CIVIL PROCEDURE II | Case Digests

MLS-JD 2L | Judge Rechie Malabanan | Sem 1 2025 | Morales, M.B.

I. Rules 40-43
1. Asian Terminals, Inc. vs. Simon Enterprises, Inc. G.R. No. 177116, February 27,
2013

Doctrine:

A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law
or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted.

A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts
or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of
the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their
relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.

The well-entrenched rule in our jurisdiction is that only questions of law may be entertained by
this Court in a petition for review on certiorari. This rule, however, is not ironclad and admits
certain exceptions, such as when (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of
fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are
based; (7) the findings of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of evidence on
record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the
Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are
beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both
parties.

FACTS: On December 3, 1996, Simon Enterprises, Inc. filed a civil action for damages before
the RTC of Manila against the unknown owner of the vessels M/V "Sea Dream" and M/V "Tern,"
their local agent Inter-Asia Marine Transport, Inc., and Asian Terminals, Inc. (ATI), the arrastre
operator, for alleged shortages in bulk soybean meal shipments. The claim involving M/V "Sea
Dream" was settled in 1998, leaving only the claims related to M/V "Tern." The unknown owner
and Inter-Asia filed their Answer, raising procedural defenses under the Rules of Civil
Procedure, including lack of cause of action, prescription, absence of real parties-in-interest,
failure to file claims within the prescribed period, and lack of liability based on shipment terms.
They also filed a cross-claim against ATI and a counterclaim for attorney’s fees. ATI, in its
Answer, denied liability, asserted due diligence, and claimed any loss occurred after discharge. It
also filed a counterclaim for attorney’s fees.

On May 10, 2001, the RTC held all defendants jointly and severally liable for ₱2,286,259.20 plus
interest and costs, finding no proof of extraordinary diligence. The CA affirmed the RTC
decision with modification on November 27, 2006, deleting attorney’s fees but holding ATI
liable as the shortage occurred during unloading under its stevedores’ supervision. ATI’s Motion
for Reconsideration was denied on March 23, 2007. The unknown owner and Inter-Asia’s

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Petition for Review (G.R. No. 177170) was denied by the Supreme Court in July 2007.
Separately, ATI filed its own Petition for Review on Certiorari on April 20, 2007,
questioning its solidary liability and asserting lack of proof of actual loss, inherent nature
of the cargo, and absence of negligence. The case advanced through the judicial system raising
procedural issues involving cause of action, burden of proof, solidary liability, evidentiary
sufficiency, and required diligence under civil and commercial law.

ISSUE: Whether the appellate court erred in affirming its solidary liability with the carrier.

RULING: YES. The Supreme Court granted the petition for review on certiorari and reversed
the Court of Appeals' decision insofar as petitioner Asian Terminals, Inc. (ATI) is concerned,
ordering the dismissal of the complaint against it. While generally limited to reviewing only
questions of law under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the Court
found that the case fell under an exception—specifically, a "misapprehension of facts"—which
justified reviewing factual findings. The Court ruled that the respondent failed to prove, by
preponderance of evidence, that a shortage occurred in the shipment of soybean meal, as the
actual weight at the port of origin was not established. The Court emphasized that the bill of
lading bearing the qualification "Shipper’s weight, quantity and quality unknown" did not
provide competent evidence of the cargo’s weight. Furthermore, it held that the respondent
did not establish ATI’s negligence and relied on inaccurate weighing methods. Given the
absence of sufficient proof of loss and fault, the Court concluded that ATI could not be held
liable, thus dismissing the case against it.

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2. Brual vs. Contreras, G.R. No. 205451, March 7, 2022

Doctrine: The right to appeal is statutory and one who seeks to avail of it must comply with the
statute or rules. The requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period
specified in the law must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions
against needless delays. Moreover, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
period set by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well, hence failure to perfect the
same renders the judgment final and executory. And, just as a losing party has the privilege to
file an appeal within the prescribed period, so also does the prevailing party have the correlative
right to enjoy the finality of a decision in his favor.

The changes and clarifications recognize that appeal is neither a natural nor a constitutional
right, but merely statutory, and the implication of its statutory character is that the party who
intends to appeal must always comply with the procedures and rules governing appeals, or
else the right of appeal may be lost or squandered.

FACTS: Fausta Brual died single and without compulsory heirs, prompting Elizabeth Brual, her
niece by affinity and instituted heir, to file a petition for probate of Fausta’s last will and
testament before the RTC on July 22, 2009. Subsequently, respondents—Fausta’s nephews and
nieces—filed a manifestation and motion for intervention with supplemental allegations,
questioning the testamentary disposition and asserting that the probate petition was procedurally
defective for failing to list the decedent’s blood relatives. Elizabeth opposed the motion, which
the RTC denied on November 4, 2010, holding that respondents were not compulsory or
testamentary heirs entitled to notice and that any defect was cured by publication. Respondents’
motion for reconsideration was also denied, leading them to file a notice of appeal on
February 3, 2011.

However, the RTC dismissed the appeal on April 27, 2011 due to respondents’ failure to file
a record on appeal, citing Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, and emphasized
that denial of intervention was discretionary and not subject to review absent arbitrariness.
Respondents later filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration and to admit the belated record on
appeal, citing excusable negligence, but the RTC denied the motion in its July 27, 2011 Order.
Respondents then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which granted it, reversing the
RTC’s dismissal and ruling that procedural lapses should not defeat substantial rights, especially
since respondents promptly submitted their record on appeal and acted in good faith. Elizabeth’s
motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) correctly dismissed the respondents' appeal for
failure to timely file the required record on appeal under Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court.

