Abstract
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is an advanced
telecommunication technology which transfers the voice/video
over
high speed network that provides advantages of flexibility,
reliability and cost efficient advanced telecommunication
features. Still the issues related to security are averting many
organizations to accept VoIP cloud environment due to
security threats, holes or vulnerabilities. So, the novel secured
framework is absolutely necessary to prevent all kind of
VoIP security issues. This paper points out the existing VoIP
cloud architecture and various security attacks and issues
in the existing framework. It also presents the defense
mechanisms to prevent the attacks and proposes a new security
framework called Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) using video
watermarking and extraction technique and Liveness
Voice Detection (LVD) technique with biometric features such
as face and voice. IPSs updated with new LVD features
protect the VoIP services not only from attacks but also from
misuses.
A Comprehensive Survey of Security Issues and
Defense Framework for VoIP Cloud
Ashutosh Satapathy* and L. M. Jenila Livingston
School of Computing Science and Engineering, VIT University,
Chennai - 600127, Tamil Nadu, India;
[email protected], [email protected]
Keywords: Defense Mechanisms, Liveness Voice Detection,
VoIP Cloud, Voice over Internet Protocol, VoIP Security Issues
1. Introduction
The rapid progress of VoIP over traditional services is
led to a situation that is common to many innovations
and new technologies such as VoIP cloud and peer to
peer services like Skype, Google Hangout etc. VoIP is the
technology that supports sending voice (and video) over
an Internet protocol-based network1,2. This is completely
different than the public circuit-switched telephone net-
work. Circuit switching network allocates resources to
each individual call and path is permanent throughout
the call from start to end. Traditional telephony services
are provided by the protocols/components such as SS7, T
carriers, Plain Old Telephone Service (POTS), the Public
Switch Telephone Network (PSTN), dial up, local loops
and anything under International Telecommunication
Union. IP networks are based on packet switching and
each packet follows different path, has its own header and
is forwarded separately by routers. VoIP network can be
constructed in various ways by using both proprietary
protocols and protocols based on open standards.
1.1 VoIP Layer Architecture
VoIP communication system typically consist of a front
end platform (soft-phone, PBX, gateway, call manager),
back end platform (server, CPU, storage, memory, net-
work) and intermediate platforms such as VoIP protocols,
database, authentication server, web server, operating sys-
tems etc. It is mainly divided into five layers as shown in
Figure1.
1.2 VoIP Cloud Architecture
VoIP cloud is the framework for delivering telephony
services in which resources are retrieved from the
cloud data center through web applications and soft-
ware, instead of a direct link to server3. Information and
applications are stored on cloud servers in a distributed
fashion. Apart from cloud computing characteristics
such as on demand service, resource pooling, opti-
mize resource allocation, pay as you go, elasticity and
scalability4,5, VoIP cloud contains mainly six components
as shown in Figure 2.
*Author for correspondence
Indian Journal of Science and Technology, Vol 9(6), DOI:
10.17485/ijst/2016/v9i6/81980, February 2016
ISSN (Print) : 0974-6846
ISSN (Online) : 0974-5645
A Comprehensive Survey of Security Issues and Defense
Framework for VoIP Cloud
Indian Journal of Science and Technology2 Vol 9 (6) | February
2016 | www.indjst.org
1.2.2 DHCP Server
It is used for dynamically distributing network configu-
ration parameters such as Internet Protocol (IP) address,
address of TFTP server etc.
1.2.3 Application Server
These servers are designed to install, host and operate
applications and provide services to end users, IT
industries and organizations.
1.2.4 Time Server
The main principle of time server is to maintain syn-
chronization over the network. The actual time from
server clock is distributed to its clients using a computer
network.
1.2.5 TFTP Server
It helps to update the network configuration used by the
phones, routers, firewalls and perhaps provide a setting
file that might contain operational parameters for VoIP
network. e.g., software updates, codec used in a particular
region.
1.2.6 Intrusion Prevention System (IPS)
It monitors networks and systems behavior for malicious
instances. The major roles of intrusion prevention sys-
tems are to find out suspicious instances and their log
information, try to block/stop them and report to con-
cern admin.
2. Literature Review
VoIP technology was started in February 1995 by
Vocaltec, Inc. in Israel. It transfers the voice over high
speed network, cheaper comparing to PSTN and reach-
able to everywhere through internet by loon developed by
Google with 4G LTE speed6.
2.1 VoIP Security Issues
VoIP transfers the voice over the data network through
different network elements such as switches and rout-
ers. Connecting PSTN to internet i.e. VoIP as a carrier
for voice/video traffic, the security problems are not only
common in circuit switch network (PSTN, POTS) such
as eavesdropping (tapping) and toll fraud attack but also
15
42. Liao HJ, Lin CHR, Lin YC, Tung KY. Intrusion detection
system: A comprehensive review.
Journal of Network and Computer Applications. 2013;
36(1):16–24.
43. Audiopedia. Honeypot (computing). Available from:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2fXAw33jOBk. [Cited 2014
Dec].
44. Goel R, Sardana A, Joshi RC. Wireless honeypot:
framework, architectures and tools.
International Journal of Network Security. 2013; 15(5):373–83.
45. Li Z, Grochulla M, Thormahlen T. Multiple active speaker
localization based on audio-
visual fusion in two stages. Proceedings IEEE International
Conference on Multisensor
Fusion Integration Intelligence Systems (MFI); Hamburg:
Germany; 2012. p. 262–68.
46. Zhu ZY, He QH, Feng XH, Xiongli Y, Wang ZF. Liveness
detection using time drift
between lip movement and voice. Proceedings IEEE
International Conference on Machine
Learning Cybernetics (ICMLC); Tianjin: China; 2013. p. 973–
78.
47. Chetty G. Biometric liveness detection based on cross modal
fusion. IEEE 12th International
Conference on Information Fusion (FUSION). Seattle: WA;
2009. p. 2255–62.
Figure 1. VoIP layer architecture.
Figure 1. VoIP layer architecture.
16
Figure 2. VoIP cloud architecture.
Figure 3. Proposed VoIP cloud architecture.
Figure 4. Video watermarking scheme for signaling message.
Figure 2. VoIP cloud architecture.
1.2.1 Call Server
Phones are registered with this component. It handles
security and admission control while connecting the
phones. The Voice data of a call carried by the transport
protocol may or may not flow through the call server.
Ashutosh Satapathy and L. M. Jenila Livingston
Indian Journal of Science and Technology 3Vol 9 (6) | February
2016 | www.indjst.org
problems related to IP network. Security issues in VoIP
are broadly classified into three categories.
2.1.1 Real Time Issues
From last decade onwards, VoIP is used for several illegal
activities such as hacking, terrorism, match fixing etc.
Recently in October 2014, phone Hackers had broken
into the phone network of the company, Foreman Seeley
Fountain Architecture and routed $166, 000 worth of
calls from the firm to premium rate telephone numbers
in Gambia, Somalia and Maldives. It would have taken
34 years for the firm to run of those charges legitimately,
based on its typical phone bill.
