HEALTH SAFETY & ENVIRONMENT
(HSE)
HAZARD & OPERABILITY STUDY (HAZOP)
Reference: HSEMS Expectation No. 35 - 37
1
Contents
Title of the Slide Slide No.
1. Introduction 4
2. Risk Management 5-6
3. Hazard Identification (HAZID) Techniques 7-8
4. Hazard & Operability Study (HAZOP) 9 - 20
5. Types of HAZOP Study 21
a. HAZOP Methodology Flow Diagram for Continuous 22
Process
b. Batch HAZOP 23
b (i). HAZOP for Batch Operations – ‘Step by Step’ 24
Method
b (ii). HAZOP for Batch Operations – ‘Section by 25
Section’ Method
2
Contents…contd.
Title of the Slide Slide No.
c. HAZOP of Procedures 26
d. HAZOP of Instrument – control systems & Electrical 27
systems
e. HAZOP of Emergency Response Plan 28
e (i). ER HAZOP – Overall Process for each accident 29
scenario
6. STRUCTURED WHAT – IF ANALYSIS (SWIFT) 30 - 33
3
1. Introduction
• Risk – It has two dimensions, chance of something to happen & the
consequence should that thing does happen
• Risk analysis – Assessment of potential severity of loss along with
the probability & exposure of hazard
• Hazard – A condition or practice with a potential for loss
• Safety – Control of accidental loss
• Risk control – Anything done to reduce loss from the business. It
includes:
– The elimination or reduction of loss exposures
– The minimization of loss when loss producing events occur.
– The termination or avoidance of risk
• Risk management – It is the application of management policies,
procedures & practices for analyzing, evaluating & controlling risk
4
2. Risk Management
People Property Environment
Harm
Hazard Accident
Likelihood Consequences
Risk
5
2. Risk Management…contd.
• It is the application of management policies, procedures & practices
for analyzing, evaluating & controlling risk & can be illustrated by
IEDIM -
Identification of loss exposures
Evaluation of risk
Develop the plan –
i. Terminate ii. Treat iii. Tolerate iv. Transfer
Implement the plan
Monitor/Review
6
3. Hazard Identification Technique (HAZID)
• What is HAZID?
– The most critical step involved in a risk assessment
– A qualitative review of possible accidents that may occur, in order
to select failure cases for detailed modeling
• Key objectives of HAZID:
- Primary objectives:
Completeness – Full list of potential hazards
Knowledge based – Be aware of past accidents and other work
Multi - disciplinary – Allow lateral thinking from diverse experiences
- Secondary objectives:
Auditable – Possible to track the process, well documented
Structured – To ensure completeness & quality of documents
Efficient – Focus on immediate problem, useful purposes
7
3. Hazard Identification Technique (HAZID)
…contd.
• Some techniques of Hazard Identification:
– Past experience
– Methodical Leak/Rupture
– Engineering Codes & Standards
– Hazard Review
– Hazard Checklist
– Structured What – If Analysis (SWIFT)
– Hazard & Operability Study (HAZOP)
– Failure Modes, Effects & Criticality Analysis (FMEA)
– Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
– Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
8
4. Hazard & Operability Study (HAZOP)
• HAZOP is:
– A formal procedure to review design & operation of
hazardous process facilities
– “Structured brainstorming” or “Formalized
Imagineering”
– Identifying deviation from normal operation which
could lead to hazard or operability problems
– Identifying the possible causes of the deviations
9
4. Hazard & Operability Study (HAZOP)
…contd.
• It is based on:
– Normal operation is a safe operation
– A deviation of a system parameter:
• Can be absorbed in the system if change is within
limits
• Has an effect & can cause change
– Deviations cause problem
10
4. Hazard & Operability Study (HAZOP)
…contd.
• Advantages of HAZOP:
– Systematic examination of a restricted system
– Level of the examination can be chosen according to
the goal
– Good method for training operating personnel &
designers & for obtaining deeper knowledge of the
system behaviour
– Gives the basis of modelling & quantification of
hazards by other methods
– Can be used as a way of rigorously & systematically
checking a design for safety, operability & conformity
with codes of practice, etc
11
4. Hazard & Operability Study (HAZOP)
…contd.
