Enforcers Barrios and Belmonte. Second, both individuals
 were recognized as agents of persons in authority and were
actively performing their official duties as traffic enforcers at
the time of the incident. Third, they were wearing the
complete official uniform mandated for Marikina traffic
enforcers, further affirming their authority. Lastly, there was
no evidence of a public uprising, which distinguishes this
offense from other forms of assault. Given the presence of all
these elements, the Supreme Court held that Pablo was
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Direct Assault under
Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code.

In addition, the Supreme Court clarified that the key

distinction between Direct Assault and Resistance or
Disobedience lies in the gravity of the force or intimidation
used. In Pablo's case, the act of pointing a gun at the traffic
enforcers was deemed a form of serious intimidation, thus
meeting the requirements for Direct Assault. The Court
emphasized that such actions cannot be taken lightly,
especially in the context of a heated argument or
confrontation. It stressed that allowing such behavior
without imposing strict consequences would not only set a
dangerous precedent but also pose a serious threat to public
order and peace.

DOCTRINE The second form of Direct Assault occurs when someone

seriously attacks, intimidates, or resists a person in authority
or their agent while performing official duties. Here, the
accused pointed a gun at uniformed traffic enforcers on duty.
Though less forceful than in Mallari, the act still meets the
seriousness required for Direct Assault. As held in this case,
such an act constitutes Direct Assault even without causing
physical injury.
Article 151

CONTRIBUTOR LLANERA, Julianne Aurea R. (1H)

CASE TITLE VYTIACO v. COURT OF APPEALS (L-20246, 24 April

1967, 19 SCRA 744)

PONENTE ZALDIVAR, J.:

KEYWORDS Resistance, disobedience to a person in authority

FACTS On March 12, 1959, at a market in Panacan, Aborlan, an

altercation occurred involving Jorge Vytiaco. The incident
began when Rosalino Jagmis was angrily discussing a
prior disturbance caused by someone named Eduardo.
Vytiaco, passing by, told Jagmis to calm down, which led to
a heated exchange and a physical confrontation. Esteban
Gapilango, a Philippine Constabulary (PC) soldier in
plainclothes, intervened and separated them. Vytiaco fled,
saying he would retrieve his gun.

On the way, Vytiaco encountered his brother-in-law,

Ramon Ramos, who handed him a rifle and a pistol.
Gapilango approached to confiscate the firearms, but
Ramos fled and Vytiaco resisted, attempting to seize
Gapilango’s service pistol. During the struggle, the gun
discharged and Gapilango lost his balance. Vytiaco took
the pistol and, now armed with both his and Gapilango's
guns, threatened Gapilango and Jagmis, ordering them to
raise their hands.

Gapilango identified himself as a PC soldier and asked for

his pistol back, but Vytiaco refused and denied his
authority. Gapilango then sent for his superior, Sgt. Pelucio
Buñag. In the meantime, another individual, Jesus
Lepasana, also attempted to mediate. Sgt. Buñag arrived
and requested the return of the firearm, which Vytiaco
again refused. He retreated into his home, telling the
soldiers to retrieve the gun themselves if they wanted it.

Later that afternoon, Capt. Pastor Escano, the PC assistant

provincial commander, intervened. Eventually, the pistol
was surrendered to the vice mayor of Aborlan and
returned to Capt. Escano. The series of events led to
criminal charges against Vytiaco for threatening behavior,
resisting authority, and disobedience.​
​
The Court of First Instance of Palawan convicted him in all
cases. However, upon appeal, the Court of Appeals
acquitted him of grave threats and disobedience but found
him guilty of resistance and serious disobedience in the
context of the charge involving Gapilango. The Court of
Appeals ruled that Jorge Vytiaco did not know that
Esteban Gapilango was a peace officer when he initially
disarmed him. Gapilango only revealed his identity after
Vytiaco had taken his gun and was asking for it back. At
that point, Vytiaco had a pistol in each hand—his own and
Gapilango’s—and pointed them at Gapilango and Jagmis.
The court interpreted this act as self-defense rather than
aggression. Because of this, Vytiaco was not found guilty of
grave threats against Jagmis or of assaulting an agent of a
person in authority (Gapilango). However, once Gapilango
identified himself as a constabulary soldier and requested
the return of his gun, Vytiaco's refusal to comply was seen
as resistance and serious disobedience. The Court
concluded that while there was no clear intent to defy law
enforcement initially, the failure to return the firearm after
Gapilango’s identification still amounted to a lesser
offense—resistance and serious disobedience.
 The case was appealed to the Supreme Court on the basis
that the findings of guilt for resistance and serious
disobedience were erroneously decided. The petitioner
argues that the Court of Appeals did not make a clear
finding that his refusal to return Gapilango’s gun was done
with intent to resist or disobey a law officer. He claims his
actions were one of a series of acts done in self-defense
and/or under a mistake of fact, one act following the other
closely in point of time, all arising from the same incident
and each one performed under the same impulse. The
refusal to return the gun happened right after the struggle
and his warning to Gapilango and Jagmis, during a time
when, as the Court of Appeals itself acknowledged, he was
still afraid and believed he was being pursued. Thus, the
petitioner asserts that his conduct was not a deliberate act
of disobedience, but a reaction under stress and confusion.

