Foundations of Science manuscript No.

(will be inserted by the editor)

Physics is organized around transformations

connecting contextures in a polycontextural world

Johannes Falk · Edwin Eichler · Katja

Windt · Marc-Thorsten Hütt
arXiv:2204.03452v1 [physics.hist-ph] 7 Apr 2022

Received: date / Accepted: date

Abstract The rich body of physical theories defines the foundation of our
understanding of the world. Its mathematical formulation is based on classical
Aristotelian (binary) logic. In the philosophy of science the ambiguities, para-
doxes, and the possibility of subjective interpretations of facts have challenged
binary logic, leading, among other developments, to Gotthard Günther’s the-
ory of polycontexturality (often also termed ’transclassical logic’). Günther’s
theory explains how observers with subjective perception can become aware
of their own subjectivity and provides means to describe contradicting or even
paradox observations in a logically sound formalism. Here we summarize the
formalism behind Günther’s theory and apply it to two well-known examples
from physics where different observers operate in distinct and only locally
valid logical systems. Using polycontextural logic we show how the emerging
awareness of these limitations of logical systems entails the design of mathe-
matical transformations, which then become an integral part of the theory. In
our view, this approach offers a novel perspective on the structure of physi-
cal theories and, at the same time, emphasizes the relevance of the theory of
polycontexturality in modern sciences.
Keywords Polycontexturality · Gotthard Günther · Subjectivity · Transfor-
mations
J. Falk
Department of Life Sciences and Chemistry, Jacobs University, Bremen, Germany
E-mail: [email protected]
E. Eichler
EICHLER Consulting AG, Weggis, Switzerland
K. Windt
Global Production Logistics, Jacobs University Bremen, Germany
K. Windt · E. Eichler
SMS Group, Düsseldorf, Germany
M.-T. Hütt
Department of Life Sciences and Chemistry, Jacobs University, Bremen, Germany
2 Falk et al.

1 Introduction

The concept of Aristotelian logic is based on an objective truth of first prin-

ciples, an absolute property that is independent of any subjectivity and con-
text (Halper 2009; Irwin and Irwin 1990). Something that is not true is nec-
essarily false and likewise, something that is not false is true, or to say it in
Aristotle’s words: “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it
is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not,
is true” (David 2016). Since there are no other possible values than True and
False, this logic is called a two-valued (also bivalent or binary) logic (Goble
2001). Providing the historical foundation of mathematical logic (Adamowicz
and Zbierski 2011; Łukasiewicz 1938) as well as Boolean Algebra (Font et al
2003), Aristotelian logic has become a cornerstone of western thought and
technology. In Aristotelian logic, truth is always inter-subjective. A sentence
is only true if it is true for each object covered and for all subjects using the
sentence (Günther 1991, p.9). There is hence no subjectivity for truth.; any-
thing described by Aristotelian logic is objective and there is only one, absolute
truth (Klagenfurt 2016, p.23). While this assumption was considered virtually
incontrovertible for centuries, one of the first philosophers who questioned the
concept of objective truth was Immanuel Kant. In his work “Critique of Pure
Reason” 1 he states: “The nominal definition of truth, that it is the agreement
of knowledge with its object, is [here] assumed as granted; the question asked
is as to what is the general and sure criterion of the truth of any and every
knowledge.” (cited after (Sen 1999)). Kant furthermore writes: “In consequence
of this mere nominal definition, my cognition, to count as true, is supposed to
agree with its object. Now I can compare the object with my cognition, however,
only by cognizing it. Hence my cognition is supposed to confirm itself, which
is far short of being sufficient for truth.” (Kant 1992, p.557). While accepting
a correspondence theory of truth, Kant does not give an objective criterion to
test whether a cognition is true or false (Cleve 2003, p.215). He rather states
that cognition is personal, hence subjective. Nevertheless, what Kant talks
about is an epistemology that still builds upon the classical understanding of
Aristotelian logic (Günther 1991, p.22).
In the German Idealism, several philosophers premised on the ideas of Kant
and used his theory to discuss self-consciousness or self-awareness. Fichte in-
troduced the self-conscious Self as “absolute subject” that needs to be distin-
guished from the I as an object of reflection. Some years later, Hegel concluded
that subject and object are essentially the same or – at least – cannot be sep-
arated as the Aristotelian logic enforces. Both Hegel and Fichte noticed that
the “thinking I” often is part of the system it makes statements about, which
introduces self-references and contradicts the Aristotelian assumption of an
inter-subjective truth.
The ideas and theories developed during the German Idealism are mainly
based on philosophical considerations and, similar to Aristotle’s logic, were

1 Original German Title: Critik der reinen Vernunft

Physics is organized around transformations connecting contextures 3

mainly focused on human reasoning. A mathematical treatment of logic was

initiated by Boole and de Morgan who formulated a symbolic logic. De Mor-
gan also showed that there are deductions that cannot be handled by the
traditional Aristotelian logic. During the Logicism, Frege developed first-order
predicate logic and tried to base all mathematics on mathematical logic. While
mathematical logic was very successful for many years, Russell showed with his
set paradox that Frege’s logic contained contradictions. During Hilbert’s pro-
gram mathematicians tried to ground mathematics on a finite and complete
axiomatic system that is free of such contradictions. However, 1931 Gödel
showed that in each rich enough and sound arithmetical theory there is a
canonical and unprovable Gödel Sentence which indirectly states that it is
unprovable (Smith 2020, p.171). The Gödel Sentence is hence true and con-
tradicts the goal of Hilbert’s program.
Sentences that cannot be derived consistently as well as infinite regressions
especially appear if a sentence contains self-references (Kordig 1983; Bolander
2002). As an example, let us refer to the statement: “I am lying”. If the subject
(I) is right, then it is lying and the statement is wrong, which would imply that
it is not lying, and so on. Since paradoxes like the liar paradox create unsolv-
able contradictions, Russell’s student Wittgenstein argued that self-references
should be banned from logical statements (Wittgenstein 2001, 3.332). How-
ever, this would also disallow circular but valid statements like: This statement
has five words.2 Other approaches argue that self-referring statements are valid
if one accounts for the context-dependence (common knowledge, previous ar-
guments, ...) of the propositions. Hence, during the course of the paradox, the
context might shift and thereby change the truth of the propositions (Par-
sons 1974; Glanzberg 2001; Burge 1982). While the contextualist approaches
might be valid explanations for the liar paradox, they apply mainly to para-
doxes that work on a semantic level and rely on the notion related to truth.
However, there are also paradoxes like Russell’s Set3 that operates on a syn-
tactic level and demonstrated contradictions in Frege’s First-order logic. In
order to avoid this type of paradox the standard form of modern set theories,
the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, axiomatically disallows Russell’s set. A more
versatile approach to tackle paradoxes was introduced by Tarski with the in-
troduction of a hierarchy of language where truth predicates can only apply
to sentences at lower levels which essentially excludes the used language from
the domain of possible references (Tarski 1944, p.350)(Günther 1964, p.188).
More radical solutions even suggest that statements like the liar paradox do
not have a truth value at all (Kripke 1975). This often implies the introduction
of undefined as a third truth-value and hence the rejection of the Tertium non
datur principle.

