Cryptography and

Network Security

Digital Signature and

Authentication Applications
 Digital Signatures
 have looked at message authentication
 but does not address issues of lack of trust
 digital signatures provide the ability to:
 verify author, date & time of signature
 authenticate message contents
 be verified by third parties to resolve disputes
 hence include authentication function with
additional capabilities
 Digital Signature Properties
 must depend on the message signed
 must use information unique to sender
 to prevent both forgery and denial
 must be relatively easy to produce
 must be relatively easy to recognize & verify
 be computationally infeasible to forge
 with new message for existing digital signature
 with fraudulent digital signature for given message
 be practical save digital signature in storage
 Direct Digital Signatures
 involve only sender & receiver
 assumed receiver has sender’s public-key
 digital signature made by sender signing
entire message or hash with private-key
 can encrypt using receivers public-key
 important that sign first then encrypt
message & signature
 security depends on sender’s private-key
 Arbitrated Digital Signatures
 involves use of arbiter A
 validates any signed message
 then dated and sent to recipient
 requires suitable level of trust in arbiter
 can be implemented with either private or
public-key algorithms
 arbiter may or may not see message
 Authentication Protocols
 used to convince parties of each others
identity and to exchange session keys
 may be one-way or mutual
 key issues are
 confidentiality – to protect session keys
 timeliness – to prevent replay attacks
 published protocols are often found to
have flaws and need to be modified
 Replay Attacks
 where a valid signed message is copied and
later resent
 simple replay
 repetition that can be logged
 repetition that cannot be detected
 backward replay without modification
 countermeasures include
 use of sequence numbers (generally impractical)
 timestamps (needs synchronized clocks)
 challenge/response (using unique nonce)
Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
 US Govt approved signature scheme
 designed by NIST & NSA in early 90's
 published as FIPS-186 in 1991
 revised in 1993, 1996 & then 2000
 uses the SHA hash algorithm
 DSS is the standard, DSA is the algorithm
 FIPS 186-2 (2000) includes alternative RSA &
elliptic curve signature variants

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 Digital Signature Algorithm
(DSA)
 creates a 320 bit signature
 with 512-1024 bit security
 smaller and faster than RSA
 a digital signature scheme only
 security depends on difficulty of computing
discrete logarithms
 variant of ElGamal & Schnorr schemes

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Digital Signature Algorithm
(DSA)

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 DSA Key Generation
 have shared global public key values (p,q,g):
 choose q, a 160 bit
 choose a large prime p = 2L
• where L= 512 to 1024 bits and is a multiple of 64
• and q is a prime factor of (p-1)
 choose g = h(p-1)/q
• where h<p-1, h(p-1)/q (mod p) > 1
 users choose private & compute public key:
 choose x<q
 compute y = gx (mod p)
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 DSA Signature Creation
 to sign a message M the sender:
 generates a random signature key k, k<q
 k must be random, be destroyed after use,
and never be reused
 then compute signature pair:
r = (gk(mod p))(mod q)
s = (k-1.H(M)+ x.r)(mod q)
 sends signature (r,s) with message M

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 DSA Signature Verification
 having received M & signature (r,s)
 to verify a signature, recipient computes:
w = s-1(mod q)
u1= (H(M).w)(mod q)
u2= (r.w)(mod q)
v = (gu1.yu2(mod p)) (mod q)
 if v=r then signature is verified
 see book web site for details of proof why
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 Summary
 have discussed:
 digital signatures
 authentication protocols (mutual & one-way)
 digital signature algorithm and standard

