TEAM CANADA 2010
Nuclear weapons
BRIEFING PAPER:
By Iqbal Kassam & Andrew Morrison January 4th, 2010
Nuclear Weapons Nuclear weapons are explosives that use nuclear reactions, either fusion or fission to create explosions. Two things distinguish nuclear explosives from conventional explosives; nuclear explosives release massive quantities of energy from a relatively small amount of matter, in addition to having long lasting radioactive effects. Nuclear devices the size of small traditional explosives have the capability to destroy entire cities. A one thousand kilogram thermonuclear bomb can produce an explosion equivalent to the detonation of over a billion kilograms of conventional high explosive: literally a one to one million ratio. This briefing paper will examine: 1. A history of nuclear weapons, their use and their development 2. Which states currently have them and their respective nuclear policies 3. The effect of nuclear weapons on international politics, and nuclear treaties 4. Practical safety and security concerns surrounding nuclear weapons 1. The History In 1911, Ernest Rutherford conducted his famous gold foil experiment, in which he fired particles one at a time at a sheet of gold no more than a few atoms thick. Surprisingly at the time, most of the particles went straight through the foil, some were slightly deflected but still passed through, and a few bounced back completely. This indicated that most of the foil was in fact empty space, and the atoms that comprised it were mainly a small, dense nucleus as well as circling electrons. For the purposes of this paper, it is important to know that this small nucleus (in a hydrogen atom, about 2 x 10-14 m in diameter) is the source of the tremendous energy released in explosions as described in the introduction. The actual amount of energy released is given by Einstein's formula E=mc2. All that is important for us to know about this equation is that E is incredibly large, and proportional to mass. With the work of Pierre and Marie Curie, it was observed that some elements produced certain amounts of radioactivity. This was the first indication the world had of the awesome power that existed on the subatomic level, and science didn't stop there. In 1932, John Cockcroft and Ernest Walton split the atom, meaning the successfully converted one element to another artificially by smashing atoms together, combining their protons. In 1934, Irene and Frederic Joliot-Curie discovered that not only were some elements naturally radioactive, but others could be made radioactive via bombardment with alpha particles and neutrons. Then, as usual when dealing with power of this magnitude, science was subverted. In 1934, Leo Szilard patented the idea of an atomic bomb which would function as a chain reaction via neutron bombardment. Essentially, a large atom is smashed with neutrons until it breaks apart, forming neutrons, smaller atoms, and a whole lot of energy due to the instability of the smashed parts. The patent was then transferred to the British Royal Navy (secretly) in 1936. This was the prelude to the untold destruction that was to come in the Pacific War, specifically to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. When the Nazi army began to encroach on other countries at the beginning of World War II, Europe's top physicists began to flee from the conflict. The concept of nuclear fission as a weapon
was well known in the physics community, and so despite all the new and exciting developments and discoveries in the field, publication of results ceased. Neither side's physicists wanted to risk giving the other side information that may have led to the completion of a bomb. Scientists in the Allied camp were, not unreasonably, suspicious that Germany had a project to develop a weapon based on the concept of nuclear fission. Britain and the U.S. therefore began funding research into uranium and other radioactive materials. At the urging of British scientists, who claimed a tangible bomb could be only years away, Britain and the U.S. collaborated to produce the bomb, though the other Allied power, the U.S.S.R. was not informed. This led to the Manhattan Project, an unprecedented expenditure on research into nuclear fission, conducted at sites in the U.S. and Canada. The key problem to tackle was the purification of uranium. In nature, uranium is usually found as a mixture of two uranium isotopes: uranium-235, and uranium-238. Uranium-238 composes 99.3% of natural uranium, but it is uranium-235 that is required for proper fission. A sample of at least 80% uranium-235 is required for a useful fission reaction. Two methods were derived for this purification: electromagnetic separation and gaseous diffusion, both of which are outside the scope of this paper. These were employed in a massively expensive purification centre at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. This produced a byproduct, plutonium, another fissile element. By the surrender of Germany on May 8, 1945, the Manhattan project had still not produced a tested weapon. When Truman assumed office, he ordered that a test be conducted, codenamed Trinity. Following this (possibly overly) successful test, it was determined that the bomb should be dropped on Japan. Initially, it was planned that it would be dropped on Tokyo, but its cultural heritage changed the drop site to the apparently less