2 A special case are sentences that contain ambiguous self-referring words like ’I’ or ’Me’.
Following (Quine 1965, p.5f), declarative sentences like ’Ha’ (’H’ stands for ’is hungry’ and
’a’ stands for me) only become statements if the ’a’ is supplanted by an unambiguous word
(see also: (Günther 1991, p25)).
3 Russell’s Set denotes the set of all sets that are not members of themselves. The paradox

occurs if one asks whether Russell’s Set contains itself.

4 Falk et al.

According to Günther, all known approaches to handle antinomies require

a global subject (or a meta-language) that observes the world as an isolated
object without interaction (referencing) to it (Günther 1976, p. 328). How-
ever, and in accordance with the observations of Fichte and Hegel, our world
consists of endless self-referencing systems. An example from biology are gene-
regulatory networks, where gene A inhibits its own production. This interac-
tion is not understandable if viewed statically with dimensionless topology
diagrams (Isalan 2009).4 Also in social sciences self-referencing systems are
more a rule than an exception: During a discussion, each member forges the
opinion of the group the member itself belongs to (Klagenfurt 2016).
Based on the assumption that truth is a subjective property that can-
not be described with a two-valued logic5 , Günther developed the theory of
polycontexturality (Günther 1976). This theory claims that reality has a poly-
contextural structure, which means that every interacting subject spans an
isolated two-valued system, a contexture, that has an inherent definition of
True and False. In each contexture a binary logic is valid. Hence, Günther
gives up the closed and viewpoint independent definition of a two-valued logic
and generalises Hegel’s and Fichte’s viewpoint dependence to a new view-
point dependent and multi-valued logic (Bierter 2018). One should note that
this multi-valued logic is not to be understood as a single multi-valued sys-
tem as e.g. found in Fuzzy Logic (Bierter 2018, p.100)(Zadeh 1965) or in the
three-valued logic of Lukasiewicz and Kleene (Lukasiewicz 1963; Kleene 1952,
1938), but rather as a network of interconnected two-valued systems, a place-
value system (Stellenwert-Logik ), where objects and subjects have different
place values. Due to this distributed definition of logical values, there is no
objectivity but only subjective and contexture dependent interpretations and
descriptions of measurements. In this new logic something can be true and
false at the same time, depending on the contexture.
While Günther’s theories are often utilised in the fields of sociology and
cognition theory (Jansen 2016; Jansen et al 2014; Jansen 2017; Vogd 2017;
Mölders 2012; Vogd 2013; Berger 2014), only little work was done to demon-
strate the impact of Günther’s ideas in the natural sciences (Bruni and Giorgi
2015). At the same time, natural sciences like physics have been very success-
ful in describing and explaining our world based on the classical two-valued
logic. It is therefore interesting to analyze the potential role of contextures
and polycontextural logic in physics. Here we show how Günther’s Theory
of Polycontexturality provides means to mathematically formalize observer-
dependence, a problem that physics has already solved by transformations.

4 Of course, this creates only a logical paradox, if all interactions are considered to be

instantaneously, which is not realistic. However, it is meaningless to search for an absolute

answer, whether the gene is active on or inactive.
5 One might argue that modern predicate logic allows for the formulation of subjectivity

by using predicates that have argument places for subjects, e.g. X thinks, that Y is wrong.
However, in this case, ’We’ as the one who replaces X and Y with actual values and who
evaluates the truth of the statement are the actual subject, leaving X and Y as objects.
Physics is organized around transformations connecting contextures 5

Accordingly, it seems possible that our world is in fact polycontextural and

our theories compensate for it.
Heisenberg stated: “Natural science does not simply describe and explain
nature; it is part of the interplay between nature and ourselves; it describes
nature as exposed to our nature of questioning” (Heisenberg and Davies 2000).
Here, Heisenberg makes clear that physical observations and the observer are
always interwoven (Bierter 2018), a problem that also puzzled physicist like
Niels Bohr when they tried to interpret the results of quantum mechanics (Mo-
hanty 1989). Since Einstein’s theory of special relativity (Einstein 1905), it
became evident that even the perception of time is only relative and hence
observer-dependent. As motivated in the previous paragraphs, viewpoint-de-
pendent truth does also imply that properties can apply and not apply at the
same time. While this might sound unfamiliar at first, such phenomena exist
even in modern physics e.g. the particle-wave duality (Selleri 1992): Depend-
ing on the measurement one can come to both the conclusion that photons
are waves or particles. This contradicts a classical point of view where (again
relying on Aristotelian logic) an object can only be particle or wave but not
both at the same time. Using methods borrowed from Günther’s theory we de-
scribe the observed phenomena in a polycontextural formalism. Subsequently,
we discuss the question of why physics is able to describe natural occurrences
even so it is not knowingly based on a multi-valued polycontextural logic. We
observe that the necessary mapping between a polycontextural world and a
two-valued science is only possible due to the utilisation of transformations.
These transformations are used to convert an observer-dependent and hence
subjective description of nature into the subjective position of another observer
(another subject).
The aim of our paper is twofold: On the one hand, we show how Gotthard
Günther’s concepts are (mostly inherently) already present in the current un-
derstanding of physical properties. On the other hand, we demonstrate that,
given the assumption that our world is polycontextural, transformations are
essentially an expedient that is used to make two-valued sciences compatible
with it.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: In the next section
(Section 2), we introduce Gotthard Günther’s concept of a polycontextural
logic and briefly explain the so-called proemial relation, which forms the min-
imal model of a self-referring system that enables the notion of subjectivity.
How Günther’s theory can be formalised and hence be used to make dialec-
tics operational is then explained in Section 3. In Section 4 we describe a
small thought model that illustrates time dilatation and show in Section 5
how the concept of polycontexturality can be applied to subjective and in-
congruent time measurements. Subsequently, in Sections 7 and 8 we discuss
the phenomenon of the particle-wave duality of photons and show how the
concepts of the theory of polycontexturality fit into this understanding. In
the last section (Section 9), we draw some conclusions and motivate a further
and more detailed discussion of the connections between modern physical and
polycontextural theories.
6 Falk et al.