RULING: YES. The Supreme Court focused on the strict application of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, specifically Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 41, in relation to Rule 109 governing special
proceedings. The Court reiterated that the right to appeal is a statutory privilege, not a
natural or constitutional right, and must be exercised only in the manner and within the period

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prescribed by law. Under Section 2(a), Rule 41, in special proceedings where a record on appeal
is required, both the notice of appeal and record on appeal must be filed and served within 30
days from notice of the judgment or final order. Section 3, Rule 41, further clarifies that “Where
a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal
within thirty (30) days from notice of judgment or final order.” The Court emphasized that
failure to comply with these procedural rules is not merely a technicality, but jurisdictional in
nature. In the present case, while respondents filed their notice of appeal within the
reglementary period, they failed to file the record on appeal within the same 30-day period,
instead filing it months later with an omnibus motion citing inadvertence.

The Supreme Court held that mere inadvertence or a mistaken belief about the procedural
timeline is not “excusable negligence,” and noted that “a mere reading of the rules could have
prevented respondents’ blunder.” The Court applied the rule in Chipongian v. Benitez-Lirio,
underscoring that non-compliance with the requirement to timely file a record on appeal renders
the judgment final and executory. Accordingly, the Supreme Court ruled that the RTC correctly
dismissed the appeal and that the CA erred in reversing it. Thus, the petition was granted, the CA
decision was reversed and set aside, and the RTC’s April 27, 2011 and July 27, 2011 Orders—
dismissing the appeal for failure to perfect it in accordance with Rule 41—were reinstated.

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3. Lapid vs.Laurea, G.R. No. 139607, October 28, 2002

FACTS: The petitioners Spouses Ramon Isidro P. Lapid and Gladys B. Lapid filed a complaint
for damages before the RTC of Malabon, docketed as Civil Case No. 2839-MN, against St.
Therese of the Child Jesus School and its officials for the alleged unjust suspension and
exclusion of their son, Christopher, without notice or hearing. After the private respondents
answered the complaint, petitioners moved to declare the school in default, which the RTC
denied in its February 9, 1999 Order. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on
March 11, 1999. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals
(CA-G.R. SP No. 52970), challenging the RTC’s orders.

However, the CA dismissed the petition via a June 1, 1999 resolution for failure to indicate
material dates, specifically the date of filing of the motion for reconsideration before the
RTC, in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 39-98, which amended Section 3, Rule 46 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA emphasized the importance of such dates in
determining the petition's timeliness under Section 4, Rule 65. Despite filing a motion for
reconsideration on June 15, 1999, petitioners again failed to cure the defect by still not stating the
required date, leading to the CA’s denial of the motion in its August 4, 1999, resolution. The
procedural issue thus centered on petitioners' non-compliance with mandatory formal
requirements concerning material dates in a special civil action for certiorari under the Rules of
Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed
by petitioners on the ground of formal and procedural deficiency, i.e., the petitioners’ failure to
state a material date in their petition for certiorari.

RULING: NO. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the resolutions of the Court
of Appeals dated June 1, 1999 and August 4, 1999, emphasizing that strict compliance with
procedural rules is mandatory, especially in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. The Court highlighted that a petition for certiorari must indicate three
material dates: (1) when notice of the judgment or final order was received, (2) when a
motion for reconsideration was filed, and (3) when notice of the denial of that motion was
received. The petitioners failed to indicate the second date, i.e., the date of filing of their motion
for reconsideration, thereby violating Section 3, Rule 46 as amended by Supreme Court
Circular No. 39-98, which states that “failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the
foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.”

The Court reiterated the purpose of this rule, quoting Santos v. Court of Appeals: “The
requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is for the
purpose of determining its timeliness.” It also underscored that “the perfection of an appeal in
the manner and within the period prescribed by law is jurisdictional and failure to perfect
an appeal as required by law renders the judgment final and executory” (Mabuhay v.
NLRC, 288 SCRA 1). While the Court acknowledged that there are instances where procedural

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rules may be relaxed to avoid injustice, it found petitioners’ explanation unpersuasive and the
repeated non-compliance inexcusable, stressing that “ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith” (ignorantia legis non excusat). In conclusion, the Court found no
reversible error in the appellate court’s dismissal of the petition and held petitioners accountable
for the procedural lapses of their counsel, reaffirming that “negligence of counsel binds the
client.”

Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure,
rather than seek exceptions as loopholes. Technical rules of procedure are not designed to
frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided to effect the prompt, proper and orderly
disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard
of these rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.

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4. DBP vs. Carpio, G.R. No. 195450, February 1, 2017

Doctrine: The "residual jurisdiction" of the trial court is available at a stage in which the court
is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the
appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the
approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the
records on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual
jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent
litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal. From the
foregoing, it is clear that before the trial court can be said to have residual jurisdiction over a
case, a trial on the merits must have been conducted; the court rendered judgment; and the
aggrieved party appealed therefrom.

FACTS: The case stemmed from a complaint filed by the respondents for delivery of certificates
of title, damages, and attorney’s fees against the petitioner DBP. The respondents prayed for the
issuance of writ of seizure claiming that the said certificate of title were unlawfully detained by
DBP and GFSME. The RTC issued the Writ of Seizure; however, the DBP later filed its Omnibus
Motion to Dismiss Complaint and to Quash Writ of Seizure on the ground of improper venue,
among others. The RTC granted DBP’s Omnibus motion and dismissed the case for
improper venue. The court ordered Abad, et al. to return the titles, which they failed to do. DBP
sought to hold the surety bond liable for damages, but the RTC denied the motion, ruling it
lacked authority since the dismissal was for improper venue, not on the merits. The CA
affirmed this, noting DBP did not properly move for reconsideration of the dismissal order and
that claims against the bond must be filed before trial or before judgment becomes final, per
Section 20, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. DBP’s subsequent motions for reconsideration were
denied, leading to the current petition.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court had residual jurisdiction to rule on DBP’s belated application for
damages on the surety bond after the dismissal of the case for improper venue.

