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War and the Willingness to Resist and Fight in

Ukraine

Tor Bukkvoll & Frank Brundtland Steder

To cite this article: Tor Bukkvoll & Frank Brundtland Steder (05 Dec 2023): War and
the Willingness to Resist and Fight in Ukraine, Problems of Post-Communism, DOI:
10.1080/10758216.2023.2277767

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PROBLEMS OF POST-COMMUNISM
https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2023.2277767

War and the Willingness to Resist and Fight in Ukraine

Tor Bukkvoll and Frank Brundtland Steder
Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, Kjeller, Norway

ABSTRACT
This study explores the effects of Russia's use of military force on the Ukrainian willingness to fight and
resist. We find assumptions from the theoretical literature on the willingness to fight of limited relevance.
Instead, our analysis suggests that Ukrainian willingness to fight and resist correlates with (1) a growth in
Ukrainian civic nationalism; (2) an increase in trust in Ukrainian political institutions, particularly the
Ukrainian armed forces; and (3) a spread of the impressions that Ukraine is not alone in its struggle. We
find little difference based on region and gender, but some on education and income.

Introduction alone in this struggle has positively affected the willingness to

resist and to fight.
This article investigates what consequences Russia’s use of
In the study, we define “willingness to fight” as “using
force has had on the stated willingness of Ukrainians to fight
a weapon in armed combat against the enemy in defense of
for their country and in other ways to resist Russian aggres­
your country,” and “willingness to resist” as “any other type of
sion. It is primarily a before-and-after February 24, 2022,
activity deliberately undertaken to prevent or disrupt the hos­
study, but it also takes into account the changes after the
tile activities of the enemy in defense of your country.” In
2014 annexation of Crimea and onset of war in Donbas.
terms of fighting, we are talking about a societal “join or not
Unsurprisingly to all who have followed recent events in
join” armed formations phenomenon. We do not study the
Ukraine, the findings suggest that Russia’s attack had
tactical-operational courage in battle of personnel who have
a strongly positive impact on the stated willingness both to
already become members of such formations (Connable et al.
resist and to fight. Different surveys suggest somewhere
2018, 30).
between a doubling and a tripling of such willingness from
The contribution of this study is twofold. First, it provides
before the annexation of Crimea in 2014 to after the Russian
a fresh and comprehensive analysis of the willingness to resist
invasion in February 2022 (see Table 1 in this article). Less
and fight in Ukraine, with a special focus on people’s motiva­
explored, however, are how changes in Ukrainian popular
tion to join or support the military. Deeper insights into these
belief may help explain why foreign armed aggression led to
motives are of policy relevance to decision makers both in
an increased stated willingness to resist and to fight.
Ukraine and abroad – regardless of when and how the war
“Willingness to fight and resist” should in this study be
eventually ends. Second, the findings of this case study ques­
understood as stated willingness to fight and resist. To what
tion some of the conclusions of the theoretical literature on the
extent these expressed sentiments translated into actual beha­
willingness to fight. Much of the willingness-to-fight literature
vior is not yet possible to study. The reasons for this are
is based on studies of how people feel about personal partici­
partially the absence of data connecting intent and behavior,
pation in combat when they live in a time of peace. Far less has
and partly the fact that Ukraine declared compulsory mobili­
been written about how an actual outbreak of war affects that
zation from day one of the conflict. Thus, after this date, at
phenomenon. The direction of such a response is not self-
least as concerns regular Ukrainian armed formations, it is not
evident. One could imagine that it is easier to report willing­
possible to distinguish whether an individual joined the fight
ness to fight when the likelihood of an actual war taking place
because he or she wanted to or had to.
The study indicates that a rise in civic nationalism and is small. Once the reality presents itself, however, some of
a very strong increase of trust in the political institutions those who reported a willingness to fight may be scared
have been the most significant factors. The latter includes away. Alternatively, those who did not report any willingness
both the political leadership, Ukrainian state institutions in before the outbreak of war may find that things look very
general, and the Ukrainian armed forces in particular. It is different once they see the human and material costs of combat
noteworthy that there does not seem to have been any signifi­ up close. As a recent Wall Street Journal report on the February
cant increase in ethnic nationalism (see also Pop-Eleches and and March 2022 fight for Kyiv put it:
Robertson 2018). Finally, there is some evidence indicating It is hard to know how people will react to a huge invasion force.
that an increasing popular perception of Ukraine not being Resistance requires a core of people in villages, towns and cities to

CONTACT Tor Bukkvoll [email protected] Norwegian Defense Research Establishment

© 2023 The Author(s). Published with license by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in
a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.
2 T. BUKKVOLL AND F. B. STEDER

Table 1. Survey Results on the Ukrainian Willingness to Fight 2010–2022

find enough courage and motivation to fight rather than flee. investigation can be termed an exploratory case study. The
(Marson 2022) purpose is to uncover mechanisms in war that might generate
an increased willingness to fight and resist and that would have
The empirical data in this study come from a survey conducted been hard to measure in a pre-war setting (Gerring 2007; Levy
on April 18 and 19, 2022, by the Ukrainian survey agency Info- 2008).
Sapiens. This survey was commissioned by the international
research project VALREF.1 Both authors are affiliated with this
project. In addition, data also come from a significant number
of other opinion surveys conducted in Ukraine by different Theoretical Expectations and Ukrainian Realities
agencies both before and after the start of the Russian invasion. Previous large-scale statistical studies of the willingness to fight
Thus, the purpose is both to establish the level of Ukrainian for your country have in particular highlighted three factors.
willingness to fight in April 2022 (VALREF/Info-Sapiens), and First, a society’s degree of modernity might significantly affect
to explain changes in the level of willingness over time the willingness to fight. People tend to be less willing to fight in
(VALREF/Info-Sapines plus the other surveys). The “modern” societies characterized by egalitarianism,
 PROBLEMS OF POST-COMMUNISM 3

