Wireless LAN Security
Wireless LAN Security
Introduction
Less expensive than wired networks Can be quickly deployed Increased use of laptops as the primary computing device
Early wireless networks were nonstandard implementations Now, several standards exist, including:
Peer-to-peer wireless LANs Multiple point wireless LANs Building-to-building wireless networks
Point-to-point Point-to-multipoint
Data Rates
Satellite
Wide
Local
Wireless Technologies
WAN
(Wide Area Network)
MAN
(Metropolitan Area Network)
LAN
(Local Area Network)
PAN
(Personal Area Network)
PAN
Standards Speed Range Applications
Bluetooth <1 Mbps Short Peer-to-Peer Device-to-Device
LAN
802.11a, 11b, 11g HiperLAN2 254+ Mbps Medium Enterprise Networks
MAN
802.11 MMDS, LMDS 22+ Mbps MediumLong Fixed, Last Mile Access
WAN
GSM, GPRS, CDMA, 2.53G 10384 Kbps Long PDAs, Mobile Phones, Cellular Access
860 Kbps
900 MHz
2.4 GHz
2.4 GHz
802.11 Ratified
5 GHz
802.11a,b 802.11g Ratified Drafted
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Wi-Fi
Wi-Fi Alliance Wireless Fidelity Alliance 170+ members Over 350 products certified Wi-Fis Mission Certify interoperability of WLAN products (802.11) Wi-Fi is the stamp of approval Promote Wi-Fi as the global standard
HiperLAN
HomeRF SWAP
A standard used to communicate between computers and appliances in a home in the 2.4 GHz band
Bluetooth
Personal area network that uses low power and short range connectivity in the 2.4 GHz range
Extremely Very Low Medium High Very Ultra Super Infrared Visible Ultra- X-Rays Low Low High High High Light violet
2.4 2.4835 GHz 83.5 MHz (IEEE 802.11) 802.11b and 802.11g
802.11 is a standard established by IEEE IEEE group responsible for defining interface between wireless clients and their network access points in wireless LANs
802.11-based technologies takes advantage of the radio spectrum usable by the public
2.4 to 2.4835 GHz for 802.11 and 802.11b 5.15 to 5.825 GHz for 802.11a
Wireless Networking
Mobile user connectivity
Wireless Bridging
LAN-to-LAN connectivity
Security Issues
Transmission through air presents some different problems than transmission through wires Attacker does not have to be within the premises to launch an attack
Availability of Sniffers
If a static WEP key is deciphered through a tool such as AirSnort, the administrator has no way of knowing that the key has been compromised by a hacker.
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SSID Authentication controlled by MAC Wired Equivalency Privacy 802.11 40 bit keys 128 bit keys (optional) Part of the association process Uses the RC4 stream cipher of RSA Data Security, Inc. encryption
AP (A) confirms authentication and registers client. [ RF PACKET ] Client sends association request to selected AP (A).
[ RF PACKET ]
Client sends an authentication request to AP (A). [ RF PACKET ] AP (A) send authentication response containing the unencrypted challenge text. [ RF PACKET ]
Client encrypts the challenge text using one of its WEP keys and sends it to AP (A). [ RF PACKET ]
AP (A) compares the encrypted challenge text with its copy of the encrypted challenge text. If the text is the same AP (A) will allow the Client onto the WLAN. [ RF PACKET ]
32 ASCII character string If access point broadcasts SSID under 802.11, any client with a NULL string will associate to any access point regardless of SSID setting on access point Default setting on most access points is to broadcast the SSIDs SSIDs are sent in plain text This should not be considered a security feature
Authentication is one-way No way to dynamically generate keys No integration with existing network authentication methods on LAN
Part of the concern about access points is physical security When shipped, access points generally rely on HTTP, Telnet, or SNMP for configuration The suggestion is that HTTPS or SSH be used instead
MAC address filtering is possible for small WLAN networks For larger networks with SSID and WEP segmentation, it may be a nightmare Further, MAC addresses can be spoofed
Improved Security
Current security recommendation from 802.11i Based on EAP framework Improved user authentication credentials Session-based encryption keys Centralized user administration
Mutual Authentication Encryption keys derived dynamically Ability to refresh encryption keys Centralized user and key management
Improved Security
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Blue
Red
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Green
How it Works
Public/SemiPublic Network
Supplicant
Enterprise Edge
Authenticator
Enterprise Network
Authentication Server
Or
Operates on client
Enterprise Edge
Authenticator
Enterprise Network
Authentication Server
802.1X traffic only Operates on client Access Point acting as Authenticator EAP plug-in goes in RADIUS server
Associate Logon
Client authenticates RADIUS server (process repeats in reverse) Client and RADIUS server derive session WEP key
Access success EAP success
802.1X/EAP (cont.)
802.1X/EAP
802.1X/EAP looks at ways to provide centralized authentication and dynamic key distribution
802.1X/EAP (cont.)
Three steps:
Mutual authentication between client and authentication (RADIUS) server Encryption keys dynamically derived after authentication Centralized control policy, where session time-out triggers reauthentication and new encryption key generation
RADIUS Authentication
RADIUS gives further security Not all access points support RADIUS RADIUS is not part of 802.11 standard However, RADIUS does not encrypt data Used when authentication is more important than encryption
Alternative to 802.1X over WLAN VPN/IPSec over WLAN Provides encryption Provides centralized user authentication and administration
DHCP/RADIUS/OTP Servers
WLAN VPN
The use of WLAN VPN makes 802.11 security standards, SSID, WEP, and MAC address filtering redundant Problems with WLAN VPN
Requires additional CPU overhead Could be prohibitively expensive to set up a new one
IPsec
IPsec VPNs use the services within IPsec to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity To deploy, an IPsec client is placed in every PC connected to the wireless network
IPsec (cont.)
Filters are put in place to prevent wireless traffic from reaching anywhere except the VPN gateway and Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) or Domain Name System (DNS) server IPsec uses 3DES or AES
Enable centralized user authentication (RADIUS, TACACS+) for the management interface Choose strong community strings for Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) and change them often
Consider using SNMP Read Only if your management infrastructure allows it Disable any insecure and nonessential management protocol provided by the manufacturer Utilize secure management protocols, such as Secure Shell Protocol (SSH)
Limit management traffic to a dedicated wired subnet. Isolate management traffic from user traffic and encrypt all management traffic where possible. Enable wireless frame encryption where available. Physically secure the access point.