RULING: NO. The petition was denied for lack of merit because the trial court did not reach the
residual jurisdiction stage. Residual jurisdiction, defined as the authority of the trial court to
issue orders for the protection of parties’ rights after appeal perfection but before the
transmittal of records, requires that a trial on the merits had been conducted, a judgment
rendered, and an appeal perfected. In this case, the RTC dismissed the complaint for improper
venue—a dismissal without prejudice—which is not appealable under Section 1(h), Rule 41 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure. Consequently, no appeal was perfected and the trial court never
acquired residual jurisdiction to rule on DBP’s application for damages. The Court emphasized

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that “[Section] 1(h), Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that no
appeal may be taken from an order dismissing an action without prejudice.” Equity
arguments by DBP could not override the Rules of Court, as equity “is applied only in the
absence of, and never against, statutory law or... judicial rules of procedure.”

Regarding the claim for damages on the replevin bond, the Court applied Section 20, Rule 57 of
the Rules of Court, which states: “If the judgment on the action be in favor of the party against
whom attachment was issued, he may recover, upon the bond given or deposit made by the
attaching creditor, any damages resulting from the attachment. Such damages may be awarded
only upon application and after proper hearing, and shall be included in the final judgment. The
application must be filed before the trial or before appeal is perfected or before the judgment
becomes executory, with due notice to the attaching creditor and his surety or sureties, setting
forth the facts showing his right to damages and the amount thereof.” DBP’s application for
damages was belatedly filed after the dismissal order had become final and executory, which
barred recovery on the bond. The Court held that filing the application late could not be excused
by DBP’s pursuit of other remedies, since the Rules do not prohibit simultaneous remedies.
Lastly, the Court noted alternative remedies available to DBP outside the bond claim, such as
enforcing the guarantee agreement with GFSME, filing an action for damages under Article 19
of the Civil Code, or instituting collection or mortgage foreclosure actions. Hence, the Court
affirmed the CA’s decision and resolution denying DBP’s petition.

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5. Phil. Nails and Wires Corp. vs. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 143933,
February 14, 2003

Doctrine: It is not within the competence of the trial court, in resolving a motion for execution
pending appeal, to rule that the appeal is patently dilatory and rely on the same as its basis for
finding good reason to grant the motion. Only an appellate court can appreciate the dilatory
intent of an appeal as an additional good reason in upholding an order for execution pending
appeal which may have been issued by the trial court for other good reasons, or in cases where
the motion for execution pending appeal is filed with the appellate court in accordance with
Section 2, paragraph (a), Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court.

Rationale: the originating court cannot pass judgment upon the purity of its own decision and
declare that an appeal therefrom is purely dilatory. That would be an arrant display of
extravagance and self-importance.

- [c]ertiorari lies against an order granting execution pending appeal where the same is not
founded upon good reasons. Appeal is not a speedy and adequate remedy that can relieve the
losing party from the immediate effects of an improvident execution pending appeal.

FACTS: The case began when petitioner Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation filed a
complaint on July 28, 1993, against respondent Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. for recovery
under its Marine Cargo Policy, seeking ₱2,698,637.00 for lost steel billets. Respondent moved to
dismiss on grounds of failure to state a cause of action and improper venue, which the trial court
denied on October 1, 1993. After being granted an extension to file an answer, respondent was
declared in default on November 5, 1993, leading to the reception of petitioner’s evidence ex
parte. Respondent subsequently filed its answer and a petition for prohibition before the Court of
Appeals, which was denied due to failure to attach an affidavit of non-forum shopping. The trial
court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner on December 10, 1993.

Respondent filed a notice of appeal, but petitioner moved for execution pending appeal,
granted by the trial court on February 4, 1994, leading to the issuance of a writ of execution and
garnishment of respondent’s bank account. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari and a
motion to stay execution, prompting this Court to issue a temporary restraining order on
March 7, 1994. The Court of Appeals annulled the writ of execution, finding the trial court had
erred in declaring respondent in default and in granting execution pending appeal without
satisfying legal requirements, and allowed respondent to file an answer to ensure proper
adjudication of the case. The issues presented for review include the propriety of the trial court’s
order allowing execution pending appeal, the validity of the default declaration, and the failure to
attach an affidavit of non-forum shopping in respondent’s petition.

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ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in annulling the trial court’s order allowing
execution pending appeal.

RULING: The Supreme Court partly granted the petition, affirming the Court of Appeals’
decision to annul the trial court’s order allowing execution pending appeal but reversing the
ruling on the improvident declaration of default. Procedurally, the Court emphasized that under
both the old and 1997 Rules of Court (Rule 39, Section 2), a trial court may only order execution
pending appeal upon “good reasons” stated in a special order after due hearing, while the court
still has jurisdiction over the case. The Court clarified that the trial court cannot determine
whether an appeal is dilatory or frivolous since that is within the appellate court’s exclusive
competence. Consequently, the trial court erred in granting execution pending appeal based
solely on petitioner’s allegation of dilatory tactics by respondent. The Supreme Court also agreed
with the Court of Appeals that mere posting of a supersedeas bond does not automatically justify
execution pending appeal; it is only one factor among others that must constitute “good reasons.”

Regarding the default declaration, the Supreme Court found that the issue was not properly
raised in the petition before the CA and had already been resolved in a separate appeal (CA-G.R.
No. 45547). It ruled that the Court of Appeals improperly ruled on the default order in the
present petition because respondent did not contest the default declaration in that petition, and
issues not raised below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, following the settled
procedural rule.

On the procedural requirement of attaching an affidavit of non-forum shopping and a verified

statement of material dates, the Supreme Court held that respondent’s failure to comply was a
procedural lapse waived by petitioner’s failure to timely raise it. The Court clarified that
there was no forum-shopping because the petitions involved different causes of action and
reliefs, even if parties were the same.

In sum, the Supreme Court applied the procedural rules strictly: it enforced the requirement of
good reasons for execution pending appeal under Rule 39, recognized the appellate court’s
exclusive role to determine the merit or dilatoriness of appeals, adhered to the rule barring issues
not raised in lower courts from being considered on appeal, and enforced but allowed waiver of
procedural requirements such as non-forum shopping affidavits when not timely objected to.