ISSUE/S Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding Jorge

Vytiaco guilty of resistance and serious disobedience
against Esteban Gapilango, a person in authority?

RULING The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Jorge Vytiaco,

reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals that deemed
him guilty of resistance and serious disobedience. The
Court found that the prosecution failed to establish that
Vytiaco knowingly resisted or disobeyed an identifiable
peace officer engaged in the performance of his official
duties.

The Court ruled that there is no positive finding that the

petitioner intended to resist or seriously disobey an agent
of a person in authority while engaged in the performance
of official duties. Likewise, there is no positive finding that
when the petitioner refused to return Gapilango's gun he
believed that Gapilango was a constabulary soldier, and
 that the petitioner knew that Gapilango was at the time
performing his official duties as a peace officer. Moreover,
the Court discussed that before a person can be held guilty
of the crime of resistance or disobedience to a person in
authority or the agent of such person it must be shown
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused knew that the
person he disobeyed or resisted is a person in authority or
the agent of such person who is actually engaged in the
performance of his official duties.

The Supreme Court accepted the hypothesis offered by

counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner had reason to
suspect that Gapilango was helping Jagmis, because right
at the start of the incident between Jagmis and the
petitioner at the store of Ramon Zambales, Gapilango did
not identify himself as a peace officer and both of them
pursued the petitioner from the store.

DOCTRINE What is punished as an act of resistance or serious

disobedience under the Revised Penal Code is not the
resistance or disobedience against a person in authority or
an agent of such person in his capacity as a private
individual but in his official capacity as an authority
under the law, or as agent of the law, while engaged in
the performance of his official duties. In this case, there is
no clear proof that the petitioner meant to resist or
seriously disobey a law officer doing his duty. Also, there
is no clear proof that when the petitioner refused to give
back Gapilango’s gun, he knew that Gapilango was a
constabulary soldier or that he was carrying out his duties
as a peace officer at that time.
Article 156

CONTRIBUTOR DOCE, Krystelle Joie P. (1G)

CASE TITLE ALBERTO v. DELA CRUZ (G.R. No. L-31839; June 30,
1980)

PONENTE Concepcion, J.

KEYWORDS Article 156 - Delivery of prisoners from jail

FACTS On September 12, 1968, detainee Pablo Denaque, held for

homicide, escaped while performing labor at the provincial
guest house in Taculod, Camarines Sur. The property was
leased and maintained by the provincial government.
Eligio Orbita, the provincial guard assigned to supervise
the prisoner, was charged under Article 224 of the Revised
Penal Code, which penalizes public officers whose lack of
proper vigilance results in a prisoner’s escape.

During the trial, the defense introduced a note (Exhibit 2)

allegedly written by Governor Armando Cledera,
instructing Assistant Warden Jose Esmeralda to send five
men to work at the guest house. The defense argued that
this instruction facilitated the escape and sought to amend
the information to include Cledera and Esmeralda as
co-accused under:

Art. 156. Delivering prisoners from jails. — The city of

arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional
in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person
who shall remove from any jail or penal establishment to
any person confined therein or shall help the escape of
such person, by means of violence, intimidation, or bribery.
If other means are used the penalty of arresto mayor shall be
imposed. If the escape of the prisoner shall take place
outside of said establishments by taking the guards by
surprise, the same penalties shall be imposed in their
minimum period;

Art. 223. Conniving with or consenting to evasion. — Any

public officer who shall consent to the escape of a prisoner
in his custody or charge, shall be punished:

1. By prision correccional in its medium and maximum

periods and temporary disqualification in its minimum
period to perpetual special disqualification, if the fugitive
shall have been sentenced by final judgment to any
penalty.

2. By prision correccional in its minimum period and

temporary special disqualification, in case the fugitive shall
not have been finally convicted but only held as a
detention prisoner for any crime or violation of law or
municipal ordinance; and

Art. 224. Evasion through negligence. – If the evasion of

the prisoner shall have taken place through the negligence
of the officer charged with the conveyance or custody of
the escaping prisoner, said officer shall suffer the penalties
of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period and temporary special
disqualification.

