231 236

ISSN: 2278 – 1323
International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Engineering & Technology
Volume 1, Issue 5, July 2012

SECURE MULTICAST COMMUNICATION USING
GROUP BASED MULTICAST HIERARCHY
R. Varalakshmi#1, Dr. V. Rhymend Uthariaraj*2
#
Teaching Research Associate – Department of Mathematics,
Anna University, Chennai, India

*
Professor and Director, Ramanujan Computing Centre
Anna University, Chennai, India

Abstract— Secure multicast communication is a significant members and used to encrypt the transmitted
requirement in emerging applications in adhoc environments like
military or public emergency network applications. Membership content. In order to prevent the joined members
dynamism is a major challenge in providing complete security in from reading previous content and the left member
such networks. This paper proposes a efficient Group Based from reading the further content, TEK must be
Multicast Hierarchy (GBMH) algorithm for secret multicast
communication, in which source nodes used the Secure Ad hoc refreshed after the membership is changed. An easy
On Demand Distance Vector (SAODV) protocol is an extension way is to allow the key server to share a unique key
of the AODV protocol. The Secure AODV scheme is based on the encryption key(KEK) with every member. When
assumption that each node possesses certified public keys of all
network nodes. The SAODV protocol collects its 1 hop the membership is changes, the key server uses the
neighbours to form group. This protocol sends acknowledgement individual KEK of every member to encrypt the
for each transmission in order to reduce the retransmission. new TEK. This is an inefficient method because the
Membership dynamism was overcome by electing local
controllers and with periodic updates of node join and leave cost of TEK updates grows linearly with the group
information using multicast hierarchy. The performance is size. Therefore, the key changing process becomes
studied in terms of average end to end delay and fault tolerance a critical problem in multicast key management.
in multicast transmission.
Efficient key management protocols should be
taken into consideration for security requirements.
Keywords— Secure Multicast Communication, Adhoc
environments, Membership Dynamism, GBMH, SAODV
Security requirements:
I. INTRODUCTION 1. Forward secrecy: In this case, users left the
Many applications like pay-per–view, distribution group should not have access to any future key.
of digital media etc., require secure multicast This ensures that a member cannot decrypt data
services in order to restrict group membership and after it leaves the group.
enforce accountability of group members. A major 2. Backward secrecy: A new user who joins the
issue associated with the deployment of secure session should not have access to any old key. This
multicast delivery services is the scalability of the ensures that a member cannot decrypt data sent
key distribution scheme. This is particularly true before it joins the group.
with regard to the handling of group membership 3. Non-group confidentiality: Here users that are
changes, such as membership departures and/or never part of the group should not have access to
expulsions, which necessitate the distribution of a any key that can decrypt any multicast data sent to
new session key to all the remaining group the group.
members. As the frequency of group membership 4. Collusion freedom: Any set of fraudulent users
change increases, it becomes necessary to reduce should not be able to deduce the currently used key.
the cost of key distribution operations. A common
method for secure multicast communications is to The process of updating the keys and distributing
use a symmetric key called traffic encryption them to the group members is called rekeying
key(TEK), which is shared by all legitimate group operation. A critical problem with any rekey

