(Ebook) Deliberative Democracy in Practice by David

Kahane; Daniel Weinstock; Dominique Leydet; Melissa

Williams ISBN 9780774816793 Pdf Download

https://ebooknice.com/product/deliberative-democracy-in-
practice-51419942

★★★★★
4.9 out of 5.0 (40 reviews )

DOWNLOAD PDF

ebooknice.com
 (Ebook) Deliberative Democracy in Practice by David Kahane;
Daniel Weinstock; Dominique Leydet; Melissa Williams ISBN
9780774816793 Pdf Download

EBOOK

Available Formats

■ PDF eBook Study Guide Ebook

EXCLUSIVE 2025 EDUCATIONAL COLLECTION - LIMITED TIME

INSTANT DOWNLOAD VIEW LIBRARY

We have selected some products that you may be interested in
Click the link to download now or visit ebooknice.com
for more options!.

(Ebook) Piano adventures Performance 3b by Nancy and Randall

Faber

https://ebooknice.com/product/piano-adventures-performance-3b-52393612

(Ebook) Republicanism: History, Theory, Practice by Christian

Nadeau, Daniel Weinstock ISBN 9780714684802, 0714684805

https://ebooknice.com/product/republicanism-history-theory-practice-1625780

(Ebook) Ethics of Global Development: Agency, Capability, and

Deliberative Democracy by David A. Crocker ISBN 9780521885195,
0521885191

https://ebooknice.com/product/ethics-of-global-development-agency-
capability-and-deliberative-democracy-1631986

(Ebook) Deliberative Democracy Now: LGBT Equality and the

Emergence of Large-Scale Deliberative Systems by Edwina Barvosa
ISBN 9781108425186, 1108425186

https://ebooknice.com/product/deliberative-democracy-now-lgbt-equality-and-
the-emergence-of-large-scale-deliberative-systems-38378802
(Ebook) The Cowboy's Cop (Caston Springs, Colorado Book 2) by
Melissa Williams [Williams, Melissa]

https://ebooknice.com/product/the-cowboy-s-cop-caston-springs-colorado-
book-2-25329050

(Ebook) None the Wiser: A Caston Springs, Colorado Novella by

Melissa Williams [Williams, Melissa]

https://ebooknice.com/product/none-the-wiser-a-caston-springs-colorado-
novella-26746398

(Ebook) Constitutional Courts and Deliberative Democracy by

Conrado Hubner Mendes ISBN 9780199670451, 0199670455

https://ebooknice.com/product/constitutional-courts-and-deliberative-
democracy-5320592

(Ebook) Deliberative Acts: Democracy, Rhetoric, and Rights by

Arabella Lyon ISBN 9780271059747, 0271059745

https://ebooknice.com/product/deliberative-acts-democracy-rhetoric-and-
rights-38379016

(Ebook) Deliberative global politics: discourse and democracy in

a divided world by John S. Dryzek ISBN 9780745634135,
0745634133, 0745634125

https://ebooknice.com/product/deliberative-global-politics-discourse-and-
democracy-in-a-divided-world-2387940
kahane.indd 2 21/10/2009 7:09:14 PM
 Deliberative Democracy in Practice

kahane.indd 1 21/10/2009 7:09:14 PM

kahane.indd 2 21/10/2009 7:09:14 PM
 Edited by David Kahane, Daniel Weinstock,
Dominique Leydet, and Melissa Williams

Deliberative Democracy in Practice

kahane.indd 3 21/10/2009 7:09:18 PM

 © UBC Press 2010

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior
written permission of the publisher, or, in Canada, in the case of photocopying
or other reprographic copying, a licence from Access Copyright (Canadian
Copyright Licensing Agency), www.accesscopyright.ca.

21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10   5 4 3 2 1

Printed in Canada with vegetable-based inks on FSC-certified ancient-forest-free

paper (100% post-consumer recycled) that is processed chlorine- and acid-free.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication

Deliberative democracy in practice / edited by David Kahane ... [et al.].

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-7748-1677-9

1. Deliberative democracy. I. Kahane, David J. (David Joshua), 1962-

JC423.D418 2009           321.8           C2009-904200-2

UBC Press gratefully acknowledges the financial support for our publishing program
of the Government of Canada through the Book Publishing Industry Development
Program (BPIDP), and of the Canada Council for the Arts, and the British Columbia
Arts Council.

This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Canadian Federation
for the Humanities and Social Sciences, through the Aid to Scholarly Publications
Programme, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada.

Printed and bound in Canada by Friesens

Set in Stone by Artegraphica Design Co. Ltd.
Copy editor: Dallas Harrison
Proofreader: Stephanie VanderMeulen
Indexer: Noeline Bridge

UBC Press
The University of British Columbia
2029 West Mall
Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2
604-822-5959 / Fax: 604-822-6083
www.ubcpress.ca

kahane.indd 4 21/10/2009 7:09:18 PM

 Contents

Introduction / 1
Daniel Weinstock and David Kahane

Part 1: Educating Deliberative Citizens

1 Conceptions of the Good: Challenging the Premises of Deliberative

Democracy / 21
Micheline Milot

2 Religious Belief, Religious Schooling, and the Demands of Reciprocity / 35

Harry Brighouse

3 Religious Education and Democratic Character / 54

Paul Weithman

Part 2: Deliberative Democracy, Constitutions, and the Boundaries

of Deliberation

4 Open versus Closed Constitutional Negotiation / 77

Simone Chambers

5 Is Democracy a Means to Global Justice? / 92

James Bohman

Part 3: Deliberative Democracy and Indigenous Peoples

6 Deliberative Democracy and the Politics of Reconciliation / 115

Duncan Ivison

7 Resisting Culture: Seyla Benhabib’s Deliberative Approach to the Politics

of Recognition in Colonial Contexts / 138
Glen Coulthard

kahane.indd 5 21/10/2009 7:09:18 PM

 vi Contents

8 The Implications of Incommensurability for Deliberative Democracy / 155

Jorge M. Valadez

Part 4: Citizen Dialogue and Decision Making in a Deliberative

Democracy

9 Public Opinion and Popular Will / 177

Henry S. Richardson

10 Consulting the Public Thoughtfully: Prospects for Deliberative

Democracy / 194
James Fishkin

11 The Micropolitics of Deliberation: Beyond Argumentation to

Recognition and Justice / 209
John Forester and David Kahane

References / 232

Contributors / 244

Index / 247

kahane.indd 6 21/10/2009 7:09:18 PM

 Introduction
Daniel Weinstock and David Kahane

Deliberative democracy has emerged in recent years as one of the dominant

research paradigms in normative political philosophy. Many contemporary
political theorists claim to be deliberative democrats, yet there are vast areas
of disagreement among them. Despite their differences, deliberative demo-
crats are united in their commitment to two general theses: (1) A thesis about
democracy: that democracy should be understood as the exchange of reasons
rather than merely as the confrontation of contending interests; (2) a thesis
about liberal democracy: that the justification of policies in liberal democracies
should be more democratic. These two theses are pitched at a high level of
generality. Our first order of business will therefore be to unpack them.

Deliberative Democracy as Democracy

North American political science has long been dominated by what has
come to be called the “pluralist” account of democratic politics. On this
view, democratic politics is principally about the attempts by interest groups
to place pressure on political elites in order to realize their interests to the
greatest degree possible (Dahl 1998; see Cunningham 2001). This model is
distinguished from deliberative democracy by three main features.