2.1.2 Network Related Issues
Attacks related to destroy, block, expose, alter, disable,
steal or gain unauthorized access to information in VoIP
network (e.g. threats include social, denial of service, ser-
vice abuse, physical access, interruption of service etc.) are
listed in Table 1 followed by different types of attacks7,8.
2.1.3 Voice Related Issues
As VoIP system carries voice traffic, so victim’s voice can
be mimicked by an attacker/intruder. A talking and sing-
ing robot that mimics human vocalization, developed
by M. Kitani, Kagawa University is vulnerable to VoIP
communication9.
2.2 VoIP Attacks
This section deals with different types of VoIP attacks.
2.2.1 Physical Attacks
The attacker performs this attack by stealing, breaking
network equipment or direct control over equipment by
getting unauthorized access to prohibited area for seeking
of information. Some of the physical attacks are dumpster
diving, shoulder surfing, hardware key logger and overt
access etc. It can be prevented by keeping the documents
and records safely inside locker and electronic equipment
must be password protected. At last, outer layer security
can be provided by deploying security guards at enter and
exit points.
2.2.2 MAC Spoofing
The technique of masking a MAC address upon actual
MAC address through software emulation is known as
MAC spoofing. Here the hacker’s system is taken over
MAC address of one of the node which is already config-
ured and permitted as VoIP end device by disconnecting
or turning off it from rest of the network. It can be pre-
vented by number of ways10. When ARP packet arrives,
direct extraction of MAC address from LAN card and
from OS registry; Compare the MAC address of LAN
card with OS. If it doesn’t match, then delete the entry
from OS registry. Lock down the system by registering its
MAC address with a DHCP IP address. At last secure the
communication channel by encrypting it.
2.2.3 ARP Spoofing
Hacker spreads forgery Address Resolution Protocol
(ARP) packets inside VoIP network by modifying ARP
buffer. Here, attacker binds own system MAC address
with IP address of genuine server which causes the traffic
imply for server is diverted to attacker. It advances hacker
Table 1. VoIP network threats classification
Threat Type Description
Social threats These threats point straight against
individuals such as misconfigurations,
security holes or defective protocol
implementation in VoIP system. (e.g.,
Phishing, Theft of identity or Service,
Social engineering, Spam etc.)
Eavesdropping,
interception
and
modification
threats
These threats include illegal/ Un-
authorization access and modification
of signaling and transport message.
(e.g., Call rerouting, interception of RTP
sessions etc.)
Denial of
service threats
DoS threats repudiate individual access to
VoIP services. DDOS attacks strike all of
user’s or business transmission potentials.
(e.g., SYN/UDP floods, ICMP floods, etc.)
Service abuse
threats
These threats cause inappropriate utilization
of VoIP services when those facilities are
provided for business purposes. (e.g., toll
fraud and billing avoidance etc.)
Physical access
threats
These threats are illegal physical access to
VoIP devices or physical layer of the VoIP
network. (e.g., Hardware key logger, theft
of media, retrieval of discarded stuffs etc.)
Interruption of
services threats
These threats cause VoIP services/
facilities to unviable and unavailable.
(e.g., power loss due to bad climate,
resource consumption due to over
purchase/ extra subscription, issues that
degenerate call quality etc.)
A Comprehensive Survey of Security Issues and Defense
Framework for VoIP Cloud
Indian Journal of Science and Technology4 Vol 9 (6) | February
2016 | www.indjst.org
not only listen to VoIP calls but also reply and terminate
the VoIP calls intended for other. ARP poisoning followed
by denial service threats or eavesdropping, interception or
modification threats which cause severe damages to vic-
tim. So, Enhanced ARP can be implemented to prevent
ARP spoofing11.
2.2.4 IP Spoofing
Attacker gets into the VoIP network by tricking the IP
address of any authorized machine which helps him to
spread malicious message inside the network. IP spoofing
helps attacker to launch further attacks such as DoS attack,
theft of services, toll fraud etc. by impersonating autho-
rized host inside VoIP network. Basically IP spoofing can
be prevented with maximum probabilities by configuring
broader gateway router. First, router disallows incom-
ing packets for destination address coming from source
address within one network. Second, router disallows to
send packets from local network to another; those don’t
have source addresses within that local address range.
Y. Ma developed an effective trace route based method
for counter measure against IP spoofing and it is worked
with trusted adjacent nodes information i.e. acceptance of
packets for a node is completely depends upon trace route
result from its adjacent nodes12.
2.2.5 ICMP Flood
Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) is one of the
network layer protocols that carry error and query mes-
sages sent by either intermediate nodes or end node.
Attacker tries to overflow the receiver cache by flood the
respective node with ICMP packets. It forces the node to
drop successive ICMP packets until free space available
at node’s cache even if request packets come from genu-
ine node. Routers are configured to set optimum points
for traffic coming from different networks. It will help the
routers to not only block unnecessary ICMP packets by
matching ICMP requests and responses but also prevent
cache overflow. The VoIP system must be configured sepa-
rate VLAN for packets originating within a single network
which are monitored by firewall. Barbhuiya et al. have
developed an error detection framework to identify dif-
ferent types of ICMP attack13. It consists of two modules.
Verification module verifies origination of ICMP packets
and Congestion check module extracts bandwidth utili-
zation information using Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP).
2.2.6 TCP/ UDP Floods
In TCP flooding attack, hacker creates huge number of SYN
packets with abnormal source IP addresses and sends to
receiver. Receiver node allocates space in its Transmission
Control Buffer (TCB) to each SYN requests. In response
to SYN packets, receiver sends SYN+ACK packets and
waiting for ACK packets. The SYN+ACK packets carry
abnormal IP addresses cause failure to receive ACK
packets which prevents receiver node to clear TCP SYN
requests from buffer and buffer to overflow later. Attacker
can use TCP flood attack against VoIP signaling protocol
such as H.323 and SIP; as both are connection oriented
protocols. Haris et al. have succeed to detect TCP flood
attack in communication by analyzing payload and unus-
able area of the HTTP protocol (e.g., port, flags, source IP,
header length)14.
In UDP flood attack, large number of UDP packets
are created with arbitrary source addresses and port num-
bers and then sends to victim node. Receiver node will
check whether any processes are running on those ports
and find most of the ports are closed. In reply, receiver
node creates large number of destination unreachable
packets. Increase the number of ICMP packets causes
the victim node and the network to overflow. The UDP
flood attack prevents genuine nodes to communicate the
victim node at a particular span of time. Attacker can
use UDP flood attack against VoIP transport protocol
such as RTP and RTCP; as both are connection less pro-
tocol. Bardas et al. proposed a proportional packet rate
assumption technique to differentiate UDP traffic for
detecting forge IP addresses responsible for UDP flood
attacks15.