231
All Rights Reserved © 2012 IJARCET

ISSN: 2278 – 1323

technique is scalability [6]. The rekey process which does not need to perform node splitting after
should be done after each membership change, and the member joining but it has better than average
if the membership changes are frequent, key rekeying performance than a B-tree.
management will require a large number of key
exchanges per unit time in order to maintain both Key management approaches can be classified
forward and backward secrecies. More frequent into three classes: centralized, distributed or
membership dynamism causes node failure, link decentralized. Distributed key agreement protocols
failure, power failure leads to time delay in do not rely on a group leader which has an
multicast transmission. To overcome these advantage over those with a group leader because,
problems, several approaches propose a multicast without a leader, all members are treated equally
group clustering. [7, 8, 9]. Grouping is dividing theand if one or more members fail to complete the
multicast group into several sub-groups. Local protocol, it will not affect the whole group. In the
controller (LC) manages each subgroup, which is protocols with a group leader, a leader failure is
responsible for local key management within the fatal for creating the group key and the operation
cluster. Thus, after Join or Leave procedures, only has to be restarted from scratch. The 1-affects-n
members within the concerned cluster are affected phenomenon is not considered because in
by rekeying process, and the local dynamics of a distributed protocols all the members are
cluster does not affect the other clusters of the contributors in the creation of the group key and
group and hence it overcomes 1-affects-n hence all of them should commit to the new key
[21,22,23,24] phenomenon. Moreover, few whenever a membership change occurs in the group.
solutions for multicast clustering such as dynamic The decentralized approach divides the multicast
clustering did consider the issue of average end to group into subgroups or clusters, each sub-group is
end delay to achieve an efficient key distribution managed by a LC (Local Controller) responsible for
process, whereas delay in transmission constitutes security management of members and its subgroup.
main issue in ad hoc environments. Two kinds of decentralized protocols are
distinguished as static clustering and dynamic
II. RELATED WORK
clustering. In Static clustering approach, the
In order to reduce the rekeying overhead, the key multicast group is initially divided into several
tree architecture has been widely used in multicast subgroups. Each subgroup shares a local session
communications. First, a logical key hierarchy key managed by
(LKH) tree approach [16,17] has been proposed to
reduce the computational and transmitted cost from LC. Example: IOLUS [7] belongs to the
O(n) to O(log n) in the rekeying process, where n is categories, which are more scalable than centralized
the number of group members. Then several protocol. Dynamic clustering approach aims to
improvements are proposed. Lie et al. [18] solve the ―1 affect n‖ phenomenon. This approach
proposed a periodic batch rekeying algorithm to starts a multicast session with centralized key
solve synchronization and inefficiency problems. management and divides the group dynamically.
Sherman and McGrew [15] proposed a one-way Example: AKMP [8], SAKM [9] belong to this
function tree (OFT) to reduce the size of the approach and are dedicated to wired networks.
rekeying message from 2(logd n) to only (logd n). Enhanced BAAL [10] and OMCT [11, 12] propose
However, the communication cost will be greater dynamic clustering scheme for multicast key
than (logd n) as soon as the key tree is out of distribution in adhoc networks.
balance. Recently, the approaches for keeping the
tree architecture balance have been proposed. Goshi OMCT (Optimized Multicast Cluster Tree) is a
and ladner [18,19] solved the unbalance problem dynamic clustering scheme for multicast key
based on 2-3 trees and have the best performance distribution dedicated to operate in ad hoc networks.
with the degree-3 key trees. Lu[20] proposed the This scheme optimizes energy consumption and
non-split balancing high-order (NSBHO) tree,

232

ISSN: 2278 – 1323

latency for key delivery. Its main idea is to elect the when the signature is verified. When the node
local controllers of the created clusters. OMCT reaches the destination, the node signs the ROUTE
needs the geographical location information of all REPLY with its private key and sends it back. The
group members in the construction of the key intermediate nodes again verify the signature .The
distribution tree. signature of the sender is again stored with the
along with the route entry.
Once the clusters are created within the multicast
group, the new LC becomes responsible for the A. Features
local key management and distribution to their local
members, and also for the maintenance of the
strongly correlated cluster property. The election of i. Ownership of certified public keys enables
local controllers is done according to the intermediate enable intermediate nodes to
localization and GPS (Global Positioning System) authenticate all in-transit routing packets.
information of the group members, which does not ii. The protocol operates mainly by using the new
reflect the true connectivity between nodes. Based extension message with the SAODV protocol.
on the literature reviewed, OMCT is the efficient iii. The SAODV can be used to protect the route
dynamic clustering approach for secure multicast discovery mechanism of the AODV by providing
distribution in mobile adhoc networks. To enhance security features like integrity, authentication and
its efficiency, it is necessary to overcome the nonrepudiation.
criteria, as OMCT needs geographical location
information in the construction of key distribution SAODV have multicast connectivity between
tree by reflecting true connectivity between nodes. nodes. It sends acknowledgement for each
It does not acknowledge the transmission and transmission in order to reduce the retransmission.
results in delay in multicast transmission. The LCs are elected easily with periodic updates of
node join and leave information using multicast
Several different protocols have been proposed hierarchy. This overcomes the issues of end to end
for ad-hoc routing. The proposal of this paper is to delay in multicast transmission and also tolerates
present an efficient Group Based Multicast the fault that occurs due to node failure. The
Hierarchy (GBMH) using Multicast version of GBMH algorithm is simulated with network
SAODV for secure multicast key distribution. simulator NS-allinone-2.33 and the performance is
studied in terms of average end to end delay and
III. SAODV OPERATION fault tolerance in multicast transmission.
The originator of the routing control packet IV. EFFICIENT GBMH WITH SAODV
appends its RSA signature and the last element of a
hash chain to the routing packets. A packet The proposed approach is to achieve secure
transverse the network, intermediate nodes multicast communication for adhoc networks. This
cryptographically authenticates the signature and approach uses Multicast version of SAODV routing
the hash value. The intermediate nodes generate the protocol to maintain routing table periodically. It
kth element of the hash chain, with k being the forms multicast hierarchy among the group
number of transverse hops, and place it in packet. members. Each node can determine their present
physical location. It quickly adopts to the topology
The SAODV protocol gives two alternatives for changes. It is used to discover alternate route for
ROUTE REQUEST and ROUTE REPLY messages. failure of existing route. It also sends
In the first case when a ROUTE REQUEST is sent, acknowledgement for each transmission in order to
the sender creates a signature and appends it to reduce the retransmission. Thus the approach of
packet. Intermediate nodes authenticate the GBMH using SAODV tends to have multicast
signature before creating or updating the reverse connectivity between the nodes.
route to the host. The reverse rout is stored only