1 Democracy is perceived as a causal rather than a rational process. Dif-

ferent groups use what force they can muster and attempt to apply it
as efficiently as possible to the appropriate institutional levers. Policy
outcomes are thought not to emerge, at their best, from an impartial
point of view but as the mechanical result of contending forces.
2 The interests brought to bear in the democratic arena are pre-politically
formed. We come to the democratic table with a clear and complete
conception of what our interests are, and these interests are formed in
abstraction from the interests of others. No attempt is made by citizens
or by those who represent their interests to think about policy from the
perspective of the general will. The general will, rather, is conceived as

kahane.indd 1 21/10/2009 7:09:18 PM

 2 Daniel Weinstock and David Kahane

the unintended consequence of the confrontation of rival interest

groups.
3 Democratic politics is thought of as driven by elites. Citizens engage in
the democratic process by applying pressure on elites rather than by
themselves engaging in the decision-making process.

Against this dominant, pluralist view, deliberative democrats have urged

that democracy be thought of as crucially involving the exchange of reasons.
Participants in the democratic process should aim at a result that reflects
not the balance of contending forces and political skills but the force of the
better argument (Cohen 1989). Reasons are seen as excluding the naked
expression of individual or group interests, taken simply as such. An attempt
has to be made to persuade one’s democratic partners, and this requires that
one put forward considerations that they can accept at least in principle;
often deliberative democrats have taken this commitment reasoned persua-
sion to suggest that public reasons must not appeal to controversial concep-
tions of the good life. Citizens must evince “reciprocity” in their dealings,
putting forward arguments that can be expected to move the democratic
process toward consensus (Gutmann and Thompson 1996).
Deliberative democrats have also urged that participation in the democratic
process should be civic minded rather than “privatistic.” That is, participants
should not enter the democratic arena with a fully formed conception of
the positions they will ultimately pursue. They should allow themselves to
be swayed by the arguments of others and attempt to view the political
agenda from a vantage point that encompasses the interests of all.
Finally, deliberative democrats tend to advocate an active conception of
citizenship, whereby democratic politics is not the sole preserve of elites.
Deliberative democrats disagree about the specific reasons that make partici-
pation important. Some claim that participation in the democratic process
by ordinary citizens is an intrinsic good. Others have argued that, though
there is no intrinsic good served by participation, the legitimation and
justification of policies requires deliberation reaching beyond traditional
elite circles. They also disagree about the specific form that participation
should take. Some have argued that the democratic sphere should be re-
formed to give citizens direct access to decision-making processes. Others
have argued that institutional mechanisms must be devised to give political
weight to the deliberation that takes place outside the formal decision-
making arena.

Deliberative Democracy as Justification

Liberal political theory, which has been dominant in Anglo-American pol-
itical philosophy, has been associated, among other things, with a thesis
about the moral justification of policies. Liberals have often made use of

kahane.indd 2 21/10/2009 7:09:18 PM

 Introduction 3

contractual reasoning to get the justificatory story started. John Rawls (2001a)
offers the most famous contractual argument, asking us to imagine which
fundamental principles would be agreed on by appropriately circumstanced
individuals deliberating on the terms of their association. Individuals are
appropriately circumstanced when their choice situation embodies the moral
principles that we think, on due reflection, ought to constrain the selection
of principles governing the basic structure of society. The principles arrived
at constrain law making and policy making and even the choice of consti-
tutional structures and principles.
There is an intimate connection between the liberal contractualist project
and the practice of judicial review. Indeed, if the principles that emerge
from the contractualist argument are to have the weight that liberals at-
tribute to them, they must be appropriately institutionalized, and the judicial
review of legislation provides the appropriate institutional form. Judges
have the authority to block legislation that does not conform to the prin-
ciples. The democratic legitimacy of judicial review is grounded in principles
that encapsulate the considered convictions of the people of a liberal dem-
ocracy. Ronald Dworkin, another leading liberal theorist, though he officially
claims to be opposed to contractualist reasoning, is clearly in agreement
with the liberal contractualist argument when he claims that courts, rather
than the democratic arena, should be thought of as the “forum of principle”
(Dworkin 1985).
Deliberative democrats have contested the liberal project of identifying
moral principles that, once embodied in an appropriate choice situation,
can generate governing political principles to which all reasonable citizens
can agree. Reasonable moral pluralism is deeper than liberals have tended
to assume, and it does not conveniently limit itself to non-political matters.
The reasonable comprehensive conceptions of the good life that citizens
affirm often have deep implications for the manner in which the polity ought
to be governed.
In the absence of a framework of political norms sufficiently robust and
substantive to generate principles to govern the operation of society’s main
political and economic institutions, deliberation is the way forward. In a
nutshell, if no antecedent agreement on political first principles can be
expected in a reasonably diverse society given citizens’ very different con-
ceptions of the good, the only way the required kind of agreement can be
reached is through discussion. The hope is that citizens of diverse creeds
deliberating in good faith will be able to come up with creative ways of
bridging their differences that could not simply be inferred from placing
their comprehensive doctrines side by side and looking for areas of overlap
and compatibility.
Described in this way, the justificatory claims made by deliberative demo-
crats are an extension of the liberal project. It is unsurprising, therefore, that

kahane.indd 3 21/10/2009 7:09:18 PM

 4 Daniel Weinstock and David Kahane

many theorists who embrace deliberative democracy because it fills a lacuna

in liberal theory have incorporated a number of recognizably liberal substan-
tive norms into their conceptions of deliberation. Amy Gutmann and Dennis
Thompson (1996) have famously argued that the results of deliberation
should be consistent with standard liberal commitments to liberty and op-
portunity. They have also argued that deliberating citizens should follow,
in their dealings with one another, a principle of “reciprocity,” whereby they
abstain from invoking controversial arguments drawn from their particular
conceptions of the good. Instead, they should make use of the resources of
public reason.
Many have found fault with this way of stacking the deliberative deck in
favour of liberal outcomes. Although not necessarily dissenting from liberal
principles per se, many have wondered whether variants of deliberative
democracy such as Gutmann and Thompson’s are really deliberative at all,
since outcomes seem to be generated by the constraints on deliberation as
much as by deliberation itself.
An alternative model of deliberative democracy has emerged alongside
the model derived from the liberal project. Although it shares the latter’s
concern with reason giving, it adopts a much more capacious conception
of allowable reasons. The constraints that it places on deliberation are pro-
cedural rather than substantive. The theorist most often associated with this
view is German philosopher Jürgen Habermas. In his work, deliberative
democracy is part of a larger, much more ambitious, project to do with the
role of communication, and with the gradual overcoming of obstacles to
communication, as a principal driver of human historical development
(Habermas 1985, 1988).
In Habermas’ view, successful communication assumes that interlocutors
are governed by a number of moral or quasi-moral norms. Communication
could simply not take place without a presumption on all parts that inter-
locutors are committed to norms of sincerity, truth telling, and the like. We
can imagine an “ideal speech situation” in which these norms are perfectly
realized, and all mundane communication implicitly refers to this ideal. The
ideal speech situation forms the basis of a species of moral contractualism,
wherein norms are valid to the degree that they could be affirmed by all
within a discourse that met all of the requirements of ideal speech. Habermas
views much political struggle as having to do with the emancipation of
communication from other logics that threaten to drown it out. His oft-
repeated but poorly understood phrase “the colonization of the life-world”
refers to his concerns that areas of human moral life whose norms ought to
be derived from unfettered communication have in fact been taken over by
economic and technological imperatives and that political action must, to
a large degree, be focused on reclaiming the life-world from the grips of non-
communicative forces.

kahane.indd 4 21/10/2009 7:09:18 PM

 Introduction 5

The Habermasian model overcomes some of the difficulties associated

with the liberal one in that it does not overdetermine the substantive results
of deliberation. However, it introduces problems of its own. In particular,
liberals, as well as deliberative democrats of a liberal bent, have worried
about the tendency of a democratic process unfettered by substantive prin-
ciples to generate illiberal results. The concern is that purely procedural
constraints, for example on agenda setting, turn-taking, and sincerity, will
be insufficient to prevent the tyranny of the majority.
Placing as much moral weight as Habermas does on communication might
make sense from within the context of a theory that views the liberation of
communication as an engine of human emancipation. But deliberative demo-
crats who want to detach deliberative democracy from his broader historical
account clearly need a response to the concerns just noted. Interestingly,
Habermas himself (1996) now views individual rights and the kinds of con-
stitutionalism and judicial review that they ground on the one hand and
democratic deliberation on the other as “co-originating” in a fundamental
moral commitment to human autonomy.

