DerbyCon2016 - Hacking SQL Server on Scale with PowerShellScott Sutherland
This presentation will provide an overview of common SQL Server discovery, privilege escalation, persistence, and data targeting techniques. Techniques will be shared for escalating privileges on SQL Server and associated Active Directory domains. Finally we?ll show how PowerShell automation can be used to execute the SQL Server attacks on scale. All scripts created and demonstrated during the presentation will be open sourced. This should be useful to penetration testers and system administrators trying to gain a better understanding of their SQL Server attack surface and how it can be exploited.
SQL Server Exploitation, Escalation, Pilfering - AppSec USA 2012Scott Sutherland
During this presentation attendees will be introduced to lesser known, yet significant vulnerabilities in SQL Server implementations related to common trust relationships, misconfigurations, and weak default settings. The issues that will be covered are often leveraged by attackers to gain unauthorized access to high value systems, applications, and sensitive data. An overview of each issue, common vectors of attack, and manual techniques will be covered. Finally newly created Metasploit modules and TSQL scripts will be demonstrated that help automate the attacks. This presentation will be valuable to penetration testers who are looking for faster ways to gain access to critical data and systems. Additionally, it should be worth while for developers and database administrators who are interested in gaining a better understanding of how to protect their applications and databases from these attacks.
More security blogs by the authors can be found @
https://www.netspi.com/blog/
2017 Thotcon - Hacking SQL Servers on Scale with PowerShellScott Sutherland
This presentation will provide an overview of common SQL Server discovery, privilege escalation, persistence, and data targeting techniques. Techniques will be shared for escalating privileges on SQL Server and associated Active Directory domains. Finally I’ll show how PowerShell automation can be used to execute the SQL Server attacks on scale with PowerUpSQL. All scripts demonstrated during the presentation are available on GitHub. This should be useful to penetration testers and system administrators trying to gain a better understanding of their SQL Server attack surface and how it can be exploited.
2017 Secure360 - Hacking SQL Server on Scale with PowerShellScott Sutherland
The document discusses hacking SQL Server at scale using PowerShell. It provides an overview of PowerUpSQL, an open source PowerShell toolkit for SQL Server discovery, auditing, and privilege escalation. Key sections include SQL Server discovery techniques using PowerUpSQL, methods for escalating privileges such as from a domain user to SQL login or SQL login to sysadmin, and post-exploitation activities like impersonation. The presentation emphasizes the benefits of using PowerShell for SQL attacks including avoiding detection by running commands in memory and leveraging existing trusted tools.
TROOPERS 20 - SQL Server Hacking Tips for Active Directory EnvironmentsScott Sutherland
During this presentation, I’ll cover common ways to target, exploit, and escalate domain privileges through SQL Servers in Active Directory environments. I’ll also share a msbuild.exe project file that can be used as an offensive SQL Client during red team engagements when tools like PowerUpSQL are too overt.
Where there is Active Directory, there are SQL Servers. In dynamic enterprise environments it’s common to see both platforms suffer from misconfigurations that lead to unauthorized system and sensitive data access. During this presentation, I’ll cover common ways to target, exploit, and escalate domain privileges through SQL Servers in Active Directory environments. I’ll also share a msbuild.exe project file that can be used as an offensive SQL Client during red team engagements when tools like PowerUpSQL are too overt.
2017 Q1 Arcticcon - Meet Up - Adventures in Adversarial EmulationScott Sutherland
This presentation provides an overview off common adversarial emulation approaches along with attack and detection trends. It should be interesting to penetration testers and professionals in security operations roles.
PowerUpSQL - 2018 Blackhat USA Arsenal PresentationScott Sutherland
This is the presentation we provided at the 2018 Blackhat USA Arsenal to introduce PowerUpSQL. PowerUpSQL includes functions that support SQL Server discovery, weak configuration auditing, privilege escalation on scale, and post exploitation actions such as OS command execution. It is intended to be used during internal penetration tests and red team engagements. However, PowerUpSQL also includes many functions that can be used by administrators to quickly inventory the SQL Servers in their ADS domain and perform common threat hunting tasks related to SQL Server. This should be interesting to red, blue, and purple teams interested in automating day to day tasks involving SQL Server.
More information can be found at:
https://github.com/NetSPI/PowerUpSQL/wiki
2018 Student360 - Beyond xp_cmdshell - Owning the Empire Through SQL ServerScott Sutherland
During this presentation, we’ll cover interesting techniques for executing operating system commands through SQL Server that can be used to avoid detection and maintain persistence during red team engagements. We’ll also talk about automating attacks through PowerShell Empire and PowerUpSQL. This will include a review of command execution through custom extended stored procedures, CLR assemblies, WMI providers, R scripts, python scripts, agent jobs, and custom ole objects. We’ll also dig into some new integrations with PowerShell Empire. All code and slide decks will be released during the presentation. This should be interesting to blue teamers looking for a faster way to test their detective control capabilities and red teamers looking for a practical way to avoid detection while trying to maintain access to their target environments.
Secure360 - Beyond xp cmdshell - Owning the Empire through SQL ServerScott Sutherland
During this presentation, we’ll cover interesting techniques for executing operating system commands through SQL Server that can be used to avoid detection and maintain persistence during red team engagements. We’ll also talk about automating attacks through PowerShell Empire and PowerUpSQL. This will include a review of command execution through custom extended stored procedures, CLR assemblies, WMI providers, R scripts, python scripts, agent jobs, and custom ole objects. We’ll also dig into some new integrations with PowerShell Empire. All code and slide decks will be released during the presentation. This should be interesting to blue teamers looking for a faster way to test their detective control capabilities and red teamers looking for a practical way to avoid detection while trying to maintain access to their target environments.
Beyond XP_CMDSHELL: Owning the Empire Through SQL ServerNetSPI
Scott Sutherland and Alexander Leary present at Secure360 Twin Cities 2018 on Owning the Empire Through SQL Server.
Presentation includes five objectives:
- Get Access
- Hide from Audit Controls
- Execute OS Commands
- Use SQL Server as a breach head
- Detect OS Comment Execution
Questions? Contact @0xbadjuju or @_nullbind on Twitter.
Beyond xp_cmdshell: Owning the Empire through SQL ServerScott Sutherland
During this presentation, we’ll cover interesting techniques for executing operating system commands through SQL Server that can be used to avoid detection and maintain persistence during red team engagements. We’ll also talk about automating attacks through PowerShell Empire and PowerUpSQL. This will include a review of command execution through custom extended stored procedures, CLR assemblies, WMI providers, R scripts, python scripts, agent jobs, and custom ole objects. We’ll also dig into some new integrations with PowerShell Empire. All code and slide decks will be released during the presentation.
This should be interesting to blue teamers looking for a faster way to test their detective control capabilities and red teamers looking for a practical way to avoid detection while trying to maintain access to their target environments.
10 Deadly Sins of SQL Server Configuration - APPSEC CALIFORNIA 2015Scott Sutherland
This presentation will cover 10 common weak SQL Server configurations and the practical attacks that help hackers gain unauthorized access to data, applications, and systems. This will include a few demonstrations of the techniques that are being used during real-world attacks and penetration tests. This should be interesting to developers, new database admins, and aspiring penetration testers looking to gain a better understanding of the risks associated with weak SQL Server configurations.
Full Video Presentation: http://youtu.be/SIeMz6gCK3Q
This presentation will provide an overview of common methods that can be used to obtain clear text credentials from Microsoft products such as Windows, IIS, and SQL Server. It also provides an overview of the proof of concept script used to recover MSSQL Linked Server passwords.
Relevant blog links have been provided below.
https://www.netspi.com/blog/entryid/215/decrypting-iis-passwords-to-break-out-of-the-dmz-part-1
https://www.netspi.com/blog/entryid/226/decrypting-iis-passwords-to-break-out-of-the-dmz-part-2
https://www.netspi.com/blog/entryid/221/decrypting-mssql-database-link-server-passwords
More security blogs by the authors can be found @
https://www.netspi.com/blog/
Cassandra provides several security features to protect data including replication for availability, authentication to control access, authorization with role-based access controls, and encryption with SSL. Logs of operations and backups enable recovery from failures or unauthorized access. System tables for authentication and authorization must be replicated to improve security. The default administrative user should be altered to reduce vulnerabilities.
Codemotion 2013: Feliz 15 aniversario, SQL InjectionChema Alonso
Charla de Chema Alonso sobre la historia y evolución de las técnicas de SQL Injection en el evento Codemotion ES del año 2013 que tuvo lugar en la Escuela Universitaria de Informática de la Universidad Politécnica de Madrid
PowerUp - Automating Windows Privilege EscalationWill Schroeder
This slidedeck was given as a firetalk at @BSidesBoston '14, and covers the genesis and implementation of PowerUp, a Powershell tool for Windows privilege escalation.
Training Slides: 302 - Securing Your Cluster With SSLContinuent
This document discusses securing a Tungsten cluster with SSL. It explains what SSL is and why it is used. It then covers deploying SSL for cluster communications and for the Tungsten connector. For the cluster, SSL is enabled in tungsten.ini and certificates are generated and distributed. For the connector in proxy mode, MySQL certificates must be imported into keystores and SSL configured from the connector to the database. SSL can also be configured from the application to the connector. Successful SSL encryption is verified using tcpdump and checking the Tungsten connection status. The next steps will cover the Tungsten dashboard.