2.2.7 TCP/ UDP Replay
First, attacker tries to obtain network sensitive information
such as session cookies, password, voice data, signal-
ing data. The information captured by sniffing tools can
be used by attacker to take over the ongoing session.
Sometime victim’s voice can be impersonated by directly
playing back recorded voice data or slightly modifying
voice data and send to destination which helps the hacker
to retrieve more information between caller and callee.
Encrypt the sessions is the best way to stop penetration.
Ali et al. proposed an enhanced port knocking technique
to block TCP replay and port scanning attacks16. It is
worked on source port sequences authentication instead
of destination port sequence number.
Ashutosh Satapathy and L. M. Jenila Livingston
Indian Journal of Science and Technology 5Vol 9 (6) | February
2016 | www.indjst.org
2.2.8 SIP Registration Hijacking
VoIP phones use SIP or other signaling protocols to
register own MAC and IP addresses with call server. In
the reply, each phone will get unique call ID which allows
it to make or receive VoIP call. Attacker tries to capture
registration packets and replaces MAC address from
the packets with own MAC address. It helps the rogue
node to register with victim IP address which causes call
intending for victim node will be forwarded to attacker.
SIP registration hijacking allows burglars to track, block
and manipulate voice traffic. As end node registration is
based on TCP connection, attack will be prevented by
implementing SSL/TLS security policies 17.
2.2.9 Malformed Packets
The hacker creates malicious packets and forwards them
to nodes inside VoIP networks with the help of networking
protocols. The target node processes those packets, causes
open unnecessary ports and processes which degrade per-
formance of the nodes to handle VoIP traffic. New patches
and software will be installed to maintain the node up-to-
date and shutdown the security holes which are vulnerable
to attack. New generation firewalls must be installed to
provide protection against vulnerable packets by filtering
packets based on inbound rules, outbound rules and con-
nection security rules. Geneiatakis et al. have succeeded
in developing a framework that provides defense against
malformed packets for VoIP infrastructure18. The detec-
tion mechanism is based on signature detection which
consists of two parts. First one, general signature detec-
tion (e.g., SIP METHOD, SIP URI, HEADERS) applicable
to all the packets and second one is method specific (e.g.,
CALL-ID, Content-Type, INVITE _METHOD) differ
from packets to packets.
2.2.10 SIP Message Modification
In message modification attack, by running network
sniffing tools (e.g.,Wireshark), attacker penetrates traffic
and tries to modify signaling message for better control over
the VoIP network. Suppose a user initiates a call to victim’s
phone by sending SIP message to call server. Modification
of SIP messages confuses and forces the server to connect
rogue phone. User knows that he is connected to one user
but actually the traffic is routed to attacker. SIP message
modification is carried out by performing MITM attack
such as MAC spoofing, IP spoofing or ARP poisoning. As
SIP and RTP packets transmission are taken place over
TCP and UDP connection; VoIP traffic must be encrypted
by implementing SSL/TLS to prevent this attack17.
2.2.11 SIP Cancel/ Bye Attack
Host (zombie) must be configured in promiscuous mode
to lunch attack into VoIP network by sending SIP Cancel
or Bye packets. Abnormal packets are created and sent
to an IP phone from its connected IP phone by spoofing
its IP address which will proceed to terminate the ongo-
ing call. Attacker can perform this attack continuously
for certain period of time by spoofing more than one IP
addresses which causes denial of service attack. As both
signaling and transport protocols use no authentication
prior to data transmission, so, this attack can be prevented
by encrypt the communication channels. Second, provide
authentication between end device and call server and at
last verification of authenticity of signaling message by
end devices before processing 19.
2.2.12 SIP Malformed Command
In web based VoIP communication (e.g. Facebook,
Google Hangout), Hyper Text Markup Language (HTML)
plays a major role as it carries all the signaling informa-
tion/ command in its body. Parsing SIP command within
HTML code for all possible input is really a headache.
Attacker tries to inject malformed SIP command in input
field and send to server for processing as like SQL injec-
tion. In response either it breaks the server authentication
or degrades the performance of server and end devices.
In counter measure, whether packets are coming from
genuine user or not will be confirmed by call server by
verifying authenticity of SIP message before processing.
Dictionary and fuzzy tests must be performed on HTML
code that filtered tricky SIP malformed packets used to
exploit server. M. Su and C. Tsai propose two functions
to resists malformed SIP packets and flooding attack on
call servers20. First function filters malformed packets
and second one uses Chi-square test to measure flooding
attack on SIP server.
2.2.13 SIP Redirect
Call server cache maintains data structure of Phone’s
caller ID, corresponding MAC and IP address. Attacker
manipulates call server cache to confuse the call server
for call redirection. So, SIP packets coming for receiver
are redirected to attacker specified number. Attacker can
perform DoS and DDoS attack by redirecting a single call
A Comprehensive Survey of Security Issues and Defense
Framework for VoIP Cloud
Indian Journal of Science and Technology6 Vol 9 (6) | February
2016 | www.indjst.org
or all the calls to void device(s). So, call server must be
strong password protected and SIP must be authenticated
to prevent redirection attack19.
2.2.14 RTP Payload
Captured packets will be played later to listening the
conversation between the end users using sniffing tools.
Attacker can insert own voice inside RTP payload
which degrade the quality of conversation and some-
time changed in the meaning of conversation. In RTP
tampering, header fields (sequence number, synchroni-
zation source Identifier, payload type, timestamp etc.)
are tampered which make the packets either unusable
or delayed, causes rejection at receiver end. In RTP redi-
rection, header field of packets are modified with other
receiver caller id and IP address causes packets intending
for one will go to other. It can be prevented by configuring
VoIP network with Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol
(SRTP) instead of RTP21. It will encrypt the RTP packets
propagate between callers.
2.2.15 Buffer Overflow
Buffer is the temporary storage allocated by OS in physical
memory for processing data by computer program. Buffer
is mainly divided into four types such as code, data, stack
and heap segments. Attacker tries to perform buffer over-
flow attack by targeting at least one of the segments. It
helps to steal or modify the sensitive information or install
malicious code and execute it. Buffer overflow attacks are
mainly executed by four ways such as long jump, function
activation record, pointer subterfuge and malicious code
execution. It can be defended by writing secure code,
performing bound checking or static and dynamic code
analysis and runtime code instrumentation22.
2.2.16 Operating System
In VoIP communication network, IP phones, Call server,
TFTP server, gateway and DHCP server etc. requires
OS (e.g., Windows, Linux, Mac) to run. So, vulnerabili-
ties in OS make them vulnerable23. OS vulnerabilities
in VoIP phones are mainly of two types. Hard phones
have in build embedded OS which is less vulnerable
and more protected than soft phones. VoIP soft phones
are software packages which are installed on computers
connected to data network. Old hardware, unsupported
drivers, bad integration of APIs, unsecure administrator
APIs expose OS to attack. Like IP phones, web server
OS, DHCP server, and call manager can be exploited
by attacker for seeking of sensitive and crucial infor-
mation (e.g., password, IP table, VoIP configuration
file). As default configuration of OS is not secure, it is
exposed to malwares to install. Its execution opens well
known ports which helps attacker to run abnormal pro-
cesses (e.g., free call, toll fraud). It can be pre-empted by
hardening OS24.
