B. nowak, challenges of liberalization

Challenges of liberalization.
The case of Polish electricity and gas sectors
by

Bartłomiej Nowak*

CONTENTS

I. Introduction
II. Polish energy market in a nutshell
III. Unbundling of transmission system operators
IV. Unbundling of distribution system operators
V. Energy market regulation and third party access
VI. The shortcomings of market reforms

Abstract
This paper applies the general insights of liberalization of the electricity and gas
market to the market conditions of a particularly important new Member State in
the EU, Poland. To this end the aim of this paper is to explain the Polish experience
of liberalizing its energy market by reviewing those developments that produced
its current shape. In fact there are two possible scenarios Polish policy makers
can follow in liberalizing its energy sector. One would involve the UK approach
that encompasses: ownership unbundling, less market concentration, less public
ownership and more private capital in the industry. The second scenario follows
the continental model: more concentration and vertical integration and more State
or public ownership in the energy field (for instance, the French model). These two
widely diverging approaches reflect different energy consumption patterns, energy
mixes, sources of supply and natural resources of various countries. Having these
differences in mind this research reviews developments that have produced the
current state of liberalization of the electricity and gas sectors in Poland and discusses
the prospects for further progress towards an integrated, competitive and liberalized

* Dr. Bartłomiej Nowak, lecturer at the Law Department of the Leon Koźmiński Academy

in Warsaw.

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142 BARTŁOMIEJ NOWAK

European electricity and gas market in the light of the challenges that remain. These
challenges include uneven unbundling, discriminatory third party access, insufficient
independency of national regulator, consolidation and anti-competitive behaviour of
incumbents or abuse of one’s dominant position on the market.

Classifications and key words: electricity, gas, liberalization, competition,
unbundling, third party access, regulation.

I. Introduction

An electricity and gas market fully open to competition is a unique mission,
it is very hard to achieve, but certainly not impossible. Continued supply is
crucial with respect to electricity, and for many customers, also gas. Undeniably,
a guarantee of secure and reliable supplies of gas and electricity at reasonable
prices constitutes an essential public service. However, the supply of energy
is dependent on transmission and distribution infrastructure which is very
costly to construct. Moreover, the fact that the return on investment (ROI)
in networks, storage capacities or Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminals is
calculated on a long-terms basis often discourages potential private investors.
The construction and operation of networks is thus left to natural monopolies
which then have the incentive to use their dominant position, for instance,
to deny access to infrastructure in order to slow down market opening.
Independent regulation, which aims to secure non-discriminatory third party
access to infrastructure, is therefore essential as a surrogate for competition in
network activities. Finally, electricity and gas used to be supplied by only one,
or very few, vertically integrated undertakings (VIU) controlling the entire
electricity/gas distribution chain (from generation to supply) in almost all EU
Member States. This model can be generally associated with high production
costs and artificially low prices supplemented by cross-subsidization and State-
subsidies. As a result, competition was absent and national markets segmented.
Legislation, regulation and market-design are commonly associated with
national governments, EU institutions, independent regulators, independent
system operators and private interest groups. They should play a significant, if
not the main, role in the development of liberalized and competitive national
electricity and gas markets.
The liberalization of the electricity and gas sectors across the EU constitutes
a major part of its Internal Energy Market strategy whereby the rules of a single
market are extended to network industries. Alongside transport, telecoms
and postal services, the energy sector is part of the general EU liberalization
policy, which started in the mid 1980s and lead to the issuance of a substantial

YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES

CHALLENGES OF LIBERALIZATION. THE CASE OF POLISH ELECTRICITY… 143

amount of secondary legislation. Especially relevant in this context are the
2003 Directive concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity
(Electricity Directive) and the 2003 Directive concerning common rules on
the internal market in natural gas (Gas Directive)1. The purpose of these two
acts was to restructure the European electricity and gas sectors by: unbundling
vertically integrated activities of electricity and gas conglomerates; reducing
their horizontal concentration; introducing competition in wholesale energy
generation markets and retail supply; monitoring transmission and distribution
networks and; establishing independent regulators.
The main rules on internal energy markets contained in the directives were
transposed into the Polish Energy Act on 3 May 20052. Unfortunately, some
concerns remain about the compatibility of some of the domestic provisions
with the directives. For example, the existing gas transmission system operator
(TSO) does not seem to be properly unbundled yet. So far, it focuses on
adapting its operations to Poland’s relatively inefficient production and
transmission structure, rather than on modifying its structure, which would in
turn facilitate an open and competitive market. Distribution system operators
(DSOs) in both electricity and gas have also not been functionally and legally
unbundled to the required degree. This gives them the means to discriminate
against other market players, especially new entrants, in favor of their own
supply companies. Another source of constraint lies in Polish regulation itself.
Until the mid 1990s, regulation was a foreign concept for Polish organizational
and legal theory and practice. Polish policy-makers saw regulation as an
unwanted development, considering independent regulators to be a threat to
their authority.
Moreover, the circumstances surrounding the establishment of a Polish
energy regulator substantially differed from the creation of its telecoms
counterpart. In the mid 1990s, little reason existed to set up a telecoms
authority since the sector was monopolised by the State owned landline
operator. With the growth of mobile phones and the privatization of the
incumbent, the need to establish a sector-specific regulator became clear.
According to Majone and Surdej, Poland needed a telecoms regulator in order
to control the incumbent and to ensure non-discriminatory conditions of third

1 Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity (OJ [2003] L 176/37); Directive
2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common
rules for the internal market in natural gas (OJ [2003] L 176/57).
2 Journal of Laws 2005, No. 62, item 552). The Energy Act regulates rules determining

national energy policy, rules and conditions of supply and consumption of energy, fuels and heat,
as well as rules and conditions of operation of energy companies and indicates the authorities
responsible for matters relating to energy and fuels.

Vol. 2009, 2(2)


party access to its facilities3. By contrast, the need to regulate the energy sector
did not arise due to technical improvements. Instead, it resulted from planned
organizational and ownership changes (privatization) of the industry as well
as new economic and organizational theories, which helped demonstrate that
the energy market could be divided into a competitive and a monopolistic
segment.

II. Polish energy market in a nutshell

Although the Polish energy sector is not fully liberalized yet, every household
is theoretically free to choose from which producer or supplier it wishes to
purchases its energy. At the time of Poland’s EU accession, 51% of its energy
market was liberalized4. In reality however, the Polish energy sector is still domi-
nated by its former monopolists. The electricity market is dominated by four
conglomerates controlling the entire electricity distribution chain from genera-
tion to supply. The situation of the gas sector is similar. Polskie Górnictowo Naf-
towe i Gazownictwo S.A. (PGNiG SA), established in 1976 as a fully vertically
integrated State owned monopoly responsible for the entire gas distribution
chain, continues to be the largest, as well as the only Polish, company operating
in oil and gas exploration5, production, processing, storage, and trade6.
Due to the requirements set out in the Electricity and Gas Directives in
relation to the unbundling of VIUs7 (as transposed into Article 9d of the Polish
Energy Act), transmission has been separated, legally and functionally8, from
the competitive activities of energy generation and supply. Nevertheless, PGNiG
3 See G. Majone, A. Surdej, “Regulatory Agencies in Economic Governance. The Polish case
in a comparative perspective”(2006) 5 KICES working papers. Koszalin Institute of Comparative
Administrative Studies 27.
4 M. Olejnik, “National Approaches to implementation – Poland” [in:] P. Cameron (ed.),

Legal Aspects of EU Energy Regulation. Implementing the New Directives on Electricity and Gas
Across Europe, Oxford 2005, p. 405.
5 Exploration and production operations of the PGNiG SA are being conducted on the

