2.

Confederalism, regionalism and regionalized states

Scholars of comparative federalism have distinguished between various forms
of governance that may embody some elements of federalism, without
resulting in the formation of a federation (unions, constitutionally
decentralized unions, federacies, associated states, condominiums, leagues,
joint functional authorities; see Elazar 1987: 38–64; and Watts 1996: 8–9 for
examples). A full discussion of all these terms is not needed here, but the
distinction between a federation and a confederation, on the one hand, and a
federation and a regionally devolved state (or a regionalized state), on the
other, is useful. Compared with a federation, a confederation provides for a
stronger position of the compounded entities. First, the entities that form a
confederal arrangement maintain their character as sovereign states. Second,
in contrast with federal structures, confederations do not rule out the
unilateral exit or secession of one or several of the federated entities. Third,
confederal centres do not act directly upon the people, but prescribe the
consent of the political institutions of the confederal entities first (for instance
the member-state legislatures or their populations). Finally, decisions of the
centre require the consent of all the states. Hence, the principle of unanimity
fully applies (Croisat 1992). It is sometimes argued that the EU provides a good
contemporary example of a confederal structure. The member-states of the EU
act as sovereign states and are recognized as such in international
organizations such as the United Nations, NATO or the OECD. The EU operates
on the basis of a collection of treaties, and in principle member-states could
decide to leave the EU. Treaty amendments require the consent of all the
member-states by procedures of their choice (parliamentary consent,
referendum, etc.). In highly sensitive policy areas, such as foreign policy or
taxation, EU decision-making still requires the consent of all. However, in other
aspects the EU has already surpassed the status of a confederation. Most
common policy decisions are now taken by Qualified Majority Voting in the
Council. The doctrines of supremacy and direct effect of EU law were
established relatively early on in the process of European integration. While EU
primary and secondary legislation (treaties, directives or framework laws)
require further action by the member-state parliaments, this is not the case for
EU decisions (a different type of EU law). The EU is not a federation, but it is
already more than a confederation. Therefore, the best-known examples of
confederal structures are historical: the Swiss confederation prior to 1789 and
again between 1815 and 1845; the United Provinces of the Netherlands
between 1579 and 1795; the German Bund between 1815 and 1866; and the
USA from 1781 until 1789, arguably even until 1865, as the southern states did
not fully embrace US statehood until the civil war had ended (see Forsyth
1981: 60–72). The long-term viability (fattibilità) of confederal structures can
be questioned. The historic examples demonstrate that confederations are
likely to fall apart (Austria–Germany), to develop into federal states (USA,
Switzerland and Germany which emerged from the North German Bund) or
even into unitary decentralized states (the Netherlands). Confederal centres
are weaker in relation to the member-states of a confederation than federal
centres in relation to the regions of a federation. However, federal centres are
weaker in relation to the regions of a federation than the centres of a
regionalized state in relation to their regions. I will refer to regionalized states
as states that exemplify some form of ‘regional devolution’ (Keating 1998a:
113). Regional devolution is the result of a process of ‘regionalism’, a term that
is couched (formulato) in even more ambiguous terms than federalism.
Regionalism refers to a process which leads territorial subunits within or across
existing sovereign states to increase their influence. That process may have a
socioeconomic, political or cultural driving force or may be a combination of all
these factors. As such regionalism is in part a bottom-up process, but the
consent of the centre is needed to increase the levels of regional autonomy.
Ultimately, the centre may be willing to recognize a greater role for the regions
if that can safeguard or expand its political support across the state. Strong
forms of regionalism may produce a regionalized state (or transform the latter
into a full-fledged federation). Regionalized states have strongly developed
local or regional tiers of government with directly elected councils. Unlike the
regions of a federation, the regions in a regionalized state remain subordinate
to the central government. The centre can increase, decrease or even suspend
or withdraw the regional levels of autonomy without requiring the consent of
the regions. In addition the scope (la portata) of the devolved powers (poteri
delegati) (but in this regard Scotland is an exception) is not as extensive as is
the case in a federation. Spain is such a regionalized state, and in most of the
characteristics that were listed above already approximates to a full-fledged
federation. In Spain, the central government has negotiated Statutes of
Autonomy with each of the regions (Autonomous Communities). These
statutes cannot be unilaterally repealed (abrogata=annullata), although they
are bound by constitutional principles. Changing the constitution as such does
not require explicit regional consent. The UK is yet another example of such a
regionalized state. Successful regionalization efforts far only affect about 15
per cent of the population, that is, UK citizens who live in Scotland, Wales or
Northern Ireland. In principle, the British Parliament could expand or reduce
the autonomy of Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland without their explicit
consent (In reality, it is assumed that at least Scotland and Wales would not
lose all of their recently gained autonomy without the consent of the people
who live in both regions). Regions of a regionalized state stand in a weaker
position relative to the centre than regions in a federal state. However, they
are in a stronger position than the subnational entities in a unitary
