148531009 cases-i-persons-and-family-relations-docx

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G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President,
HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
CRUZ, J.:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of
presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law.
The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so
when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they
were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case
on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these
decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official
Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application,
and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for
reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1 Specifically, they ask the following
questions:
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are
not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction
between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means
complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official
Gazette. 2
In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion
was a request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the
merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code
meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication,
when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case
the subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and consequently not
binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next the February
Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of
the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding,
he submitted that issuances intended only for the internal administration of a
government agency or for particular persons did not have to be 'Published; that
publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that,
however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was not
supported by eight members of this Court. 5
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall
take effect one year after such publication.

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the
original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and so hold,
that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to
the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause
does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example,
as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original
decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its
publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule
did not apply because it was "otherwise provided. "
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason. is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it
would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature
could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after
publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result
and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply because they
did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is
commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on
prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before
they can begin to operate.
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law,
which of course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to
have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of
the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the
legislative enactments of the government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not
apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual,
like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely
cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably
does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public
interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if
he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on
the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra
vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest
even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only,
and t to the public as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated
by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative
rules and regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.
Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies
to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that
place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a
public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or
requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are
meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that
body is supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of
Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid
down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his
personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are
not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is
to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the
petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such
decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity,
and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication
requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally,
in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably
of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. 7 The
evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.
Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically
for publication in the Official Gazette 8 and that six others felt that publication could be
made elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his
vote 10 and another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without indicating
where it should be made. 11 It is therefore necessary for the present membership of this

Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision
supported by the necessary vote.
There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the
Official Gazette, considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly,
newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating,
the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication
is not the one required or authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment
has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to
such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet
been published.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or
modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the
legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved
by the political departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed
procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of
the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazett and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication
or after a different period provided by the legislature.
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as
possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility,
of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered
unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its
publication as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at
this time.
Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for
an advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment.
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again
an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and
available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain
democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority
emanating from them.
Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to
review the work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights,
through their freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the
acts of the legislature are concealed.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a

valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.
The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked
blade is drawn.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately
upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official
Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another
date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and
Paras, JJ., concur.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent
argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws
which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
HELD:
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other
date, without its previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking,
all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A
law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect
the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the
people only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public
of the content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not
called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows
with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be
recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication
intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

G.R. No. 105364* June 28, 2001
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-N.U.B.E. and PERFECTO V.
FERNANDEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE BENJAMIN VEGA, Presiding Judge of Branch 39 of the REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT of Manila, the CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE
LIQUIDATOR OF THE PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, respondents
KAPUNAN, J.:
May a liquidation court continue with liquidation proceedings of the Philippine Veterans Bank
(PVB) when Congress had mandated its rehabilitation and reopening?
This is the sole issue raised in the instant Petition for Prohibition with Petition for Preliminary
Injunction and application for Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Sometime in 1985, the Central Bank of the Philippines (Central Bank, for brevity) filed with
Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of
the Philippine Veterans Bank, the same docketed as Case No. SP-32311. Thereafter, the
Philipppine Veterans Bank Employees Union-N.U.B.E., herein petitioner, represented by

petitioner Perfecto V. Fernandez, filed claims for accrued and unpaid employee wages and
benefits with said court in SP-32311.1
After lengthy proceedings, partial payment of the sums due to the employees were made.
However, due to the piecemeal hearings on the benefits, many remain unpaid.2
On March 8, 1991, petitioners moved to disqualify the respondent judge from hearing the above
case on grounds of bias and hostility towards petitioners.3
On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7169 providing for the rehabilitation
of the Philippine Veterans Bank.4
Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for benefits and for
reinstatement upon reopening of the bank.5
Sometime in May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to
reopen.6
Despite the legislative mandate for rehabilitation and reopening of PVB, respondent judge
continued with the liquidation proceedings of the bank. Moreover, petitioners learned that
respondents were set to order the payment and release of employee benefits upon motion of
another lawyer, while petitioners’ claims have been frozen to their prejudice.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners argue that with the passage of R.A. 7169, the liquidation court became functus officio,
and no longer had the authority to continue with liquidation proceedings.
In a Resolution, dated June 8, 1992, the Supreme Court resolved to issue a Temporary
Restraining Order enjoining the trial court from further proceeding with the case.
On June 22, 1992, VOP Security & Detective Agency (VOPSDA) and its 162 security guards
filed a Motion for Intervention with prayer that they be excluded from the operation of the
Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court. They alleged that they had filed a motion
before Branch 39 of the RTC of Manila, in SP-No. 32311, praying that said court order PVB to
pay their backwages and salary differentials by authority of R.A. No 6727, Wage Orders No.
NCR-01 and NCR-01-Ad and Wage Orders No. NCR-02 and NCR-02-A; and, that said court, in
an Order dated June 5, 1992, approved therein movants’ case and directed the bank liquidator or
PVB itself to pay the backwages and differentials in accordance with the computation
incorporated in the order. Said intervenors likewise manifested that there was an error in the
computation of the monetary benefits due them.
On August 18, 1992, petitioners, pursuant to the Resolution of this Court, dated July 6, 1992,
filed their Comment opposing the Motion for Leave to File Intervention and for exclusion from
the operation of the T.R.O. on the grounds that the movants have no legal interest in the subject
matter of the pending action; that allowing intervention would only cause delay in the