2.2.17 Malwares
A vulnerable piece of executable codes or program used
by unknown third party to install in VoIP network and
bring down its performance by hook or crook. Malicious
programs or malwares are mainly classified as two cat-
egories, first one simple malwares and second one is
self-replicated malwares25. Logic bomb and Trojan horse
are come under non self-replicated/simple malware. Self-
replicating malware such as virus and worm, who spread
its infection over the network within few hours or days.
Trojan horses are dispatched over network for remote
control over victim VoIP phones. Logic bomb helps the
attacker to trigger other dangerous attacks (DoS, DDoS,
sniffing etc.) in timely manner. It will be prevented by
installing updated antivirus and patching up VoIP system
software on regular basis.
2.2.18 Application Flaws
As most of the VoIP communications are web based,
it’s vulnerable to two major application flaws such as
Structured Query Language (SQL) Injection attack and
cross site scripting attacks. In SQL Injection attack, mali-
cious commands are inserted in SQL statements to gain
unauthorized access to server database. It can be prevented
by implementing three primary defense mechanisms
such as defensive coding, SQL injection vulnerabilities
detection and runtime SQL injection attack prevention26.
In cross site scripting attack, hacker uses the advantages
of scripting languages to launch attack by injecting mali-
cious code inside the web application. It can be prevented
by configuring strong authentication and validation for
web based VoIP application27.
2.2.19 TFTP Server Insertion
Hacker tries to plant rouge TFTP server in the network
by disabling/ spoofing actual TFTP server. It forces IP
phones to receive wrong configuration information (e.g.,
Call ID, SIP server IP address and phone number) which
Ashutosh Satapathy and L. M. Jenila Livingston
Indian Journal of Science and Technology 7Vol 9 (6) | February
2016 | www.indjst.org
may provoke bill fraud attack. It will be prevented by
encrypting and authenticating the channel between IP
phones and TFTP server using TLS/ SSL. N. N. Mohamed
et al. suggested compression and encryption technique
to secure TFTP packets28. For compression, lossless
algorithm (e.g., Huffman coding) and for encryption,
symmetric encryption algorithm (e.g., AES, 3-DES) is
used. Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange algorithm is used for
distribution of symmetric key between client and server.
2.2.20 DHCP Server Starvation
Attacker generates random MAC addresses and creates
DHCP request for each MAC address. By flooding DHCP
server with DHCP requests, consumes DHCP IP pool
and to overflow later. It is to be continued until reserved
IP addresses DHCP timers will be expired. Dinu and
Togan proposed digital certificate based DHCP server
authentication to stop DHCP server starvation attack29. It
uses asymmetric key cryptography and digital certificates
for DHCP server authentication and verifying DHCP
response from it to prevent starvation.
2.3 Defense Mechanisms to Prevent Attacks
Defense mechanisms provide basic counter measures to
prevent potential VoIP attacks explained above are broadly
classified into twelve types and listed in Table 2 7,30.
2.3.1 Physical Access Control (PAC)
Physical securities can be implemented mainly three
ways31. First, equipment should be placed and surrounded
by multi-layer barriers, which will prevent from natu-
ral disasters like cyclone, floods etc. (e.g., wall, multiple
locks, fireproof safes etc.). Second, deployment of surveil-
lance systems such as smoke and heat detectors, cameras,
alarms that decreases occurrences of manmade disasters
with maximum amount. At last, practices must be imple-
mented to prevent before any attack has been occur and
fast recovery from damages, if any attack has occurred.
2.3.2 ARP Cache Protection (ACP)
Static ARP cache entries allow maintaining manual
mapping between IP address to MAC address so that
Table 2. Defense mechanisms against attacks
Attacks
Defense
Mechanisms
1.
Ph
ys
ic
al
A
tt
ac
ks
2.
M
A
C
S
po
ofi
ng
3.
A
R
P
Sp
oo
fin
g
4.
IP
S
po
ofi
ng
5.
IC
M
P
Fl
oo
d
6.
T
C
P/
U
D
P
Fl
oo
ds
7.
T
C
P/
U
D
P
R
ep
la
y
8.
S
IP
R
eg
is
tr
at
io
n
H
ija
ck
in
g
9.
M
al
fo
rm
ed
P
ac
ke
ts
10
. S
IP
M
es
sa
ge
M
od
ifi
ca
tio
n
11
. S
IP
C
an
ce
l/
By
e
A
tt
ac
k
12
. S
IP
M
al
fo
rm
ed
C
om
m
an
ds
13
. S
IP
R
ed
ir
ec
t
14
. R
T
P
Pa
yl
oa
d
15
. B
uff
er
O
ve
rfl
ow
16
. O
pe
ra
tin
g
Sy
st
em
17
. M
al
w
ar
es
18
. A
pp
lic
at
io
n
Fl
aw
s
19
. T
FT
P
Se
rv
er
In
se
rt
io
n
20
. D
H
C
P
se
rv
er
S
ta
rv
at
io
n
PAC √
ACP √
OSP √ √ √ √
PA √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
RC √ √
FC √ √ √
SVDT √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
CA √ √
SA √ √ √ √ √ √ √
ME √
IDS √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ …
Reading and summarizing a research article:
Authors’ last names (year) conducted a study about
________________________. The participants were/the setting
was ___________________________. (New paragraph) The
findings were _____________________________. Discussion.
(Possibly a new paragraph) The authors suggested
_____________________. Discussion.
Students should fill in the blanks with their own words. To copy
directly from the article fails to show comprehension and
considered plagiarism.
To “fill in the blanks”, a student should read the journal article
and pay specific attention to:
Sentence #1- Authors’ last names (year) conducted a study
about _________________.
· Read the Abstract; this will give an overview of the study’s
(article’s) purpose.
· Read the entire article without trying to summarize it.
· Go back and read the Literature Review or Background section
of the article. Toward the end of the section, the authors should
identify gaps in the existing literature and tell the reader how
the current study will fill that gap. The authors will also state
their hypothesis (purpose) at the end of this section.
·
Section #2 - The participants were/the setting was
___________________________.
· Read the Methods section of the paper. In this section, the
authors will describe how the data was collected, who was
included in the sample, and any instruments used.
· A reader might want to consider sample size, demographic
characteristics, or any interesting protocol.
· It is not necessary to report every fact (i.e., 35% of the
participants were male, 71%)
Section #3 - The findings were
_____________________________.
· Read the Findings section of the article.
· Some statistics may be confusing. Pay attention to key words
such as “increased”, “decreased”, “improved”, and “reduced”.
· “No change” may also be considered a significant finding.
