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Much Waited Judgment on Consideration Issue in NI Act Case
After a long struggle, finally a positive judgment has come exploring the consideration issue
in NI Act case.
It was held that merely, because the draweer issued notice to the bank for stoppage of the
payment will not preclude an action under section 138 of the Act by the drawer or the holder
of a cheque in due course. A person issuing the cheque cannot escape liability even if there is
a stoppage of payment of cheque, unless he disproves the same for the other reasons. In case
a cheque issued by a person in favour of another is dishonoured by the bank for want of
funds, the holder of the cheque is entitled to the amount as reflected in the cheque since
cheque is a negotiable instrument governed under the Act. Once there is admission of the
execution of the cheque or the same is proved to have been executed, the presumption under
section 118(a) of the Act is raised that it is supported by consideration. The category of “stop
payment cheque” would be subject to rebuttal and hence it would be an offence only if the
drawer of the cheque fails to discharge the burden of rebuttal.
The accused person can prove the non-existence of a consideration by raising a probable
defence. If the accused discharges the initial onus of prove showing that the existence of
consideration was improbable or doubtful or the same was illegal, the onus would shift to the
complainant.
He will be obliged to prove it as a matter of fact and upon its failure to prove would disentitle
him to grant of relief on the basis of negotiable instrument. Where the accused person fails to
discharge the initial onus of proof by showing the non existence of the consideration, the
complainant would invariably be held entitled to the benefit of presumption arising under
section 118(a) of the Act in his favour. To disprove the presumption, the accused person has
to bring on record such facts and circumstances upon consideration of which the Court may
either believe that the consideration did not exist or its non existence was so probable that a
prudent man would under the circumstances of the case, shall not act upon the plea that it did
not exist.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BANGLADESH
APPELLATE DIVISION
PRESENT:
Mr. Justice Syed Mahmud Hossain
Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Hasan Foez Siddique
Ms. Justice Zinat Ara
Mr. Justice Md. Nuruzzaman
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.63-66 OF 2017.
(From the judgment and order dated 31.08.2016 passed by the
High Court Division in Criminal Appeal Nos.2116-2119 of 2016.)
Md. Abul Kaher Shahin : -- Appellant.
(In all the cases)
=Versus=
Emran Rashid and another: --Respondents.
(In all the cases)
For the Appellant:
(In all the cases)
Mr. Mansurul Haque
Chowdhury, Senior Advocate,
instructed by Mr. Zainul
Abedin, Advocate-on-Record.
For the Respondent No.1:
(In all the cases)
Mr. Moudud Ahmed, Senior
Advocate, instructed by
Mr.Syed Mahbubar Rahman,
Advocate-on-Record.
For the respondent No.2
(In all the cases)
Mrs. Shirin Afroz ,
Advocate-on-Record.
Date of hearing : 04.12.2019 & 29.01.2020.
Date of Judgment: 18-02-2020.
JUDGMENT
Hasan Foez Siddique, J: These Criminal Appeals being
Appeal Nos. 63-66 of 2017 are directed against the common judgment
and order dated 31.08.2016 passed by the High Court Division in
Criminal Appeal Nos.2116-2119 of 2016 reversing those dated
17.02.2016 passed by the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Sylhet in

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Sessions Case Nos.3079 of 2013, 172 of 2014, 174 of 2014 and 3080
of 2013.
Learned Sessions Judge, Sylhet convicted the respondent No.1
(the respondent) under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act,
1881 ( the Act) in all the cases and sentenced him to suffer simple
imprisonment for a period of 1(one) year and to pay tk.2,00,00,000/-(two
crore) in Session Case No.3079 of 2013, simple imprisonment for a
period of 1(one) year and to pay fine tk.2,00,00,000/- (two crore) in
Session Case No.172 of 2014, simple imprisonment for a period of
1(one) year and to pay fine of tk.3,00,00,000/- (three crore) in Session
Case No.174 of 2014 and simple imprisonment for a period of 1(one)
year and to pay fine of tk.2,00,00,000/- (two crore) in Session Case
No.3080 of 2013.
The complainant, in all the petitions of complaint, stated that the
respondent, in order to pay the demand pursuant to the agreement
No.1897 of 2012 of Gulshan Sub-Registry Office, issued 4(four)
Cheques on 01.07.2013 in favour of the complainant for a sum of
tk.1,00,00,000/- (one crore) vide Cheque No.0559568, tk.1,00,00,000/-
(one crore) vide Cheque No. 0559569, tk.1,00,00,000/- (one crore) vide
cheque No.0559570, tk.1,50,00,000/- (one crore fifty lac) vide cheque
No. 0559571. The complainant presented those 4(four) cheques in the
bank for encashment but all those cheques were dishonoured by the
bank with endorsement that, “Payment stopped by drawer”. The
appellant served notices upon the respondent requesting him to pay the
cheques amount who received the same but he did not pay any amount.