Video of the presentation: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8z3h4Uv9YbE
At LinkedIn, we have started to use the Play Framework to build front-end and back-end services at massive scale. Play does things a little differently: it's a Java and Scala web framework, but it doesn't follow the servlet spec; it's fairly new, but it runs on top of robust technologies like Akka and Netty; it uses a thread pool, but it's built for non-blocking I/O and reactive programming; most importantly, it's high performance, but also high productivity. We've found that the Play Framework is one of the few frameworks that is able to maintain the delicate balance of performance, reliability, and developer productivity. In the Java and Scala world, nothing even comes close. In this talk, I'll share what we've learned so far, including details of rapid iteration with Java and Scala, the story behind async I/O on the JVM, support for real time web apps (comet, WebSockets), and integrating Play into a large existing codebase.
Nagios Conference 2014 - Jeff Mendoza - Monitoring Microsoft Azure with NagiosNagios
Jeff Mendoza's presentation on Monitoring Microsoft Azure with Nagios.
The presentation was given during the Nagios World Conference North America held Oct 13th - Oct 16th, 2014 in Saint Paul, MN. For more information on the conference (including photos and videos), visit: http://go.nagios.com/conference
How to scheduled jobs in a cloudera cluster without oozieTiago Simões
This presentation, it’s for everyone that is looking for an oozie alternative to scheduled jobs in a secured Cloudera Cluster.With this, you will be able to add and configure the Airflow Service an manage it with in Cloudera Manager.
Describes in detail the security architecture of Apache Cassandra. We discuss encryption at rest, encryption on the wire, authentication and authorization and securing JMX and management tools
Troy Lea's presentation on Monitoring VMware Virtualization Using vMA.
The presentation was given during the Nagios World Conference North America held Oct 13th - Oct 16th, 2014 in Saint Paul, MN. For more information on the conference (including photos and videos), visit: http://go.nagios.com/conference
How to implement a gdpr solution in a cloudera architectureTiago Simões
Since the implementation of GDPR regulation, all data processors across the world have been struggling to be GDPR compliant and also deal with the new reality in Big Data, that data is constantly drifting and mutating.
In this presentation, the approach will be:
Cloudera architecture
No additional financial cost
Masking & Encrypting
In a dynamic infrastructure world, let's stop pretending credentials aren't public knowledge in an organization and just assume that they have already been leaked, now what?
Oracle security 02-administering user securityZhaoyang Wang
This document discusses administering user security in an Oracle database. It covers how to create and manage database user accounts, including authenticating users and assigning privileges. It also covers creating and managing roles to simplify privilege management, and creating profiles to implement password security and control resource usage. Profiles allow enforcing standards for password complexity, aging, locking accounts, and limiting resource consumption. The document stresses applying the principle of least privilege and separating administrative duties for security.
Tracing allows you to see the path a query takes through the Cassandra cluster. It shows details like which nodes are queried, how long each step takes, and can help identify performance bottlenecks. The tracing information can be accessed via the Java driver, cqlsh, or DevCenter and provides a detailed timeline of query execution. Reviewing traces is recommended during development to catch unexpected query behavior.
Attack All the Layers: What's Working during Pentests (OWASP NYC)Scott Sutherland
This presentation is intended to provide an overview of vulnerabilities and attack techniques that are popular in penetration testing at the moment. Vulnerabilities related to the application, network, and server layers will be covered along with current anti-virus bypass and privilege escalation techniques used by attackers and penetration testers. This presentation should be interesting to security professionals and system administrators looking for more insight into real world attacks.
This is the version modified for the OWASP meeting in June of 2014.
AMSI: How Windows 10 Plans to Stop Script-Based Attacks and How Well It Does ItNikhil Mittal
The talk I gave at Black Hat USA 2016 on Anti Malware Scan Interface. The talk looks at what good AMSI brings to Windows 10 and various methods of avoiding/bypassing it.
2018 Student360 - Beyond xp_cmdshell - Owning the Empire Through SQL ServerScott Sutherland
During this presentation, we’ll cover interesting techniques for executing operating system commands through SQL Server that can be used to avoid detection and maintain persistence during red team engagements. We’ll also talk about automating attacks through PowerShell Empire and PowerUpSQL. This will include a review of command execution through custom extended stored procedures, CLR assemblies, WMI providers, R scripts, python scripts, agent jobs, and custom ole objects. We’ll also dig into some new integrations with PowerShell Empire. All code and slide decks will be released during the presentation. This should be interesting to blue teamers looking for a faster way to test their detective control capabilities and red teamers looking for a practical way to avoid detection while trying to maintain access to their target environments.
Secure360 - Beyond xp cmdshell - Owning the Empire through SQL ServerScott Sutherland
During this presentation, we’ll cover interesting techniques for executing operating system commands through SQL Server that can be used to avoid detection and maintain persistence during red team engagements. We’ll also talk about automating attacks through PowerShell Empire and PowerUpSQL. This will include a review of command execution through custom extended stored procedures, CLR assemblies, WMI providers, R scripts, python scripts, agent jobs, and custom ole objects. We’ll also dig into some new integrations with PowerShell Empire. All code and slide decks will be released during the presentation. This should be interesting to blue teamers looking for a faster way to test their detective control capabilities and red teamers looking for a practical way to avoid detection while trying to maintain access to their target environments.
Beyond XP_CMDSHELL: Owning the Empire Through SQL ServerNetSPI
Scott Sutherland and Alexander Leary present at Secure360 Twin Cities 2018 on Owning the Empire Through SQL Server.
Presentation includes five objectives:
- Get Access
- Hide from Audit Controls
- Execute OS Commands
- Use SQL Server as a breach head
- Detect OS Comment Execution
Questions? Contact @0xbadjuju or @_nullbind on Twitter.
Beyond xp_cmdshell: Owning the Empire through SQL ServerScott Sutherland
During this presentation, we’ll cover interesting techniques for executing operating system commands through SQL Server that can be used to avoid detection and maintain persistence during red team engagements. We’ll also talk about automating attacks through PowerShell Empire and PowerUpSQL. This will include a review of command execution through custom extended stored procedures, CLR assemblies, WMI providers, R scripts, python scripts, agent jobs, and custom ole objects. We’ll also dig into some new integrations with PowerShell Empire. All code and slide decks will be released during the presentation.
This should be interesting to blue teamers looking for a faster way to test their detective control capabilities and red teamers looking for a practical way to avoid detection while trying to maintain access to their target environments.
10 Deadly Sins of SQL Server Configuration - APPSEC CALIFORNIA 2015Scott Sutherland
This presentation will cover 10 common weak SQL Server configurations and the practical attacks that help hackers gain unauthorized access to data, applications, and systems. This will include a few demonstrations of the techniques that are being used during real-world attacks and penetration tests. This should be interesting to developers, new database admins, and aspiring penetration testers looking to gain a better understanding of the risks associated with weak SQL Server configurations.
Full Video Presentation: http://youtu.be/SIeMz6gCK3Q
This presentation will provide an overview of common methods that can be used to obtain clear text credentials from Microsoft products such as Windows, IIS, and SQL Server. It also provides an overview of the proof of concept script used to recover MSSQL Linked Server passwords.
Relevant blog links have been provided below.
https://www.netspi.com/blog/entryid/215/decrypting-iis-passwords-to-break-out-of-the-dmz-part-1
https://www.netspi.com/blog/entryid/226/decrypting-iis-passwords-to-break-out-of-the-dmz-part-2
https://www.netspi.com/blog/entryid/221/decrypting-mssql-database-link-server-passwords
More security blogs by the authors can be found @
https://www.netspi.com/blog/
Cassandra provides several security features to protect data including replication for availability, authentication to control access, authorization with role-based access controls, and encryption with SSL. Logs of operations and backups enable recovery from failures or unauthorized access. System tables for authentication and authorization must be replicated to improve security. The default administrative user should be altered to reduce vulnerabilities.
Codemotion 2013: Feliz 15 aniversario, SQL InjectionChema Alonso
Charla de Chema Alonso sobre la historia y evolución de las técnicas de SQL Injection en el evento Codemotion ES del año 2013 que tuvo lugar en la Escuela Universitaria de Informática de la Universidad Politécnica de Madrid
PowerUp - Automating Windows Privilege EscalationWill Schroeder
This slidedeck was given as a firetalk at @BSidesBoston '14, and covers the genesis and implementation of PowerUp, a Powershell tool for Windows privilege escalation.
Training Slides: 302 - Securing Your Cluster With SSLContinuent
This document discusses securing a Tungsten cluster with SSL. It explains what SSL is and why it is used. It then covers deploying SSL for cluster communications and for the Tungsten connector. For the cluster, SSL is enabled in tungsten.ini and certificates are generated and distributed. For the connector in proxy mode, MySQL certificates must be imported into keystores and SSL configured from the connector to the database. SSL can also be configured from the application to the connector. Successful SSL encryption is verified using tcpdump and checking the Tungsten connection status. The next steps will cover the Tungsten dashboard.