· Next, read the Discussion section. The authors will present the
findings in general terms. Section #4 - The authors suggested
_____________________.
· Read the Discussion section and look for comments that the
authors made about the intervention or program such as “Did it
work?” or “Should it be continued?”.
· Look for the author’s critique of why the study did or did not
produce results. Did anything unexpected influence the
findings?
· The author may suggest a future line of research or “next
steps” to improve the body of knowledge.
Additional Considerations:
· A literature review is a summary of what research has been
completed in a topic area; it should be summarized in your own
words.
· Read the entire article first and then go back and take notes.
Jot down notes in your own words. This increases
comprehension as well as decreases the likelihood of
plagiarism.
· The review is written in third person; no “I” or “you”.
· Not every detail or fact needs to be reported. A reader will
obtain a copy of the article if more information is needed.
· Write the literature review in the past tense; the research has
already been completed.
· The article cannot “do”, “find”, or “say” anything. The authors
are the people who conducted the study.
· The above format is a guideline. It may be necessary to change
the verbs or to expand an idea.

AbstractVoice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is an advanced t.docx

  • 1.
    Abstract Voice over InternetProtocol (VoIP) is an advanced telecommunication technology which transfers the voice/video over high speed network that provides advantages of flexibility, reliability and cost efficient advanced telecommunication features. Still the issues related to security are averting many organizations to accept VoIP cloud environment due to security threats, holes or vulnerabilities. So, the novel secured framework is absolutely necessary to prevent all kind of VoIP security issues. This paper points out the existing VoIP cloud architecture and various security attacks and issues in the existing framework. It also presents the defense mechanisms to prevent the attacks and proposes a new security framework called Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) using video watermarking and extraction technique and Liveness Voice Detection (LVD) technique with biometric features such as face and voice. IPSs updated with new LVD features protect the VoIP services not only from attacks but also from misuses. A Comprehensive Survey of Security Issues and Defense Framework for VoIP Cloud Ashutosh Satapathy* and L. M. Jenila Livingston School of Computing Science and Engineering, VIT University, Chennai - 600127, Tamil Nadu, India; [email protected], [email protected] Keywords: Defense Mechanisms, Liveness Voice Detection, VoIP Cloud, Voice over Internet Protocol, VoIP Security Issues
  • 2.
    1. Introduction The rapidprogress of VoIP over traditional services is led to a situation that is common to many innovations and new technologies such as VoIP cloud and peer to peer services like Skype, Google Hangout etc. VoIP is the technology that supports sending voice (and video) over an Internet protocol-based network1,2. This is completely different than the public circuit-switched telephone net- work. Circuit switching network allocates resources to each individual call and path is permanent throughout the call from start to end. Traditional telephony services are provided by the protocols/components such as SS7, T carriers, Plain Old Telephone Service (POTS), the Public Switch Telephone Network (PSTN), dial up, local loops and anything under International Telecommunication Union. IP networks are based on packet switching and each packet follows different path, has its own header and is forwarded separately by routers. VoIP network can be constructed in various ways by using both proprietary protocols and protocols based on open standards. 1.1 VoIP Layer Architecture VoIP communication system typically consist of a front end platform (soft-phone, PBX, gateway, call manager), back end platform (server, CPU, storage, memory, net- work) and intermediate platforms such as VoIP protocols, database, authentication server, web server, operating sys- tems etc. It is mainly divided into five layers as shown in Figure1. 1.2 VoIP Cloud Architecture VoIP cloud is the framework for delivering telephony services in which resources are retrieved from the cloud data center through web applications and soft- ware, instead of a direct link to server3. Information and applications are stored on cloud servers in a distributed
  • 3.
    fashion. Apart fromcloud computing characteristics such as on demand service, resource pooling, opti- mize resource allocation, pay as you go, elasticity and scalability4,5, VoIP cloud contains mainly six components as shown in Figure 2. *Author for correspondence Indian Journal of Science and Technology, Vol 9(6), DOI: 10.17485/ijst/2016/v9i6/81980, February 2016 ISSN (Print) : 0974-6846 ISSN (Online) : 0974-5645 A Comprehensive Survey of Security Issues and Defense Framework for VoIP Cloud Indian Journal of Science and Technology2 Vol 9 (6) | February 2016 | www.indjst.org 1.2.2 DHCP Server It is used for dynamically distributing network configu- ration parameters such as Internet Protocol (IP) address, address of TFTP server etc. 1.2.3 Application Server These servers are designed to install, host and operate applications and provide services to end users, IT industries and organizations. 1.2.4 Time Server The main principle of time server is to maintain syn- chronization over the network. The actual time from server clock is distributed to its clients using a computer
  • 4.
    network. 1.2.5 TFTP Server Ithelps to update the network configuration used by the phones, routers, firewalls and perhaps provide a setting file that might contain operational parameters for VoIP network. e.g., software updates, codec used in a particular region. 1.2.6 Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) It monitors networks and systems behavior for malicious instances. The major roles of intrusion prevention sys- tems are to find out suspicious instances and their log information, try to block/stop them and report to con- cern admin. 2. Literature Review VoIP technology was started in February 1995 by Vocaltec, Inc. in Israel. It transfers the voice over high speed network, cheaper comparing to PSTN and reach- able to everywhere through internet by loon developed by Google with 4G LTE speed6. 2.1 VoIP Security Issues VoIP transfers the voice over the data network through different network elements such as switches and rout- ers. Connecting PSTN to internet i.e. VoIP as a carrier for voice/video traffic, the security problems are not only common in circuit switch network (PSTN, POTS) such as eavesdropping (tapping) and toll fraud attack but also 15 42. Liao HJ, Lin CHR, Lin YC, Tung KY. Intrusion detection system: A comprehensive review.
  • 5.
    Journal of Networkand Computer Applications. 2013; 36(1):16–24. 43. Audiopedia. Honeypot (computing). Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2fXAw33jOBk. [Cited 2014 Dec]. 44. Goel R, Sardana A, Joshi RC. Wireless honeypot: framework, architectures and tools. International Journal of Network Security. 2013; 15(5):373–83. 45. Li Z, Grochulla M, Thormahlen T. Multiple active speaker localization based on audio- visual fusion in two stages. Proceedings IEEE International Conference on Multisensor Fusion Integration Intelligence Systems (MFI); Hamburg: Germany; 2012. p. 262–68. 46. Zhu ZY, He QH, Feng XH, Xiongli Y, Wang ZF. Liveness detection using time drift between lip movement and voice. Proceedings IEEE International Conference on Machine Learning Cybernetics (ICMLC); Tianjin: China; 2013. p. 973– 78. 47. Chetty G. Biometric liveness detection based on cross modal fusion. IEEE 12th International Conference on Information Fusion (FUSION). Seattle: WA; 2009. p. 2255–62. Figure 1. VoIP layer architecture. Figure 1. VoIP layer architecture.
  • 6.