2 Theory of polycontexturality

Günther postulated that reality consists of an unlimited number of so-called

contextures. Each contexture has its own (and possibly unique) classical two-
valued logic. Each of these values is a truth-value and, at the same time,
indicates its place within a polycontextural system. Globally, this creates a
multi-valued – a place-valued – logic of different subjects in different contex-
tures. All contextures have equal rights and are aligned in a heterarchy (rather
than a hierarchy). Hence there is no absolute subject as in Aristotelian logic.
Using this concept, Günther noticed that the interaction of three contextures
allows for the closed formulation of self-reference: He assumed that each sub-
ject and the objects it observes form a contexture, in which subject and object
are connected by an order relation that subordinates (in a static picture) the
object to the subject. The process of a subject that observes an object in one
contexture can, in turn, become object in another contexture (as sketched in
Fig. 1). This exchange of an observing subject and an observed object is medi-
ated by an exchange relation that connects two contextures. In this way, in the
second contexture, the initial object that was observed in the first contexture
becomes an object as observed by the subject of the first contexture (Klagen-
furt 2016). It is necessary to stress again that contextures form a heterarchical
order. Hence, the subject of the second contexture can also become the sub-
ject of the first contexture that is observed by some other subject. In contrast
to propositional logic, no hierarchy puts one contexture a level above another
contexture (Günther 1979, p.228). Finally, a third contexture mediates the
relationship between the original object of investigation and the same object
in its subjectified form. The fact that the object of the first contexture is also
the object of the third contexture, as well as that the subject of the third
contexture is the subject of the second contexture is reflected by coincidence
relations (lines in Fig. 1). The third contexture (that is only created by the
intertwining interaction of the first and second contexture) hence provides the
means for the individual subjects to reflect their own understandings of the
world. Günther termed this structure of three contextures proemial relation.
By naming the three different processes, Günther makes the structures
and their respective functions more explicit. The internal subject of the first
contexture observes an object. If this internal subject becomes an object of
another external observer, this is formally equivalent to an I that thinks about
a You whereby both the I and the You are placed in the same environment.
Obviously, a simple change of the perspective interchanges the I and the You,
which highlights the heterarchical character of both contextures. Both the I
and the You are objects with subjective perception and the I is the You’s
you. In the mind of the I the You exists and likewise, the I exists in the mind
of the You. Nevertheless, I and You are completely different from each other.
There is no global perspective that subsumes both the I and the You (Botz-
Bornstein 2004). Let us now assume that the I and the You are talking about
the same topic, the It. For the I this It is now accessible both directly or
via the observation of the You that talks about the It (the You objectified
Physics is organized around transformations connecting contextures 7

Object(O) Subject(S1) C1

Object(O S1) Subject(S2) C2

Object(O) Subject(S2) C3

Fig. 1 Sketch of the proemial relation. In each contexture (C1, C2, C3) a subject observes
an object as indicated by the arrows (The direction of the arrows indicates the flow of infor-
mation; Object → Subject reads: Subject observes Object). The lines (coincidence relations)
indicate, that the red object in C1 and C3 and, respectively, the green subject in C2 and C3
are the same. The blue subject in C1 and the blue object in C2 are basically the same but
change the role from an observing entity to an observed one (exchange relation; indicated by
the inverted double-arrow). The blue object in C2 represents the entire observation process
of C1. (Figure adapted from: (Klagenfurt 2016, p.49)).

the It). This mediation between two perspectives creates the third contexture
and likewise indicates the I how subjectivity manifests in You’s observations
(based on the I ’s subjective world view) (Günther 1964, p.80).
In the Aristotelian logic, this construction must fail. If the You is thought
of by the I then the You necessarily needs to be a simple “dead object” and
cannot be thought of as a thinking subject. Here, the designation “dead object”
only refers to the standpoint of the I. It is, of course, possible that the I thinks
about a You thinking about dog. But in doing so, the I thinks in its own logical
context throughout. The I can’t think about what the You is thinking about
in the You’s context/using the You’s logical system. As soon as one agrees that
I and You are different and I and You perceive differently, a globally valid
logic must fail and one needs to take polycontextural logic into account. Each
subject and its perception span a defined contexture and can be described
with a two-valued logic. Nevertheless, the totality of all subjects calls for a
higher-valued, a polycontextural logic (Günther 1980, p. 87).
Following (Günther 1980, p.88), we illustrate this concept with a small ex-
ample. In order to explain how two interacting subjects form a mutual I -You
system that is unable to generate absolute objectivity, we draw on Fig. 2. Here,
E is the environment that is observed by two subjects S1 and S2, where both
subjects are assumed to perceive different aspects of E. The information flow
from E to the respective subject is indicated with an arrow. From the per-
spective of each subject the environment contains one other subject that itself
observes the environment and interacts with it. The interactions of S1 and S2
with the environment generate additional information about the environment
that are denoted E1 and E2, respectively. As a result, S1 not only observes
E but also E2 generated by S2 and likewise S2 observes E and E1. Hence,
although S1 and S2 are embedded in the same environment their respective
observations are different. It is reasonable to assume that the events E1 and
8 Falk et al.

S1
S3

E1 E E2

S2
Fig. 2 Sketch of two subjects S1 and S2 observing the same environment E. Both subjects
interact with the environment and produce events E1 and E2 that contain their subjective
information about the observed environment. A third subject S3 can observe the convergence
process of E1 and E2. (Figure adapted from: (Günther 1980, p.88)).

E + E2 S1 C1 E + E1 S2 C1

E1 S2 C2 E2 S1 C2

E + E2 S2 C3 E + E1 S1 C3

Fig. 3 Two subjects and the environment form a proemial relation. This proemial relation
itself is a contexture of another relation which creates a cyclic structure of two connected
relations.