cultured Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These bombs killed upwards of 100,000 Japanese, most of whom were civilians. Tens of thousands died later with radiation sickness and other cancers. Despite the U.S.S.R. not being informed of the developments in nuclear fission, Soviet spies in the U.S. were able to secure information regarding the construction of the bombs. Their resources were tied up in the European war and therefore they could not concentrate immediately on developing a bomb of their own. Following the war, the Soviets vetoed a bill at the UN that would have limited the expansion of atomic energy. This led directly to the arms race that was the Cold War. 2. Who has them: The USA, UK, France, Russia, and China make up the 5 states who have declared possession of nuclear weapons in addition to being either Nuclear Non Proliferation signatories or ratifiers. India, Pakistan, and North Korea make up the three non-NPT nuclear states, and Israel is the sole undeclared nuclear power and signatory of the NPT. United States
The United States has the most extensive nuclear weapon testing program in the world; in total, 1045 nuclear weapons have been tested. As a signatore (but not ratifier) of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the last nuclear test the US underwent was in 1992. The US currently has 3 types of nuclear weapon deployments; Land based ICBM's, sea based nuclear submarine launched ballistic missiles, and air based nuclear weapons of the US Airforces heavy bomber group. Since the US stopped testing nuclear weapons, the funding and focus has been on stockpile stewardship: that is, maintenance and dismantling of the nuclear arsenal. In accordance with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty for 2003, the US announced it had 5968 deployable warheads. In 2002, the US and Russia agreed to the SORT treaty which requires both countries to reduce their deployed stockpiles to a maximum of 2200 warheads each. In 2003, the US rejected a Russian proposal for both countries to reduce stockpile sizes to 1500. The number of nuclear warheads in the USA continue to decline as disassembly and dismantling brings them closer to the 2012 SORT deadline. The United State's sea based nuclear weapons and air based tactical nuclear weapons ensure it of a second strike capability with enough nuclear power to destroy the entire world several times over; this guarantees that any country that launches a first strike against the US would be destroyed. Unfortunately, the sheer number of nuclear weapons possessed and tested means the US has suffered from a number of nuclear accidents. The most significant of these accidents is the Castle Bravo test which spread radioactive ash over 100 miles, including several populated islands. Eleven American warheads are also thought to be "misplaced" (whoops) primarily because of submarine accidents. The US has also spent about $4 billion helping Russia to secure its nuclear arsenal and assist in the dismantling and decommissioning of warheads. The US government has taken a very vocal stance against nuclear proliferation; It has spoken out aggressively against the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea, but has taken a silent policy on the nuclear ambitions of Israel. According to the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations which emphasizes the possibility of using first strike to preemptively neutralize an adversary possessing weapons of mass destruction or overwhelming conventional force. United Kingdom The UK is thought to maintain approximately 160 operational nuclear warheads. Since the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defense Agreement the US and UK have had very close ties and cooperated extensively with their nuclear programs. The UK has pursued a joint nuclear deployment development and production program with the US, and the majority of its nuclear technology is American. Unlike the US, the UK has only a single nuclear deployment system; the system consists of four Vanguard class nuclear submarines each armed with 16 Trident Missiles guaranteeing it second strike capability. For defense, the UK relies on the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System, and the Defense Support Program satellites for warning of a nuclear attack. Both of these systems are owned and operated by the US. The Trident missiles that arm the 4 nuclear submarines each can carry up to 12 warheads, giving each submarine the hypothetical ability to carry 192 warheads. However, at present, each submarine only carries 48. Since the end of the Cold War, the UK has relaxed its nuclear posture; the submarines carry less warheads than they used to, and the UK feels that the ability to carry out a limited second strike is more than enough of a deterrent against attack. France