proceedings; and that the motion to exclude the movants from the T.R.O. is without legal basis
and would render moot the relief sought in the petition.
On September 3, 1992, the PVB filed a Petition-In-Intervention praying for the issuance of the
writs of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in connection with the
issuance by respondent judge of several orders involving acts of liquidation of PVB even after
the effectivity of R.A. No. 7169. PVB further alleges that respondent judge clearly acted in
excess of or without jurisdiction when he issued the questioned orders.
We find for the petitioners.
Republic Act No. 7169 entitled "An Act To Rehabilitate The Philippine Veterans Bank Created
Under Republic Act No. 3518, Providing The Mechanisms Therefor, And For Other Purposes",
which was signed into law by President Corazon C. Aquino on January 2, 1992 and which was
published in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992, provides in part for the reopening of the
Philippine Veterans Bank together with all its branches within the period of three (3) years from
the date of the reopening of the head office.7 The law likewise provides for the creation of a
rehabilitation committee in order to facilitate the implementation of the provisions of the same.8
Pursuant to said R.A. No. 7169, the Rehabilitation Committee submitted the proposed
Rehabilitation Plan of the PVB to the Monetary Board for its approval. Meanwhile, PVB filed a
Motion to Terminate Liquidation of Philippine Veterans Bank dated March 13, 1992 with the
respondent judge praying that the liquidation proceedings be immediately terminated in view of
the passage of R.A. No. 7169.
On April 10, 1992, the Monetary Board issued Monetary Board Resolution No. 348 which
approved the Rehabilitation Plan submitted by the Rehabilitaion Committee.
Thereafter, the Monetary Board issued a Certificate of Authority allowing PVB to reopen.
On June 3, 1992, the liquidator filed A Motion for the Termination of the Liquidation
Proceedings of the Philippine Veterans Bank with the respondent judge.
As stated above, the Court, in a Resolution dated June 8, 1992, issued a temporary restraining
order in the instant case restraining respondent judge from further proceeding with the
liquidation of PVB.
On August 3, 1992, the Philippine Veterans Bank opened its doors to the public and started
regular banking operations.
Clearly, the enactment of Republic Act No. 7169, as well as the subsequent developments has
rendered the liquidation court functus officio. Consequently, respondent judge has been stripped
of the authority to issue orders involving acts of liquidation.

Liquidation, in corporation law, connotes a winding up or settling with creditors and debtors.9 It
is the winding up of a corporation so that assets are distributed to those entitled to receive them.
It is the process of reducing assets to cash, discharging liabilities and dividing surplus or loss.
On the opposite end of the spectrum is rehabilitation which connotes a reopening or
reorganization. Rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of corporate life and activities in an
effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its former position of successful operation and
solvency.10
It is crystal clear that the concept of liquidation is diametrically opposed or contrary to the
concept of rehabilitation, such that both cannot be undertaken at the same time. To allow the
liquidation proceedings to continue would seriously hinder the rehabilitation of the subject bank.
Anent the claim of respondents Central Bank and Liquidator of PVB that R.A. No. 7169 became
effective only on March 10, 1992 or fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette;
and, the contention of intervenors VOP Security, et. al. that the effectivity of said law is
conditioned on the approval of a rehabilitation plan by the Monetary Board, among others, the
Court is of the view that both contentions are bereft of merit.
While as a rule, laws take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the
legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions, as indicated in the clause "unless
otherwise provided."
In the case at bar, Section 10 of R.A. No. 7169 provides:
Sec. 10. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Hence, it is clear that the legislature intended to make the law effective immediately upon its
approval. It is undisputed that R.A. No. 7169 was signed into law by President Corazon C.
Aquino on January 2, 1992. Therefore, said law became effective on said date.
Assuming for the sake of argument that publication is necessary for the effectivity of R.A. No.
7169, then it became legally effective on February 24, 1992, the date when the same was
published in the Official Gazette, and not on March 10, 1992, as erroneously claimed by
respondents Central Bank and Liquidator.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE
and GRANTED. Respondent Judge is hereby PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from further
proceeding with Civil Case No. SP- 32311.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

* This case was transferred to the ponente pursuant to the resolution in AM No. 00-9-03-SC. Re:
Creation of Special Committee on Case Backlog dated February 27, 2001.
G.R. No. 108461 October 21, 1996
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PRESIDING JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES, BRANCH 58, RTC, MAKATI;
REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION; AND FIRESTONE CERAMIC,
INC., respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:p
The PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION (PITC, for
brevity) filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking the reversal of the
Decision dated January 4, 1993 of public respondent Hon. Zosimo Z. Angeles,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58, in Civil Case
No. 92-158 entitled Remington Industrial Sales Corporation, et. al. vs. Philippine
Industrial Trading Corporation.
The said decision upheld the Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus of
REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION (Remington, for brevity)
and FIRESTONE CERAMICS, INC. (Firestone, for brevity), and, in the process,
declared as null and void and unconstitutional, PITC's Administrative Order No.