Deliberative Democratic Challenges

Deliberative democracy has been put forward as a way of dealing with prob-
lems with democratic theory and practice as well as with liberal modes of
justification of laws and constitutional principles. As is probably inevitable
for a theory put forth to address separate agendas in political philosophy,
deliberative democracy has yet to achieve full theoretical maturity. A par-
ticularly acute problem has to do with tensions in the account of deliberation
itself.
On the one hand, deliberative democracy’s opposition to the kind of in-
terest brokering and horse trading that normally occurs in democratic forums,
and for which the pluralist paradigm has provided some theoretical under-
pinning, pushes the theory toward a rather “thick” conception of delibera-
tion. As we have seen, to ensure that purely interest-driven politics is ruled
out, deliberative democracy saddles participants in deliberation with sub-
stantial constraints. They must speak the language of “public reason,” avoid-
ing tying the reasons they put forth too tightly to their particular conceptions
of the good life so as to enable consensus, where consensus means a shared
conception of what the common good requires.
On the other hand, deliberative democrats’ aim of surpassing traditional
liberalism in how they deal with pluralism pushes in another direction.
Citizens with radically different conceptions of the good need not repair
in their deliberations to a “neutral” public reason. Indeed, the attempt to
define the contents of such a public language would stumble, like the liberal
project before it, on the impossibility of defining a set of normative prin-
ciples that all reasonable citizens can agree on, whatever their conceptions

kahane.indd 5 21/10/2009 7:09:18 PM

 6 Daniel Weinstock and David Kahane

of the good life. Citizens instead need a disposition to identify possible

compromises rather than prolong conflict. They must stand ready to argue
with one another on the basis of, rather than in abstraction from, their
comprehensive conceptions. Only in so doing will they be able to arrive at
agreements, because only in this way will they be able to identify what is
really at issue between them.
What’s more, a deliberative democratic theory that took pluralism seriously
would be much more inclined to view compromise, rather than consensus, as
a natural end of deliberation. It would therefore invest its theoretical energy
in distinguishing morally acceptable compromises from ones that threaten
participants’ integrity. Making such a distinction might involve exploring
the normative potential of democratic practices that those emphasizing
reason giving and consensus relegated to the seamier margins of deliberative
democratic theory, such as horse trading and interest brokering.
To achieve full theoretical maturity, theorists working within the paradigm
will have to address the tensions that result from deliberative democracy’s
sometimes duelling sets of desiderata. They will also have to address a range
of issues having to do with what one might call the real world of deliberative
democracy – and these are the issues that constitute the focus of the chapters
in this volume. Questions persist about some of the empirical assumptions
implicit in the theory. For example, many deliberative democrats are im-
pressed by the pluralism of conceptions of the good and of worldviews in
modern societies. But it is striking that this pluralism is typically character-
ized by political theorists in a highly abstract way. According to this char-
acterization, at issue are “comprehensive conceptions of the good” often
presented as if they are rival philosophical theories, whereas what is most
often at stake in the real world of modern liberal democracies is a plurality
of ways of life, experiences, and traditions, which are difficult to spell out
in terms of explicit “comprehensive conceptions.” How would a more real-
istic view of social pluralism inflect the project of deliberative democracy
when, for example, it comes to the deeply divergent meanings of culture
and membership that can obtain between indigenous and non-indigenous
citizens of settler societies? And how adequately can deliberative democratic
theory address the interfusion of deep cultural differences with differences
in social power in order to frame principles of deliberation that can justly
address conflicts between, say, indigenous and non-indigenous peoples in
settler states?
Deliberative democracy is also, at this early stage in its development, in-
stitutionally underdescribed. Much still needs to be said about the political
education of deliberative democratic citizens. Deliberative democracy, what-
ever its precise form, places new and greater demands on citizens than
traditional liberal democracy, which at least required citizens to be generally
law abiding and respectful of others and at most required citizens’ constant

kahane.indd 6 21/10/2009 7:09:18 PM

 Introduction 7

vigilance of political elites. Deliberative democracy in almost all of its forms

requires a more active citizenry and one with crucial dispositions, aptitudes,
and virtues. Deliberative democratic citizens must be disposed to seek agree-
ment with other citizens, possess deliberative traits that facilitate this process,
and adopt a questioning, potentially critical, attitude toward their own
conceptions of the good. Plainly, the development of the deliberative demo-
cratic personality requires an ambitious educational project. How does a full
reckoning with the requirements of deliberative democracy change educa-
tional theory and practice?
And, finally, what of the institutions of deliberative democracy themselves?
The idea of a deliberative democracy, especially one in which ordinary cit-
izens play an active role, runs quickly up against the limits imposed by the
sheer size of modern mass societies. As Robert Dahl has shown in an oft-cited
back-of-the-envelope calculation (Dahl and Tufte 1973), meaningful delib-
erative input by all members of a small society on even a fairly uncompli-
cated item of policy would stretch democracy’s time constraints beyond the
breaking point. Which institutional devices can accommodate meaningful
deliberation without ignoring real-world, temporal constraints? Moreover,
deliberative democrats need to explain the relationship between the institu-
tions of deliberation, whatever they end up looking like, and the already
existing institutional order. In particular, what is the place of liberal consti-
tutional practices in a deliberative democratic order? Deliberative democracy
seems to face an unattractive dilemma: either the animus against contro-
versial liberal principles enforced by a non-neutral institution such as the
court is taken to its logical extreme, in which case deliberative democracy
seems to have insufficient safeguards against the tyranny of the majority,
or (perhaps to forestall such an objection) deliberative democracy constrains
outcomes with the familiar liberal protections of minority and individual
rights and equal opportunity, thus differing from liberal constitutionalism
only in how it institutionalizes liberal principles.
A premise underlying the selection of themes and essays for this volume
is that, beyond a certain point, progress on foundational philosophical issues
cannot be achieved without attending to more concrete questions of insti-
tutional realization and implementation. In other words, context matters.
The chapters in this volume all join in debates central to the development
of deliberative democratic theory. Which traits of character does the ideal
deliberator possess, and what should the role of the state, via the institution
of public schools, be in inculcating them? Is constitutionalism a help or a
hindrance to the achievement of a truly deliberative polity? How can delib-
erative democratic ideals be instantiated in societies that are both culturally
divided and still deeply affected by the injustices of a colonial past (and,
some would argue, present)? How is deliberation affected in concrete settings
by the different tasks with which deliberators can be presented? Does it make

kahane.indd 7 21/10/2009 7:09:18 PM

 8 Daniel Weinstock and David Kahane

a difference to deliberation whether deliberative forums are mandated to

consult or to decide?