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 Using Symmetric Encryption
 as discussed previously can use a two-
level hierarchy of keys
 usually with a trusted Key Distribution
Center (KDC)
 each party shares own master key with KDC
 KDC generates session keys used for
connections between parties
 master keys used to distribute these to them
Needham-Schroeder Protocol
 original third-party key distribution protocol
 for session between A B mediated by KDC
 protocol overview is:
1. A->KDC: IDA || IDB || N1
2. KDC -> A: EKa[Ks || IDB || N1 || EKb[Ks||IDA] ]
3. A -> B: EKb[Ks||IDA]
4. B -> A: EKs[N2]
5. A -> B: EKs[f(N2)]
Needham-Schroeder Protocol
 used to securely distribute a new session
key for communications between A & B
 but is vulnerable to a replay attack if an old
session key has been compromised
 then message 3 can be resent convincing B
that is communicating with A
 modifications to address this require:
 timestamps (Denning 81)
 using an extra nonce (Neuman 93)
 Using Public-Key Encryption
 have a range of approaches based on the
use of public-key encryption
 need to ensure have correct public keys
for other parties
 using a central Authentication Server (AS)
 various protocols exist using timestamps
or nonces
 Denning AS Protocol
 Denning 81 presented the following:
1. A -> AS: IDA || IDB
2. AS -> A: EPRas[IDA||PUa||T] || EPRas[IDB||PUb||T]
3. A -> B: EPRas[IDA||PUa||T] || EPRas[IDB||PUb||T] ||
EPUb[EPRas[Ks||T]]
 note session key is chosen by A, hence AS need
not be trusted to protect it
 timestamps prevent replay but require
synchronized clocks
 One-Way Authentication
 required when sender & receiver are not in
communications at same time (eg. email)
 have header in clear so can be delivered
by email system
 may want contents of body protected &
sender authenticated
 Using Symmetric Encryption
 can refine use of KDC but can’t have final
exchange of nonces, vis:
1. A->KDC: IDA || IDB || N1
2. KDC -> A: EKa[Ks || IDB || N1 || EKb[Ks||IDA] ]
3. A -> B: EKb[Ks||IDA] || EKs[M]
 does not protect against replays
 could rely on timestamp in message, though
email delays make this problematic
 Public-Key Approaches
 have seen some public-key approaches
 if confidentiality is major concern, can use:
A->B: EPUb[Ks] || EKs[M]
 has encrypted session key, encrypted message
 if authentication needed use a digital
signature with a digital certificate:
A->B: M || EPRa[H(M)] || EPRas[T||IDA||PUa]
 with message, signature, certificate
Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
 US Govt approved signature scheme
 designed by NIST & NSA in early 90's
 published as FIPS-186 in 1991
 revised in 1993, 1996 & then 2000
 uses the SHA hash algorithm
 DSS is the standard, DSA is the algorithm
 FIPS 186-2 (2000) includes alternative RSA &
elliptic curve signature variants
 Digital Signature Algorithm
(DSA)
 creates a 320 bit signature
 with 512-1024 bit security
 smaller and faster than RSA
 a digital signature scheme only
 security depends on difficulty of computing
discrete logarithms
 variant of ElGamal & Schnorr schemes
Digital Signature Algorithm
(DSA)
 DSA Key Generation
 have shared global public key values (p,q,g):
 choose a large prime p with 2L-1 < p < 2L
• where L= 512 to 1024 bits and is a multiple of 64
 choose q with 2159 < q < 2160
• such that q is a 160 bit prime divisor of (p-1)
 choose g = h(p-1)/q
• where 1<h<p-1 and h(p-1)/q mod p > 1
 users choose private & compute public key:
 choose x<q
 compute y = gx mod p
 DSA Signature Creation
 to sign a message M the sender:
 generates a random signature key k, k<q
 nb. k must be random, be destroyed after
use, and never be reused
 then computes signature pair:
r = (gk mod p)mod q
s = [k-1(H(M)+ xr)] mod q
 sends signature (r,s) with message M
 DSA Signature Verification