Mining and Geological Laws, and as such are not covered by the Energy Act.
6 See PGNiG SA web page at: www.pgnig.pl
7 See Article 9d of the Energy Act (Journal of Laws 2006 No. 89, item 625), as amended by

the Act 2006 which transpose Directives. According to this Article there has to be a separation
between the management of the TSO or DSO on the one hand and the management structure
of the integrated energy undertakings on the other.
8 The core of functional or managerial unbundling is that system operators have effective and

independent decision-making rights as well as independent management structures, especially
regarding access to the networks. Legal unbundling, in contrast, requires that a separate legal
undertaking be created, a legal entity or personality in which all activities different from



SA is still involved in transmission through its subsidiary, the TSO Gaz System.
PGNiG SA is also involved in the distribution and supply of gas, a fact that
effectively blocks competition in this market in violation of the Gas Directive.
Moreover, Polish authorities have delayed the restructuring of the gas
market choosing instead to focus on electricity. The Ministry of Economy
clearly stated that the liberalization of the gas market will be postponed until
20109, a delay not permitted by the Gas Directive. So far, Poland has not
informed the Commission about its plans concerning its gas market for the
potentially transitory period leading up to 2010. The Ministry has merely
asserted that Poland wants to diversify its gas supplies before addressing
the issue of making its gas market more competitive. This claim is mistaken
however, since competition facilitates the diversification of supplies and thus,
enhances the security of supply.
With regard to unbundling, Article 324–325 of the Energy Act distinguishes
between TSOs and DSOs. Article 326–328 concerns gas storage operators, LNG
operators and combined operators. The role of system operators is central to
electricity and gas markets. They are the only entities permitted to carry out
transmission, distribution or storage activities – they must obtain a license
from the Energy Regulatory Office (Urząd Regulacji Energetyki - URE), to
carry out their business10. TSOs are mainly responsible for the transmission11
of energy in Poland, while DSOs are responsible for the transmission and
distribution12 in stipulated regions of Poland, as indicated in their licenses.
System operators are obliged to grant access to their networks to all
suppliers and traders, based on third party access rules set out in the Electricity
and Gas Directives. Article 9 of the Polish Energy Act delegates the power
to issue access tariff decrees to the Ministry responsible for the economy.
Consequently, system operators must grant access in accordance with the
generation and supply (namely, transmission or distribution) are conducted. For more on this
see B. Nowak, Wewnętrzny Rynek Energii w Unii Europejskiej, Warszawa 2009.
9 See Commissions Staff Working Document. Implementation Report – SEC(2006)

1709, page 136. Accompanying document to the Communication from the Commission to the
Council and the European Parliament – Prospects for the internal gas and electricity market
– COM(2006) 841 final. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy_policy/doc/10_internal_
market_country_reviews_en.pdf
10 See Articles 32–43 of the Energy Act.
11 Total number of electricity transmission networks (750 kV-only for connecting Polish

electricity system with Ukraine, currently not used, 400 kV and 220 kV) in Poland is counted to
be 13 thousands km. Additionally due to insufficiency in capacity and technological developments
the distribution networks are used for the transmission purposes that is 110 kV lines, estimated
at 32,5 thousands km. Transmission gas networks amount to 18,6 thousands km. See Program
Operacyjny Infrastruktura i Środowisko, Warszawa 29 listopada 2006; p.4.
12 Distribution electricity networks lower than 110 kV amount to 705 thousands km.

Distribution gas networks amount to 123 thousands km.

Vol. 2009, 2(2)


general terms and tariffs approved by URE concerning the sale, transmission
or distribution agreements between transmission/distribution operators and
suppliers or traders. In the transmission segment, system operators themselves
set tariffs; in the distribution segment, which is not really unbundled, vertically
integrated distribution companies set their own tariffs. System operators can
refuse access but only under certain, justified conditions such as serious
financial or technical inadequacies or issues relating to the security of supply.
Every refusal must be reasoned. The regulator reviews refusals acting in the
capacity as a dispute-settlement body13. System operators are responsible for
the security and condition of the electricity and gas networks14.

III. Unbundling of transmission system operators

Poland has established two TSOs – one for the electricity market (PSE–
Operator) and one for gas (Gaz-System). The directives did not envisage
derogation periods or exemptions from the unbundling requirements for
TSOs. PSE-Operator was unbundled legally and functionally on 1 July 2004
by its parent company PSE SA (currently part of Polska Grupa Energetyczna
– PGE). Gaz-System, the only gas TSO in Poland, was established on 16 April
2004 by its parent company PGNiG SA. Originally, 100% of its shares were
held by its parent company. However, on 28 April 2005, PGNiG SA donated
them to the Polish Ministry of Treasury.15 As a result, the Treasury maintains
direct control over the natural gas transmission system in Poland, even though
around 40% of the transmission networks and other connected facilities is still
owned by PGNiG SA16. However, PGNiG SA is effectively also controlled
by the Treasury, which holds 85% of its shares. Gaz-System has been legally
unbundled since 1 July 2005.
To ensure competition, market opening and the proper functioning of
the European internal energy market, system operators must have effective
and independent decision-making rights as well as independent management
structures, especially with respect to network access. In other words, system
13 Article 8 of the Energy Act.
14 Secure and proper maintenance involves: the ongoing long-term operational security
of the system, the use, maintenance and repair and necessary expansion of the distribution or
transmission networks, including connections to other gas or electricity systems. See for instance
Article 324 and 325 of the Polish Energy Act.
15 For more on this see Gaz-System web page at: http://www.gaz-system.pl/page?mid=10
16 The 60 % has been recently donated through the Ministry of Treasury to the Gaz-System.

See for more on this on portal CIRE.PL - Gaz System odkupi gazociągi? Available at: http://
www.cire.pl/item,29628,1.html



operators should be independent from other activities not directly related
to transmission or distribution. This is of particular significance to Poland
where Gaz-System leases, rather than owns, the entire network infrastructure.
This arrangement effectively makes the TSO an affiliate of PGNiG SA even
thought they were theoretically unbundled both in the legal and functional
sense. The following case study will demonstrate that having VIUs present in
the supply and/or generation chain as well as directly or indirectly involved in
transmission, raises serious doubts about their non-discriminatory behavior.
At the end of 2006, Gaz-System denied pipeline access to the trading
company Emfesz Polska (Hungarian origin). Access was needed in this case to
fulfil Emfesz’s contractual obligations to transport 150 million cubic meters of
gas from the Polish border to the largest Polish fertilizer producer (ZA Pulawy).
The grounds for the denial were vague. Gaz-System claimed, in favour of PGNiG
SA, that Emfesz did not have adequate storage capacity in Poland17 in order
to secure trade (all storage belongs to PGNiG SA). Moreover, according to
PGNiG SA, it needed the entire Polish storage capacity for its own operation18.
As a result, Emfesz lodged a complaint to the Polish Office of Competition and
Consumer Protection (Urząd Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumenta, UOKiK).
However, the UOKiK President upheld the decision of Gaz-System. Emfesz
took the case to the EU and is now awaiting decision. The Emfesz case highlights
several important legal issues concerning the Polish energy sector.
First, access to storage is regulated according to Article 19 of the Gas
Directive, stating that access procedures shall operate in accordance with
objective, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria (Article 19(2)). Since
there is no need to un-bundle storage (only separation of accounts), PGNiG
is left in charge of the entire Polish storage capacity rather than transferring
it to TSOs (be it Gaz-System or other independent storage operators). In
light of PGNiG’s dominant position, Emfesz has not been able to gain access.
This fact might constitute a breach of Article 19 of the Gas Directive. PGNiG
disagreed, claiming that it needed the entire available capacity for its own use.
In fact, it saw the existing capacity as indispensable for its own operations and,
since it was very limited, it clamed that the existing Polish storage capacity was
not sufficient for sharing.