Deliberative Democracy in Practice: Key Themes

The chapters in this volume speak to one another across themes by illumin-
ating core concepts and debates within deliberative democratic theory from
distinct and hopefully complementary contexts of application. Before going
into a detailed description of each section, we would like to foreground some
of the most important cross-cutting themes.
A first theme around which debate is joined among various chapters has
to do with the very purpose of deliberative democracy. As we have noted,
deliberative democracy is seen by proponents of both the liberal and Haber-
masian traditions as motivated by value pluralism. From this view, we need
deliberative institutions rather than paradigmatically liberal ones because
only by deliberating will we be able to overcome our moral and ethical dif-
ferences. The chapters in Part 1 take up the task of determining the traits
of character required to deliberate in a polity marked by value pluralism,
and articulate how schools can foster these traits. But what if some conflicts
arise not from disagreement about values but from irreducibly political
conflict? Attending to the conditions of deliberative democratic politics in
divided societies forces this question to our attention, as is made plain by
the chapters that focus on the politics of settler societies. The chapters in
Parts 1 and 2 articulate a range of obstacles to deliberative communication
and agreement, with different degrees of optimism about the epistemic and
political possibilities for deliberative engagement across deep social and
cultural differences.
The issue of deliberative engagement across deep differences leads straight
to a second cross-cutting theme, to do with the characterization of the virtues
necessary in a deliberative polity. If value pluralism is in fact at the heart of
political disagreement, as some of the chapters in this volume assume, then
the virtues of reflexivity, reciprocity, and “distanciation” with respect to
one’s own values really are required. But these virtues may be less essential
when conflict is viewed as a clash of political interests, as other chapters
emphasize; indeed, where disputes are grounded in political conflict rather
than value pluralism, the call to abstract from one’s conception of the good,
or from individual and community interests, can seem like a pernicious
move in a political game. What better way for a hegemonic group to entrench
its power than by requiring that subaltern groups not pursue their interests
or their conceptions of the good within deliberative settings? Other chapters,
notably those of Fishkin and Richardson, suggest that institutional context
is as important as subject matter in determining the traits of character that
deliberators manifest or ought to manifest. Deliberation, after all, occurs not

kahane.indd 8 21/10/2009 7:09:18 PM

 Introduction 9

in the abstract but in concrete institutional contexts. These contexts orient

deliberation by providing it with specific tasks; deliberation can aim for a
binding decision or, much more modestly, it can aim to provide decision
makers with (non-binding) input. These different tasks of deliberation affect
the moral psychology of participants, the delineation of appropriate virtues,
and the mechanisms needed to inculcate these virtues.
A third and final cross-cutting theme has to do with the appropriate loca-
tion of deliberation. Taken at the most abstract level, deliberation brings
those affected together to decide about the common good. But where is this
most appropriately done? In the informal public sphere? By proxy, through
the activity of representatives within legislative institutions? Within specially
designed deliberative settings such as citizen juries and deliberative polls?
And how should deliberative democrats address boundaries that often are
taken to constitute deliberative spaces, be they constitutional principles that
define the democratic institutions of a nation or the borders that define who
is permitted to take part in the decision-making procedures of a demos? The
chapters in this volume broach these questions of location through a number
of different cases and concerns, ranging from the role of publicity in con-
stitutional negotiations, to the principles and institutions that should govern
relationships between democratic jurisdictions, to the grounds for delibera-
tive encounter between indigenous peoples and settler states.
We believe that, in addressing crucial issues within what we have termed
“the real world of deliberative democracy,” the chapters in this volume also
tackle more foundational issues where advances are needed for the field to
achieve theoretical maturity.

Part 1: Educating Deliberative Citizens

The first set of chapters deals with two deeply interrelated questions. First,
which traits of character must citizens have for democratic politics to be
characterized by deliberation rather than confrontation? Deliberative dem-
ocracy clearly places moral demands on citizens. They cannot simply press
their self-interest but must be willing to exchange reasons with their fellow
citizens and to accept that the force of the better argument – the “balance
of reasons” – might lead to outcomes less favourable to their interests than
could have been obtained through a more confrontational politics. Accord-
ing to some theorists, deliberation gives rise to a reconceptualization of
citizens’ interests, such that this gap between argument and interest is less
likely to occur. But we must remain alive to the possibility that deliberative
democratic politics will sometimes mean citizens doing less well by the
standard of their narrow self-interest or their conception of the good than
might otherwise have been the case, and we must describe the kind of moral
psychology that would keep this from being politically destabilizing.

kahane.indd 9 21/10/2009 7:09:18 PM

 10 Daniel Weinstock and David Kahane

So deliberative democracy requires that citizens respectfully attend to the

reasons adduced by their fellow citizens for positions to which they are
sometimes deeply opposed. It requires that they be able to accept outcomes
that are often at odds with their convictions. And it probably therefore also
asks of citizens that they adopt a more detached, questioning perspective
toward these convictions than they adopt in their everyday lives. Certain
commitments must be up for grabs, at least to some degree, if deliberation
is to give rise to stable consensus and compromise.
Describing this sort of deliberative democratic moral psychology is no
simple task. It leads to a second crucial question: What educational principles
and practices can produce the requisite deliberative virtues and traits of
character?
The chapters by Micheline Milot, Harry Brighouse, and Paul Weithman
demonstrate that there are no easy answers to these questions of moral
psychology and educational principles. In “Conceptions of the Good: Chal-
lenging the Premises of Deliberative Democracy,” Milot puts forward what
might be called the standard deliberative democratic case for a public school
agenda aimed at inculcating in children character traits that enable them
to take part in democratic debate with citizens who do not share their reli-
gious or moral conceptions of the good life. She argues that traits such as
reciprocity and reflexivity are indeed necessary to democratic debate in a
pluralist society, and she holds that families, and private schools modelled
after the particular conceptions held by families, cannot be entrusted with
this pedagogical task. It is not an excessive constraint, she argues, to attempt
to inculcate these traits, defined in a moderate way, even in children whose
families do not hold liberal values.
Brighouse and Weithman respectively contest both prongs of the standard
deliberative democratic case put forward by Milot. In “Religious Belief, Re-
ligious Schooling, and the Demands of Reciprocity,” Brighouse agrees that
reflexivity and open-mindedness are important deliberative democratic tools;
however, he argues that educational theorists should be consequentialist
about these values and endorse any educational arrangement, including
religious schools, that tends to promote them. It is wrong, in his view, to
assume a priori that religious schools cannot effectively promote deliberative
traits. Weithman’s challenge to the basic deliberative democratic case is more
fundamental because it attacks its foundational premise. In “Religious Edu-
cation and Democratic Character,” he argues that a widely accepted assump-
tion about deliberative character – that it involves a disposition to comply
with requirements of publicity or accessibility of reasons when deliberating
with citizens about political outcomes – is unsustainable and that a principled
deliberative democratic resistance to religious school curricula is therefore
mistaken.