    16 Figure 2. VoIPcloud architecture. Figure 3. Proposed VoIP cloud architecture. Figure 4. Video watermarking scheme for signaling message. Figure 2. VoIP cloud architecture. 1.2.1 Call Server Phones are registered with this component. It handles security and admission control while connecting the phones. The Voice data of a call carried by the transport protocol may or may not flow through the call server. Ashutosh Satapathy and L. M. Jenila Livingston Indian Journal of Science and Technology 3Vol 9 (6) | February 2016 | www.indjst.org problems related to IP network. Security issues in VoIP are broadly classified into three categories.
  • 7.
    2.1.1 Real TimeIssues From last decade onwards, VoIP is used for several illegal activities such as hacking, terrorism, match fixing etc. Recently in October 2014, phone Hackers had broken into the phone network of the company, Foreman Seeley Fountain Architecture and routed $166, 000 worth of calls from the firm to premium rate telephone numbers in Gambia, Somalia and Maldives. It would have taken 34 years for the firm to run of those charges legitimately, based on its typical phone bill. 2.1.2 Network Related Issues Attacks related to destroy, block, expose, alter, disable, steal or gain unauthorized access to information in VoIP network (e.g. threats include social, denial of service, ser- vice abuse, physical access, interruption of service etc.) are listed in Table 1 followed by different types of attacks7,8. 2.1.3 Voice Related Issues As VoIP system carries voice traffic, so victim’s voice can be mimicked by an attacker/intruder. A talking and sing- ing robot that mimics human vocalization, developed by M. Kitani, Kagawa University is vulnerable to VoIP communication9. 2.2 VoIP Attacks This section deals with different types of VoIP attacks. 2.2.1 Physical Attacks The attacker performs this attack by stealing, breaking network equipment or direct control over equipment by getting unauthorized access to prohibited area for seeking of information. Some of the physical attacks are dumpster diving, shoulder surfing, hardware key logger and overt access etc. It can be prevented by keeping the documents and records safely inside locker and electronic equipment
  • 8.
    must be passwordprotected. At last, outer layer security can be provided by deploying security guards at enter and exit points. 2.2.2 MAC Spoofing The technique of masking a MAC address upon actual MAC address through software emulation is known as MAC spoofing. Here the hacker’s system is taken over MAC address of one of the node which is already config- ured and permitted as VoIP end device by disconnecting or turning off it from rest of the network. It can be pre- vented by number of ways10. When ARP packet arrives, direct extraction of MAC address from LAN card and from OS registry; Compare the MAC address of LAN card with OS. If it doesn’t match, then delete the entry from OS registry. Lock down the system by registering its MAC address with a DHCP IP address. At last secure the communication channel by encrypting it. 2.2.3 ARP Spoofing Hacker spreads forgery Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) packets inside VoIP network by modifying ARP buffer. Here, attacker binds own system MAC address with IP address of genuine server which causes the traffic imply for server is diverted to attacker. It advances hacker Table 1. VoIP network threats classification Threat Type Description Social threats These threats point straight against individuals such as misconfigurations, security holes or defective protocol implementation in VoIP system. (e.g., Phishing, Theft of identity or Service,
  • 9.
    Social engineering, Spametc.) Eavesdropping, interception and modification threats These threats include illegal/ Un- authorization access and modification of signaling and transport message. (e.g., Call rerouting, interception of RTP sessions etc.) Denial of service threats DoS threats repudiate individual access to VoIP services. DDOS attacks strike all of user’s or business transmission potentials. (e.g., SYN/UDP floods, ICMP floods, etc.) Service abuse threats These threats cause inappropriate utilization of VoIP services when those facilities are provided for business purposes. (e.g., toll fraud and billing avoidance etc.) Physical access threats These threats are illegal physical access to
  • 10.
    VoIP devices orphysical layer of the VoIP network. (e.g., Hardware key logger, theft of media, retrieval of discarded stuffs etc.) Interruption of services threats These threats cause VoIP services/ facilities to unviable and unavailable. (e.g., power loss due to bad climate, resource consumption due to over purchase/ extra subscription, issues that degenerate call quality etc.) A Comprehensive Survey of Security Issues and Defense Framework for VoIP Cloud Indian Journal of Science and Technology4 Vol 9 (6) | February 2016 | www.indjst.org not only listen to VoIP calls but also reply and terminate the VoIP calls intended for other. ARP poisoning followed by denial service threats or eavesdropping, interception or modification threats which cause severe damages to vic- tim. So, Enhanced ARP can be implemented to prevent ARP spoofing11. 2.2.4 IP Spoofing Attacker gets into the VoIP network by tricking the IP address of any authorized machine which helps him to spread malicious message inside the network. IP spoofing helps attacker to launch further attacks such as DoS attack, theft of services, toll fraud etc. by impersonating autho- rized host inside VoIP network. Basically IP spoofing can
  • 11.
    be prevented withmaximum probabilities by configuring broader gateway router. First, router disallows incom- ing packets for destination address coming from source address within one network. Second, router disallows to send packets from local network to another; those don’t have source addresses within that local address range. Y. Ma developed an effective trace route based method for counter measure against IP spoofing and it is worked with trusted adjacent nodes information i.e. acceptance of packets for a node is completely depends upon trace route result from its adjacent nodes12. 2.2.5 ICMP Flood Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) is one of the network layer protocols that carry error and query mes- sages sent by either intermediate nodes or end node. Attacker tries to overflow the receiver cache by flood the respective node with ICMP packets. It forces the node to drop successive ICMP packets until free space available at node’s cache even if request packets come from genu- ine node. Routers are configured to set optimum points for traffic coming from different networks. It will help the routers to not only block unnecessary ICMP packets by matching ICMP requests and responses but also prevent cache overflow. The VoIP system must be configured sepa- rate VLAN for packets originating within a single network which are monitored by firewall. Barbhuiya et al. have developed an error detection framework to identify dif- ferent types of ICMP attack13. It consists of two modules. Verification module verifies origination of ICMP packets and Congestion check module extracts bandwidth utili- zation information using Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP). 2.2.6 TCP/ UDP Floods In TCP flooding attack, hacker creates huge number of SYN
  • 12.
    packets with abnormalsource IP addresses and sends to receiver. Receiver node allocates space in its Transmission Control Buffer (TCB) to each SYN requests. In response to SYN packets, receiver sends SYN+ACK packets and waiting for ACK packets. The SYN+ACK packets carry abnormal IP addresses cause failure to receive ACK packets which prevents receiver node to clear TCP SYN requests from buffer and buffer to overflow later. Attacker can use TCP flood attack against VoIP signaling protocol such as H.323 and SIP; as both are connection oriented protocols. Haris et al. have succeed to detect TCP flood attack in communication by analyzing payload and unus- able area of the HTTP protocol (e.g., port, flags, source IP, header length)14. In UDP flood attack, large number of UDP packets are created with arbitrary source addresses and port num- bers and then sends to victim node. Receiver node will check whether any processes are running on those ports and find most of the ports are closed. In reply, receiver node creates large number of destination unreachable packets. Increase the number of ICMP packets causes the victim node and the network to overflow. The UDP flood attack prevents genuine nodes to communicate the victim node at a particular span of time. Attacker can use UDP flood attack against VoIP transport protocol such as RTP and RTCP; as both are connection less pro- tocol. Bardas et al. proposed a proportional packet rate assumption technique to differentiate UDP traffic for detecting forge IP addresses responsible for UDP flood attacks15. 2.2.7 TCP/ UDP Replay First, attacker tries to obtain network sensitive information such as session cookies, password, voice data, signal- ing data. The information captured by sniffing tools can
  • 13.