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6. Mendoza vs. Bautista, G.R. No. 143666, March 18, 2005

Doctrine: As a rule, no issue may be raised on appeal unless it has been brought before the
lower tribunal for its consideration. Higher courts are precluded from entertaining matters
neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below but ventilated for the
first time only in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal. However, as with most procedural
rules, this maxim is subject to exceptions. Indeed, our rules recognize the broad discretionary
power of an appellate court to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and to consider
errors not assigned.

An appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not
assigned as errors in the appeal in these instances: (a) grounds not assigned as errors but
affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but
are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law; (c) matters not assigned as
errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and
complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing
piecemeal justice; (d) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial
court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties
failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; (e) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but
closely related to an error assigned; and (f) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon
which the determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent.

FACTS: On December 10, 1991, respondent Purita Bautista filed a complaint for annulment of
sale and reconveyance against petitioners Soledad Mendoza and Peregil T. Raymundo, and
spouses Philip G. Casiño and Ma. Caridad Zara Casiño, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City, docketed as Civil Case No. 61606. Respondent alleged that the Raymundo spouses
sold a property to the Casiño spouses without offering it first to her, in violation of her right of
first refusal under the Civil Code and the Land Reform Code. On February 20, 1992, petitioners
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata based on a prior case (Civil Case No.
60953) dismissed for non-suit. The RTC denied the motion on March 2, 1992, ruling the prior
case was dismissed without prejudice. On April 29, 1992, the RTC declared petitioners in default
for failing to file a responsive pleading. Petitioners’ motion to lift the default order was denied on
September 2, 1992, and their subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied on October
22, 1992.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) on November 18, 1992,
which was dismissed on July 19, 1993, for lack of merit. They then filed a petition for review
with the Supreme Court, which was denied on October 4, 1993, becoming final and executory on

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November 5, 1993. The case was remanded to the RTC. Upon motion, the RTC allowed
respondent to present evidence ex parte. Respondent testified to substantiate her right of first
refusal under P.D. No. 1517 as a tenant who resided on the property for over ten years. Based on
this, the RTC ruled in respondent’s favor, ordering the Casiño spouses to reconvey the property
to her upon payment, and awarding attorney’s fees and costs.

Petitioners appealed to the CA, arguing the case was barred by res judicata and that the RTC
erred in denying their motions and refusing to consider their answer. The CA, in an August 20,
1999 decision, affirmed the RTC ruling, holding the prior dismissal was without prejudice, and
that as petitioners were declared in default, respondent’s evidence stood uncontroverted. The CA
also ruled that issues regarding the denial of motions had been resolved by the Supreme Court.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on procedural grounds, which the CA denied on
June 2, 2000, noting that procedural errors not raised in the appeal brief could not be considered
on appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in granting the respondent the
right of first refusal under Presidential Decree No. 1517 despite the absence of any allegation or
proof that the disputed property is located within an Area of Priority Development and Urban
Land Reform Zone.

RULING: YES. The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals patently and seriously erred
in not reversing the trial court’s decision granting respondent the right of first refusal under P.D.
No. 1517, despite the absence of any allegation in the complaint or finding that the disputed land
is within a place declared both as an Area of Priority Development (APD) and Urban Land
Reform Zone (ULRZ). The Court emphasized the general rule that no issue may be raised on
appeal unless it was brought before the lower court, but recognized the appellate court’s broad
discretionary power under Section 8, Rule 51 of the Rules of Court to consider plain errors even
if not assigned as errors in the appeal. Applying this principle, the Court found a fundamental
and manifest error in the trial court’s reliance on P.D. No. 1517 since respondent, as a mere
lessee, had no right of first refusal, and the property was not situated in a proclaimed APD or
ULRZ. The Court noted that strict adherence to procedural rules must not be used to
perpetuate injustice, and that plain errors affecting substantial justice may be noticed by
the court. Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the
decisions of the Court of Appeals, and dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action,
without pronouncement as to costs.

- Importance of summons. Pag walng proper service of summons, it may invalidate the case
due to lack of jurisdiction.

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7. A.L. Ang Network, Inc. vs. Emma Mondejar; G.R. No. 200804, 22 January 2014

FACTS: On March 23, 2011, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money under the Rule of
Procedure for Small Claims Cases before the MTCC, seeking to collect from respondent the
amount of ₱23,111.71 which represented her unpaid water bills for the period June 1, 2002 to
September 30, 2005.

Parties & their arguments

a. Petitioner – Claimed that it was duly authorized to supply water to and collect payment
from the homeowners of Regent Pearl Subdivision. The Petitioner contended that the
respondent only paid the amount of P5,468.38, thus, leaving a balance of P23,111.71
(28,580 ang total) which was left unpaid despite repeated demands.
b. Respondents – Contended that she religiously paid petitioner the agreed monthly flat rate
of 75 pesos. However, despite their agreement that the same would be adjusted only upon
prior notice, petitioner unilaterally charged her unreasonable and excessive adjustments.

MTCC Ruling – The MTCC noted that petitioner failed to submit evidence showing (a) the
exact date when it actually began imposing the NWRB approved rates; and (b) that the parties
had a formal agreement containing the terms and conditions thereof, without which it cannot
establish with certainty respondent’s obligation. Accordingly, it ruled that the earlier agreed rate
of ₱75.00 per month should still be the basis for respondent’s water consumption charges for the
period August 8, 2003 to September 30, 2005. The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under
rule 65 before the RTC for grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC in finding that
petitioner failed to establish with certainty respondent’s obligation.

RTC Ruling – The RTC dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that such petition was only
filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of small claims cases as provided under the Rules
on small claims cases (improper remedy). Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied,
hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing petitioner’s recourse under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court assailing the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case.

RULING: YES. The Court thus finds that petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of
certiorari to assail the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case,
contrary to the RTC’s ruling. Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision
under the above-stated rule, the remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party may,
thus, immediately move for its execution. Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small

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claims cases, like other proceedings where appeal is not an available remedy, does not preclude
the aggrieved party from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In a
long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that "the extraordinary writ of certiorari is
always available where there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law." Verily, a petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an original
action designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not of judgment. Owing to its nature, it
is therefore incumbent upon petitioner to establish that jurisdictional errors tainted the MTCC
Decision. The RTC, in turn, could either grant or dismiss the petition based on an evaluation of
whether or not the MTCC gravely abused its discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or
arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is material to the controversy.