individualism, and concern for non-materialistic values than in accept that Ukraine is at least partly an unequal society. We
“pre-modern” ones characterized by strong hierarchies, collec­ discuss that issue more thoroughly with the help of our own
tivism, and a focus on material values (Ingelhart, Puranen, and VALREF data later in this study.
Welzel 2015; Paez et al. 2016, 348). One exception, however, is Finally, as the existing literature would expect, a high level
the willingness to fight in “modern” societies that border of national pride among Ukrainians goes hand in hand with
a potentially aggressive society of the opposite sort. That is, for a high willingness to fight. Interestingly, however, that seems
example, the case with Nordic nations close to Russia (Ingelhart, most accurate if we look at the civic dimension of national
Puranen, and Welzel 2015, 420; Kim 2020). These tend to score pride. To be sure, there may have also been a slight increase in
higher on the willingness to fight than other modern societies the ethnic dimension of national pride. That, however, seems
that have a safer geopolitical location. Second, and related to the to be more a result of historical long-term trends that have
first, the rich are generally less willing to fight than the poor in little to do with the war/not war distinction. The strong
unequal societies. This difference, however, tends to disappear increase in the Ukrainians’ willingness to fight finds little or
when inequality is low (Anderson, Getmansky, and Hirsch- no correlation with the very slow but steady rise in the ethnic
Hoefler 2018). Third, there is a strong relationship between dimension of national pride.
national pride and the willingness to fight for one’s country Overall, the existing theoretical literature is hard pressed to
(Diez-Nicolas 2010; Paredes, Brinol, and Gomez 2018). We are explain the increased willingness of Ukrainians to fight. The case
open to the possibility that the theoretical claims of the current suggests that surveys in times of peace are of limited value to
literature may explain well the willingness to fight in other parts predict actual human behavior in times of war. These studies
of world. The mentioned Nordic countries may be a case in may be valuable in themselves in terms of gauging how other
point, However, we still think the Ukrainian cases poses societal developments affect popular perceptions of what they
a significant challenge to this literature. would be willing to do if their country was attacked, but they
Several surveys and studies indicate that values such as seem to say relatively little about people’s actual willingness to
hierarchy, collectivism, and materialism have a strong stand­ fight once war is a fact. In the latter case, both positive and
ing in Ukrainian society (Pivovarova and Khliapatura 2015; negative incentives can change people’s calculations of what
Starodubska 2022). True, Marina Starodubska moderates this they express themselves willing to do; during wartime, even
picture by pointing out that Ukrainian collectivism is wea­ identities can change with surprising speed.
kened by a significant dose of vertical individualism. This The rest of this study will unpack and explain the findings
means that “improving one’s status by making an effort . . . outlined above more thoroughly. In particular, we detail the
and obtaining and demonstrating status and being competitive effects of the Russian use of force on Ukrainian society, and by
is not merely acceptable, but desired individual behavior” extension, discuss how they relate to the increased willingness
(Starodubska 2022). Still, based on the existing literature, we to fight and resist.
would expect that the prevalence of such values would make
the Ukrainian population more willing to fight for their coun­
try compared to populations of more “modern” societies.
Changes in the Ukrainian Willingness to Fight and
If we look at the reported Ukrainian willingness to fight
Resist
prior to the first Russian use of force in 2014, that is not the
case. Quite the opposite, among the ten post-Soviet countries Already before the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine,
that are included in the World Values Survey (WVS), Ukraine several surveys suggested a rise in the Ukrainian willingness to
was by a wide margin the country where the fewest people fight in response to military aggression. In 2012, before the
declared themselves ready to fight for their country. In the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the Donbas war, the Ukrainian
WVS sixth wave study (2010–2014), only 40 percent of survey bureau Rating measured only a 33 percent “yes”
Ukrainians expressed such willingness. That was significantly response to the question “Are you ready to take up arms to
below the Organization for Economic Cooperation and defend your country if a threat to its territorial integrity
Development (OECD) average of 53 percent, and far below occurs?” In 2017, that figure had risen to 54 percent. It con­
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) average of tinued to rise to 59 percent in 2020.4 It is difficult to imagine
65 percent. It was even further below Poland at 71 percent – any other major changes to Ukrainian society during the 2012
a country in a somewhat similar geopolitical situation to to 2022 period than Crimea and Donbas that can explain this
Ukraine.2 Thus, at a time when war did not seem likely, the rise. Similar results are also found in the World Value Survey.
strong standing of hierarchy, collectivism, and materialism in Here, respondents were presented with the following question
Ukraine did not result in any particularly high degree of will­ “Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but
ingness to fight. if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your
Concerning the relationship between income and willingness country?” According to the WVS wave six survey (2010–2014),
to fight, the Ukrainian Rating agency surveyed this relationship 40 percent of Ukrainians answered in the affirmative. That
twice before the 2022 invasion, in 2017 and 2020. Both surveys figure rose to 59 percent in wave seven (2017–2020). This was,
gave the same result. The willingness to fight increased with however, still slightly below the OECD average of 63 percent
income. It was between 60 and 70 percent for both wealthy and and far below the CIS average of 77 percent.5
middle-income respondents in the two surveys, and between 40 The February 2022 invasion changed that. Already in
and 60 percent for low income or poor respondents.3 That is the March, Rating could report an 80 percent Ukrainian readiness
opposite of what the theoretical literature would expect if we to fight.6 Furthermore, a US National Democratic Initiatives
4 T. BUKKVOLL AND F. B. STEDER