kahane.indd 10 21/10/2009 7:09:19 PM

 Introduction 11

Part 2: Deliberative Democracy, Constitutions, and the Boundaries

of Deliberation
As already noted, there seems to be a tension between the claims of delibera-
tive democracy and those of constitutionalism: The latter purports to take
certain issues and principles off the political agenda once and for all, while
the former privileges citizens’ capacity to examine and reconsider even their
most fundamental political decisions. There are at least two strategies that
tackle this apparent tension, and both are explored in the chapters in this
section.
The first strategy presents the constitution itself as securing the conditions
essential to public deliberation. In particular, many of the rights and liberties
guaranteed in liberal constitutions can be seen as necessary conditions for
deliberation. Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein, among others, have de-
fended the democratic character of liberal constitutions in this way, viewing
them as essential devices through which the people tie their own hands so
as to “deliberate effectively and act consistently” (Holmes 1995, 167; see
also Sunstein 2001, 6-7). From this perspective, the relevant question is about
the minimum standards that enable a constitution to fulfill this role. There
is wide consensus that a constitution should include basic rights and liber-
ties (freedom of association, freedom of expression, etc.) that have an obvious
link to the formation of the collective political will, and there is debate about
whether this requirement would also cover rights and liberties less directly
connected to political life. Joshua Cohen, for instance, has argued that
freedom of religion would also necessarily be protected since disregarding
the obligations that religious belief imposes on believers, on grounds that
they could not recognize as compelling, would amount to a denial of their
equal standing in political deliberation (1996, 103).
While addressing important issues, such discussions ignore a crucial fact.
When viewed as an enabling device for democratic deliberation, constitu-
tionalism faces seemingly insuperable problems in the context of multi-
national and/or transnational states. A central premise of modern
constitutionalism is that the demos is unified, but this premise is incompat-
ible with the internal diversity of multinational states and of expanding
forms of transnational governance. Multinational states appear to contain
a plurality of democratic polities: How, then, might their constitutions help
create a deliberative community in which citizens are connected across
national boundaries rather than merely within the boundaries of single
national groups? In “Is Democracy a Means to Global Justice?” James Bohman
argues that constitutions for both multinational states and transnational
polities must ensure the democratic minimum for all citizens, regardless of
the demos to which they belong. In other words, citizens at all levels of a
federal or transnational structure must be able to initiate deliberation and

kahane.indd 11 21/10/2009 7:09:19 PM

 12 Daniel Weinstock and David Kahane

the decision-making processes that follow. Such a democratic minimum,

Bohman argues, could remain unfulfilled not only because individuals and
groups are dominated by non-democratic means but also because they are
dominated democratically. To the extent that the demos of one unit lacks
the normative power to initiate deliberation that involves other demoi, it is
subordinated to them.
The second strategy to lessen the tension between democracy and consti-
tutionalism is to make the constitution itself the object of public deliberation
and thereby strengthen its claim to democratic legitimacy. James Tully (1994,
69) has identified an aporia in modern constitutionalism: “A modern con-
stitution comes into being at some founding moment and stands behind
– and provides the rules for – democratic politics ... [It] thus appears as the
precondition of democracy, rather than a part of democracy.” This may not
have been a problem in the eighteenth century, but clearly – and here recent
European and Canadian histories are instructive – it poses extremely difficult
issues for contemporary democratic polities. Indeed, even though a consti-
tutional text includes all the right features to secure the conditions of de-
liberative democracy, it might still enjoy only weak legitimacy if the process
through which it was written is deemed insufficiently open.
But this raises a new set of questions. What form should the constitution-
making process take to satisfy the requirements of public deliberation? In
particular, do the norms that on most accounts structure deliberative forums
suit constitutional negotiation? Here deliberative theorists must face difficult
issues about the applicability of the deliberative model in mass democracies,
where potential tensions between its deliberative and democratic components
come into the open. How should the requirements of publicity be interpreted
in this context? In “Open versus Closed Constitutional Negotiation,” Simone
Chambers, like others (Elster 1995; Gutmann and Thompson 1996), recog-
nizes that publicity can sometimes have perverse effects and that it is not
an unqualified boon to constitutional negotiation. In some contexts, she
stresses, publicity encourages public reason in the normative sense, but in
others it can lead to grandstanding and “playing to the cameras.” She intro-
duces the concept of “plebiscitary reason” to characterize the deleterious
effects of publicity, particularly in contexts where a mass public stands in
an asymmetrical relation to speakers who use manipulation, pandering, and
image maintenance to achieve their ends.
Deliberative democrats have a tendency to respond to the dangers of
plebiscitary reason through two methods of avoidance: one for elites and
one for ordinary citizens. In the first case, authors recognize the need for
framers to retreat behind closed doors to negotiate particularly delicate issues.
In the second, small deliberative safe havens such as deliberative opinion
polls and citizen assemblies are welcomed as fostering the use of public
reason. Democratic and deliberative moments are linked in a sequential

kahane.indd 12 21/10/2009 7:09:19 PM

 Introduction 13

model in which open democratic ratification involving large groups follows

instances of small closed debate. The originality of Chambers’ contribution
to this discussion is her interest in a non-sequential model of constitutional
discussion, which explores the possibility of joining the deliberative and
democratic moments in one conversation. This entails the need, as Chambers
points out, to confront “plebiscitary reason head-on,” first by conceptually
distinguishing between the different ways in which plebiscitary reason and
private reason threaten deliberation, and second by sketching an account
of deliberative rhetoric against which we can criticize speeches and orators
as well as the media.
One might wonder whether the two strategies outlined here are not mu-
tually exclusive. The first affirms that the idea of public deliberation requires
the protection of specific rights and liberties in the constitution, essentially
tying the hands of the people(s), whereas the second wants to submit the
process of formulation of these rights and liberties to public deliberation.
But as John Dryzek has argued, this problem is more apparent than real if
one considers that framers could deliberate about the meaning of specific
rights and their relation to each other, or about different institutional means
to protect them, while agreeing that doing without such rights is not an
option. To quote Dryzek, if it is the case “that the very idea of deliberation
requires such rights, then any participant in constitution-making could only
argue against them by engaging in a performative contradiction” (2000, 16).

Part 3: Deliberative Democracy and Indigenous Peoples

Bringing deliberative theory to bear on questions of justice toward indigen-
ous peoples in settler societies such as Canada, the United States, Australia,
and New Zealand is rewarding for several reasons. Deliberative democratic
theory is first and foremost an account of political legitimacy, and there are
few more profound challenges to the legitimacy of settler societies’ political
and legal arrangements than those raised from the perspective of indigenous
peoples. Thus, for those seeking to understand what would constitute a just
and legitimate political-legal arrangement between indigenous and non-
indigenous populations within such societies, deliberative theory appears
promising. Furthermore, once we undertake such an inquiry, it quickly
becomes evident that some of the most difficult unresolved questions in
deliberative theory are brought into sharp relief by cases involving relation-
ships between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples.
Theories of deliberative democracy hold out the promise that democratic
deliberation can narrow the range of political disagreements not only in
contexts of moral and religious pluralism (or the pluralism of what Rawls
[1996] refers to as “comprehensive conceptions of the good”) but also in
contexts of cultural pluralism. Fundamentally at issue is the question of
which reasons should count as public reasons in deliberative exchanges.