17 Recently Emfesz has found another solution to the obstacles set forth by the PGNiG.
Namely the company had bought underground gas resources (Antonin in Poland) of
approximately 120 million cubic meters of which 80 million cubic meters has been already
exploited. Emfesz after exploiting the remaining 40 million cubic meters, plans to use the
underground resources as the gas storage facilities. For more on this see “Emfesz zarzucił
w Polsce mocną kotwicę” – available at portal CIRE: http://www.cire.pl/item,29706,1.html
18 See “New Gas Reserve Act gives PGNIG even stronger control over the Polish market”

Gas Matters, May 2007, p. 18, Platts.

Vol. 2009, 2(2)


In addition, PGNiG argues that it cannot make its storage capacity available
to third parties due to the Act on fuel reserves19, which forces the company to
store larger quantities of gas in order to secure an adequate reserve in case of
national emergencies. The Act requires every trading company that annually
supplies above 50 million cubic meters of imported gas, to have a storage
capacity in Poland and to maintain a 30-day reserve of gas. Companies that
import less than 50 million cubic meters per year and have less than 100,000
customers are exempt from this requirement. Each year, PGNiG produces
around 3.9 billion cubic meters of gas and imports around 7.9 billion cubic
meters from Russia. At present, its storage capacity is only about 2 billion
cubic meters. If PGNiG’s argument was accepted, one would have to ask:
Why have the Polish authorities adopted the Act on fuel reserves in the first
place (with the aim to store gas on Polish territory) if it was clear that it would
become a dead law due to the lack of storage capacity. In fact, even though
PGNiG already controlled around 95% of the Polish gas market, the Act on
fuel reserves made it possible for PGNiG to also control its competitors, for
instance, by denying access to storage.
Second, the Emfesz case highlights also the fact that a denial of access to
the transmission system may constitute a breach of Article 1(1) of the gas-
regulation20 (which states: “This Regulation aims at setting non-discriminatory
rules for access conditions to natural gas transmission systems (…)”). Thus,
Gaz–System’s denial of system access constitutes discriminatory behaviour on
the part of a TSO, acting in favour of its parent company (PGNiG SA) which
is, in turn, the main gas trader in Poland.
Third, it might be inferred that the behaviour of Gaz–System indicates that
it was informally granted preferential capacity for cross-border transmission
and storage of gas (as the only gas TSO), If that was true, Poland would be
in violation of the ECJ Judgment of 7 June 2005(C-17/03)21 which deems
preferential access to historical long-term supply contracts and capacity
reservations contracts to be discriminatory and thus, in violation of Directive
2003/54/EC and Regulation 1228/2003. Although this judgement concerns
electricity, it could be easily applied to contracts granting preferential
transmission, distribution and storage in other segments of the energy sector
– in the case at hand, natural gas. If so, Poland would be in violation of
Directive 2003/55/EC and Regulation 1775/2005. Still, as a dominant market

19 Act from 16 February 2007 on Reserves of Oil, Oil Products, Natural Gas and on

Procedures in Case of Emergency in Security of Fuel Supply and Disturbance on Oil Market
(Journal of Laws No. 52, item 343).
20 Regulation (EC) No. 1775/2005 of the European Parliament and Council of 28 September

2005 on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks, OJ [2005] L 289/1.
21 OJ [2005] C 182/2.



player, Gaz–System may argue that it has denied access to Emfesz because
it must fulfil its public service obligations by protecting the security of supply
or because it was concerned about the economic and financial difficulties
associated with take-or-pay contracts. However, such refusal would be subject
to derogation by the competent national regulatory authority as well as
confirmation of the Commission, neither of which took place in this case.
Moreover, it is hard to believe that supplying 150 million cubic meters of gas
to a single company would threaten the security of the nation’s supply.
Finally, PGNiG, or more precisely, the Ministry of Treasure as its owner,
might be thought to have breached Article 31 EC. Under this Article, Member
States are obliged to intervene to ensure that State monopolies of a commercial
nature do not discriminate against companies from other EU Member States
regarding the conditions under which goods are bought and sold. In a case
comparable to the above, the Commission issued a formal request under
Article 226 EC asking Malta to intervene in the actions of its monopoly over
the import, storage and wholesale of petroleum products. Malta, according to
Commissioner Kroes, had been maintaining discriminatory measures favouring
its own commercial state monopoly, which blocked potential new entrants
from entering Malta’s wholesale petroleum market22.
The fact that suppliers must negotiate with their competitors in order
to contract their storage needs must be seen as a serious barrier for new
entrants, undermining confidence in the market. As a result, even though
it is not necessary to un-bundle storage, an obligation to separate storage
operators would certainly enable competitors and regulators to verify whether
all available storage capacity is offered on the market on transparent terms.
In addition to its legal consequences, the Emfesz case has political
implications. Polish authorities oppose liberalizing the gas sector because
doing so will boost the prices of subsidised gas and leave the Polish gas
market open to influences by companies such as Emfesz, which has close
ties to the Russian companies Gazprom and RosUkroEnergo. This concern
might be partly eliminated by the third country clause – an amendment to
the Electricity and Gas Directives contained in the third legislative package
on EU internal electricity & gas markets. The package contains safeguards to
ensure that in the event that companies from third countries wish to acquire
a significant interest, or even control, over an EU network, they will have to
clearly and unequivocally comply with the same unbundling requirements as
EU companies. The Commission can intervene where a purchaser cannot

22 For more on this see IP/07/958 from June 2007 on Commission requests Malta to adjust

import monopoly for petroleum products. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
do?reference=IP/07/958&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en

Vol. 2009, 2(2)


demonstrate both its direct and indirect independence from supply and
generation activities.
Even when unbundling is conducted with regard to independent decision-
making, or separate accounting and bookkeeping procedures, the threat
remains that a TSO will remain informally dependent on its parent company.
Experience shows that three types of problems arise where a TSO/DSO forms
part of a VIU. First, system operators often treat their affiliated companies
better than competing third parties, for instance, by using network assets to
make entry more difficult for competitors. Second, non-discriminatory access
to information cannot be guaranteed since there is no effective tool to prevent
a TSO/DSO from releasing sensitive market information to the generation or
supply branch of a VIU. Third, investment incentives within VIU are distorted
since vertically integrated system operators have no reason to develop their
network in the interests of all market players. Such situation has a negative
influence on the competitiveness of the Polish energy sector as well as its
security of supply, especially in terms of infrastructure. Therefore, ownership
unbundling seems to be the best solution to end discriminatory practices.
Ownership unbundling should give rise to a situation where the same person
(e.g. a pension fund) can only hold non-controlling minority interests (for
instance up to 10% of shares) in a TSO/DSO and a supply undertaking.
Moreover, minority shareholders should not be able to hold blocking rights
in both undertakings nor appoint members of their managerial boards nor
have a representative in the boards of both entities. This way, the inherent
conflict of interests would diminish.
However, as a key amendment proposed in the Commission’s third energy
package, ownership unbundling remains a controversial issue. According to
the Commission and Member States such as the UK and the Netherlands,
the most radical form of ownership unbundling would increase competition
and clear the path for a greater level of sustainability and supply security23.
On the other hand, ownership unbundling is strongly opposed by the affected
companies, such as E.ON and RWE or EDF and GDF, as well as by Germany
and France24. These two countries, in light of the specific structure and strong
23 For more on this see third legislative package
24 In fact the Commission’s proposal of ownership unbundling has been criticized by 8
countries: France, Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, Latvia, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Greece. The
8 countries in a letter to the European Commission and the chairwomen of the European
Parliament’s ITRE committee published in January 2008 (for more on this see Goldberg S.,
“Recent developments in the European Union energy sector” (2008) European Energy Review
published by Herbert Smith LLP in association with Gleiss Lutz and Stibbe ) gave several main
reasons for their opposition to ownership unbundling. They argue that ownership unbundling:
i) may not be compatible with the relevant constitutional laws and the free movement of capital
across the EU, ii) dose not respect the principle of proportionality as they argue other solutions



national orientation of their energy sectors, have chosen to advocate a third
way on ownership unbundling – an independent system operator – sometimes
referred to as the Scottish model. In Scotland, the two dominant energy
companies continue to own electricity infrastructure but the transmission lines
are leased and run by National Grid, an independent group that runs the
infrastructure of UK’s gas and electricity networks. This model could offer
a compromise between those calling for big energy groups to be carved up and
those advocating less radical action such as France or Germany.