study from August 2022 suggests that an increased readiness to The VALREF data collection process, a stratified random sam­
fight was combined with a readiness to engage in other forms ple, was conducted by telephone on April 18 and 19, 2022. At
of resistance. Asked about whether they had donated money to that time, war with Russia had already significantly impacted
the Ukrainian armed forces during the war, 81 percent everyday life in Ukraine. That included numerous civilian
answered in the affirmative. This was so, despite the fact that casualties in addition to damaged infrastructure. Figures from
as many as 70 percent of respondents stated that they had the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
suffered a reduction in income since the war started. An suggest that by the end of April 2020 about 5,000 civilians were
additional 16 percent said they would have donated if their dead as a direct result of the invasion and a similar number were
personal financial situation had allowed for this.7 injured.8 Because of the short-lived Russian occupation of parts
Various organizations have conducted opinion surveys on of Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts as well as the longer
the Ukrainian willingness to fight before and after the start of occupation of parts of the East and South, and the refugee
the February 2022 invasion. The results can be seen in Table 1. wave since February 24, there were significant challenges to
Two conclusions can be drawn from this general overview. upholding the principles of randomness and representation in
First, the willingness to fight among Ukrainians increased with the data collection process. There were three concerns in parti­
hostile Russian activity in Ukraine. On average, it has more cular with this process: first, Ukrainian refugees outside Ukraine
than doubled, from 37 percent to 75 percent, since the out­ are not included in the sample; second, respondents from occu­
break of the war. Second, there is some spread of results among pied areas are less likely to pick up the phone and answer the
different surveys, suggesting that how the question is framed survey; and third, randomly selected respondents holding “pro-
may significantly influence answers. Thus, comparisons across Russian” views are less likely to express their true opinions. This
surveys must be done with some caution. Table 1 should be is not to say that the survey data are unreliable, or uncertain, in
regarded just as an indication of changes in Ukrainians’ will­ any way. The data collection was done in a wartime society,
ingness to fight. Of the survey agencies presented in Table 1, sometimes in occupied areas, and treated accordingly.
only Rating made comparable surveys both before and after Given the variation in willingness to fight over time, as
the Russian annexation (2014) and full-scale invasion (2022). shown in Table 1, one gets the impression that there is
The reported finding of an increase by 21 percentage points in a positive relationship between willingness to fight and the
the willingness to fight after the Russian invasion is, in our proximity of hostile aggression. The closer a person is to
view, a good approximation of the situation today. hostile war-like aggression, the higher the willingness to
Finally, there are many ways the Ukrainian population can fight. That relationship was specifically studied in a Peace
counter foreign aggression other than taking up arms themselves. Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) March 2022 survey.
Many of these will also entail accepting considerable risk of Together with Info-Sapiens, PRIO organized a survey to
violence or other forms of aggressor retribution. Therefore, the explore whether there was a direct link between exposure to
Ukrainian willingness to oppose foreign aggression cannot be enemy military action and the willingness to fight.
measured without also investigating this nonmilitary aspect. Respondents reported whether they personally had been vic­
That is especially so because military service is only compulsory tims of enemy violence or not, and if yes, whether that had
for men. True, a government decree from December 2021 taken place at least once or more than 10 times. The results
required Ukrainian women between the ages of 18 and 60 to showed that among those who had not been personally
register with the Ukrainian armed forces for potential mobiliza­ attacked, 48 percent “had intentions to engage in open battle
tion. It was, however, explicitly pointed out that this was not the against the Russian or pro-Russian forces.” For those indivi­
same as the male conscription. The purpose seems to have been to duals who had been attacked once or more, this percentage
increase the Ukrainian state’s legal foundation for conscripting rose to 55 percent, and for those who had been personally
women for non-combat roles in case of war. However, even if attacked 10 times or more to 65 percent (Bartusevicius,
general conscription was expanded to include women, gender Mazepus, and van Leeuwen 2022). Thus, the more personal
roles would probably still make a large part of the population see exposure to enemy use of force, the higher willingness to fight.
armed combat primarily as a male responsibility. Thus, unless A similar effect may also have worked on the collective
non-military resistance is included, the study will both be unduly level, although we currently do not have survey data to corro­
gender biased and unable to assess the total resistance potential. borate that. It is likely that single in-war events such as the
Russian atrocities in Bucha and Irpin had mobilization effects
similar to the ones uncovered by the PRIO/Info-Sapiens sur­
vey. These atrocities received widespread media coverage after
Ways of Fighting and Resisting
Russian troops withdrew in late March. Here, both anger at the
The April 2022 VALREF and Info-Sapiens survey asked three Russian forces for what they had done and fear that similar
questions: events could take place in one’s own communities may have
convinced more people of the need to get engaged in resistance
(1) Are you personally prepared to take part in armed or fighting.
resistance to end the Russian occupation of Ukraine? At first glance, the findings of the PRIO study are supported
(2) Are you personally prepared to train in the use of by the results from the VALREF survey. On the first question,
weapons/light arms? “Are you personally prepared to take part in armed resistance
(3) Are you personally prepared to help the Ukrainian to end the Russian occupation of Ukraine,” 71 percent of the
army to end the Russian occupation of Ukraine? respondents throughout the country reported that they were
 PROBLEMS OF POST-COMMUNISM 5

ready for this or already doing this. Central Ukraine, however, more prepared (72 percent) to help the Ukrainian army com­
reported a higher readiness of 80 percent. Given the time that pared to the respondents from the high-income class (51 per­
the survey was conducted, this may be due to the fact that this cent). The same pattern emerges for those with basic education
region had a significantly higher number of respondents who (76 percent) compared with high education (62 percent).
already had been engaged in helping the armed forces. Much In short, VALREF data measure the expressed willingness
of the fighting in March and April was concentrated in this to fight at around 70 percent about 7–8 weeks after the Russian
region (Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy in particular). We found invasion into Ukraine. The survey also finds some variation
no difference in willingness to fight related to education or across region, gender, income, and education. These factors
income, but we did find that women were not as ready or will be investigated more thoroughly in the next section.
personally prepared as men (60 percent versus 80 percent).
On the second question, “Are you personally prepared to
train in the use of weapons/light arms,” 63 percent of the Social Characteristics of Ukrainians Willing to Fight
respondents reported that they were ready for this or already and Resist
doing it. The readiness to use weapons/light arms varies some­
what across regions, from 73 percent in west and center to There are many ways to subdivide the Ukrainian population
51 percent in east and south. As will be explained later, this into different categories. Here, we will limit ourselves to
finding seems to be in contradiction with the PRIO study. region, education, income and gender. Regional differences
However, there is a large difference in gender where 76 percent are probably what many would first think of, since Ukraine
of men feel prepared to use weapons, compared to 52 percent traditionally has been thought of as strongly divided by regio­
of women. In addition, there is a small difference in income. nal and partly overlapping language and ethnic divisions.
The lower income class is somewhat less prepared (61 percent) There is some truth in that, but these divisions and their
to train in the use of weapons compared to the high-income political consequences have probably never been as clear-cut
class (67 percent). We found no difference in education. as many have assumed (Barrington and Herron 2004).
The third question, “Are you personally prepared to help Furthermore, as we shall see, opinion polls suggest that
the Ukrainian army to end the Russian occupation of a strong development toward national cohesion took place
Ukraine,” is somewhat different from the two first. Here, after the events of 2014 and continued after the
respondents are asked about helping or assisting the February 2022 invasion. Nevertheless, because the regions of
Ukrainian armed forces, not about their willingness to directly Ukraine differ with regard to their historical experience, it is
participate or support. In this case, 67 percent of the respon­ important to investigate whether and to what extent that
dents reported that they were personally prepared to help the experience has an impact on the willingness to fight.
Ukrainian army. There were no differences between men and As noted above, the October 2020 and March 2022 Rating
women. The preparedness to help the Ukrainian army varied surveys show an overall increase in the willingness to fight
a little from region to region, from 63 percent in the west to from 59 percent before the Russian invasion to 80 percent
71 percent in the north. There was, however, a difference in after.9 The regional breakdown of the Rating surveys, com­
income; respondents from the lower income class were much pared to VALREF-survey results, is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Changes in willingness to fight (from Rating surveys) and measured willingness to resist (in VALREF) after invasion, by region.
6 T. BUKKVOLL AND F. B. STEDER