SOCPEC 89-08-01 and its appurtenant regulations. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of Petitioner
and Intervenor and against the Respondent, as follows:
1) Enjoining the further implementation by the respondent of the following issuances
relative to the applications for importation of products from the People's Republic of
China, to wit:
a) Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 dated August 30, 1989 (Annex A,
Amended Petition);
b) Prescribed Export Undertaking Form (Annex B, Id.);
c) Prescribed Importer-Exporter Agreement Form for non-exporter-importer (Annex C,
Id.);
d) Memorandum dated April 16, 1990 relative to amendments of Administrative Order No.
SOCPEC 89-08-01 (Annex D, Id.);
e) Memorandum dated May 6, 1991 relative to Revised Schedule of Fees for the
processing of import applications (Annexes E, E-1., Ind.);
f) Rules and Regulations relative to liquidation of unfulfilled Undertakings and expired
export credits (Annex Z, Supplemental Petition),
the foregoing being all null and void and unconstitutional; and,
2) Commanding respondent to approve forthwith all the pending applications of, and all
those that may hereafter be filed by, the petitioner and the Intervenor, free from and
without the requirements prescribed in the above-mentioned issuances.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The controversy springs from the issuance by the PITC of Administrative Order
No. SOCPEC 89-08-01, 1 under which, applications to the PITC for importation
from the People's Republic of China (PROC, for brevity) must be accompanied
by a viable and confirmed Export Program of Philippine Products to PROC
carried out by the improper himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate importer
in an amount equivalent to the value of the importation from PROC being applied
for, or, simply, at one is to one ratio.
Pertinent provisions of the questioned administrative order read:
3. COUNTERPART EXPORTS TO PROC
In addition to existing requirements for the processing of import application for goods and
commodities originating from PROC, it is declared that:

3.1 All applications covered by these rules must be accompanied by a
viable and confirmed EXPORT PROGRAM of Philippine products to
PROC in an amount equivalent to the value of the importation from
PROC being applied for. Such export program must be carried out and
completed within six (6) months from date of approval of the Import
Application by PITC. PITC shall reject/deny any application for
importation from PROC without the accompanying export program
mentioned above.
3.2 The EXPORT PROGRAM may be carried out by any of the following:
a. By the IMPORTER himself if he has the capabilities
and facilities to carry out the export of Philippine
products to PROC in his own name; or
b. Through a tie-up between the IMPORTER and a
legitimate exporter (of Philippine products) who is willing
to carry out the export commitments of the IMPORTER
under these rules. The tie-up shall not make the
IMPORTER the exporter of the goods but shall merely
ensure that the importation sought to be approved is
matched one-to-one (1:1) in value with a corresponding
export of Philippine products to PROC. 2
3.3 EXPORT PROGRAM DOCUMENTS which are to be submitted by
the improper together with his Import Application are as follows:
a) Firm Contract, Sales Invoice or Letter of Credit.
b) Export Performance Guarantee (See Article 4 hereof).
c) IMPORTER-EXPORTER AGREEMENT for non-
exporter IMPORTER (PITC Form No. M-1006). This
form should be used if IMPORTER has tie-up with an
exporter for the export of Philippine Products to PROC.
4. EXPORT GUARANTEE
To ensure that the export commitments of the IMPORTER are carried out in accordance
with these rules, all IMPORTERS concerned are required to submit an EXPORT
PERFORMANCE GUARANTEE (the "Guarantee") at the time of filing of the Import
Application. The amount of the guarantee shall be as follows:
For essential commodities: 15% of the value of the imports applied for.
For other commodities: 50% of the value of the imports applied for.
4.1 The guarantee may be in the form of (i) a non-interest bearing cash
deposit; (ii) Bank hold-out in favor of PITC (PITC Form No. M-1007) or
(iii) a Domestic Letter of Credit (with all bank opening charges for
account of Importer) opened in favor of PITC as beneficiary.

4.2 The guarantee shall be made in favor of PITC and will be
automatically forfeited in favor of PITC, fully or partially, if the required
export program is not completed by the importer within six (6) months
from date of approval of the Import Application.
4.3 Within the six (6) months period above stated, the IMPORTER is
entitled to a (i) refund of the cash deposited without interest; (ii)
cancellation of the Bank holdout or (iii) Cancellation of the Domestic
Letter of Credit upon showing that he has completed the export
commitment pertaining to his importation and provided further that the
following documents are submitted to PITC:
a) Final Sales Invoice
b) Bill of lading or Airway bill
c) Bank Certificate of Inward Remittance
d) PITC EXPORT APPLICATION FOR NO. M-1005
5. MISCELLANEOUS
5.1 All other requirements for importations of goods and commodities
from PROC must be complied with in addition to the above.
5.2 PITC shall have the right to disapprove any and all import
applications not in accordance with the rules and regulations herein
prescribed.
5.3 Should the IMPORTER or any of his duly authorized representatives
make any false statements or fraudulent misrepresentations in the
Import/Export Application, or falsify, forge or simulate any document
required under these rules and regulations, PITC is authorized to reject
all pending and future import/export applications of said IMPORTER
and/or disqualify said IMPORTER from doing any business with
SOCPEC through PITC.
Desiring to make importations from PROC, private respondents Remington and
Firestone, both domestic corporations, organized and existing under Philippine
laws, individually applied for authority to import from PROC with the petitioner.
They were granted such authority after satisfying the requirements for importers,
and after they executed respective undertakings to balance their importations
from PROC with corresponding export of Philippine products to PROC.
Private respondent Remington was allowed to import tools, machineries and
other similar goods. Firestone, on the other hand, imported Calcine Vauxite,
which it used for the manufacture of fire bricks, one of its products.
Subsequently, for failing to comply with their undertakings to submit export
credits equivalent to the value of their importations, further import applications
were withheld by petitioner PITC from private respondents, such that the latter
were both barred from importing goods from PROC. 3