Video of the presentation: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8z3h4Uv9YbE
At LinkedIn, we have started to use the Play Framework to build front-end and back-end services at massive scale. Play does things a little differently: it's a Java and Scala web framework, but it doesn't follow the servlet spec; it's fairly new, but it runs on top of robust technologies like Akka and Netty; it uses a thread pool, but it's built for non-blocking I/O and reactive programming; most importantly, it's high performance, but also high productivity. We've found that the Play Framework is one of the few frameworks that is able to maintain the delicate balance of performance, reliability, and developer productivity. In the Java and Scala world, nothing even comes close. In this talk, I'll share what we've learned so far, including details of rapid iteration with Java and Scala, the story behind async I/O on the JVM, support for real time web apps (comet, WebSockets), and integrating Play into a large existing codebase.
Nagios Conference 2014 - Jeff Mendoza - Monitoring Microsoft Azure with NagiosNagios
Jeff Mendoza's presentation on Monitoring Microsoft Azure with Nagios.
The presentation was given during the Nagios World Conference North America held Oct 13th - Oct 16th, 2014 in Saint Paul, MN. For more information on the conference (including photos and videos), visit: http://go.nagios.com/conference
How to scheduled jobs in a cloudera cluster without oozieTiago Simões
This presentation, it’s for everyone that is looking for an oozie alternative to scheduled jobs in a secured Cloudera Cluster.With this, you will be able to add and configure the Airflow Service an manage it with in Cloudera Manager.
Describes in detail the security architecture of Apache Cassandra. We discuss encryption at rest, encryption on the wire, authentication and authorization and securing JMX and management tools
Troy Lea's presentation on Monitoring VMware Virtualization Using vMA.
The presentation was given during the Nagios World Conference North America held Oct 13th - Oct 16th, 2014 in Saint Paul, MN. For more information on the conference (including photos and videos), visit: http://go.nagios.com/conference
How to implement a gdpr solution in a cloudera architectureTiago Simões
Since the implementation of GDPR regulation, all data processors across the world have been struggling to be GDPR compliant and also deal with the new reality in Big Data, that data is constantly drifting and mutating.
In this presentation, the approach will be:
Cloudera architecture
No additional financial cost
Masking & Encrypting
In a dynamic infrastructure world, let's stop pretending credentials aren't public knowledge in an organization and just assume that they have already been leaked, now what?
Oracle security 02-administering user securityZhaoyang Wang
This document discusses administering user security in an Oracle database. It covers how to create and manage database user accounts, including authenticating users and assigning privileges. It also covers creating and managing roles to simplify privilege management, and creating profiles to implement password security and control resource usage. Profiles allow enforcing standards for password complexity, aging, locking accounts, and limiting resource consumption. The document stresses applying the principle of least privilege and separating administrative duties for security.
Tracing allows you to see the path a query takes through the Cassandra cluster. It shows details like which nodes are queried, how long each step takes, and can help identify performance bottlenecks. The tracing information can be accessed via the Java driver, cqlsh, or DevCenter and provides a detailed timeline of query execution. Reviewing traces is recommended during development to catch unexpected query behavior.
Attack All the Layers: What's Working during Pentests (OWASP NYC)Scott Sutherland
This presentation is intended to provide an overview of vulnerabilities and attack techniques that are popular in penetration testing at the moment. Vulnerabilities related to the application, network, and server layers will be covered along with current anti-virus bypass and privilege escalation techniques used by attackers and penetration testers. This presentation should be interesting to security professionals and system administrators looking for more insight into real world attacks.
This is the version modified for the OWASP meeting in June of 2014.
AMSI: How Windows 10 Plans to Stop Script-Based Attacks and How Well It Does ItNikhil Mittal
The talk I gave at Black Hat USA 2016 on Anti Malware Scan Interface. The talk looks at what good AMSI brings to Windows 10 and various methods of avoiding/bypassing it.
2017 OWASP SanFran March Meetup - Hacking SQL Server on Scale with PowerShellScott Sutherland
This presentation will provide an overview of common SQL Server discovery, privilege escalation, persistence, and data targeting techniques. Techniques will be shared for escalating privileges on SQL Server and associated Active Directory domains. Finally I’ll show how PowerShell automation can be used to execute the SQL Server attacks on scale with PowerUpSQL. All scripts demonstrated during the presentation are available on GitHub. This should be useful to penetration testers and system administrators trying to gain a better understanding of their SQL Server attack surface and how it can be exploited.
Sections Updated for OWASP Meeting:
- SQL Server Link Crawling
- UNC path injection targets
- Command execution details
A database is a structured collection of information that can be searched. It contains records made up of fields, which are individual items of data like names, dates, or numbers. Databases allow users to search for records that match criteria and sort records into a specific order. During a mail merge, information from a database is combined with a standard word-processed letter to automatically create customized letters for each record in the database.
Windows: Having its ass kicked by Puppet and Powershell since 2012 #PuppetConfPaul Stack
This document discusses how infrastructure as code and configuration management tools like Puppet and PowerShell have improved Windows server management since 2012. It argues that code is better than manual processes for managing servers. PowerShell allows automating tasks on Windows, while Puppet can manage Windows resources through a declarative language. Using Puppet and PowerShell together provides an effective way to automate and standardize Windows server configurations.
PASS VC: SQL Server Performance Monitoring and BaseliningPARIKSHIT SAVJANI
When managing large scale deployment of SQL Server instances, it is important for DBAs to setup proactive monitoring & establishing performance baselines which helps in performance tuning, capacity planning & identifying workload patterns. Attend this session to learn what data should a DBAs collect & how, to monitor & establish performance baseline in SQL Server.
DerbyCon 2016
Nick Landers @monoxgas
External mail via Exchange is one of the most common services offered by organizations today. The Microsoft Office suite is even more prevalent making Outlook the most common mail client around. This talk focuses on the abuse of these two products for the purpose of gaining code execution inside remote networks. Subjects include E-Mail and password scraping, OWA/EWS brute forcing techniques, and new research into abusing Outlook mail rules for remote code execution. Learn about the capabilities of client side rules, the underlying Windows APIs, and how to modify these rule objects to make phishing attacks obsolete. Security Consultant at Silent Break Security. Professional Hacker for 2 years. Current work involves writing custom malware and researching unique attack vectors that abuse functionality in windows environments.
Up is Down, Black is White: Using SCCM for Wrong and Rightenigma0x3
This document discusses using Microsoft's System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM) for both offensive and defensive purposes. It introduces PowerSCCM, a PowerShell toolkit for interacting with SCCM. PowerSCCM can be used to create malicious applications and deploy them to targeted collections of machines. It also provides cmdlets for hunting for compromised users and systems. The document recommends tuning SCCM for improved host-based security monitoring and inventory capabilities. It provides examples of using SCCM data for incident response and hunting activities on the network.
This document provides an overview of security topics related to Hadoop. It discusses what Hadoop is, common versions and distributions. It outlines some key security risks like default passwords, open ports, old versions with vulnerabilities. It also summarizes encryption options for data in motion and at rest, and security solutions like Knox and Ranger for centralized authorization policies.
The Travelling Pentester: Diaries of the Shortest Path to CompromiseWill Schroeder
The document summarizes the work of three pentesters who use tools like BloodHound and PowerView to analyze attack paths within Active Directory environments. It describes how they use these tools to hunt for logged-in users, enumerate administrative privileges, discover group memberships, and analyze object ACLs to escalate privileges and compromise systems. It also discusses defenses organizations can implement and how increased endpoint telemetry could help detect and prevent their techniques.
This is the talk given at NullCon 2017. This talk give s history of the Veil Framework, and showcases the differences between 2.0 and the newly released 3.0. Veil 3.0 is released in this talk
SQL injection attacks occur when malicious SQL statements are injected into an application's existing SQL commands, potentially allowing attackers to alter or destroy database contents. Attackers can exploit vulnerabilities like unvalidated user input or direct use of dynamic SQL queries. To prevent this, developers should follow practices like input validation, parameterizing queries, and limiting database account privileges to only what is necessary.
This document provides a summary of a session on SQL Server security and authentication using ADO.NET. The session discusses SQL Server authentication modes including Windows authentication and SQL Server authentication. It demonstrates how to programmatically manage SQL Server logins, roles, and permissions from VB.NET. The document also covers application security techniques using views, stored procedures and SQL Server application roles to restrict database access.
This document discusses SQL injection and the sqlmap tool for automating the process of detecting and exploiting SQL injection flaws. Some key points:
- SQL is a programming language used to manage data in relational database management systems. SQL injection occurs when malicious SQL code is inserted into an entry field for execution, potentially enabling control of the entire database.
- Sqlmap automates the process of detecting and exploiting SQL injection vulnerabilities. It has capabilities like database fingerprinting, data extraction, accessing the underlying file system, and executing commands on the operating system via SQL injections.
- The tool can detect injectable parameters, generate automatic payloads to retrieve data, fingerprint the database management system, and provide an interactive SQL shell
A short course I had few weeks ago that I wanted to share with you. All the MySQL issues from basics to experts: tuning, ERD, DDL, DML, Backup, Security
This document discusses various ways to invoke PowerShell from SQL Server and the SQL command line to perform administrative tasks. It provides examples of loading the SQL Server and SQL Analysis Services management objects assemblies to allow administration of SQL Server instances from PowerShell. The document also covers considerations for using SQL authentication in PowerShell and provides some example PowerShell commands for querying SQL Server processes and customizing the output.