While the Russian invasion has led to an increased will­ percentages per oblast can be explained by either demographic
ingness to fight in all parts of Ukraine, Figure 1 illustrates the mobility between oblasts from December 2015 or poor
regional differences in level and changes. The increase is sig­ quality12 in the VALREF data collection process. Most likely
nificantly higher in the west (24 percentage points) and the it is a combination of both.
south (24 percentage points) than in central Ukraine (14 per­ Given the fact that we have nominal data, with categorical
centage points) and the east (9 percentage points). answers, we have performed a chi-square analysis and a post
Furthermore, the highest overall level (from the Rating sur­ hoc test with Bonferroni correction. A chi-square test is used
veys) is in the west with 87 percent. The highest level of to help determine if observed results are in line with expected
resistance measured by VALREF is also in the west, followed results, and to rule out that the observations are due to chance.
by central and southern Ukraine. The result of the test is a statistic that has a chi-squared
distribution and can be interpreted to reject, or fail to reject,
the null hypothesis that the observed and expected frequencies
Geographical Proximity to Combat
are the same.
One reason for the difference in measured willingness to resist When performing a hypothesis test with multiple compar­
could be the fact that some oblasts are bordering Russia and isons, a result could occur that appears to demonstrate statis­
some were also partly occupied by Russian forces immediately tical significance in the dependent variable even when there is
prior to the period of data collection. At the point of data none. The Bonferroni correction13 complements and validates
collection, eight bordering oblasts had either experienced or the chi-square analysis, reducing the chances of obtaining false
were experiencing occupation. These oblasts were located positive results (type I errors) when multiple pairwise tests are
across three different regions,10 as illustrated in Figure 2. performed on a single set of data. If the chi-square test rejects
Given this grouping of respondents, we can perform statis­ the null hypothesis, and the Bonferroni correction test fails to
tical analyses and investigate whether their answers differed reject the null hypothesis, it is a false positive. In other words,
systematically depending on the closeness to the occupying we cannot prove a difference in the answers. However, if the
force, hostile neighboring nation, and preferred language. The Bonferroni test complements the chi-square test and rejects
green percentages inside the circles in Figure 2 are the share of the null hypothesis, we also know where the difference in
the Russian-speaking population (at home) from answers lies since the Bonferroni correction is a multiple pair­
a December 2015 survey.11 The yellow percentages are the wise test. Table 3 below is investigating Q1, “Are you person­
share of respondents that chose to answer the VALREF survey ally prepared to take part in armed resistance to end the
in Russian. On average, the two datasets are very similar, Russian occupation of Ukraine,” across the two groups
showing a share of 34–37 percent Russian-speaking population (respondents in either partly occupied oblasts or non-
in the partly occupied oblasts. occupied oblasts).14
In our analysis, we will use the chosen language in the As shown in Table 2, and indicated in green, we can reject
VALREF data as a demographic variable, together with gender, the null hypothesis; the respondents in eight partly occupied
income, and education. The occasionally large difference in oblasts (Figure 2) answer differently from the respondents in

Figure 2. Share of Russian speakers in partly occupied oblasts.

 PROBLEMS OF POST-COMMUNISM 7

other oblasts. The Bonferroni test tells us that the difference in respondents in partly occupied oblasts. All of the results are
answers lies in “fully prepared” and “not at all prepared.” opposite for the respondents in non-occupied oblasts. In two
Fewer respondents than expected in partly occupied oblasts tests, for low income and intermediate education, we also find
answered “fully prepared” (negative number and red color in that the respondents are answering more than expected on
Bonferroni table), and more respondents than expected in “somewhat not prepared.” In short, the respondents in partly
partly occupied oblasts answered “not at all prepared” (positive occupied oblasts (Figure 2) feel less “fully prepared,” and more
number and yellow color in the Bonferroni table). “not at all prepared” than respondents in non-occupied oblasts.
One plausible explanation might be that people, when When investigating the other two questions we find
directly exposed to the horror of war, realize they are not as a similar outcome. Table 4 shows the post hoc Bonferroni
prepared as they initially thought they were. When controlling results for Q2, “Are you personally prepared to train in the
the statistical data for language, gender, income, and education use of weapons/light arms.”
we can investigate the outcome shown in Table 2. We find that As we can see from Table 4, the results are consistent with
the share and number of respondents in partly occupied those we found regarding Q1 in Table 3. Respondents living in
oblasts answering “fully prepared” are less than expected. In partly occupied oblasts answered differently from those living in
Table 3 we have indicated the post hoc Bonferroni results with non-occupied oblasts. The share of respondents answering
colored cells15 and entered the text “Less than expected” or “fully prepared” is lower than expected and the share answering
“More than expected” in the cell when the Bonferroni correc­ “not at all personally prepared to train in the use of weapons” is
tion test rejects the null hypothesis. The results show that higher than expected in the partly occupied oblasts. There is no
respondents answered differently on the question with difference in preparedness between respondents speaking
a statistical significance level of five percent. Reading Table 3 Russian, men, middle income, and basic education living in
one finds a consistent result among Ukrainian-speaking partly occupied and non-occupied oblasts.
respondents, men, those with low and middle income, and Table 5 shows the post hoc Bon ferroni results for Q3, “Are
those with intermediate and high education. The invalid you personally prepared to help the Ukrainian army to end the
tests16 are colored gray in Table 3. Russian occupation of Ukraine.”
In Table 3 the yellow/red cells indicate above/below The tests of Q3 listed in Table 5 show that the difference in
Z-criteria in the Bonferroni pairwise test. Grey rows indicate respondent’s preparedness between partly occupied oblasts and
no difference in answers (failed to reject null hypothesis). non-occupied oblasts is very small. The only statistical signifi­
Given this simplified illustration of the statistical tests, one cant difference is that Ukrainian-speaking respondents in partly
can clearly see that the post hoc Bonferroni multiple pairwise occupied oblasts are more than expected “somewhat prepared”
test is mostly confirmed in two areas for all variables: “fully compared to those in non-occupied oblasts. All other tests in
prepared” and “not at all prepared.” Table 5 are valid, but not able to reject the null hypothesis. The
In the column “fully prepared,” the values of most17 variables main reason for this is that most respondents use relatively few
are lower than expected (red color) and higher than expected in answer-alternatives from the 5-point Likert scale; the overall
the column “not at all prepared” (yellow color), for the outcome is that the respondents feel prepared to help,