IV. Unbundling of distribution system operators

The situation in the distribution segment of the Polish energy sector is
more complicated than in transmission. Distribution companies are dominant
in their respective geographic regions. New traders occasionally enter the
market but they are generally linked to one of the main generators. According
to Polish officials, DSOs have been functionally and legally unbundled. In
reality, most DSOs are part of distribution supply companies (which have
no production/generation capacity, though most of them are linked to major
electricity generating companies). Only recently has a moderate change in that
structure appeared – there are now fourteen electricity and six gas distribution
companies, though most of them still function as DSOs and supply entities.
In the gas market, all six distribution companies are subsidiaries of PGNiG
SA. The latter also largely controls the supply (sales) of gas to end-users,
making it able to take actions against a competitive market. In addition, Polish
authorities are delaying the liberalization of the gas sector until after the
restructuralisation of the electricity sector. However, since the Commission
did not foresee such a transitional period for the gas sector, it might yet start
infringement proceedings against Poland under Article 226 TEU for the
violation of the provisions of the Gas Directive.
From the six gas distribution companies (dolnośląska, górnośląska,
karpacka, mazowiecka, pomorska i wielkopolska), only one sales entity
(Oddział Handlowy PGNiG) has been actually unbundled as of 1 July 2007.
Still, even this company remains under the supervision of its mother company

are available; iii) is not sufficient and appropriate tool to deliver the opening of the European
markets and to reach objective of guaranteeing an adequate level of investment in the networks
and fostering the integration of the internal market, iv)generates negative social consequences,
although not specified what kind of; and v) will not have clear and positive consequences for
grid investments and energy prices, as these are determined by other factors according to the
eight, although again not specified what kind of factors.

Vol. 2009, 2(2)


PGNiG SA. In theory, the six existing distribution companies became DSOs
strongly connected to PGNiG SA. However, why was only one sales entity
unbundled so far and why has it been placed under PGNiG supervision?
Moreover, the six new DSOs are controlled by PGNiG SA, an arrangement
that is anti-competitive and incompatible with the unbundling requirements
of the Gas Directive. It is hard to believe that the Commission will overlook
the fact that the distribution and sales segments of the Polish gas market, even
though theoretically unbundled, are in practice still under the supervision and
command of a single VIC.
In comparison to the gas market, the distribution segment of the electricity
market is more competitive. However, the level of dominance of PGE is
still significant. Of the fourteen electricity distribution companies, only two
(RWE STOEN and GZE SA25) are owned by foreign capital. The remaining
twelve are to some degree dependent on the Polish Treasury and the former
monopolist. In light of the derogation periods provided in the Electricity
Directive (with respect to legal unbundling and the under-100,000 customer
clause), it is possible to have distribution companies operate as both supply
companies and DSOs. This solution has however negative consequences for
market participants because it creates the impression that the interest of the
supply company is convergent with the interests of DSOs. Such convergence
increases the possibility of discrimination against access-seeking third parties,
which, in turn, reduces competition.
Furthermore, the Polish electricity market is currently in a state of transition
with the management of the distribution companies often also responsible for
the management of supply and distribution (network) activities. No separate
premises or business structures – one for the DSO and another for the supply
company – exist. Moreover, all distribution companies in Poland supply more
than 100,000 customers in both the electricity as well as gas market. Thus, none
meets the exception clause set in the Electricity Directive (less than 100,000
customers) making it possible to postpone functional unbundling. All this
might suggest that Poland has not actually managed to functionally un-bundle
its electricity market. If so, that would suggest a violation of EU laws.
Not surprisingly, the European Commission opened infringement proceed-
ings against Poland in April 200626. In its Letter of Formal Notice, the Com-
mission stated that Poland had either not begun legally unbundling or had not

25 GZE SA (76,4% owned by Vattenfall) currently has been unbundled and the following

entities have been created: Vattenfall Distribution Poland (GZE SA), Vattenfall Sales Poland
(GZE Kontakt) and Vattenfall Heat Poland (EW SA).
26 See Memo/06/152 Infringement procedures opened in the gas and electricity market

sector, by Member States. Brussels, 4 April 2006, and “Polska nie przestrzega prawa unijnego”
Gazeta Prawna, 19.12.2006.



sufficiently unbundled its DSOs in the gas and electricity market. Additionally,
the Commission claimed that Poland did not notify its public service obliga-
tions in the electricity and gas markets and also maintained preferential access
for some historical contracts in relation to electricity. The Commission decided
on 18 September 2008 to send a reasoned opinion to Poland concerning the
failure to fully implement the Gas Directive27 Since some of its provisions
were indeed not transposed into the Polish legal system. The Commission
decided however to limit the scope of its reasoned opinion to Poland’s failure
to designate a storage system operator. A reasoned opinion is the last step of
the infringement procedure before referral to the Court of Justice.
Several additional problems arise from the “Program for the Polish electro-
energy sector” policy adopted in 2006 by the Council of Ministers. On its basis,
electricity distribution companies with network assets were grouped together
with generators. As a result, four new energy giants were established. (i) The
first vertically integrated conglomerate was set up under the name Polish
Energy Group (Polska Grupa Energetyczna, PGE). It was created primarily
on the basis of PSE SA, with an additional 85% stake of the largest Polish
electricity generator (BOT Górnictwo i Energetyka SA), which was in turn made
up of three electricity plants (Bełchatów, Opole, Turów) and two coalmines.
Added was also: PGE-Energia SA, made up of a generation company (Zespół
Elektrowni Dolna Odra) and four combined heat and power plants (CHP
Rzeszów, CHP Wrotków, CHP Gorzów, and CHP Bydgoszcz) as well as eight
distribution companies operating in the east and south of Poland (Łódzki Zakład
Energetyczny SA, Zakład Energetyczny Łódź-Teren SA, Zakład Energetyczny
Warszawa-Teren SA, Lubelskie Zakłady Energetyczne LUBZEL SA, Zakład
Energetyczny Białystok SA, Rzeszowski Zakład Energetyczny SA, Zakłady
Energetyczne Okręgu Radomsko-Kieleckiego SA, and i Zamojska Korporacja
Energetyczna SA). (ii) The second conglomerate was named Tauron Polska
Energia. It was established by merging Południowy Koncern Energetyczny
(made up of five power plants, two CHP plants and two coal mines) with an
electricity generator (Stalowa Wola) and two distribution companies (ENION
and ENERGIA-PRO). (iii) The third energy giant, ENERGA, contains three
power plants (Zespół Elektrowni, PAK, and Ostrołęka) and the distribution
company Energia (formerly the group G-8 operating in northern Poland). (iv)
Finally, the fourth conglomerate, ENEA, combined an electricity generator
(Kozienice) and a distribution company (Enea).
Chart 1 identifies the shares of the four VIC and the regions in which they
operate in Poland.