This workshop handles the concept of using Object Relational Mapping features from ColdFusion 9 in AIR to synchronise your local database with a remote server without writing any SQL code.
WWHF 2018 - Using PowerUpSQL and goddi for Active Directory Information Gathe...ThomasElling1
This document discusses tools for Active Directory information gathering called PowerUpSQL and goddi. PowerUpSQL uses SQL Server and the OLE DB provider to query Active Directory via LDAP, while goddi uses Go and the LDAP library to directly query Active Directory. The document provides overviews of both tools, including how to install them, the methodology behind how they gather information, and demos of them in use. It also discusses some of the limitations and optimizations of each tool.
DEF CON 31 Demo Labs 2023: Abusing Microsoft SQL Server with SQLReconSanjiv Kawa
Video: https://youtu.be/LsYSePobFWA
Conference: DEF CON 31
Presentation Title: Abusing Microsoft SQL Server with SQLRecon
Presenter: Sanjiv Kawa
The document discusses SQL Server security and authentication methods when connecting from an application using ADO.NET, including SQL Server authentication with usernames and passwords versus Windows authentication using Windows credentials, as well as ways to control access to databases and objects using roles, permissions, and application roles within SQL Server. It also provides examples of managing authentication and security programmatically using Transact-SQL, SQL-DMO, and ADO.NET code samples.
SQL Server R Services: What Every SQL Professional Should KnowBob Ward
SQL Server 2016 introduces a new platform for building intelligent, advanced analytic applications called SQL Server R Services. This session is for the SQL Server Database professional to learn more about this technology and its impact on managing a SQL Server environment. We will cover the basics of this technology but also look at how it works, troubleshooting topics, and even usage case scenarios. You don't have to be a data scientist to understand SQL Server R Services but you need to know how this works so come upgrade you career by learning more about SQL Server and advanced analytics.
This document provides an overview of new features in SQL Server 2005, including SQLCLR which allows writing functions, procedures and triggers in .NET languages. It discusses how to install and debug SQLCLR assemblies, and create user-defined data types and aggregates that can extend the functionality of SQL Server. Key enhancements to T-SQL are also summarized, such as common table expressions, ranking commands, and exception handling.
Performance testing as part of Agile - Continius Delivery solutionSergey Radov
This presentaion provides steps that are necessary for implementing of performace test solution for nightly build validation for regression.
It doesn't have detailed instructions.
If detailed steps are needed contact the author.
Brief introduction into SQL injection attack scenariosPayampardaz
This document discusses SQL injection vulnerabilities and techniques. It explains how web applications interact with databases by passing user-input as parameters in SQL queries. SQL injection occurs when user-input containing SQL code is not sanitized. The document outlines various SQL injection payloads and techniques, such as terminating strings, commenting queries, accessing stored procedures and server variables. It also provides recommendations for secure coding practices and database hardening.
common_schema, DBA's framework for MySQLShlomi Noach
An introduction to common_schema, looking at the concepts behind the project and some notable features.
Slides from my talk at Percona Live London, Dec 2012
The document discusses SQL Server security attacks and defenses. It outlines how attackers can fingerprint servers, acquire user accounts through brute force or SQL injection, and escalate privileges. It then provides recommendations for securing SQL Server deployments through configuration hardening, input validation, patching, and access control best practices.
This document provides techniques for escalating privileges on Windows systems. It begins with an overview of tricks that can grant escalated privileges to users or administrators. Specific techniques discussed include exploiting misconfigurations, using keyloggers, searching for credentials on systems, exploiting Group Policy Preferences files, unattended installation files, Windows Deployment Services, binary path modifications, service configuration issues, and registry permissions problems. The document then covers methods for escalating from an administrative user to SYSTEM level privileges like using Metasploit exploits, Sysinternals tools, binary replacement, and WMIC. It concludes with sections on achieving persistence and bypassing authentication.
A follow on to the Encyclopedia Of Windows Privilege Escalation published by InsomniaSec at Ruxcon 2011, this talk is aimed at detailing not just escalation from user to admin and admin to system, but persistence and forced authentication as well as a few other treats.
This document provides an introduction to PowerShell for database developers. It begins by stating the goals of the presentation which are to amaze with PowerShell capabilities, convince that PowerShell is needed, provide a basic understanding of PowerShell programming, and point to support resources. It then provides an overview of what PowerShell is, including its history and why Windows needed a shell. It discusses PowerShell concepts like cmdlets, variables, operators, loops, and functions. It also provides examples of PowerShell scripts and best practices. Throughout it emphasizes PowerShell's power and integration with Windows and databases.
Understanding and preventing sql injection attacksKevin Kline
SQL Injection attacks are one of the most common hacker tricks used on the web. Learn what a SQL injection attack is and why you should be concerned about them.
This all new session is loaded with demos. You’ll get to witness first-hand several different types of SQL injection attacks, how to find them, and how to block them.
Hunting SMB Shares with Data, Graphs, Charts, and LLMs (SO-CON 2025)Scott Sutherland
Every hacker has a story about abusing SMB shares, but it’s an attack surface that cybersecurity teams still struggle to understand, manage, and defend. In this presentation, we’ll cover simple but effective data analysis techniques to identify, understand, attack, and remediate SMB shares in Active Directory environments. The session will include demos showcasing how these techniques can be applied using PowerShell, Neo4j, Cytoscape, and PowerHuntShares.
Into the Abyss: Evaluating Active Directory SMB Shares on Scale (Secure360)Scott Sutherland
During this presentation, we’ll talk about how to identify and triage the large volume of excessive access most standard Active Directory users have to common network shares. Over the course of hundreds of internal network penetration tests and audits one theme has stood out, vulnerability management programs do not adequately identify excessive share privileges. The excessive shares have become a risk for data exposure, ransomware attacks, and privilege escalation within enterprise environments. During this discussion, we will talk about why this gap exists, how to inventory excessive share across an entire Active Directory domain quickly, and how to triage those results to help reduce risk for your organization.
How to Build and Validate Ransomware Attack Detections (Secure360)Scott Sutherland
Ransomware is a strategy for adversaries to make money – a strategy that’s proven successful. During this presentation, we will cover how ransomware works, ransomware trends to watch, best practices for prevention, and more. At the core of the discussion, Scott will explain how to build detections for common tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by ransomware families and how to validate they work, ongoing, as part of the larger security program. Participants will leave this webinar with actionable advice to ensure their organization is more resilient to ever-evolving ransomware attacks.
This presentation is intended to provide an overview of vulnerabilities and attack techniques that are popular in penetration testing at the moment. This talk includes real-world examples of attacks that they use on a daily basis, and some reflections on what techniques have changed over the last year. Vulnerabilities related to the application, network, and server layers will all be covered along with current anti-virus bypass and privilege escalation techniques used by attackers and penetration testers. This presentation should be interesting to security professionals and system administrators looking for more insight into real world attacks.
More security blogs by the authors can be found @
https://www.netspi.com/blog/
This presentation will provide an overview of what a penetration test is, why companies pay for them, and what role they play in most IT security programs. It will also include a brief overview of the common skill sets and tools used by today’s security professionals. Finally, it will offer some basic advice for getting started in penetration testing. This should be interesting to aspiring pentesters trying to gain a better understanding of how penetration testing fits into the larger IT security world.
Additional resources can be found in the blog below:
https://www.netspi.com/blog/entryid/140/resources-for-aspiring-penetration-testers
More security blogs by the authors can be found @
https://www.netspi.com/blog/
This presentation is intended to provide an overview of vulnerabilities and attack techniques that are popular in penetration testing at the moment. Vulnerabilities related to the application, network, and server layers will be covered along with current anti-virus bypass and privilege escalation techniques used by attackers and penetration testers. This presentation should be interesting to security professionals and system administrators looking for more insight into real world attacks. Karl Fosaaen and I put this together for Secure 360 in Minneapolis. We hope you enjoy it.
More security blogs by the authors can be found @
https://www.netspi.com/blog/
This presentation will take a high level look at the malware life cycle and the role that both hackers and IT professionals play in it. It should be interesting to IT professionals as well as individuals interested in learning more about the general approach used by hackers to gain unauthorized access to systems, applications, and sensitive data.
More security blogs by the authors can be found @
https://www.netspi.com/blog/
Scott Sutherland discusses penetration testing thick applications. He explains why these applications create unique risks compared to web applications due to users having full control over the application environment. This allows attacks on trusted components, exposure of data and admin functions, and privilege escalation. Sutherland outlines the goals and process for testing thick applications, including common architectures, accessing the application, and testing the application's GUI, files, registry, network traffic, memory, and configurations to identify vulnerabilities.
In this presentation I will cover the basics of how to perform dictionary attacks against Windows Active Directory accounts safely. Below is an overview of the steps that will be covered:
Identify domains
Enumerate domain controllers
Enumerate users from domain controllers
Enumerate password policy from domain controllers
Perform dictionary attack
More security blogs by the authors can be found @
https://www.netspi.com/blog/
This presentation will provide an overview of what a penetration test is, why companies pay for them, and what role they play in IT security.