• Disadvantages of HAZOP: It does not reveal
– Hazards generated by factors outside the system
– Occupational accident failures, hazards of chemicals
& chemical reactions are only partly within the scope
of the analysis
– The consequences of complicated chain of events
– The deficiencies in the installation & location of the
equipment
12
4. Hazard & Operability Study (HAZOP)
…contd.
• Various steps involved in the development of HAZOP
study are –
4 a. Defining the objectives & scope
4 b. Selecting the HAZOP team members
4 c. Preparing for the study
4 d. Undertaking the study
4 e. Recording the result
4 f. Conducting the follow up actions
13
4. Hazard & Operability Study (HAZOP)
…contd.
4 a. Defining the objectives & scope – A no. of
factors will influence the study objectives & scope,
among which are:
– The nature & stage of the project
– The requirement of full documentation
– The availability of personnel for the HAZOP team
– The no. of P & ID’s
– The timing & the duration allowed for the study
– The degree of the authority given to the study team
– Budget
14
4. Hazard & Operability Study (HAZOP)
…contd.
4 b. Selecting the HAZOP team members – This should comprise
of:
– HAZOP Leader
– HAZOP Scribe
– Process Personnel
– Safety Personnel
– Maintenance Personnel
– Operation Personnel
– Instrumentation Personnel
15
4. Hazard & Operability Study (HAZOP)
…contd.
4 c. Preparing for the study –
– Establish the ground rules of the study
– Plan the study schedule
– Identify the team members & arrange for their
assistance
– Organize the data base
– Become familiar with the data base
– Ensure that all team members are familiar with the
design & operating principles
– Arrange a suitable meeting place.
16
4. Hazard & Operability Study (HAZOP)
…contd.
4 d. Undertaking the study – After breaking the P & ID into
different nodes, there are seven stages which are repeated
many times during a HAZOP –
– Apply a guideword
– Develop a deviation
– Examine possible causes
– Examine consequences
– Consider hazards, or operability problems
– List existing safeguards
– Decide upon action
– Make a record of the discussion & decision
17
4. Hazard & Operability Study (HAZOP)
…contd.
4 e. Recording the result – The following points should
be kept in view –
– While making the recommendations, 3 W’s should be
answered : “What do I do?”, “Where do I do it?” &
“Why do I do it?”
– The team leader & scribe should review & edit the
record of each day’s study
– The record after completion should be printed &
distributed for the team to review its accuracy
– The leader should ensure during his review that none
of the recommendations are open ended.
18
4. Hazard & Operability Study (HAZOP)
…contd.
4 f. Conducting the follow up actions – It can be done by the preparation of
report – Draft Report & Final Report
4 f (i). Draft Report – The format of the draft report could be as
follows:
– Introduction
– Description of the study method
– Objective & scope of the study
– Description of the unit/process studied
– List of HAZOP team members with location & job titles
– Study period & list of P & ID’s studied
– Major recommendations
– Appendices:
• HAZOP study log sheets
• Complete list of recommendations
• Team members and P & ID’s studied by session
19
4. Hazard & Operability Study (HAZOP)
…contd.
4 f (ii). Final Report – The contents of the final report
could be as follows:
– Introduction
– Description of the study method
– Objective & scope of the study
– Description of the unit/process studied
– List of HAZOP team members with location & job titles
– Study period & list of P & ID’s studied with identification codes
– Major recommendations
– Major actions taken
– List of recommendations rejected & reason for rejection
– List of recommendations being evaluated
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5. Types of HAZOP
5 a. HAZOP for Continuous process
5 b. HAZOP for Batch Operations
5 c. HAZOP of Procedures
5 d. HAZOP of Instrument – control systems & Electrical
systems
5 e. HAZOP of Emergency Response Plan
21
5 a. HAZOP Methodology Flow Diagram for
Continuous Process
Start
Decide on SCOPE & OBJECTIVE of study
Choose a study section
Clearly set out operating conditions & design intent
Apply first (next) guideword to generate deviations
Identify possible causes for each deviation in turn & record
Decide on potential consequences for each cause & record
List safeguards against causes or consequences of deviation
Decide on any necessary recommendations & record
Yes
More guideword?
Yes No
More section?