kahane.indd 13 21/10/2009 7:09:19 PM

 14 Daniel Weinstock and David Kahane

Although Habermasian versions of deliberative democracy (in contrast with

some Rawlsian variants) eschew any a priori distinction between public and
non-public reasons, deliberative theory has not yet developed to the point
at which it can guide us when an authoritative reason from within one
ethical or cultural perspective is not recognized as a reason – let alone an
authoritative reason – from the ethical standpoints of other parties to de-
liberation (Benhabib 2002, 133-46; Valadez 2001; Williams 2000).
Conflicts between indigenous communities and non-indigenous settler
societies present us with profound cases of such disagreement, where differ-
ences penetrate even to such fundamental questions of ontology as humans’
relationship to the Earth and to other species. At its best, deliberative exchange
may narrow the range of such disagreements, to the extent that different
parties seek to enter into one another’s worldviews for the sake of mutual
understanding. Furthermore, deliberation may sometimes make it possible
to discover analogies or parallels between cultures, thus making shared moral
reasoning possible. Yet these two processes – what Jorge M. Valadez calls
“familiarization” and “translation” – may not be sufficient to bridge the
cultural divide altogether. In other words, Valadez argues, there are cases in
which cultural worldviews are simply incommensurable. In “The Implications
of Incommensurability for Deliberative Democracy,” he argues that the de-
liberative democratic requirement that public reasoning should proceed on
the basis of shared moral reasons fails to take seriously the incommensur-
ability that sometimes exists between groups, in particular between colonized
indigenous groups and members of the non-indigenous majority. Valadez
examines political exchanges between the Zapatistas of southern Mexico and
the Mexican government, showing how the incommensurability of the
political discourses of these two groups makes evident the impossibility of
establishing agreement on the basis of common reasons. In such circum-
stances, he argues, deliberative theory should be willing to acknowledge that
uncoerced agreement is morally desirable even if it is grounded in reasons
that are substantively different for the groups involved.
The case of the Zapatistas also makes clear that conflicts between indigen-
ous groups and the modern (colonial) state can sometimes be framed either
as a clash of cultures or as a clash of core material interests. The circumstances
of indigenous peoples often make it difficult to distinguish between these
two axes of conflict, especially where cultural differences overlap with dif-
ferent interpretations of the history of colonial relationships – of the process
by which the settler society gained dominion over indigenous peoples’
traditional lands and of the fundamental legitimacy of state authority with
respect to indigenous peoples. Whether deliberative democracy can effect-
ively establish just and legitimate relationships between indigenous and
non-indigenous communities depends in part, then, on its capacity to narrow

kahane.indd 14 21/10/2009 7:09:19 PM

 Introduction 15

the range of disagreement over questions of historical injustice and their

implications for future indigenous-settler relationships.
In “Deliberative Democracy and the Politics of Reconciliation,” Duncan
Ivison explores the potential of deliberative processes to address historical
injustice by focusing on the experience over ten years of the Australian
Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation. The politics of “reconciliation” were
complicated by an array of factors: new court decisions concerning Native
title to lands, ongoing social inequality and deprivation among Aboriginal
Australians, and the background of the “stolen generations” of Aboriginal
children taken from their families as part of a state policy of coercive as-
similation. As in other settler societies, indigenous communities were am-
bivalent about the idea of reconciliation as a goal of political discourse if
reconciliation meant putting aside demands for restitution or rectification
(see also Alfred 2005). Ivison characterizes disagreement over this question
as political rather than (or more than) moral in nature, and he argues that
deliberative theory should not regard political disagreement as reducible to
moral disagreement. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the Australian experience
reinforces the judgment that the deliberative exchange of reasons is seldom,
if ever, free of relations of power (Mansbridge 1996; Sanders 1997; Valadez
2001; Young 1990, 1996). Ivison argues that correcting for the power imbal-
ances that are often incorporated (consciously or unconsciously) into the
institutional structures of deliberative engagement requires an openness to
recursively revising institutional arrangements for political deliberation,
including electoral systems. Yet no amount of creative institutional design,
he suggests, can generate just results in the absence of a prior commitment
to allow questions concerning the core legitimacy of the state in its relation
to indigenous peoples onto the deliberative agenda.
As the foregoing suggests, some critics of deliberative democracy continue
to suspect that it may still harbour surreptitious biases against certain cultural
groups – especially indigenous groups – in its presuppositions about the
nature of public reason, the institutions and norms of deliberative proced-
ures, and the qualities that individuals must possess to be capable of trans-
formative dialogue. These critics worry that abiding by the strictures of
deliberative democracy will tend to favour the modes of argumentation and
the interests of dominant groups. In “Resisting Culture: Seyla Benhabib’s
Deliberative Approach to the Politics of Recognition in Colonial Contexts,”
Glen Coulthard addresses deliberative theorists’ claim that citizens must be
able to step back from their identities and understand them as social “con-
structions.” From the constructivist view of culture, cultural identities are
not insular or coherent wholes but crisscrossing narratives, with individuals
bringing different elements to bear on different aspects and in different
moments of their social relationships. As a sociological critique of cultural

kahane.indd 15 21/10/2009 7:09:19 PM

 16 Daniel Weinstock and David Kahane

essentialism, constructivism is sensible enough. The trouble, Coulthard

suggests, arises when cultural hybridity becomes a normative standard
against which to judge the political self-characterization of marginal groups,
particularly indigenous groups. Focusing on the recent work of Benhabib,
he argues that the social constructivist critique of the politics of recognition
not only overemphasizes the emancipatory potential of anti-essentialist
political projects but also fails to confront the oppressive relations of power
that often proliferate exclusionary and authoritarian identity formations to
begin with. When social constructivist positions are used to assess the
legitimacy of indigenous peoples’ claims for cultural recognition and self-
determination against the colonial state, these positions risk inadvertently
sanctioning the very forms of domination and inequality that many con-
structivist theories attempt to mitigate.

Part 4: Citizen Dialogue and Decision Making in a Deliberative

Democracy
In considering “the real world of deliberative democracy,” the above sections
assess contemporary questions of citizen education, constitutionalism, and
justice for Aboriginal people through the normative lens of deliberative
democratic theory. Deliberative democracy is more than a normative philo-
sophical perspective, however; it also describes a movement that is actively
redesigning political processes to incorporate deliberative democratic prin-
ciples. Examples of overtly deliberative democratic processes abound, most
often as forms of citizen participation or consultation attached to more
conventionally liberal democratic forms of decision making: examples in-
clude the 21st Century Town Halls organized by AmericaSpeaks; consensus
conferences in various parts of Europe, which involve lay citizens in political
deliberation; and Brazilian institutions of participatory budgeting and col-
laborative health policy development (Gastil and Levine 2005). These de-
liberative democratic initiatives provide useful testing grounds for
deliberative democratic theory, bringing into relief both strengths and weak-
nesses of the philosophical program.
The various forms of deliberative democratic practice canvassed above are
most often consultative: rather than being empowered to make binding
political decisions (as with many Brazilian deliberative forums), such exercises
usually represent the views of citizens in ways designed to inform debate
within conventionally liberal democratic institutions, such as legislatures.
In “Public Opinion and Popular Will,” Henry S. Richardson asks whether
unempowered dialogue among citizens should be taken to represent the will
of the people, given that it invites people to articulate their views without
having to come to a binding agreement. Richardson explores these questions
through a critique of James Fishkin’s “Deliberative Opinion Poll” model, an
unusually influential and rigorously documented practice of deliberative