More security blogs by the authors can be found @
https://www.netspi.com/blog/
AI Agents in Logistics and Supply Chain Applications Benefits and ImplementationChristine Shepherd
AI agents are reshaping logistics and supply chain operations by enabling automation, predictive insights, and real-time decision-making across key functions such as demand forecasting, inventory management, procurement, transportation, and warehouse operations. Powered by technologies like machine learning, NLP, computer vision, and robotic process automation, these agents deliver significant benefits including cost reduction, improved efficiency, greater visibility, and enhanced adaptability to market changes. While practical use cases show measurable gains in areas like dynamic routing and real-time inventory tracking, successful implementation requires careful integration with existing systems, quality data, and strategic scaling. Despite challenges such as data integration and change management, AI agents offer a strong competitive edge, with widespread industry adoption expected by 2025.
National Fuels Treatments Initiative: Building a Seamless Map of Hazardous Fu...Safe Software
The National Fuels Treatments Initiative (NFT) is transforming wildfire mitigation by creating a standardized map of nationwide fuels treatment locations across all land ownerships in the United States. While existing state and federal systems capture this data in diverse formats, NFT bridges these gaps, delivering the first truly integrated national view. This dataset will be used to measure the implementation of the National Cohesive Wildland Strategy and demonstrate the positive impact of collective investments in hazardous fuels reduction nationwide. In Phase 1, we developed an ETL pipeline template in FME Form, leveraging a schema-agnostic workflow with dynamic feature handling intended for fast roll-out and light maintenance. This was key as the initiative scaled from a few to over fifty contributors nationwide. By directly pulling from agency data stores, oftentimes ArcGIS Feature Services, NFT preserves existing structures, minimizing preparation needs. External mapping tables ensure consistent attribute and domain alignment, while robust change detection processes keep data current and actionable. Now in Phase 2, we’re migrating pipelines to FME Flow to take advantage of advanced scheduling, monitoring dashboards, and automated notifications to streamline operations. Join us to explore how this initiative exemplifies the power of technology, blending FME, ArcGIS Online, and AWS to solve a national business problem with a scalable, automated solution.
Bridging the divide: A conversation on tariffs today in the book industry - T...BookNet Canada
A collaboration-focused conversation on the recently imposed US and Canadian tariffs where speakers shared insights into the current legislative landscape, ongoing advocacy efforts, and recommended next steps. This event was presented in partnership with the Book Industry Study Group.
Link to accompanying resource: https://bnctechforum.ca/sessions/bridging-the-divide-a-conversation-on-tariffs-today-in-the-book-industry/
Presented by BookNet Canada and the Book Industry Study Group on May 29, 2025 with support from the Department of Canadian Heritage.
Domino IQ – Was Sie erwartet, erste Schritte und Anwendungsfällepanagenda
Webinar Recording: https://www.panagenda.com/webinars/domino-iq-was-sie-erwartet-erste-schritte-und-anwendungsfalle/
HCL Domino iQ Server – Vom Ideenportal zur implementierten Funktion. Entdecken Sie, was es ist, was es nicht ist, und erkunden Sie die Chancen und Herausforderungen, die es bietet.
Wichtige Erkenntnisse
- Was sind Large Language Models (LLMs) und wie stehen sie im Zusammenhang mit Domino iQ
- Wesentliche Voraussetzungen für die Bereitstellung des Domino iQ Servers
- Schritt-für-Schritt-Anleitung zur Einrichtung Ihres Domino iQ Servers
- Teilen und diskutieren Sie Gedanken und Ideen, um das Potenzial von Domino iQ zu maximieren
For the full video of this presentation, please visit: https://www.edge-ai-vision.com/2025/06/state-space-models-vs-transformers-for-ultra-low-power-edge-ai-a-presentation-from-brainchip/
Tony Lewis, Chief Technology Officer at BrainChip, presents the “State-space Models vs. Transformers for Ultra-low-power Edge AI” tutorial at the May 2025 Embedded Vision Summit.
At the embedded edge, choices of language model architectures have profound implications on the ability to meet demanding performance, latency and energy efficiency requirements. In this presentation, Lewis contrasts state-space models (SSMs) with transformers for use in this constrained regime. While transformers rely on a read-write key-value cache, SSMs can be constructed as read-only architectures, enabling the use of novel memory types and reducing power consumption. Furthermore, SSMs require significantly fewer multiply-accumulate units—drastically reducing compute energy and chip area.
New techniques enable distillation-based migration from transformer models such as Llama to SSMs without major performance loss. In latency-sensitive applications, techniques such as precomputing input sequences allow SSMs to achieve sub-100 ms time-to-first-token, enabling real-time interactivity. Lewis presents a detailed side-by-side comparison of these architectures, outlining their trade-offs and opportunities at the extreme edge.
FME Beyond Data Processing Creating A Dartboard Accuracy AppSafe Software
At Nordend, we want to push the boundaries of FME and explore its potential for more creative applications. In our office, we have a dartboard, and while improving our dart-throwing skills was an option, we took a different approach: What if we could use FME to calculate where we should aim to achieve the highest possible score, based on our accuracy? Using FME’s Geometry User parameter, we designed a custom solution. When launching the FME Flow app, the map is now a dartboard. The centre of the map is always fixed on the same area of the world, where we pinned a PNG picture of a dartboard as a basemap through a self-created WMS. This visual setup allowed us to draw polygons—each with three points—where our darts landed, using the Geometry parameter. These polygons get processed through an FME workspace, which translates the coordinates from the map into exact X and Y positions on the dartboard. With this accurate data, we calculate all sorts of statistics: rolling averages, best scores, and even standard deviations. The results get displayed on a dashboard in FME Flow, giving us insights into how we could maximize our scores, based purely on where we actually tend to throw. Join us for a live demonstration of the app! The takeaway? FME isn’t just a powerful data processing tool; with a bit of imagination, it can be used for far more creative and unconventional applications. This project demonstrates that the only limit to what FME can do is the creativity you bring to it.
Trends Artificial Intelligence - Mary MeekerClive Dickens
Mary Meeker’s 2024 AI report highlights a seismic shift in productivity, creativity, and business value driven by generative AI. She charts the rapid adoption of tools like ChatGPT and Midjourney, likening today’s moment to the dawn of the internet. The report emphasizes AI’s impact on knowledge work, software development, and personalized services—while also cautioning about data quality, ethical use, and the human-AI partnership. In short, Meeker sees AI as a transformative force accelerating innovation and redefining how we live and work.
Scaling GenAI Inference From Prototype to Production: Real-World Lessons in S...Anish Kumar
Presented by: Anish Kumar
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/anishkumar/
This lightning talk dives into real-world GenAI projects that scaled from prototype to production using Databricks’ fully managed tools. Facing cost and time constraints, we leveraged four key Databricks features—Workflows, Model Serving, Serverless Compute, and Notebooks—to build an AI inference pipeline processing millions of documents (text and audiobooks).
This approach enables rapid experimentation, easy tuning of GenAI prompts and compute settings, seamless data iteration and efficient quality testing—allowing Data Scientists and Engineers to collaborate effectively. Learn how to design modular, parameterized notebooks that run concurrently, manage dependencies and accelerate AI-driven insights.
Whether you're optimizing AI inference, automating complex data workflows or architecting next-gen serverless AI systems, this session delivers actionable strategies to maximize performance while keeping costs low.
What is Oracle EPM A Guide to Oracle EPM Cloud Everything You Need to KnowSMACT Works
In today's fast-paced business landscape, financial planning and performance management demand powerful tools that deliver accurate insights. Oracle EPM (Enterprise Performance Management) stands as a leading solution for organizations seeking to transform their financial processes. This comprehensive guide explores what Oracle EPM is, its key benefits, and how partnering with the right Oracle EPM consulting team can maximize your investment.
Creating an Accessible Future-How AI-powered Accessibility Testing is Shaping...Impelsys Inc.
Web accessibility is a fundamental principle that strives to make the internet inclusive for all. According to the World Health Organization, over a billion people worldwide live with some form of disability. These individuals face significant challenges when navigating the digital landscape, making the quest for accessible web content more critical than ever.
Enter Artificial Intelligence (AI), a technological marvel with the potential to reshape the way we approach web accessibility. AI offers innovative solutions that can automate processes, enhance user experiences, and ultimately revolutionize web accessibility. In this blog post, we’ll explore how AI is making waves in the world of web accessibility.
Interested in leveling up your JavaScript skills? Join us for our Introduction to TypeScript workshop.
Learn how TypeScript can improve your code with dynamic typing, better tooling, and cleaner architecture. Whether you're a beginner or have some experience with JavaScript, this session will give you a solid foundation in TypeScript and how to integrate it into your projects.
Workshop content:
- What is TypeScript?
- What is the problem with JavaScript?
- Why TypeScript is the solution
- Coding demo
Developing Schemas with FME and Excel - Peak of Data & AI 2025Safe Software
When working with other team members who may not know the Esri GIS platform or may not be database professionals; discussing schema development or changes can be difficult. I have been using Excel to help illustrate and discuss schema design/changes during meetings and it has proven a useful tool to help illustrate how a schema will be built. With just a few extra columns, that Excel file can be sent to FME to create new feature classes/tables. This presentation will go thru the steps needed to accomplish this task and provide some lessons learned and tips/tricks that I use to speed the process.
