(Filed) Petition for Writ of Cert.10.17.2016 copy

NO. 16-_____
In the Supreme Court of the United States
WAYNE COUNTY, MICHIGAN AND WAYNE
COUNTY EMPLOYEES, SOCIAL WORKER
LARRY CAMERON, NURSE APRIL WILLIAMS,
AND DEPUTY ANDRE STINSON,
Petitioners,
–v–
LINDA RICHKO, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE ESTATE OF JEFFREY HORVATH,
Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
CARSON J. TUCKER, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONERS
LAW OFFICES OF CARSON J. TUCKER
117 N. FIRST ST., SUITE 111
ANN ARBOR, MI 48104
(734) 629-5870
CJTUCKER@LEXFORI.ORG
OCTOBER 17, 2016
SUPREME COURT PRESS ♦ (888) 958-5705 ♦ BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.
In Bd. of Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S.
397, 409 (1997), this Court “did not foreclose the
possibility that evidence of a single violation of federal
rights, accompanied by a showing that a municipality
has failed to train its employees to handle recurring
situations presenting an obvious potential for such a
violation, could trigger municipal liability” under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 as found in Monell v. New York Dep’t of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Quoting Canton
v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390, n. 10 (1989), the Court
reiterated its formulation of this “single-incident
Monell liability” (SIML): “[I]t may happen that in light
of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees
the need for more or different training is so obvious
. . . that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be
said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.”
Bryan Cty., supra.
In Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 63 (2011),
the Court again acknowledged the existence of SIML,
but refused to recognize it for a “failure to train” claim
against a district attorney’s office for a prosecutor’s
single Brady violation. The Court noted that there
remains “the possibility, however rare, that the
unconstitutional consequence of failing to train could
be so patently obvious that a city could be liable under
§ 1983 without proof of a pre-existing pattern of
violations.” Id. at 64.
This Court has yet to approve application of SIML
in any context, whether it be failure to train, failure to

ii
screen, or failure to enact a policy requiring certain
action.
In the case sub judice, the Circuit Court took the
apparent liberty to stretch the unspecified limits of
SIML to Petitioner Wayne County’s alleged “de facto
policy” not to require a particular action (screening
record entries in a “Mental Health Wellness Infor-
mation Network” (MH-WIN) database of pretrial
detainees entering the Wayne County Jail (WCJ)),
which act was then cited as proof of the municipality’s
deliberate indifference and “moving force” behind the
single constitutional violation of failing to protect
Respondents’ decedent from a sudden, unforeseeable
murder by the pretrial detainee.
THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS:
Did the Court of Appeals extension of SIML for
the sudden and unforeseeable assault upon a pretrial
detainee by another pretrial detainee in Wayne
County Jail’s mental health ward deemed by the
Circuit Court to have been caused by the County’s
unwritten “de facto” policy of not requiring a review of
data entries related to the aggressor in an external
database constitute an unwarranted expansion of
SIML, which has only been recognized by this Court
to be potentially available in the very limited and
narrow failure to train police officers in their duties
regarding deployment of appropriate force as
proposed in Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390, n. 10?
II.
In Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S.Ct. 2042, 2045 (2015),
this Court held there was no “clearly established” law
requiring screening including records of pretrial

iii
detainees for suicidal tendencies. The right of a
pretrial detainee to be protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment does not include the right to such
screening. Id. at 2044-45, citing Comstock v. McCrary,
273 F.3d 693, 702 (CA6 2001), a case cited and
extensively discussed by Petitioners in the Court of
Appeals for the proposition that there is no analogous
“clearly established” rule requiring adequate
screening of the external records of pretrial detainees
to identify mental health issues that might forewarn
about attacks on other detainees or inmates. AR22,
P64-72; AR28, P12-13.
This Court has “repeatedly told courts . . . not to
define clearly established law at a high level of
generality.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742
(2011). In this unique area, it has expressed an
unusual willingness to reverse errant judgments of an
inferior tribunal that overgeneralizes the right thereby
depriving the individual governmental actor’s qualified
immunity defense asserted on the basis there was no
established right or duty. Id. at 735.
Therefore, this Court has given fair warning to
the circuit courts not to “insulate constitutional
decisions at the frontiers of the law from [its] review
or inadvertently undermine the values qualified
immunity seeks to promote.” Id. “The former occurs
when the constitutional-law question is wrongly decided;
the latter when what is not clearly established is held
to be so.” Id.

iv
THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS:
Did the Circuit Court err in over-generalizing the
“clearly established” duty in this case stating “[t]he
constitutional right at issue in this case–[decedent’s]
right to be free from violence at the hands of other
inmates—was clearly established by the Supreme
Court in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), see
App.10a, and in ignoring Petitioner Larry Cameron’s
qualified immunity defense, which was based on the
argument that there is no clearly established right to
a screening of mental health information for pretrial
detainees to ensure they do not pose a risk of harm to
themselves or others (a correct statement of the law
recently confirmed by this Court in Taylor, supra at
2045)?
III.
In terms of an individual governmental employee’s
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in a failure to protect
claim under the Fourteenth Amendment brought by a
pretrial detainee, “deliberate indifference” requires
time to discover, deliberate, and consciously disregard
a known risk to the claimant.
This Court held in Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S.
344, 347-48 (1994), that there must be an opportunity
for the individual defendant to know of and disregard
the risk. If there is no specifically identifiable victim,
then there can be no such “opportunity” and therefore
no deliberation with respect to the present risk of
harm to that individual. The Sixth Circuit has also
previously ruled “officers cannot be held liable under
this theory if they do not have a realistic opportunity
to intervene and prevent harm.” Wells v. City of

v
Dearborn Heights, 2013 WL 4504759 at *6 (6CA
2013), quoting Ontha v. Rutherford Cnty., Tenn., 222
Fed. Appx. 498 (6CA 2007).
PETITIONERS ARE AWARE OF NO CASE FROM THIS COURT
ADDRESSING THE PRECISE QUESTION, AS FOLLOWS:
Can an individual governmental employee be
liable for the constitutional tort of “deliberate indif-
ference” as defined and applied by this Court in
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (to inmates
under the Eighth Amendment); Kingsley v. Hendrick-
son, 135 S.Ct. 2466 (2015) (to pretrial detainees under
the Fourteenth Amendment) where the victim of the
constitutional harm is the subject of a random,
unforeseeable attack, and who is completely unknown
to the individual defendant before the incident and part
of no specifically known and vulnerable class?

vi
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING AND
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Petitioners
Petitioners, Wayne County, Psychologist and Social
Worker Larry Cameron, Registered Nurse April
Williams and Deputy Andre Stinson. were defendants
in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan and Appellants in the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals.
None of the Petitioners are corporate parties.
Respondents
Respondent, Linda Richko, as representative of
the Estate of Jeffrey Horvath, was the plaintiff in the
District Court and appellee in the Court of Appeals.

vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED........................................ i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING AND
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT..... vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... ix
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI............. 1
OPINIONS BELOW ................................................... 1
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT ............................ 1
CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY AUTHORITIES............................. 2
INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 3
STATEMENT............................................................ 10
A. Facts ............................................................... 10
B. Procedural History......................................... 14
1. District Court Opinion.............................. 16
2. The Sixth Circuit Appeal and Opinion .... 17
REASONS FOR GRANTING THIS PETITION...... 21
I. THIS CASE PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY TO
ADDRESS THE EXTENT AND LIMITS OF SO-
CALLED SINGLE-INCIDENT MONELL LIABILITY
(SIML) BECAUSE THE CIRCUIT COURT’S
APPLICATION IN THIS CASE IS BEYOND
ANYTHING THIS COURT’S POST-MONELL
JURISPRUDENCE WOULD TOLERATE AND
EFFECTIVELY IMPOSES DE FACTO STRICT
LIABILITY ON PETITIONER WAYNE COUNTY..... 21

viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued
Page
II. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT IGNORED PETITIONER
LARRY CAMERON’S QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
DEFENSE ON THE BASIS IT WAS NOT CLEARLY
ESTABLISHED THAT PRETRIAL DETAINEES
HAD A RIGHT TO HAVE RECORDS SCREENED IN
ORDER TO PREVENT HARM TO THEMSELVES
OR OTHERS. ..................................................... 29
III. THE CIRCUIT COURT’S RULING REQUIRES
APPLICATION OF A “DELIBERATE INDIFFE-
RENCE” STANDARD AS APPLIED TO THE
INDIVIDUAL PETITIONERS UNDER THE 14TH
AMENDMENT, EVEN THOUGH THE CLAIMANT
IN THIS CASE WAS NOT THE DIRECT SUBJECT
OF ANY OF THEIR ACTIONS OR CONDUCT ......... 34
CONCLUSION.......................................................... 37

ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PageTABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
563 U.S. 731 (2011) ....................................passim
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009). ............................................ 5
Bd. of Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown,
520 U.S. 397 (1997)................................. i, 3, 4, 22
Brosseau v. Haugen,
543 U.S. 194 (2004) ........................................... 30
Canton v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378 (1989) ....................................passim
Comstock v. McCrary,
273 F.3d 693 (CA6 2001) .....................................iii
Connick v. Thompson,
563 U.S. 51 (2011) ......................................passim
Davidson v. Cannon,
474 U.S. 344 (1994) ............................................ iv
Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97 (1976). ............................................ 18
Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825 (1994) ............................ iv, v, 29, 34
Glisson v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr.,
813 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2016)................................ 6
Holloman v. Markowski,
No. 15-1878, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 18268
(4th Cir. Oct. 7, 2016) ........................................ 23

x
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Hott v. Hennepin County,
260 F.3d 901 (8CA 2001).................................... 32
Kingsley v. Hendrickson,
135 S.Ct. 2466 (2015) .......................................... v
Los Angeles v. Heller,
475 U.S. 796 (1986)............................................. 19
Maness v. Cty. of St Francois, No.
4:04CV01157 ERW, 2006 WL 1738370
(E.D. Mo. June 19, 2006)................................... 32
Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. 37 (1803) ................................................. 33
Martin v. Heideman,
106 F.3d 1308 (6th Cir.1997) ............................ 30
Monell v. New York Dep’t of Social Services,
436 U.S. 658 (1978) ....................................passim
Mullenix v. Luna,
136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) ......................................... 30
Oklahoma v. Tuttle,
471 U.S. 808 (1985) ............................................. 7
Ontha v. Rutherford Cnty., Tenn.,
222 Fed. Appx. 498 (6CA 2007) .......................... v
Owens v. Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s
Office, 767 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2014).................. 24
Peterson v. City of Fort Worth,
588 F.3d 838 (5CA 2009)............................... 7, 24

xi
Page
Raheem v. Miller,
No. CIV-09-80, 2010 WL 2595112
(W.D. Okla. May 14, 2010)................................ 32
Reichle v. Howards,
132 S.Ct. 2088 (2012) ........................................ 31
Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194 (2001) ........................................... 30
Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police
Dept., 717 F.3d 760 (10CA 2013), ....................... 8
Shadrick v. Hopkins Cnty.,
805 F.3d 724 (6CA 2015)................................... 24
Taylor v. Barkes,
135 S.Ct. 2042 (2015) .................................passim
Wells v. City of Dearborn Heights,
2013 WL 4504759 (6CA Cir. 2013) ............... v, 35
Wilson v. Layne,
526 U.S. 603 (1999) ........................................... 31
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
United States Constitution, Amend. XIV, § 1 ..passim
STATUTES
42 U.S.C. § 1983.................................................passim

xii
Page
OTHER AUTHORITIES
James and Glaze, Special Report, Mental
Health Problems of Prison and Jail
Inmates, Bureau of Justice Statistics.
September 2006................................................. 36
Karen Blum, et. al., Municipal Liability and
Liability of Supervisors: Litigation
Significance of Recent Trends and
Developments, 29 Touro L. Rev. 93 (2012) ... 6, 27
Karen M. Blum, Section 1983 Litigation: The
Maze, the Mud, and the Madness, 23 Wm.
& Mary Bill Rts. J. 913 (2015)............................ 27
Kate McClelland, “Somebody Help Me
Understand This”: The Supreme Court’s
Interpretation of Prosecutorial Immunity
and Liability Under S 1983, 102 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 1323 (2012)....................... 5, 28
Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation
Claims & Defenses, (2013) .............................. 5, 8
Rosalie Berger Levinson, Who Will Supervise
the Supervisors? Establishing Liability for
Failure to Train, Supervise, or Discipline
Subordinates in A Post-Iqbal/Connick
World, 47 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 273
(2012) ................................................................. 27

1
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioners Wayne County, Social Worker Larry
Cameron, Nurse April Williams, and Deputy Andre
Stinson respectfully petition for a writ of certiorari to
review the judgment of the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at
819 F.3d 907 and reproduced at 1a. The order denying
rehearing en banc is found at 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS
9985. The opinion of the district court is unreported
and reproduced at 29a.
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254(1).
The Court of Appeals issued its opinion and
judgment on April 15, 2016. 1a-28a. On May 18, 2016
the Court of Appeals denied a petition for rehearing
en banc.
On August 15, 2016, Justice Kagan, as Circuit
Justice for the Sixth Circuit, granted Petitioners’
application for an extension of time to file their
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

2
CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY AUTHORITIES
 United States Constitution, Amend. XIV, § 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress, except that in any
action brought against a judicial officer for an act
or omission taken in such officer’s judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted
unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress

3
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District
of Columbia.
INTRODUCTION
In Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services,
436 U.S. 589, 694 (1977), this Court first held munici-
palities could be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
subjecting a person to a constitutional violation. The
Court noted it is only “when execution of a government
policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or
by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the
government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”
Id. To avoid imposing vicarious liability on the
municipality for the torts of its employees, the Court
clarified that the municipality itself must be the cause
of the injury. “[A] local government may not be sued
under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its
employees or agents.” Id.
This, the Court later explained, requires proof of “a
municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff’s
injury.” Board of Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520
U.S. 397, 403 (1997). A municipality either has a
policy that, when executed, causes the harm, a custom,
which establishes a pattern or practice of violating
constitutional rights, or a municipality’s policymaking
authority (whether collective or individual) executes a
decision which causes such a violation.