27 IP/08/1374 Internal market in natural gas: the Commission sends reasoned opinion to

Poland, Brussels, 18 September 2008.

Vol. 2009, 2(2)


Chart 1. Consolidation of the electricity sector in Poland.

Source: Polish Energy Regulatory Office (Urząd Regulacji Energetyki, URE)

The creation of the energy giants might have been a good idea in theory,
assuming that they would compete with each other on the domestic market
and, potentially, also externally. In practice however, the compatibility of this
change is put in doubt in light of the provisions of the Electricity Directive,
as transposed into the Polish legal system, unless a number of legal issues are
considered.
The main problem associated with this reshuffle surrounds the issue
of unbundling and, in particular, the need to ensure that generation and
supply are separated from distribution and transmission. In other words, the
conglomerate PGE would have to separate its network activities from its supply
activities, while its eight distribution companies would have to become supply
companies only rather than DOSs. Alternatively, they would have to divest
their supply activities and become system operators only. For example, Zakład
Energetyczny Warszawa-Teren SA does not currently fulfil the unbundling
requirements. The company engages in generation, distribution and supply of
electricity and heating. Moreover, it has around 815,000 customers and as such,
it does not qualify for the “less-than-100,000-customer” derogation from the



unbundling requirement set out in the Electricity Directive. Other distribution
companies from other conglomerates, such as ENION and ENERGIA-PRO,
are in a similar position. Moreover, even though the unbundling requirement
had not been fulfilled at that time, in late 2007, URE granted a distribution
activities concession to all eight of PEG’s distribution companies28. Was
URE’s decision based on political considerations or was it a naïve wish of the
regulator hoping that the companies would have unbundled by 1 July 2007?
It is doubtful whether the consolidation of the energy sector under State
auspices is the correct choice. In Poland, consolidation through administrative
methods is a political, rather than a market-oriented, solution. It goes against
the Commission’s ambitions to liberalize the continent’s energy markets, to
offer consumers more choice and to lower gas and electricity bills. Whenever
politicians intervene in the mechanism of the free market, they jeopardize
its overall long-term economic outcome. That has certainly been the case in
Poland. The Polish Government might not have enough human and financial
resources to equally equip all four of its new energy giants in order to create
potentially competitive players on the EU market. A general scarcity of
capital and resources in different branches of the national economy might
also negatively affect the energy sectors. In addition, domestic consolidation
by administrative means might bring about either of two possible outcomes.
It may have a positive impact on the conglomerates, or at least on some of
their parts, by strengthening poorly performing companies within the group.
In other words, their well performing elements might act as leverage for their
weak elements. However, the opposite might be true instead whereby the
poorly performing companies might slow down the development of the strong
ones, thus lowering the value and competitiveness of the group overall. This
would, in turn, lower the overall competitiveness of the group in the context
of the internal market.
Consolidation might indeed lead to greater cost savings or lower energy
prices for consumers but only under the assumption that the group would
become more efficient thanks to internal restructuring and better transparency.
In this regard, privatization is the best route: consolidation makes sense only
when accompanied by a sell of parts of the energy companies. At least partial
privatisation would generate the capital and achieve the internal corporate
resilience necessary to compete on EU markets. In defence of the energy
companies, one might argue that the global financial crisis in general, and
skyrocketing prices of wholesale gas and coal in particular has put them under
great strain. In fact, it might have left them with no choice at all but to pass
on their increasing costs to customers as well we to consolidate to increase
28 See “Cztery firmy bez wydzielonej dystrybucji prądu”, Gazeta Prawna, 1 June 2007.

Available also at: http://www.cire.pl/item,27919,1.html

Vol. 2009, 2(2)


capitalization. Consolidation might indeed enable them to weather the present
crisis. In the long run however, it may prove to have a harmful influence on
the competitiveness of the Polish energy sector.

V. Energy market regulation and third party access

Regulation is commonly traced back to US industrial development and, in
particular, to the railroad industry. Between 1840 and 1940, many independent
agencies emerged whose members were appointed by the US President. The
US President would not normally revoke these appointees before the end
of their term in light of the concerns that presidential powers would grow
excessively to the point of threatening the constitutional balance of power29.
However, the idea of sector-specific regulation was not exclusive to the US.
Its roots can also be traced back 19th Century England where the Parliament
created an independent railway commission with limited legislative, rather
than exclusively administrative, powers.
In contrast, the European continental model of regulation has not been
burdened by the problem of a “checks and balances” system so important in
the UK and the US30. Regulatory authorities were historically established so
as to be functionally independent from political influences of presidents, prime
ministers or ministers. They were intended to be impartial decision-making
bodies without raising major constitutional concerns. However, in most EU
countries, explicit constitutional provisions seem to exclude the possibility of
establishing administrative bodies such as regulators not directly linked to
the government or to a specific minister. For example, Article 146(3) of the
Constitution of the Republic of Poland states that the Council of Ministers
directs the activities of public administration. Similarly, the 1958 French
Constitution is based on the idea that public administration is hierarchically
subordinated to a Minister or to the Prime Minister. Article 20(2) of the
French Constitution states that the government shall have at its disposal the
apparatus of public administration. Article 20(3) notes that the government
will answer to the French Parliament for its own actions as well as for the
acts of its public administrators. Article 21 further prescribes that the Prime
Minister must direct the activities of the government. It might be concluded,
that the French Constitution prohibits the creation of independent regulatory
29 On development of regulation see more G. Majone, Regulating Europe, Routledge,
London 1996, p. 10.
30 For more on the history of regulation in Europe see W. Hoff, Polish energy regulation in

its European setting, LKAEM Publishing House, Warszawa 2007, p. 86–88.



agencies. However, the French Conseil Constitutionnel ruled in 1986 that
Article 21 of the Constitution does not stand in the way of the Parliament
assigning responsibility for establishing rules in a specified policy area to
another public authority. That conclusion was based on the assumption
that this was done within the framework of an act of parliament and for the
purpose of implementing that act. The Conseil Constitutionnel also held that
Article 20(2) would be violated only if the delegation of powers infringed
essential aspects of governmental policy31.
Different aims were pursued by regulation in differed countries. The pur-
pose of regulation in the UK and the US was not to promote competition per
se, as it was in continental Europe, but rather to supervise network companies
and their potentially monopolistic activities32. Such dissimilarity was linked
to different ownership structures. In the UK and the US, network compa-
nies were from the outset largely privately owned. In continental Europe, the
operation of the networks was entrusted to State owned energy undertakings,
which in turn created legal and natural monopolies. In this regard, Poland’s
approach to energy regulation and liberalization follows the continental model
whereby the regulator in granted independence mainly to enhance its imparti-
ality in decision-making. Nonetheless, in line with the German model, regula-
tory functions are integrated into the Polish Ministry of Economy33. Statutory
regulation is still a fairly new concept in Poland. As a result, no general legal
framework or doctrinal consensus exists in relation to the question of how
should regulatory agencies function in practice. The ongoing debate concerns
the limits to the political independence of regulators as well as the scope of
their powers. The trend is clear however: in spite of residual constitutional
doubts and democratic concerns, independent regulators have become a nec-
essary component of effective governance in all industrialized countries.
New market-oriented regulation for network industries requires an active
national regulatory authority, independent from the influence of market players
as well as from day-to-day governmental interference. The Polish energy regulator
monitors network performance and regulates energy enterprises in order to secure
the interests of final consumers and, at the same time, to ensure market stability34.
However, the competences of URE changed considerably with Poland’s accession
to the EU. Presently, it holds the position of a central authority of public admin-
istration. According to Article 21(2a) of the Polish Energy Act, the President of