    be used byattacker to take over the ongoing session. Sometime victim’s voice can be impersonated by directly playing back recorded voice data or slightly modifying voice data and send to destination which helps the hacker to retrieve more information between caller and callee. Encrypt the sessions is the best way to stop penetration. Ali et al. proposed an enhanced port knocking technique to block TCP replay and port scanning attacks16. It is worked on source port sequences authentication instead of destination port sequence number. Ashutosh Satapathy and L. M. Jenila Livingston Indian Journal of Science and Technology 5Vol 9 (6) | February 2016 | www.indjst.org 2.2.8 SIP Registration Hijacking VoIP phones use SIP or other signaling protocols to register own MAC and IP addresses with call server. In the reply, each phone will get unique call ID which allows it to make or receive VoIP call. Attacker tries to capture registration packets and replaces MAC address from the packets with own MAC address. It helps the rogue node to register with victim IP address which causes call intending for victim node will be forwarded to attacker. SIP registration hijacking allows burglars to track, block and manipulate voice traffic. As end node registration is based on TCP connection, attack will be prevented by implementing SSL/TLS security policies 17. 2.2.9 Malformed Packets The hacker creates malicious packets and forwards them to nodes inside VoIP networks with the help of networking protocols. The target node processes those packets, causes
  • 14.
    open unnecessary portsand processes which degrade per- formance of the nodes to handle VoIP traffic. New patches and software will be installed to maintain the node up-to- date and shutdown the security holes which are vulnerable to attack. New generation firewalls must be installed to provide protection against vulnerable packets by filtering packets based on inbound rules, outbound rules and con- nection security rules. Geneiatakis et al. have succeeded in developing a framework that provides defense against malformed packets for VoIP infrastructure18. The detec- tion mechanism is based on signature detection which consists of two parts. First one, general signature detec- tion (e.g., SIP METHOD, SIP URI, HEADERS) applicable to all the packets and second one is method specific (e.g., CALL-ID, Content-Type, INVITE _METHOD) differ from packets to packets. 2.2.10 SIP Message Modification In message modification attack, by running network sniffing tools (e.g.,Wireshark), attacker penetrates traffic and tries to modify signaling message for better control over the VoIP network. Suppose a user initiates a call to victim’s phone by sending SIP message to call server. Modification of SIP messages confuses and forces the server to connect rogue phone. User knows that he is connected to one user but actually the traffic is routed to attacker. SIP message modification is carried out by performing MITM attack such as MAC spoofing, IP spoofing or ARP poisoning. As SIP and RTP packets transmission are taken place over TCP and UDP connection; VoIP traffic must be encrypted by implementing SSL/TLS to prevent this attack17. 2.2.11 SIP Cancel/ Bye Attack Host (zombie) must be configured in promiscuous mode to lunch attack into VoIP network by sending SIP Cancel
  • 15.
    or Bye packets.Abnormal packets are created and sent to an IP phone from its connected IP phone by spoofing its IP address which will proceed to terminate the ongo- ing call. Attacker can perform this attack continuously for certain period of time by spoofing more than one IP addresses which causes denial of service attack. As both signaling and transport protocols use no authentication prior to data transmission, so, this attack can be prevented by encrypt the communication channels. Second, provide authentication between end device and call server and at last verification of authenticity of signaling message by end devices before processing 19. 2.2.12 SIP Malformed Command In web based VoIP communication (e.g. Facebook, Google Hangout), Hyper Text Markup Language (HTML) plays a major role as it carries all the signaling informa- tion/ command in its body. Parsing SIP command within HTML code for all possible input is really a headache. Attacker tries to inject malformed SIP command in input field and send to server for processing as like SQL injec- tion. In response either it breaks the server authentication or degrades the performance of server and end devices. In counter measure, whether packets are coming from genuine user or not will be confirmed by call server by verifying authenticity of SIP message before processing. Dictionary and fuzzy tests must be performed on HTML code that filtered tricky SIP malformed packets used to exploit server. M. Su and C. Tsai propose two functions to resists malformed SIP packets and flooding attack on call servers20. First function filters malformed packets and second one uses Chi-square test to measure flooding attack on SIP server. 2.2.13 SIP Redirect Call server cache maintains data structure of Phone’s
  • 16.
    caller ID, correspondingMAC and IP address. Attacker manipulates call server cache to confuse the call server for call redirection. So, SIP packets coming for receiver are redirected to attacker specified number. Attacker can perform DoS and DDoS attack by redirecting a single call A Comprehensive Survey of Security Issues and Defense Framework for VoIP Cloud Indian Journal of Science and Technology6 Vol 9 (6) | February 2016 | www.indjst.org or all the calls to void device(s). So, call server must be strong password protected and SIP must be authenticated to prevent redirection attack19. 2.2.14 RTP Payload Captured packets will be played later to listening the conversation between the end users using sniffing tools. Attacker can insert own voice inside RTP payload which degrade the quality of conversation and some- time changed in the meaning of conversation. In RTP tampering, header fields (sequence number, synchroni- zation source Identifier, payload type, timestamp etc.) are tampered which make the packets either unusable or delayed, causes rejection at receiver end. In RTP redi- rection, header field of packets are modified with other receiver caller id and IP address causes packets intending for one will go to other. It can be prevented by configuring VoIP network with Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol (SRTP) instead of RTP21. It will encrypt the RTP packets propagate between callers. 2.2.15 Buffer Overflow
  • 17.
    Buffer is thetemporary storage allocated by OS in physical memory for processing data by computer program. Buffer is mainly divided into four types such as code, data, stack and heap segments. Attacker tries to perform buffer over- flow attack by targeting at least one of the segments. It helps to steal or modify the sensitive information or install malicious code and execute it. Buffer overflow attacks are mainly executed by four ways such as long jump, function activation record, pointer subterfuge and malicious code execution. It can be defended by writing secure code, performing bound checking or static and dynamic code analysis and runtime code instrumentation22. 2.2.16 Operating System In VoIP communication network, IP phones, Call server, TFTP server, gateway and DHCP server etc. requires OS (e.g., Windows, Linux, Mac) to run. So, vulnerabili- ties in OS make them vulnerable23. OS vulnerabilities in VoIP phones are mainly of two types. Hard phones have in build embedded OS which is less vulnerable and more protected than soft phones. VoIP soft phones are software packages which are installed on computers connected to data network. Old hardware, unsupported drivers, bad integration of APIs, unsecure administrator APIs expose OS to attack. Like IP phones, web server OS, DHCP server, and call manager can be exploited by attacker for seeking of sensitive and crucial infor- mation (e.g., password, IP table, VoIP configuration file). As default configuration of OS is not secure, it is exposed to malwares to install. Its execution opens well known ports which helps attacker to run abnormal pro- cesses (e.g., free call, toll fraud). It can be pre-empted by hardening OS24. 2.2.17 Malwares
  • 18.