4
In Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011),
the Court explained “[o]fficial municipal policy includes
the decisions of a government’s lawmakers, the acts of
its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent
and widespread as to practically have the force of law.”
(internal citations omitted).
However, the Court continued to hold open the
possibility, first enunciated in Canton v. Harris, 489
U.S. 378, 390, n. 10 (1989), that “[i]n limited circum-
stances, a local government’s decision not to train
certain employees about their legal duty to avoid
violating citizens’ rights may rise to a level of an
official government policy for purposes of § 1983.” Id.
at 61. The Court stated that Canton’s dicta stood for
the proposition that for some undefined “narrow range
of circumstances, a pattern of similar violations might
not be necessary to show deliberate indifference.” Id.
at 61-64. See also Bryan Cty, supra at 409. As the
Court in Connick rationalized, Canton “sought not to
foreclose the possibility, however rare, that the
unconstitutional consequences of failing to train could
be so patently obvious that a city could be liable under
§ 1983 without proof of a pre-existing pattern of
violations.” Connick, supra at 64.
In other words, in some circumstances a single
incident resulting in a constitutional violation could
give rise to municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(single-incident Monell liability (SIML)).
The suggestion by this Court that there remains
the possibility of SIML without a clearly defined
boundary to its limits both in terms of what types of
claims it might apply to and how the “institutional”

5
“deliberate indifference” 1 can be imposed is proble-
matic. In the former situation, the supposition is it
only applies to “failure to train” claims. However, it is
unclear whether it is limited to liability for “excessive
force” allegations against police under the Fourth
Amendment (as it was stated in Canton), or whether
it applies to other constitutional claims and to
different subject matter areas. For the latter
situation, the question is what can substitute for the
ordinary requirement of “actual or constructive”
notice to the municipality ordinarily required under
the “deliberate indifference” analysis.
What evidence or proof is needed to show the
obviousness of a preexisting risk in the absence of
prior incidents with respect to which the municipality
can formulate a policy of inaction or indifference? In the
absence of guidance from this Court, these questions
have left courts and litigants searching for the perimeters
and questioning this Court’s intentions.2
1 In this case, the standard of conduct is “deliberate indifference”
for both the individual Petitioners and the County. This may not
always be the case. For individual defendants, the applicable
state of mind will depend on the type of constitutional violation
at issue. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). See also
Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation Claims & Defenses,
§ 6.02[A] (2013), available at Westlaw SNETLCD. In contrast,
the prevailing state-of-mind standard for a municipality is
deliberate indifference regardless of the nature of the underlying
constitutional violation. Schwartz, supra at § 6.02[C].
2 See Kate McClelland, “Somebody Help Me Understand This”:
The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Prosecutorial Immunity
and Liability Under S 1983, 102 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1323
(2012) (stating “[n]either side [of the Court] is particularly clear
on what a single incident that gives rise to liability looks like
either. It appears that a single incident could produce liability in

6
In the meanwhile, courts continue to assume SIML
applies and have freely extended it to a variety of
claims and circumstances with no “limits” in sight.
An example of this disarray can be seen in the
treatment of the question whether a failure to train or
a failure to enforce a policy requires recurring
constitutional violations. If it does not, as suggested
by the cryptic (and never actually applied) footnote 10
in Canton, which continues to survive, despite some
speculation 3 of its eventual demise, then a single
tragic incident can provide the necessary notice to the
municipality of its constitutionally deficient (and
newly imposed) policy or custom, and at the same time
subject it to liability for failing to implement it.4
Presumably, that “single incident” must at least
be an “obvious” result of the municipality’s constitu-
tional deficiencies. See, e.g.., Peterson v. City of Fort
two ways. First, there is the hypothetical in footnote 10 of Harris.
Both sides agree that this is still good law. Second, the majority
in Connick seems to say that something other than a pattern
could give the municipality a ‘specific reason’ to know that
additional training was necessary”).
3 See Karen Blum, et. al., Municipal Liability and Liability of
Supervisors: Litigation Significance of Recent Trends and
Developments, 29 Touro L. Rev. 93 (2012).
4 See, e.g., Glisson v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 813 F.3d 662, 667-
68 (7th Cir. 2016) (rejecting a prisoner’s SIML Eighth Amendment
claim for lack of medical care against a private health care
provider (deemed to be equivalent to a municipality) and holding
there is a requirement to demonstrate a “series” of incidents).
However, the court has since vacated its opinion and granted
rehearing en banc as to the precise issue of whether there is a
requirement to demonstrate more than a single incident. See
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9557 (May 24, 2016).

7
Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 850 (5CA 2009) (a city could be
liable for a single incident of objectively unreasonable
excessive force under a “failure to supervise” theory, if
it was obvious that “the highly predictable
consequence” of the specific deficiency in supervision
was that officers would apply force in such a way as to
violate the Fourth Amendment).
Courts have also substituted the “pattern or prac-
tice” and “actual or constructive notice requirement” of
the “deliberate indifference” inquiry for “expert
testimony”, the latter of which can only proffer that a
municipality and its policymakers “knew or should
have known” that its deficiencies, presumably being
pointed out to it for the first time in the litigation,
would eventually cause the single constitutional harm
being complained of.
Taken to its extreme, the premonition of Justice
Rehnquist in Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-
24 (1985), as reiterated by this Court in Canton, has
already come to pass by application of SIML. In other
words, “[i]n virtually every case where a person has
had his or her constitutional rights violated . . . a
§ 1983 plaintiff [can now] point to something [via
expert testimony or otherwise] the city ‘could have
done’ to prevent the unfortunate incident.” Canton,
389 U.S. at 392, citing Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823.
De facto, indeed strict, respondeat superior liability
may now be imposed on municipalities–a result [this
Court] rejected in Monell. Canton, supra. This is
untenable. It also places a needlessly heavy burden on
state governments struggling to operate correctional
facilities with limited resources when balanced with
the ease with which this Court could, at least, offer

8
clarification in which “limited” circumstances SIML
applies.
Other important issues are placed into relief by
SIML. For example, this Court has yet to clarify the
standard of causation for municipal liability claims.
See, e.g., Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police
Dept., 717 F.3d 760, 780, n. 10 (10CA 2013), citing
Schwartz at § 7.12[B].
Further, although not a cause in and of itself for
this Court’s review, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is erroneous in several other respects.
First, the Circuit Court ignored Petitioners’
argument that there was no clearly established law
requiring the screening of a pretrial detainees’
externally held database records to prevent them from
harming themselves or others. This Court recently
stated as much in Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S.Ct. 2042,
2045 (2015), applying this to the Third Circuit’s self-
created “screening requirement” to prevent pretrial
detainees from committing suicide. In this unique
area (the determination of whether there is clearly
established law in the qualified immunity context),
this Court has not shied away from correcting
erroneous de facto conclusions by inferior tribunals
that suddenly announce a new “clearly established”
rule or duty that the governmental defendants are
supposed to have been aware of, depriving them of
their ability to claim qualified immunity and
expanding constitutional rights in one fell swoop
without this Court’s approval (tacit or otherwise). See
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011).
Furthermore, imposing “deliberate indifference”
liability on each of the individual Petitioners, Social

9
Worker Cameron, Nurse Williams and Deputy Stinson,
is problematic in this case from a pure causation
perspective because none of these defendants made
any specific or conscious decisions with respect to
Horvath, the victim of the alleged constitutional
deprivation. Indeed, Cameron had no idea his decision
not to house Gillespie, the assailant, alone (negligent,
at most, although Petitioners do not concede it) meant
that Gillespie would be housed with Horvath.
With respect to Nurse Williams, her role in the
jail as a professional medical care provider makes it
impossible for her to have acted or reacted to the
sudden attack in a way that it could have been
meaningfully prevented. Moreover, she was not made
aware, in advance, of any risk to Horvath. There was
only the Respondent’s claim of a commotion in the
mental health unit where Nurse Williams was
performing her rounds in the approximately 20-minute
period during which the assault occurred. (App.4a)
Finally, Deputy Stinson also only had 20 minutes,
at most to appreciate any risk and to do anything to
prevent it. The Circuit Court imagines that upon the
realization of a commotion in the mental health unit
of the Petitioners’ jail, it can be immediately quelled
and responded to. Protocol requires otherwise. There
are safety measures in place to protect jail staff and
other detainees and inmates if something is happening
inside of a cell. Certain employees (like nurses and
medical staff) have to be moved out of the cell block so
it can be secured before the correctional staff can go in
to secure the situation. Once that is done, the medical
staff may be allowed back in to administer care.

10
Imposing “deliberate indifference” liability on
Nurse Williams and Deputy Stinson in this setting
and under these circumstances is not only contrary to
the standard, but it creates a precedent for imposing
liability for similar sudden, unforeseeable, and there-
fore unavoidable incidents which regularly occur in
correctional facilities.
STATEMENT
A. Facts
On September 19, 2011, Detroit police arrested
Brandon Gillespie (Gillespie) for pulling a knife on a
bus driver. App.5a. Gillespie was charged with felony
assault and booked into Petitioner Wayne County’s
Jail (WCJ) at 9:00 p.m. Id.
After 36 hours without incident, on the morning
of September 21, 2011 (sometime between 8:34 a.m.
and 8:50 a.m. (App.4a)), Gillespie suddenly, and without
warning, attacked and murdered his cellmate, Jeffrey
Horvath (Horvath), after Horvath asked Gillespie to
perform a sexual act upon him. LR41-1, P221.5
5 In addition to Petitioners’ Appendix, Petitioners refer to public
documents in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan’s electronic case filing docket and record
entries, designated as “LR”, followed by the docket entry number
and “P”, followed by the page identification number for that
docket: 2:12-cv-11232. Likewise, Petitioners refer to public
documents in the United States Circuit Court for the Sixth
Circuit’s appeal docket for this case, 15-1524, as “AR”, followed

11
Gillespie was a first-time, pre-trial detainee in
the WCJ. He had self-reported a history of bipolar and
schizophrenia to the intake officer. LR40, P176; LR
41-9; P388-392.
Petitioner Larry Cameron (Cameron) conducted a
“mental status examination” (MSE) on Gillespie.
App.7a. He checked a database known as the Mental
Health Wellness Information Network (“MH-WIN”), a
privately managed database set up for approved
vendors to bill for various services. The database
showed 2,334 “encounters.” 6 Id. Cameron did not
know what an “encounter” was, nor did he investigate
further to complete Gillespie’s examination. App.38a.
Cameron decided Gillespie needed to be housed in
the mental health ward in cell 10. Cameron made no
further decisions with respect to Gillespie’s housing
assignment.
Jeffrey Horvath was arrested for a nonviolent
misdemeanor on September 13, 2011. App.2a. He had
been in WCJ before, and, because he had a prior known
by the docket entry number, and “P” followed by the page
identification number.
6 MH-WIN is an external social services database containing
mostly billing codes and entries for a wide variety of social and
public services. LR40, P179; LR40, P452-57. The MH-WIN
“encounters” document an event and billing information regard-
ing that event, among other data. See id. and MH-WIN printout.
An “encounter” will be registered in the database for a multitude
of services, including community living support, family training
and counseling, fiscal and financial services, housing assistance,
occupational therapy, skill building, speech and language
therapy, supported employment services, transportation, mental
status examinations, psychological counseling and medication
prescriptions.

12
history of mental illness documented in the WCJ, he
was housed in cell 11 on floor 4, southwest (4SW), the
WCJ’s mental health unit. LR47, P637; App.2a.
On September 20, 2011, at 7:00 p.m., Horvath was
moved to cell 14 because of a plumbing problem in cell
11. Id., LR41-18, P472-73. At 8:00 p.m., Deputy Taylor-
Beavers brought Gillespie to 4SW. to be placed in cell
10 per Petitioner Cameron’s earlier instructions.
Petitioner Cameron had assigned him cell 10 with no
restriction to be housed alone. LR41-18, P473; LR55,
P1184-85.
Gillespie was only moved into cell 14 with Horvath,
after Annette Johnson, a nurse, told the deputy that
another inmate with a “house alone” designation had
already been moved into cell 10. LR40, P181; LR41-18,
P473, 475.
Gillespie and Horvath spent the night in the cell
without incident. App.3a.
Petitioner Deputy Andre Stinson reported to work
at 7:00 a.m. on September 21, 2011. LR 40; App.3a. He
was assigned to man the duty station on 4SW. Id. He
did not work the previous night when Gillespie was
brought to the floor, and had no involvement in
relocating Horvath from cell 11 to cell 14, or in placing
Gillespie into cell 14 with Horvath. App.3a.
At 7:40 a.m. Deputy Stinson flicked the lights off
and on in cell 14 and remotely opened its door to send
Horvath from his cell to a prearranged medical
appointment. Deputy Stinson remotely opened
Horvath’s cell door and Horvath came to the outside
of the duty station. App.3a.

13
Horvath stated he did not want to go to the
appointment, but rather wanted to stay in the cell
with Gillespie. Id. He never indicated he was afraid of
Gillespie, or that he did not want to return to the cell.
After canceling the medical appointment, Deputy
Stinson returned Horvath to his cell at approximately
7:44 a.m. Id.
Nothing unusual happened until approximately
8:50 a.m. (the last observations made of Gillespie and
Horvath in their cell together by the guard conducting
rounds was 8:31 a.m.). That same guard had also
conducted three previous rounds without any recorded
incident (7:14 a.m., 7:40 a.m., and 8:08 a.m.). App.4a
Gillespie later testified he began having auditory
hallucinations on that morning, although this was
never reported to anyone before the attack. Sometime
between 8:34 a.m. and 8:50 a.m., Gillespie brutally
attacked and murdered Horvath. App.4a.
Petitioner Nurse Williams, who was handing out
medication to the inmates on the ward at the time of
the attack, arrived at the cell door at approximately
8:50 a.m. and noticed something was wrong. App.4a.
Gillespie was standing at the front of the cell naked
with his genitals exposed. He made lewd comments
and asked Nurse Williams to check his privates for an
infection. Nurse Williams could not see Horvath in his
cell. She notified Deputy Stinson at 8:50 a.m. that she
could not locate Horvath. Id.
At 9:00 a.m. Stinson called another officer to
assist him in entering the ward. When that officer
arrived, Deputy Stinson went to cell 14. They opened
the cell and found Horvath’s body sandwiched between
two mattresses. Horvath had visible signs of being

14
beaten and was unresponsive. Nurse Williams came into
the ward again with another nurse and they began to
administer CPR upon Horvath. He was pronounced dead
at 9:29 a.m. App.5a.
B. Procedural History
Respondent sued Petitioners Wayne County and
several individual Wayne County employees under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Petitioners Cameron, Williams and
Stinson are the only remaining individual defendants.
Respondent alleged Wayne County “knew or
should have known” that “their procedures and
policies, customs and practices” for the WCJ were
defective. LR23, P87. Supporting this claim, Respondent
alleged Wayne County inadequately screened all
incoming detainees for health histories to determine
special medical and/or custodial holding needs; fostered
a custom, outside of the written policy, to fail to protect
those in custody, and to fail to separately confine
detainees known to be suffering from illness or other
serious mentally deficient conditions. Id.
Respondent also alleged Wayne County failed to
adequately train employees in monitoring violent or
dangerous persons and those with mental illness, in
secluding or separating persons with known dangerous
violent propensities, severe medical or mental
conditions from others in custody, and in making
proper notation, inquiry and appropriate notification
to the proper persons regarding necessary medical
care, attention, seclusion or separation required for
those in custody in order to avoid causing harm to
others in custody, including violence. Id., P87-88.

15
Respondent claimed these “policies, customs and
practices” were carried out with deliberate indiffe-
rence, wilful and wanton disregard and with the spirit
of gross negligence, and were the direct and deliberate
cause of Horvath’s constitutional deprivations of his
rights to liberty, due process, and life, health and
physical well-being. Id., P89.
With respect to Petitioner Cameron, Respondent
alleged he failed to review entries in the MH-WIN
database to assess the risk that Gillespie posed to
other inmates. Plaintiff introduced evidence that
Cameron had accessed the database and saw the 2,334
mental health “encounters” but did not inquire further
into the nature or specificity of those encounters.
Wayne County moved for summary judgment,
arguing there was no clearly established right or rule
that required consultation and review of the MH-WIN
database. The County further argued that all decisions
made with respect to Gillespie were reasonable, and
were in fact focused on providing him with the mental
health treatment he needed. The County also argued
that since there was no clearly established rule or law
requiring it to access and review the MH-WIN records,
none of the individual defendants could be held liable
under the appropriate “deliberate indifference”
standard.
As such, neither the County itself, nor any of its
executive level departments could be held liable
because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not recognize municipal
liability in the absence of underlying constitutional
violations.
Petitioner also argued that the proofs did not
establish that the conduct of the individual WCJ

16
defendants rose to the very stringent “deliberate
indifference” standard applicable to Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment claims respecting prisoners’
and detainees’ rights, respectively.
Finally, Petitioner argued that the single instance
of Horvath’s injury could not serve as the basis for
liability. See LR40, P191.
1. District Court Opinion
The district court denied Petitioners’ summary
judgment motion. With respect to Petitioner Wayne
County’s liability, the district court held:
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to
Plaintiff, there is a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether Defendant Wayne County
had a policy that constituted deliberate
indifference to inmate safety in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. Defendant Wayne
County had a de facto policy of not requiring
a review of readily-available prior mental
health records, including the MH-WIN
records. Failing to adequately review an
inmate’s mental health records after the
discovery of mental health issues, and then
placing him in the same cell with another
inmate before investigating further may be
considered a reckless disregard of the risk of
harm to the other inmate, which is sufficient
to satisfy the deliberate indifference standard.
See Farmer [v. Brennan,] 511 U.S. [825,] 836
[1994].
App.38a-39a.