 having received M & signature (r,s)
 to verify a signature, recipient computes:
w = s-1 mod q
u1= [H(M)w ]mod q
u2= (rw)mod q
v = [(gu1 yu2)mod p ]mod q
 if v=r then signature is verified
 see book web site for details of proof why
 Summary
 have discussed:
 digital signatures
 authentication protocols (mutual & one-way)
 digital signature algorithm and standard
 Authentication Applications
 will consider authentication functions
 developed to support application-level
authentication & digital signatures
 will consider Kerberos – a private-key
authentication service
 then X.509 - a public-key directory
authentication service
 Kerberos
 trusted key server system from MIT
 provides centralised private-key third-party
authentication in a distributed network
 allows users access to services distributed
through network
 without needing to trust all workstations
 rather all trust a central authentication server
 two versions in use: 4 & 5
 Kerberos Requirements
 its first report identified requirements as:
 secure
 reliable
 transparent
 scalable
 implemented using an authentication
protocol based on Needham-Schroeder
 Kerberos v4 Overview
 a basic third-party authentication scheme
 have an Authentication Server (AS)
 users initially negotiate with AS to identify self
 AS provides a non-corruptible authentication
credential (ticket granting ticket TGT)
 have a Ticket Granting server (TGS)
 users subsequently request access to other
services from TGS on basis of users TGT
 Kerberos v4 Dialogue
1. obtain ticket granting ticket from AS
• once per session
2. obtain service granting ticket from TGT
• for each distinct service required
3. client/server exchange to obtain service
• on every service request
 Introduction
 Security
 The world is full of unscrupulous people, and
we must protect vital data and services.
 Many tools exist for system administrators
that provide security.
 But, as security increases, so does user
burden.
 System administrators need a tool that is
tough and convenient.
 Threats in a distributed
environment
 Distributed computing model, client/server
1) A user gains access to a WS, and pretend to be another user
operating from that WS.
2) A user alters the network address of a WS so that the request
sent from the altered WS appear to come from impersonate
WS.
3) A user eavesdrops and uses a replay to gain entrance to a
server or disrupt operations.
 In any of these case unauthorized user
may gain access to service and data that
he is not authorized to access.
 Kerberos
 trusted key server system from MIT
 provides centralised private-key third-party
authentication in a distributed network
 allows users access to services distributed
through network
 without needing to trust all workstations
 rather all trust a central authentication server
 two versions in use: 4 & 5
 Kerberos Requirements
 first published report identified its requirements as:
 security-an eavesdropper shouldn’t be able to get enough
information to impersonate the user
 reliability- services using Kerberos would be unusable if
Kerberos isn’t available
 transparency-users should be unaware of its presence
 scalability- should support large number of users
 implemented using a 3rd party authentication scheme
using a protocol proposed by Needham-Schroeder
 Kerberos 4 Overview
 a basic third-party authentication scheme
 uses DES buried in an elaborate protocol
 Authentication Server (AS)
 user initially negotiates with AS to identify self
 AS provides a non-corruptible authentication
credential (ticket-granting ticket TGT)
 Ticket Granting server (TGS)
 users subsequently request access to other services
from TGS on basis of users TGT
 How Kerberos works
 In A Simple Scenario kerberos work in
three step
1. C AS : IDc || Pc || IDv
2. AS  C : Ticket
3. C  V : IDc || Ticket

