THE KUHN PARADIGMS: WHAT THEY ARE AND WHAT THEY ARE FOR

This work presents a brief outline of Thomas Kuhn's paradigms and their foundation.
scientific of the same, as well as the main characteristics of the Kuhnian methodology.
It also establishes a comparison between the paradigms of Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper.
pointing out the main differences between both.

The problems of conclusively falsifying a theory, since the observable statements

depends on the theory itself, as well as the difficulty of scientific progress if applied in a way
Radical falsificationism led some researchers to reflect on the resistance to change in
scientific theories because they are not found in isolation but function as
organized structures. Among these authors, and within the so-called historical school, stands out
Kuhn, who in his work 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions' posits a conception
discontinuity of the scientific development process.

The topic that has been decided to address is called the Kuhn Paradigm, extracted from the work of
Thomas Kuhn, especially from his book“The Structures of Scientific Revolutions”In the
There are few references to the topic in Marxist literature; in fact, I have only found isolated notes. It is
to say that it has not been refuted with the firmness that it required and, once again, old ideas
they were smuggled within the scientific spirit.

Kuhn began his training focusing on the history of science, which broke the mold.
many of the prejudices that the author had about science. Thanks to this study, Kuhn discovered
that science is also a historical product, hence the word 'revolution' in his work, concept
typically historiographic and social, from which the concept of paradigm will derive. Kuhn attempts to offer
an image of science adjusted to its history, with what needs to be reconsidered is an idyllic vision of
the science that identifies it with an eternal and timeless knowledge, with that classical image of science that
It conceives it as the discipline that treasures the truth.

Kuhn graduated in theoretical physics with studies in the history of science and quickly became
to become convinced that the traditional image of science did not correspond to reality. He observed
a contrast between social scientists and natural scientist communities. In the search
A explanation of the origin of these differences is found with the concept of paradigm, which
occupies a central role in their epistemological theses. Two philosophical positions can be deduced: the
positivism and empiricism.

The first position dates back to the early 1920s and from it, the sciences are divided into two.
large groups:

1- The formal ones: logic, mathematics.

2- The factics: physical reality, biology, psychology, and social. The character is reductionist.

That date suggests thinking of another world, very different from today; however, it has a character
actual.
One can think that something repeats, along with the emergence of the novel and destabilizing.
Then a distinction was established between contexts: of discovery and of justification; and it
puts forward the proposal of a new scientific idea.

Empiricism emerged around the 1960s, sidelining logical aspects and emphasizing interest in
the sociological and historical factors. The most significant representative of this current is Tomas
Kuhn.

That finding of contrasts between the "natural" sciences and social sciences led him to the search for others.
explanations and encountered the concepts of: paradigm, normal science, enigma, crisis, and
incommensurability. From there, his guiding idea is that of 'scientific revolution.'

It is based on Gestalt theory; in studies on language and perception; it demystifies disciplines.

like physics, astronomy raises doubts about its objectivity.

In its evolution, three stages are distinguished:

1- Describe science as a discontinuous process, with interruptions of events.

"revolutionaries", which break the course taken up to that moment. These developments crystallize
In 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions' - Chicago - 1962 (published in Spanish in Buenos Aires.
in 1990)

The version of "Postdata" published in 1969. Here it describes a more moderate stance.

3-His final position, developed in 'The Road Since Structure'

1990-PSA-Michigan (in English).

Kuhn says that these rules do not manifest themselves explicitly "the explicit rules...are
generally common to a large scientific group; but the same cannot be said of the
paradigms...even the same men who start studying the same books...can, in
the course of your specialization...finding very different paradigms...”...”the activity governed by
a paradigm is characterized by the resolution of enigmas... when this does not happen, it leads to a
crisis situation…the foundations are laid for the establishment of a new paradigm…that which emerges
suddenly…in the mind of a man deeply immersed in crisis.