17
With respect to Petitioner Cameron, the court
concluded:
Defendant Cameron was aware that Gillespie
had 2,334 encounters registered on MH-
WIN, was hospitalized six times for depression
and hearing voices, and that he had not
taken his medications for six days. Viewing
the facts in a light most favorable to the
Plaintiff, there is a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether failing to inquire further
about Gillespie’s mental health background
was reckless disregard of the excessive risk of
harm to Horvath. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836.
App.39a-40a.
With respect to Nurse Williams and Deputy
Stinson, the district held:
Viewing the facts in light most favorable to
Plaintiff, Defendants Williams and Stinson
may have had notice of the attack against
Horvath, and their failure to investigate or
intervene may rise to the level of reckless
disregard of the excessive risk of harm to
Horvath. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836. The
court will not grant summary judgment on
these claims.
App.40a.
2. The Sixth Circuit Appeal and Opinion
Petitioners appealed arguing that the deliberate
indifference standard as to each individual defendant
had not been met.

18
With respect to Cameron, Petitioner argued the
standard applied to his conduct was akin to that applied
to jail medical personnel enunciated by this Court in
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). RA22, P56-
57. Negligence, even professional malpractice, was
insufficient to impose liability. Id. at 57-58. The
County also argued the deliberate indifference standard
was not met because it required a demonstration that
the individual defendant knew of a substantial risk of
harm to the victim and consciously disregarded it. RA
22, P72-77; RA35-1, P11-13. Since there was no action
taken by Cameron directly affecting Horvath, Cameron’s
conduct could not meet the deliberate indifference
standard.
The County also argued there was no clearly
established duty for Cameron to screen the MH-WIN
records, and thus, he was entitled to qualified immunity.
RA65. Petitioner argued it was not the law in the
Sixth Circuit that jail personnel had a duty to consult
records from external sources to adequately screen
incoming pretrial detainees.
With respect to Nurse Williams and Deputy
Stinson, the County also argued that the short period
of time in which Nurse Williams and Deputy Stinson
had to discover and prevent the attack upon Horvath
was insufficient to meet the “deliberate indifference”
standard. RA22, P72-77.
With respect to the County’s Monell liability,
Petitioners argued since none of the individual
defendants could be found to have exhibited the
requisite level of deliberate indifference, the County
itself could not be held liable. In order for the County
to be liable there has to be proof of an underlying

19
constitutional violation on the part of the individual
defendants. Id., P14, 77-80 citing, inter alia, Los
Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam).
Petitioners also argued the County could not be
liable for the single incident constitutional violation
complained of. Id. P81, citing Connick v. Thompson,
563 U.S. 51 (2011). Further, in this regard, Petitioners
argued there was not the requisite showing of
causation for the municipal liability claim. Id., P83.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision. First, with respect to Cameron, it stated he
knew or should have known Gillespie was a danger
and therefore there was a question of fact as to
whether he was deliberately indifferent to the
supposed risk of harm Gillespie posed to the jail
population at large. App.18a.
Second, the Court disagreed (or rather ignored)
the County’s argument that there was no clearly
established right or duty entitling pretrial detainees
to screening of external records. Instead, the Court
cited the broad, over-generalized right of pretrial
detainees to be protected from attacks at the hands of
others. App.10a. In this regard, the Court stated:
The constitutional right at issue in this
case—Horvath’s right to be free from vio-
lence at the hands of other inmates—was
clearly established by the Supreme Court in
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
Farmer held that “prison officials have a
duty to protect prisoners from violence at the
hands of other prisoners” because corrections
officers have “stripped them of virtually
every means of self-protection and foreclosed

20
their access to outside aid.” Id. at 833
(ellipsis and internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d
596, 600 (6th Cir. 1998) (“Without question,
prison officials have an affirmative duty to
protect inmates from violence perpetrated by
other prisoners.”).
Id.
Thus, the Circuit Court denied Cameron was
entitled to qualified immunity from suit.
The Court also ruled none of the individual
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity
because questions of fact existed as to whether their
conduct rose to the level of “deliberate indifference” to
Horvath’s rights as a detainee in the Wayne County
Jail.
The Court also dismissed Wayne County’s pendent
interlocutory appeal on the basis that Wayne County
could be liable even for the single instance of harm
caused to Horvath and even if there was no underlying
constitutional violation committed by the individual
defendants. App.24a.
Petitioners filed a petition for en banc consideration
arguing that the Court had improperly ruled Cameron
could be liable when he had no knowledge of Horvath’s
placement into cell 14 with Gillespie. The Circuit
Court denied the petition.

21
REASONS FOR GRANTING THIS PETITION
I. THIS CASE PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY TO
ADDRESS THE EXTENT AND LIMITS OF SO-
CALLED SINGLE-INCIDENT MONELL LIABILITY
(SIML) BECAUSE THE CIRCUIT COURT’S
APPLICATION IN THIS CASE IS BEYOND
ANYTHING THIS COURT’S POST-MONELL
JURISPRUDENCE WOULD TOLERATE AND
EFFECTIVELY IMPOSES DE FACTO STRICT
LIABILITY ON PETITIONER WAYNE COUNTY
While this Court has left open the possibility of
single-incident Monell liability (SIML) in “failure to
train” scenarios, it has yet to define and apply this to
any case, much less a case such as the one sub judice,
involving a claim that a de facto, i.e., non-existent,
municipal policy of not requiring professional jail
employees to screen incoming pretrial detainees’
mental health information records from external
sources can give rise to liability for a single instance
of violence at the hands of the ostensibly inadequately
screened detainee.
This Court has never held there can be “de facto”
SIML under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a “failure to train” or
a “failure to screen” in the institutional correctional
setting.
In fact, there is no “de facto respondeat superior
liability for each . . . violation under the rubric of
failure to train simply because the municipality does
not have a professional educational program covering
the specific violation in sufficient depth.” Connick v.

22
Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 73 (2011) (SCALIA, J.,
concurring). Just as there is no “de facto” municipal
liability under the rubric of a failure to train prosecutors
(Connick, supra), a failure to adequately screen
applicants for police officer jobs, Bd. of County
Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405
(1997), and a failure to adequately screen externally
held mental health records to prevent a detainee’s
suicide (Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S.Ct. 2042, 2045 (2015),
there should not be liability for a failure to require
screening of external mental health information in
order to protect all other inmates in the correctional
facility from a single, unforeseeable, violent and
sudden attacks upon them by the incoming, ostensibly
inadequately screened detainee.
The Circuit Court ruled just this. It held Petitioner
Wayne County could be held liable for Gillespie’s
unforeseeable attack on Horvath based on the single
instance of the attack and on the basis that Wayne
County had a “de facto” policy of not requiring its
intake officers to review the records information on a
database.
Respondent produced no evidence that Petitioner
had notice of the alleged inadequacy of this unwritten
“de facto” policy, i.e., no evidence of prior attacks by
detainees on other detainees or inmates already housed
in the more secure mental health ward of the county
jail; no evidence that the failure to screen the MH-
WIN database would have led to “obvious consequen-
ces”; and no evidence the failure to review the
marginally relevant entries from that database led
Cameron to decide, among several alternatives, not to
house Gillespie alone. See LR40, P179; P452-57.

23
In Monell v. New York Dep’t of Social Services,
436 U.S. 658 (1978), this Court held “a municipality
can be found liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only where
the municipality itself causes the constitutional
violation” and stated “[r]espondent superior or vicarious
liability will not attach under § 1983.” City of Canton
v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (emphasis in original).
The only “theory” on which the Circuit Court and
District Court ruled Wayne County could be subject to
municipal liability was it had a “de facto policy” of not
requiring a review of the MH-WIN database (App.38a),
and that this failure lead to placement of Gillespie
with Horvath in Cell 14, and then to Gillespie’s attack
and murder of Horvath. This set of circumstances
according to this “theory” of municipal liability was
sufficient to show deliberate indifference by Petitioner
Wayne County of Horvath’s constitutional right to be
protected while in custody.
Some courts have rejected SIML where there is
an alleged “lack of a policy”, similar to the “de facto”
“unwritten” policy “not to require” something that the
district court and Circuit Court found in this case
regarding review of the MH-WIN database. These
courts recognize that institutional awareness of risk is
key to the imposition of institutional liability.
The reasons for rejecting this approach as stated
by these courts is that there simply cannot be notice
(actual or constructive) and thus the “deliberate”
indifference to the possibility of constitutional harm.
See, e.g., Holloman v. Markowski, No. 15-1878, 2016
U.S. App. LEXIS 18268, at *4-5 (4th Cir. Oct. 7, 2016)
(“[w]hile we can infer both knowledge and deliberate
indifference from the extent of an employee’s

24
misconduct, sporadic or isolated violations of rights
will not give rise to Monell liability; only widespread
or flagrant violations will.”), quoting Owens v. Baltimore
City State’s Attorney’s Office, 767 F.3d 379, 402 (4th
Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted).
However, some courts do allow SIML liability on
the basis of a municipality’s failure to have a policy, or
lack of a policy. Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588
F.3d 838, 850 (5th Cir. 2009) (a city could be liable for
a single incident of objectively unreasonable excessive
force under a “failure to supervise” theory, if it was
obvious that “the highly predictable consequence” of
the specific deficiency in supervision was that officers
would apply force in such a way as to violate the Fourth
Amendment). See also Shadrick v. Hopkins Cnty., 805
F.3d 724, 739 (6CA 2015) (citing Canton, 489 U.S. 390
and n. 10 and holding municipal liability could be
imposed on the basis of a single violation if proof was
offered to show that the municipal defendant (a govern-
ment contracted health care provider in a county jail)
lacked a training program to handle recurring situ-
ations)
Without guidance from this Court, courts and
litigants continue to navigate their way through this
nebulous space of SIML. Despite the apparent difference
between “obviousness” (something that might occur in
the future) and “actual or constructive notice” (some-
thing that is occurring now, or has occurred in the
past), there is a strange penumbral haze between
these two concepts. Is this concept of “obviousness” a
substitute for the “actual or constructive” notice, and
thus, a substitute for the actual objective knowledge
of the risk associated with the action that is supposed

25
to accompany the institutional “deliberate indifference”
analysis?
All that courts and litigants can do in the current
muddle is speculate as to the nature of what a
successful or unsuccessful claim might be and where
the boundaries of such liability might take them.
Although he sat with and interviewed Gillespie for
30 minutes, and conducted a series of routine tests
and mental health evaluations on him pursuant to the
MSE he had been conducting on inmates and detainees
for at least 8 years at the WCJ, Cameron did not review
the 2,344 “encounters” logged into the MH-WIN
database, which, as demonstrated by Wayne County
in its summary judgment motion, contained only basic
data about billings for a wide range of services
provided to Gillespie. LR40, P179; LR40, P452-57.
This failure on Cameron’s part is being cited as the
basis for Wayne County’s liability for the single
instance of a deprivation of a pretrial detainee’s
constitutional rights because there is simply no other
theory that would support it in this case. There is no
proof of a written policy. No custom or usage that
resulted in a pattern of or persistent constitutional
violations. There was also no act performed by a
policymaker. And, there were no prior incidents of this
nature in the mental health unit.
The only way to impose Monell liability on the
County was this claimed “de facto” policy of not
requiring a review of the MH-WIN database. And, the
only objective evidence that the Respondents have to
demonstrate the claimed inadequacy of this de facto
policy of non-action is Jeffrey Horvath’s death at the
hands of Gillespie.

26
Moreover, because there is no respondeat superior
liability under Monell, the inevitable result of imposing
SIML liability on Wayne County in this case is that it
will be held liable even if each one of the individual
Petitioners (Cameron, Williams and Stinson) are
found not to have been “deliberately indifferent”, a
conclusion that seems inevitable when the conduct of
these individuals with respect to Horvath is
considered in isolation and under the correct standard,
as it should have been (as explained below).
As noted, the circuit courts are uncertain as to
application and extent of SIML. Litigants continue to
take advantage of or suffer from this admitted
uncertainty in the law of municipal liability under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
Another effect of this uncertainty allows
claimants to impose liability on the municipality
because, in many cases, the case for a constitutional
tort against the individual employee defendants is too
difficult to prove. The facts do not support the theory
of individual liability in the given case. However, as
Wayne County asked below, if there is no consti-
tutional violation, how can the municipality be liable
under these circumstances?
Indeed, Cameron, at worst, was perhaps negligent
or simply not diligent. Although, Petitioner would not
concede the point. He performed a thorough and well-
documented assessment on Gillespie. He made a
professional discretionary choice, or perhaps no choice,
but that does not in and of itself rise to the level of
deliberate indifference. If his “choice” was not actionable,
how can it be so with respect to the County that employed
him to exercise his professional discretion? How can

27
the County be liable without being imposed with the
type of strict respondeat superior liability rejected by
this Court in Monell and subsequent cases?
Authors of law review articles and treatises consider
whether post-Connick cases signal a tougher hurdle
for plaintiffs in establishing liability based on the
Canton single-incident theory or make it easier as a
result of the now-persistent nature of this Court’s
leaving the possibility open without addressing its
limits, or at least taking a case in which those limits
can be sufficiently explored. See, e.g., Rosalie Berger
Levinson, Who Will Supervise the Supervisors?
Establishing Liability for Failure to Train, Supervise,
or Discipline Subordinates in A Post-Iqbal/Connick
World, 47 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 273 (2012) and Karen
Blum et. al., Municipal Liability and Liability of
Supervisors: Litigation Significance of Recent Trends
and Developments, 29 Touro L. Rev. 93 (2012) (the court
in Connick expressed no hostility to “other theories” of
establishing SIML liability); Karen M. Blum, Section
1983 Litigation: The Maze, the Mud, and the Madness,
23 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 913 (2015) (noting it
continues to be the view that a claimant may establish
that a failure to train, supervise, discipline, or ade-
quately screen, while not itself unconstitutional, is
deliberately indifferent to and the cause of a single
constitutional violation by a non-policymaker).
Other legal writers have even suggested this
Court’s two sides on the “single incident” issue are not
clear as to the scope of its application and the types of
claims it might apply to. See Kate McClelland,
“Somebody Help Me Understand This”: The Supreme
Court’s Interpretation of Prosecutorial Immunity and

28
Liability Under S 1983, 102 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
1323 (2012) (stating “[n]either side is particularly clear
on what a single incident that gives rise to liability
looks like either. It appears that a single incident
could produce liability in two ways. First, there is the
hypothetical in footnote 10 of Harris. Both sides agree
that this is still good law. Second, the majority in
Connick seems to say that something other than a
pattern could give the municipality a “specific reason”
to know that additional training was necessary.”
As explained in this Petition, the SIML theory
has vexed the Circuit Court of Appeals. The
speculation that it exists has caused broad ranging
theories of liability to survive the summary judgment
stage.
The Circuit Court’s decision in this case appears
not even within the speculative range of possibilities
because there is no proved unconstitutional policy, no
proved pattern of implementation, no implementation
by a policymaker, and the random, unforeseeable
assault upon Horvath was not causally related (even
by the most generous standards of proximate cause) to
the alleged constitutionally deficient “de facto policy”
of not requiring a review of the content of the MH-
WIN database, which, as demonstrated to the lower
courts (without rebuttal) contains no clinically infor-
mative information. LR40, P179; LR40, P452-57.
The only conclusion here is that the Sixth Circuit
sanctioned imposition of strict respondeat superior
liability on Wayne County. This is prohibited under
this Court’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 jurisprudence, and the
Petition should be granted to clarify the standard of
SIML and correct the Circuit Court’s error.