GIS and FME: The Foundation to Improve the Locate Process of UtilitiesSafe Software
Locate requests is an important activity for utility companies to prevent people who are digging from damaging underground assets. At Energir, locates were historically treated by our internal field technicians. It’s a very intensive and time-sensitive task during the summer season and it has a significant financial and environmental cost. Since locate requests tend to increase from year to year, it became clear that improvements were needed to keep delivering a quality service to requestors and keeping Energir’s assets safe. This presentation will explain how transformative projects done in the past years allowed to start sending locate plans to requestors without the intervention of field technicians. The analysis of the GIS data through FME workbenchs allows to filter some locate request types and process them semi-automatically. However, the experience gained so far shows that this process is limited by the fact that Energir’s is missing precise information about the spatial accuracy. Future plans are to precisely locate most of Energir’s gas network and FME will again be a huge help to integrate all the data that will be produced.
Integration of Utility Data into 3D BIM Models Using a 3D Solids Modeling Wor...Safe Software
Jacobs has developed a 3D utility solids modelling workflow to improve the integration of utility data into 3D Building Information Modeling (BIM) environments. This workflow, a collaborative effort between the New Zealand Geospatial Team and the Australian Data Capture Team, employs FME to convert 2D utility data into detailed 3D representations, supporting enhanced spatial analysis and clash detection.
To enable the automation of this process, Jacobs has also developed a survey data standard that standardizes the capture of existing utilities. This standard ensures consistency in data collection, forming the foundation for the subsequent automated validation and modelling steps. The workflow begins with the acquisition of utility survey data, including attributes such as location, depth, diameter, and material of utility assets like pipes and manholes. This data is validated through a custom-built tool that ensures completeness and logical consistency, including checks for proper connectivity between network components. Following validation, the data is processed using an automated modelling tool to generate 3D solids from 2D geometric representations. These solids are then integrated into BIM models to facilitate compatibility with 3D workflows and enable detailed spatial analyses.
The workflow contributes to improved spatial understanding by visualizing the relationships between utilities and other infrastructure elements. The automation of validation and modeling processes ensures consistent and accurate outputs, minimizing errors and increasing workflow efficiency.
This methodology highlights the application of FME in addressing challenges associated with geospatial data transformation and demonstrates its utility in enhancing data integration within BIM frameworks. By enabling accurate 3D representation of utility networks, the workflow supports improved design collaboration and decision-making in complex infrastructure projects
3. Presentation Overview
● Why SQL Server and PowerShell?
● PowerUpSQL Overview
● Finding & Accessing SQL Servers
● Privilege Escalation Scenarios
o Domain user to SQL Server login
o SQL Server Login to Sysadmin
o Sysadmin to Windows Admin
o Windows Admin to Sysadmin
o Domain Escalation
● Post Exploitation Activities
● General Recommendations
4. Why SQL Server?
● Used in most enterprise environments
● Supports local Windows and Domain authentication
● Integrates with lots of Windows applications
● Generally has trust relationships that other don’t
5. Why PowerShell?
● Native to Windows
● Run commands in memory
● Run managed .net code
● Run unmanaged code
● Avoid detection by legacy Anti-virus
● Already flagged as "trusted" by most
application whitelist solutions
● A medium used to write many open source
Pentest toolkits
7. PowerUpSQL Overview: Project Goals
Project Goals (Get-Abilities)
● Scalability via runspace threading
● Flexibility via pipeline support
● ps objects and data tables
● Portability
o No SMO dependancies
o .Net Framework libraries
o PowerShell v.2 compliant (in theory)
o Single file
Functional Goals
● Discover SQL Servers from different attacker perspectives
● Inventory SQL Servers quickly
● Audit SQL Servers for common insecure configurations
● Escalate privileges quickly on SQL Servers
● Support authentication using SQL Login or Windows Credential
9. PowerUpSQL Overview: Where can I get it?
Github
https://github.com/netspi/PowerUpSQL
PowerShell Gallery
https://www.powershellgallery.com/packages/PowerUpSQL/
10. PowerUpSQL Overview: How do I install it?
Github
Import-Module PowerUpSQL.psd1
IEX(New-Object
System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString("https://raw.githubusercontent.com/NetSPI/PowerUpSQL/master/P
owerUpSQL.ps1")
Execution policy work arounds
https://blog.netspi.com/15-ways-to-bypass-the-powershell-execution-policy/
PowerShell Gallery
Install-Module -Name PowerUpSQL
12. SQL Server Basics
What is SQL Server?
● A database platform
● An application
● A set of Windows services
● Each instance has its own set of
services
13. SQL Server Basics: Account Types
Account Types
● Windows Accounts
o Used to login
o Mapped to SQL Server login
● SQL Server Logins
o Used to login
o Mapped to database account
● Database Users
o Used to access databases
14. SQL Server Basics: Common Roles
Important SQL Server Roles
● Sysadmin role
○ Database administrator account
○ Think of it as the “Administrators” Windows group,
but in SQL Server
● Public role
○ Only provides CONNECT permission
○ Think of it as the “Everyone” Windows group, but
in SQL Server
16. Find SQL Servers: Techniques
Attacker Perspective Attack Technique
Unauthenticated ● List from file
● TCP port scan
● UDP port scan
● UDP broadcast
● Azure DNS dictionary attack (x.databases.windows.net)
● Azure DNS lookup via public resources
Local User ● Services
● Registry entries
Domain User ● Service Principal Names
● Azure Portal / PowerShell Modules
17. Find SQL Servers: PowerUpSQL
Attacker Perspective PowerUpSQL Function
Unauthenticated Get-SQLInstanceFile
Unauthenticated Get-SQLInstanceUDPScan
Local User Get-SQLInstanceLocal
Domain User Get-SQLInstanceDomain
Blog: https://blog.netspi.com/blindly-discover-sql-server-instances-powerupsql/
19. Testing Login Access: Techniques
What credentials can I use to log into discovered SQL Servers?
Attacker Perspective Attack Technique
Unauthenticated Dictionary attacks using common user names and passwords.
Unauthenticated Default passwords based on the SQL Server instance names.
Local Windows or ADS
Domain Account
Attempt to login using the current account.
20. Testing Login Access: PowerUpSQL CMDs
What PowerUpSQL functions can I use to test for successful logins?
Attack Technique PowerUpSQL Function
Dictionary Attack Invoke-SQLAuditWeakLoginPw
Default Password Test Invoke-SQLAuditDefaultLoginPw
Get-SQLServerLoginDefaultPw
Get-SQLInstanceDomain | Get-SQLServerLoginDefaultPw -Verbose
Local Windows or ADS
Domain Account
Get-SQLConnectionTestThreaded
22. Testing Login Access: Login CMD Examples
Attacker Perspective Command Example
Unauthenticated Get-SQLInstanceUDPScan | Get-SQLConnectionTestThreaded
-Verbose -Threads 15 -Username testuser -Password testpass
Local User Get-SQLInstanceLocal | Get-SQLConnectionTestThreaded -Verbose
Domain User Get-SQLInstanceDomain | Get-SQLConnectionTestThreaded
-Verbose -Threads 15
Alternative
Domain User
runas /noprofile /netonly /user:domainuser PowerShell.exe
Get-SQLInstanceDomain | Get-SQLConnectionTestThreaded
-Verbose -Threads 15
23. Testing Login Access: Reusing Result Lists
Process Command Example
Enumerate
Accessible Servers
$Accessible = Get-SQLInstanceDomain |
Get-SQLConnectionTestThreaded -Verbose -Threads 15 |
Where-Object {$_.Status –like “Accessible”}
Get server information $Acessible | Get-SQLServerInfo -Verbose
Get database list $Acessible | Get-SQLDatabase -Verbose
Perform audit $Acessible | Invoke-SQLAudit -Verbose
Do I have to rerun instance discovery every time I want to run a command? No.
26. Escalating Privileges: Domain User
Why can Domain Users login into so
many SQL Servers?
● Admins give them access
● Privilege inheritance issue on
domain systems = Public role
access
27. Escalating Privileges: Domain User
Why can Domain Users login into so
many SQL Servers?
● Admins give them access
● Privilege inheritance issue on
domain systems = Public role
access
28. Escalating Privileges: Domain User
Why can Domain Users login into so
many SQL Servers?
● Admins give them access
● Privilege inheritance issue on
domain systems = Public role
access
30. Escalating Privileges: Weak Passwords
Didn’t we just cover this? Yes, but there’s more…
Technique PowerUpSQL Function
Dictionary Attack Invoke-SQLAuditWeakLoginPw
Default Password Test Invoke-SQLAuditDefaultLoginPw
Local Windows or ADS
Domain Account
Get-SQLConnectionTestThreaded
31. Escalating Privileges: Weak Passwords
…we can also enumerate SQL Server logins and Domain Accounts
Technique PowerUpSQL Function
Blind Login Enumeration
+
Dictionary Attack
=
Super Cool!
Invoke-SQLAuditWeakLoginPw
• Enumerate all SQL Server logins with the Public role
• Enumerate all domain accounts with the Public role
32. Escalating Privileges: Weak Passwords
Enumerating SQL Logins
1. Attempt to list all SQL Server
logins and fail.
33. Escalating Privileges: Weak Passwords
Enumerating SQL Logins
1. Attempt to list all SQL Server
logins and fail.