The court ordered the Fiscal to conduct a reinvestigation.

However, the accused Orbita did not appear, and the note
was not produced, preventing confirmation of its
authenticity or context. Governor Cledera could neither
affirm nor deny the signature. After review, the Fiscal
 concluded there was no prima facie case against Cledera or
Esmeralda under the above provisions.

Despite the Fiscal’s findings, the trial judge ordered the

amendment of the information to include them. A motion
for reconsideration was filed but denied, leading to a
petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S 1.​ Whether or not a trial court may compel a provincial

fiscal to amend a criminal information to include
additional accused despite the fiscal’s finding of no
prima facie case against them.
2.​ Whether or not Governor Armando Cledera and
Assistant Warden Jose Esmeralda may be held
criminally liable under Articles 156, 223, or 224 of the
Revised Penal Code for the escape of detainee Pablo
Denaque.

RULING No, a court cannot compel a fiscal to amend an information

to include additional accused individuals if the fiscal, after
reinvestigation, finds no prima facie evidence to justify such
inclusion. The Supreme Court emphasized that while a
fiscal's discretion in determining whom to charge is subject
to judicial review in cases of grave abuse, it remains
improper for a court to substitute its judgment and force a
prosecutor to file charges unsupported by evidence.
Compelling a fiscal to prosecute persons he believes are
not criminally liable violates prosecutorial independence
and may lead to unjust prosecution.

No, Governor Armando Cledera and Assistant Warden

Jose Esmeralda are not criminally liable under Articles 156,
223, or 224 of the Revised Penal Code based on the
evidence on record. Article 156, which penalizes the act of
delivering prisoners from jail by outsiders through
 violence, intimidation, or deceit, does not apply to
custodial officials like governors or jailers. For liability
under Article 223 (connivance with or consenting to
evasion) or Article 224 (evasion through negligence), the
law requires clear proof of deliberate consent or gross
neglect. In this case, there was no evidence of connivance
or negligence on the part of Governor Cledera or Lt.
Esmeralda. The governor’s note did not name specific
prisoners, and it was the accused guard, Eligio Orbita, who
selected and escorted the detainees. As such, there is no
basis to include Cledera and Esmeralda as co-accused, and
the trial court’s orders directing their inclusion were
erroneous.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court annulled the trial court’s

orders dated January 26 and February 18, 1970, and
directed that the case against Eligio Orbita proceed without
the inclusion of the said officials.

DOCTRINE A court cannot compel a fiscal to amend an information

when there is no prima facie evidence against the persons
to be included. In this case, Article 156, which applies to
outsiders aiding escapes, does not cover public officers like
Governor Cledera or Lt. Esmeralda. Their liability must be
assessed under Articles 223 (connivance) or 224
(negligence), both of which require clear proof. Since no
such evidence was found, the judge’s order was improper.
Article 157

CONTRIBUTOR DOMENS, Sheldyne (1G)

CASE TITLE PANGAN v. GATBALITE (G.R. No. 141718; January 21,

2005)

PONENTE Azcuna, J.

KEYWORDS Evasion of sentence

FACTS Benjamin Pangan was convicted of the crime of simple

seduction and the Municipal Trial Court sentenced the
accused to serve a penalty of two months and one day of
arresto mayor on September 16, 1987.

On August 9, 1991, the case was called for promulgation of

the decision in the court of origin. Notice to the petitioner
was returned unserved with a note that the petitioner no
longer resides at the given address.

The court of origin issued an order of arrest against the

petitioner. On January 20, 2000, the petitioner was
apprehended and detained at Mabalacat, Pampanga. The
petitioner filed a petition of writ of Habeas Corpus at the
RTC of Angeles City. Petitioner contended that the arrest
was illegal and unjustified on the grounds that his
detention was unlawful because his penalty had prescribed
for having been able to continuously evade service of
sentence for almost nine years, his criminal liability has
long been totally extinguished.

ISSUE/S Whether or not the penalty already prescribed

RULING No, the court cannot subscribe to the contention of the

petitioner that the penalty imposed on him in the decision
 had already prescribed and that his detention is illegal.

Under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements

of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the offender is a
convict by final judgment; (2) he "is serving his sentence
which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades
service of sentence by escaping during the term of his
sentence.

Additionally, Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code

provides that the prescription of penalties shall commence
to run from the date the felon evades the service of his
sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion
of service of sentence can be committed only by those who
have been convicted by final judgment by escaping during
the term of his sentence.