Table 2. Chi-square Test and Post Hoc Test with Bonferroni Correction on Q1, in Partly Occupied and non-occupied Oblasts
8 T. BUKKVOLL AND F. B. STEDER

Table 3. Summary of Post Hoc Test with Bonferroni Correction on Q1

Table 4. Summary of Post Hoc Test with Bonferroni Correction on Q2

independent of location, gender, income, and education. dependent and independent variables. There is a minor coherence
Twenty-eight percent of the respondents are already helping between income, education, and willingness to help the Ukrainian
and 65 percent are either “fully prepared” or “somewhat pre­ army (Q3), but the statistical coefficient is very small. However,
pared” to help the Ukrainian army to end the Russian occupa­ we do find some covariance between income and education.
tion of Ukraine.
Doing a Poisson regression on the VALREF data set, using the
responses from Q1, Q2, and Q3 as dependent variables and five Income
independent variables (language, gender, oblast, income, and When analyzing income and willingness to fight we find that
education), we find little or no coherence18 between the lower income classes are more than expected “not at all
 PROBLEMS OF POST-COMMUNISM 9

Table 5. Summary of Post Hoc Test with Bonferroni Correction on Q3

prepared” compared to the other income classes. Furthermore, measures based only on official statistics give a false descrip­
the high-income class is more than expected “already doing it” tion of reality. Many observers maintain that inequality
compared to the other income classes, but we have no valid remains a serious problem in Ukraine despite the low Gini-
tests across regions at this point. coefficient (Cherep, Helman, and Makazan 2022, 164).
Rating found in October 2020 that high income correlated
with increased willingness to fight. In that year, 66 percent of
those with high income reported willingness to fight.19 As the Gender
VALREF data shows, 35 percent of the respondents in all
income classes were “fully prepared” to join the fight. The In terms of gender, it is likely that the existence of male
difference in willingness to fight is in “I am already doing it,” conscription may have had its own effect on the reported
where high income has a share of 11 percent and the other willingness to fight: if you know you cannot refuse, then why
income classes report around 3 percent. Table 6 below inves­ not embrace the idea. A related factor may be that a significant
part of the female and underage part of the population fled
tigates Q2, “Are you personally prepared to train in the use of
after February 2022. UNICEF estimated that by April 4, 2022,
weapons/light arms,” across income classes.20
5 million people had fled Ukraine. Of these, about 90 percent
As we can see in Table 6, we find some differences across
were women and children.21 With close family members safe
income classes. The low-income class is more than expected
and at a significant geographical distance, it may be easier to
using the answer option ‘not at all prepared’ and less than
report willingness to fight than if they were close by.
expected using the answer option “I am already doing it.” The
The October 2020 Rating survey showed that the willing­
high-income class answers more than expected option 5, “I am ness to fight was significantly higher for men (73 percent) than
already doing it.” Similar findings are found on Q1 and Q3. In for women (48 percent).22 However, the March 2022 survey
other words, respondents in high-income classes are more from the same agency demonstrated that the mobilizing effect
willing to fight and help the Ukrainian army than low- of the war in terms of taking up arms was even higher for
income classes. women than for men. In the March survey, 90 percent of men
Both the Rating results and VALREF data are in contra­ declared a willingness to fight. That constituted a 17–percen­
diction to the findings from the theoretical literature on tage points increase since 2020. In the same survey, 73 percent
income and the willingness to fight. Here, scholars have argued of women declared a willingness to fight.23 This represented
that the willingness to fight tends to be lower among the rich, a 25–percentage point increase. Thus, there was actually
at least in highly unequal societies (Anderson, Getmansky, and a higher willingness among Ukrainian women to take up
Hirsch-Hoefler 2018). The question of whether Ukraine is arms after the outbreak of war in February 2022 than there
a highly unequal society or not is contentious. The GINI- had been among Ukrainian men before. The April 2022
coefficient, a standard measure of economic inequality, is VALREF and Info-Sapiens survey showed somewhat lower
one of the lowest in the world. However, economists warn results for both genders, 82 percent for men and 60 percent
that the size of the shadow economy probably is so large that for women.
10 T. BUKKVOLL AND F. B. STEDER