FALLO: The petition is GRANTED. The RTC decision must be reinstated and remanded for its
proper disposition.

Ratio/Doctrine/Rules

Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the special civil action of
certiorari may only be invoked when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the course of law," this rule is not without exception. The availability of the ordinary
course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari where appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial,
speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy – not the mere absence – of all other legal
remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ that usually determines the
propriety of certiorari.

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8. Lee vs. LBP; G.R. No. 218867; 17 February 2016.

FACTS: Petitioners-spouses Edmond Lee and Helen Huang are registered owners of a parcel of
land with an aggregate area of 5.4928 hectares in Hermosa Bataan. However, the subject
property was compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform in accordance with
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform law of 1988. DAR offered the sum of P109,429.98 as just
compensation for the 1.5073-ha of the subject property.

Parties & their arguments

a. Petitioner – The petitioners rejected the valuation and filed the present petition for
determination of just compensation against DARAB.
b. Respondent – Respondent claimed that its valuation was based on DAR admin order
no.11 as amended.

RTC: Sitting as SAC, it rejected the valuation given by the respondent and setting the just
compensation for petitioners at P250 per sqm. Respondent filed MR but was denied. Several
years later petitioners filed a motion for execution (September 2006).

a. Petitioner – Although they received a notice of appeal dated June 2002, no such appeal
was actually filed before the RTC.
b. Respondent – Denied the petitioners’ claim, asserted that it filed a Notice of Appeal in
accordance with the rules and has perfected the appeal. They claim that the decision was
not yet final and executory.

The RTC, finding that respondent had perfected its appeal, gave due course to the
respondent’s appeal and directed the transmittal of the entire records thereof to the CA.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration which was denied. The RTC clarified that respondent was
able to file its Notice of Appeal within the prescribed period and that a postal money order in the
amount of P520 was issued in the Clerk of Court of the RTC representing payment of the appeal
fee.

Five years later, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the appeal of the respondent for failure to
prosecute, asseverating that from the time the RTC gave due course of the appeal in 2008,
respondent had not made any further action on its appeal, particularly the payment of the appeal
fees. In its defense, the respondent argued that RTC no longer had jurisdiction after its Notice
of Appeal had been given due course. Petitioners’ motion should have been filed before the CA.

RTC GRANTED PETITIONERS’ MOTION dismissing respondent’s appeal, on the ground

that the respondent failed to pay the prescribed appeal fees. It stated that the postal money issued
as payment therefor, had not been remitted or credited to the account of the Office of the Clerk of

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Court in RTC. This is the very reason why the records were not transmitted to CA. It ruled that
proof of payment of the appeal fees is required attachment that forms part of the records to be
transmitted to the CA. With the appeal not perfected, the RTC held it did not lose jurisdiction.

CA: It found grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC dismissing the appeal for failure to
prosecute, upholding the validity of the appeal. It ruled that upon the perfection of the appeal,
RTC had already lost jurisdiction. Any issuance of the RTC after the filing of respondent’s NOA
were of no force and effect. MR denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
when it dismissed respondent's appeal for failure to prosecute.

RULING: YES. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the RTC dismissing respondents’
appeal. Rule 41 Section 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. - Within the period for
taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or
final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees.
Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the
original record or the record on appeal. In the case at bar, the Court gave credence to the
statement by the OIC Clerk of Court of the RTC, finding that that despite the issuance by the
respondent of the postal money order, the amount pertaining thereto was never remitted nor
received by the court. There being no proof of payment of the required appellate fees, the case
records cannot be transmitted to the CA and therefore remained with the RTC.

Additionally, Rule 41 section 9 provides that in appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses
jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of appeals filed in due time and the
expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. Since the respondent failed to present its
proof of payment, therefore it failed to perfect its appeal before the RTC. As a result of
respondent's failure to perfect an appeal within the period fixed by law, no court could exercise
appellate jurisdiction to review the RTC decision.

FALLO: Petition is GRANTED. The decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
orders of RTC as Special Agrarian Court are AFFIRMED.

Ratio/Doctrine/Rules

The requirement of paving the full amount of the appellate docket fees within the prescribed
period is not a mere technicality of law or procedure. The payment of docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appeal
is not perfected. The appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action and the Decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory. It bears to
stress that the right to appeal is a statutory right and the one who seeks to avail that right must
comply with the statute or rules. An appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege. The
payment of the docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and
jurisdictional.

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9. Bernardo vs. Soriano; G.R. No. 200104, 19 June 2019.

FACTS: Bernardo, Stephanie’s grandmother filed a petition for habeas corpus to produce the
person of her minor granddaughter. Bernardo asserted that Stephanie was being deprived and
restrained of her liberty while under the custody of the DSWD, and despite demand, the DSWD
refused to release the minor under Bernardo’s custody. RTC ordered for the petition to be
converted to a case for custody for Bernardos’s failure to prove the illegality of DSWD’s custody
over the minor. Soriano, the surviving parent of Stephanie for her part, filed a complaint-in-
intervention seeking to be granted permanent custody of her child.

RTC: GRANTED Soriano’s right to parental custody and parental authority. However, for the
best interest of the minor child, the RTC ruled that the minor will be staying for the meantime for
the School year 2009-2010 under the custody of Bernardo.

a. Petitioner – Bernardo asserted in her Motion for Reconsideration that Soriano is

unfit to take care of her child, alleging the latter verbally maltreats the child. RTC
DENIED (August 31, 2010).
b. Respondent – On the very same day, SORIANO timely filed her comment with
Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated Aug. 27, 2010. She sought for the
immediate custody of Stephanie in her favor. RTC GRANTED (October
22,2010)
c. Petitioner – Bernardo for the RTC’s denial of her MR, TIMELY filed a Notice of
Appeal on September 8, 2010. RTC denied due course the NoA, on the ground that
August 10, 2010 and 31 have not yet attained finality, thus may not be subject of an
appeal.