29
II. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT IGNORED PETITIONER
LARRY CAMERON’S QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
DEFENSE ON THE BASIS IT WAS NOT CLEARLY
ESTABLISHED THAT PRETRIAL DETAINEES HAD A
RIGHT TO HAVE RECORDS SCREENED IN ORDER
TO PREVENT HARM TO THEMSELVES OR OTHERS.
This Court has recently admonished the Court of
Appeals not to create “new” constitutional duties
without clear guidance. Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S.Ct.
2042, 2045 (2015). Indeed, it did so in a case involving
a “screening requirement” held by the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals to be “required” for pretrial detainees
to prevent them from committing suicide. As this Court
explained, “clearly established” law can never be over
generalized, nor can it be suddenly created by a Circuit
Court’s pronouncement (whether affirmatively or by
simple acquiescence (as in this case)).
Not only did the Circuit Court ignore Wayne
County’s argument that there was no “clearly
established” law requiring screening of pretrial
detainees’ records to further protect against claims
that they either failed to protect the detainee or
another subsequently harmed by the detainee, but it
also simply over-generalized, stating the “clearly
established” right at issue was protection from
violence at the hands of another inmate.
This was the rule articulated long ago in Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
However, it was a gross overgeneralization in this
case given that Petitioners specifically argued there
was no screening requirement, and especially since
that “requirement” is being advanced to impose SIML

30
on the County, and, individual liability on Cameron.
See discussion, Section I, supra.
As this Court has warned, painting with such a
broad brush threatens to create a constitutional right
in every case where discretion and reasonable delibe-
ration (even negligently performed) are free from the
costs and expenses of litigation and liability. What is
the point of immunity from litigation and liability if a
court inferior to this one can define away circum-
stances in which it might apply, or create new duties
out of whole cloth to impose liability on the entity?
Even the Sixth Circuit recognizes this problem,
stating “[b]ecause most legal rights are ‘clearly
established’ at some level of generality, immunity
would be impossible to obtain if a plaintiff were
required only to cite an abstract legal principle that
an official had ‘clearly’ violated.” Martin v. Heideman,
106 F.3d 1308, 1312 (6th Cir.1997).
This Court will not hesitate to reverse such
decisions. As the Court has stated: “We have
repeatedly told courts . . . not to define clearly estab-
lished law at a high level of generality.” See Ashcroft
v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011) (emphasis added).
The dispositive question is “whether the violative
nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” Id.
(emphasis added). This inquiry “‘must be undertaken
in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad
general proposition.’” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S.
194, 198 (2004) (per curiam) (quoting Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct.
305, 308 (2015).
Further, the Court has explained exactly what it
needs to do when the Circuit Court of Appeals gets the

31
question wrong or “makes up” a “clearly established
right” without existing precedent:
Although not necessary [for the Court] to
reverse an erroneous judgment, doing so
ensures that courts do not insulate constitu-
tional decisions at the frontiers of the law
from our review or inadvertently undermine
the values qualified immunity seeks to
promote. The former occurs when the consti-
tutional-law question is wrongly decided; the
latter when what is not clearly established is
held to be so.
al-Kidd, 563 U.S.at 735.
In this case, the Circuit Court’s analysis need
correction on both points. There simply is no case
saying that a county jail or correctional facility must
consult outside medical or mental health records when
screening incoming prisoners (for preventing them
from either harming themselves or others). Furthermore,
there is no consensus or trend in this direction. As
noted, while the Court does “not require a case directly
on point . . . existing precedent must have placed the
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”
Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (emphasis
supplied).
The Court has also recently stated: “‘clearly
established’ means that every reasonable official
would have understood that what he is doing violates
that right.” Reichle v. Howards, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 2093
(2012) (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted). Clearly established requires robust “consensus
of cases of persuasive authority.” Wilson v. Layne, 526
U.S. 603, 617 (1999). Accord Ashcroft, supra.

32
Cameron could not have known this at the time
he made his “decision” not to review the MH-WIN
database that what he was doing was constitutionally
deficient. Indeed, it flies in the face of logic to claim he
had a duty to do something the district court and
Circuit Court agreed was a “de facto” unwritten
County policy of not requiring the thing to be done.
Moreover, as recognized by this Court in al-Kidd,
supra Circuit Courts cannot go about at once creating
the “clearly established” constitutional right and at
the same time holding the individual officer liable for
violating it, and not affording him or her the
opportunity to claim immunity.
The Circuit Court created new “clearly estab-
lished” law and at the same time insulated its decision
(and presumably that of any other district court in the
Sixth Circuit) from further scrutiny, a decision which
is beyond any imaginable “forefront” of constitutional
law. See discussion, Section I, supra.
Moreover, cases closer in time to the acts in this
case (2011) continue not to require screening of
inmates and detainees in various circumstances. See,
e.g., Maness v. Cty. of St Francois, No. 4:04CV01157
ERW, 2006 WL 1738370, at *8 (E.D. Mo. June 19,
2006) (“There is no evidence that the Jail possessed
any records relating to [the inmate’s] prior suicide
attempt, and the Jail had no duty to obtain such
records.”), and Raheem v. Miller, No. CIV-09-80, 2010
WL 2595112, at *4 (W.D. Okla. May 14, 2010), report
and recommendation adopted, No. CIV-09-80, 2010 WL
2595082 (W.D. Okla. June 23, 2010) (Relying on and
citing Hott v. Hennepin County, 260 F.3d 901, 905
(8CA 2001) (regarding whether “failure to obtain medical

33
records” was a clearly established right / law, the court
stated: “[a]lthough perhaps regrettable, the alleged
failure to order medical records . . . would not create a
reasonable inference of deliberate indifference.”).
And, most importantly, “clearly established law”
is, or should be, what this Court says. In that regard,
this Court in Taylor analogously (and most recently)
stated with respect to screening and assessment of
mental health information:
No decision of this Court establishes a right
to the proper implementation of adequate
suicide prevention protocols. No decision of
this Court even discusses suicide screening
or prevention protocols. And to the extent
that a “robust consensus of cases of persua-
sive authority” in the Courts of Appeals
“could itself clearly establish the federal
right respondent alleges,” the weight of that
authority at the time of Barkes’s death
suggested that such a right did not exist.
Taylor, 135 S.Ct. at 2045 (2015).
If it is the right and duty of any court to say what
the law is, it is that of this Court. This is especially
true in in the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
requires tethering causes of action against the states
and state actors to federal constitutional rights. That
is emphatically the duty of this Court, and no other
inferior tribunal. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 37 (1803).

34
III. THE CIRCUIT COURT’S RULING REQUIRES APPLI-
CATION OF A “DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE”
STANDARD AS APPLIED TO THE INDIVIDUAL
PETITIONERS UNDER THE 14TH AMENDMENT,
EVEN THOUGH THE CLAIMANT IN THIS CASE WAS
NOT THE DIRECT SUBJECT OF ANY OF THEIR
ACTIONS OR CONDUCT
Petitioner Larry Cameron filed a petition for en
banc consideration, in which he raised this issue. The
Circuit Court’s decision improperly expands the reach
of “deliberate indifference” under the Fourteenth
Amendment by holding that prison officials can be
subjectively aware of a risk to an inmate or detainee
with whom they have not come into contact, and with
respect to whom they have made no decisions,
deliberate or otherwise.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), required
knowledge of a substantial risk of violence to a specific
person. It is undisputed that Cameron did not place
Horvath in a cell with Gillespie, and Respondent
never plead that Horvath belonged to a “specific class”
of vulnerable inmates. Cameron could not anticipate
that others would place Horvath (specifically) in a cell
with Gillespie. Cameron could also not anticipate that
Horvath would proposition Gillespie for sex and that
Gillespie would react violently to that suggestion. For
these reasons, Cameron cannot be liable for
deliberately failing to appreciate a “substantial risk”
to Horvath.
The shortcomings in the Circuit Court’s application
of the individual deliberate indifference standard as
applied to Cameron applies equally to Nurse Williams
and Deputy Stinson, both of whom had only 20 minutes,

35
at most, to act or react to Horvath’s plight. As the
Sixth Circuit has ruled ruled “officers cannot be held
liable under this theory if they do not have a realistic
opportunity to intervene and prevent harm.” Wells v.
City of Dearborn Heights, 2013 WL 4504759 at *6 (6CA
Cir. 2013), quoting Ontha v. Rutherford Cnty., Tenn.,
222 Fed. Appx. 498 (6CA 2007). “Deliberate indifference”
cannot arise under such circumstances.
Moreover, it is doubtful Nurse Williams was
equipped or responsible to provide the type of inter-
vention that may have stopped the assault. She did
provide medical care after the fact, which was her role
in Petitioner’s jail.
Deputy Stinson had to follow certain protocol in
“responding” once he was on notice that a specific
inmate was in danger. He could not just run onto the
floor of the mental health unit with Nurse Williams
still there and open the door to check on Horvath’s
well-being. He had to clear the floor, and he had to call
for backup. Moreover, Stinson had no particular
reason to believe the alleged “commotion” preceding
the discovery of the assault involved Horvath, because
only an hour earlier he had complied with Horvath’s
request to cancel a medical appointment and return to
the cell where he was housed with Gillespie.
All such things as this are the reality of the day-
to-day prison environment. They appear cold,
functionary and bureaucratic precisely because they
are. And, they are so out of necessities far more
important to society than we often realize.
Inmates and detainees are placed in the mental
health unit of the WCJ to be subjected to a necessarily
greater level of surveillance and to receive a higher

36
level of care than other inmates and detainees. But, as
this case demonstrates, it is impossible to protect
every inmate from every other inmate at all times.
Intake classifications, screening measures, redundancy
and safety measures are all diligently employed and
yet cannot, in every case, avoid the unavoidable.
It is noteworthy that Petitioner Wayne County
processes on average 40,000 inmates into the WCJ
every year. Of this amount the national averages
suggest approximately 60% have some type of mental
illness.7 Of that 60%, the national averages further
suggest 80% have a history of violence-related
criminal charges.
Another pertinent fact in light of these staggering
numbers is that no prior inmate-on-inmate murder
had ever occurred in the Wayne County Jail’s mental
health unit. Besides the point of its primary relevance
to the central question of imposing “single-incident
Monell liability” on Petitioner Wayne County, it is
remarkable in and of itself.
The Circuit Court imposed SIML on the County
on the sole basis that Cameron failed to do something
the County is said to have had an obligation to require,
but did not. That singular failure, of necessity, must
be the “moving force” behind the single constitutional
violation that is the subject of Respondent’s suit. This
effectively creates strict respondeat superior liability
(assuming Cameron’s act did not rise to the level of the
7 James and Glaze, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report,
Mental Health Problems of Prison and Jail Inmates, September
2006.

37
“deliberate indifference, or, at best, respondeat supe-
rior liablity, because Cameron’s “act” is the only one
being identified as proof that the municipality acted
with “deliberate indifference.” Neither of these
outcomes are defensible under Monell. This grave
error (caused only by the uncertainty of the theory’s
application) is exacerbated by the fact the Circuit
Court refused to recognize Wayne County’s right to an
interlocutory appeal.
CONCLUSION
The Petition for Certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
CARSON J. TUCKER, ESQ.
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONERS
LAW OFFICES OF CARSON J. TUCKER
117 N. FIRST ST., SUITE 111
ANN ARBOR, MI 48104
(734) 629-5870
CJTUCKER@LEXFORI.ORG
OCTOBER 17, 2016

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS
Opinion of the Sixth Circuit
(April 15, 2016)................................................... 1a
Judgment of the Sixth Circuit
(April 15, 2016)........................................... 27a
Order Denying in Part and Deeming Moot in
Part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss &
Motion For Summary Judgment
(March 31, 2015)............................................... 29a
Defendant Wayne County’s Motion to Dismiss and
Motion for Summary Judgment, Transcript of
Hearing (June 25, 2014)................................... 44a
Order of the Sixth Circuit Denying
Petition for Rehearing En Banc
(May 18, 2016) .................................................. 84a

App.1a
OPINION OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
(APRIL 15, 2016)
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
________________________
LINDA RICHKO, as Personal Representative of the
Estate of Jeffrey Horvath,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
WAYNE COUNTY, MICHIGAN; APRIL WILLIAMS;
LARRY CAMERON; ANDRE STINSON,
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________
No. 15-1524
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 2:12-cv-11232—Denise Page Hood,
Chief District Judge.
Before: CLAY, GILMAN, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.
RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Jeffrey
Horvath died on September 21, 2011 after being
beaten and stabbed b cellmate Brandon Gillespie
inside the mental health ward of Michigan’s Wayne
County Jail. Linda Richko, as the personal represent-
tative of Horvath’s estate, filed this lawsuit under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988. She alleged

App.2a
that Wayne County and jail personnel Larry
Cameron, Andre Stinson, and April Williams were
deliberately indifferent to Horvath’s safety, in violation
of his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Specifically, Richko alleged that the defendants
knew or should have known that Gillespie’s dangerous
and violent propensities presented a substantial risk
of serious harm to Horvath, but disregarded that risk
by (1) allowing Gillespie to be placed in Horvath’s
cell, and (2) failing to adequately respond to the
ensuing assault.
The district court denied summary judgment to
all of the defendants, concluding that a genuine dispute
existed regarding whether Wayne County and the
individual defendants violated Horvath’s constitutional
rights by disregarding a substantial risk of serious
harm to Horvath. The individual defendants have filed
this interlocutory appeal on the basis of qualified
immunity. Wayne County has also appealed, asserting
pendent jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth below,
we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court with
regard to the individual defendants and DISMISS
Wayne County’s interlocutory appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Assault on Horvath
On September 13, 2011, the police in Dearborn,
Michigan arrested Horvath based on an outstanding
warrant for a nonviolent misdemeanor. Horvath was
later booked at the Wayne County Jail. Officials noted
that Horvath had undergone prior mental-health treat-
ment and accordingly placed him in “4SW,” the jail’s

App.3a
mental-health unit. Unable to post bail, Horvath
remained in 4SW for eight days.
On the evening of September 20, Horvath
requested that he be moved out of his original cell
due to a malfunctioning toilet. He was then placed in
cell 14 of 4SW. A short time later, Gillespie was
placed in the same cell. The two spent the night in
cell 14 without apparent incident.
On the morning of September 21, approximately
an hour before the attack took place, Horvath was
scheduled for an x-ray examination. Deputy Stinson,
who was manning the ward’s duty station, said that
at approximately 7:40 a.m., he “flick[ed] the lights”
on and off in cell 14 to get Horvath’s attention. He
then “yell[ed] through the sally port slot” of the duty
station to summon Horvath from his cell. After
Stinson remotely opened the cell door, Horvath
stepped to the “outside of [the] duty station in front
of the . . . wire window.” Stinson later stated that,
upon exiting the cell, Horvath “was outside in the
hallway” and “off the ward completely.”
When Stinson informed Horvath that it was
time for his x-ray, Horvath protested. He asked if the
x-ray was really necessary, noting that he anticipated
“getting out tomorrow.” Stinson then called down to
the medical unit and learned that Horvath’s protest
was moot because the x-ray had in fact been
cancelled. Notably, during this conversation with
Stinson, Horvath expressed no concerns about being
housed with Gillespie. Stinson then directed Horvath
to return to cell 14 at approximately 7:44 a.m.
That same morning, Gillespie began experiencing
auditory hallucinations. He said that voices were

App.4a
“having sex, yelling at [him], [and] trying to make
deals with [him],” which caused him to become aroused.
Sometime between 8:34 a.m. and 9 a.m., the Complaint
alleges that, as a result of these hallucinations,
Gillespie assaulted Horvath “by punching him in the
head and face several times, delivering blows to his
face with his foot and knee, stabbing him multiple
times in the face with a pencil, and sodomizing him
either pre- or post-mortem, causing serious injuries
resulting in his death.” Gillespie later told investigators
that he was angered by Horvath, whom he believed
“was trying to be gay.”
Several inmates housed in 4SW during this time
reported hearing a series of loud “thumps” coming
from Horvath’s cell and seeing water flowing out of
the cell into the ward. Due to the fact that solid walls
separate one cell from the next, they were unable to
see into Horvath’s cell. One inmate heard banging
and a voice yelling: “Let me out. Let me out.” Another
inmate grew concerned about the banging and called
out to Horvath to ask if he was okay. Gillespie shouted
back: “Stay out of this or I’ll [f***ing] kill you.”
Nurse April Williams, who had been adminis-
tering medication to inmates in 4SW during this time,
arrived at cell 14 at approximately 8:50 a.m. and found
Gillespie standing at the bars with his genitals exposed.
According to Williams’s deposition, Gillespie made
lewd comments and asked her if his penis was
“infected.” Williams saw no sign of Horvath in the cell.
She then notified Stinson, again at approximately
8:50 a.m., that she had been unable to locate Horvath.
At approximately 9:00 a.m., Stinson called another
officer to assist him so that he could enter the ward.
Stinson’s deposition does not explain the ten-minute

App.5a
delay in responding to Williams’s notification that
Horvath was missing. When he entered the ward,
Stinson found Gillespie standing at the front of cell
14. He also noticed water on the floor of the cell, a
blanket shoved into the toilet, and two mattresses
stacked on top of each other. Stinson entered the cell
and found Horvath’s body sandwiched between the
mattresses. According to the Complaint, Horvath
was “hemorrhaging blood between the scalp and
skull into both jaws,” and his “eyes were bloody and
swollen, with multiple puncture wounds around the
eyes, the bridge of the nose, and his lip pushing into
his teeth.” Stinson called for another guard in the
duty station to sound a medical alert. Williams, who
was either standing outside the ward or in a meeting,
then reentered the ward with another nurse and
began administering CPR. Efforts to resuscitate
Horvath were unsuccessful, and he was declared
dead at 9:29 a.m.
B. Gillespie’s Intake and Medical Examinations
On September 19, 2011, Gillespie was arrested
for felonious assault after allegedly threatening a bus
driver with a knife. He was brought to the Wayne
County Jail, where he underwent several screening
interviews over the course of the night and the
following day. Because Gillespie had not been
previously housed in the Jail, there were no internal
records regarding his mental-health history. But, as
discussed below, Gillespie did report to the medical
staff that he had both bipolar disorder and
schizophrenia, and that he had not taken his
prescribed medications for six days.