Consequently, Remington filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus, with
prayer for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction on January 20, 1992, against PITC in the RTC Makati Branch 58. 4 The
court issued a Temporary Restraining Order on January 21, 1992, ordering PITC
to cease from exercising any power to process applications of goods from
PROC. 5 Hearing on the application for writ of preliminary injunction ensued.
Private respondent Firstone was allowed to intervene in the petition on July 2,
1992,6 thus joining Remington in the latter's charges against PITC. It specifically
asserts that the questioned Administrative Order is an undue restriction of trade,
and hence, unconstitutional.
Upon trial, it was agreed that the evidence adduced upon the hearing on the
Preliminary Injunction was sufficient to completely adjudicate the case, thus, the
parties deemed it proper that the entire case be submitted for decision upon the
evidence so far presented.
The court rendered its Decision7 on January 4, 1992. The court ruled that PITC's
authority to process and approve applications for imports from SOCPEC and to
issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 444 and P.D. No. 1071, has already
been repealed by EO No. 133, issued on February 27, 1987 by President
Aquino.
The court observed:
Given such obliteration and/or withdrawal of what used to be PITC's regulatory authority
under the Special provisions embodied in LOI 444 from the enumeration of power that it
could exercise effective February 27, 1987 in virtue of Section 16 (d), EO No. 133, it may
now be successfully argued that the PITC can no longer exercise such specific regulatory
power in question conformably with the legal precept "expresio unius est exclusio
alterius."
Moreover, the court continued, none of the Trade protocols of 1989, 1990 or
1991, has empowered the PITC, expressly or impliedly to formulate or
promulgate the assailed Administrative Order. This fact, makes the continued
exercise by PITC of the regulatory powers in question unworthy of judicial
approval. Otherwise, it would be sanctioning an undue exercise of legislative
power vested solely in the Congress of the Philippines by Section, 1, Article VII of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
The lower court stated that the subject Administrative Order and other similar
issuances by PITC suffer from serious constitutional infirmity, having been
promulgated in pursuance of an international agreement (the Memorandum of
Agreement between the Philippines and PROC), which has not been concurred
in by at least 2/3 of all the members of the Philippine Senate as required by
Article VII, Section 21, of the 1987 Constitution, and therefore, null and void.

Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
Furthermore, the subject Administrative Order was issued in restraint of trade, in
violation of Sections 1 and 19, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Sec. 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and
services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and, an expanding
productivity as the key to raising the equality of life for all, especially the underprivileged.
Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so
requires. No combination in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.
Lastly, the court declared the Administrative Order to be null and void, since the
same was not published, contrary to Article 2 of the New Civil Code which
provides, that:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette, unless the law otherwise provides. . . .
Petitioner now comes to use on a Petition for Review on Certiorari, 8 questioning
the court's decision particularly on the propriety of the lower court's declarations
on the validity of Administrative Order No. 89-08-01. The Court directed the
respondents to file their respective Comments.
Subsequent events transpired, however, which affect to some extent, the
submissions of the parties to the present petition.
Following President Fidel V. Ramos' trip to Beijing, People's Republic of China
(PROC), from April 25 to 30, 1993, a new trade agreement was entered into
between the Philippines and PROC, encouraging liberalization of trade between
the two countries. In line therewith, on April 20, 1993, the President, through
Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Antonio T. Carpio, directed the Department of
Trade and Industry and the PITC to cease implementing Administrative Order
No. SOCPEC 89-08-01, as amended by PITC Board Resolution Nos. 92-01-05
and 92-03-08. 9
In the implementation of such order, PITC President Jose Luis U. Yulo, Jr. issued
a corporate Memorandum 10 instructing that all import applications for the PROC
filed with the PITC as of April 20, 1993 shall no longer be covered by the trade
balancing program outlined in the Administrative Order.
Forthwith, the PITC allowed the private respondents to import anew from the
PROC, without being required to comply anymore with the lifted requirement of
balancing its imports with exports of Philippine products to PROC. 11 In its
Constancia12 filed with the Court on November 22, 1993, Remington expressed
its desire to have the present action declared moot and academic considering the