31 For more on this see G. Majone, A. Surdej, “Regulatory Agencies…”, p. 7–8.
32 For more on the aim of regulation in different countries see W. Hoff, Prawny model
regulacji sektorowej, Warszawa 2008, p. 26–38.
33 More on the regulatory functions of the URE and Ministry of Economy and its correlation

see F. Elżanowski, Polityka energetyczna. Prawne instrument realizacji, Warszawa 2008, p. 84–94.
34 www.ure.gov.pl

Vol. 2009, 2(2)


URE is nominated by the Minister responsible for the economy (presently, the
Minister of Economy) and appointed by the Prime Minister. Until 2006, the term
in office of the President of URE was set for five years35.
Unfortunately, the Act on State Human Resources and Senior Higher State
Offices of 24 August 200636 removed the tenure of the URE President. By
doing so, it eliminated one of the fundamental pillars ensuring its autonomy,
violating in turn the independence requirement set out in the Electricity
and Gas Directives. The Prime Minister can dismiss the URE President in
one of the listed cases37: continued inability to perform his/her duties due to
severe illness; grave violation of duty or criminal conviction. At first sight, it
might seem that the law provides the regulator with sufficient independence
from the government. However, the dismissal grounds are rather vague.
With this change, the government acquired almost unlimited power to shape
the structure of the regulatory system38. In practice, the autonomy of the
regulator is therefore rather limited while political influence is significant. This
should be perceived as a major step back for Poland on its road to creating
an independent regulator.
Several issues compromise the independence of the Polish energy
regulator at this moment. The first major problem lies in the supervision
over administrative bodies such as URE. The Ministry of Economy supervises
its activities based on the Act on the Council of Ministers39. According to
its Article 34a(1), the Minister may issue binding decisions directed to his/
her subordinate (dependent) agencies. In addition, Article 12 names the
Minister of Economy as the chief administrative authority in charge of the
energy policy. In practice therefore, all actions of URE must be compatible
with governmental policy - URE must seek guidelines from the Ministry. As
a result, the regulator is often under political pressure to act in favour of the
incumbents (owned by the Treasury) or in favour of political considerations,
rather than in favour of the market, for example, by approving inappropriate
supply tariffs for gas or electricity (prices charged to end users).
On the one hand, regulated prices may sometimes protect customers, for
instance, in the period of transition to an open and competitive market40 or
35 See Article 21(2a) of the Energy Act.
36 Journal of Laws 2006 No. 170, item 1271.
37 Article 12(5) of Act of 24 August 2006 on State Human Resources and Senior Higher

State Offices of 24 August 2006
38 For more on his see Hoff W. (2007) Polish Energy Regulation in it European setting.

LKAEM Publishing House, Warsaw p. 78–82.
39 Ustawa z dnia 8 sierpnia 1996 o Radzie Ministrów (Journal of Laws 2003, No 24, item

199 with subsequent amendments.
40 In transition periods towards well functioning competition the coexistence of regulated

and market prices may be necessary to protect customers from potential abuse of dominant



when they are most vulnerable41. On the other hand, regulated prices are
also a political instrument – when elections are in sight, politicians like to
keep electricity and gas prices low. Unfortunately, market structure may suffer
from price controls that should be declared a public service obligation. The
free market cannot function if electricity prices are kept constant, despite
rising costs of primary energy sources such as coal, oil or gas. On the gas
market, low prices are hard to reconcile with such market factors as the
need to move to more expensive supply sources such as LNG. As a result,
regulated prices are a strong disincentive for investment in new generation
capacity and alternative energy infrastructure, placing those who invest in
renewable energy at a competitive disadvantage because it is more expensive
than conventional energy production. Moreover, if regulated prices are not
in line with the market, those suppliers that have no capacity to generate
significant cost savings, or equivalent long-term contracts, will not be able to
make competitive offers, which would cover their supply costs.
Therefore, in a country like Poland, where long-term contracts are being
slowly abolished, maintaining regulated prices is a dangerous step for the
market. It would be justified to separate the regulator from the Ministry and
entrust the Parliament with the power to supervise it. This idea is supported by
the fact that the division of tasks between URE and the Ministry of Economy
is currently quite vague. Seeing as it is unclear who is in charge of guarantying
the functional unbundling of network system operators, neither entity seems
to be responsible. However, considering that unbundling is a political issue,
it requires a political solution.
The second major problem concerning URE’s independence derives from
the fact that the regulator is financed from the State budget. Its autonomy is
endangered by the potential risk of abuse of power by the government in shaping
the budget allocated to the authority. This problem might soon be resolved
thanks to the third legislative package on EU Electricity & Gas markets, which
proposes to give budgetary autonomy to national regulators. Furthermore,
since the regulator had no say as to the government’s consolidation plans, as
well as no authority to regulate cross-border issues, URE does not have the
power necessary to intervene in the functioning of the market and to move it
towards liberalization.

positions. Unfortunately in practice the co-existence of regulated and market prices is clearly
not a transitory measure e.g., France or Poland. Such scheme has been valid for many years
and there are no clear indications that Member States with regulated prices intend to remove
them and proceed towards market prices.
41 However protecting vulnerable customers which fulfils requirements of public service

obligations should not be confused with maintaining regulated energy prices for all categories
of customers.

Vol. 2009, 2(2)


The third issue impacting the independence of the energy regulator concerns
the absence of transparency in URE’s relationship with the UOKiK. The two
institutions must be separate and autonomous in their operations, especially
in circumstances where both can claim jurisdiction such as abuse of market
power or violations of suppliers’ rights in third party access. Electricity and
gas markets, where many mergers and acquisitions fall under antitrust law,
are in urgent need of a clear identification of the hierarchy of authority and
responsibility between URE and UOKiK.
Third party access has been implemented in Poland through the regulation
of access tariffs to the transmission and distribution networks. The question
of whether customers really do have third party access is measured by the
possibility of switching suppliers. In general, a high switching rate indicates
that there is a high level of choice of suppliers or traders. If suppliers
and traders have easy access to networks, it can be assumed that access is
transparent and based on well-defined tariffs. If the percentage of customers
switching suppliers is low, in other words, if customers remain with incumbent
suppliers, it must be assumed that their regulated prices impede the entrance
of new suppliers. According to the Commission’s Benchmarking Report of
2004, only 7% of large customers switched suppliers in the Polish electricity
sector42. In 2005, only around 20% of large industrial customers and less than
1% of smaller businesses changed electricity suppliers43. The switching rates
remained low with only a few very large users changing electricity suppliers in
2006. Unsurprisingly, no gas customer has switched its supplier to date44 and
it is doubtful that such switch will take place next year.
As of 1 July 2007, there were 15.7 million electricity and 6.7 million gas
customers eligible to change suppliers45. According to URE’s provisional
statistics, only 63 industrial customers and 541 households changed their
suppliers of electricity in 2007. Among the reasons contributing to low switching
levels lies the fact that the switching procedure is costly and complicated
involving: the need to balance rules set up by different DSOs; high costs of
metering systems introduced by a number of distribution companies and;
high equipment modernization costs. Switching is additionally obstructed by
heavy administrative burdens such as the need for an expensive and complex
expertise concerning access to the system for renewable energy in the case of

42 http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/electricity/report_2005/doc/trade_unions/12b_epsu_

psiru_report.pdf
43 For more on this see European Commission, Report on Progress in Creating the Internal

Gas and Electricity Market, SEC(2005) 1448.
44 See “New Gas Reserves Act gives...”, p. 18.
45 For more on this see Z. Żukowski, “Umowę dostawy energii będzie można wypowiedzieć”

Gazeta Prawna of 15 June 2007.



implicit (presumed) lack of capacity set by the operators. Customers are further
deterred from switching by the lack of an automated customer information
exchange system between suppliers and distributors.
In comparison, at the end of 2006, approximately 50% of all customers
(more than 50% of large industrial customers, more than 50% of small and
medium businesses and 48% of all households) changed suppliers on the UK
electricity market. On the gas market, entities other than the incumbent supply
64% of all customers: more than 85% of large industrial customers, more than
75% of small and medium businesses and 47% of homes46. These numbers
place the UK energy sector among those with the highest switching rates in
the EU.