App.6a
Gillespie was first booked by Matthew Mears,
who logged Gillespie’s basic information into the Jail’s
Inmate Management System. He was then examined by
medical assistant Dawn Benette to determine whether
he posed a risk to himself or others. Benette
documented the examination by completing an “intake
form” in which she asked Gillespie to describe his
past medical history. Gillespie self-reported that he
was being treated for bipolar disorder and schizo-
phrenia. He denied any drug use. Benette noted that
Gillespie was “acting very strange” and referred him
to the mental-health department for further screening.
Gillespie was next examined by registered nurse
Renella Thomas in the early hours of September 20.
Thomas observed that Gillespie appeared clean, coop-
erative, and neat, and that his mood was stable. Like
Benette, Thomas asked Gillespie to self-report his
mental state. He denied having any homicidal or
suicidal thoughts or hallucinations. Gillespie also
said that he had been prescribed medication for his
bipolar disorder and schizophrenia but did not have
any with him. Although she was aware that Gillespie
was not taking his medications, Thomas failed to
request that Gillespie be prescribed anything for his
conditions. Thomas concluded that Gillespie was not
a danger to himself, but she nevertheless recommended
that Gillespie be given a mental-status examination
(MSE) at some point. She concluded that Gillespie
could be housed in the jail’s general population until
the MSE.
At approximately 6:30 p.m. on September 20,
social worker Larry Cameron performed the requested
MSE on Gillespie. As part of this examination, Came-
ron searched the Wayne County Mental Health Well-

App.7a
ness Information Network (MH-WIN). Richko charac-
terized the MH-WIN system as a compilation of
“mental health treatment records maintained by
providers within Wayne County,” with access to the
MH-WIN system “provided to all Qualified Health
Professionals conducting a mental status exam at the
jail.” Cameron discovered that Gillespie, who was 22
years old, had 2,334 mental-health “encounters”
logged into the MH-WIN system over an 11-year
period. But because Jail policy did not require it,
Cameron failed to conduct any further investigation
to determine what those encounters actually were.
During the MSE, Gillespie told Cameron that he
had been hospitalized six times as a result of hearing
voices. He also stated that he had not taken his anti-
psychotic medications for six days. Despite these
disclosures, Cameron made no attempt to access the
records of Gillespie’s past hospitalizations in the MH-
WIN system. He did, however, note on the MSE form
that Gillespie had “psychosocial and environmental
problems” and “poor insight into his mental illness.”
Nevertheless, Cameron did not recommend that
Gillespie be housed alone in a single cell.
C. Procedural History
Richko originally brought claims against the
Wayne County Sheriff’s Department, Wayne County,
and a number of jail personnel under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, claiming that the individual defendants were
deliberately indifferent to Horvath’s need for protection
from violent attacks by inmates, and that the individual
defendants’ deliberate indifference resulted from the
deficient policies, training, and supervision on the
part of the entity defendants. Richko v. Wayne Cty.

App.8a
Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 12-CV-11232, 2015 WL 1498162,
at *1-2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2015). In addition to her
§ 1983 claims, Richko sought damages against the
individual defendants for wrongful death, conscious
pain and suffering, and physical injuries under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1986, and 1988. Id.
All of the defendants moved for summary judg-
ment, arguing that the individual defendants were
entitled to qualified immunity and that Richko’s theory
of municipal liability was untenable. The parties
filed a stipulated order in May 2014 in which they
dismissed the Sheriff’s Department and several of
the jail personnel, leaving only Cameron, Stinson,
Williams, and Wayne County as the remaining defen-
dants in this action.
In March 2015, the district court denied summary
judgment for the remaining defendants. Richko, 2015
WL 1498162, at *7. Regarding municipal liability,
the district court found that Wayne County “had a de
facto policy of not requiring a review of readily-
available prior mental health records, including the
MH-WIN records.” Id. at *5. It concluded that this
failure to review Gillespie’s mental-health records
after being put on notice that he had a significant
mental-health history, coupled with Gillespie’s
subsequent placement into Horvath’s cell without
further investigation, “may be considered a reckless
disregard of the risk of harm” to Horvath sufficient to
show deliberate indifference. Id. The district court
also held that Cameron, Stinson, and Williams were
not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of
qualified immunity, concluding that “there is a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether Defendants violated
Horvath’s constitutional rights by recklessly disregar-

App.9a
ding the excessive risk of harm to Horvath.” Id. at *7.
The defendants have timely appealed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
“We review de novo a district court’s denial of a
defendant’s motion for summary judgment on qualified
immunity grounds.” Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of
Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 565 (6th Cir. 2013). Summary
judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). But summary judgment is not proper if,
after reviewing all facts and drawing all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party. See Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 565.
A municipality, unlike the individual defendants,
is not permitted to raise qualified immunity as a
defense and thus may not normally appeal the
district court’s denial of summary judgment. Meals v.
City of Memphis, Tenn., 493 F.3d 720, 727 (6th Cir.
2007). This court, however, may exercise pendent
jurisdiction over municipal liability to the extent that
issues raised by the municipality on appeal are
“inextricably intertwined” with the qualified-immunity
analysis. Mattox v. City of Forest Park, 183 F.3d 515,
523–24 (6th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The defendants raise a number of issues on
appeal, ranging from discrete legal questions to
disputed issues of fact. We will first address the
arguments raised by the individual defendants

App.10a
Cameron, Stinson, and Williams, and will then discuss
the jurisdictional issue regarding Wayne County.
B. Deliberate Indifference Claims Regarding
Cameron, Stinson, and Williams
The individual defendants argue that the district
court failed to apply the correct legal standard
regarding Richko’s deliberate-indifference claim.
Because this argument presents a purely legal issue,
we have jurisdiction to consider it. See Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields
government officials from civil liability under § 1983
if “their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “Qualified immunity balances
two important interests—the need to hold public
officials accountable when they exercise power irres-
ponsibly and the need to shield officials from haras-
sment, distraction, and liability when they perform
their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 231 (2009). To determine whether an officer is
entitled to qualified immunity, a court evaluates two
independent prongs: whether the officer’s conduct
violated a constitutional right, and whether that
right was clearly established at the time of the incident.
Id. at 232. These prongs may be addressed in any order.
Id. at 236.
The constitutional right at issue in this case—
Horvath’s right to be free from violence at the hands
of other inmates—was clearly established by the
Supreme Court in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825
(1994). Farmer held that “prison officials have a duty

App.11a
to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of
other prisoners” because corrections officers have
“stripped them of virtually every means of self-
protection and foreclosed their access to outside aid.”
Id. at 833 (ellipsis and internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596,
600 (6th Cir. 1998) (“Without question, prison officials
have an affirmative duty to protect inmates from
violence perpetrated by other prisoners.”).
We begin by clarifying the specific source of the
constitutional right to be free from inmate-on-inmate
violence. In denying the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, the district court appears to
have based its holding solely on the Eighth Amendment
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
Richko, 2015 WL 1498162, *4-6. But the Eighth
Amendment applies only to those individuals who
have been tried, convicted, and sentenced. Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979); Roberts v.
City of Troy, 773 F.2d 720, 723 (6th Cir. 1985).
Pretrial detainees like Horvath, on the other hand,
are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause. See Roberts, 773 F.2d at 723. But
such a misstatement by the district court is
inconsequential because this court has made clear
that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, pretrial
detainees are “entitled to the same Eighth Amendment
rights as other inmates.” Thompson v. Cty. of
Medina, Ohio, 29 F.3d 238, 242 (6th Cir. 1994). The
analysis set forth in Farmer, although rooted in the
Eighth Amendment, therefore applies with equal
force to a pretrial detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment
claims. Ruiz-Bueno v. Scott, Nos. 14-4149, 14-4151,
2016 WL 385294, at *4 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 2016) (noting

App.12a
that “Supreme Court precedents governing prisoners’
Eighth Amendment rights also govern the Fourteenth
Amendment rights of pretrial detainees”).
Applying the above analysis to the present case,
Richko had the burden of presenting evidence from
which a reasonable juror could conclude that the
individual defendants were deliberately indifferent to
a substantial risk of serious harm to Horvath and
that they disregarded that risk by failing to take
reasonable measures to protect him. See Farmer, 511
U.S. at 842. Under this rubric, Richko must satisfy
both an objective and a subjective component. Id. at
835-38. She can satisfy the objective component by
showing that, “absent reasonable precautions, an
inmate is exposed to a substantial risk of serious
harm.” Amick v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 521 F.
App’x 354, 361 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Farmer, 511
U.S. at 836). The subjective component requires Richko
to show that (1) “the official being sued subjectively
perceived facts from which to infer a substantial risk
to the prisoner,” (2) the official “did in fact draw the
inference,” and (3) the official “then disregarded that
risk.” Rouster v. Cty. of Saginaw, 749 F.3d 437, 446
(6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Comstock v. McCrary, 273
F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001)). “Because government
officials do not readily admit the subjective component
of this test, it may be demonstrated in the usual
ways, including inference from circumstantial
evidence . . . .” Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555
F.3d 543, 550 (6th Cir. 2009) (brackets, citation, and
internal quotation marks omitted).

App.13a
1. Richko has Satisfied Farmer’s Objective Prong
The individual defendants argue that Richko
failed to present evidence of their culpability under
Farmer’s objective and subjective prongs. They first
contend that there was no objective evidence in the
record showing that Gillespie posed a risk of harm to
anyone. But such a statement is belied by the record.
All that Richko needs to show is that Horvath was
“incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial
risk of serious harm.” Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493,
506 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at
834).
We analyze the objective component “in the
abstract.” Clark-Murphy v. Foreback, 439 F.3d 280,
286-87 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that “the deprivation
of water and medical care, including psychological
services, of course would be ‘sufficiently serious’ to
satisfy [Farmer’s objective] requirement”); see also
Williams v. McLemore, 247 F. App’x 1, *9 (6th Cir.
2007) (“In the abstract, one prison inmate’s threat to
the health and safety of another inmate is ‘sufficiently
serious’ to satisfy [the objective] requirement.”).
Viewing the present case in the abstract, the
risk to Horvath of being housed with and attacked by
an inmate who had recently been arrested for violent
assault and had a history of serious mental illness
was sufficient to fulfill the objective component of
this analysis. Because the analysis of the facts below
establishes, for the purpose of overcoming the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment, that
Richko has satisfied the subjective component of
Farmer’s test, the objective component is likewise
satisfied based on the same factual analysis.

App.14a
The individual defendants next argue that the
district court failed to apply the subjective component
of a deliberate-indifference claim to each of them. In
Garretson v. City of Madison Heights, 407 F.3d 789
(6th Cir. 2005), the court held that “[t]his subjective
component [of a deliberate-indifference claim] must
be addressed for each officer individually.” Id. at 797.
This holding was further discussed in Phillips v.
Roane Cty., Tenn., 534 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2008), where
the court held that “general allegations” of liability,
so long as they are not “broad and conclusory accu-
sations,” can provide “sufficient evidence from which
a trier of fact could infer that each individual correc-
tional officer had an objective awareness as to the
seriousness” of the risk, “and that their failure to do
anything . . . amounted to deliberate indifference.”
Id. at 542. Utilizing Phillips’s guidance, therefore, we
next consider whether the facts construed in the light
most favorable to Richko show that Cameron, Stinson,
and Williams had the requisite level of culpability to
satisfy Farmer’s subjective component.
2. Social worker Larry Cameron
a. Richko’s Factual Allegations About
Cameron’s Ability to Access Information
in the MH-WIN System are not
Blatantly Contradicted by the Record
Because Cameron appeals from the denial of
summary judgment, he must concede the version of the
facts most favorable to Richko. See Johnson v. Jones,
515 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1995). But Cameron contends
that Richko made “blatantly and demonstrably false”
misrepresentations regarding material facts that, in
view of Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), should

App.15a
not be considered for the purpose of summary
judgment. See id. at 380 (noting that a version of the
material facts that “is blatantly contradicted by the
record” should not be credited).
Cameron specifically argues that Richko
misrepresented to the district court that Cameron
could have accessed Gillespie’s specific treatment
information in the MH-WIN system. Richko alleged
that Cameron “admit[ted] that if he had examined
the MH-WIN encounters, he could have determined
the extent of Gillespie’s former treatments, diagnoses,
and outpatient care.” But Cameron maintains that
the deposition shows only that he “did not consult
any other information in the MHWIN system,
because he did not need to do so in order to complete
the mental status examination.”
The specific deposition testimony at issue is as
follows:
ATTORNEY: Based on your understanding of
the MH-WIN System, are you able to access
previous treatment information about a
consumer?
CAMERON: No previous treatment information.
[ . . . ]
ATTORNEY: Are you able to access information
regarding diagnosis?
CAMERON: Yes.
ATTORNEY: And are you able to access
information regarding risk assessment?
CAMERON: No.

App.16a
ATTORNEY: Are you able to access information
regarding any service, mental health service
that a consumer received?
CAMERON: Yes.
[ . . . ]
ATTORNEY: Once you took the mental status
examination and Mr. Gillespie had indicated
to you that he was diagnosed bipolar, were
you able to confirm that through the MH-
WIN System?
CAMERON: Yeah, I did not access that infor-
mation at the time.
ATTORNEY: Okay. So you did not confirm
through the MH-WIN System Mr. Gillespie’s
indication to you that he was previously
diagnosed as bipolar?
CAMERON: No.
[ . . . ]
ATTORNEY: If [Gillespie] was diagnosed as
being schizophrenic would that be something
that you could have accessed in the MH-
WIN System?
CAMERON: Yes. By code, yes.
ATTORNEY: Are you familiar with the code for
pycho-schizophrenia?
CAMERON: Yes, I am.
This deposition testimony does not “blatantly
contradict[]” or “utterly discredit[]” Richko’s allegations.
See Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. Richko’s argument is based
on Cameron’s own admission that he was able to access

App.17a
previous diagnoses and prior mental-health and
substance-abuse services by a corresponding code.
Cameron also stated that he never attempted to use
the “incident” portion of the MH-WIN system, thereby
raising a factual question of whether he was unable
to access incident reports or simply chose not to do
so. And although Cameron testified that he could not
access detailed treatment information, Richko notes
that Cameron explicitly conceded that he could
access, among other things, Gillespie’s prior diagnoses,
mental-health services, and substance-abuse services
—and possibly incident reports.
Richko also presented evidence in the form of a
MH-WIN chart, which suggests that Cameron could
access at least some treatment information in the
MH-WIN system. The MH-WIN chart lists a series of
“encounters” by date, and includes links to “view,”
“print claim,” and “view full detail.” Based on this
information, a factfinder could reasonably infer that
Cameron could have further investigated the “full
detail” of Gillespie’s mental-health issues in the MH-
WIN system to determine whether he posed a
substantial risk to other inmates and thus should
have been recommended for single-cell placement.