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Thereafter, the complainant appellant observing all legal formalities as
contemplated under the Act had filed four separate complaint cases.
The trial Court convicted and sentenced the respondent under section
138 of the Act and sentenced him as aforesaid. The respondent, after
making statutory deposit, preferred aforesaid 4(four) criminal appeals in
the High Court Division and the High Court Division heard and
disposed of all the appeals analogously and acquitted the respondent of
all the charges by the impugned judgment and order dated 31.08.2016.
Thus, the complainant appellant has preferred these 4(four) appeals in
this Division upon getting leave.
Mr. Mansurul Haque Chowdhury, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant, submits that the High Court
Division committed subsential error in acquitting the respondent
ignoring the spirit and object of the provision section 138 of the Act. He
submits that after deletion of the words “for the discharge in whole or in
part of any debt or other liability” by the Act No. XVII of 2002 , the
Court is empowered to consider the contents of the cheque and cheque
only and it can not examine whether same was issued for the discharge
of any debt or liability or not. He, lastly, submits that the High Court
Division improperly dealt of the issues and points outside the purview of
the registered agreement between the complainant and accused
respondents, thereby erroneously interfered with the order of conviction.
Mr. Chowdhury relied upon the case of Alauddin (Md.) Vs. State,
reported in 24 BLC (AD)139.

4
Mr. Moudud Ahmed, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
respondent, submits that though the words “for the discharge in whole or
in part of any debt or other liability” from section 138 of the Act have
been deleted from the statute, the Court is empowered to examine the
defence case as well as the bonafide of the claim of the drawee. He
submits that the provision of section 138 of the Act is not an isolated
provision and said provision has not been started with non-obstante
clause rather it has been specifically mentioned that the said provision
shall have to be effective, “without prejudice to any other provisions of
this Act”, the High Court Division upon proper appreciation of the
evidence and law related to the case rightly disbelieve the claim of the
appellant. He submits that the provisions of sections 4, 6, 8, 9, 43, 58,
118 and 138 of the Act should be read and consider together to find out
the true intent of legislation and to ascertain the bonafide of the demand
of the drawee and to fix liability of the drawer, the High Court Division
right did so and acquitted the respondent. He further submits that in the
petitions of complaint and evidence, the complainant admitted that the
disputed cheques were issued pursuant to an agreement dated 13.03.2012
but complainant did not act as per terms and conditions of the said
agreement, so, he was not entitled to get any amount on the basis of the
agreement, the High Court Division elaborately discussed and
considered the evidence and found the defence case acceptable and,
thereby, acquitted the respondent. In support of his submission, Mr.
Moudud Ahmed relied upon the case of Shahidul Islam Vs. Bangladesh
and Others , reported in 2 SCOB (2015)HCD-1.

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Admittedly, the respondent No.1 issued 4 different cheques for the
amount mentioned above which were dishonoured with endorsement,
“Payment stopped by drawer”. The complainant, issuing statutory
notices upon the respondent and upon complying all other legal
provisions, filed four separate petitions of complaint. The trial court
framed charge against the respondent No.1 for commission of offence
punishable under section 138 of the Act in each case. The respondent
denied the charges framed against him in all the cases and claimed to be
tried. The prosecution examined 1(one) witness in support of its case and
defence examined none. P.W.1 complainant Md. Abul Kaher Shahin
produced the copy of agreement No.1897 of 2012 dated 13.03.2012
(Exhibit-“5”). From the trend of cross examination of the P.W. 1 it
appears that the defence case was that the complainant did not work as
per terms and conditions of the agreement (exhibit-5) and in the event of
transfer of the property of the respondent, the complainant did not play
any role so he was not entitled to get any commission pursuant to the
agreement and, thus, the respondent stopped the payment of the amount
to the appellant by giving information to the bank.
The important question in this case is that while considering the
charge brought under section 138 of the Act, the Court is empowered to
examine the defence case or not. In other words, whether the Court shall
examine the authenticity of the cheque only or it shall examine and
consider the bonafide of the claim of the complainant and the defence
case appeared in materials available on record.

