ECONOMIC CRIMES: IS

THIS A CASE OF
CRIMINAL OR CIVIL
ACTION ?
PREPARED BY: SAN DIEGO, JUNDEL D.R.
 WHAT IS ECONOMIC CRIMES ?
ECONOMIC CRIMES, ALSO KNOWN AS FINANCIAL
CRIMES. REFERS TO ILLEGAL ACTS COMMINTED BY
AN INDIVIDUAL OR A GROUP OF INDIVIDUAL TO
OBTAIN A FINANCIAL OR PROFESSIONAL ADVANTAGE.
-THE PRINCIPAL MOTIVE IN SUCH CRIMES IS
ECONOMIC GAIN.
EXAMPLE OF ECONOMIC CRIMES
-TAX EVASION
TAX EVASION IS AN ILLEGAL ACTIVITY IN WHICH A
PERSON OR ENTITY DELIBERATELY AVOIDS PAYING A
TRUE TAX LIABILITY
-ILLICIT CAPITAL HEAVENS
OR ILLICIT OF FINANCIAL FLOWS(IFF) ARE ILLEGAL
OF MOVEMENT OF MONEY OR CAPITAL FROM ONE
COUNTRY TO ANOTHER.
-MONEY LAUNDERING
THE PRACTICE OF MAKING MONEY THAT WAS GAINED
THROUGH CRIMINAL MEANS, SUCH AS SMUGGLING
WEAPONS, LOOK AS IF IT CAME FROM A LEGITIMATE
BUSINESS ACTIVITY.
IS AN INTENTIONALLY DECEPTIVE ACTION DESIGN
TO PROVIDE THE PERPETRATOR WITH AN
UNLAWFUL GAIN OR TO DENY A RIGHT TO A
VICTIM.
-MARKET ABUSE
THE CONCEPT OF MARKET ABUSE TYPICALLY
CONSISTS OF INSIDER DEALING, UNLAWFUL
DISCLOSURE OF INSIDE INFORMATION, AND
MARKET MANIPULATION OF THE FINANCIAL
MARKETS WHICH COULD ARISE FROM
DISTRIBUTING FALSE INFORMATION, DISTORTING
PRICES OR IMPROPER USE OF INSIDER
INFORMATION.
-CYBER CRIME
CYBER CRIMES ARE CRIMINAL OFFENSES COMMITTED
VIA THE INTERNET OR OTHERWISE AIDED BY VARIOUS
FORMS OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY
CRIME COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICIAL
-BRIBERY
REFERS TO THE OFFERING, GIVING, SOLICITING, OR
RECEIVING OF ANY ITEM OF VALUE AS A MEANS OF
INFLUENCING THE ACTIONS OF AN INDIVIDUAL
HOLDING A PUBLIC OR LEGAL DUTY.
-EMBEZZLEMENT
FRAUDULENT TAKING OF PERSONAL PROPERTY BY
SOMEONE TO WHOM IT WAS ENTRUSTED. MOST OFTEN
ASSOCIATED WITH THE MISAPPROPRIATION OF
MONEY.
EMBEZZLEMENT CAN OCCUR REGARDLESS OF
WHETHER THE DEFENDANT KEEPS THE 
PERSONAL PROPERTY OR TRANSFERS IT TO A THIRD
PARTY.
-TRAFFIC OF INFLUENCES
INFLUENCE PEDDLING OCCURS WHEN AN
INDIVIDUAL WHO HAS REAL OR APPARENT
INFLUENCE OVER SOMEONE ELSE ANOTHER PERSON
EXCHANGES THEIR INFLUENCE FOR UNDUE
ADVANTAGE.
 IS ECONOMIC CRIMES A ?
CRIMINAL CASE CIVIL ACTION
CRIMINAL ACTION
- A CRIMINAL ACTION IS ONE BY
WHICH THE STATE PROSECUTES A
PERSON FOR AN ACT OR OMISSION
PUNISHABLE BY LAW.
CIVIL ACTION
-A civil action is one by which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
-A CIVIL ACTION MAY EITHER BE ORDINARY
OR SPECIAL. BOTH ARE GOVERNED BY THE
RULES FOR ORDINARY CIVIL ACTIONS,
SUBJECT TO THE SPECIFIC RULES
PRESCRIBED FOR A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION.
IN SECTION 1 OF RULE 111 OF THE RULES OF COURT:
INSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL AND CIVIL ACTION- WHEN
CRIMINAL ACTION IS INSTITUTED, THE CIVIL ACTION
FOR RECOVERY OF CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM
THE OFFENSE CHARGED SHALL BE DEEMED
INSTITUTED WITH THE CRIMINAL ACTION, UNLESS
THE OFFENDED PARTY EXPRESSLY WAIVES THE CIVIL
ACTION OR RESERVES HIS TO RIGHT TO INSTITU IT
SEPERATELY OR INSTITUTES THE CIVIL ACTION PRIOR
TO THE CRIMINAL ACTION.