The RTC eventually granted Soriano’s timely filed Motion for Partial Reconsideration allowing
the latter to take custody of her minor child immediately.

a. Petitioner - Filed for another MR for the September 2010 and October 2012 orders
but was denied. THUS, Bernardo filed PETITION FOR CERTIORARI under
Rule 65 before the CA. On the grounds of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, the RTC’S decision denying due course of her notice of
appeal.

CA: DENIED Bernardo’s Certiorari petition. The CA held that despite the RTC's Decision
being a judgment on the merits of the case and despite the RTC having already disposed
Bernardo's Motion for Reconsideration of such Decision, the pendency of Soriano's Motion for

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Partial Reconsideration warranted the treatment of the RTC's Decision as an interlocutory order
and not a final judgment that can be appealed, as there was still something left for the RTC to do,
which was to decide the Motion for Partial Reconsideration. Hence this instant appeal.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in holding that Bernardo is precluded from filing a
Notice of Appeal due to the pendency of Soriano’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
2. Whether the CA erred in denying Bernardo's Certiorari Petition for being premature.

RULING:

1. YES. The Supreme Court found the RTC and CA’s petitions erroneous. The SC
emphasized that RTC's Decision did not cease to be an appealable judgment,
transforming into a mere interlocutory order, for the sole reason that the opposing party,
Soriano, filed her own Motion for Partial Reconsideration. With Bernardo's own Motion
for Reconsideration having been denied by the RTC, according to Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court, Bernardo already had 15 days to file a Notice of Appeal regardless of Soriano
filing her own Motion for Reconsideration. SC cited Jurisprudence which held that "each
party has a different period within which to appeal" and that "[s]ince each party has a
different period within which to appeal, the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration
by one party does not interrupt the other or another party's period of appeal." Hence, a
party's ability to file his/her own appeal upon receipt of the assailed judgment or the
denial of a motion for reconsideration challenging the said judgment within the
reglementary period of 15 days is not affected by the other parties' exercise of discretion
to file their respective motions for reconsideration.

2. NO. The Supreme Court held that CA was not in error to deny
Bernardo's Certiorari Petition. It was found that Bernardo still has an adequate remedy of
appeal which must first be exhausted before she can avail herself of the issuance of writ
of certiorari. As seen in the RTC's Order dated September 9, 2010, denying due course
Bernardo's Notice of Appeal, the RTC did not completely preclude Bernardo from
appealing the RTC's Decision dated August 5, 2010. What the RTC merely did was to
deny due course the Notice of Appeal in the meantime and order Bernardo to file
her comment on Soriano's Comment (With Motion for Partial Reconsideration), so
that upon the RTC's eventual disposition of the said Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, Bernardo and/or Soriano could henceforth file their respective
notices of appeal.Thus, despite the earlier denial of due course by the RTC of Bernardo's
Notice of Appeal, Bernardo still had the available remedy of filing another Notice of
Appeal after the RTC eventually modified its Decision dated August 5, 2010 when it
granted Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration. Thus, an appeal was still available
to Bernardo after the Oct. 22, 2010, order modifying the decision.

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Ratio/Doctrine/Rules

1. There is nothing in the Rules which makes a party's right to appeal dependent or contingent on
the opposing party's motion for reconsideration. Similarly, a party's undertaking to file a motion
for reconsideration of a judgment is not hindered by the other party's filing of a notice of appeal.
Jurisprudence holds that "each party has a different period within which to appeal" and that
"[s]ince each party has a different period within which to appeal, the timely filing of a motion for
reconsideration by one party does not interrupt the other or another party's period of appeal."

Hence, a party's ability to file his/her own appeal upon receipt of the assailed judgment or the
denial of a motion for reconsideration challenging the said judgment within the reglementary
period of 15 days is not affected by the other parties' exercise of discretion to file their respective
motions for reconsideration.

2. It is elementary that a writ of certiorari will not issue where the remedy of appeal is available
to the aggrieved party. The remedies of appeal in the ordinary course of law and that
of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
cumulative. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is proper only if the
aggrieved party has no plain, adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law.

FALLO: Petition DENIED. CA Resolution AFFIRMED.

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10. PBC vs. Court of Appeals; G.R. No. 218901; 15 February 15, 2017.

FACTS: The case originated from the complaint for collection of a sum of money in the amount
of P8,971,118.06 filed by PBCOM against private respondents before the RTC of Makati City.

Parties & their arguments

a. Petitioner -
b. Respondent – Private respondent moved for the dismissal of the complaint alleging that
they had already paid the obligation in full and that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
case because PBCOM failed to pay the correct docket fees.

RTC: September 29, 2010, issued an order, directing PBCOM to pay additional docket fees
within 15 days from receipt thereof. PBCOM paid on Oct 21 but filed its compliance with the
RTC only on November 11, 2010. Thus, the RTC dismissed the complaint filed by the PBCOM.

a. PBCOM filed MR but was denied on the grounds that the proof of payment of the
additional fee was not submitted on time. PBCOM filed a NOTICE OF APPEAL.
The RTC DENIED on the ground that appeal is not the improper remedy.
PBCOM , without filing another MR, filed a Petition for CERTIORARI and
MANDAMUS with the CA.

CA: DENIED and AFFIRMED the decision of RTC. The CA reasoned that, apart from availing
itself of a wrong mode of appeal, PBCOM failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of a
motion for reconsideration.

a. Petitioner - PBCOM argues that the CA should have given due course to its Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus because it is the proper remedy to question the Order
dated June 2, 2011 of the RTC denying its Notice of Appeal and that a motion for
reconsideration is not required when the order assailed of is a patent nullity for
having been issued without jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by the
petitioner.