Kuhn has sought a superior approach to Popper with his theory of normal science and
scientific revolutions that alter that normal situation to return to a new normality.
Kuhn points out that sciences progress cyclically starting from an accepted paradigm by the
scientific community and research during a period of normal science. Normal science attempts
adapt the theory to practice, but there may be certain discrepancies. These discrepancies, if they are not
resolved become anomalies, and if these accumulate it leads to a crisis that entails the
fall of the old paradigm, and the rise of a scientific revolution in which the old
paradigm is replaced by a new one incompatible with the previous one. Therefore, for this author,
Science does not develop through the accumulation of individual discoveries or inventions,
but it is formed as a process of breaking away from what came before. In the process of translation - it brings us

remember Wells (1976) – from the old set of ideas to the new, the community of scientists follows a
number of determined steps:
1- Recognition of anomalies.

2- Period of insecurity.

3- Development of alternative idea groups.

4- Identification of schools of thought.

5- Dominance of new ideas.

In this development, problems will arise, phenomena that are not explained by the paradigm. If
these difficulties are consolidated, it can lead to a crisis that can only be resolved from a new
paradigm. When this new paradigm breaks radically with the previous one, a
scientific revolution. Once the functioning of the general process has been explained, we can explain
one by one all the concepts that are involved in it:

Paradigm: coordinates and directs problem-solving and its approach. It is the model of
doing science that guides scientific research and blocks any budget,
method or alternative hypothesis. The paradigm is the support for normal science. It consists of
laws and theoretical assumptions, as well as applications of those laws and the equipment
necessary for them. A metaphysical principle also appears in the background, a
conception of reality and things.

Normal science: the activity of solving problems, theoretical or experimental, governed by the rules.
from a paradigm. Only from the paradigm can the appropriate means be achieved to solve problems.
Unexplained phenomena are anomalies, the responsibility of the scientist, not the theory.
scientific "lives" in the paradigm. Prescience is characterized by a lack of agreement on it.
fundamental, for the 'debate' about the main laws and guiding principles. Normal science,
on the contrary, it is based on a shared model, in an agreement that serves as a starting point
funding for scientific research.

Crisis: the existence of anomalies does not imply a crisis. Only if it affects the foundation of the paradigm and
it is not overcome, the phenomenon would be a crisis. Anomalies also lead to a crisis when
there are social needs or demands, scarce time, or accumulation of anomalies. The crisis
marked professional insecurity: doubt arises, discussion ensues, and it may even end up
forming a rival paradigm.

In any case, articulated theories are still scientific by the fact that they have been
discarded. However, it is difficult to consider development as a process of accumulation.
Historical research itself, which shows the difficulties in isolating inventions and discoveries.
individuals, provides the basis for harboring deep doubts about the accumulation process,
through which it was believed that those individual contributions to science had emerged (Kuhn,
1971).

It is evident that the scientific demarcation criteria derived from falsification, although critical of
the traditional methodology remains on the same line. In contrast, Kuhn, with his book 'The...
The structure of scientific revolutions explains scientific behavior by contributions.
criticisms directed at the theory. Kuhn indicates that when theories fail to overcome a
test, they are not rejected and replaced by others, but rather modifications are introduced or else they
they ignore the anomalies. One of their most noteworthy characteristics is their frontal rejection of the point of
view of the inductivist methodology.

Kuhn's contribution revolves around the following concepts: Paradigm, Normal Science and
Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn understands the concept of paradigm in two senses (Pheby, 1988,
p. 37):

First: it would mean a success that is considered so important that it is capable of attracting a group of
scientists who engage in competitive activity.

Second: it is understood as a step in scientific development that is capable of providing a solution to

unsolved problems. If we look at their literal definition, the paradigms are:
Universally recognized scientific achievements that, for a time, provide
models of problems and solutions for a scientific community” (Kuhn, 1971, p. 13).

The concept of paradigm shapes the scene for the next stage of Kuhn's framework, the concept
of normal science. For Kuhn, there are alternating periods of normal science and periods of crisis. In
the phase of normal science, in which an essential body of theory is accepted, begins to emerge
situations that cannot be convincingly explained and are referred to as anomalies.
When anomalies increase, an unsustainable process occurs around normal science, which
which leads to the emergence of new theories or, in other words, a paradigm is replaced by
another.

By scientific community, Kuhn understands the organ of a consensus that brings together a group of
individuals who collaborate with each other, who are considered the only ones responsible for the
pursuit of scientific objectives in their specialty.