SECTION 3 OF RULE 111 OF THE RULES OF COURT:
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION- IN THE CASES
PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 31, 32, 33, 34, AND 2177 OF
THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AN
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION ENTIRELY SEPARATE AND
DISTINCT FROM THE CRIMINAL ACTION, MAYBE
BROUGHT BY THE INJURED PARTY DURING THE
PENDENCY OF THE CRIMINAL CASE, PROVIDED THE
RIGHT IS RESERVED AS REQUIRED IN THE PRECEDING
SECTION. SUCH CIVIL ACTION SHALL PROCEED
INDEPENDENTLY OF THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
AND SHALL REQUIRE ONLY A PREPONDERANCE OF
EVIDENCE.
EXAMPLE OF CIVIL CASES
-FINANCIAL ISSUES- SUCH AS
BANKRUPTCY OR BANKING
DISPUTES
-HOUSING
-DEFAMATION
-FAMILY LAW
-EMPLOYMENT LAW
IN ART. 33 OF CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
-IN CASES OF DEFAMATION ,FRAUD AND PHYSICAL
INJURIES, A CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES, ENTIRELY
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THE CRIMINAL
ACTION, MAY BE BROUGHT BY THE INJURED PARTY.
SUCH CIVIL ACTION SHALL PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY
OF THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION, AND SHALL
REQUIRE ONLY A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.
G.R. NO. 199975, FEBRUARY 24, 2020
LUIS T. ARRIOLA, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES RESPONDENT
-LUIS T . ARRIOLA WAS CHARGED WITH ESTAFA
UNDER SECTION 315, PARAGRAPH2(A) OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE(RPC).
The RTC issued its April 17, 2007 Decision12 convicting Arriola
of the crime charged. It found that the prosecution sufficiently
discharged its burden of proving Arriola's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The RTC concluded that through Arriola's
fraudulent representations and false pretenses, Del Rosario parted
with her hard-earned money and paid him the amount of
P437,000.00 as the agreed consideration for the purchase of
Candelaria's lot, which Arriola represented to be for sale and that
he was duly authorized by its owner to sell. Arriola also admitted
having received Del Rosario's money. The evidence presented by
the prosecution was undisputed, as Arriola failed to rebut the
same despite several opportunities given to him to do so. The
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING JUDGMENT IS
HEREBY RENDERED DECLARING THE ACCUSED LUIS T.
ARRIOLA, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME OF ESTAFA DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER
ARTICLE 315, PARAGRAPH 2 (A) OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE. CONSIDERING THAT THE AMOUNT INVOLVED
EXCEEDS THE AMOUNT OF PHP 22,0000.00, PURSUANT TO
ARTICLE 315 (1) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, THE
PENALTY IMPOSED SHOULD BE X X X IN ITS MAXIMUM
PERIOD, ADDING ONE YEAR FOR EACH ADDITIONAL PHP
10,000.00, BUT THE TOTAL PENALTY SHALL NOT EXCEED
TWENTY YEARS.
ACCORDINGLY THE ACCUSED IS HEREBY SENTENCED
TO SUFFER AN INDETERMINATE PENALTY OF FOUR (4)
YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY
OF PRISION CORRECCIONAL, AS MINIMUM TO TWENTY
(20) YEARS OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL AS MAXIMUM,
AND HE IS ORDERED TO RETURN THE AMOUNT OF
PHP437,000.00 THAT THE ACCUSED RECEIVED FROM
THE OFFENDED PARTY, INGEBORG DE VENECIA DEL
ROSARIO.
SO ORDERED.13
ON OCTOBER 15, 2007, ARRIOLA PAID DEL ROSARIO
THE AMOUNT OF P437,000.00.14
ON JUNE 11, 2008, ARRIOLA FILED HIS APPEAL BEFORE
THE CA. HE CLAIMED THAT THE RTC CONVICTED HIM
SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE.
correctly found that the elements of Estafa by means of
deceit were all present and that the subsequent payment
did not exculpate Arriola from criminal liability. It deemed
the representations by Arriola to Del Rosario as fake, e.g.,
his authority to sell the subject property, his
correspondences with Candelaria, the authorization letter,
the faxed letter, and the Deed of Absolute Sale. It also
declared that the prosecution's evidence anent the phone
call to Candelaria was not pure hearsay, since it did not
consider Del Rosario's testimony in isolation but in
consonance with other proof, which consisted of telephone
 AND THE STATUTORY DECLARATION OF ONE CECILIA
ELICANAL VILLANUEVA17 THAT THE COPY OF THE
BRISBANE WHITE PAGES CAME FROM THE BRISBANE
WHITE PAGES ISSUE OF 2002-2003. ARRIOLA ALSO CANNOT
DECRY LACK OF DUE PROCESS SINCE THE RECORDS
SHOWED THAT HE HAD ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN THE
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE RTC AND THAT HE HAD BEEN
FAIRLY NOTIFIED AND WARNED OF THE CONSEQUENCES
OF HIS CONTINUED NON-APPEARANCE IN COURT. FINDING
HOWEVER THAT ARRIOLA HAD ALREADY PAID THE
SUBJECT AMOUNT OWING TO DEL ROSARIO, THE CA
DELETED THE AMOUNT OF P437,000.00 GRANTED AS
INDEMNITY TO ARRIOLA. IT DISPOSED OF THE
APPEAL VIA ITS ASSAILED AUGUST 5, 2011 DECISION,18 VIZ.:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, THE INSTANT
APPEAL IS DENIED. THE ASSAILED DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 146 OF MAKATI CITY,
DATED APRIL 17, 2007, IS AFFIRMED WITH
THE MODIFICATION THAT THE PORTION OF THE
DECISION ORDERING APPELLANT TO PAY COMPLAINANT
THE AMOUNT OF P470,000.00 IS DELETED.