E2 are somehow related to E. Therefore, E1 can be considered to contain

S1’s subjective information about E (the same holds for S2 and E2). As a
result, an updated E1 will not only depend on E but also on E2 which itself
depends on E1. Over the course of time, both subjects will agree on a common
description for the same observed features and the subjective understandings
E1 and E2 will converge. Nevertheless, since we can only distinguish between
S1 and S2 based on the difference between E1 and E2, they will never become
equal and there will never be a common and hence objective understanding of
E.
The described mutual observation of the two interacting subjects can also
be sketched as two co-existing proemial relations, as shown in Fig. 3. One
proemial relation is formed by S2 that observes both E1 and E. This first
relation can hence be written as E + E1 → S2, which itself is part of another
relation. This second relation can be condensed to E+E2 → S1, which is again
an integral part of the first contexture. It is important to note the relations
do not represent consecutive but coexisting states of the system.
We can now imagine that there is a third subject S3 observing the full
structure of the two interacting subjects S1 and S2. For S3 both S1 and S2
belong to the objective world. Hence, S3 can observe the convergence process of
E1 and E2 as an uninvolved individual. Additionally, S3 is able to understand
that S1 and S2 are both right in what they preceive and reveal about E, even
Physics is organized around transformations connecting contextures 9

so, E1 6= E2. It is, however, important to note that the existence of S3 does not
imply that S1 and S2 can be described from an objective viewpoint. Rather
is S3 itself a subject of the shown setup and can, e.g., adopt the position of
S1, which can then be observed by S2. Likewise S1 or S2 can take up the
position of a spectator observing S3 and the respective other subject. Hence,
all of the three subjects are equal in what observer position they can take up:
they form a heterarchy. Nevertheless, as long as we assume that S3 acts as an
external spectator, and being aware that this implies a freezing of the in reality
perpetually changing roles, we as readers ourselves can take up the position
of the third subject. Hence, in the following examples we will not specifically
mention the third subject but always assume that the reader takes up this
position.
With the arguments presented so far, Günther justifies why a polycontex-
tural description is suitable for representing real physical relationships that are
excluded in binary systems. So far, this theory is in large parts a reiteration of
the concepts of modern dialectic mainly developed by Hegel. However, by the
introduction of a three-valued logic, Günther was able to make dialectics oper-
ational. In the following section we will outline the concept of this three-valued
logic and subsequently apply it to two examples taken from physics.

3 Three-valued logic

The Leibniz law, one of the most fundamental laws in logic states, that two
entities A and B are equal if A has every property of B and vice versa (Tarski
1995). Hence, every entity is only identical to itself. If the existence of such
a self-identical entity is stated by a positive predicate, then – due to the
law of noncontradiction – the negation of this predicate can only exist in
a reflection. Now, the law of excluded middle asserts that there can not exist
a third between the given positive and negative predicates. This indicates
that classical logic requires a direct symmetry relation between Being and
Thought (Günther 1991, p.127). As a consequence, in classical binary logic
everything that is not a subject is an object and everything that is not an
object is necessarily a subject.
This contradicts the ideas of the polycontextural concept described above
where different observers (different subjects) are able to reflect objects as well
as other reflecting observers. Günther acknowledged that binary logic is the
correct way for every single subject (working in its personal contexture) to
describe its observations. However, he argued that classical logic is only local
and intra-subjective.
Let us assume two different subjects S1 and S2 , each equipped with its own
binary logical values T1 ↔ F1 and T2 ↔ F2 . If both subjects do not interact
we arrive at a four-valued logic with two completely isolated contextures (see
also Fig. 4A). Since they do not exchange information, both subjects have
no means to learn whether their logics can be mapped on each other or not.
Contrary, if we assume that there is a direct mapping between T1 ↔ F1 and
10 Falk et al.

A B C T1 F1 C1
T1 F1 F1 T1
T2 F2 C2
= =
T2 F2 T2 F2 C3
T1 F2

Fig. 4 Sketch of the three examples presented in the main text. A: Two contextures with
isolated logical systems. B: Two subjects in one contexture with a direct mapping between
T1 , F1 , T2 , F2 . C: Three contextures that form a proemial relation (see also Fig. 1).

T2 ↔ F2 , e.g. T1 = F2 and T2 = F1 , both subjects are equal or just the

mirror-image of each other (Fig. 4B).
Now, let us assume that there is only a mapping between one of the re-
spective logical values, e.g.: F1 = T2 but T1 6= F2 . In a classical understanding
this would lead to a contradiction, since
¬T1 = F1 = T2 = ¬F2 → ¬T1 = ¬F2 → T1 = F2 . (1)
However, Günther argues that each contexture has its own negation, leading
to
¬1 T1 = F1 = T2 = ¬2 F2 → ¬1 T1 = ¬2 F2 . (2)
The problem of how ¬1 and ¬2 are related can then be solved by a third
subject S3 that spans another contexture with the logical values T1 ↔ F2 .
Figure 4C shows how this concept relates to the proemial relation explained
in the previous section. Hence, the object of the second contexture is not an
irreflexive object but the reflection process of the first contexture and the
negation ¬2 negates the complete alternative situation of C1.
Obviously, this concept renders the global assignment of True and False to
specific logical values impossible. Similarly to Günther we will use the integer
values 1 ≡ T1 , 2 ≡ F1 /T2 , 3 ≡ F2 instead of T and F from now on. To un-
derstand Günther’s concept, it is important to note that these values are not
numbers in the conventional sense, but place-values. Two values each define a
logical place in which both assume the function of truth-values. Hence, each
of these place-values is a truth-value and, at the same time, indicates its place
within a polycontextural system.
In order to operationalize this framework, Günther showed how the stan-
dard logical functions like AND and OR can be understood in this polycontex-
tural system. In Tab. 1 we show the truth tables for the case of the standard
binary logic, where we relabeled T → 1, F → 2. A mechanistic definition of the
two logical functions could hence be that AND (OR) always takes the largest
(smallest) value of the two given alternatives. This definition can be used to
generalize both logical functions for a polycontextural logic of three contex-
tures as shown in Table 2. We then arrive at a definition of a multi-valued logic
that – in its structure – is known from the works of Lukasiewicz (Lukasiewicz
1963) or Kleene (Kleene 1952, 1938).
Physics is organized around transformations connecting contextures 11

p q p∧q p q p∨q
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 2 1 2 1
2 1 2 2 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
Table 1 Logical AND (left) and logical OR (right)in classical binary logic. Here, 1 denotes
the classical T and 2 the classical F.

p q p∧q p∨q p q p ∧D q
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 2
3 1 3 3 1 3 1 3 3
4 2 1 2 1 4 2 1 2
5 2 2 2 2 5 2 2 2 2
6 2 3 3 2 6 2 3 3
7 3 1 3 1 7 3 1 3
8 3 2 3 2 8 3 2 3
9 3 3 3 3 9 3 3 3 3
S1 S2 S3
Table 2 Left: logical AND and logical OR for a polycontextural logic with three connected
contextures. Right: rearranged logical AND with a separate column for each contexture
(S1,S2,S3). For each contexture only the relevant positions are filled in.