In the instant case, the petitioner has not served the

penalty imposed on him because he was never brought to
prison. In fact, even before the execution of the judgment
for his conviction, he was already in hiding. Therefore, the
petitioner cannot argue that his penalty had already
prescribed because the essential element of prescription
which is the evasion of the service of sentence is absent.

Hence, the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus was

denied.

DOCTRINE There was no evasion of the service of the sentence in this

case, because such evasion presupposes escaping during
the service of the sentence consisting in deprivation of
liberty. Since petitioner never suffered deprivation of
liberty before his arrest on January 20, 2000 and as a
consequence never evaded sentence by escaping during
the term of his service, the period for prescription never
began.
Article 160

CONTRIBUTOR FABON, Ajenver P. (1G)

CASE TITLE PEOPLE v. VILLANUEVA (G.R No. L-32274; April 2,

1984)

PONENTE Gutierrez, Jr., J.

KEYWORDS Art. 160 - Convicts committing a crime.

FACTS
On December 8, 1969, inside the New Bilibid Prison,
several inmates—specifically members of the Sigue-Sigue
Sputnik gang—attacked and killed Bonifacio Davis, an
inmate from the rival OXO gang. The attack was in
retaliationfor the killing of two Sputnik members by OXO
inmates two days prior. The assailants, including Romeo
Villanueva and several co-accused, were already serving
final sentences at the time of the incident.

That morning, when a prison guard opened the cell door to

release one inmate, multiple gang members—armed with
improvised bladed weapons—rushed out. They chased
after Davis and stabbed him multiple times in various
parts of his body, leading to his instantaneous death. After
the killing, the attackers voluntarily returned to their
respective cells.

An investigation followed, and the inmates involved were

charged with murder. Some of the accused signed
extra-judicial confessions, which were admitted into
evidence, while others pleaded guilty during trial. The trial
court convicted all the accused, imposing the death
penalty, and awarded ₱12,000 in indemnity to the victim’s
heirs. The case was automatically elevated to the Supreme
 Court for review due to the capital punishment imposed.

ISSUE/S Whether the accused, who committed murder while

serving sentence, were properly convicted and whether
Article 160 of the RPC—which imposes an additional
penalty for a crime committed by a person already serving
sentence—should apply.

RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the finding of guilt for
murder, holding that the killing was attended by
conspiracy, evident premeditation, and abuse of superior
strength.

Crucially, the Court recognized the applicability of Article

160 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that:

“Any person who shall commit a felony after having

been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to
serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall
be punished by the maximum period of the penalty
prescribed by law for the new felony, and such
penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.”

The Court explicitly applied Article 160, noting that all

the accused were convicts actually serving final sentences
at the time they committed the killing. Therefore, the
penalty for murder was to be imposed in its maximum
period.

Although the trial court imposed the death penalty, the

Supreme Court modified the penalty to reclusion
perpetua, due to the lack of the necessary majority vote to
affirm a death sentence as required under law.
 The application of Article 160 remained significant
because it justified the imposition of the penalty in its
maximum period, and the Court upheld its applicability
to all the accused.

DOCTRINE
Under Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code, when an
accused commits a felony while serving sentence by final
judgment, the penalty for the new offense must be
imposed in its maximum period.

The provision operates as a special aggravating

circumstance, mandating increased liability regardless of
the presence of other modifying circumstances. In People
v. Villanueva, the Supreme Court upheld the application of
Article 160, ruling that the accused, having committed
murder while serving final sentences, were properly
subject to the maximum imposable penalty for the crime
charged.
CONTRIBUTOR FERNANDEZ, Lyka May Pauline F. (1G)

CASE TITLE PEOPLE v. BALDOGO (G.R. Nos. 128106-07, January 24,

2003)

PONENTE Callejo, Sr., J.

KEYWORDS Modifying Circumstances, Quasi-Recidivism

FACTS On the night of February 22, 1996, after coming back from
a bible study, Julio Camacho, Sr., an officer of the Iwahig
Prison and Penal Colony, found the bloodied body of his
son, Jeoge Camacho, in the kitchen of their house, with his
daughter Julie, nowhere to be found.

According to the testimony of Julie, after Julio Sr. left the

house and she was left alone with her brother, Jorge, she
stayed at the sala to do her assignment. However, while
doing so, Bermas, an inmate of the penal colony, who
serves as one of their househelpers, repeatedly called her
towards the kitchen, claiming that her brother was looking
for her. Julie ignored his repeated calls, however, upon
hearing loud yells coming from the kitchen, she
immediately rushed to check what was going on. It was
then that she found her brother, Jorge Camacho, sprawled
on the ground with Gonzalo Baldogo (Baldogo) and
Edgardo Bermas (Bermas), both of whom were inmates of
the colony assigned to be house helpers of the Camachos,
standing over him, while each carrying a bolo.