App.18a
b. A Reasonable Juror Could Find that
Cameron was Deliberately Indifferent
to a Substantial Risk of Harm to
Horvath Because He Was Aware of
Gillespie’s Significant Mental History,
Failed to Investigate it Further, and
Failed to Recommend that Gillespie be
Housed Alone
Cameron next argues that, even if his decision
not to house Gillespie alone led to the attack, it does
not prove that Cameron had the requisite mental state
to establish deliberate indifference. But Richko need
not show that Cameron acted with the “very purpose
of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will
result.” See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835
(1994). Liability can instead be established simply by
showing that the correctional officer “refused to
verify underlying facts that he strongly suspected to
be true, or declined to confirm inferences of risk that
he strongly suspected to exist.” Id. at 843 n.8.
That is precisely the issue here. The record
includes facts that, when viewed in the light most
favorable to Richko, reveal that Cameron (1) was aware
of Gillespie’s self-reported history of bipolar disorder
and schizophrenia, (2) was aware that Gillespie had
not taken his medication for these conditions for six
days, (3) knew that Gillespie had been arrested the
day before for attempted assault with a dangerous
weapon, (4) knew that Gillespie had been hospitalized
six times for his mental illnesses, and (5) discovered
through the MH-WIN system that Gillespie had 2,334
prior encounters with mental-health services and/or
providers over the past 11 years (equating to approxi-

App.19a
mately 212 encounters per year since he was 11
years old).
So even if one assumes for the sake of argument
that Cameron could not have accessed information
regarding individual incidents in the MH-WIN
system, a reasonable juror could nevertheless
conclude that the information that was available to
Cameron was enough to show that Cameron was
aware that Gillespie posed a substantial risk of
violence to others and that Cameron was deliberately
indifferent to that risk. The district court therefore
properly denied Cameron’s motion for summary
judgment based on his claim of qualified immunity.
3. Deputy Sheriff Andre Stinson
We confront a closer question in determining
whether the district court properly denied summary
judgment to Deputy Sheriff Stinson. Unlike Nurse
Williams, Stinson was not physically inside ward
4SW during the time of the assault; he was instead
manning the ward’s duty station. In addition,
Stinson testified that he did not know that Horvath
was sharing a cell with another inmate at the time.
The dispositive inquiry regarding Stinson is therefore
whether Richko presented sufficient evidence for a
reasonable juror to conclude that (1) Stinson heard
the thumps, shouts, and banging coming from cell 14
while he was inside the duty station, and that he
simply chose not to respond; and (2) Stinson failed to
promptly respond to the incident once Williams
informed him that Horvath was missing.
Stinson points to several facts that would tend to
show that he was not on notice of a serious
altercation, and therefore could not have actual

App.20a
knowledge that Gillespie posed a substantial risk of
serious harm to Horvath. For one, Stinson notes that
he had a conversation with Horvath that same morn-
ing, and that Horvath never mentioned feeling uncom-
fortable or unsafe in his cell with Gillespie. Moreover,
Stinson noted that two other officers performed
separate “walk-throughs” of the ward that morning,
at 8:07 a.m. and 8:30 a.m., respectively, and neither
found any evidence of suspicious behavior.
But this evidence is irrelevant to our present
analysis. The key issue here is instead whether, during
the relevant time period beginning at 8:34 a.m., there
is any evidence showing that Stinson heard the assault
taking place and chose not to respond. We need not
consider what information Stinson had before the time
of the attack, but whether, once the attack began,
Stinson perceived a risk of harm to Horvath and chose
to disregard that risk.
Stinson certainly raises doubts as to what he
could hear and see at the time of the attack. He
disputes Richko’s contention that he heard the assault
from the duty station, pointing to the fact that, in
order to speak with Horvath earlier that morning, he
had to bring Horvath out of his cell into the hallway
and “off the ward completely.” And he also disputes
Richko’s claim that there was a 10-minute gap between
the time he was notified by Williams and the time he
went inside the ward to locate Horvath. But all of
these arguments are disputes of fact and not of law.
They are therefore outside our jurisdictional purview
for purposes of this appeal. See Johnson v. Jones, 515
U.S. 304, 317 (1995) (limiting interlocutory appeals
of qualified immunity to cases presenting “neat abstract

App.21a
issues of law” and not to factual controversies
(citation omitted)).
Indeed, Stinson might very well prevail in
proving that he did not hear the attack, and thus
that he could not have deliberately disregarded the
risk that Gillespie posed to Horvath. But such
arguments are appropriately reserved for a jury, not
for this court at the summary-judgment stage of the
case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986) (noting that the district court, at the
summary-judgment stage, is tasked with determining
“if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
Elliott v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 341 (7th Cir. 1991)
(“[W]hether the defendants did the deeds alleged
. . . is precisely the question for trial.” (emphasis in
original)).
Here, Richko proffered enough evidence for a
reasonable juror to conclude that Stinson did have
knowledge of the risk to Horvath and that he
deliberately disregarded that risk. First, she presented
evidence indicating that sounds, and especially loud
ones, can be heard from the duty station. Deputy
Sheriff Jeremy Meinke testified that “you can hear a
good amount” from the duty station, and that “it gets
loud” when inmates play cards or watch TV. This
evidence is bolstered by the fact that Stinson himself
noted that he “may be able to hear some noise” from
the duty station.
Construing the facts in the light most favorable
to Richko, a reasonable juror could infer that Stinson
heard the banging, yelling, and pounding from the
duty station, that he simply chose not to respond,

App.22a
and that he further delayed responding for 10 minutes
even after being notified by Nurse Williams that
Horvath was missing. All of Stinson’s arguments are
thus best left to a jury, which will be tasked with
weighing the evidence presented by Stinson against
that proffered by Richko. We therefore conclude that
the district court properly denied Stinson’s motion for
summary judgment that was based on his claim of
qualified immunity.
4. Nurse April Williams
For similar reasons, the district court properly
decided that factual issues precluded the grant of
qualified immunity to Nurse Williams. She contends
that she did not see or hear “loud talking,” “fighting,”
or anything out of the ordinary when she was making
her rounds, and therefore could not have been aware
of any substantial risk of harm to Horvath. But Richko
presented testimony from three inmates stating the
opposite: (1) that there were five or six thumps coming
from Horvath’s cell during the time that Williams
was in the ward; (2) that Williams stepped around
water that was overflowing from Horvath’s cell into
the ward; (3) that there was banging coming from
Horvath’s cell and an individual repeatedly yelling
“Let me out. Let me out”; and (4) that Gillespie verbally
threatened to kill an inmate who called out to Horvath.
Faced with this competing circumstantial evidence,
a jury could reasonably infer that Williams did in
fact hear Gillespie’s assault on Horvath and elected
not to respond. See Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs.,
555 F.3d 543, 550 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that
circumstantial evidence is important in a deliberate-
indifference analysis because “government officials

App.23a
do not readily admit” culpability). The district court
therefore properly denied Williams’s motion for
summary judgment based on her claim of qualified
immunity.
D. This Court Does Not Have Interlocutory
Jurisdiction Over Wayne County’s Appeal
We finally turn to Richko’s claim against Wayne
County as a municipal defendant. The district court
determined that there remained “a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Defendant Wayne
County had a policy that constituted indifference to
inmate safety.” Richko v. Wayne Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t,
No. 12-CV-11232, 2015 WL 1498162, at *5 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 31, 2015). In particular, it found that
Wayne County’s “de facto policy of not requiring a
review” of an individual’s mental-health records
during a MSE, coupled with the placement of that
individual inside a cell with another inmate without
further investigation, “may be considered a reckless
disregard of the risk of harm to the other inmate,
which is sufficient to satisfy the deliberate indifference
standard.” Id.
Wayne County argues that the district court
erred in denying the County’s motion for summary
judgment because the individual defendants did not
violate Horvath’s constitutional rights. In other
words, Wayne County contends that, because the
individual defendants are not liable, it cannot be held
liable. The County’s argument is not only unsound,
see Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 365
(6th Cir. 1993) (holding that “a municipality may not
escape liability for a § 1983 violation merely because
the officer who committed the violation is entitled to

App.24a
qualified immunity”), but is irrelevant in light of our
conclusion that the liability of the individual defendants
is an issue for the jury.
“A [municipality] is not entitled to claim qualified
immunity, and thus may not normally appeal the
district court’s denial of summary judgment as to it.”
Meals v. City of Memphis, Tenn., 493 F.3d 720, 727
(6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Under the collateral-
order doctrine, “only decisions that are conclusive,
that resolve important questions separate from the
underlying merits, and that are effectively unreview-
able on appeal from the final judgment” may be
appealed immediately. Swint v. Chambers Cty.
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995) (citing Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)).
Wayne County’s interlocutory appeal fails Cohen’s
third requirement. Whether its policy of not requiring
the review of mental-health records in the MH-WIN
database amounts to deliberate indifference is an issue
that is reviewable on appeal after the district court
renders a final judgment. See id. at 43 (“An erroneous
ruling on liability may be reviewed effectively on
appeal from final judgment.”).
Pendent appellate jurisdiction over Wayne
County’s appeal is likewise inappropriate. A court
may exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over only
those decisions that are “inextricably intertwined
with” or “necessary to ensure meaningful review of”
qualified-immunity claims. Id. at 51 (noting that
pendent jurisdiction is proper “[o]nly where essential
to the resolution of properly appealed collateral
orders” (citation and internal quotation marks omit-
ted)); see also Brennan v. Twp. of Northville, 78 F.3d
1152, 1158 (6th Cir. 1996) (defining “inextricably inter-

App.25a
twined” as “coterminous with, or subsumed in, the
claim before the court on interlocutory appeal”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Richko’s claims against Stinson and Williams
are plainly independent of and in no way implicate
Wayne County’s mental-health screening policy. And
although it may overlap, the resolution of Richko’s
municipal-liability claim against Wayne County is
not “essential to” the question of Cameron’s immunity
from suit because Richko’s claim against Cameron is
based on far more than Cameron’s review of
Gillespie’s mental-health records. See Swint, 514
U.S. at 51. The “far more” consists of proof that
Cameron was aware of a host of other factors
indicating that Gillespie posed a substantial risk of
serious harm to a fellow inmate. These factors
included Gillespie’s self-report of having bipolar
disorder and schizophrenia, his statements that he
had been hospitalized six times and that he had not
taken his medication in six days, and—perhaps most
glaringly—the fact that he had been arrested for
attempted assault with a dangerous weapon just a
day earlier. Because Cameron’s appeal on the basis
of qualified immunity is not coterminous with the
issue of Wayne County’s municipal liability, we lack
pendent jurisdiction over the County.
Our conclusion is bolstered by the Supreme
Court’s holding in Swint. There, the Court reversed
the Eleventh Circuit’s exercise of pendent jurisdiction,
which was based on the theory of judicial economy,
over a county commission’s appeal from the denial of
summary judgment. 514 U.S. at 45. The Court held
that the question of the county commission’s liability
was not “inextricably intertwined” with the individual

App.26a
defendants’ immunity from suit because the claim
against the commission focused on whether one of the
individual defendants qualified as a county policy-
maker, whereas the individual defendants’ claims were
based on whether they had violated clearly established
law. Id. at 51. Here, Wayne County’s potential liability
is based on its alleged de facto policy of not reviewing
an inmate’s mental-health records in the MH-WIN
system. This issue is not inextricably intertwined
with the decision to deny summary judgment to
Cameron based on qualified immunity, and a review
of the former issue is not necessary to ensure a
meaningful review of the latter. We therefore decline
to exercise pendent jurisdiction over Wayne County’s
interlocutory appeal.
III. CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM
the judgment of the district court with regard to the
individual defendants and DISMISS Wayne County’s
interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

App.27a
JUDGMENT OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
(APRIL 15, 2016)
________________________
Estate of Jeffrey Horvath,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
WAYNE COUNTY, MICHIGAN; APRIL WILLIAMS;
LARRY CAMERON; ANDRE STINSON,
________________________
No. 15-1524
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
THIS CAUSE was heard on the record from the
district court and was argued by counsel.
IN CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is
ORDERED that the judgment of the district court
with regard to the individual defendants is
AFFIRMED, and Wayne County’s interlocutory
appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

App.28a
Entered by Order of the Court
/s/ Deborah S. Hunt
Clerk

App.29a
ORDER DENYING IN PART AND DEEMING
MOOT IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS & MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(MARCH 31, 2015)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
________________________
ESTATE OF JEFFREY HORVATH,
Plaintiff,
v.
WAYNE COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT,
a Municipal Corporation, COUNTY OF WAYNE,
a Municipal Corporation, APRIL WILLIAMS,
DEPUTY MEARS, JEREMY MEINEKE, SERGEANT
TAYLOR-BEAVERS, LARRY CAMERON, and
ANDRE STINSON, Individually and Jointly,
Defendants.
________________________
Case Number 12-CV-11232
Before: Honorable Denise Page HOOD
United States District Judge
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss &
Motion for Summary Judgment on behalf of the
remaining Defendants in this case [Docket No. 40,
filed April 14, 2014]. On May 28, 2014, the parties

App.30a
filed a stipulated order dismissing Defendants Wayne
County Sheriff’s Department, Matthew Mears, Jeremy
Meinke, and Lamiko Taylor-Beavers [Docket No. 51].
The Motion to Dismiss pertains to Defendant Wayne
County Sheriff’s Department only, and therefore, it is
deemed MOOT. Remaining are Defendants Wayne
County, April Williams, Larry Cameron, and Andre
Stinson. Plaintiff filed a Response to the Motion
[Docket No. 47, filed May 19, 2014] and the remaining
Defendants filed a Reply to the Response [Docket No.
52, filed June 9, 2014].
I. BACKGROUND
On March 20, 2013, Plaintiff Linda Richko, as
the personal representative of the Estate of Jeffrey
Horvath, filed this an action for money damages
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988,
and the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution. Plaintiff filed an
Amended Complaint (with removal of the state law
claims) on April 27, 2012 [Docket No. 9]. On April 2,
2013, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint.
The Complaint was filed against the above-named
Defendants, in their individual capacities and/or as
the entities in charge of running the Wayne County
Jail and/or based on the above-named Defendants being
in charge of supervising the employees, agents, officers
and all others entrusted with positions and responsi-
bilities of the Defendants.
The Second Amended Complaint alleges that on
or about September 13, 2011, Horvath was arrested
on an outstanding warrant by Dearborn Police at the
Marathon gas station located at Southfield Road and
Oakwood Boulevard, in the City of Dearborn, Michigan.