We will now analyze how Günther extends this logic in order to meet the
requirements of an operational dialectic. In the following, we will focus on the
logical AND, however, the results can analogously be applied to the logical
OR.
Given the three contextures, each based on a binary logic, we can arrange
the results of Tab. 2 (left) in such a way that each contexture is written in a
separate column, as depicted in Tab 2 (right). Due to our initial global defini-
tion of the logical function the contextures S1 and S2, both show a logical AND
and are framed by an overarching AND of the third contexture (S3). For this
reason, Günther calls this function a total conjunction (given by the operator
∧D ) and contrasts it by two partial conjunctions (given by the operators ∧R
and ∧I ) that are distinguished by a disjunction in either S1 or S2 as depicted
in Tab. 3. A more detailed interpretation of the tables will be presented in the
following examples.
In the next section, we will introduce a thought experiment that presents
an apparent situation of observer dependence in physics. Using the ideas of
polycontextural logic we then show how the incompatibility of different mea-
surements can be incorporated into the formalism, consequently becomes an
integral part of the formalism, and, thus also of our everyday intuition about
this class of physical systems. Subsequently, we analyse how modern physics
utilises transformations to address and dissolve polycontexturality in these
situations.
12 Falk et al.

p q p ∧D q p ∧R q p ∧I q
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 2 2 1 2
3 1 3 3 3 3
4 2 1 2 1 2
5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
6 2 3 3 3 2
7 3 1 3 3 3
8 3 2 3 3 2
9 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
O3 O2 O1
Table 3 Complete polycontextural table for the three possible AND functions. Here, p ∧D q
denotes the total conjunction; p ∧R q and p ∧I q are the two partial conjunctions.

h t=0

h
h s t>0
O1
O2
Fig. 5 Sketch of the thought model to explain time dilatation. (left) One observer O1
inside the train observes the laser-beam. (right) The observer O2 observes the beam from
the perspective of another train.

4 Relative moving reference systems as contextures

We refer to an example from the theory of special relativity. This theory,

proposed by Albert Einstein in 1905, is one of the cornerstones of theoretical
physics. The two basic postulates of this theory are (Stachel et al 1990):
– The laws of physics are invariant in all reference frames.
– The speed of light is the same for all observers.
While these postulates are well known, their implications contradict daily ex-
periences and, furthermore, give rise to an observer dependence of some mea-
sured quantities. In what follows we focus on one special implication of the
above postulates, namely the relativity of time. Let us assume two observers
O1 and O2 seated in two similar trains (as depicted in Fig. 5). The trains shall
pass each other at a relative speed of v = 0.5c, where c denotes the speed
Physics is organized around transformations connecting contextures 13

of light. This might e.g. be due to both trains having an opposite speed of
v 0 = 0.25c or similarly due to one train standing still and the other one pass-
ing at a speed of v 0 = 0.5c. Let us further assume that observer O1 measures
in its train the time a laser beam needs to go perpendicularly from the ceiling
down to the floor (Fig. 5 left). Given the speed of light c and the height of the
train h we can predict the exact travel time t1 that observer O1 obtains:
h
t1 = . (3)
c
If, however, O2 wants to do the same measurement on the laser beam in O1 ’s
train, things are different. During the time interval t1 the first train moves a
distance of s = vt1 relative to the second train. Due to this relative movement,
O2 will not observe a perpendicular but a diagonal trajectory of the laser beam
that now goes down the height of the train h but at the same time moves
forward a distance of s (Fig. 5 right). Hence, from O2 ’s point of view, the laser
beam travels a distance of:
p
h0 = h2 + s2 . (4)

One of Einstein’s postulates states that the speed of light is constant. Thus,
the observer O2 obtains a travel-time for the laser beam of:
√
h0 h2 + s2
t2 = = < t1 , (5)
c c
Both observers have conducted a measurement that fulfils all requirements
of an objective and authoritative experiment that was – in each train – based
on the valid laws of physics. However, if the observers meet and compare their
measured times, they do not agree. Furthermore, there is no way to tell whose
results are correct. Both moving trains constitute a reference frame where
the laws of physics are invariant and hold. One can consider each train as a
distinct contexture where a classical logical system (represented by the laws of
classical physics) is valid.6 This brings us back to Gotthard Günther’s theory
of polycontexturality.

5 Lorentz transformation as a relation among contextures

Using the ideas of Günther’s theory of polycontexturality, we are in the posi-

tion to interpret the phenomenon observed in the previous thought experiment
as a result of observer dependence. Each observer performs a local measure-
ment of the time the laser beam needs to pass the train. For O1 inside the
6 Note that the comparison between classical logic and classical physics (no quantum

mechanics and no theory of relativity) is more than a play on words. If the speed of the
objects under investigation is much smaller than the speed of light, the laws of classical
physics are a sufficient approximation. Analogously, as long as the interactions of the objects
under investigation do not depend on subject-object relations, the laws of classical logic are
sufficient.
14 Falk et al.