France is thought to have the third largest nuclear stockpile in the world with about 300 operational warheads. France did not sign the Partial test ban treaty, but signed and ratified the CTBT. Without informing the US, France's nuclear program was initiated by the UK agreeing to give France a few grams of highly enriched Plutonium in 1955. In 2006, President Jaques Chiraq said that France would be willing to use nuclear weapons against a state attacking France by terrorist means, and that the French nuclear arsenal had been uniquely configured to carry this out. In 2008, Nikolas Sarkozy announced that France would reduce its plane-based arsenal by one third, bringing the French arsenal to under 200 warheads. France also has second strike capability from its aircraft carrier Charles De Gaulle, which is armed with nuclear-capable fighter aircraft. China China is believed to have approximately 180 active nuclear weapons. The main focus of Chinese nuclear technology development (that we know of) has been miniaturization, a subject of hot contention; the Cox Commission accuses that these improvements have been made by covert espionage and the theft of the US's W88 nuclear warhead design and guided ballistic missile technology. Chinese nuclear policy is one of no-first-strike; China has said that in no situation would it be the first state to use nuclear weapons, but it would ensure second strike capability to retaliate against any nuclear aggression. China is also the only nuclear weapons state that has given a security assurance to non-nuclear states. "China undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states or nuclear weapon free zones at any time or under any circumstance". China has a nuclear weapon for virtually every given situation; The Chinese nuclear arsenal consists of land based intercontinental ballistic missiles, long range ballistic missiles, medium range ballistic missiles, nuclear cruise missiles, submarine launched ballistic missiles, and a small heavy bomber group capable of deploying tactical nuclear weapons from bombers. Russia The latest estimates on Russia's nuclear stockpiles have them at about 3900 warheads. Russia has large arsenals of both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons; strategic stockpiles include land based ICBMs, and sea based submarine-launched weapons. Tactical stockpiles mostly consist of strategic aviation which includes 884 cruise missiles. According to 2003 Russian military doctrine, tactical nuclear weapons of the Strategic Deterrence Forces could be used to "prevent political pressure against Russia and her allies". "Thus, the Russian leadership is officially contemplating a limited nuclear war". In regards to proliferation, Russia has openly exchanged nuclear technology with China. Out of all the nuclear states, Russia seems to have been the most absent minded; in 1997 it was revealed that 100 "suitcase-size" nuclear weapons were unaccounted for (a fair mistake, I mean, its only the size of a suitcase). In 2005, it was further revealed that in the transfer of nuclear weapons from Ukraine to Russia, there was a 250 weapon discrepancy. Whoops. India Estimates suggest that India has anywhere between 45 and 90 nuclear weapons, with enough weapons grade plutonium for 110. India's arsenal consist of short, intermediate, and long range ballistic missiles, nuclear capable aircraft, surface ships, and submarines under development that
could host nuclear tipped warheads. Weapons grade plutonium is believed to be produced at the CIRIUS reactor India gained from Canada. Like China, India has a declared no-first-strike policy, but has a credible and significant second strike capability. It is currently producing a doctrine based on "credible minimum deterrence"; this doctrine asserts that nuclear weapons would be used in retaliation only and the only purpose of their existence is for deterrence. India is aggressively pursuing a Missile Defence program using anti-ballistic missiles and integrated radar. India also has Russian S300PMU-2s which can be used to intercept ballistic missiles. Pakistan Pakistan has somewhere between 50-100 nuclear weapons in its stockpiles; their nuclear program was started as a response to India's test of its first nuclear weapon, the Smiling Buddha. Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons seems to be based on a doctrine created from the words of Pakistan's founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah in 1948: "The weak and the defenseless in this world invite aggression from others. The best way we can serve peace is by removing the temptation from the path of those who think we are weak and, for that reason, they can bully or attack us. That temptation can only be removed if we make ourselves so strong that nobody dare entertain any aggressive designs against us. Pakistan has come to stay and no power on earth can destroy it." Since the end of 2001, the USA has been providing aid to Pakistan to assist in securing its nuclear weapon arsenals; costs of this program are at approximately $100 million so far. Pakistan uses a locally developed version of Permissive Action Link (PAL) technology, a sophisticated "weapon release" technology to secure its arsenal. It is widely alleged and believed that Pakistan received significant assistance from China in developing its fledgling nuclear weapons program, and Pakistan has confirmed second strike capability through six "secret launch sites". Israel Very little information exists about Israel's nuclear arsenal; the Israeli government neither confirms nor denies the existence of any nuclear weapons. That being said, estimates suggest that Israel has approximately 400 thermonuclear weapons with ICBM deployment technology. The government maintains a position of deliberate vagueness; when asked about its arsenal, the government darkly mutters something to the effect of "we wouldn't be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East". North Korea Like Israel, very little is known about North Korea's nuclear arsenal beyond the fact that it has undergone multiple nuclear tests, and several missile technology tests. According to the US, Pakistan supplied North Korea with nuclear information in exchange for key missile technology (probably not realizing that the majority of North Korea's missile tests fail miserably). It is also widely assumed that North Korea developed nuclear technology as a political tool to increase standing on the international stage and further its bargaining position in negotiations. North Korean nuclear technology is crude at best, and it is certainly nowhere near developing second strike capability. 3. Nuclear Weapons and Politics