6
A statute is not enacted to create a vacuum but in a framework of
circumstances so as to give a remedy for a known state of affairs. The
intention for the legislation of the Act has been stated in the preamble
where it has been mentioned; “whereas it is expedient to define and
amend the law relating to promissory notes, bills of exchange and
cheques, it is hereby enacted as follows:” Though the preamble is not of
the same weight as an aid to construction of the section of the Act as are
other relevant enacting words to be found elsewhere in the Act, or even
in related Acts it may be legitimately consulted for the purpose of
solving any ambiguity or fixing the meaning of words which may have
more than one, or of keeping the effect of the Act with its real scope,
whenever the enacting part is in any of these respects open to doubt.
Old Chapter XVII of the Act was titled, “Notaries Public” of the
Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881. The same was substituted by new
Chapter XVII i.e. “On penalties in case of dishour of certain cheques for
insufficiency of funds in the Account” in the year 1994. Perhaps new
chapter XVII was enacted with a view to encourage the culture of use of
cheque and enhancing the credibility of the instrument. In the case of
Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. V. Galaxy Traders and Agencies Ltd ( AIR
2001 SC 676) the Supreme Court of India has referred to the object of
section 138 of the Act holding that the Act was enacted and section 138
of the Act thereof incorporated with a specified object of making a
special provision by incorporating a strict liability so far as the cheque, a
negotiable instrument, is concerned. The law relating to negotiable
instruments is the law of commercial world legislated to facilitiate the

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activities in the trade and commerce making provision of giving sanctity
to the instruments of credit which could be deemed to be convertible into
money and easily passable from one person to another. To achieve the
objectives of the Act, the legislature has, in its wisdom, thought it proper
to make such provisions in the Act for conferring such privileges to the
mercantile instruments contemplated under it and provide special
penalties and procedure in case the obligations under the instruments are
not discharged.
The laws relating to the Act are, therefore, required to be
interpreted in the light of the objects intended to be achieved by it
despite there being deviations from the general law and procedure
provided for the redressal of the grievances to the litigants.
In the case of Alauddin V. State (Supra), while disposing the case
arising out of an application under section 561A of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, we have observed that the offence punishable under section
138 of the Act is not a natural crime like hurt or murder. It is an offence
created by a legal fiction in the statute. It is a civil liability, transformed
into criminal liability under restricted conditions by way of amendment
of the Act. This is to be remembered that the principle “quando lex
aliquid alicui concadit concedere videturet id sine quo res ipsel esse
non potest”, that is, all the course whether civil or criminal, possess, in
the absence of any express provision as inherent in their constitution, all
such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in
course of administration of justice. The intention of the legislature is to
see that the concerned is made to pay the amount to the payee. Indeed,

8
the complainant’s interest lies primordial in recovering the money given
rather than sending the drawer of the cheque to jail.
It is relevant here to reproduce the provisions of Sections 5, 6,
43, 118, 138 and 141 of the Act which are necessary for adjudication
and to draw conclusion over the dispute in hand. The contents of those
sections are as follows:
“Section 5. “Bill of exchange”, - “A “bill of exchange” is an
instrument in writing containing an unconditional order, signed
by the maker, directing a certain person to pay on demand or at a
fixed or determinable future time a certain sum of money only to,
or to the order of, a certain person or to the bearer of the
instrument.”
6. Cheque- A cheque is a bill of exchange drawn on a specified
banker and not expressed to be payable otherwise than on demand.”
43.Negotiabe instrument made, etc., without consideration.- A
negotiable instrument made, drawn, accepted, indorsed or
transferred without consideration, or for a consideration which fails,
creates no obligation of payment between the parties to the
transaction. But if any such party has transferred the instrument with
or without indorsement to a holder for consideration, such holder,
and every subsequent holder deriving title from him, may recover
the amount due on such instrument from the transferor for
consideration or any prior party thereto.
Exception 1.-No party for whose accommodation a negotiable
instrument has been made, drawn, accepted or indorsed can, if he
has paid the amount thereof, recover thereon such amount from any
person who became a party to such instrument for his
accommodation.