new supervening developments. For its part, respondent Firestone made a
Manifestation 13 in lieu of its Memorandum, informing the court of the aforesaid
developments of the new trade program of the Philippines with China, and
prayed for the court's early resolution of the action.
To support its submission that the present action is now moot and academic,
respondent Remington cites Executive Order No. 244, 14 issued by President
Ramos on May 12, 1995. The Executive Order states:
WHEREAS, continued coverage of the People's Republic of China by Letter of
Instructions No. 444 is no longer consistent with the country's national interest, as
coursing Republic of the Philippines-People's Republic China Trade through the
Philippine International Trading Corporations as provided for under Letter of Instructions
No. 444 is becoming an unnecessary barrier to trade;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines,
by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order;
The Committee on Scientific and Technical Cooperation with Socialist Countries to delete
the People's Republic of China from the list of countries covered by Letter of Instructions
No. 444.
Done in the City of Manila, this 12th day of May in the year of Our Lord, Nineteen
Hundred and Ninety-Five.
PITC filed its own Manifestation 15 on December 15, 1993, wherein it adopted the
arguments raised in its Petition as its Memorandum. PITC disagrees with
Remington on the latter's submission that the case has become moot and
academic as a result of the abrogation of Administrative Order SOCPEC No. 89-
08-01, since respondent Remington had incurred obligations to the petitioner
consisting of charges for the 0.5% Counter Export Development Service provided
by PITC to Remington, which obligations remain outstanding. 16 The propriety of
such charges must still be resolved, petitioner argues, thereby maintaining the
issue of the validity of SOCPEC Order No. 89-08-01, before it was abrogated by
Executive fiat.
There is no question that from April 20, 1993, when trading balancing measures
with PROC were lifted by the President, Administrative Order SOCPEC No. 89-
08-01 no longer has force and effect, and respondents are thus entitled anew to
apply for authority to import from the PROC, without the trade balancing
requirements previously imposed on proposed importers. Indeed, it appears that
since the lifting of the trade balancing measures, Remington had been allowed to
import anew from PROC.
There remains, however, the matter of the outstanding obligations of the
respondent for the charges relating to the 0.5% Counter Export Development
Service in favor of PITC, for the period when the questioned Administrative Order

remained in effect. Is the obligation still subsisting, or are the respondents freed
from it?
To resolve this issue, we are tasked to consider the constitutionality of
Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01, based on the arguments set up by
the parties in their Petition and Comment. In so doing, we must inquire into the
nature of the functions of the PITC, in the light of present realities.
The PITC is a government owned or controlled corporation created under P.D.
No. 25217 dated August 6, 1973. P.D. No. 1071, 18 issued on May 9, 1977 which
revised the provisions of P.D. 252. The purposes and powers of the said
governmental entity were enumerated under Section 5 and 6 thereof. 19
On August 9, 1976, the late President Ferdinand Marcos issued Letter of
Instruction (LOI) No. 444,20 directing, inter alia, that trade (export or import of all
commodities), whether direct or indirect, between the Philippines and any of the
Socialist and other Centrally Planned Economy Countries (SOCPEC), including
the People's Republic of China (PROC) shall be undertaken or coursed through
the PITC. Under the LOI, PITC was mandated to: 1) participate in all official trade
and economic discussions between the Philippines and SOCPEC; 2) adopt such
measures and issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the
effective discharge of its functions under its instructions; and, 3) undertake the
processing and approval of all applications for export to or import from the
SOCPEC.
Pertinent provisions of the Letter of Instruction are herein reproduced:
LETTER OF INSTRUCTION 444
xxx xxx xxx
II. CHANNELS OF TRADE
1. The trade, direct or indirect, between the Philippines and any of the Socialist and other
centrally-planned economy countries shall upon issuance hereof, be undertaken by or
coursed through the Philippine International Trading Corporation. This shall apply to the
export and import of all commodities of products including those specified for export or
import by expressly authorized government agencies.
xxx xxx xxx
4. The Philippine International Trading Corporation shall participate in all official trade and
economic discussions between the Philippines and other centrally-planned economy
countries.
xxx xxx xxx
V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

The Philippine International Trading Corporation shall adopt such measures and issue
such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the effective discharge of its
functions under these instructions. In this connection, the processing and approval of
applications for export to or import from the Socialist and other centrally-planned
economy countries shall, henceforth, be performed by the said Corporation. (Emphasis
ours)
After the EDSA Revolution, or more specifically on February 27, 1987, then
President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated Executive Order (EO) No.
13321 reorganizing the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) empowering the
said department to be the "primary coordinative, promotive, facilitative and
regulatory arm of the government for the country's trade, industry and investment
activities" (Sec. 2, EO 133). The PITC was made one of DTI's line agencies. 22
The Executive Order reads in part:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 133
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 16. Line Corporate Agencies and Government Entities.
The following line corporate agencies and government entities defined in Section 9 (c) of
this Executive Order that will perform their specific regulatory functions, particularly
developmental responsibilities and specialized business activities in a manner consonant
with the Department mandate, objectives, policies, plans and programs:
xxx xxx xxx
d) Philippine International Trading Corporation. — This corporation, which shall be
supervised by the Undersecretary for International Trade, shall only engage in both
export and trading on new or non-traditional products and markets not normally pursued
by the private business sector; provide a wide range of export oriented auxiliary services
to the private sector; arrange for or establish comprehensive system and physical
facilities for handling the collection, processing, and distribution of cargoes and other
commodities; monitor or coordinate risk insurance services for existing institutions;
promote and organize, whenever warranted, production enterprises and industrial
establishments and collaborate or associate in joint venture with any person, association,
company or entity, whether domestic or foreign, in the fields of production, marketing,
procurement, and other relate businesses; and provide technical advisory, investigatory,
consultancy and management services with respect to any and all of the functions,
activities, and operations of the corporation.
Sometime in April, 1988, following the State visit of President Aquino to the
PROC, the Philippines and PROC entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
23 (MOU) wherein the two countries agreed to make joint efforts within the next
five years to expand bilateral trade to US $600 — US $800 Million by 1992, and
to strive for a steady progress towards achieving a balance between the value of
their imports and exports during the period, agreeing for the purpose that upon
the signing of the Memorandum, both sides shall undertake to establish the
necessary steps and procedures to be adopted within the framework of the