a. Pakistan Vs. India The stated reason India gave for testing its first nuclear weapon was a growing threat (and nuclear status) from its neighbor China. What's interesting is that it took over 2 decades from India's initial development of a nuclear weapon to the fusion test date in 1998. India had spent 20 years strongly supporting nonproliferation efforts and emphasizing the need for nuclear powers to extend restraint. India emphasizes the political utility of its nuclear arsenal, and for that reason, it has renounced first strike. Pakistan, too, sees nuclear weapons as a purely political tool that exist for the purpose of deterrence. Unfortunately, this political stance from both sides has proved dangerous, and will continue to threaten political stability in the region. While it seems reassuring that both sides would likely not use nuclear weapons unless they were under a nuclear attack themselves, a "stability-instability paradox" has been created. Because neither sides see nuclear weapons as proper or effective instruments of war, both sides might be and have been tempted to attack strategically peripheral areas. The most clear example of this was Pakistan's incursion over the working boundary in Kashmir. What is worrying is that the nuclear deterrent is not enough to prevent military activity; the stakes of any military activity are now substantially higher than they ever were before. This is because if said military activity escalates to a point where one of the countries feels strategically threatened, the no-first-strike policy may just become a lot of empty words. Fortunately, during the ensuing conflict in 1999, India showed an impressive amount of restraint and a desire to keep the rest of the country out of the fighting. India delayed using air power in Kargil and avoided opening up another front on the India-Pakistan border. Contrast this with Pakistan's attack on Indian areas of Kashmir in 1965; within a week Indian forces had counterattacked in Punjab with overwhelming force, thus widening the scope and increasing the scale of the conflict. b. North Korea and bargaining power While there is no official stated goal behind North Korea's nuclear status, it is fairly easy to see how it has changed North Korea's political status in the region. What is most important is that it has now become completely irresponsible for South Korea, Japan, or any of the United States' allies in the region to take any kind of military action against North Korea. It is likely that this security was the foremost aim of North Korea's nuclear ambitions; nuclear weapons also present Kim Jong Il's regime with some personal security. It would be equally irresponsible to execute any kind of attempted regime change or put Kim Jong Il in a position where his regime has "nothing to lose". Because of that, the United States and her allies have been unable to simply ignore North Korea on the international stage. Instead, they have had to adopt a position of "negotiation first". Rather than pursue harsh punishments and military threats against North Korea for its domestic and international politics, the world has been forced to provide North Korea with carrots such as humanitarian and developmental aid in exchange for weak promises of nuclear disarmament. Yet the biggest threat is still the potential of a "nuclear cascade" throughout Asia; there is no doubt that North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons has created an immediate national security threat for South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. In mid-October of 2006, immediately after the October North Korea test Japanese foreign minister Aso Taro tried to revive the debate in Japan about the viability of pursuing nuclear weapons. This certainly did not escape the notice of China and South Korea who both expressed concern and a desire for Japan to maintain its non-nuclear stance. All this being said, from the United States' perspective, there is some willingness to play the "Japan card" against China. What does this mean? It means encouraging Japan to re-think its non-nuclear