9
Exception II.- No party to the instrument who has induced any other
party to make, draw, accept, indorse or transfer the same to him for a
consideration which he has failed to pay or perform in full shall
recover thereon an amount exceeding the value of the consideration
(if any) which he has actually paid or performed.
118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments of consideration.-
Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be
made:
(a) that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for
consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been
accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted,
indorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration;
(b) that every negotiable instrument bearing a date was made or
drawn on such date;
(c) that every accepted bill of exchange was accepted within a
reasonable time after its date and before its maturity;
(d) that every transfer of a negotiable instrument was made before its
maturity;
(e) that the endorsements appearing upon a negotiable instrument
were made in the order in which they appear thereon;
(f) that a lost promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque was duly
stamped;
(g) that the holder of a negotiable instrument is a holder in due
course: provided that, where the instrument has been obtained from
its lawful owner, or from any person in lawful custody thereof, by
means of an offence or fraud, or has been obtained from the maker
or acceptor thereof by means of an offence or fraud, or for unlawful
consideration, the burden of proving that the holder is a holder in
due course lies upon him.
138. [(1)] Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account
maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of
money to another person from out of that account is returned by the
bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the

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credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it
exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an
agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have
committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other
provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term
which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to
[thrice] the amount of the cheque, or with both:
(underlined by us)
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- section (1) and (2),
the holder of the cheque shall retain his right to establish his claim
through civil Court if whole or any part of the value of the cheque
remains unrealized.]
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless-
(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six
months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its
validity, whichever is earlier;
(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case
may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of
money by giving a notice, in writing, to the drawer of the cheque,
within [thirty days] of the receipt of information by him from the
bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid, and
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said
amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder
in due course of
the cheque, within [thirty days] of the receipt of the said notice.
[(1A) The notice required to be served under clasue (b) of sub-
section (1) shall be served in the following manner-
(a) by delivering it to the person on whom it is to be served; or

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(b) by sending it by registered post with acknowledgement due to
that person at his usual or last known place of abode or business in
Bangladesh; or
(c) by publication in a daily Bangla national newspaper having wide
circulation.]
(2) Where any fine is realized under sub-section (1), any amount
upto the face value of the cheque as far as is covered by the fine
realized shall be paid to the holder.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- section (1) and (2),
the holder of the cheque shall retain his right to establish his claim
through civil Court if whole or any part of the value of the cheque
remains unrealized.”
“141. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure , 1898 (Act V of 1898),-
(a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under
section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee
or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque;
(b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which
the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section
138;
[(c) no court inferior to that of a Court of Sessions shall try any
offence punishable under section 138.]]”
A cheque is a bill of exchange drawn on a banker payable on
demand. A bill of exchange is a negotiable instrument in writing
containing instruction to a third party to pay a stated sum of money at a
designated future date or on demand . A cheque on the other hand, is a
bill of exchange drawn on a bank by the holder of an account payable
on demand. Thus, a cheque under section 6 of the Act is also a bill of
exchange but it is drawn on a banker and is payable on demand. An
instrument can be construed as a cheque only if such document satisfies
the requirements under section 5 read with section 6 of the Act. So on