App.31a
He was booked and transferred to the custody of the
Wayne County Sheriff’s Department where he
remained in the Wayne County Jail System for the
following eight days because he was unable to post
bond. On or about September 20, 2011, Horvath was
transferred from his cell into a cell located in the
area of the jail reserved for those detainees/inmates
with mental illness because the toilet in Horvath’s
cell had been malfunctioning. At some time between
Horvath’s assignment to this new cell and the morn-
ing of September 21, 2011, inmate Brandon Gillespie
(hereinafter referred to as “Gillespie”), was placed in
Horvath’s cell. Plaintiff alleges that Gillespie was
placed in the cell with Horvath despite the fact that
Defendants knew or should have known about Gilles-
pie’s dangerous and/or violent propensities, including
the serious risk of harm or death to the Horvath
based on Gillespie’s violent schizophrenic history.
Gillespie had also been incarcerated on felony charges
of aggravated assault.
Plaintiff contends that according to Detroit
Police Department records, on September 21, 2011
between the hours of 7:40 a.m. and 9:10 a.m., Gillespie
“brutally assaulted] [Horvath] . . . by punching him the
head and face several times, delivering blows to his
face with his foot and knee, stabbing him multiple
times in the face with a pencil, and sodomizing him
either pre- or post-mortem, causing serious injuries
resulting in his death.” Plaintiff states that, upon
information and belief, during the assault Horvath
“called for help from the Defendants [John Does 1-5],
screaming let me out, let me out,’ however, the
Defendants willfully and wantonly disregarded his
pleas for help and/or refused to intervene.” Plaintiff

App.32a
states that Horvath’s body was found between two
mattresses on the floor of the jail cell and that,
further, according to Wayne County Jail officials, at
the time the body was taken from the cell, Horvath’s
eyes were bloody and swollen, with multiple puncture
wounds around the eyes, the bridge of his nose, and
his lip pushing into his teeth.” Horvath also suffered
from “hemorrhaging blood between the scalp and
skull and into both jaws.”
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint seeks relief
based on the following claims for relief: Violation of
the United States Constitution against Defendants
Wayne County Sheriff’s Department and the County of
Wayne (Count I); Federal Statutory and United States
Constitutional Violations Against the Individual
Defendants April Williams, Deputy Mears, Jeremy
Meineke, Sergeant Taylor-Beavers, Larry Cameron,
and Andre Stinson (Count II); and Claim for
Reasonable Costs, Disbursements and Attorney Fees
in Bringing Actions Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985,
1986 Pursuant To 42 U.S.C. § 1988 As To All Defen-
dants (Count V). Prior to filing the Second Amended
Complaint, Plaintiffs state law claims (Count III & IV)
were dismissed [Docket No. 7, April 18, 2012].
Plaintiff claims that “[a]t all material times,
Defendants were the exclusive custodians of [Horvath]
following his transfer into their custody and were
charged with the responsibility of monitoring [Horvath]
and those around him to ensure that [Horvath’s] health
and welfare would not be placed in jeopardy while
[Horvath] was in the custody of the Defendants.”
Plaintiff contends that Horvath’s death was -a result
of the willful and wanton, grossly negligent, reckless
and otherwise negligent conduct of Defendants.”

App.33a
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate in cases
where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating
that summary judgment is appropriate. Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. MacMillan
Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1093 (6th
Cir. 1974). The Court must consider the admissible
evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Sagan v. United States of Am., 342
F.3d 493, 497 (6th Cir. 2003).
“At the summary judgment stage, facts must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those
facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)
(emphasis added). To create a genuine issue of
material fact, the nonmovant must do more than
present “some evidence” of a disputed fact. Any
dispute as to a material fact must be established by
affidavits or other documentary evidence. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). “If the [nonmovant’s] evidence is merely
colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary
judgment may be granted.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (citations omitted).
Accordingly, a nonmovant “must produce evidence
that would be sufficient to require submission to the
jury of the dispute over the fact.” Mathieu v. Chun,
828 F. Supp. 495, 497 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (citations
omitted). “When opposing parties tell two different

App.34a
stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the
record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a
court should not adopt that version of the facts for
purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”
Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Municipal Liability Pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (Count I)
In order for a municipality to be liable under
Section 1983 there must be some evidence that “execu-
tion of [the] government’s policy or custom, whether
made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or
acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,
inflicts the injury.” Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “[A] municipality
cannot be held liable solely because it employs a
tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be
held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior
theory.” Id. at 691. Generally, the doctrine of
respondeat superior has no application in a § 1983
claim absent an allegation that the defendants were
following the government’s policies or customs. Dunn
v. Tennessee, 697 F.2d 121, 128 (6th Cir. 1982). Rather,
“the touchstone of the § 1983 action against a govern-
ment body is an allegation that official policy is
responsible for a deprivation of rights protected by
the Constitution.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
The Supreme Court has indicated that “municipal
liability may be imposed for a single decision by
municipal policymakers under appropriate circum-
stances.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S.
469, 480 (1986). However, “an ‘official policy’ is one

App.35a
adopted by someone with ‘final authority to establish
municipal policy with respect to the action ordered.’”
Hull v. Cuyahoga Valley Joint Vocational Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Ethic., 926 F.2d 505, 515 (6th Cir.1991)
(quoting Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481) (emphasis
added). In other words, “[l]iability for unauthorized
acts is personal; to hold the municipality liable, Monell
tells us, the agent’s action must implement rather
than frustrate the government’s policy.” Id. A
municipal employee is not a “final policymaker”
unless his decisions “are final and unreviewable and
are not constrained by the official policies of superior
officials.” Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 988 F.2d
649, 655 (6th Cir.1993).
In their Motion, Defendants argue that Defendant
Wayne County is entitled to summary judgment on
the constitutional claims, because it has policies and
procedures to ensure safe and secure housing for all
inmates, and the single incident of Horvath being
murdered does not constitute deliberate indifference
by the municipality. Defendants also allege that
Plaintiff has not provided any evidence to support
the allegations that the injuries were the result of a
failure to discipline the employees and the
ratification of the employees’ misconduct.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant Wayne County’s
policies in effect at the time of Horvath’s death fail to
meet the Constitutional requirements under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to take reasonable
measures to prevent inmate-on-inmate violence.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant Wayne County had
policies that resulted in inadequate screening, fostering
a custom to fail to protect, having a practice or policy
of inadequately monitoring potentially dangerous

App.36a
inmates, having a practice or policy of not sequestering
potentially dangerous inmates, failure to train, failure
to discipline, and ratifying wrongful conduct of
employees.
Municipal liability may be found where there is
an inadequate policy or where established fixed plans
become the de facto policy. Pembaur v. City of Cincin-
nati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-81, 106 S. Ct. 1292, 1299, 89
L. Ed. 2d 452 (1986). Next, the Court must determine
if the policy constitutes deliberate indifference to
inmate safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S. Ct.
1970, 1977, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994). “Without
question, prison officials have an affirmative duty to
protect inmates from violence perpetrated by other
prisoners.” Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 600 (6th
Cir. 1998). To satisfy the subjective and objective
tests required for a finding of deliberate indifference,
“the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under
conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,”
and that the official’s “state of mind is one of ‘deliberate
indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511
U.S. at 834. “Acting or failing to act with deliberate
indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a
prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding
that risk.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836, 114
S. Ct. 1970, 1978. 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994).
Defendant Wayne County’s Jail Health Services
Policy & Procedures require a health care screening
of all inmates upon arrival, including Medical and
Mental Health observations and questions that are
answered in the Information Management System
(“IMS”) (Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. X, “Wayne
County Jail Screening Policies”). The screenings are

App.37a
supposed to include an inquiry into mental health
problems and observation of behavior (Id.). Inmates
that require mental health services are flagged and
transferred to the Mental Health Department, and a
Mental Health Professional or Registered Nurse is to
perform a mental status examination (Id.). The
inmate is then required to be appropriately housed,
based on the findings, until further examination by a
psychologist or psychiatrist (Id.).
After Gillespie was admitted to Wayne County
Jail on September 19, 2011, for charges of felonious
assault for threatening a bus driver with a knife,
Dawn Benette, a medical assistant interviewed him
and referred him to see medical staff after he
indicated he was bipolar and schizophrenic (Pl.’s
Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. E, “Deposition of Dawn
Benette” at p. 42). On the intake form, Benette notes
Gillespie is “acting very strange,” but that he “denies
drug use” (Id., Ex. F, “Brandon Gillespie: Intake Form”
at p. 3). Next, Renella Thomas, R.N. evaluated Gilles-
pie based on the flag, and Gillespie told her that he
was on medication but didn’t have the medication
with him (Id., Ex. G, “Deposition of Renella Thomas”
at p. 63). Thomas did not call the psychiatrist on duty
for a few hours, until between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m.,
because Gillespie appeared stable (Id. at pp. 79-80).
Thomas had Gillespie return to the general prison
population at around 3:00 a.m. to be evaluated by a
psychiatric social worker later in the day (Id. at pp.
71, 87-88).
On September 20, 2011, at 7:00 p.m., Defendant
Larry Cameron, a social worker, conducted a mental
status examination (“MSE”) and discovered that
Gillespie had 2,334 encounters in the Mental Health

App.38a
Wellness Information Network (“MH-WIN”), but
Cameron did not know what an “encounter” was nor did
he investigate further (Id., Ex. L, “Deposition of
Larry Cameron” at pp. 160-161, 167-168). Defendants
state that “Cameron did not consult any other infor-
mation in the MHWIN system, because he did not
need to do so in order to complete the mental status
examination” (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., p. 13). Cameron
noted that Gillespie was hospitalized six times for
depression and hearing voices, and that Gillespie had
not taken his medications for six days (Pl.’s Resp. to
Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. M, “Brandon Gillespie: Mental
Status Examination” at p. 1). On the same day, Came-
ron ordered that Gillespie be housed in 4SW cell 10
and noted mental illness, but did not indicate that
Gillespie should be housed separately (Id., Ex. N,
“Brandon Gillespie: Housing Report” at p. 1).
Gillespie was eventually moved to cell 14 with
Horvath, since there were no requirements to house
him alone. The next morning, Gillespie killed Horvath.
Gillespie claims he had auditory hallucinations that
“hurt [his] eardrums” and he could “her them having
sex, yelling at [him], trying to make deals with [him]”
that morning (Id., Ex. 0, “Brandon Gillespie: Wayne
County Jail Medical Records” at p. 1).
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to
Plaintiff, there is a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether Defendant Wayne County had a policy that
constituted deliberate indifference to inmate safety
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Defendant
Wayne County had a de facto policy of not requiring
a review of readily-available prior mental health
records, including the MH-WIN records. Failing to
adequately review an inmate’s mental health records

App.39a
after the discovery of mental health issues, and then
placing him in the same cell with another inmate
before investigating further may be considered a
reckless disregard of the risk of harm to the other
inmate, which is sufficient to satisfy the deliberate
indifference standard. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836.
For these reasons, the motion for summary judgment
on this claim is denied.
B. Statutory and Constitutional Violations by
Individual Defendants (Count II)
Plaintiff claims damages for wrongful death,
conscious pain and suffering, physical injuries, and
all other damages, under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986,
1988, and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution against Defendants Williams,
Cameron, and Stinson.
In Farmer, the Supreme Court explained the
standard for deliberate indifference by a prison
official as follows:
[A] prison official cannot be found liable
under the Eighth Amendment for denying
an inmate humane conditions of confinement
unless the official knows of and disregards
an excessive risk to inmate health or safety;
the official must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and
he must also draw the inference.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
Defendant Cameron was aware that Gillespie had
2,334 encounters registered on MH-WIN, was hospi-
talized six times for depression and hearing voices,

App.40a
and that he had not taken his medications for six
days (supra). Viewing the facts in a light most favorable
to the Plaintiff, there is a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether failing to inquire further about
Gillespie’s mental health background was reckless
disregard of the excessive risk of harm to Horvath.
See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836.
Defendant Williams, a nurse, was on the ward
distributing medications to inmates at around the
same time that Horvath was killed, and was the first
official to discover the attack. She alerted Defendant
Stinson, a guard who was in the duty station on the
ward that morning. Both Defendants deny hearing the
attack on Horvath or that they knew what was going
on. Plaintiff has presented evidence that other inmates
on the ward heard signs of the altercation, including
banging, thumping sounds, and someone yelling of “Let
me out! Let me out!” (Pl.’s Res. to Defs.’ Mot. for
Summ. J., Ex. U, “Inmate Witness Statements”). Other
inmates, however, stated they did not hear anything.
Defendant Stinson stated that he “may be able to hear
some noise” from the duty station (Id., Ex. R, “Deposi-
tion of Andre Stinson” at p. 32). Viewing the facts in
a light most favorable to Plaintiff, Defendants Williams
and Stinson may have had notice of the attack against
Horvath, and their failure to investigate or intervene
may rise to the level of reckless disregard of the
excessive risk of harm to Horvath. See Farmer, 511
U.S. at 836. The Court will not grant summary judg-
ment on these claims.
C. Qualified Immunity
Defendants Williams, Cameron, and Stinson
further argue that they are entitled to qualified

App.41a
immunity on the claims against them. Under certain
circumstances, public officials are shielded from
liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity,
which insulates “government officials performing
discretionary functions . . . from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct.
2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Qualified immunity is
generally a threshold defense whose applicability is
to be determined by the trial judge. Garvie v. Jackson,
845 F.2d 647, 649 (6th Cir.1988). The Supreme Court
has set forth a two-part test to determine whether
qualified immunity should attach. First, the court
must decide whether, in the light most favorable to
the party asserting the injury, the facts alleged show
the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right.
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200, 121 S. Ct. 2151,
2155, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001). If there is no such
violation, the inquiry ends here. Id.
If a violation can be adequately stated, the court
next asks whether the right was clearly established.
Id. Providing guidance in determining whether a
right was clearly established, the Court stated, “[t]he
relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether
a right is clearly established is whether it would be
clear to a reasonable offic[ial] that his conduct was
unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. Saucier
also provides that an official’s reasonable mistake is
still cloaked with immunity. Id.; See also, Pearson,
129 S.Ct. at 823 (“The principles of qualified immunity
shield an officer from personal liability when an
officer reasonably believes that his or her conduct

App.42a
complies with the law.”). Plaintiff must show that the
officers violated a right so clearly established that
any official in Defendants’ position would have
understood that they were under an affirmative duty
to refrain from such conduct. Poe v. Haydon, 853 F.2d
418, 426 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1007,
109 S.Ct. 788, 102 L.Ed.2d 780 (1989). In other words,
Plaintiff must demonstrate that Defendant’s conduct
was objectively unreasonable in light of Plaintiffs clearly
established rights. See Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d
685, 691 (6th Cir.1999).
As discussed above, viewing the facts in a light
most favorable to Plaintiff, there is a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Defendants violated
Horvath’s constitutional rights by recklessly disre-
garding the excessive risk of harm to Horvath. Horvath
had the right to be protected from violence perpetrated
by other prisoners. See Wilson, 148 F.3d at 600. If the
facts alleged are true that Defendants knew the risk
of harm, became aware of the altercation, and failed to
protect Horvath, then Defendants’ conduct was
objectively unreasonable. See Williams, 186 F.3d at
691.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment [Docket No. 40, filed April 14,
2014] is DENIED as it pertains to the remaining
Defendants, Wayne County, April Williams, Larry
Cameron, and Andre Stinson, and deemed MOOT as
it pertains to all parties that have been dismissed.