2. Get principal id for the sa
account with “suser_id”
34. Escalating Privileges: Weak Passwords
Enumerating SQL Logins
1. Attempt to list all SQL Server
logins and fail.
2. Get principal id for the sa account
with “suser_id”
3. Use “suser_name” to get SQL
logins using just principal ID
35. Escalating Privileges: Weak Passwords
Enumerating SQL Logins
1. Attempt to list all SQL Server
logins and fail.
2. Get principal id for the sa account
with “suser_id”
3. Use “suser_name” to get SQL
logins using just principal ID
4. Increment number and repeat
36. Escalating Privileges: Weak Passwords
Enumerating SQL Logins
1. Attempt to list all SQL Server
logins and fail.
2. Get principal id for the sa account
with “suser_id”
3. Use “suser_name” to get SQL
logins using just principal ID
4. Increment number and repeat
select n [id], SUSER_NAME(n) [user_name]
from (
select top 10000 row_number() over(order by t1.number) as N
from master..spt_values t1
cross join master..spt_values t2
) a
where SUSER_NAME(n) is not null
Code gifted from @mobileck
Source:
https://gist.github.com/ConstantineK/c6de5d398ec43bab1a29ef07e8c21ec7
37. Escalating Privileges: Weak Passwords
select n [id], SUSER_NAME(n) [user_name]
from (
select top 10000 row_number() over(order by
t1.number) as N
from master..spt_values t1
cross join master..spt_values t2
) a
where SUSER_NAME(n) is not null
Code gifted from @mobileck
Source:
https://gist.github.com/ConstantineK/c6de5d3
98ec43bab1a29ef07e8c21ec7
39. Escalating Privileges: Weak Passwords
Enumerating Domain Users
1. Get the domain
2. GID RID of default group
Full RID of
Domain Admins
group
40. Escalating Privileges: Weak Passwords
Enumerating Domain Users
1. Get the domain
2. GID RID of default group
3. Grab the first 48 Bytes of the full RID
RID = 0x0105000000000005150000009CC30DD479441EDEB31027D000020000
SID = 0x0105000000000005150000009CC30DD479441EDEB31027D0
41. Escalating Privileges: Weak Passwords
Enumerating Domain Users
1. Get the domain
2. GID RID of default group
3. Grab the first 48 Bytes of the full RID
4. Create new RID with by appending
a hex number value and the SID
1. Start with number, 500
2. Convert to hex, F401
3. Pad with 0 to 8 bytes, F4010000
4. Concatenate the SID and the new RID
SID = 0x0105000000000005150000009CC30DD479441EDEB31027D0
RID = 0x0105000000000005150000009CC30DD479441EDEB31027D0F4010000
42. Escalating Privileges: Weak Passwords
Enumerating Domain Users
1. Get the domain
2. GID RID of default group
3. Grab the first 48 Bytes of the full RID
4. Create new RID with by appending a
hex number value and the SID
5. Use “suser_name” function to get
domain object name
1. Start with number, 500
2. Convert to hex, F401
3. Pad with 0 to 8 bytes, F4010000
4. Concatenate the SID and the new RID
SID = 0x0105000000000005150000009CC30DD479441EDEB31027D0
RID = 0x0105000000000005150000009CC30DD479441EDEB31027D0F4010000
43. Escalating Privileges: Weak Passwords
Enumerating Domain Users
1. Get the domain
2. GID RID of default group
3. Grab the first 48 Bytes of the full RID
4. Create new RID with by appending a
hex number value and the SID
5. Use “suser_name” function to get
domain object name
6. Increment and repeat
1. Start with number, 500
2. Convert to hex, F401
3. Pad with 0 to 8 bytes, F4010000
4. Concatenate the SID and the new RID
SID = 0x0105000000000005150000009CC30DD479441EDEB31027D0
RID = 0x0105000000000005150000009CC30DD479441EDEB31027D0F4010000
46. Escalating Privileges: Impersonation
1. Impersonate Privilege
a. Server: EXECUTE AS LOGIN
b. Database: EXECUTE AS USER
2. Stored Procedure and Trigger Creation / Injection
Issues
a. EXECUTE AS OWNER
b. Signed with cert login
3. Automatic Execution of Stored Procedures
4. Agent Jobs
5. xp_cmdshell proxy acount
6. Create Databse Link to File or Server
7. Import / Install Custom Assemblies
8. Ad-Hoc Queries
9. Shared Service Accounts
10. Database Links
11. UNC Path Injection
47. Escalating Privileges: Impersonation
Impersonate Privilege
• Can be used at server layer
o EXECUTE AS LOGIN
• Can be used at database layer
o EXECUTE AS USER
Pros
• Execute queries/commands in another user context
Cons
• Requires database to be configured as trustworthy
for OS command execution
• Commands and queries are not limited in any way
50. Escalating Privileges: Impersonation
Stored Procedure and Trigger Creation / Injection
Issues
• EXECUTE AS OWNER can be used to execute a
stored procedure as another login
Pros
• Can execute queries/commands in another user context
• Limit commands and queries
• Don’t have to grant IMPERSONATE
Cons
• No granular control over the database owner’s privileges
• DB_OWNER role can EXECUTE AS OWNER of the DB,
which is often a sysadmin
• Requires database to be configured as trustworthy for
OS command execution
• Impersonation can be done via SQL injection under
specific conditions
• Impersonation can be done via command injection under
specific conditions
51. Escalating Privileges: Impersonation
Stored Procedure and Trigger Creation / Injection
Issues
• EXECUTE AS OWNER can be used to execute a
stored procedure as another login
• DB_OWNER role can impersonate the actual
database owner
USE MyAppDb
GO
CREATE PROCEDURE sp_escalate_me
WITH EXECUTE AS OWNER
AS
EXEC sp_addsrvrolemember
'MyAppUser','sysadmin'
GO
52. Escalating Privileges: Impersonation
Stored Procedure and Trigger Creation / Injection
Issues
• EXECUTE AS OWNER can be used to execute a
stored procedure as another login
• DB_OWNER role can impersonate the actual
database owner
USE MyAppDb
GO
CREATE PROCEDURE sp_escalate_me
WITH EXECUTE AS OWNER
AS
EXEC sp_addsrvrolemember
'MyAppUser','sysadmin'
GO
SYSADMIN
is often the
OWNER
53. Escalating Privileges: Impersonation
Stored Procedure and Trigger Creation / Injection
Issues
• Use signed Procedures
o Create stored procedure
o Create a database master key
o Create a certificate
o Create a login from the certificate
o Configure login privileges
o Sign stored procedure with certifiate
o GRANT EXECUTE to User
Pros
• Can execute queries/commands in another user
context
• Limit commands and queries
• Don’t have to grant IMPERSONATE
• Granular control over permissions
• Database does NOT have to be configured as
trustworthy for OS command execution
Cons
• Impersonation can be done via SQL injection
under specific conditions
• Impersonation can be done via command
injection under specific conditions
54. Escalating Privileges: Impersonation
SQL Injection Example
CREATE PROCEDURE sp_sqli2
@DbName varchar(max)
AS
BEGIN
Declare @query as varchar(max)
SET @query = ‘
SELECT name FROM master..sysdatabases
WHERE name like ''%'+ @DbName+'%'' OR
name=''tempdb''';
EXECUTE(@query)
END
GO
https://blog.netspi.com/hacking-sql-server-stored-procedures-part-3-sqli-and-user-impersonation/
55. Escalating Privileges: Impersonation
SQL Injection Example
CREATE PROCEDURE sp_sqli2
@DbName varchar(max)
AS
BEGIN
Declare @query as varchar(max)
SET @query = ‘
SELECT name FROM master..sysdatabases
WHERE name like ''%'+ @DbName+'%'' OR
name=''tempdb''';
EXECUTE(@query)
END
GO
PURE EVIL
https://blog.netspi.com/hacking-sql-server-stored-procedures-part-3-sqli-and-user-impersonation/
58. Escalating Privileges: Impersonation
Automatic Execution of Stored Procedure
• Stored procedures ca be configured to execute
when the SQL Server service restarts
Pros
• Marking a stored procedure to run when the SQL
Server service restarts has many use cases
• Only stored procedures in the master database
can be marked for auto execution
Cons
• No granular control over what context the startup
command is executed in
• All stored procedures marked for auto execution
are executed as ‘sa’, even if ‘sa’ is disabled
• Any non sysadmin access to stored procedures
can lead to execution as ‘sa’
64. Escalating Privileges: SysAdmin to Service Account
OS Command Execution = Service Account Impersonation
Executing OS Commands:
● xp_cmdshell
● Custom Assemblies (.net)
● Custom Extended Stored Procedures (C++)
● Agent Jobs
o ActiveX: Vbscript, Jscript, and Other
o CmdExec
o PowerShell
o SSIS Package
● Registry Autoruns
● File Autoruns
65. Escalating Privileges: SysAdmin to Service Account
OS Command Execution = Service Account Impersonation
You don’t need to know the password, crack a hash, or PTH
Service Account Types
● Local User
● Local System
● Network Service
● Local managed service account
● Domain managed service account
● Domain User
● Domain Admin
66. Escalating Privileges: SysAdmin to Service Account
But wait, there’s more…RottenPotato @ DerbyCon 2016
- Authors: Chris Mallz (@vvalien1) & Steve Breen (@breenmachine)
- We can now escalation from service account to LocalSystem!