Ticket= E( Kv, [IDc || ADc || IDv])

BOB Service Think “Kerberos Server” and
don’t let yourself get mired in
terminology.
Key
Distribution
Center

Authen-
Tication
Service

Alice
Desktop
Alice Computer
BOB Service Represents something
requiring Kerberos
authentication (web
server, ftp server, ssh Key
server, etc…) Distribution
Center

Authen-
Tication
Service

Alice
Desktop
Alice Computer
BOB Service

Key
“I’d like to be allowed to Distribution
get tickets from AS. Center

Authen-
Tication
Service

Alice
Desktop
Alice Computer
BOB Service
“AS checks its database for
proper password and user ID
and whether this user is Key
permitted access the server V Distribution
And if confirm Generate a Center
Ticket .”

Authen-
Tication
Service

Alice
Desktop
Alice Computer
 Alice Sends this to
BOB Service BOB
I’m Alice. I’ll prove it.
Here’s a copy of my
ticket and Alice ID for
BOB. Key
Distribution
Center

Authen-
Hey BOB:
Hey BOB: Tication
Alice is Alice.
Alice is Alice.
TGT Service
CONFIRMED: TGS
CONFIRMED:

Alice
Desktop
Alice Computer
 That’s Alice alright. Let me
determine if she is
authorized to use me.
BOB Service

Hey BOB:
Alice is Alice. Key
CONFIRMED: Distribution
Center

Authen-
Hey BOB:
Tication
Alice is Alice. TGT Service
CONFIRMED:

Alice
Desktop
Alice Computer
 More Secure Authentication
Dialogue
 This scenario solve Authentication problem
but there are still some problem:
a) Minimize the no. of time that a user has to
Enter a password.
(1. Make the Ticket , for single Login session
2. It remain case that a user need a new ticket for every new service)

b) Plaintext transmission of the password.

(Eavesdropper could capture the password and use any service)
 To Solve these problem we use concept of
Ticket granting server (TGS)
 AS with TGS
 Once per user logon session:
1. C AS : IDc || IDtgs
2. AS  C : E( Kc, Ticket tgs )
 Once per type of service:
3. C  TGS : IDc || IDv || Ticket tgs
4. TGS  C : Ticketv
 Once per service session:
5. CV: IDc || Ticketv

Ticket tgs = E( Ktgs, [IDc || ADc || IDtgs || TS1 || Lifetime1])