stance in order to punish China for not doing enough to pressure North Korea. While the potential for a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia, there is a political benefit to more of North Korea's neighbors pursuing nuclear weapons: If either Japan or South Korea builds a nuclear arsenal, North Korea's bargaining power becomes substantially diminished. c. "If my neighbor has one, I need one too" This mentality is the basis for any and all speculation that one country acquiring nuclear weapons could fuel a nuclear weapons arms race. The United States pursued its nuclear weapons program out of fear that Germany was doing the same, the USSR began nuclear research because Stalin suspected (rightly) that the United States was doing the same in 1942. China too developed its nuclear weapons because of some not-so-subtle threats from Harry Truman. India began its nuclear program in response to China's, and Pakistan was quick to follow. What is clear here is that when one nation develops nuclear weapons, the amount of regional influence and power it holds increases dramatically. As a result, other states in the region feel compelled to do the same in order to level the playing field; no country wants to be held hostage in regional politics. While in theory every country would be on an even playing field if everyone had a nuclear arsenal, the nuclear arsenal would need to have second-strike capability in order to be an effective deterrent and a useful political tool. This is problematic because of how expensive it is to pursue nuclear weapons let alone developing second strike capability; it is simply unfeasible for even a majority of countries in the world to acquire nuclear weapons, at least in the foreseeable future. One of the ways in which such an arms race can be prevented is through use of the "nuclear umbrella". If South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan did not feel protected by the United States' Intercontinental Ballistic Missile weapons and sea-based nuclear weapon launchers, they would be forced to develop nuclear weapons of their own to defend themselves against the political and military weight of North Korea and China. d. Why disarmament is impossible There are two major reasons why disarmament seems to not be anything more than a pipedream. First of all, as Obama put it, the "geopolitical conditions do not exist" and they probably never will. Most of the nuclear powers (excluding Israel and North Korea) would likely be willing to destroy their nuclear arsenals... if each of them had the last one to be destroyed. Unless China and Russia somehow became close allies with the United States to the same extent as France and the United Kingdom, both are likely to be unwilling to remove all of their nuclear weapons. On top of that, in the event of disarmament, it is unlikely that any country will believe that the others have met their obligations. In addition to this, Israel and North Korea represent a different type of nuclear power. Neither produced nuclear weapons in response to another countries' nuclear ambitions or arsenals; both did it to elevate their respective geopolitical standings and pursue security against countries that had only conventional weaponry. It would be a strategic mistake for these countries, and any countries that develop nuclear weapons with such a purpose to give up their nuclear weapons while they hold regional monopolies or continue to benefit from their existence. The second reason nuclear disarmament is impossible is that the technology exists. Because the know-how exists, there is always going to be the possibility that a country under threat will feel it necessary to use said knowledge to develop nuclear weapons once again. Moreover, even if disarmament occurs, the incentive to produce nuclear weapons for countries like Israel and North Korea increases a thousandfold. The only thing better than having nuclear weapons to for strategic goals or to extort things you want from the international community is by having a global
nuclear monopoly. It is very plausible that a country may develop nuclear weapons out of disarmament only to hold said weapons over the head of the international community and threaten to use them if they find any evidence that another country is also producing nuclear weapons. Important nuclear treaties: a. 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty This was an agreement between the US, USSR, and the UK which prohibited nuclear testing above ground, underwater, and in outer space. It does however allow testing underground provided the fallout is not widespread. China refused to sign this, and in 1992, did a test which violates its guidelines. 116 countries have signed on. b. 1967 Outer Space Treaty A treaty between the US, USSR, and UK which prohibits the placing of WMDs in orbit, on the moon, or anywhere in outer space for military purposes. 86 countries have signed on. c. 1968 Non proliferation Treaty Agreement between the US, USSR, UK and 113 non nuclear countries to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Made permanent in May 1995. d. Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I and STALT II Agreements to keep the same level of ballistic missiles for 5 years, restrict the construction of ICBM Silos, and limit the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to 2400. The US voided it in 1986 e. Intermediate Range nuclear forces treaty Agreement between the US and USSR which bans all short and intermediate range missiles and related equipment. f. START I and START II Agreements to limit the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to 1600 and to reduce total warhead numbers to 5000 by December 2001. g. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty An Agreement signed by the US, UK, and 91 other countries which banned all nuclear tests above and below the earths surface. It created a worldwide system comprising of 170 seismic stations to check for signs of any nuclear explosion. India was the only nuclear country not to sign it.