233

ISSN: 2278 – 1323

The approach of Efficient GBMH with SAODV group 0), encrypt with the respective public keys.
is described in five phases with specific notations Each local controller should join this group. The
local controllers decrypt the message, extract the
Phase 1: Authentication: For each node, assign TEK, re-encrypt it with their respective group keys
certificate key to verify its node identity. Each node and send it to all their local members.
has address, node address and certificate key. TEK Distribution
Certificate key and its IP address encrypt to form a For all mgik ,Gk → mg ik:{TEK, Num_Seq,
public key. Thus, each node is authenticated based KEK_GSG ik, IDG, IDGSG, Pub_G,(GBID_CG)
on broadcast request and reply. Pri_G }Pub_ mg ik

Node Authentication and Access Control Phase 5: Node mobility: For frequent node
mg ik → LCik: Join_Request, Pub_mgik mobility, a new member may join a group or an
LCik → mgik : Join_Request existing member may leave a group. To ensure
mgik→ LCik: Join_Reply, Pub_ mg secure multicast communication, both forward and
ik ,{GBID_}Pri_mg ik backward secrecy has to be maintained.

Phase 2: Group Head Election: Initially the list Forward Secrecy: When a node leaves the
of Local Controllers(LCs) contains only the source multicast group, it cannot decrypt the future data.
Group Controller (GC). Then, GC collects all its 1 The leave operation is in two cases
hop neighbours by SAODV routing protocol. Elect I. When an ordinary node leaves, it gives less
LCs which are group members and which have effect in multicast transmission. The leave
child group members ( the LC belongs to the operation of an ordinary node is specified as
unicast path between the source and the child group follows:
members). Verify for each one if it a group member
and if it has child group members then add the LC Leave Procedure
to the list of LCs. Thus, LCs are selected as group
heads for its corresponding group members. mg ik : outgoing member leaving a group
For mg ik : Local member,
Phase 3: Group Formation: All the members mg ik < > mg ik _outgoing
reachable by this new LC will form a new group. If LC ik → mg ik:{IDLC, KEK_GSG ik }Pub_ mg ik
group members that exist and do not belong to the II. When a local controller leaves, it leads to
formed group then choose the nodes that have the clusterization. It first sends the leave notification to
maximum reachability to the other nodes in one hop the group controller and then all the members of the
from the remaining members. This reachability current LCs are merged with the other group based
information is collected through the SAODV on the reachability information obtained by the
routing protocol. Thus, nodes are selected as local SAODV routing protocol.
controllers for the remaining group members and
forms new group. Leave Notification

Phase 4: Secure Multicast Communication: LC ik → GLC:{ID_ LC ik }KEK_GLC
The source encrypts multicast data with the TEK, For all j< > i, GC k → LC ik :{ID_GC,
and then sends it to all the members of the group new_KEK_GLC} Pub_CL jk
following the multicast hierarchy. The TEK Merge
distribution is achieved in parallel, according to the For all mg ik, LC ik : {ID_group, LL_LC
following steps. Initially, the entire group members ik }KEK_GSGik
receive from the source by unicast the session key
KEKgsg-0(key encryption key of the group sub-

234

ISSN: 2278 – 1323

Backward Secrecy: When a new node joins the
multicast group, it cannot decrypt the past
encrypted data. Each new node is authenticated
based on broadcast request and reply.