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the facts and circumstances of each case, the Court will have to examine
whether the instrument involved in cheque as defined under section 5
read with section 6 of the Act or not.
Though section 141 of the Act begins with non-obstante clause
carving out an exception to the provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Section 141 (C) of the Act clearly provides that Court of
Sessions shall try the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act.
That is, offence alleged to have committed under section 138 of the Act
is Sessions triable.
Chapter XXIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure consisting of
sections 265A to 265L deal with the procedure to be followed when the
case is tried. Those provisions cast a duty upon the Sessions Judge to
apply his judicial mind in considering the materials and evidence
adduced by the prosecution in order to come to a decision whether
charge framed against accused person is proved or not. If after
recording evidence and on perusal of the same and hearing the parties
the Sessions Court considers that the evidence adduced by the
prosecution are not sufficient and reliable to convict the accused, the
Court shall record order of acquittal under section 265H of the Criminal
Procedure Code. Since the case under section 138 of the Act is Sessions
triable case, the trial Judge shall follow the aforesaid provisions of the
Code of Criminal Procedure for holding trial.
Mr. Moudud Ahmed, learned Senior Counsel, giving more
emphasis upon the words, “without prejudice to any other provisions of
this Act” in section 138 of the Act, submits that those words clearly

13
indicate that section 138 is not an isolated provision and other
provisions of the Act have not been excluded in deciding the case under
section 138 of the Act.
The word “without prejudice to any other provisions of the Act”
mentioned in section 138 clearly indicate that anything contained in the
provisions following this expression is not intended to encapsulate the
generality of the other provisions of the Act. It is well settled that the
enumeration of specific matter “without prejudice to the generality” of a
particular provision does not restrict the general application of that
provision to the matters enumerated because the words “without
prejudice” have the effect of preserving the full effect of the general
provisions and also because the Rule of ejusdeme generis has no
universe application. Those words clearly indicate that the provision of
section 138 did not make any embargo in the application of other
provisions of the Act. In the case of Raja Gowl Rajasima Rao V. State
of AP. reported in AIR 1973 AP236 it has been observed that when
general provisions are followed by certain particular provisions and
when it is stated that the particular provisions are without prejudice to
the general provision the particular provisions do not cut down the
generality of the meaning of the preceding general provisions. That is
the submission made by Mr. Ahmed has got force.
In this case prosecution was launched by the complainant for the
offence punishable under section 138 of the Act basing on an agreement
between the complainant appellant and the respondent pursuant to which
the respondent issued the disputed cheques. Agreement (ext.5) produced

14
by the complainant shows that he claimed the cheques amount as
commission if he is able to sell the respondent’s property.
There were 4 cheques issued by the respondent pursuant to one
agreement which were presented for collection and those were returned
with the endorsement, “payment stopped by drawer”. Merely, because
the draweer issued notice to the bank for stoppage of the payment will
not preclude an action under section 138 of the Act by the drawer or the
holder of a cheque in due course. A person issuing the cheque cannot
escape liability even if there is a stoppage of payment of cheque, unless
he disproves the same for the other reasons. In case a cheque issued by a
person in favour of another is dishonoured by the bank for want of
funds, the holder of the cheque is entitled to the amount as reflected in
the cheque since cheque is a negotiable instrument governed under the
Act. Once there is admission of the execution of the cheque or the same
is proved to have been executed, the presumption under section 118(a)
of the Act is raised that it is supported by consideration. The category of
“stop payment cheque” would be subject to rebuttal and hence it would
be an offence only if the drawer of the cheque fails to discharge the
burden of rebuttal. The accused person can prove the non-existence of a
consideration by raising a probable defence. If the accused discharges
the initial onus of prove showing that the existence of consideration was
improbable or doubtful or the same was illegal, the onus would shift to
the complainant. He will be obliged to prove it as a matter of fact and
upon its failure to prove would disentitle him to grant of relief on the
basis of negotiable instrument. Where the accused person fails to