SO ORDERED.19
IN ITS JANUARY 3, 2012 RESOLUTION,20 THE CA DENIED
ARRIOLA'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ITS
AUGUST 5, 2011 DECISION. THUS, THIS PRESENT
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI.
HE ARGUED THAT HE WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS
AS THE RECORDS WERE ALLEGEDLY BEREFT OF ANY
SHOWING THAT HE FULLY PARTICIPATED IN THE
PROCEEDINGS, EVEN AT THE TIME THE COMPLAINT
WAS FILED BEFORE THE PROSECUTOR. ARRIOLA
MAINTAINED THAT THERE WAS NO DECEIT AND HIS
GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT. HE ALSO ASSERTED THAT THERE WAS NO
DAMAGE, SINCE THE MONEY HAD ALREADY BEEN
RETURNED TO DEL ROSARIO.
G.R. NO. L-26442 AUGUST 29,1969
MANUELA S. FORMENTO AND RODOLFO L. FORMENTO,
PETITIONERS, VS HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO
HERAS, DUING BUSINESS IN THE NAME AND STYLE OF
JD TRANSIT, GRACIANO GUARINO AND THE
FIELDMEN’S INSURANCE COMPANY,RESPONDENTS.
THE CASE WAS CHARGED IS DAMAGE TO PROPERTY
AND SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES THROUGH
RECKLESS NEGLIGENCE
The plea of res adjudicata set up by the defendants is
anchored upon Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court, reading:
SECTION 1. —Institution of criminal and civil actions. —
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged
is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party expressly waives the civil action or
reserves his right to institute it separately.
SECTION 2. —Independent civil action. — In the cases
provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action,
may be brought by the injured party during the pendency
of the criminal case,
provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
These provisions are, however, inapplicable to the case at bar, inasmuch as
the former form part of the revised Rules of Court, which became effective
on January 1, 1964, and the present civil action was commenced over nine
(9) months prior thereto, or on March 29, 1963. Accordingly, in Reyes v.
De la Rosa, it was held that, in view of Article 33 of the New Civil Code,
which provides that:
In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
a civil complaint, filed in 1955, for the recovery of
damages arising from physical injuries inflicted and
slander or defamation committed by the defendants, was
not barred by the judgment in the criminal action against
the latter for said acts, despite plaintiff's failure to reserve,
in said criminal action, the "right to institute a separate
civil action for damages." This view was reiterated
in Ortaliz v. Echarri involving another case of physical
injuries through negligence committed by the driver of a
motor vehicle.
Besides, owing to the policy set forth in the above-quoted Art. 33
of the Civil Code, it has been consistently held, not only that "the
responsibility arising from fault or negligence in quasi-delict is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code," but, also, that — at least, in
cases instituted before January 1, 1964 — the failure to make, in
the criminal action, the reservation required in said Rule will not
bar a separate civil action for quasi delict provided, that the
injured party has not intervened "actually" or actively in the
prosecution of said criminal action. Hence, in Parker v.
Panlilio, we said:
The failure, therefore, on the part of the petitioner to reserve her
right to institute the civil action in the criminal case cannot in any
way be deemed as a waiver on her part to institute a separate
civil action against the respondent company based on its
contractual liability, or on culpa aquiliana under articles 1902 to
1910 of the Civil Code.
It should be here emphasized that these two actions are separate
and distinct and should not be confused one with the other. In the
supposition that the one accused in the criminal case is a driver,
employee, or dependent of the respondent Company, the failure
to reserve the right to institute a separate civil action in the
criminal case would not necessarily
constitute a bar to the institution of the civil action against said
respondent, for the cause of action in one is different from that in
the other. These are two independent actions based
on distinct causes of action. This distinction is aptly stated in the
(Barredo case (Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario, 73 Phil. 607).
This Court said: "There are two liabilities of Barredo: first, the
subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi driver
arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second,
Barredo's primary liability as an employer under Article
1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take,
and they preferred tie second remedy. In so doing they were
acting within their rights" (pp. 614-615, id.).
CRIME IS ALWAYS A CRIMINAL
CASE!

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