decentralized state. Like regionalized states, the subnational entities owe their
strength to the centre. Most likely these subnational entities also have directly
elected councils and executive bodies. However, unlike the regions in a
regionalized state, they have fewer legislative, administrative and/or fiscal
powers. Compared with regionalized states, the ‘making’ of regional
boundaries is also more likely to be the result of top-down regional planning
than of bottom-up popular demand. Admittedly, there is no real cut-off point
between both groups and, in Western Europe alone, the number of unitary
decentralized states is still quite broad, comprising three different groups of
countries. At least two of them are moving in the direction of a regionalized
state, therefore I shall take them as the starting point of this overview. The
first group consists of Italy and France. At present, the Italian regions are about
to achieve the same level of regional autonomy as the Spanish autonomous
regions in the 1980s. Shortly after the Second World War, 5 ‘special’ regions
were recognized with specific cultural or geographic features. The regions of
Trentino-South Tyrol, Aoste and Friuli-Venezia-Giulia contain respectively
German-, French- and Slovenian-speaking minorities. They received a ‘statute
of autonomy’ which conferred some fiscal, socioeconomic and most
importantly cultural autonomy upon them. The geographically isolated island
regions of Sicily and Sardinia received some form of autonomy as well, focused
more on socioeconomic matters (Palermo 2005: 184–5). A further 15 ‘ordinary’
regions did not come into operation until the 1970s. Their autonomy did not
increase significantly until the late 1990s. None of these regions has clear
historical roots. Their borders were in fact ‘created’ in the 1930s for statistical
purposes. The collapse of communism in 1989 sent shockwaves through the
Italian party system. In some respects it also reawakened the so-called
Northern Question. GDP per head of the population was almost twice as high
in the Northwest and Northeast of Italy as in the South (Gold 2003: 66). The
Lega Nord tapped into the feelings of discontent that emerged from these
large socioeconomic divergences. It emerged as an important political force in
the North. It called for more Northern autonomy (provocatively even for the
secession of Padania, a fictitious state which encompasses the regions to the
north of the Po River). In this way, the North would be able to keep a larger
share of national wealth for itself and to stop financing ‘pork barrel’ projects
which exclusively benefited the South. Federalism or ‘devolution’ has been on
the agenda since the mid-1990s. At this stage, all regions have been offered a
statute of autonomy (but in July 2004, only two ordinary regions had
effectively enacted one). The regions have directly elected presidents and
assemblies. Some forums of intergovernmental relations have been set up to
incorporate the leading regional figures into central decisions which affect
their interests (such as the allocation of EU Structural Funds). However, most
of these mechanisms are ad hoc and generate non-binding decisions. The
Italian Senate does not operate as a territorial chamber. Furthermore, the
levels of regional autonomy remain relatively limited, both in policy and in
fiscal terms. It remains unclear in which policy domains the regions have the
final say. The Italian Constitutional Court has played a significant role in
clarifying that matter (Palermo 2005: 188). Since the so-called Bassanini laws
have been implemented (1999), central parliament cannot simply overturn
regional laws. A referendum in 2001 put Italy on course for further devolution,
possibly even federalism (Amoretti 2002, 2004). However, disagreements on
the nature of devolution (should all regions receive the same set of powers)
and widespread resistance to devolution among one of the central
government’s coalition partners (the right-wing but also ‘pro-centralist’
Alleanze Nationale) slowed down or even reversed the process of devolution.
When this happened, the Italian government was introducing legislation that
would ‘undo’ some of the reforms which the Italian population had agreed to
in 2001. In this sense, it makes sense not (yet) to include Italy in this
comparative study, that is, until more clarification is given on the distribution
of competencies, the autonomy of the regions and their participation in
intergovernmental channels. The possibility for each region to negotiate a
statute of autonomy with the centre is in fact very much inspired by the
Spanish example. At least in the medium long term this may give rise to ‘a
highly differentiated, asymmetrical regional system’ (Palermo 2005: 193). Next
to Italy, the French regional levels of government have strengthened
considerably in France since François Mitterrand enacted his decentralization
reforms in 1982. In 1991 regional autonomy was increased in Corsica and has
continued to expand there in the wake of small-scale nationalist violence
(Loughlin and Seiler 2001: 196–7). Yet, the political autonomy of the 22 French
regions is constrained in several respects. For instance, a centrally appointed
prefect (governor) coordinates central administrative powers and supervises
the regionally elected bodies in the exercise of their devolved powers (Keating
1998a: 113). In terms of the scope of their powers, regions remain the ‘weaker
cousins’ of the 96 departments and more than 36,000 local governments.
Regions only have some responsibility in economic development, transport,
secondary education, tourism, training and culture. Most regions employ less
than one hundred full-time salaried staff. Consequently, they rely on the
assistance of employees at the departmental or local levels. Their budgets
(which only consist of grants) are dwarfed by the budgets of the departmental
councils, despite the fact that they cater for larger population groups. For
instance, in 1995, the budget of the Nord department was twice the budget of
the Nord Pas de Calais region. This is so despite the fact that the region catered
for nearly four million inhabitants, and the department only for two and a half
million (Cole 2005: 122–3). Departments have a history that goes back to 1790.