RULING: YES. The SC considered that although it is a settled rule that a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is filed before the

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respondent court, it is subject to exceptions and one of those is applicable in the case at bar,
specifically “where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction.” Rule 41, Section 13 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure states that, prior to the
transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal to the appellate court, the trial court
may, motu proprio or on motion, dismiss the appeal for having been taken out of time or for non-
payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.

As held in Salvan v. People, the RTC has no jurisdiction to deny a notice of appeal on the ground
that an appeal is not the proper remedy; such authority belongs to the CA under Rule 50, Section
1. The Court’s pronouncement in Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco reiterated
that the RTC’s authority to dismiss appeals is limited to grounds in Section 13, Rule 41, while
dismissals based on Rule 50 grounds, such as non-appealability of the judgment, are within the
exclusive competence of the appellate court. Hence, the RTC’s denial of due course to
PBCOM’s notice of appeal on the ground that it was a wrong remedy is a patent nullity,
constituting an act without or in excess of jurisdiction. Consequently, the petition is granted, the
assailed RTC Order and CA rulings are reversed and set aside, and the RTC is directed to give
due course to PBCOM’s notice of appeal and transmit the case records to the CA for review.

Ratio/Doctrine/Rules Dismissals of appeal may also be had upon the grounds specified by Rule
50 of the Rules of Court; but it is the Court of Appeals, not the trial court, which is explicitly
authorized to dismiss appeals on said grounds. Generally, these grounds do not include matters
which go into the merits of the cause or to the right of the plaintiff or def end ant to recover. Case
law has come to recognize other grounds for dismissal, by way of exception, e.g., that the cause
has become moot, or the appeal is frivolous or manifestly dilatory.1âwphi1 But, to repeat,
authority to dismiss an appeal on the ground that it is frivolous or taken manifestly for delay "is
not certainly with the court a quo whose decision is an issue, but with the appellate court.

FALLO: Petition GRANTED.

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11. First Leverage and Services Group, Inc. vs. Solid Builders, Inc.; G.R. No. 155680, 02
July 2012

FACTS:

Parties & their arguments

a. Petitioner
b. Respondent

RTC:

CA:

ISSUE:

RULING:

FALLO: Petition DENIED.

Ratio/Doctrine/Rules

It is settled that under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari. This Court is not a trier of facts, and it is not its function to
analyze or weigh evidence. The jurisdiction of this Court over cases brought to it via petition for
review on certiorari is limited to the review and rectification of errors allegedly committed by
the lower courts. These issues should be properly threshed out before the trial court.

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12. Anderson vs. Ho; G.R. No. 172590, 07 January 2013

FACTS:

Parties & their arguments

a. Petitioner
b. Respondent

RTC:

CA:

ISSUE:

RULING:

FALLO:

Ratio/Doctrine/Rules

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13. Punongbayan-Visitacion vs. People; G.R. No. 194214, 10 January 2018

FACTS:

Parties & their arguments

a. Petitioner
b. Respondent

RTC:

CA:

ISSUE:

RULING:

FALLO:

Ratio/Doctrine/Rules

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14. Metro Construction, Inc. vs. Chatham Properties, G.R. No. 141897, 24 September
2011

FACTS:

Parties & their arguments

a. Petitioner
b. Respondent

RTC:

CA:

ISSUE:

RULING:

FALLO:

Ratio/Doctrine/Rules

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15. St. Martin Funeral Homes vs. NLRC; G.R. No. 130866, 16 September 1998

FACTS:

Parties & their arguments

a. Petitioner
b. Respondent

RTC:

CA:

ISSUE:

RULING:

FALLO:

Ratio/Doctrine/Rules

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WEEK 2

16. Neypes vs. Court of Appeals; G.R. No. 141524, 14 September 2005

FACTS:

Parties & their arguments

a. Petitioner - Petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration should be construed as the "final order," not the February 12, 1998 order
which dismissed their complaint. Since they received their copy of the denial of their
motion for reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary period to
appeal had not yet lapsed when they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.
b. Respondent

RTC:

CA:

ISSUE:

RULING:

FALLO:

Ratio/Doctrine/Rules

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17. Pates vs. COMELEC; G.R. No. 184915; 30 June 2009

FACTS:

Parties & their arguments

a. Petitioner
b. Respondent

RTC:

CA:

ISSUE:

RULING:

FALLO:

Ratio/Doctrine/Rules

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18. Boston Bank of the PHL vs. Manalo; G.R. No. 158149; 09 February 2006

FACTS:

Parties & their arguments

a. Petitioner
b. Respondent

RTC:

CA:

ISSUE:

RULING:

FALLO:

Ratio/Doctrine/Rules

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19. Gatan vs. Vinarao, G.R. No. 205912; 18 October 2018

FACTS:

Parties & their arguments

a. Petitioner
b. Respondent

RTC:

CA:

ISSUE:

RULING:

FALLO:

Ratio/Doctrine/Rules

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20. Querubin vs. COMELEC; G.R. No. 218787, 08 December 2015

FACTS:

Parties & their arguments

a. Petitioner
b. Respondent

RTC:

CA:

ISSUE:

RULING:

FALLO:

Ratio/Doctrine/Rules

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21. Ocampo vs. Tirona, G.R. No. 147812, April 6, 2005

FACTS: Leonardo R. Ocampo (petitioner) claimed ownership of a 500-square meter parcel of

land in Pasay City (TCT No. 134359), which he had bought from Rosauro Breton, an heir of the
registered owner, Alipio Breton Cruz. Though the title was not yet in Ocampo’s name, he was
already in possession and administering the land. Leonora Tirona (respondent) occupied a
portion of that land as a lessee, having been recognized by previous owner/lessor. Ocampo sent a
formal written notice on 9 March 1995 that he had acquired the property and demanded rent;
Tirona, after initial payment or acknowledgment, ceased paying rent. Tirona interposed claims
under various Urban Land Reform Presidential Decrees (PD Nos. 1517, 1893, 1968), asserting
her rights and ownership claims (or claims of first refusal or occupancy under those laws). The
MTC ordered Tirona to vacate, surrender possession to Ocampo, pay rent arrears, attorney’s fees,
and costs. The RTC affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because the estate of
the original owner had not yet been partitioned among heirs, Ocampo could not yet eject Tirona
from the portion she occupies — ownership or partition issues were prerequisites. Ocampo then
brought the petition to the Supreme Court.