annual midyear review meeting under the Trade Protocol, in order to monitor and
ensure the implementation of the MOU.
Conformably with the MOU, the Philippines and PROC entered into a Trade
Protocol for the years 1989, 1990 and 1991, 24 under which was specified the
commodities to be traded between them. The protocols affirmed their agreement
to jointly endeavor between them. The protocols affirmed their agreement to
jointly endeavor to achieve more or less a balance between the values of their
imports and exports in their bilateral trade.
It is allegedly in line with its powers under LOI 444 and in keeping with the MOU
and Trade Protocols with PROC that PITC issued its now assailed Administrative
Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-0125 on August 30, 1989 (amended in March, 1992).
Undoubtedly, President Aquino, in issuing EO 133, is empowered to modify and
amend the provisions of LOI 444, which was issued by then President Marcos,
both issuances being executive directives. As observed by us in Philippine
Association of Services Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres, 26
there is no need for legislative delegation of power to the President to revoke the Letter of
Instruction by way of an Executive Order. This is notwithstanding the fact that the subject
LOI 1190 was issued by President Marcos, when he was extraordinarily empowered to
exercise legislative powers, whereas EO 450 was issued by Pres. Aquino when her
transitional legislative powers have already ceased, since it was found that LOI 1190 was
a mere administrative directive, hence, may be repealed, altered, or modified by EO 450.
We do not agree, however, with the trial court's ruling PITC's authority to issue
rules and regulations pursuant to the Special Provision of LOI 444 and P.D. No.
1071, have already been repealed by EO 133.
While PITC's power to engage in commercial import and export activities is
expressly recognized and allowed under Section 16 (d) of EO 133, the same is
not limited only to new or non-traditional products and markets not normally
pursued by the private business sector. There is not indication in the law of the
removal of the powers of the PITC to exercise its regulatory functions in the area
of importations from SOCPEC countries. Though it does not mention the grant of
regulatory power, EO 133, as worded, is silent as to the abolition or limitation of
such powers, previously granted under P.D. 1071, from the PITC.
Likewise, the general repealing clause in EO 133 stating that "all laws,
ordinances, rules, and regulations, or other parts thereof, which are inconsistent
with the Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly, cannot
operate to abolish the grant of regulatory powers to the PITC. There can be no
repeal of the said powers, absent any cogency of irreconcilable inconsistency or
repugnancy between the issuances, relating to the regulatory power of the PITC.

The President, in promulgating EO 133, had not intended to overhaul the
functions of the PITC. The DTI was established, and was given powers and
duties including those previously held by the PITC as an independent
government entity, under P.D. 1071 and LOI 444. The PITC was thereby
attached to the DTI as an implementing arm of the said department.
EO 133 established the DTI as the primary coordinative, promotive, facilitative
and regulatory arm of government for the country's trade, industry and
investment activities, which shall act as a catalyst for intensified private sector
activity in order to accelerate and sustain economic growth. 27 In furtherance of
this mandate, the DTI was empowered, among others, to plan, implement, and
coordinate activities of the government related to trade industry and investments;
to formulate and administer policies and guidelines for the investment priorities
plan and the delivery of investment incentives; to formulate country and product
export strategies which will guide the export promotion and development thrusts
of the government. 28 Corollarily, the Secretary of Trade and Industry is given the
power to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out the
department's objectives, policies, plans, programs and projects.
The PITC, on the other hand, was attached as an integral part to the said
department as one of its line agencies,29 and given the focal task of implementing
the department's programs. 30 The absence of the regulatory power formerly
enshrined in the Special Provision of LOI 444, from Section 16 of EO 133, and
the limitation of its previously wide range of functions, is noted. This does not
mean, however, that PITC has lost the authority to issue the questioned
Administrative Order. It is our view that PITC still holds such authority, and may
legally exercise it, as an implementing arm, and under the supervision of, the
Department of Trade and Industry.
Furthermore, the lower court's ruling to the effect that the PITC's authority to
process and approve applications for imports from SOCPEC and to issue rules
and regulations pursuant to LOI 444 and P.D. 1071 has been repealed by EO
133, is misplaced, and did not consider the import behind the issuance of the
later presidential edict.
The President could not have intended to deprive herself of the power to regulate
the flow of trade between the Philippines and PROC under the two countries'
Memorandum of Understanding, a power which necessarily flows from her office
as Chief Executive. In issuing Executive Order 133, the President intended
merely to reorganize the Department of Trade and Industry to cope with the need
of a streamlined bureaucracy. 31
Thus, there is not real inconsistency between LOI 444 and EO 133. There is,
admittedly, a rearranging of the administrative functions among the
administrative bodies affective by the edict, but not an abolition of executive
power. Consistency in statutes as in executive issuances, is of prime importance,

and, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, all laws are presumed to be
consistent with each other. Where it is possible to do so, it is the duty of courts, in
the construction of statutes, to harmonize and reconcile them, and to adopt a
construction of a statutory provision which harmonizes and reconciles it with
other statutory provisions. 32 The fact that a later enactment may relate to the
same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause
an implied repeal of the latter, since the law may be cumulative or a continuation
of the old one. 33
Similarly, the grant of quasi-legislative powers in administrative bodies is not
unconstitutional. Thus, as a result of the growing complexity of the modern
society, it has become necessary to create more and more administrative bodies
to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular field
assigned to them, they can deal within the problems thereof with more expertise
and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice.
This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
powers in what is now not unreasonably called the fourth department of the
government. 34 Evidently, in the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned
must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private
parties under such contracts. One thrust of the multiplication of administrative
agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private
rights thereunder is no longer uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our
regular courts. (Antipolo Realty Corporation vs. National Housing Authority, G.R.
No.
L-50444, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 399).
With global trade and business becoming more intricate may even with new
discoveries in technology and electronics notwithstanding, the time has come to
grapple with legislations and even judicial decisions aimed at resolving issues
affecting not only individual rights but also activities of which foreign governments
or entities may have interests. Thus, administrative policies and regulations must
be devised to suit these changing business needs in a faster rate than to resort
to traditional acts of the legislature.
This tendency finds support in a well-stated work on the subject, viz.:
Since legislatures had neither the time nor the knowledge to create detailed rules,
however, it was soon clear that new governmental arrangements would be needed to
handle the job of rule-making. The courts, moreover, many of them already congested,
would have been swamped if they had to adjudicate all the controversies that the new
legislation was bound to create; and the judges, already obliged to handle a great
diversity of cases, would have been hard pressed to acquire the knowledge they needed
to deal intelligently with all the new types of controversy.
So the need to "create a large number of specialized administrative agencies and to give
them broader powers than administrators had traditionally exercised. These included the
power to issue regulations having the force of law, and the power to hear and decide

cases — powers that had previously been reserved to the legislatures and the courts.
(Houghteling/Pierce, Lawmaking by Administrative Agencies, p. 166)
The respondents likewise argue that PITC is not empowered to issue the
Administrative Order because no grant of such power was made under the Trade
Protocols of 1989, 1990 or 1991. We do not agree. The Trade Protocols
aforesaid, are only the enumeration of the products and goods which signatory
countries have agreed to trade. They do not bestow any regulatory power, for
executive power is vested in the Executive Department, 35 and it is for the latter to
delegate the exercise of such power among its designated agencies.
In sum, the PITC was legally empowered to issue Administrative Orders, as a
valid exercise of a power ancillary to legislation.
This does not imply however, that the subject Administrative Order is a valid
exercise of such quasi-legislative power. The original Administrative Order issued
on August 30, 1989, under which the respondents filed their applications for
importation, was not published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation. The questioned Administrative Order, legally, until it is
published, is invalid within the context of Article 2 of Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette (or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines), unless it
is otherwise provided. . . .
The fact that the amendments to Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01
were filed with, and published by the UP Law Center in the National
Administrative Register, does not cure the defect related to the effectivity of the
Administrative Order.
This court, in Tanada vs. Tuvera36 stated, thus:
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative Rules and Regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither
is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties
xxx xxx xxx

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose
is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.
The Administrative Order under consideration is one of those issuances which
should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and
implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, in
relation to LOI 444 and EO 133.
Thus, even before the trade balancing measures issued by the petitioner were
lifted by President Fidel V. Ramos, the same were never legally effective, and
private respondents, therefore, cannot be made subject to them, because
Administrative Order 89-08-01 embodying the same was never published, as
mandated by law, for its effectivity. It was only on March 30, 1992 when the
amendments to the said Administrative Order were filed in the UP Law Center,
and published in the National Administrative Register as required by the
Administrative Code of 1987.
Finally, it is the declared Policy of the Government to develop and strengthen
trade relations with the People's Republic of China. As declared by the President
in EO 244 issued on May 12, 1995, continued coverage of the People's Republic
of China by Letter of Instructions No. 444 is no longer consistent with the
country's national interest, as coursing RP-PROC trade through the PITC as
provided for under Letter of Instructions No. 444 is becoming an unnecessary
barrier to trade. 37
Conformably with such avowed policy, any remnant of the restrained atmosphere
of trading between the Philippines and PROC should be done away with, so as to
allow economic growth and renewed trade relations with our neighbors to flourish
and may be encouraged.
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED,
to the effect that judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the private respondents,
subject to the following MODIFICATIONS:
1) Enjoining the petitioner:
a) From further charging the petitioners the Counter Export Development Service
fee of 0.5% of the total value of the unliquidated or unfulfilled Undertakings of the
private respondents;
b) From further implementing the provisions of Administrative Order No.
SOCPEC 89-08-01 and its appurtenant rules; and,
2) Requiring petitioner to approve forthwith all the pending applications of, and all
those that may hereafter be filed by, the petitioner and the Intervenor, free from
and without complying with the requirements prescribed in the above-stated
issuances.

SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988
FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL,
JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and
LUIS BERNAL, SR., respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
CORTES, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of
the Special First Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v.
Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated
on 30 September 1987 denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion

for reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the decision in said case had
become final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners'
motion for reconsideration for having been filed out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified as
required by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant petition
did not suffer from this defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would
still resolve to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned by
petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private
respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa
Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their
shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the
basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch
XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners
guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal,
the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision
promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on
August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an
appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of
September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24,
1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion
when it denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration, directed entry of judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration.
It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R.
No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day period for appealing or
for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In its Resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court
en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly
enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be
filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the
Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant
or deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R.
No. 73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went further to
restate and clarify the modes and periods of appeal.

Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA
161],stressed the prospective application of said rule, and explained the operation of the
grace period, to wit:
In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30,
1986 of the Court's Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30,
1986, within which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or
reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it is still
within the grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.
This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No.
73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]
In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on
September 9, 1987, more than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June
30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the
length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the decision
of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the
ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made
to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the
Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was
promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication of
Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a
condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in
active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where
issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports
of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court
Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of
discretion in affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article
2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is
responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due
to the lack of necessary repairs.
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the
"last clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning to vacate the
tailoring shop and , therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since
the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is
inapplicable to this case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant
petition for lack of merit.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-16704 March 17, 1962
VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., petitioner-appellant,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee.
Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General and Ernesto T. Duran for respondent-appellee.
BARRERA, J.:
On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. 22 of the following
tenor: .

Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due the System,
will take into consideration and include in the Employee's remuneration all bonuses and
overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. All these will
comprise the Employee's remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2-1/2%
contributions will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one month.
Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel,
wrote the Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to
a previous Circular No. 7, dated October 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in
the computation of the employers' and employees' respective monthly premium contributions,
and submitting, "In order to assist your System in arriving at a proper interpretation of the term
'compensation' for the purposes of" such computation, their observations on Republic Act 1161
and its amendment and on the general interpretation of the words "compensation",
"remuneration" and "wages". Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for lack of
authority on the part of the Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the approval of
the President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette.
Overruling these objections, the Social Security Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is not a
rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and publication in the Official
Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere statement
of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed.
Not satisfied with this ruling, petitioner comes to this Court on appeal.
The single issue involved in this appeal is whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation,
as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security
Commission "to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of the President such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act."
There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and
an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative
body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law
with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of
policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law (Parker, Administrative Law, p. 197; Davis,
Administrative Law, p. 194). Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the
procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of
a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law.
This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy,
purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the
manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its
enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a
delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law. (Davis,
op. cit., p. 194.) .
A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed
and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not

in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom (Davis, op. cit., 195-197). On the
other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts
that finally determine what the law means.
Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the Social Security Commission, in view of the
amendment of the provisions of the Social Security Law defining the term "compensation"
contained in Section 8 (f) of Republic Act No. 1161 which, before its amendment, reads as
follows: .
(f) Compensation — All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any
remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except (1) that part of the remuneration
in excess of P500 received during the month; (2) bonuses, allowances or overtime pay;
and (3) dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make, although not
legally required to do so.
Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of "compensation" to:
(f) Compensation — All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any
remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except that part of the remuneration in
excess of P500.00 received during the month.
It will thus be seen that whereas prior to the amendment, bonuses, allowances, and overtime pay
given in addition to the regular or base pay were expressly excluded, or exempted from the
definition of the term "compensation", such exemption or exclusion was deleted by the
amendatory law. It thus became necessary for the Social Security Commission to interpret the
effect of such deletion or elimination. Circular No. 22 was, therefore, issued to apprise those
concerned of the interpretation or understanding of the Commission, of the law as amended,
which it was its duty to enforce. It did not add any duty or detail that was not already in the law
as amended. It merely stated and circularized the opinion of the Commission as to how the law
should be construed. 1äwphï1.ñët
The case of People v. Jolliffe (G.R. No. L-9553, promulgated on May 30, 1959) cited by
appellant, does not support its contention that the circular in question is a rule or regulation.
What was there said was merely that a regulation may be incorporated in the form of a circular.
Such statement simply meant that the substance and not the form of a regulation is decisive in
determining its nature. It does not lay down a general proposition of law that any circular,
regardless of its substance and even if it is only interpretative, constitutes a rule or regulation
which must be published in the Official Gazette before it could take effect.
The case of People v. Que Po Lay (50 O.G. 2850) also cited by appellant is not applicable to the
present case, because the penalty that may be incurred by employers and employees if they
refuse to pay the corresponding premiums on bonus, overtime pay, etc. which the employer pays
to his employees, is not by reason of non-compliance with Circular No. 22, but for violation of
the specific legal provisions contained in Section 27(c) and (f) of Republic Act No. 1161.

We find, therefore, that Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of the
System of what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the
monthly compensation of their employees upon which the social security contributions should be
based, and that such circular did not require presidential approval and publication in the Official
Gazette for its effectivity.
It hardly need be said that the Commission's interpretation of the amendment embodied in its
Circular No. 22, is correct. The express elimination among the exemptions excluded in the old
law, of all bonuses, allowances and overtime pay in the determination of the "compensation"
paid to employees makes it imperative that such bonuses and overtime pay must now be included
in the employee's remuneration in pursuance of the amendatory law. It is true that in previous
cases, this Court has held that bonus is not demandable because it is not part of the wage, salary,
or compensation of the employee. But the question in the instant case is not whether bonus is
demandable or not as part of compensation, but whether, after the employer does, in fact, give or
pay bonus to his employees, such bonuses shall be considered compensation under the Social
Security Act after they have been received by the employees. While it is true that terms or words
are to be interpreted in accordance with their well-accepted meaning in law, nevertheless, when
such term or word is specifically defined in a particular law, such interpretation must be adopted
in enforcing that particular law, for it can not be gainsaid that a particular phrase or term may
have one meaning for one purpose and another meaning for some other purpose. Such is the case
that is now before us. Republic Act 1161 specifically defined what "compensation" should mean
"For the purposes of this Act". Republic Act 1792 amended such definition by deleting same
exemptions authorized in the original Act. By virtue of this express substantial change in the
phraseology of the law, whatever prior executive or judicial construction may have been given to
the phrase in question should give way to the clear mandate of the new law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs
against appellant. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon
and De Leon, JJ., concur.

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