- No patch that I’m aware of.
Check out their blog for details:
https://foxglovesecurity.com/2016/09/26/rotten-potato-privilege-
escalation-from-service-accounts-to-system/
67. Escalating Privileges: Invoke-SQLOSCmd
Invoke-SQLOSCMD can be used for basic command execution.
PS C:>$Accessible | Invoke-SQLOSCmd –Verbose –Command “whoami” –Threads 10
ComputerName Instance CommandResults
--------------------- ----------- --------------
SQLServer1 SQLServer1SQLEXPRESS nt servicemssql$sqlexpress
SQLServer1 SQLServer1STANDARDDEV2014 nt authoritysystem
SQLServer1 SQLServer1 DomainSQLSvc
69. Escalating Privileges: Shared Service Accounts
Why should I care about shared service accounts?
1. SysAdmins can execute OS commands
2. OS commands run as the SQL Server service account
3. Service accounts have sysadmin privileges by default
4. Companies often use a single domain account to run hundreds of SQL Servers
5. So if you get sysadmin on one server you have it on all of them!
One account to rule them all!
71. InternetDMZIntranet
LRA HVA
LVA
ADS
LVA
Ports
80 and 443
Ports
1433 and 1434
HVA
PURE
EVIL
Captain Evil
SQL Injection
1
Key
HVA = High Value Application
LVA = Low Value Application
Leveraging Shared MS SQL Server Service Accounts
72. InternetDMZIntranet
LRA HVA
LVA
ADS
LVA
Ports
80 and 443
Ports
1433 and 1434
HVA
PURE
EVIL
Captain Evil
SQL Injection
1
Execute Local Command
via xp_cmdshell
2
Key
HVA = High Value Application
LVA = Low Value Application
Leveraging Shared MS SQL Server Service Accounts
73. InternetDMZIntranet
LRA HVA
LVA
ADS
LVA
Ports
80 and 443
Ports
1433 and 1434
HVA
PURE
EVIL
Captain Evil
SQL Injection
1
Execute Local Command
via xp_cmdshell
2
Access to HVA with shared domain service account
Key
HVA = High Value Application
LVA = Low Value Application
Execute commands and
gather data from other
database servers via osql
3
Leveraging Shared MS SQL Server Service Accounts
75. Escalating Privileges: Crawling Server Links
What’s a database link?
● Database links are basically persistent database connections for SQL Servers.
Why should I care?
● Short answer = privilege escalation
● Public role can use links to execute queries on remote servers (impersonation)
SELECT * FROM OpenQuery([SQLSERVER2],’SELECT @@Version’)
● Stored procedures can be executed (xp_cmdshell)
● Links can be crawled
76. InternetDMZIntranet
LRA HVA
LVA
ADS
Ports
80 and 443
Ports
1433 and 1434
HVA
PURE
EVIL
Captain EvilKey
HVA = High Value Application
LVA = Low Value Application
Leveraging MS SQL Database links
DB1
LVA
77. InternetDMZIntranet
LRA HVA
LVA
ADS
Ports
80 and 443
Ports
1433 and 1434
HVA
PURE
EVIL
Captain Evil
SQL Injection
1
Key
HVA = High Value Application
LVA = Low Value Application
Leveraging MS SQL Database links
DB1
LVA
78. InternetDMZIntranet
LRA HVA
LVA
ADS
Ports
80 and 443
Ports
1433 and 1434
HVA
PURE
EVIL
Captain Evil
SQL Injection
1
Key
HVA = High Value Application
LVA = Low Value Application
Leveraging MS SQL Database links
D
B
Link
w
ith
LeastPrivileges
DB1
LVA
79. InternetDMZIntranet
LRA HVA
LVA
ADS
Ports
80 and 443
Ports
1433 and 1434
HVA
PURE
EVIL
Captain Evil
SQL Injection
1
Key
HVA = High Value Application
LVA = Low Value Application
Leveraging MS SQL Database links
D
B
Link
w
ith
LeastPrivileges
DB Link with
SA account
DB1
LVA
Execute SQL queries and
local commands on
database servers via
nested linked services
2
80. Escalating Privileges: Crawling Server Links
Penetration Test Stats
● Database links exist (and can be crawled) in about 50% of environments we’ve seen
● The max number of hops we’ve seen is 12
● The max number of servers crawled is 226
81. Escalating Privileges: Crawling Server Links
Old Script
● 2012 - https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/mssql/mssql_linkcrawler
New Script
● /scripts/pending/Get-SqlServerLinkCrawl.ps1
● Author: Antti Rantasaari
86. Escalating Privileges: UNC Path Injection
UNC Path Injection Summary
● UNC paths are used for accessing remote file servers like so 192.168.1.4file
● Almost all procedures that accept a file path in SQL Server, support UNC paths
● UNC paths can be used to force the SQL Server service account to authenticate to an attacker
● An attacker can then capture the NetNTLM password hash and crack or relay it
● Relay becomes pretty easy when you know which SQL Servers are using shared accounts
88. Escalating Privileges: UNC Path Injection
Oh yeah…
By DEFAULT, the PUBLIC role can execute (at least) two procedures that accept a file path
xp_dirtree
xp_fileexists
89. Escalating Privileges: UNC Path Injection
So, in summary…
The PUBLIC role can access the SQL
Server service account NetNTLM
password hash by default!!
90. Escalating Privileges: UNC Path Injection
But who really has
PUBLIC role access?
Oh yeah, a ton of domain users
94. Escalating Privileges: OS Admin to SysAdmin
Two things to know…
1. Different SQL Server versions can be abused in different ways
2. All SQL Server versions provide the service account with sysadmin privileges.
95. Escalating Privileges: OS Admin to SysAdmin
Approach 2000 2005 2008 2012 2014 2016
LSA Secrets x x x x x x
Local Administrator x x
LocalSystem x x x
Process Migration x x x x x x
Token Stealing x x x x x X
Single User Mode ? x x x x x
Below are some options for leveraging that knowledge...
96. Escalating Privileges: OS Admin to SysAdmin
Here are some tool options...
Approach Common Tools
Access as Local Administrator Management Studio, sqlcmd, and other native SQL client
tools.
Access as LocalSystem Psexec, accessibility options, debugger with native SQL
client tools.
Recover SQL Server service account
password from LSA Secrets
Mimikatz, Metasploit, lsadump.
Inject shellcode or DLL into the SQL
Server service process
Metasploit, Empire, Python, Powershell, C, C++
(LoadLibrary,CreateRemoteThread, and similar functions)
Steal Authentication Token From SQL
Server service process
Metasploit, Incognito, Invoke-TokenManipulation
Single User Mode DBATools
98. Post Exploitation: Overview
Common Post Exploitation Activities
1. Establish Persistence
• SQL Server Layer: startup procedures, agent jobs, triggers, modified code
• OS Layer: Registry & file auto runs, tasks, services, etc.
2. Identify Sensitive Data
• Target large databases
• Locate transparently encrypted databases
• Search columns based on keywords and sample data
• Use regular expressions and the Luhn formula against data samples
3. Exfiltrate Sensitive Data
• All standard methods: Copy database, TCP ports, UDP ports, DNS tunneling,
ICMP tunneling, email, HTTP, shares, links, etc. (No exfil in PowerUpSQL
yet)
105. General Recommendations
Things to do…
1. Enforce least privilege everywhere!
2. Disable dangerous default stored procedures.
3. Audit and fix insecure configurations.
4. Use policy based management for standardizing configurations.
5. Enable auditing at the server and database levels, and monitor for potentially malicious activity.
106. PowerUpSQL Overview: Thanks!
Individual Third Party Code / Direct Contributors
Boe Prox Runspace blogs
Warren F. ( RamblingCookieMonster) Invoke-Parallel function
Oyvind Kallstad Test-IsLuhnValid function
Kevin Robertson Invoke-Inveigh
Joe Bialek Invoke-TokenManipulation
Antti Rantasaari, Eric Gruber, and Alexander
Leary, @leoloobeek, and @ktaranov
Contributions and QA
Khai Tran Design advice
NetSPI assessment team and dev team Design advice
#73: Scenario
Database account with excessive privileges
Shared service account
Use xp_cmdshell to verify local command execution
#74:
Use xp_cmdshell and OSQL to:
Enumerate databases on the internal network
Issues queries on remote HVA database server that is configured with the same service account.
No alerts – using trusted account and non destructive native functionality
No logs (or few logs) – No account creation or group modification
No accountability!
#76: Another REALLY COOL lateral movement / privilege escalation technique.
#78: Scenario
No sysadmin role
No excessive service account access
No shared service account access
Enumerate linked servers
Find link to DB1 - Used to transmit marketing metrics to DB1
#79: Connect to DB1 (linked server) via OPENQUERY
Has least privilege
Enumerate linked servers
Find link to HVA - Used to pull marketing metrics to DB1
#80: Connect to HVA (linked server) via NESTED OPENQUERY
Configured with the SA account
HVA could have access to other resources
Nesting can continue
Nested Shared service account with excessive privs
Linked database can be
direct between high value and low value
Other server not on the diagram
Can be nested many times