The breadth of the paradigm concept leads Kuhn to accept the imprecision of the term and
subsequently replace it with that of 'disciplinary matrix', disciplinary, because it refers to the
common heritage of those who practice a discipline, and matrix, because it refers to a set
ordered elements of diverse nature that require additional specification: 'A matrix
discipline is composed of paradigms, parts of paradigms that constitute a unit and
function together” (Katouzian, 1982, p. 123).

The process of replacing one paradigm with another can be summarized in the following stages:

Normal science, composed of accepted paradigms.

Small unexplained phenomena, regarding which the proponents of science

They normally trust in explaining them without changes in paradigms.

Force the theory to include such unexplained phenomena.

Period of confusion.

Period of innovation and opposition.

 Again normal science, integrated by the new accepted paradigms, with which the
dialectical process begins a new cycle.

When a paradigm is replaced by another, we encounter what Kuhn

denominates 'scientific revolution'.

Kuhn's thesis is based, therefore, on three fundamental concepts: paradigm, normal science and
scientific revolution. The first is defined (Kuhn, 1971) as that which shares a
scientific community, understood as the group of men who share a
paradigm. The previous definitions clearly show the circular nature of conceptualization.

The path opened by Kuhn points, then, not only to a different conception than the Popperian of
scientific progress and scientific rationality, but also fosters some reflection on the
purpose of the sciences, the responsibilities of scientific practice, and finding a perspective
towards the social epistemology of science (Mardones and Ursa, 1982).

According to Professor Gonzalo Angulo (1983), Kuhn's view on scientific evolution can
gather in the following stages: pre-science, normal science, crisis, revolution, new science
normal and new crisis. In the primitive state, points out the mentioned author, a science finds a certain
number of rival theories, those that try to overlap. When one of them succeeds, and it is
accepted by the scientific community, a phase of normal science begins. In it, the scientist
he works confidently in his paradigm while acknowledging that certain observations remain unresolved.
Subsequently, a new paradigm, as an alternative to the existing one, takes root in the community.
This is how the crisis period begins, which ends when scientists adhere to that new
paradigm and abandon the old one. In this way, at an undetermined time, the new paradigm
It is being installed, thus we begin a new period of normal science.

Kuhn offers a theory of scientific progress in which normal science is the norm and the
revolution the exceptional, realizing the acceptance of falsification by the community
extraordinary scientific character.

However, although the period of normal science seems to be characterized by

creative contributions of certain importance, has a great interest in scientific evolution because
how much they produce precisions around the current paradigm, which constitutes, to a large extent,
the main task of numerous scientists.

The vision of scientific development in Kuhn is characterized, therefore, by a process in which succession occurs.
in the periods of normal science and periods of extraordinary science or crisis.

Throughout a period of normal science, the theories and principles that give rise to a paradigm are
undisputedly accepted in the scientific community, giving rise to a process of
refinement of it. As Professor Quintanilla (1976) states, "scientific activity in
these times are limited to being a task of solving more or less new puzzles with the help of
the traditional instruments. It would be, in a way, a process in which the only thing that
What happens is that the field of experiences to which some theories apply increases and
prescribed procedures..." And as Schwartz (1972) indicates, during periods of normal science "the
the scientific community works based on an undisputed common paradigm or theory;
scientists primarily deal with solving the puzzles posed by such a paradigm. Far from
wanting to refute it by seeking factual counterexamples, scientists, in normal times, consider
the facts that do not correspond to what is predicted by the paradigm as anomalies that, or do
they are resolved, or archived, or taken as evidence of the experimenter's incapacity. The
the accumulation of anomalies, however, creates an environment of crisis in the scientific community;
the longer the crisis lasts, the more likely it is for the emergence -often simultaneously in several
distinct places - of a new paradigm, which will result in another era of normal science. Far from
to abandon their theories at the first sign of refutation, scientists tend to hold on to them
against the anomalies until they have another more satisfactory paradigm to rely on.

Kuhn (1971) points out, for his part, that 'discovery begins with the perception of the
anomaly, that is, with the recognition that in a certain way nature has violated the
induced expectations by the paradigm that governs normal science. This substitution of
paradigms take place when the energy of a crisis and an alternative paradigm are satisfied. That
it is the point where resistance to change weakens and ultimately collapses.

In this way, with the establishment of the new paradigm, three important objectives are achieved.
demands (Katauzian, 1982): "Offers a solution to the scientific crisis; provides a new vision
of the world; and finally offers an alternative research agenda that scientists
work.