Join Procedure

For old_ mg ik : old member of group
LC ik → old_ mgik :{IDLC,
KEK_GSGik }old_KEK_ GSG ik
LC ik → mgik:{IDLC, TEK, KEK_GSGik}Pub_ mg
ik

Thus the approach of an efficient Group Based
Fig. 1 Average end to end delays of multicast transmission
Multicast Hierarchy (GBMH) using Multicast
version SAODV is described in five phases in order The average end to end delays of multicast
to have secure multicast communication adhoc transmission is efficient in proposed GBMH.
networks. This approaches the issues of end to end
delay in multicast transmission and also tolerates
the fault that occurs due to node failure.
As number of nodes increases, it increases the fault-
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS tolerance in key distribution. Indeed, this approach
divides the multicast group with the effective
connectivity between nodes. It allows fast reaction
The performance of secure multicast
to topology changes. This is due to the fact that it
communication of the efficient GBMH for adhoc
sends acknowledgement for each transmission in
networks in terms of end to end delay and fault
order to reduce the retransmission. Hence it
tolerance due to node failure is analyzed. This
tolerates the fault that occurs due to node failure of
approach is simulated under Linux Fedora, using
multicast transmission in efficient GBMH
the network simulator NS2 version ns-allinone-2.33.
compared to OMCT.
The performance metrics are namely average end to
end delay and fault tolerance of secure multicast
communication.

End to End Delay: The average latency or end to
end delay of keys transmission from the source to
the receivers. This metrics allows evaluating the
average latency to forward a key from a LC to its
group members.

Fault Tolerance: This metrics allows evaluating
the percentage of tolerance of fault that occurs due
to node failure. Fig 1 and Fig 2 shows the
simulation results of the comparison of OMCT with
GBMH.