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22. Wack-Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. v. Won, G.R. No. L-23851, March 26, 1976
(Interpleader)

FACTS: Wack-Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. filed an action for interpleader against Lee E.
Won and Bienvenido Tan over membership certificate No. 201, which both claimed to own. Won
had already sued the Club earlier in Civil Case No. 26044 and obtained a final judgment
recognizing his rights to the certificate. Tan, however, also asserted ownership by assignment
from the original holder. The Club argued that because of these conflicting claims, it was entitled
to file interpleader to compel Won and Tan to litigate between themselves.

ISSUE: Whether interpleader was a proper remedy under these circumstances.

RULING: NO. Interpleader is available only when a stakeholder, with no or limited interest in
the subject matter, is faced with conflicting claims before it becomes independently liable to any
claimant. In this case, the Club had already been adjudged liable to Won in a final judgment in
Civil Case No. 26044, despite being aware of Tan’s competing claim even then. Filing
interpleader afterwards would undermine the finality of that judgment and force Won to re-
litigate an issue already resolved.

The Court held that the Club’s delay amounted to laches, and that the earlier judgment was
binding under the principle of res judicata. Thus, the interpleader complaint was dismissed.

DOCTRINE: The doctrine established is that interpleader must be filed promptly upon
knowledge of conflicting claims; once a stakeholder has been adjudged independently liable to
one claimant, interpleader is no longer available.

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23. Uy Kiao Eng v. Nixon Lee, G.R. No. 176831, January 15, 2010 (Mandamus)

FACTS: Respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for mandamus before the RTC to compel his
mother, petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, to produce the original holographic will of his late father,
claiming she had custody of it. Uy denied having the will or knowledge of its whereabouts and
argued that mandamus was not proper since other remedies existed under the Rules of Court on
probate. The RTC, after respondent’s evidence, granted petitioner’s demurrer and dismissed the
case. The CA reversed, granted mandamus, and ordered Uy to produce the will.

ISSUE: Whether mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the alleged custodian to produce
the original holographic will.

RULING: NO. The Supreme Court reversed the CA and upheld the RTC. The respondent failed
to prove that Uy actually had custody or knowledge of the will’s whereabouts. More importantly,
mandamus will not lie because there are other adequate remedies under the Rules of Court—
particularly in probate proceedings where allowance of a will may be sought even if the original
is lost, destroyed, or not in the petitioner’s possession.

DOCTRINE: Mandamus under Rule 65 lies only when there is a clear legal duty to perform
an act and no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy exists. Where the Rules of Court (e.g.,
Rules 75–76 on probate of wills) already provide remedies for production, allowance, or
enforcement of wills, mandamus is improper.

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24. Araullo vs. Aquino III, G.R. No., 209287, July 1, 2014 (Certiorari)

FACTS: Multiple petitions were filed assailing the constitutionality of the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP) and related issuances of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM). Petitioners, composed of citizens, taxpayers, legislators, and organizations,
alleged that the DAP involved unconstitutional withdrawal of unobligated allotments, declaration
of “savings,” and cross-border fund transfers. The government, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, argued that certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 were not proper remedies
because no actual controversy existed, petitioners lacked legal standing, and the petitions sought
to directly assail executive acts outside the writ’s scope.

ISSUE: Whether certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a proper remedy to assail the
constitutionality of the DAP and related issuances.

RULING: YES. The Supreme Court held that certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 are
proper remedies in this case. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution broadened judicial
power to include the duty of courts not only to settle actual controversies involving rights that are
legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether any branch or instrumentality
of the government committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Thus, Rule 65 petitions may be used to correct such grave abuse, even if the acts
challenged are not judicial or quasi-judicial but involve executive or legislative functions. The
Court found that an actual case or controversy existed since DAP had been implemented,
involving billions of pesos in public funds, making the issue ripe for judicial review. Petitioners
had legal standing as taxpayers and citizens, especially given the transcendental importance of
the case.

RATIO / DOCTRINE / RULES:

 Certiorari under Rule 65 is a proper remedy to question acts of grave abuse of discretion
committed by any branch of government, not only judicial or quasi-judicial bodies.

 Expanded judicial power (Art. VIII, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution): Courts have the duty to strike
down acts of the political branches when they constitute grave abuse of discretion.

 Petitions involving the illegal disbursement of public funds fall under exceptions to locus
standi rules due to transcendental importance.

 Even if a program (DAP) has been discontinued, the Court may still rule when (1) grave
constitutional violations exist, (2) issues are of paramount public interest, (3) controlling
principles must be laid down, or (4) issues are capable of repetition yet evading review.

CITY UNIVERSITY OF PASAY – SCHOOL OF LAW

CIVIL PROCEDURE II | Case Digests
MLS-JD 2L | Judge Rechie Malabanan | Sem 1 2025 | Morales, M.B.

25. Fortune Life Insurance Co. vs. COA, G.R. No. 213525, 27 January 2015

FACTS:

Parties & their arguments

a. Petitioner
b. Respondent

RTC:

CA:

ISSUE:

RULING:

FALLO:

Ratio/Doctrine/Rules

CITY UNIVERSITY OF PASAY – SCHOOL OF LAW

CIVIL PROCEDURE II | Case Digests
MLS-JD 2L | Judge Rechie Malabanan | Sem 1 2025 | Morales, M.B.

26. Phil. Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators vs. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 223505, 03 October 2017

FACTS:

Parties & their arguments

a. Petitioner
b. Respondent

RTC:

CA:

ISSUE:

RULING:

FALLO:

Ratio/Doctrine/Rules

CITY UNIVERSITY OF PASAY – SCHOOL OF LAW