On the other hand, it is worth noting that the thesis defended by Kuhn was aimed, in a way, at criticizing
the methodology of Popper. As is well known, this author denies the existence of any procedure of
verification, and instead emphasizes the importance of falsification, that is, of the proof that,
Due to its negative result, it is necessary to reject an established theory. In this
meaning, Kuhn (1971) points out "the role that in this essay we attribute to anomalous experiences;
sea, to the experiences that, by provoking crises, prepare the way for a new theory. Without
however, anomalous experiences cannot be equated with those of falsification. In fact, I doubt
a lot that these last ones exist.

Moreover, Kuhn argues, Losee (1981) states that the logical construction of the proposition of
Popper's falsification is not applicable to the case of rejecting a paradigm, since it does not
invalid by comparison of its consequences with the elements of empirical judgment, but the
the rejection of a paradigm is rather a triangular relationship in which a
established paradigm, a rival paradigm, and the observational judgment elements. Science,
Well, it enters a revolutionary stage when a promising alternative paradigm emerges.

Nonetheless, Kuhn's interpretation regarding the discontinuities in the development of

science, are explained based on their conception of scientific revolution, it was not so
different from the Popperian one. As Kuhn himself later writes (Lákatos and Musgrave, 1975),
referring to Popper, "... his views on science and mine are very
approximately identical. Both of us are more occupied with the dynamics of the process through the
how scientific knowledge is acquired with the logical structure of the products of the
scientific research.

Given this occupation, we both emphasize, as legitimate data, the facts and also in the
spirit of real scientific life, and both often turn to history in search of them.
From this common data pool, we draw many identical conclusions. Both
we reject the viewpoint that science progresses through accumulation; instead, both
we emphasize the revolutionary process through which an old theory is rejected and
replaced by a new one incompatible with it, and both of us strongly underline the role that in this
the process plays the eventual failure of the old theory in addressing the challenges it faces
logic, experimentation or observation. Finally, Sir Karl and I are united in opposition to
some more characteristic theses of classical positivism.

It should be added that the main novelty brought by this author is the concept of paradigm, and that
the main differences that separate it from the positivists are found in the substitution of the
individual by the scientific community and the theory by the paradigm, as well as the elimination of the
linear accumulation of facts and theories through normal and revolutionary phases in science.

Lastly, it should be noted that motivated by the criticism received for the imprecision of the concept of
paradigm, Kuhn (1971) suggests the use of the term 'disciplinary matrix' as a replacement for it
last, because it refers to the common possession of practitioners of a particular discipline and is
composed of ordered elements of various types. These elements would be the following
they are exposed:

1- Symbolic generalizations: they are components generally accepted by the group and easily
represented in a logical form.

Agreements or group models: they are beliefs that provide the group with analogies and metaphors.
preferred or permissible. Helping to determine what will be accepted as a solution to
enigmas, and conversely, assisting in the determination of the list of unsolved enigmas and in the
evolution of the importance of each of them.

3- Values: they are the elements that contribute the most to considering the scientific community as a
everything. Its particular importance arises when the members of a scientific community must
identify the crises or, subsequently, choose between theories.

4- Exemplars: they are shared agreements regarding solutions to concrete problems that are
they consider it of interest to the community in the field of research specific to it.

In a more restricted sense, a paradigm is similar to this last element, which in principle was
defined by Kuhn (1971) as 'the universally recognized scientific achievements that
for a certain period, they provide models and solutions to a scientific community.

In conclusion, we can indicate that the Kuhnian methodology advocates that scientific progress
it cannot be established in terms of the search for the ultimate truth, but in successive
substitutions of paradigms, or revolutions, that occur over time. Opposite idea to
Popper, in the sense that for the latter, the history of science is the history of continuous
"conjectures and refutations", for this would be in a state of permanent revolution.
To illustrate this idea, we can quote the following words from Katouzian (1982, p. 126):
While Popper argues that the scientific research process consists of continuous
attempts to falsify refutable hypotheses. Kuhn would maintain that scientific progress occurs only
sometimes, when those same refutable hypotheses are in crisis and change through
a revolution, that is, the scientific community accepts falsification only under certain circumstances
extraordinary.