Table 6. Chi-square Test and Post Hoc Test with Bonferroni Correction on Q2

Why the War Resulted in an Increased Willingness to this article simply refers to how people answered World Values
Fight and Resist Survey (WVS) question 254: “How proud are you to be
Ukrainian?” The national pride effect is probably connected
Despite the fact that respondents living in partly occupied
to a “oneness with a group” feeling (Paredes, Brinol, and
oblasts felt less “fully prepared” than respondents living in
Gomez 2018, 517). Such pride may come from both ethnic
non-occupied oblasts, the VALREF survey shows an overall
and civic sources. Two markers of ethnic pride would be self-
large share of willingness to fight (see Figure 1). Combining
identification as ethnic Ukrainian and the use of Ukrainian as
the VALREF survey with other surveys we see a significant
opposed to Russian in daily conversations. The evidence sug­
overall increase in the willingness to fight after the Russian
gests that the ethnic factor is of limited importance. It is true
invasion. The question is whether there are reasons for this
that the percentage of those who answered in Ukrainian to the
increase other than the social characteristics discussed above.
question “Who are you by nationality?” rose from 88 percent
We identify at least four correlating changes in popular opi­
in October 2020 to 92 percent in April 2022.24 However, this
nion that may be related to the increased reported willingness to
was not a particularly big rise and is also not necessarily the
fight and resist: (1) a rise in national pride; (2) a rise in trust in
same as ethnic self-identification. We do not know to what
Ukrainian political institutions; (3) a rise in trust in the Ukrainian
extent respondents saw nationality as an ethnic or civic cate­
armed forces; and (4) an impression that Ukraine is not alone in
gory. More importantly, earlier statistics show the same rate in
its struggle. In terms of the latter, we mean both in the sense that
the rise of the answer “Ukrainian” to that question can be
Ukraine is fighting for something more than its own freedom and
found all the way back to at least 2012. That was before both
in the sense that other countries are ready to assist and share some
the annexation of Crimea, the war in the Donbas, and the
of the burden. The first correlation is the only one of the three
expansion into the current war. Much of the same can be
theoretically derived assumptions discussed at the beginning of
said for the increasing use of the Ukrainian language as the
the article for which we find support. The other three are induc­
main means of communication in people’s homes. This rose
tively derived from our own observations of the war.
from 46 percent in August 2020 to 51 percent in April 2022
and stayed at that level in August 2022.25 Again, this is an
increase but not a very dramatic one.
National Pride
It should be noted, however, that Rating found a 42 percent
Previous research has found a strong link between national rise in respondents who reported that they aimed to increase
pride and the willingness to fight. The term “national pride” in their overall use of the Ukrainian language from before to after
 PROBLEMS OF POST-COMMUNISM 11

the February 2022 invasion. Similarly, an August 2022 popular trust in Zelensky’s leadership seems beyond doubt.
National Democratic Institute (NDI) survey found that 82 per­ This support is also overwhelming throughout the country.
cent had started to use Ukrainian more frequently after the Although somewhat lower in the east, the support for him
start of the war (NDI August 2022).26 Whether this is a sign of there was at 83 percent in March 2022. In the west and in
increasing ethnic nationalism can be discussed. Speaking central Ukraine it was 96 percent, and in the south it was
Ukrainian in public may be as much a tribute to the indepen­ 89 percent.31
dent Ukrainian state as it is to the ethnic Ukrainian nation. Of Furthermore, the current trust in the Ukrainian state is not
course, we cannot know this for sure without further investi­ limited to the president. Asked to evaluate the efficiency of
gation, but the latter finding at least suggests that a rise in the Ukrainian state structures as such, only 45 percent thought
ethnic component of national pride should not be excluded as these performed well or rather well in November 2021. By
a cause for some of the rise in the willingness to resist and fight. May 2022, that figure had risen to 94 percent.32 It is of course
Still, the evidence for a correlation between increased civic likely that many respondents thought about different parts of
nationalism and the willingness to fight seems considerably the state structure at the two different points in time. The
stronger. November 2021 poll most likely caught sentiments regarding
For example, when respondents were asked whether they structures and institutions relevant in a time of peace, such as
would have supported independence for Ukraine if the 1991 social services, the legal system, or the battle against corrup­
referendum had been repeated today, 81 percent answered in tion. The May 2022 figures probably reflect more concern with
the affirmative in August 2020. That figure had risen to 97 per­ the armed forces and war-related efforts of other state institu­
cent in August 2022.27 Furthermore, in a July 2022 survey by tions. Nevertheless, the figures do suggest that the popular
the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), where trust in political institutions is broader than just “the
respondents had to choose among several identities the one Zelensky effect.”
that was most important to them, 85 percent chose “citizen of Finally, new figures showing a decreasing desire to emigrate
Ukraine” and only 3 percent “representative of own ethnic support the trust in the political leadership findings. If people
group.” Those 85 percent had risen from 65 percent in had little faith in the ability of the political leadership and state
a survey immediately prior to the invasion.28 institutions to lead the country to victory, then we would
Similarly, in an August 2022 Info-Sapines Survey con­ expect more of them to think about leaving. The figures
ducted together with the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, show that the desire to work abroad decreased from 35 percent
98 percent of respondents said they were proud to be citizens in July 2020 to 28 percent in June 2022, and even more
of Ukraine. Info-Sapiens had asked this question in surveys compellingly, the number of Ukrainians who would like to
since 2002, but August 2022 was the first time that the “proud” move permanently abroad declined from 27 percent in
response had been the same in all major regions of the country. June 2020 to only 9 percent in June 2022.33 Here, though,
In 2002, only 41 percent of respondents had been proud to be there seems to be a limit to the population’s endurance.
citizens of Ukraine. After the 2014 events, this figure rose to Asked about whether they planned a future for their children
67 percent, and then to 98 percent after the February 2022 in Ukraine even if the war with Russia were to continue
attack.29 indefinitely, only 43 percent answered in the affirmative.
That percentage rose to 55 percent in case of a temporary
ceasefire, 77 percent in case of an end to the war because of
Trust in Political Institutions
a democratic revolution in Russia, 85 percent in case of an end
In addition to national pride, one would expect the stated to the war by Russian capitulation, or in case of victory in the
willingness to fight to correlate with trust in the country’s war and Ukraine joining NATO.34
political institutions. Most important among them would be Of course, much of this optimism may be based on the fact
the country’s political leadership. If you seriously question that Ukraine has done much better in terms of resisting the
whether the political leadership has the right motives for Russian invasion than many, probably also in Ukraine, had
sending you into war or the necessary competence to conduct thought possible before the onset of war. We do not know
the war, this would most likely negatively influence your will­ what effects military setbacks might have on those figures.
ingness to fight. This is the variable where the sociological data Furthermore, a courageous and competent political leader­
show the strongest changes from before to after the onset ship and well-functioning state institutions alone are no guar­
of war. antee of success in war. If they are combined with weak or
To start with trust in the president; it rose from slightly less incompetently led armed forces, the war may still end in
than 40 percent in October 2020 to 93 percent in defeat. Thus, a person considering his or her willingness to
March 2022.30 Thus, trust in Volodymyr Zelensky more than fight is also likely to assess the quality of the armed forces
doubled from before to after. There are probably a number of separately from other state institutions before making
reasons for this radical change, but the fact that the president a decision to risk his or her life. If there is a high probability
stayed in Kyiv to continue to govern the country from home of losing your life because of incompetent operational or
was probably among the most important. tactical leadership, one is unlikely to join. In order to evaluate
Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba thinks that if this factor, the population would need to feel that they have an
Zelensky had followed US advice and fled into exile, Ukraine acceptable level of information about what is going on within
would have lost the war (Gordon 2022). That statement is the military organization. In this respect, it is important to
a counterfactual, impossible to prove or disprove, but the note that already as of August 2022, 54 percent of Ukrainians
12 T. BUKKVOLL AND F. B. STEDER