Ticket v = E( Kv, [IDc || ADc || IDv || TS2 || Lifetime2])
Kerberos with TGS
 Problem associated with previous
scenario
 There are still two problem in previous
procedure
1. Lifetime associated with the Ticket Granting Ticket
a) If time is very short then user will be repeatedly ask for Password
b) If the lifetime is long: Greater opportunity for replay
( Need to determine that the ticket presenter is the same as the client
for whom the ticket was issued. The threat is that an opponent will steal
the ticket and use it before it expires. )
2. Requirement for servers to authenticate themselves to user
(Without this , opponent could configure so that messages to a server
were directed to other server and capture any information from user)
 Kerberos message exchange
 Authentication service exchange to obtain ticket –granting
ticket
1. C AS : IDc || IDtgs || TS1
2. AS  C : E( Kc, [ Kc,tgs|| IDtgs || TS2 || Lifetime2 || Tickettgs]))
Ticket tgs = E( Ktgs, [ Kc,tgs||IDc ||ADc||IDtgs || TS2 || Lifetime2 ]))
 Ticket granting service exchange to obtain service granting
ticket
3. C  TGS : IDc || Ticket tgs || Authenticator c
4. TGS  C : E(Kc,tgs||IDv|| TS4|| Ticketv )
Ticket tgs = E( Ktgs, [ Kc,tgs||IDc ||ADc||IDtgs || TS2 || Lifetime2 ]))
Ticket v = E( Kv, [ Kc,v||IDc ||ADc||IDv || TS4 || Lifetime4 ]))
Authenticator c = E [ Kc,tgs, IDc ||Adc || TS3
 Client/server authentication exchange to obtain service
5. CV: Ticket v ||Authenticator c
6. V C : E(Kc,v, [TS5 + 1]) (for mutual authentication)
Ticket v = E( Kv, [Kc,v|| IDc || ADc || IDv || TS4 || Lifetime4])
Authenticator c = E [ Kc,v, [IDc ||ADc || TS5 ] )
 Technical deficiencies of
version 4
1) Encryption system dependence
2) Internet protocol dependence
3) Ticket lifetime
4) Authentication forwarding
5) Double encryption
6) Password attack
Kerberos 4 Overview
 Kerberos Realms
 a Kerberos environment consists of:
 a Kerberos server
 a number of clients, all registered with server
 application servers, sharing keys with server
 this is termed a realm
 typically a single administrative domain
 if have multiple realms, their Kerberos
servers must share keys and trust
Kerberos Realms
 Kerberos Version 5
 developed in mid 1990’s
 specified as Internet standard RFC 1510
 provides improvements over v4
 addresses environmental shortcomings
• encryption alg, network protocol, byte order, ticket
lifetime, authentication forwarding, interrealm auth
 and technical deficiencies
• double encryption, non-std mode of use, session
keys, password attacks
X.509 Authentication Service
 part of CCITT X.500 directory service standards
 distributed servers maintaining user info database
 defines framework for authentication services
 directory may store public-key certificates
 with public key of user signed by certification authority
 also defines authentication protocols
 uses public-key crypto & digital signatures
 algorithms not standardised, but RSA recommended
 X.509 certificates are widely used
 X.509 Certificates
 issued by a Certification Authority (CA), containing:
 version (1, 2, or 3)
 serial number (unique within CA) identifying certificate
 signature algorithm identifier
 issuer X.500 name (CA)
 period of validity (from - to dates)
 subject X.500 name (name of owner)
 subject public-key info (algorithm, parameters, key)
 issuer unique identifier (v2+)
 subject unique identifier (v2+)
 extension fields (v3)
 signature (of hash of all fields in certificate)
 notation CA<<A>> denotes certificate for A signed by CA
X.509 Certificates
 Obtaining a Certificate
 any user with access to CA can get any
certificate from it
 only the CA can modify a certificate
 because cannot be forged, certificates can
be placed in a public directory
 CA Hierarchy
 if both users share a common CA then they are
assumed to know its public key
 otherwise CA's must form a hierarchy
 use certificates linking members of hierarchy to
validate other CA's
 each CA has certificates for clients (forward) and
parent (backward)
 each client trusts parents certificates
 enable verification of any certificate from one CA
by users of all other CAs in hierarchy
CA Hierarchy Use
 Certificate Revocation
 certificates have a period of validity
 may need to revoke before expiry, eg:
1. user's private key is compromised
2. user is no longer certified by this CA
3. CA's certificate is compromised
 CA’s maintain list of revoked certificates
 the Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
 users should check certificates with CA’s CRL
 Authentication Procedures
 X.509 includes three alternative
authentication procedures:
 One-Way Authentication
 Two-Way Authentication
 Three-Way Authentication
 all use public-key signatures
 One-Way Authentication
 1 message ( A->B) used to establish
 the identity of A and that message is from A
 message was intended for B
 integrity & originality of message
 message must include timestamp, nonce,
B's identity and is signed by A
 may include additional info for B
 eg session key
 Two-Way Authentication
 2 messages (A->B, B->A) which also
establishes in addition:
 the identity of B and that reply is from B
 that reply is intended for A
 integrity & originality of reply
 reply includes original nonce from A, also
timestamp and nonce from B
 may include additional info for A
 Three-Way Authentication
 3 messages (A->B, B->A, A->B) which
enables above authentication without
synchronized clocks
 has reply from A back to B containing
signed copy of nonce from B
 means that timestamps need not be
checked or relied upon
 X.509 Version 3
 has been recognised that additional
information is needed in a certificate
 email/URL, policy details, usage constraints
 rather than explicitly naming new fields
defined a general extension method
 extensions consist of:
 extension identifier
 criticality indicator
 extension value
 Certificate Extensions
 key and policy information
 convey info about subject & issuer keys, plus
indicators of certificate policy
 certificate subject and issuer attributes
 support alternative names, in alternative
formats for certificate subject and/or issuer
 certificate path constraints
 allow constraints on use of certificates by
other CA’s
Public Key Infrastructure
 Summary
 have considered:
 Kerberos trusted key server system
 X.509 authentication and certificates