Horrified at what she’d seen, Julie immediately ran

towards the sala but was intercepted by Baldogo, who then
tied her hands with a torn t-shirt and stuffed a piece of
cloth in her mouth. Then, while Bermas tarried in the
house of the Camachos, Baldogo dragged Julie outside the
house and led her towards the mountain.

Bermas later joined the two of them and while Baldogo

and Bermas promised to later release her, Baldogo
continued to hold Julie captive even after Bermas had left
the two of them the following day. Baldogo only released
Julie on February 28, 1996 after he told her that he was
going to Puerto Princesa City and left her to fend for
herself. Finally set free, Julie was able to return to the
lowlands and asked a certain Nicodemus for help and she
was returned to the custody of the police.

According to the findings of the medico legal, the victim

suffered one stab wound at the breast and seven at the
back, along with a lacerated wound on the neck. As such,
based on the nature of the wounds sustained by the victim,
it was possible that the victim was attacked by two
assailants who used two sharp-edged and sharp pointed
weapons.

On the other hand, despite the evidence provided by the

medico legal and the testimony of Julie, the
accused-appellant, Baldogo, denied killing Jorge and
kidnapping Julie. According to him, he was originally
assigned to be the helper of Augusto Camacho, the brother
of Julio Sr., however, upon the request of the latter, he was
transferred and became a househelper of the family of Julio
Sr., along with Bermas.

In his testimony, Baldogo alleged that Julio Sr., used to

maltreat both him and Bermas; and that on the night of the
attack, Bermas came to him to tell him that he had killed
the young son of Julio Sr. in revenge and ordered him to
remain quiet. As such, fearing for his life, Baldogo quietly
followed the order of Bermas.
 Nevertheless, despite the testimony of Baldogo, the RTC
found Baldogo guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal of the crime of murder, appreciating against him
the specific aggravating circumstance of taking advantage
of and use of superior strength. Additionally, the RTC also
found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention.

On the other hand, the case against Bermas was dismissed

by reason of the extinction of his criminal liability
occasioned by his death.

ISSUE/S 1.​ Whether or not the RTC erred in finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder and kidnapping. (NO)
2.​ Whether or not the RTC erred in appreciating the
qualifying aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation and the generic aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage of superior
strength against the accused. (YES)

RULING 1.​ NO. The Court did not agree with the contention of
Baldogo. While the Court did agree that the
prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence to
prove that Baldogo killed the victim; the Court
found that the prosecution had sufficiently shown
indubitable proof that Baldogo and Bermas acted in
conspiracy with one another, given that: (1) Julie had
found the co-accused together with the victim, (2)
Baldogo stopped to wait for Bermas to join them in
the mountain, and (3) Baldogo continued to hold
Julie captive even after Bermas had left them.

As such, in pursuant to Art. 8 of the RPC, which

 holds offenders who are found to be in conspiracy to
be equally liable as co-principals, the Court upheld
the ruling of the RTC in finding Baldogo guilty both
for the crime of murder and the crime of kidnapping
and illegal detention.

2.​ YES. With the second issue, the Court cited that
while it agreed with the ruling of the RTC in finding
Baldogo guilty of murder, the Court did not agree
that the crime was qualified by evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength as the
prosecution failed to adduce clear and convincing
evidence as to when and how the crime was
planned.

Instead, the Court found the killing of the victim,

who was only 14 years old, to be qualified by
treachery as jurisprudence holds the killing of minor
children to be attended by treachery as they could
not be expected to be able to put up a defense
against their assailants.

Finally, while the personal file of Baldogo shows that

he had previously been convicted of homicide and
was still serving his sentence at the time of the
commission of the crime, the Court ruled that the
prosecution failed to prove the quasi-recidivist status
of the accused as they had merely provided the
excerpt of the prison record of Baldogo showing that
he had been convicted of homicide, rather than
adduce in evidence a certified copy of the judgment
convicting Baldogo of the homicide and prove that
said judgment had become final and executory. As
such, quasi-recidivism cannot be appreciated against
the accused.
DOCTRINE Art. 160 of the Revised Penal Code provides for
quasi-recidivism and states that, “any person who shall
commit a felony after having been convicted of final
judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or
while serving the same, shall be punished by the
maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the
new felony.”

In the case of People v. Baldogo, while the personal file of

Baldogo showed that he had been convicted of homicide
and was still serving his sentence, without providing a
certified copy of the judgment convicting the accused of
homicide and proof that such judgment had become final
and executory, quasi-recidivism cannot be appreciated as a
special aggravating circumstance against Baldogo.