reported that they had someone close to them who either had against Russia as a defense of democracy also beyond their
fought or was currently fighting.35 Thus, more than half of borders.
Ukrainians had by that time more or less direct access to On the issue of burden sharing by other countries, there was
information on how the troops themselves evaluated the per­ initially a feeling of disappointment that other countries did
formance of the organization in which they were fighting. not do more. Info-Sapiens found at the end of May that
Trust in the institution of the armed forces has been relatively Ukrainians were far from satisfied with other countries’ will­
high in Ukraine at least since the mid-2000s (Pecheniuk and ingness to share the military burden with them. No less than
Pecheniuk 2021), but it seems beyond doubt that it has increased 71 percent agreed with the statement that military aid from
since the start of the war. In August 2022, after six months of war, NATO was insufficient.41 However, at about the same time,
approval of the armed forces stood at 98 percent of the Rating found that 77 percent of the population thought that
population.36 Important to notice here is that this poll was taken Ukrainians and “other European peoples” were fighting the
before the major breakthrough and liberation of Kharkiv Oblast in war together.42 The latter view seems to have prevailed. At the
the beginning of September 2022 and the Russian retreat from end of September, a KIIS survey found that as many as 81 per­
Kherson in November of that year. Thus, approval of this institu­ cent of respondents thought the Ukrainian progress on the
tion was almost complete even at a time when the forces had not battlefield was a result of joint Ukrainian–Western efforts. Of
yet demonstrated a strong ability to retake territory. these 81 percent, 40 percent saw the advances as mainly
Another potential indication of trust in the military is belief Ukrainian but with some assistance from the West, 36 percent
in military victory. The motivation for participating in combat thought they were the results of equal efforts, and 5 percent
is probably higher if you think your side is likely to win. In found them mostly to be the result of Western efforts (KIIS,
January 2022, before the invasion, 56 percent of respondents 2022–09–29).43 Here, one could argue that foreign military aid
thought Ukraine might achieve victory in a war with Russia. In may not necessarily increase the willingness to fight. It is also
March 2022, after the invasion, that figure had risen to 93 ­ possible to imagine that many might be happy to let others do
percent.37 This war optimism is probably also one reason why the job and take the risks for them, if possible. However, such
89 percent of respondents in March 2022 were against an effect would be unlikely in the current case. No external
a temporary ceasefire unless Russia first conducted a full with­ country has been willing to supply troops. Foreign aid in terms
drawal of its troops from Ukraine.38 of armaments, intelligence, and training would have been
An August 2022 survey by the Democratic Initiatives useless unless the Ukrainians themselves stepped up in terms
Foundation found a similar strong belief in victory. of manpower.
Interestingly, however, the findings of this latter survey suggest
that the war optimism is not necessarily preconditioned on
a quick victory. Of the 90 percent who believed in victory, only Conclusion
31 percent thought victory would come by the end of 2022;
Based on the findings of this study, there is no doubt that
34 percent thought it would take 1–2 years and 7 percent
Russian president Vladimir Putin’s use of armed force against
thought it could take 3–5 years.39
Ukraine turned the Ukrainians into staunch defenders of their
country. Before the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of
war in the Donbas in 2014, figures from the World Value
International Solidarity Survey showed them to be among the most pacifist peoples
Finally, it is also reasonable to assume that a conviction that of Europe. Today, the stated willingness to fight and resist is
Ukraine is not alone in this struggle may contribute to the rise generally strong throughout the country. Nevertheless, we
in the Ukrainian willingness to fight. This may take at least two found that respondents in partly occupied areas were some­
forms. First, an understanding that Ukraine is not only fight­ what less prepared to take part in armed resistance or train in
ing for its own survival but also for a bigger cause, such as the the use of weapons than those in non-occupied areas. That
future of democracy, may increase the importance of the finding partly seems to contradict the results from the
struggle in people’s eyes. Second, a belief in the willingness March 2022 PRIO survey that exposure to combat made peo­
and ability of other countries to support Ukraine in its struggle ple more willing to fight.
increase the chances of a victory, and thus the willingness of In terms of the willingness to fight versus the willingness to
people to participate in the war. resist (in terms of assisting the Armed Forces of Ukraine in
Regarding the first, there is so far little survey evidence. True, other ways than taking part in combat yourself), we find no
the support for democracy as a system of government has major differences based on gender or region. Individuals from
increased significantly after the Russian invasion. An NDI survey all regions and both genders report such willingness in roughly
from August 2022 found that 94 percent of respondents in central, equal degrees. However, we do find that people with higher
eastern, and southern Ukraine said it was important to them that education and higher income tend to report a higher willing­
Ukraine became a full democracy. For western Ukraine, the figure ness to fight whereas the opposite group to a larger extent see
was 96 percent. That was up from 82 percent in western Ukraine, their role as supporting by other means. So far we do not have
76 percent in central, 72 percent in southern, and 71 percent in any evidence to explain why this is the case.
eastern in August 2021.40 Thus, the appreciation for democracy is The study also shows that the rapid changes in
now massive across Ukrainian regions. So far, however, we do not Ukrainians’ willingness to fight and resist challenge some
have data on the extent to which Ukrainians see their struggle of the postulates of the existing theoretical literature. The
 PROBLEMS OF POST-COMMUNISM 13

strong standing of hierarchy, collectivism, and materialism 9. https://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukraine/