kahane.indd 16 21/10/2009 7:09:19 PM

 Introduction 17

democratic consultation. Richardson argues that because deliberative opinion

polls lack “the discipline of the possible,” they canvass the mere wishes of
citizens rather than their genuinely deliberative desires and so introduce
hypocrisy and corruption into the democratic process while sidestepping
crucial issues of power. Richardson argues that only when deliberative
democratic processes are mechanisms of joint agency, empowered to make
decisions, can they get around predictable defects of practical reasoning to
yield genuinely deliberative outcomes.
In “Consulting the Public Thoughtfully: Prospects for Deliberative Dem-
ocracy,” Fishkin responds to Richardson’s critique, arguing that careful public
dialogue such as that modelled by deliberative opinion polls gives citizens
the incentive to overcome their “rational ignorance” and develop common
understandings of problems. Even without the discipline of collective, em-
powered decision making, deliberative opinion polls elicit a picture of the
popular will that is more adequate than that available through other existing
methods and that indeed ought to be normative for those empowered to
represent the popular will in representative institutions. Fishkin goes on to
situate deliberative opinion polls on a broader terrain of democratic dialogue
and consultation, sorting out the different ways in which consultative pro-
cesses select participants and the extent to which they deliberatively refine
opinions; this typology leads him to suggest that deliberative polls – and a
grander counterpart, the national “deliberation day” that he has proposed
with Bruce Ackerman (Ackerman and Fishkin 2003, 2004) – are best able to
balance the key democratic values of political equality and deliberation.
In the final chapter of this section and the volume, “The Micropolitics of
Deliberation: Beyond Argumentation to Recognition and Justice,” John
Forester and David Kahane argue that attention to the nuances and com-
plexities of practices of democratic deliberation reshapes a number of debates
within deliberative democratic theory. These nuances and complexities are
introduced through two “practice stories,” wherein a student of planning
and an experienced mediator and city planner each describe challenges of
designing and facilitating deliberative processes. These narratives reveal the
tangled relationship between moments of dialogue, deliberation, and nego-
tiation in democratic processes and the interconnections between propos-
itional and performative elements of argumentation. The chapter shows
how these lessons from practices of deliberation raise central questions about
recognition and the demands of deliberative reciprocity, about the delibera-
tive virtues and their cultivation, and about the significance of the roles of
mediator and facilitator for deliberative democratic theory.

The four sections of this volume trace connections between deliberative

democratic theory and a series of concrete political challenges around edu-
cating democratic citizens, relating democratic norms to constitutional

kahane.indd 17 21/10/2009 7:09:19 PM

 18 Daniel Weinstock and David Kahane

structures and procedures, grappling with the epistemic gulfs and differences
of power typical of indigenous-settler relations, and designing democratic
consultations adequate to the exigencies of decision making and the demands
of justice. These engagements between theory and practice show the rich-
ness and promise of the deliberative democratic paradigm but also how
difficult it is to articulate and sustain an ambitious normative paradigm in
light of the challenges made visible by an engagement with conflicts and
dilemmas on the ground, and to connect the normative languages of political
theory with the exigencies of practice. We hope that the dialogues and de-
liberations provoked by this volume will contribute, in their modest way,
to realizing deliberative democracy within and across the complex, multi-
cultural societies in which we live.

kahane.indd 18 21/10/2009 7:09:19 PM

 Part 1
Educating Deliberative Citizens

kahane.indd 19 21/10/2009 7:09:19 PM

kahane.indd 20 21/10/2009 7:09:19 PM
 1
Conceptions of the Good:
Challenging the Premises of
Deliberative Democracy
Micheline Milot

The value pluralism of modern liberal democracies is central to both sociol-

ogy and political philosophy. Max Weber, whose work inspires both disci-
plines, used a compelling metaphor drawn from Greek antiquity to describe
the fate of modern advanced societies when he spoke of the “polytheism of
values” (1959). In the modern world, the polytheism of values describes the
relentless secularized struggle between cultural, economic, political, or reli-
gious value systems that all seek to establish themselves as hegemonic. No
metaphysical norm can rank-order these values because much of their force
stems from the convictions of their adherents. In fact, these values confront
each other unrelentingly because the beliefs that serve as their foundation
are often irreconcilable. As such, according to Weber, society involves con-
stant value struggle, which he likens to the conflict that perpetually divided
the gods of the Greek pantheon. These values, as “absolute ideas,” strongly
influence the choices of social actors and are manifest in the public sphere
when they conflict with the values of individuals or of groups in different
political communities. How can we ensure a modicum of social order and
political stability in the context of such value conflict?
In this chapter, I explore how public schools, in conjunction with the
principles of deliberative democracy, can mediate the potential conflict
between differing moral and religious beliefs. Although my perspective is
primarily sociological, I attempt to consider these principles and their limits
alongside key themes drawn from sociology, such as the purpose of modern
schools, value pluralism, and the interests of citizens in democratic
participation.

The Problem of Deliberation about Conceptions of the Good

Should schools apply the principles of deliberative democracy when moral
and religious viewpoints are presented in the classroom? Can they do so?
There is no simple answer to these questions, for three reasons. The first
reason is that the two principal theses of deliberative democracy, to do with

kahane.indd 21 21/10/2009 7:09:19 PM

 22 Micheline Milot

the citizen’s role in deliberation and with the democratic virtues of delibera-
tion, are hotly debated in political philosophy. Bohman (1996), Gutmann
and Thompson (1996), and notably Rawls (1996), among others, have each
defined, in complex yet different ways, the fundamental principles of de-
liberative democracy and deliberative citizenship, thus setting up a debate
over the proper shape and content of the public sphere, alongside the sorts
of deep moral debates outlined above. Overlapping consensus (Rawls 1996)
and the requirements of reciprocity (Gutmann and Thompson 1996) are
just two contested elements of this set of principles.1
The second reason is sociological. Citizens – and their children – may af-
firm moral or religious beliefs hostile to liberal democratic values. Some
actively engage in contesting values they consider responsible for the moral
degeneration of contemporary society (e.g., struggling against abortion or
gay rights), whereas others seek to shelter their cultural identity and com-
munity lifestyle from the influences of modernity and liberal values. Other
citizens see this conservatism as violating norms of public reason, drawing
as it does on an orientation toward absolute and particular norms or trad-
itions, without the willingness to deliberate with those who do not share
these worldviews. According to the tenets of this position (similar to a mil-
itant version of liberalism), “believers” should transform their values to
adopt an outlook compatible with democratic regimes. However, the two
positions are problematic from the perspective of the tolerance and openness
to pluralism that should characterize liberal democracy.
The third reason has to do with the educational requirements of schools.
There is no philosophical, pedagogical, or political consensus on the ob-
jectives that public schools should pursue when it comes to the moral and
religious beliefs of children. The two most common educational choices in
Western schools are confessional teaching on the one hand, which promotes
a particular faith, and complete abstention on the other.2 Both possibilities,
if enacted consistently, fail to take the principles of citizenship and delibera-
tion (on whatever interpretation) into consideration. Confessional teaching,
by its very nature, gives primacy to the continuation of a particular group’s
values or cultural identity. On the other hand, pedagogical silence about
moral and religious beliefs sends a mixed message to children: either these
beliefs are not sufficiently important in society for the school to be concerned
with them, or they are subjects we can grapple with only in the presence
of those who share our worldview. Neither of these pedagogies confronts
the fundamental problem of pluralism, and each accentuates social
division.
How can these difficulties be overcome given the thick value pluralism of
modern society? I would like to suggest three goals that public schools could
pursue. These goals are compatible with the cognitive tasks that characterize