No
Finish
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5 b. HAZOP for Batch Operations
• Approach to Batch HAZOP –
1. Understand steps of the process.
2. Prepare the matrix of steps & sections (active &
inactive)
3. Each step becomes a node, carry out continuous
HAZOP & also consider when inactive becomes active
4. Use additional guidewords
23
5 b(i). HAZOP for Batch Operations –
‘Step by Step’ Method
1st Step
Take 1st Active Section
Complete Log sheet
Take next Active Section No Last Active Section?
Yes
Take other inactive sections Next Step
Complete Log sheet
Last Step?
Yes
Finished
24
5 b(ii). HAZOP for Batch Operations –
‘Section by Section’ Method
1st Section
Take 1st Step in which this section
is active
Complete Log sheet
Take next step in which No Last step in which this section
this section is active is active?
Yes
Take steps in which this section
Next Section
is not active
Complete Log sheet
Last Section?
Yes
Finished
25
5 c. HAZOP of Procedures
• It is concerned with the software (practices) rather than
the hardware
• The procedure is a set of instructions to be followed in a
sequence
• To achieve the objective in a safe manner
26
5 d. HAZOP of Instrument – control systems
& Electrical systems
• HAZOP of Instrument – control systems would consider
the reasons for the sequence of the control logic, as well
as reviewing the control philosophy & design
• HAZOP of Electrical systems – An electrical distribution
system HAZOP can be carried out to identify the
consequences of power failure to the individual
components, as well as total power failure.
27
5 e. HAZOP of Emergency Response Plan
• For the ER HAZOP the structure is provided by
accident scenarios, ER stages, property words &
guidewords
• It enables a more systematic review of emergency
response arrangements as compared to purely brain
stormed ideas
• It is very effective method for transferring valuable
information between project phases.
• It is considered to be suitable for application at various
periods in the lifecycle of plant development &
operation
• It can highlight possibilities that had not been expected
28
5 e (i). ER HAZOP – Overall Process for
each accident scenario
Start
Decide study
Select Node
Apply Guideword & Deviation
Identify possible causes
Select cause
Assess Consequences
Assess Safeguards
Assess need for Recommendations
Repeat for all causes until complete
Repeat for all guidewords/deviations until complete
Repeat for all nodes until complete
End 29
6. Structured What – If Analysis (SWIFT)
• It is a thorough, systematic, multidisciplinary team oriented analytical
technique
• Application of SWIFT – To identify the different risks areas & to
identify those risks that when addressed will make the biggest impact
on the overall risk.
• Conducting a SWIFT –
The following issues can be taken up Hazards of the process
– Hazards of the process
– Previous incidents with catastrophic potential
– Engineering & administrative controls
– Consequences of failures of engineering & administrative
controls
– Unit layout
– Qualitative evaluation of safety & health effects
– Other regulatory issues
30
6. Structured What – If Analysis (SWIFT)
…contd.
• The structure for questioning is provided by the following
categories:
– Equipment/Instrumentation malfunction
– Utility failures
– Integrity failure or loss of containment
– Environmental release
– Operating errors & other human factors
– Material problems
– External effects or influences
– Analytical or sampling errors
– Process upsets of unspecified origin
– Emergency operations
31
6. Structured What – If Analysis (SWIFT)
…contd.
• Advantages of SWIFT –
– It is efficient because it generally avoids lengthy discussion of
areas where the hazards are well understood or where prior
analysis has shown no hazards are known to exist.
– It’s effectiveness in identifying hazards comes from asking
questions in a variety of important areas.
– Hazards are identified according to a structured plan to help
ensure complete coverage of all the various types of failures or
errors which are likely to result in hazards within the system being
examined.
– The SWIFT analysis is further strengthened through the use of
the checklists at conclusion of each question category resulting in
an additional level of thoroughness
32
6. Structured What – If Analysis (SWIFT)
…contd.
• Disadvantages of SWIFT –
– Although risk reduction measures will be obvious for
some of the issues raised, further analysis methods
need to be applied to determine exactly how risks can
be reduced.
– The quantification of the risk relies on a ‘gut feel’ in
many cases, & again it must be realized that other
techniques need to be employed to determine the
magnitude of the risk more accurately
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THANK YOU
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