train all physical laws are valid and – for O1 – the measurement seems to be
an objective and universal measurement. Hence, O1 and the observed laser
beam form one contexture that exists inside the first moving train. The same
holds for the laser beam and O2 . From the second train O2 could perform an
equally valid and universal measurement that, however, results in a different
value for the time. In a mono-contextural interpretation (a global two-valued
logic) this would create a contradiction.
Based on the ideas of the theory of polycontexturality, we can now assume
that O2 observes O1 while O1 is performing its measurement.7 In other words:
O2 observes the former observer O1 while the latter observes the laser. Hence,
O2 observes now two objects: the laser and the laser as subjectively observed by
O1 . As we already know, both observations will result in different values for the
time.8 However, from a polycontextural view O2 and the laser as well as O2 and
the former subject O1 span two different contextures with different two-valued
logics. It is hence up to O2 to combine the two observations and communicate
the resulting time t2 . In the same way, O1 can directly measure the time
of the laser as well as observe the result t2 of O2 ’s measurement (which itself
depends on a previous result of O1 ). During several such communication cycles
between O1 and O2 (in which also the relative speed between the two observers
might change), both observers will understand that the time measurement is
a relative process and will eventually try to converge to a description of the
laser that seems to be general for both observers. Since both observers are
directly involved in this circular process, only we as an outside observer are
able to objectively describe the convergence process.
While we are able to interpret and accept the validity of both divergent
measurements using the theory of polycontexturality, the concept of the rela-
tivity of time is also well known and perfectly understood in classical physics.
In the previous example, we explained that the two observers will converge on
a description that seems to be general for both of them. If our assumption of a
polycontextural world is correct this would imply that there is some transfor-
mation that enables one observer to map the subjective and polycontextural
observation onto the own frame of reference.
Indeed, due to the theory of special relativity we know that the relation
that connects the observed subjective time t1 of O1 and the observable time
is the Lorentz transformation:

t0 = γ t , (6)
1
where γ = √ . Hence, for two observers with different speed, it is and
1−v 2 /c2
will never be possible to define an absolute and objective time. The reference
frames form a heterarchy.
7 Analogously, the same can happen for O1 , who observes O2 .
8 As a result, O2 might decide that O1 ’s stopwatch is moving too slowly. This is not helpful
in our current debate, since O1 and O2 still disagree in their results. We hence assume that
both observers can be certain that the measurement was done correctly and the watches are
perfect.
Physics is organized around transformations connecting contextures 15

This is connected to section 1 were we noted that classical logic does only
allow for two values, namely True and False. Here a transformation at the
core of the theoretical framework implements the relation among different
contextures that allows for constructions like “True in contexture 1 and at the
same time False in contexture 2”.

6 Logically resolving observer-dependent measurements within a

polycontextural framework

We can also explain the described situation by the means of the logic tables
presented in Tab. 3. For this, we identify the AND of the first observer O1 with
p ∧I q and that of the second observer O2 with p ∧R q. The first observer claims
that the correct time is t1 , the second observer O2 claims that the correct time
is t2 . The two operands p and q can then be interpreted as:
p = My measurement confirms my claim,
q = Your measurement confirms my claim.
With these assignments the logical AND in S1/O1 has the intuitive meaning:
I consider my claim t1 only as correct if my measurement AND your measure-
ment confirm my claim.
As explained in the previous section, S2/O1 discusses the antithesis of the
(short: anti-claim): ¬t1 . The meaning behind S2/O1 is hence: I consider my
anti-claim ¬t1 as correct if my measurement OR your measurement confirm
my anti-claim.
In classical logic this would just be a version of De Morgan’s law, since:
2 in S1 ≡ F → 2 in S2 ≡ T and equally 1 in S1 ≡ T → 3 in S2 ≡ F .
However, within a polycontextural interpretation the negation ¬2 in the second
contexture does not mirror back to the first contexture, but creates a third
value that lies “beyond” the classical binary values. Hence, the third contexture
S3/O1 discusses the relation between the claim and the anti-claim: t1 ↔ ¬t1 .
The same applies to the second observer O2 that also spans three con-
textures. However, without loss of generality, we assume that for the second
observer the claim t2 is discussed in S2 and the anti-claim ¬t2 is discussed in
S1.
Up to now, both observers performed only a local discussion of their mea-
surement. If, however, O1 wants to compare its claim with O2, this is only
possible via a comparison between t1 and ¬t2 , hence a comparison between
an AND in S1/O1 and an OR in S1/O2. For O1 the only possible decision is
hence, that O2’s result is wrong. The same applies in the inverse direction to
O2 who might compare his claim t2 with O1 ¬t1 . A graphical representation
of these processes is depicted in Fig. 6. The unsolvable contradiction between
O1 and O2 illustrates the “unsolvable” situation that we already described in
the previous paragraphs. What is missing is a third observer.
As a third and external observer we are in a different contexture, indicated
in Tab. 3 by p∧D q. We can observe a difference between O1 and O2 but, at the
16 Falk et al.

O2 disagrees in the 1 1
interpretation of O1's 1 2
measurement of Not(t2)
1 2
2 2
O2's view
relation:
t2 / Not(t2)
1 1 1 1
O2's 1 2
anit-claim: 3 1 1 3
1 O2 agrees 2
Not(t2) in the local 3
2 2 3 2 2
3 3 view of the 2 3
3 3
relation:
t2 / Not(t2) 3
=3 2 3
O2's 3 3 3 3
claim: 3 3
t2 S1 S2 S3 3 3 S1 S2 S3
O2 (t2) O1 (t1)
2 2
3 2
O2 disagrees in the
interpretation of O1's 3 2
measurement of t2 3 3

Fig. 6 Sketch of the relation between O1 and O2 based on the local view of O2 with its
claim t2 .

same time, we observe that the structures of their (mutual) observations are
equal. If we, therefore, compare S1/O1 and S2/O2 we are comparing two logical
AND functions (they are now S1/O3 and S2/O3). As an external observer we
can evaluate the correctness of both claims from the same (our) standpoint
and need to acknowledge them. We need to conclude: Both are right. Hence,
the relation between both of these measurements needs to be a logical AND.
A graphical representation of these processes is depicted in Fig. 7.
This ultimately leads to a logically closed description of the result that t1
AND t2 are both true, although different: The only logical conclusion for O3
is that O1 an O2 each have their own time system which is different from that
of the other.

7 The wave and particle properties of photons as distinct

contextures

A prominent but likewise confusing concept in quantum mechanics is the wave-

particle duality, which states that particles like photons have the properties
of a wave as well as of a particle. In the following, we describe two historical
experiments illustrating this duality.
Physics is organized around transformations connecting contextures 17

O3 compares
with own claim
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 2
3 3 3
2 1 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3 2 3
3 3 3 3 2 3
3 3 3 3 3 3
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
O3 (t1/t2) O2 (t2) O1 (t1)

O2's claim t2

O1's claim t1

Fig. 7 Sketch of the proemial-relation between O1, O2 and O3 based on the local view of
O3 with its claim t1 ∧ t2 .