Their political structure is supervised by centrally appointed prefects.
Departments are governed by councils with an (indirectly) elected basis.
Departments exemplify a form of ‘functional decentralization’, seeking to
uphold France’s Jacobin administrative philosophy of ‘a single and indivisible
Republic’. If we leave aside Corsica and Brittany, all of the French regions have
strong artificial roots; they are central bureaucratic creatures. In 2003–2004, a
constitutional reform finally recognized the regions as one of four levels of
local authority. The same reform also enabled the regions and departments to
bid for additional functions. The central parliament would be responsible for
decentralizing these functions (most likely transport infrastructure, such as
airports). After a period of five years it would assess whether their
decentralization should be made permanent. However, the constitution does
not tolerate wide-scale asymmetry (if a function is decentralized, it ought to be
decentralized to all similar types of subnational government). In July 2003, the
voters of Corsica were offered the possibility of merging their departmental
structures (Haute Corse and Corse-Sud) into a single regional unit. The
Corisican voters narrowly rejected it (Cole 2005: 129). The second group of
unitary decentralized states is made up of the Scandinavian countries (but it
excludes the special status of Greenland in relation to Denmark). The
Scandinavian countries have a tradition of unusually strong local government.
If we set aside the Swiss municipalities, Scandinavian local governments are
stronger in administrative and fiscal capacity than their counterparts in all the
other West European countries. Therefore, many analysts of fiscal federalism
lumped the Scandinavian countries together with the federal states, because
their local governments absorb such high shares of total public expenditure
(Ter-Minassian 1997; Fossati and Panella 1999; Wellisch 2000). However, it
would be wrong to consider these states as federal for three reasons. First, a
considerable amount of local government tasks relate to the administrative
implementation of central government welfare legislation. Municipalities have
a limited input in shaping that legislation. Second, the activities of local
government outputs are more often subject to central oversight. Third, the size
and number of municipalities can be adjusted with relative ease for reasons of
cost-efficiency or urban planning. For instance, the number of Swedish
municipalities was reduced from approximately 2,500 in the 1950s to 289 in
2001. Although this may have improved the long-term viability of the localities,
such a reform also illustrates the difference between the constitutional
position of a region in a federal state and that of a municipality in a
decentralized unitary state (Lindström 2001: 319–42). Changing the borders of
a region in a federal state, or merging existing regions cannot normally be
accomplished without some sort of regional consent. Creating the Swiss Jura
canton or merging the German Länder of Berlin and Brandenburg required the
consent of the affected regions (only with success in the first case). The final
group of countries is the easiest to classify. It consists of countries such as
Greece, Luxembourg or Portugal (excluding Madeira and the Azores) with
respectively weak or no regional tiers of government at all (Loughlin 2001).

3. Multilevel governance
In the previous section, I identified three major groups of states on the basis of
the institutional strength of the regions therein: federal states, regionalized
states and unitary decentralized states. Some may dispute the criteria that
were used to delineate these categories, but at least readers should know
what distinguishes them. The absence of clear, universally agreed cut-off
points, in particular between regionalized and unitary decentralized states, is
due to the frequent understanding of regionalism as a continuum and not as a
taxonomy. In this regard the more recently developed term of multilevel
governance (MLG) can be used as an umbrella concept in which all forms of
decentralization find their place. Two of the authors who popularized the term,
Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, defined MLG as the ‘dispersion of
authoritative decision-making across multiple territorial levels’ (Hooghe and
Marks 2001: xi). Initially, the concept of MLG was developed to provide a
better understanding of the EU, a political system which until the 1990s was
primarily interpreted through the contrasting lenses of intergovernmentalism
and (neo-)functionalism (Rosamond 2000). MLG provided a middle way
between both theories. It acknowledges the central position of national
governments in European integration, but also argues that ‘authority and
policy-making are shared across multiple levels of government – subnational,
national and supranational’ (Hooghe and Marks 2001: 2). Collective European
decision-making has weakened individual state autonomy, because some
decisions no longer prescribe unanimity voting but nonetheless enforce
common rules across the EU. Furthermore, MLG theorists make a strong claim
that subnational interests are not necessarily mediated through national
governments, but may find direct access to the European policy arena. Based
on their analysis in Multi-Level Governance and European Integration, Liesbet
Hooghe and Gary Marks seem to distinguish MLG from a federal stateformat.
They point at the lack of a formalized supreme constitutional framework which
specifies the legal ends (central competencies) of integration, and the absence
of EU statehood warranting the legitimate use of violence. Echoing the
confederal traits of the EU, they argue that ‘national governments in the
member-states have greater powers of self-determination than constituent
units in any existing federal state, and while the territorial units within a
federal regime tend to have similar subnational political systems, the domestic
political systems of the member states vary greatly’ (Hooghe and Marks 2001:
37). However, in their more recent work, Hooghe and Marks have broadened
the concept of MLG to include any type of political system that provides for
multiple territorial tiers of government (Hooghe and Marks 2003).