Fig. 2 Fault Tolerance in multicast communication

235

ISSN: 2278 – 1323
[8] Bettahar, H., Bouabdallah, A., Challal, Y.: An adaptive key management
protocol for secure multicast. In: Proc. IEEE International Conference on
Computer Communications and Networks, October 2002, pp. 190–195
VI. CONCLUSION (2002)
[9] Challal, Y., Bettahar, H., Bouabdallah, A.: SAKM: A Scalable and
Adaptive Key Management Approach for Multicast Communications.
Secure multicast communication in adhoc ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, 55–70 (April 2004)
[10] Bouassida, M., Chrisment, I., Festor, O.: An Enhanced Hybrid Key
networks is challenging due to its inherent Management Protocol for Secure Multicast in Ad Hoc Networks. In:
characteristics of infrastructure-less architecture NETWORKING 2004. LNCS, vol. 3042, pp. 725–742. Springer,
Heidelberg (2004)
with lack of central authority, limited resources [11] Bouassida, M., Chrisment, I., Festor, O.: Efficient Clustering for
such as bandwidth, time and power. Hence key Multicast Key Distribution in MANETs. In: NETWORKING 2005.
LNCS, vol. 3462, pp. 138–153. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
management is the fundamental challenge in [12] Bouassida, M., Chrisment, I., Festor, O.: Group Key Management in
achieving secure communication using multicast Manets. International Journal of Network Security, 67–79 (January 2008)
[13] Zapata,M.G.,‖Secure ad-hoc on-demand distance vector (SAODV)
key distribution in adhoc networks. This paper routing ,― IETF MANET ,internetdraft (Work in progress),draft -
studies how to design key management schemes for guerrero-manet-saodv-00.txt,2001.- accessed 10/10/2006.
[14] A H A Rahman, Z A Zukarnain.: Performance Comparison of AODV,
such networks that will allow to identify nodes DSDV and I-DSDV routing protocols in Mobile Adhoc Networks. In.:
without the need of any kind of certification European Journal of scientific Research, pp 566-576, 2009
[15] Elgamal T., A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on
authority. In addition, it presents a method to discrete logarithms, CRYPTO 84 on Advances in Cryptology
reduce the delays in route establishment in cases Proceedings, 1984, 10-18.
[16] Debby M. Wallner, Eric J. Harder, Ryan C. Agee, ―Key Management
where routing messages are signed and need to be for Multicast: Issues and Architectures‖, Informational RFC, draft-
verified. Finally, it applies all these to SAODV (an Wallnerkey-arch-ootxt, July 1997.
[17] Chung Kei Wong, Mohamed Gouda, and Simon S Lam, ―Secure Group
extension of the AODV routing protocol that Communication Using Key Graphs‖, Proceedings of ACMSIGCOMM,
protects the route discovery mechanism providing Vancouver, British Columbia, September 1998.
[18] Goshi, J. and Ladner, R.E (2003) Algorithms for Dynamic Multicast
security features like integrity and authentication), Key Distribution Trees. Procs. Twenty-second Annual Symp. Principles
and presents results from simulations that show of Distributed Computing (PODC2003), New York, NY, USA, July, pp
243-251.
how this method provides the same security with [19] Goshi, J. and Ladner, R.E. (2007) Algorithms for dynamic multicast key
minimum impact in the network performance. distribution. J. Exp. Algorithmics, 11, 1-37.
[20] Lu, H(2005) A novel high-orer tree for secure multicast key
Simulation results shows the demonstration of management. IEEE Trans. Comput., 54, 214-224.
GBMH using SAODV have better system [21] C.K.Wong, M. Gouda, S.S.Lam, 2000. "Secure Group Communications
using key graphs", IEEE/ACM Transactions on networking, pp.16-30.
performance in terms of end to end delay and fault [22] Sandro Rafeli, David Hutchison, 2000." A survey of Key Management
tolerance rate under varying network conditions. for Secure Group Communication", ACM Computing Surveys, Vol.35,
No.3, pp.309-329.
Therefore, providing a more complete solution to [23] M. Manulis, ―Security-Focused Survey on Group Key Exchange
the problem of security in adhoc networks. Protocols,‖ Report 2006/395, Cryptology ePrint Archive, http://
eprint.iacr.org/, 2006.
[24] F. Zhu, A. Chan, and G. Noubir, ―Optimal Tree Structure for Key
Management of Simultaneous Join/Leave in Secure Multicast,‖ Proc.
Military Comm. Conf. (MILCOM), 2003
REFERENCES

[1] Chiang, T., Huang, Y.: Group keys and the multicast security in ad hoc
networks. In: Proc. IEEE International Conference on Parallel Processing,
October 2003, pp. 385–390. IEEE press, Los Alamitos (2003)
[2] T. Kaya, G. Lin, G. Noubir, and A. Yilmaz.:Secure multicast groups on
ad hoc networks. In: Proc. 1st ACM workshop on security of ad hoc and
sensor networks, ACM Press, pp 94-102.(2003).
[3] Lazos, L., Poovendram, R.: Energy-Aware Secure Multicast
Communication in Ad Hoc Networks Using Geographical Location
Information. In: Proc.IEEE International Conference on Acoustics Speech
and Signal Processing, April 2003, pp. 201–204 (2003)
[4] Dondeti, L., Mukherjee, S., Samal, A.: Secure one-to many group
communication sing dual encryption. In: IEEE sym. on Computers and
Communications, July 1999, pp. 1–25 (1999)
[5] H. Harney and C. Muckenhirn. Group key management protocol (gkmp)
specification. RFC2093, 1997.
[6] G. H. Chiou and W. T. Chen. Secure Broadcast using Secure Lock. IEEE
Transactions on Software Engineering, August 1989.
[7] Mittra, S.: Iolus: A framework for scalable secure multicasting. In:
SIGCOMM, pp. 277–288 (1997)

236

231 236

More Related Content

What's hot (20)

Viewers also liked (9)

Similar to 231 236 (20)

More from Editor IJARCET (20)

Recently uploaded (20)

231 236