In 1802, the British physicist Thomas Young presented an experiment,

which proved that light displays characteristics of waves. In this double-slit
experiment, coherent light is shed on two parallel slits. The light that passes
the slits causes a diffraction pattern on a screen. This pattern can only be
explained if one assumes that light is a wave originating from the two slits
and interfering on the screen. Using the geometry of the experiment as well as
the distance of the observed maxima of the diffraction pattern it is possible to
obtain the exact wavelength λ of the light.
While the double-slit experiment suggests that light needs to be under-
stood as waves, there are also experiments that seem to postulate an opposite
understanding. In 1839 the French physicist Alexandre Edmond Becquerel ob-
served the emission of electrons when light shines on materials. Interestingly,
upon an increase of the light intensity the energy of the emitted electrons does
not change but their number. This behaviour can only be understood if light
is considered as a beam of small particles.
Hence, the photoelectric effect leads to the conclusion that light should be
considered as particles instead of waves. Based on experimental observations
it is possible to calculate the energy of one of such light particles, the photons:
c
E = hf = h (7)
λ
where h is the Planck’s constant, f is the frequency of the photon and λ is
the wavelength of the light beam (as e.g. measured in the double-slit exper-
iment). Using the mass–energy equivalence E = mc2 one can also derive the
18 Falk et al.

momentum of a photon:
h h
E = mc2 = pc = c⇒p= . (8)
λ λ
These experiments and their implications are well proven and validated.
Nevertheless, they seem to propose two contradicting concepts, namely that
light displays characteristics of waves as well as characteristics of particles.
Furthermore, none of both characteristics can be used to explain both exper-
imental results. Hence, there is no possibility to decide on one correct inter-
pretation. In fact, the common understanding of modern physics is that light
shows a particle-wave duality, which means light is simultaneously a particle
and a wave. Or to say it with Einstein’s words: “It seems as though we must use
sometimes the one theory and sometimes the other, while at times we may use
either. We are faced with a new kind of difficulty. We have two contradictory
pictures of reality; separately neither of them fully explains the phenomena of
light, but together they do” (Brown 1939). This – again – brings us back to
Günther’s theory of polycontexturality.

8 Wave–particle duality as a polycontextural phenomenon

The two presented experiments – and there are plenty more – give contra-
dicting results, leading to the conclusion that light should be regarded as a
wave and as a particle. In classical logic, this would result in an antinomy. If
something is a wave, it cannot be a particle and vice versa. However, from
a polycontextural position, this antinomy can be resolved (Günther 1955).
Both experiments provide a different and measurement-dependent (which here
means: dependent on the means of observation or the design of the experiment)
view on the object of observation and can hence be considered as a measure-
ment that was done in its own contexture. How can this be formalized in a
polycontextural framework? In order to clarify the following analysis, we will
utilise an abstraction of the previous experimental setting. Based on the setup
of the double-slit experiment, let us stipulate that O1 uses some measure-
ment device that provides information about the momentum (and hence the
wavelength) of light, but does not tell us anything about the spatial position.
Likewise, O2 uses a device that provides exact information about the spatial
coordinates, but does not measure any momentum or wavelength. Now – based
on the proemial relation – let us assume that O2 observes O1 conducting its
experiment, as sketched in Fig. 8. For O1 the important result of the exper-
iment is that the analysed light behaves like interfering waves. However, O2
observes that O1 ’s experiment does not make any statements about the spa-
tial properties of light. Hence, O2 does not comment on O1 conclusions but on
the process of obtaining it. Additionally, O2 can perform its own experiment
and obtains that light consists of particles that have an exact spatial position.
Since O2 also observed O1 performing his experiment, O2 must conclude that
light has (if measured) a defined wavelength and at the same time can have
Physics is organized around transformations connecting contextures 19

C1

C2

C3

Fig. 8 Sketch of the polycontextural analysis of the particle-wave duality. One observer
detects particles, the other observer identifies waves.

(if measured) a defined position. During the course of many measurements,

O1 and O2 will converge to a common understanding of this fact.9 However,
the process of convergence is only objectively describable by us as a third and
external observer.
In the case of the wave-particle duality the incompatibility of the different
contextures can be expressed in the following way: In quantum mechanics each
observable A (like position or momentum) is associated with an operator Â
that acts on the wave function, and the values of the observable are the eigen-
values of the respective operator. The German physicist Werner Heisenberg
discovered that for any measurement it holds (Werner and Farrelly 2019):

h
∆x∆p ≥ , (9)
4π
where ∆x and ∆p are the standard deviations of the expectation values of the
position and momentum operators, respectively (acting on the same wavefunc-
tion). Formally, this uncertainty relation (or indeterminacy relation) follows
from the commutator relation of conjugated operators. More accessible is, how-
ever, the wave function based interpretation of the uncertainty principle. Let
us start from the relationship between the (time independent) wave function
ψ(x) in position space and the corresponding wave function φ(p) in momentum
space:
Z ∞
1 ipx
ψ(x) = √ φ(p)e h̄ dp . (10)
2πh̄ −∞
This equation tells us that the wave function in position space is given by
adding up states with a defined momentum, weighted by φ(p). From the above
9 Note that our stylised experimental setting assumes that the observers measure either

only the position or only the momentum and hence conclude that light is either only particle
or only wave. It has, however, been established, both theoretically and empirically (e.g. with
low-intensity double-slit experiments), that the relationship is more gradual, a phenomenon
summarized as quantitative wave-particle duality (Qureshi 2016; Jacques et al 2008; Englert
1996; Jaeger et al 1995).
20 Falk et al.

equation follows:
Z ∞
i d 1 ipx
ψ(x) = √ p φ(p)e h̄ dp , (11)
h̄ dx 2πh̄ −∞

which can be identified as:

i d
ψ(x) = p̂ψ(x) , (12)
h̄ dx
where p̂ is the momentum operator in position space. The two views (operator-
based, wave function-based) are hence related. The measurement of the mo-
mentum projects the wave function into an eigenstate of the momentum op-
erator. As a consequence, the momentum in position space is represented as a
sum of multiple eigenstates of the momentum operator.
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle states that any measurement that ob-
tains a particle description and hence a precisely defined position ∆x ≈ 0
results in an undefined momentum, i.e. an undefined wavelength. Likewise,
any measurement that obtains a defined momentum (a defined wavelength)
results in an undefined position and hence an unlocated particle. There is no
way to measure exact position and momentum at the same time, or in the
words of polycontexturality: there is no way to merge different contextures.
They are in a heterarchy. More generally: a physical state can be equally de-
fined in momentum or space coordinates. But once one of these coordinates is
chosen, the outcome of the measurement is predetermined and can no longer
be in keeping with results obtained in the other coordinates.
While we have shown that the particle-wave duality can be interpreted as a
polycontextural phenomenon, it is obvious that modern physics is able to work
and to exploit the particle-wave duality even though based on a two-valued
logic. As in our previous examples, a transformation can serve as an exchange
relation between incompatible logical systems.10 Starting from the concepts
in quantum mechanics it is possible to illustrate the duality described above
with the concept of a Fourier transform, which provides an isomorphic map-
ping between the representation of the wave function in space and momentum
coordinates. If the position of a particle is well defined (the uncertainty of
the expectation value of the position operator is small), then the probability
density of its position is a narrow and localised distribution e.g. a Gaussian
function:
1 −x2
g(x) = √ e 2σ2 , (13)
σ 2π
with a small variance σ 2 . The probability density of its momentum – given by
the Fourier transform Fx [g(x)] (p) of the probability density of its position –
then results in:
−p2 σ 2
Fx [g(x)] (p) = e− 2 , (14)
10 Our notion of transformations among contextures in quantum mechanics is similar to –

but distinct from – the well-established notion of quantum contextuality, where, given three
observables A, B and C, the result for a measurement of A can be different, depending on
whether A is measured together with B or with C (Abramsky and Brandenburger 2011;
Jaeger 2019; Ghirardi and Wienand 2009; Auffèves and Grangier 2016)
Physics is organized around transformations connecting contextures 21

a wide and unlocalised distribution with a large variance of 1/σ 2 . It should

be noted that, as the Fourier transform is a classical (non-quantum) method,
this argument just serves as an illustration of the reciprocal relationship of
localisations in position space and momentum space. This hints at an impor-
tant logical difference between quantum theory and the theory of relativity:
the Lorenz transformation eventually allows for a deterministic account of
the relative moving observers and could hence – in principle – be formulated
within an Aristotelian framework: polycontextural logic provides only a good
means of visualising the paradoxical situation. Contrarily, in quantum physics,
different experiments can yield measured properties that can not be embed-
ded into a single σ-algebra (Kochen 2015). As a consequence, observations of
different observers can generate irresolvable contradictory claims (Frauchiger
and Renner 2018), and it is thus not possible to assign truth values jointly to
their contrary propositions (Brukner 2018, 2015). In quantum theory, it hence
becomes unavoidable to incorporate logically inconsistent observer positions,
as put forward by polycontextural logic.

9 Conclusion

The classical two valued logic requires a sharp separation between observer
(subject) and objects. However, in physical reality subject and objects are not
necessarily independent. The theory of polycontexturality provides a place
value system where subject-object interrelationships can be represented with
their real properties. By means of two different examples, we have illustrated
how polycontextural concepts can be found in common problems of modern
physics. Drawing on the setup of the model of fast-moving observers, we used
the viewpoint dependent measurement of time to illustrate Gotthard Gün-
ther’s theory of polycontexturality. As a second example, we showed how the
particle-wave duality of light can be described within a polycontextural form.
Based on these observations, we argued that a polycontextural understanding
of the world is a cornerstone for the correct treatment of context-dependent
measurements. However, in both examples, the overarching question is why
present-day science – that seems to rely on a two-valued global logic – can
deal with the apparent logical incompatibilities. Our analysis suggests that in
modern physics key components of the theoretical formalisms, namely trans-
formations, serve the purpose of incorporating situations that are not describ-
able without a polycontextural understanding. These transformations enable
an observer in one frame to become aware of its own relativity and likewise to
correct for it. Thereby – under the assumption that the world can be described
with a polycontextural framework – the polycontextural reality is projected
on one contexture (and thereby on a two-valued logic).
The significance of polycontextural logic is often viewed in its contributions
to formal logic, where it offers a new approach to address inconsistencies of
logical systems related to Gödel’s incompleteness theorems (Bense 1960; Kaehr
and Ditterich 1979; von Foerster 2003). The distinct logical systems associated
22 Falk et al.

with different contextures allow to distribute contradictions and arrive at non-

contradictory systems (Günther 1980, p.87)(Mahler 1995).
With our investigation we emphasize that already the existence of inter-
subjective differences in measurements and observations seem to call for a
description in terms of polycontextural logic. This is well known, e.g., in the
social sciences (Jansen et al 2014; Blaschke and Schoeneborn 2016). Here we
showed that also in physics the development of theoretical descriptions can be
elucidated with the help of polycontextural logic (by identifying transforma-
tions as connections among contextures). From our perspective, it is interest-
ing to extend this approach further by investigating theory building in other
disciplines with the same set of methods. A field, where this is of particu-
lar relevance, is artificial intelligence and machine learning, where devices are
trained to classify data. This classification often remain in the realm of binary
logic (Ben-David et al 2019). One should also note that we restricted ourselves
to only one specific interpretation of Günther’s polycontextural logic, namely
an observational position. This is the interpretation that Günther follows in his
work as well as the interpretation that corresponds best with our everyday un-
derstanding. Günther based his polycontextural logic on two theories that he
called Morphogrammatic and Kenogrammatic (Klagenfurt 2016, p.140) (Gün-
ther 1976, p.215) (Günther 1980, p.109). At its core, these theories allow for
an interpretation-free mediation of differences. Resorting to these theories, it
would hence be possible to apply Günther’s formalism without drawing on a
specific interpretation. This would e.g. leave open whether contextures are I
and You, or different worlds, or something else. On that basis, our investi-
gation could in principle be extended to other interpretations of (quantum)
physics (e.g., the many-worlds interpretation).
Being a natural framework for analyzing the solvability of distributed logi-
cal systems, a first implementation of polycontextural algorithms could e.g. be
provided for self-organized dynamical processes on graphs (Windt and Hütt
2010; Hütt et al 2014). Additionally, a polycontextural formalism can lead to
a formal acceptance and a deeper understanding of undecidable statements as
they appear in machine learning (Ben-David et al 2019).
We hope that our attempt to summarize, formalize and apply the basic
framework of polycontexturality will help initiate further investigations in this
direction.

Acknowledgement

We thank Beatrix C. Hiesmayr (University of Vienna) and Thorsten Kohl (TU

Darmstadt) for helpful comments and valuable discussions.

Conflict of Interest

On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author states that there is no

conflict of interest.
Physics is organized around transformations connecting contextures 23

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