in Ukraine did not result in a high willingness to fight fbb3f3c52d452cdd1646d4a62b69dba5.html and https://ratinggroup.
prior to Putin’s use of force. After that use of force, how­ ua/en/research/ukraine/ko_dnyu_zaschitnika_ukrainy.htm.
10. Central, east, and south region.
ever, the willingness to fight doubled with a speed that 11. This is the most updated language mapping we could find.
cannot be explained by any significant shift in these values. 12. The VALREF data in the oblasts are not a good representation of
Furthermore, the assumption that the wealthy are less will­ the local population.
ing to fight than the poor in unequal societies is not 13. The Bonferroni correction refers to the process of adjusting the alpha
level so that we control for the probability of committing a false
confirmed by the VALREF dataset. We find that the
positive, or incorrectly reject a true null hypothesis (type 1 error).
wealthy, although not the very richest, are already partici­ 14. Bordering Russia, and occupied (April 2022) after the full-scale
pating in fighting to a much greater degree than either the invasion, see Figure 2.
less wealthy or the “extremely” wealthy. In other words, 15. Red indicates “less than expected” and yellow indicates “more than
respondents in the high-income classes are more willing expected.”
both to fight and to help the Ukrainian army. 16. Russian-speaking, high income, and basic education.
17. No significant result for Russian-speaking respondents and
Finally, national pride is confirmed as something that females. The other tests (low income and basic education), not
correlates strongly with the willingness to fight and resist. shown in Table 3, were returned as no valid tests.
However, in the Ukrainian case, we find a significant cor­ 18. Coherence measures whether datasets correspond to each other.
relation only with a rise in the civic as opposed to the Correlation measures degree of similarity.
ethnic version of national pride. Whether that is only 19. https://ratinggroup.ua/files/ratinggroup/reg_files/rg_defenders_
day_102020_press.pdf.
a Ukrainian phenomenon or a more general trend could 20. In the VALREF data collection income was classified by 6
be a topic for further investigation. Overall, however, we options that we have categorized in three: Low income (1 |
question to what extent the existing theoretical literature is Need to save on food and 2 | Enough for food. To buy
able to predict behavior in this regard once enemy use of clothes, shoes, you need to save up or borrow). Medium
force is a fact. income (3 | Enough for food and the necessary clothes,
shoes. For a good suit, a mobile phone, need to save up or
To draw valid conclusions about causality is difficult
borrow and 4 | Enough for food, clothes, shoes. But to buy
given the limited availability of data and the exploratory expensive things (TV, refrigerator) need to save up or bor­
nature of this study. Still, our findings indicate that trust in row). High Income (5 | Enough for food, clothes, shoes,
Ukrainian political institutions, trust in the Ukrainian expensive purchases. For car, an apartment, need to save up
armed forces, and a rising recognition that Ukraine is not or borrow and 6 | I can make any necessary purchases at any
alone in its struggle affect the willingness to fight and time).
21. https://www.unicef.org/media/118666/file/2022-HAC-Ukraine-
resist. It would therefore seem logical to explore these and-Refugee-Outflow-revised-April.pdf.
factors more thoroughly in future studies. A more general 22. https://ratinggroup.ua/files/ratinggroup/reg_files/rg_defenders_
finding of this study is that a protracted war may not day_102020_press.pdf.
necessarily reduce the willingness to fight and resist. We 23. https://ratinggroup.ua/files/ratinggroup/reg_files/rg_ua_1200_
must of course hope that we never have to find out if that 032022_war_press.pdf.
24. https://ratinggroup.ua/files/ratinggroup/reg_files/rg_ua_1000_
is true. However, if the war drags on for years, this will be ideological_markers_ua_042022_press.pdf.
one of the most important questions to study for both 25. https://ratinggroup.ua/files/ratinggroup/reg_files/rg_ua_1000_
politicians and analysts alike. independence_082022_xvii_press.pdf.
26. https://ratinggroup.ua/files/ratinggroup/reg_files/rg_ua_1000_
independence_082022_xvii_press.pdf and https://www.ndi.org/
sites/default/files/Opportunities%20and%20Challenges%20Facing
Notes %20Ukraine%E2%80%99s%20Democratic%20Transition%
20August%20%28English%29.pdf.
1. National Values and Political Reforms in Post-Maidan Ukraine, or 27. https://ratinggroup.ua/files/ratinggroup/reg_files/rg_ua_1000_
in short, VALREF, is an international project financed by the independence_082022_xvii_press.pdf.
Norwegian Research Council. 28. https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=
2. Authors’ own calculation based on the WVS database available at 1131&page=2.
https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.js. 29. https://sapiens.com.ua/en/publication-single-page?id=241 (down­
3. https://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukraine/ loaded October 3, 2022).
fbb3f3c52d452cdd1646d4a62b69dba5.html and Rating databases 30. https://ratinggroup.ua/files/ratinggroup/reg_files/rg_ua_1200_
available at https://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukraine/ko_dnyu_ 032022_war_press.pdf.
zaschitnika_ukrainy.htm. 31. https://ratinggroup.ua/files/ratinggroup/reg_files/rg_ua_1200_
4. https://ratinggroup.ua/files/ratinggroup/reg_files/rg_ua_1200_ 032022_war_press.pdf.
032022_war_press.pdf. 32. https://ratinggroup.ua/files/ratinggroup/reg_files/rg_dynamics_
5. Authors’ own calculation based on the database at https://www. of_ukraine_s_government_assessment_cati_2000_052022.pdf.
worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.js. 33. https://ratinggroup.ua/files/ratinggroup/reg_files/rg_ua_job_
6. https://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukraine/ko_dnyu_zaschit income_1000_ua_072022_%D1%85v_press.pdf.
nika_ukrainy.htm. 34. https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=
7. https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/Opportunities%20and% 1118&page=5.
20Challenges%20Facing%20Ukraine%E2%80%99s% 35. https://ratinggroup.ua/files/ratinggroup/reg_files/rg_ua_veter
20Democratic%20Transition%20August%20%28English%29.pdf. ans_1000_ua_082022_%D1%85vi_press.pdf.
8. See https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2023/07/ukraine-civilian- 36. https://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/opros_iri_obschest
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