VI. The shortcomings of market reforms

The shortcomings of the reforms of the national energy sector can be traced
back to the fact, that competition in Poland is generally limited to vertically
integrated suppliers that are part of former monopolists. Non-vertically
integrated (“independent”) energy producers and suppliers have been largely
excluded from the market and thus, from the benefits of liberalization. In
consequence, vertically integrated incumbents divided the market among
themselves – facing only minimal competition – significantly limiting customer
choice. Therefore, even though all customers have the right to choose their
supplier since 1 July 2007, their choice is in practice very restricted since
suppliers are strongly linked to incumbent system operators, which hold the
right to grant access to their networks.
In the first part of 2007, only around 1.5% of electricity was purchased on
a liberalized market and only 1.8 % of the volume of gas was purchased by
entities other than the regional distribution companies owned by PGNiG47.
This constraint does not apply to energy trading companies, which in theory
could operate on a regional or national scale. In practice however, they do
not do so because over 55%48 of all energy trading is blocked by existing long-
term contracts (LTC). Long-term contracts are an exception in competitive
markets with adequate liquidity (e.g. the Scandinavian or UK electricity
markets). Conversely, in less liberalized markets, companies are bound by
long-term supply contracts which oblige them to receive all of their electricity
46 Data collected during the stage at the European Commission DG TREN, Unit D-1.
47 See “New Gas Reserves Act...”, p. 18.
48 See the assumptions of the Ministry of Economy on long-term contracts available at:

http://www.cire.pl/item,27821,1.html

Vol. 2009, 2(2)


or gas from the incumbents. Long-term supply contracts can create barriers for
smaller firms that want to expand their sales or for potential competitors who
want to enter the market. A dominant firm is thus likely to abuse its market
position, in light of Article 82 EC, if it ties a substantial proportion of demand
to obligatory purchases on a long-term exclusive basis49. Long-term contracts
have generally the potential to prevent, restrict or distort competition. They
are subject to scrutiny under EU competition rules.
Poland has repeatedly, but so far unsuccessfully, tried to eliminate LTCs
between electricity generators and PSE (acting as a single buyer), most of
which were concluded in the later half of the 1990s. A new law on the recovery
of stranded costs due to the cancellation of LTCs50 entered into force in August
2007. A maximum of € 3.3 billion51 in compensation is offered to State owned
and private electricity generators as an incentive for a voluntary cancellation
of LTCs. If power producers do not take advantage of this voluntary scheme,
they leave themselves open to sanctions by the Commission, which believes
that LTCs distort competition.52 Compensation payments started in the second
quarter of 2008 – all 13 State owned generators as well as several privately
owned generators, such as Elcho (owned by CEZ), Zielona Góra and Kraków
(owned by EDF), Połaniec (owned by Electrabel) and Nowa Sarzyna (owned
by Ashmore Energy, formerly Enron), are expected to cancel their LTCs.
A new law on LTCs envisages additional compensation of up to € 270
million53 for gas-fired, combined heat and power plants signed before 1 May
2004. Gas-fired CHP plants have higher variable costs flowing from take-or-
pay commitments for the supply of gas. Without extra compensation, gas-fired
plants would be disadvantaged vis-à-vis coal-fired generators, which buy local
coal under short-term contracts. Five CHP plants will be eligible for extra
compensation (Zielona Góra, Nowa Sarzyna and three state owned companies:
EC Gorzów, which is owned by PSE, EC Lublin and EC Rzeszów).
The cancellation of LTCs is legally and practically logical and justifiable.
They have a negative influence on competition and market liquidity creating

49 See Case T-65/89 BPB v. Commission [1993] ECR II-389, para. 68.
50 Journal of Laws 2007 No. 130, item 905.
51 See Ministry of Economy Web page available at: http://www.mg.gov.pl/Wiadomosci/

Strona+glowna/kdt.htm (visited 13 July 2007).
52 In this regard in November 2005 Commission used its competences under Article 226

EC and asked Poland to deliver Reasoned Opinion regarding long-term contracts. Additionally
in its decision C-17/03 of June 2005 ECJ (concerning preferential access given by the Dutch
regulator to transport capacities, for imports resulting from long-term electricity supply
contracts) considered that the existence of long-term contracts, even concluded before the
entry into force of the electricity directive, does not justify any preferential treatment and as
such LTC are perceived discriminatory vis-à-vis other market players.
53 “Poland’s power producers to terminate PPAs” (2007) 116 Energy in East Europe.



entry barriers and distorting the prices of final energy products. The mechanism
is straightforward – compensation is being paid in quarterly, pre-payments
spread over a period of several years. The payments are handled by a special
body, the Manager of Accounts (Zarządca Rozliczeń), owned by the TSO
PSE-Operator. The costs of the compensation will be borne by end users.
A transitional fee will be added to their electricity bills replacing the current
equalization fee. Compensation will be calculated based on the difference
between revenues raised from the sale of the amount of electricity produced
at market prices and estimated stranded costs.
Although the cancellation of LTCs does not raise major legal issues, it has
some negative economic consequences. Long-term contracts provide a financial
guarantee for electricity generators seeking to invest in infrastructure – they
were used to secure bank credits of around € 5.3 billion54 (about half of which
has already been repaid) to finance the modernization of aging plants and
the construction of new capacity. Additionally, LTCs serve as a guarantee
for private investors seeking to invest in the energy sector. Assuming that
there is a need for new nuclear generation capacity, or capacity based on
renewable resources, the return on investment in the energy sector is very
long. Finding potential investors is therefore difficult, especially since the
necessary input would have to be substantial. Additionally, present global
financial crisis is putting an extra strain on the whole of the world economy.
The cost of a 2500 megawatt nuclear power plant would be around $7 billion
(3 million per megawatt as opposed to 1 million per megawatt in a coal-fired
power plant). Receiving a guarantee in the form of a LTC for the supply of
electricity would help secure investment and sustain its rating. Because around
60% of Polish infrastructure needs immediate upgrading, that extra security
is important. Unfortunately, legal and business considerations are not always
in sync – a lot depends here on the will of the banks to grant credits without
the guarantee of a LTC.
Another significant factor delaying the opening of the market, and thus the
advent of effective competition, is the slowness of the privatization process. Some
believe that energy companies should not be privatized at all. Considering that
they are the backbone of the national energy sector, they fear that privatization
might undermine the nation’s security in the energy field.55 The managers of
the incumbents as well as their trade unions maintain that privatization will
result in major job losses and negative consequences for the environment. Not
surprisingly, the energy sector is overstaffed, inflating energy prices. The public
still has a negative attitude toward privatization and liberalization.
54 “Poland’s power producers....”, op. cit.
55 This is a very often mistake made by the politicians. In practice national security is achieved
by the diversification of sources and supply routes and not by privatisation or consolidation.