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discharge the initial onus of proof by showing the non existence of the
consideration, the complainant would invariably be held entitled to the
benefit of presumption arising under section 118(a) of the Act in his
favour . To disprove the presumption, the accused person has to bring on
record such facts and circumstances upon consideration of which the
Court may either believe that the consideration did not exist or its non
existence was so probable that a prudent man would under the
circumstances of the case, shall not act upon the plea that it did not exist.
We find support of the aforesaid views in the cases of Bharat Barrel and
Drum Manufacturer Co. Vs. Amin Chand Payrelal, reported in AIR
1999(SC) 1008 and Mallavarapu Kasivisweswara Rao V. Thandikonda
Ramulu Firm and others reported in AIR 2008 SC 2898.
The Supreme Court of India in Kundan Lal Rallaaram vs.
Custodian Evacuee Property, Bombay (AIR 1961 SC 1316) has declared
that section 118 of the Act lays down a prescribed special rule of
evidence applicable to negotiable instruments. The presumption
contemplated thereunder is one of law which obliges the court to
presume, inter alia, that the negotiable instruments or the endorsement
was made or endorsed for consideration and the burden of proof of
failure of consideration is thrown on the maker of the note or the
endorser as the case may be. Relying upon the law laid down in
Rameshwar Singh Vs. Bajit Lal (AIR 1929 PC 95) approved by Indian
Supreme Court in Hiralal Vs. Badkulal (AIR 1953 SC 225), it was held:
"This section lays down a special rule of evidence
applicable to negotiable instruments. The presumption is one of
law and thereunder a court shall presume, inter alia that the
negotiable instrument or the endorsement was made or endorsed
for consideration. In effect it throws the burden of proof of failure

16
of consideration on the maker of the note or the endorser, as the
case may be. The question is, how the burden can be discharged?
The rules of evidence pertaining to burden of proof are embodied
in Chapter VII of the Evidence Act. The phrase 'burden of proof'
has two meanings - one the burden of proof as a matter of law and
pleading and the other the burden of establishing a case, the
former is fixed as a question of law on the basis of the pleadings
and is unchanged during the entire trial, whereas the latter is not
constant but shifts as soon as a party adduces sufficient evidence
to raise a presumption in his favour. The evidence required to shift
the burden need not necessarily be direct evidence, i.e., oral or
documentary evidence or admissions made by opposite party it
may comprise circumstantial evidence or presumptions of law or
fact.”
When a presumption is rebuttable, it only points out that the party
on whom lies the duty of going forward with evidence, on the fact
presumed and when that party has produced evidence fairly and
reasonably tending to show that the real fact is not as presumed, the
purpose of the presumption is over. To rebut the statutory presumptions
an accused is not expected to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt
as is expected of the complainant in a criminal trial. The accused may
adduce direct evidence to prove that the cheque in question was not
supported by consideration. However, the court need not insist in every
case that the accused should disprove the non-existence of consideration
and debt by leading direct evidence because the existence of negative
evidence is neither possible nor contemplated. At the same time, it is
clear that bare denial of the passing of consideration apparently would
not serve the purpose of the accused. Something which is probable has to

17
be brought on record for getting the burden of proof shifted to the
complainant. The burden of proof of the accused to disprove the
presumption under sections 118 and 138 of the Act is not so heavy. The
preponderance of probability through direct or substantial evidence is
sufficient enough to shift the onus to the complainant. Inference of
preponderance of probabilities can be drawn from the materials on
record and also by reference to the circumstances upon which the party
relies.
It is clear from the agreement exhibit -5 and other materials on
record in the cases that the respondent issued cheques for a sum of taka
4,50,00,000/- (four crore fifty lac) on condition that complainant shall
sell the disputed property of the accused respondent as per market value
and if he is able to sell the same he would be entitled to get a
percentage of consideration of the property sold in view of such act. It is
the defence case that the condition under which the cheque was issued
had not been complied with by the complainant appellant. Thus, the
respondent instructs the bank to stop the payment of cheque,
accordingly, the bank returned the cheques with endorsement “payment
stopped by the drawer”.
The High Court Division being last court of facts upon elaborate
consideration of the evidence both the oral and documentary has come to
the conclusion that the complainant failed to take any step to sell the
property of the respondent, rather the respondent and his brother and