4. Security and safety a. Security of the American arsenal As alarming as it sounds, the security of American nuclear weapons is far from guaranteed. Since the beginning of the United State's nuclear program, there have been well over 300 accidents
involving the misplacement, accidental dropping, and broken safeties of nuclear weapons. The most significant of these is as noted above Castle Bravo where radioactive ash was spread over 100 miles. Other incidents include "broken arrows" where weapons were either detonated or accidentally released. These include the 1975 collision of the USS Belknap and the USS John F. Kennedy which caused a major fire in close proximity to the nuclear warheads, and the 1961 explosion of a nuclear bomber in which a nuclear bomb was badly damaged before the fire could be put out. Perhaps more frightening are incidents involving neglect; the most notable and recent of these is the 2007 accident at Minot air base in which six nuclear tipped cruise missiles were accidentally loaded onto a B-52 Heavy Bomber. The mistake: Air base crew forgot to remove the warheads before loading the missiles into the bomber. The nuclear warheads were not reported missing, and remained without standard nuclear weapon protection protocols for 36 hours. b. Security of the Pakistani arsenal While the nuclear facilities and weapons themselves are (at least as far as the US tells us) as safe as the nuclear weapons in the US and India, the same cannot be said for nuclear material. Since 2004, there has been a lot of concern over the safety of Pakistan's nuclear technology when it was revealed that the "father" of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program AQ Khan was leaking nuclear secrets to Libya, North Korea, and Iran. Leading experts in nuclear security in Pakistan believe that it would be fairly easy to smuggle small amounts of fissile material out of Pakistan's nuclear facilities. c. Security of the Russian arsenal A National Intelligence Council report to congress (2002) concludes that Russia maintains "adequate security and control of its nuclear weapons, but a decline in military funding has stressed the nuclear security system. It does however note that The security system was designed in the Soviet era to protect weapons primarily against a threat outside the country and may not be sufficient to meet todays challenge of a knowledgeable insider collaborating with a criminal or terrorist group. It goes on to say that security varies widely among Russias facilities and institutes. Facilities housing weapons-usable nuclear materialtypically receive low funding, lack trained security personnel, and do not have sufficient equipment for securely storing such material, It also confirms suspicions of theft of nuclear weapons grade fissile material: weaponsgrade and weapons-usable nuclear materials have been stolen from some Russian institutes. It cites an allegation made by the head of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energys Nuclear Materials Accounting and Control Department that enough weapons grade nuclear fuel quite sufficient to produce an atomic bomb was stolen from an unidentified site at the Chelyabinsk nuclear complex in 1998. d. Possibility of theft by a terrorist group Unfortunately, inadequate nuclear weapons security standards can mean something that no state wants: the theft of nuclear fuel or a nuclear device by a terrorist group. The most basic principle here is that more states producing nuclear weapons means there is more nuclear fissile material being produced. According to Pakistani nuclear scientists Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy and Brig Shaukat Qadir, "making an actual bomb is very easy". "Its getting the weapons grade material that requires industrial facilities". Evidence of a 2001 meeting in Afghanistan by local security officials, nuclear scientists, and a few other individuals confirm the presence of Osama Bin Laden who was
reportedly "very interested" in how to acquire nuclear weapons. He was apparently told that making the bomb was very simple, it was obtaining weapons grade uranium ore or plutonium that was the problem. He is reported to have asked in response "What if we already had the ore?". The single largest problem associated with a terrorist organization acquiring a nuclear weapon is that the principles of Mutually Assured Destruction and deterrence do not apply to them. With nucleararmed terrorists, a countrys own nuclear stocks become a liability rather than a way of defending oneself.