Vol. 2009, 2(2)


Economic indicators show that Poland’s energy demands greatly exceed
the available supply. Its growing energy needs will require both domestic
and foreign direct investment. Opening of the sector to private investment,
considered to be a means of alleviating Poland’s energy shortage, is a steadily
growing necessity rather than just one of the available options. Poland suffers
from a long-standing lack of investments in production capacity as well as
lack of upgrades, or even proper maintenance, of the electricity and gas
transmission and distribution grids.
The problem of ownership must also be emphasised. Privatisation plans for
the electricity market started as early as 1997. However, they were abandoned
for political reasons by the former government (in power from 2005–2007)
which focused on consolidating existing State owned energy companies
into large capital groups such as PGE or Enea. Only recently has the new
government taken steps towards partial privatization of these energy giants.
However, the preparations needed to float these companies on the stock
exchange are not simple, especially when financial markets are in turmoil. To
meet listing requirements, energy companies may need, among other things,
to increase their capital. However, this is an issue they have to face anyway,
considering the investment challenges they face. Although costly, the creation
of new capacity is necessary to ensure Poland’s energy security.
Partial privatization on the stock market may not necessarily translate into
the necessary internal restructuralisation or improve business practices of
energy companies. Despite public trading, they may still be subject to strong
political influence that is not always in line with the market. In the future,
a strategic investor might still take partial, or even complete, control over
these entities. This outcome depends on the Ministry of Treasury which owns
most of the energy sector. In order to attract potential strategic investors, the
Polish government must reduce the risk associated with its current policies – it
must significantly enhance transparency in government institutions and create
a climate favourable to economic growth. The introduction of a policy that
reflects the interests of investors and consumers is also a must. The sector also
needs an independent regulator with the power to ensure affordable services
for consumers.
The political controversy surrounding privatization has put pressure on the
government to retain State ownership of energy networks or energy network
companies (system operators). On the one hand, State control might be justified
not only from the strategic point of view but also from the competitive point of
view. It makes it possible to set the conditions of access to the electricity grid/
gas network independently of commercial interests. However, assuming that
the State continues to own a major share of infrastructure companies, it must
not hold any stock in generation or supply companies. At the very least, it must



limit its participation in generation or supply companies to a level which does
not allow it to exercise any influence over their operations. Such an approach
would emphasize the necessary expansion of the energy infrastructure with
respect to the security of supply. It would also achieve the objective of securing
efficient operation and development of the infrastructure and the provision
of equal access to the grids for all users.
On the other hand, while State ownership of system operators might
find justification in competition and strategic interests of the country, State
ownership of supply companies cannot. Only privately owned supply companies
are directly linked to customers and exposed to the free market and thus
able to adapt to the market mechanism of demand and supply when setting
electricity/gas prices. In this regard, Poland does not have adequate financial
and human resources to equally equip all of its State owned energy giants.
Thus, for the benefit of the market and consumers, supply companies should
leave State hands. Where networks or network operators are bundled together
with supply companies under State auspices, the problem of unbundling would
arise. Monopolistic public entities would be tempted to abuse their favorable
market position to discriminate against competitors.

VII. Conclusions

There are at last two possible scenarios Polish policy makers can follow
in liberalizing its energy sector. One would involve the UK approach that
encompasses: ownership unbundling, less market concentration, less public
ownership and more private capital in the industry. The second scenario
follows the continental model: more concentration and vertical integration
and more State or public ownership in the energy field (for instance, the
French model). These two widely diverging approaches reflect different energy
consumption patterns, energy mixes, sources of supply and natural resources
of various European countries.
Three issues make it difficult to objectively measure which of the models
is better. First, the process of market opening is far from complete. Second,
the process started much earlier in the UK than in other EU countries
– historical circumstances have thus given the UK an advantage over other
regions. Third, the UK has adopted a model based on a political, legal and
economic environment that has long since supported the accumulation of
private capital and the pursuit of entrepreneurial initiative. In contrast, the
French have successfully adopted an approach that has entailed a very strong
role of the State. It is difficult to determine in the abstract whether one of

Vol. 2009, 2(2)


the models is better than the other. It is thus difficult to predict which model
should be applied in Poland.
From the Polish point of view, changing the structure of its energy markets
(from State to private ownership), especially under heavy opposition from
trade unions, is very difficult in political terms. With its history of a centrally-
planned economy and the nationalization of the energy sector, Poland is
likely to find the French model easier to accept. This acceptance does not
guarantee however that it would turn out to be the best economic choice for
the national energy sector. In this regard, Poland’s and France’s experiences
are very different. Whereas France has long since exposed its State owned
entities to competition in the EU and the global market (with moderate State
interventionism), Poland has persistently protected its socialist economy from
market forces. For years, it was irrelevant whether State owned companies
were profitable or not. The lack of a capable, market-tested private sector in
general, has delayed the development of Poland’s electricity and gas markets
in particular. In the opinion of the author, the lack of a competent industry
“owner” (far more knowledgeable about the particularities of the sector than
the State) severely impacted its development.
If the French model is somewhat problematic for Poland so too is the UK
model. The latter is likely to be the better option because both its electricity
and gas markets have been fully open since 1998, as a result of the liberalization
process that started in the late 1980s. What characterises the UK model is that:
price controls are removed; customer-switching rates are among the highest
in the EU; market concentration is relatively low; the ownership of gas and
electricity transmission companies is unbundled and thus, there is no incentive to
discriminate among market players and; finally, that competition is considered
to be effective. Particularly the English and Welsh markets appear to have
become much more competitive since the late 1990s. The sector in general
has become more efficient and customer bills have fallen (some of the lowest
energy prices in the EU). The research of Joskow56 suggests that structural,
regulatory and market reforms like those in the UK have significantly improved
the condition of the energy companies – once State owned monopolies that
have underwent an effective privatisation process. The latter, together with
a mechanism to regulate distribution companies, has generated significant
cost-savings overall, without compromising service quality. Wholesale markets
have also stimulated improved performance among existing generators and
facilitated major investments in new energy-generating capacity. Although the
outcome of the liberalization of the UK energy sector has been satisfactory,
the radical political and economic transformation, from which it originates and
56 P. Joskow, Lessons Learned From Electricity Market Liberalization (2008) The Energy

Journal, Special Issue. The Future of Electricity: Papers in Honor of David Newbery.



which began in the Margaret Thatcher era, would be very difficult to apply in
Poland. Although Thatcher’s policies might not have benefited everyone, she
ensured that the UK economy has not become a socialist welfare-state such
as Germany or France. This is especially noticeable in the energy sector, with
its high rate of employment (not to say over-employment).
One has to wonder therefore whether it would be possible to somehow
foster in Poland the results of UK liberalization process? Alternatively, would
it be possible to apply a conjunction of the two models? The answer is, to
some extend, yes. Consolidation through administrative means, as conducted
in Poland, goes against the Commission’s spirit of liberalization. However, it
could succeed in the long run if followed by privatization (through the stock
exchange or through private ownership by a strategic investor and, if necessary,
partial government ownership) which would lead to internal restructuring of
the energy conglomerates. Paradoxically, privatization needs strong support
from the government. Unfortunately, the government’s seemingly strong liberal
approach towards the reform of the energy sector is threatened by the negative
attitude towards privatization in general, and unbundling in particular, of the
trade unions and the two energy giants PGNiG and PGE. The workforce
and the companies themselves are indeed very influential stakeholders in this
debate, allegedly able to successfully lobby the government and to affect the
formation of economic policy.

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