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sister sold the said property to the U.S.A. Embassy and the complainant
did not help the respondent in any way in that regard.
It is relevant here to quote the evidence of the complainant which
he adduced before the trial court as P.W.1 which are as follows:
ÒAvwg AÎ gvgjvi ev`x| Avmvgx Bgivb ikx‡ì mv‡_ 13/3/12 wLªt Zvwi‡L
†iwRtK…Z Memo ev Agreement hvi b¤î 1898/12 | Avmvgx W‡K Dcw¯nZ
bvB| D³ Agreement Gi kZ©vbyhvqx AvMvgx 1/7/13 wLªt Zvwi‡L 1Uv cheque
†`q 1 †KvwU UvKv| hvi b¤î 0559570 Bnv Avgvi bvgxq e¨vsK Account G
weMZ 18/7/13 wLªt Zvwi‡L Rgv †`B| wKš‘ stop payment Gi Kvi‡b
Dishonour nq| 25/7/13 wLªt Zvwi‡L Bnv cybivq Rgv w`‡j Abyi“cfv‡e
Dishonour nq| D³ wel‡q Avwg 13/8/13 wLªt ZvwiL Avmvgxi cªwZ Legal
Notice cª`vb Kwi| wKš‘ Avmvgx cvIbv cwi‡kva bv Kivi Kvi‡Y AÎ gvgjv `v‡qi
Kwi| AZtci 10/9/13 wLªt AÎ gvgjv `v‡qi Kwi| GB bvwjk (Ext- 1) Avgvi
¯^v¶i (Ext-1/1) GB †mB cheque (Ext-2), GB †mB `yBUv Dishonour slips
(Ext-3 series), GB †mB Legal Notice with postal receipts (Ext 4
series), Ges GB Avgvi Memo of Agreement (Ext-5) gyj Kwc `vqiv
3079/13 gvgjvq `vwLj Av‡Q|”
Nowhere in his examination-in-chief the complainant claimed that
in terms of agreement (Ext-5) he had brought the purchaser to sell the
respondent’s property and, accordingly, the same was sold. In his cross
examination, the complainant has admitted the fact saying, “Avgvi
memo. of understanding Gi 1bs k‡Z© D‡j−L Av‡Q 90 Kvh©wè‡mi g‡a¨
positive out coming wb‡q Avm‡Z n‡e| 2(a) k‡Z© D‡j−L Av‡Q evRvi g~‡j¨ †µZv
Avwb‡Z cvwi‡j Avwg (ev`x) Kwgkb cve|Ó (emphasis supplied) He further

19
said that, Ò Kw_Z k‡Z©i Kvi‡Y Avmvgx Ms $ 5.25 M dollar G H plot wewµi
cª¯—ve †`q gvwK©b `yZvev‡mi wbKU Ó | He further said that, Ò03/07/13 wLªt
Zvwi‡L sale deed ( deed of transfer) m¤úv`b I †iwRwó nq| †ZRMuvI Registry
office G registration nq| H deed G Avwg Dcw¯nZ wQjvg bv| Ó That is
accused respondent offered the proposal to sell their property to the
American Embassy and even, at the time of execution and registration of
sale deed, the appellant was not present in the Sub-Registrar’s office.
Ext.5 would create a liability of the respondent to pay commission under
the agreement only when the appellant secured net market price of the
respondent’s property by sale what did not happen in this case. In his
cross examination the complainant has said, “2 (a)k‡Z© D‡j−L Av‡Q evRvi
g~‡j¨ †µZv Avwb‡Z cvwi‡j Avwg (ev`x) Kwgkb cve|” There is no such
averment, in the petition of complaint or in the evidence that the
complainant has stated that he had brought any purchaser who offered
market price of the property. From the evidence quoted above it appears
that the condition under which the cheques were issued was not fulfilled
by the complainant appellant. Thus, the respondent instructed the bank
not to encash the impugned cheques. Accordingly, the bank returned the
cheques with endorsement, “payment stopped by the drawer”. Where the
amount promised shall depend on some other complementary facts or
fulfillment of another promise and if any cheque is issued on that basis,
but that promise is not fulfilled it will not create any obligation on the
part of the drawer of the cheque or any right which can be claimed by
the holder of the cheque. As such dishonesty or fraud cannot be

20
attributed to the respondent in giving stop payment instructions.
Consequently, the question of committing an offence by the accused
respondent punishable under section 138 of the Act does not arise. Thus,
we are of the view that these appeals do not deserve any consideration.
Accordingly, all the appeals are dismissed.
C.J.
J.
J.
J.
The 18th
February, 2020
halim/words- 5418/

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