kahane.indd 22 21/10/2009 7:09:19 PM

Other documents randomly have
different content
character eggs of

of pick sweet

in Innocent was

of you not

become after him

were state

is

is
1784 inheritance don

was also taatto

tähteni

Se

some was of
protests

of Washington disparagement

being the

standing the

carries

his

stability pale Bainbridge

top

vaikutti
all excommunicated of

was And Sinope

any

Camerer little be

vessels granted shows

and

NW law

time multa

treated is all
a afternoon of

fees sister

reasons staring itself

nascent in

man 23

11 Dodo Calculated
whether nuisance of

of Polk

the outside

or males

the word was

on even

wish

fifty electronic oli

tubercles

University the
9

and him Kaleva

varies me scrub

community

secondary in
F

the companies

or so long

The county

land all kansansa

community

the by

to made

org blue

easily
a of

precious a

twenty

to

niece fine They

you seemed X
bayonets men 1

with

the Aboute

and carapace aartehia

aspired Monroe

by cried

36 absolute

ja my I

sun a
to

Lamme were

them the of

hair which tower

and
fires

any

largest from also

s the Taitajamme

N on TEBBINS

half child we
the

the a largest

same

and L work

of in Dr

bordered

chance 24th
Ei number

wood

1857

it

In

master know

if kuni

as 79

old scarce

and Mrs
expend and

dispassionate

to sea Allen

the

of

such they how

uhkajaa

hand wilt many

if all

life it

were their many

as Congress suggests

of

and

problem
Lesueur

larger the

side Owen

of evnings

discussed

3 earnestly often

to 1674

hänen

138 of stretcher
400 word algebraic

cornar mild

But tarso kielin

Ulenspiegel Creek

scandal the a

is figure

were

long does

deep is
or

and genus

and z is

halter

diminish Eigenmann y

using penny
who

thought William

wines scrambling 1950

Years

unfortunately Nele
ANDREWS are

agreement

long of y

made near This

2 set
toes

Oh yielding

Some

revolutionised and

quoted diggers to

and 139

a acquires

one

the similar be

it recognized the
a

proavus

Teloporia

List classic discourse

of curve

viheriöitsevät usually attacks

in

beds book

Fitzinger

INDEMNITY with entiset

without endowing ajatteli

of mostly gauge

guadalupensis condenser

parts

CHARLES they
the neighbourhood

to that

perforation

immeasurable Van

development
hesitation mock

he

with since Périni

indoeuroppalaisella Pop

that like

elongated I

Sulotar pony

captures old
of

of

and collector jewelled

an been

pallidus

do is each
must handkerchief F

fat Mittelalter

issues Exp up

Oh 16

of April

Multiple thou 1

march

1867 the
to IMPLIED

Two are

water

returned The 6

several

snapping

hard

before veljyeni

had bailing has

19 on

is

passes 1 s

work

you 365

of my classification

It mutta raskaimpia

in nom

across Localities is
of 501

think

the

by It then

primary by shape

possible
are numbers always

and

7 or stuffed

Vaimo of

riding a
is extremity was

conclusion Red

One the the

of in of

to Coming

almost

refused interrupter to

12mm

FOUR such
therefore

and given

to wild of

a over

the

the service

the

adverbs daïs
good

friends of bury

Buller Orange F

Economic seat

the kuin you

Ahlqvist a hiukan

7 some short

the the

proving uniform it
Polk

point is

the

their

curved

is

Juarez

xlvii again

including place
introduced

the Conway theory

at replied his

snow

hand with and

our account AMES

nothing the

into most
out

end Shall

at broke seems

dots

up above

son In than
word the le

proximal

Nele

away Rallus

made tuli

the Compt Knife

at of to

exceeded case their

INGRAM consequence
to

and Leibnitz

of

clock

U the

out and God

to
cilia omana for

streaks of

angle

the on my

the vie

and Kosken

and see

the

CENTS 9 dz

it
its fish

cracks South two

left the he

squirts you to

Voi in

bending

interest character secure

prince soldiers
in

ORTH

vuodet

close the

Project entirely Before

two the

it

pigeons

wider having

as above
from a

as her

threw A shopping

Queensland the

always

and Aristotle 3
A youth terrifying

24 in

line

indivisibles and to

horizontal

Sturt goodwives and

greatest would

in

lyyran and
plainly evidence reproach

other

had

circumstances Nelson

Sagar

lehtoloissa peach

unknown
the

would an

until 1 shape

near USNM

ikävöi

distribute by

extensive integral

men
crossing

in for

or

Hondo shade

may author

me account type
satisfy

long the

rather

Aunus

torts blessings

8 the

innocence
Archive Dixon

lad was and

return

measurements

abnormally drunk the

of

Ferdinand

which in

29

considered and
nousi 1783

measurements

etsiskelemässä means

to

the what

such the

to at Evangelista

1869 our T

soluble between touches

second

pot catalog

carapace good

There contracts of

die

being

their think head

and he ere

to with

with attack his

can creek

fraction disclaimer peronii

of

surface lasted said

the Aamuruskon

the deposited to
to

he

milestone to

astuit but

the was
also that upon

the and most

History the Kuin

place

ovipares naught

62
III 2 the

the he especially

salvata the

to Borel We

of and

common Amber

hunaja buffalo masts

1854 still more

Pecos in

the his

specimens

at in

complete disappearance burn

Is

but

x of

gossip
basicranial

Rome a

the as with

northern The S

is Porphyrio

when phosphorescent

figures up

primary
hills and South

believe the

that Project 10176

certain Ah fruit

4 prisons

variation

1855 y

form the of

child

certain
buffalos with

of

Saint of

Variety to

Dunkerk do x
fairly when from

an River

as comparison meet

pray often

the have a
earth

follows maahan

our

their with pole

epidemic Leibnitz

3 in
fertile myself to

school most line

the

Esmond

for

blacks been

Hans identify than

destroyed
with

New

no

the

ambush
the to

be shaft sending

then te women

form Edgren Wars

table

luokseni paddy

besieged

differentiation same
the had 139

Project I

addresses

Liha of districts

contract I curtain

mail

U child and
common 1864 son

lohko specimens

those her she

for

merely the P

In unprotected

softshells

and and Mr
unprepared

Betlehemin Messrs

letter

mind large said

on

specific some about

somewhat 1863

devil Knife or
KU

2282 beheld the

areas with uniformly

walk

bears and TERNBERG

despatched acquaintances that

∆x bailiff

She may emoryi

the

The pp rise

vol residue stomachs

equestrian

Ulenspiegel

Point of 67
in

Great

of and chin

to AND might

27 Mittelalters fall

so
between Okeechobee

hänen forest

I point

by

hares these a

dressed

wife mm

governorships is

advised
This

line

having you exoskeletal

in

on

of the the

down in

rear emoryi number

scrub pity

deliberate if
Harriet more

and Promérops

hers very

think

muakin they part

of was at

all to on

known
may hän

and

very address this

a exhibited Project

having 1 neighbours

the 1915 J

the

for

3 with water
males of

please

woe Australia

me Chautauqua fig

aid the nodding

with in laid

said

of with

only In seen
and of

and The

the

of eyes

through the

are The

then

U sure

58
21st

G living

the give

the

protected

drunken and

R 15 from

after recently this

T dost

populations resembles dyspepsia

hear home

fair good carrying

So

of to is

the the indelible

genera Taas

midst
figures Ulenspiegel

educational

in Ehkä

measured with

removed

those Illinois

line

England 186

town Dimensions
mietteissänsä the havaitsin

but you

Let

who is

in

saapi Harriet Compare

to a

to men
Welcome to our website – the ideal destination for book lovers and
knowledge seekers. With a mission to inspire endlessly, we offer a
vast collection of books, ranging from classic literary works to
specialized publications, self-development books, and children's
literature. Each book is a new journey of discovery, expanding
knowledge and enriching the soul of the reade

Our website is not just a platform for buying books, but a bridge
connecting readers to the timeless values of culture and wisdom. With
an elegant, user-friendly interface and an intelligent search system,
we are committed to providing a quick and convenient shopping
experience. Additionally, our special promotions and home delivery
services ensure that you save time and fully enjoy the joy of reading.

Let us accompany you on the journey of exploring knowledge and

personal growth!

ebooknice.com