    A vulnerable pieceof executable codes or program used by unknown third party to install in VoIP network and bring down its performance by hook or crook. Malicious programs or malwares are mainly classified as two cat- egories, first one simple malwares and second one is self-replicated malwares25. Logic bomb and Trojan horse are come under non self-replicated/simple malware. Self- replicating malware such as virus and worm, who spread its infection over the network within few hours or days. Trojan horses are dispatched over network for remote control over victim VoIP phones. Logic bomb helps the attacker to trigger other dangerous attacks (DoS, DDoS, sniffing etc.) in timely manner. It will be prevented by installing updated antivirus and patching up VoIP system software on regular basis. 2.2.18 Application Flaws As most of the VoIP communications are web based, it’s vulnerable to two major application flaws such as Structured Query Language (SQL) Injection attack and cross site scripting attacks. In SQL Injection attack, mali- cious commands are inserted in SQL statements to gain unauthorized access to server database. It can be prevented by implementing three primary defense mechanisms such as defensive coding, SQL injection vulnerabilities detection and runtime SQL injection attack prevention26. In cross site scripting attack, hacker uses the advantages of scripting languages to launch attack by injecting mali- cious code inside the web application. It can be prevented by configuring strong authentication and validation for web based VoIP application27. 2.2.19 TFTP Server Insertion Hacker tries to plant rouge TFTP server in the network by disabling/ spoofing actual TFTP server. It forces IP phones to receive wrong configuration information (e.g.,
  • 19.
    Call ID, SIPserver IP address and phone number) which Ashutosh Satapathy and L. M. Jenila Livingston Indian Journal of Science and Technology 7Vol 9 (6) | February 2016 | www.indjst.org may provoke bill fraud attack. It will be prevented by encrypting and authenticating the channel between IP phones and TFTP server using TLS/ SSL. N. N. Mohamed et al. suggested compression and encryption technique to secure TFTP packets28. For compression, lossless algorithm (e.g., Huffman coding) and for encryption, symmetric encryption algorithm (e.g., AES, 3-DES) is used. Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange algorithm is used for distribution of symmetric key between client and server. 2.2.20 DHCP Server Starvation Attacker generates random MAC addresses and creates DHCP request for each MAC address. By flooding DHCP server with DHCP requests, consumes DHCP IP pool and to overflow later. It is to be continued until reserved IP addresses DHCP timers will be expired. Dinu and Togan proposed digital certificate based DHCP server authentication to stop DHCP server starvation attack29. It uses asymmetric key cryptography and digital certificates for DHCP server authentication and verifying DHCP response from it to prevent starvation. 2.3 Defense Mechanisms to Prevent Attacks Defense mechanisms provide basic counter measures to prevent potential VoIP attacks explained above are broadly classified into twelve types and listed in Table 2 7,30.
  • 20.
    2.3.1 Physical AccessControl (PAC) Physical securities can be implemented mainly three ways31. First, equipment should be placed and surrounded by multi-layer barriers, which will prevent from natu- ral disasters like cyclone, floods etc. (e.g., wall, multiple locks, fireproof safes etc.). Second, deployment of surveil- lance systems such as smoke and heat detectors, cameras, alarms that decreases occurrences of manmade disasters with maximum amount. At last, practices must be imple- mented to prevent before any attack has been occur and fast recovery from damages, if any attack has occurred. 2.3.2 ARP Cache Protection (ACP) Static ARP cache entries allow maintaining manual mapping between IP address to MAC address so that Table 2. Defense mechanisms against attacks Attacks Defense Mechanisms 1. Ph ys ic al A tt ac ks
  • 21.
  • 22.
  • 23.
  • 24.
  • 25.
  • 26.
  • 27.
  • 28.
  • 29.
    PAC √ ACP √ OSP√ √ √ √ PA √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ RC √ √ FC √ √ √ SVDT √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ CA √ √ SA √ √ √ √ √ √ √ ME √ IDS √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ … Reading and summarizing a research article: Authors’ last names (year) conducted a study about ________________________. The participants were/the setting was ___________________________. (New paragraph) The findings were _____________________________. Discussion. (Possibly a new paragraph) The authors suggested _____________________. Discussion. Students should fill in the blanks with their own words. To copy directly from the article fails to show comprehension and considered plagiarism. To “fill in the blanks”, a student should read the journal article and pay specific attention to:
  • 30.
    Sentence #1- Authors’last names (year) conducted a study about _________________. · Read the Abstract; this will give an overview of the study’s (article’s) purpose. · Read the entire article without trying to summarize it. · Go back and read the Literature Review or Background section of the article. Toward the end of the section, the authors should identify gaps in the existing literature and tell the reader how the current study will fill that gap. The authors will also state their hypothesis (purpose) at the end of this section. · Section #2 - The participants were/the setting was ___________________________. · Read the Methods section of the paper. In this section, the authors will describe how the data was collected, who was included in the sample, and any instruments used. · A reader might want to consider sample size, demographic characteristics, or any interesting protocol. · It is not necessary to report every fact (i.e., 35% of the participants were male, 71%) Section #3 - The findings were _____________________________. · Read the Findings section of the article. · Some statistics may be confusing. Pay attention to key words such as “increased”, “decreased”, “improved”, and “reduced”. · “No change” may also be considered a significant finding. · Next, read the Discussion section. The authors will present the findings in general terms. Section #4 - The authors suggested _____________________. · Read the Discussion section and look for comments that the authors made about the intervention or program such as “Did it work?” or “Should it be continued?”. · Look for the author’s critique of why the study did or did not
  • 31.
    produce results. Didanything unexpected influence the findings? · The author may suggest a future line of research or “next steps” to improve the body of knowledge. Additional Considerations: · A literature review is a summary of what research has been completed in a topic area; it should be summarized in your own words. · Read the entire article first and then go back and take notes. Jot down notes in your own words. This increases comprehension as well as decreases the likelihood of plagiarism. · The review is written in third person; no “I” or “you”. · Not every detail or fact needs to be reported. A reader will obtain a copy of the article if more information is needed. · Write the literature review in the past tense; the research has already been completed. · The article cannot “do”, “find”, or “say” anything. The authors are the people who conducted the study. · The above format is a guideline. It may be necessary to change the verbs or to expand an idea.