App.43a
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss [Docket No. 40, filed April 14, 2014] is deemed
MOOT as it pertains to Defendant Wayne County
Sheriff’s Department.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant
JOHN DOEs 1-5 be terminated pursuant to the
Amended Complaint failing to name them as
Defendants.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Denise Page Hood
Dated: March 31, 2015

App.44a
DEFENDANT WAYNE COUNTY’S MOTION TO
DISMISS AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING
(JUNE 25, 2014)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
________________________
ESTATE OF JEFFREY HORVATH,
Plaintiff,
v.
WAYNE COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT,
a Municipal Corporation, COUNTY OF WAYNE,
a Municipal Corporation, APRIL WILLIAMS,
DEPUTY MEARS, JEREMY MEINEKE, SERGEANT
TAYLOR-BEAVERS, LARRY CAMERON, and
ANDRE STINSON, Individually and Jointly,
Defendants.
________________________
Case Number: 12-11232
Before: Honorable Denise Page HOOD
[June 25, 2016 Transcript, p. 2]
THE CLERK: Calling case number 12-11232, Linda
Richko, as Personal Representative of the Estate

App.45a
of Jeffrey Horvath versus Wayne County Sheriff’s
Department, et. al.
THE COURT: Good afternoon.
How are you?
Please put your appearances on, please.
MR. COLELLA: Good afternoon, your Honor.
Vince Colella, appearing on behalf of the Estate
of Jeffrey Horvath.
MR. FISHMAN: And, Steven Fishman, also appearing
on behalf of the Estate of Jeffrey Horvath.
THE COURT: Okay. Very good.
Good afternoon to both of you.
MR. THOMAS: Good afternoon, your Honor.
Aaron Thomas, appearing on behalf of Wayne
County and Wayne County individual defendants.
THE COURT: Okay. Very good.
This is a motion to dismiss, and a motion for
summary judgment.
MR. THOMAS: It is, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. You may proceed.
MR. THOMAS: Thank you.
THE COURT: Do you all have clients here?
MR. COLELLA: We do not.
THE COURT: How about you?
MR. THOMAS: I do have one client, Christina
Robinson with the Sheriff’s Department is in the
courtroom, your Honor, as well as four aspiring

App.46a
lawyers and first year law students from the
University of Detroit Michigan, and I believe one
from Wayne State University.
THE COURT: Okay.
Approach the sidebar.
(Sidebar discussion, not on record.)
(Proceedings continuing in open court.)
MR. THOMAS: In briefing this particular case, I
think the parties both stipulated that the various
attorneys would file briefs that were in excess of
the page limitation because there were a lot of
facts involved, a lot of documents exchanged, a
lot of depositions taken.
But, Judge, at the end of the day, the Wayne
County defendants move for—to dismiss this case
as well as a motion for summary judgment con-
tending that there is no issue—a genuine issue
of fact with respect to any material facts in the
case. Indeed, after the initial motion was filed,
four defendants were involuntarily dismissed by
the plaintiffs. So the only remaining defendants are
the County of Wayne, Nurse Williams, Deputy
Stinson, and Larry Cameron who is a social
worker. And, so—
THE COURT: Does that mean that the Department,
the County of Wayne, and Deputy Mears, Jeremy
Meineke, and I have Lamiko Taylor-Beavers?
MR. THOMAS: That’s correct. They were all dismissed.
So the Sheriff’s Department, Mears, Meineke and
Taylor-Beavers were all dismissed as defendants
by stipulation the plaintiff not having responded
to the arguments in that particular case.

App.47a
MR. COLELLA: That’s correct. The Court did mention
the County of Wayne, but they’re still a
defendant in the case.
THE COURT: Okay. The County of Wayne, April
Williams, Larry Cameron and Andre Stinson?
MR. THOMAS: That’s correct.
THE COURT: Are the remaining ones.
MR. THOMAS: That’s correct.
THE COURT: Very good.
MR. THOMAS: Judge, I’d like to just address, first of
all, with respect to Wayne County—the allegation
that Wayne County’s policies are facially uncons-
titutional. We move for dismissal of that count
under 569© based upon the contention that
Wayne County’s classification policy is facially
unconstitutional, and Wayne County’s screening
policy is facially constitutional.
It appears that the plaintiffs have abandoned an
unconstitutional classification policy and their
only argument is that the screening policy is
facially unconstitutional.
Now, in support that contingent, your Honor,
they point to the Intake Screening Policy and
specifically the policy where they allege that
because the mental status examination that was
done by—Judge, maybe I should back up a
minute.
This whole case arises out of the fact there were
two inmates, Mr. Horvath, their client—you
understand that.
THE COURT: I understand.

App.48a
MR. THOMAS: And Mr. Gillespie who came into the
jail and who killed him about 20 hours or 30
hours after he was in the jail.
So the plaintiffs contend that the mental status
examination that was done by Larry Cameron, a
social worker, the day before Mr. Horvath was
killed is facially unconstitutional because, and
only because they allege there is no requirement
that he review medical records. That’s the
allegation where they say the policy which—our
policy says every inmate coming into the jail
shall be screened medically because of our
obligation to provide adequate medical care,
that’s how we fulfill it. But they say because
there is no specific requirement that in the
written policies that says you have to review
records, they say that’s facially unconstitutional.
There’s a problem with that argument for a
couple of reasons. First of all, your Honor, the
evidence shows that he did, Cameron did review
medical records as part of his mental status
examination. He testified before Mr. Gillespie,
the murderer, was seen by Larry Cameron, he
was seen by a nurse who did the psychological
evaluation of him. Larry Cameron testified that
he had that record, that he reviewed that record,
and that was the referral based upon which he
conducted his mental status examination. So he
did review the records that he had at hand.
He also testified by way of affidavit and that was
provided in the reply brief, he testified by way of
affidavit that whenever an inmate receives mental
health services at the jail they’re flagged in the
IMS system, the Inmate Management System, as

App.49a
a red 6 consumer. What that means is that for
any subsequent incarcerations a jail officer or
medical personnel they access the IMS system
and they can see, if it says red 6 they know that
this person has been in the jail before and they
have received mental health services.
In this particular case this was—and Larry
Cameron testified by way of affidavit that I did
that because that’s my routine and practice and
I saw that he had never been in the jail before.
So there were no—so he had no at least medical
history records in the jail that said this guy
had—that he had received mental health
treatment because he, in fact, had never been in
the jail.
But more importantly, your Honor—and so, to
the extent the plaintiffs allege that the absence
of a specific requirement that jail records be
reviewed make that policy facially constitutional
Cameron did review the records in this particular
case.
Really what their objection is that he did not
review the MHWIN which MHWIN and if you’re
read the briefs that’s the Mental Health Wellness
Information Network, is a—it’s a computer
system whereby any person in Wayne County
who has any contact with a mental health
provider of services an encounter with that
mental health service provider is documented in
the MHWIN system.
Larry Cameron testified that I did access the
system to see if he was a mental health
consumer. He saw that there were 2300 plus

App.50a
encounters. What he did not do, he did not click
on each of 2300 encounters to see what services
Mr. Gillespie had accessed. And by way of affidavit
and it was supported in our brief those services
ranged from housing placement. Those services
can be things as work training. They can be finan-
cial services. They can be transportation to and
from a job. They can run the gamut of services.
And so he did not click on 2300 encounters to see
what those services were.
But important to this discussion, your Honor, is
that there’s no evidence at all in this case that
any of the WHWIN encounters showed that he had
been violent before or showed that he had any
type of assaultive or dangerous behavior. So to
the extent that they say well he could have
looked into the MHWIN system, first of all, he
has limited access. He doesn’t have access to
medical records. It just is an encounter and a
code.
But even if he had clicked on some or a repre-
sentative sample there is nothing in this record
to show that any of those showed that he was
dangerous. So their argument with the facially
invalid—or constitutionally and facially unconsti-
tutional policy fails for those reasons, your
Honor.
I note a case they rely on, Hubic v Otsego, that
particular case was a case where a jail had a
policy where correctional officers could use a
taser on verbally non-compliant prisoners with
no regard for the circumstances. And so the
court there says, well, look, this is a facially
unconstitutional policy because there’s several

App.51a
case law that in any circumstance where a police
officer uses force the surrounding circumstances
—it has to be reasonable force under the
circumstances and the circumstances matter.
We don’t have that in this particular case, your
Honor. So the case they cite just does not
support their position.
Beyond that the plaintiffs also cite to the case,
Comstock versus McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 2001
circuit court case where they argue that—in that
particular case, the Sixth Circuit found that a
psychiatrist who had one day found an inmate to
be suicidal and had put information into his
records that were there inside the prison system.
The next day decides without consulting the
records in their possession that the inmate had
been taken off suicidal watch, puts him in a cell
that is not monitored, and then the inmate
commits suicide, and the court says, you know
what, there is evidence that particular psychiatrist
drew the inference that this inmate was suicidal.
They said under those circumstances you would
have to consult your own records before you just
make that particular decision to take him off a
suicidal watch. In fact, the medical official did
not.
Nothing in Comstock, however, says that to look
outside of the records that are in your position
that are part of the agency in order to satisfy the
requirement of not being deliberately indifferent
to the medical needs, serious medical needs of an
inmate.
In this particular case, Larry Cameron does a
psychological—a mental status examination of

App.52a
Mr. Gillespie. His observations are that he is
exhibiting no behavior that would deem him to
be a danger to himself or to others. He specifically
asked questions of Mr. Gillespie, are you feeling
homicidal? Are you feeling suicidal? And the
answer was no. In fact, Mr. Gillespie in his depo-
sition testimony, admits I never told the guy
that I was going to hurt anybody, I never told
the guy that I was going to hurt myself. Gillespie
says that in his deposition transcript.
So even citing to Comstock there is no
constitutional requirement that Wayne County
consult sources outside of its own records in
order to make a determination with respect to
whether or not an inmate poses a serious source
of danger to himself—a risk of danger to himself
or others. And there’s absolutely no evidence in
the record that Larry Cameron, in fact, drew the
inference that Mr. Gillespie was dangerous to
someone else and disregarded that inference.
There is no evidence of that fact,
Judge, with respect to—Judge, let me just wrap
up with respect to Cameron—
THE COURT: With respect to what?
MR. THOMAS: I’m sorry, with Larry Cameron.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. THOMAS: And on the qualified immunity.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. THOMAS: Because again there’s been no
showing as to deliberate indifference.

App.53a
If the protection of qualified immunity indifference
for a discretionary decision of prison officials
means anything it has to mean that the decisions
that they make based on their education, training,
experience and knowledge at the time have to be
given indifference because if the standard is 20/20
hindsight that’s always going to be correct and
accurate.
Here, he made a professional decision based
upon the facts in front of him: Yes, Mr. Gillespie
needed mental health services. And so he made
a decision will he receive those mental health
services as an outpatient basis in the general
population or will it be on a secured ward? And
he said, you know what, I think he needs to go
on a secured ward. So he sent him to a secured
ward.
Then he has another decision to make: Does he
need any additional intervention like being
housed alone, like being on constant observation,
and he said, he testified that is always a
consideration, I took that into consideration, and
he said based upon the objective observations
that I made of him at the time, based upon Mr.
Gillespie’s discussions with me I did not—I
made the decision that no further interventions
on the secured ward were necessary.
And so Mr. Gillespie was referred to the secured
ward. He goes into a cell with Mr. Horvath. They
spend the night together. No problems. There
was no assault. That eight hours or ten hours
overnight they were on the ward.

App.54a
At 7:00 o’clock in the morning Mr. Horvath came
out of his cell because he had to go to a prior
arranged medical appointment. He talked to
Deputy Stinson. He never said to Deputy Stinson
I’m afraid of the guy, the guy is acting strange,
he’s acting weird, don’t put me back in there. He
asked do I really have to go to my appointment
this morning? Deputy Stinson says I’ll call, and
they say, no, you don’t have to. So Mr. Horvath
goes back into the cell. He doesn’t protest.
So on those facts how can it be said that the
deputy was deliberately indifferent? How can it
be said that at all times Mr. Gillespie was
dangerous to himself or to other people because
they had already spent the night together, and
Mr. Horvath didn’t even protest that Gillespie
was dangerous.
Judge, if I can direct your attention because I
want to talk just a few minutes about the actual
morning, and there being absolutely no evidence
that either Deputy Stinson who was inside of the
bubble, a glass enclosure, that looks out onto the
ward, there’s no evidence that he heard anything
or saw anything. There’s no evidence that April
Williams heard or saw anything when she’s
making her rounds passing out medication that
morning. So, Judge, if I could just direct your
attention to a floor plan that was an exhibit in
this case. It was page ID number 528. If you
don’t have that extra copy, if you’d like, I could
pass it up to the Court.
THE COURT: Okay. I think I do have it, but I don’t
know if I brought it out.

App.55a
MR. THOMAS: Okay. I have extra copies if you’d
like, Judge, and I have copies for counsel as well.
THE COURT: Well, I’ll just take that one.
MR. THOMAS: Judge, I’ll hand you a color copy.
THE COURT: There are a lot of exhibits.
MR. THOMAS: There were a lot.
THE COURT: Okay. Do you all have a copy of this as
well?
MR. COLELLA: We do, your Honor.
MR. THOMAS: Judge, I’m sorry, if I could pass that,
because this has actually the date stamp.
THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. THOMAS: Judge, the only information or
argument that the plaintiffs make about the
nurse’s deliberate indifference to this assault on
Mr. Horvath and Deputy Stinson’s deliberate
indifference is their allegation, well, somebody
must have heard something. So I just handed
you, your Honor, what was marked as Stinson
Exhibit Number 1. It’s a hand-drawn map that
Deputy Stinson did of the floor.
If you look at the top of the page you’ll see
there’s a cell number 7 at the left-hand corner—
the very left-hand corner and cell 16 at the every
right.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. THOMAS: Do you see that?
THE COURT: Yes.

App.56a
MR. THOMAS: Okay. Mr. Horvath and Mr. Gillespie
were housed in cell 14.
Now, following the assault when Mr. Horvath
was found dead, the inmates who were on the
ward were interviewed by the Wayne County
Deputies as well as the Detroit Police Department.
Document Number—Page ID number 593 was a
statement form of the inmate in cell number 7.
He was asked a question,
“Q What can you tell me about what happened this
morning?
“A I don’t know what happened. I just saw a lot of
police, and they said someone got hurt.
“Q Did you hear anyone arguing this morning?
“A No.”
Now, he’s in cell number 7 at the very end of the
ward. That is where Nurse Williams started her
rounds.
Now, according to the plaintiffs they alleged that
the assault started at the time Nurse Williams
started her rounds and we have to accept that as
true.
The inmate himself says I didn’t hear anything.
Nurse Williams says I didn’t hear anything, and
I didn’t know anything that Mr. Horvath was in
trouble until I made it down to cell 14.
That was Page ID 593.
Page ID 601, is another inmate. He’s in cell
number 9.
“Q Can you tell me what happened here today?

App.57a
“A I was in my cell, 9, when I heard someone
yelling, ‘let me out, let me out.’ I didn’t hear any
argument.
“Q Do you know who was yelling?
“A No.”
Now, as we go through these, you’ll see that’s
the only person who says anything about any
yelling or anything of “Let me out, let me out.”
But interestingly enough,
“Q Do you know who was yelling?
“A No.”
Cell number 10,
“Q Mr. Shelton, what can you tell me about what
happened this morning?
“A I didn’t hear anything.
“Q Did you see anything?
“A No.
“Q What cell are you in?
“A Cell number 10.”
Again, at the every [sic] end of the ward, away
from cell number 14. And he testifies I didn’t
hear anything this morning. It’s consistent with
the nurse.
Cell number 12,
“Q What can you tell me about what happened this
morning?
“A I didn’t see or hear anything.”
Another inmate in cell 13 is asked,

App.58a
“Q What can you tell about the incident that
happened in cell 14?”
Now, he’s—this particular inmate is in cell 13,
directly adjacent.
“A I didn’t see anything but about 30 minutes before
the nurse came and found cell 14 flooding”—
He says,
“A About 30 minutes before the nurse came and
found cell 14 flooding I heard a thumping sound.
The nurse was on the floor doing her rounds
when I heard the thumping sounds.
“Q Did you hear—are you in cell 14?” Now, he’s
right next door.
“A No.
A question a little further down. These are pages
596 and 597, this gentleman’s witness.
“Q How many times did you hear the thump,
thumping sound?
“A Probably about six thumps.
“Q Do you remember what time this happened?
“A The beginning of the nurse rounds.”
Cell number 15, on the very other side of the
Horvath cell.
“Q Can you tell me what happened today involving
the men in the cell next to you?
He says it was approximately 7:00 a.m. or 7:30
a.m. this morning, I heard thudding sounds. I
didn’t hear any yelling.”

App.59a
Then he goes on to describe a conversation that
he has with apparently Horvath in the next cell.
Finally in cell 16,
“Q What can you tell me about the incident this
morning?
“A I was sleep this morning. When I woke up I
heard the guy in cell 13 or 14, he was
disrespecting the nurse. I told him to stop
talking to her like that. He threatened me and I
said some words to him.
“Q Did you hear anyone arguing?
“A No.
“Q Did you see or hear anything else?
“A No.”
And he signed his name at the bottom.
Judge, there really is no issue of fact here with
respect to the witnesses who were on the ward
that morning.
We have witnesses on the one side of Mr.
Horvath’s cell who says I heard thudding, but I
don’t know what’s going on. On the other side he
says I heard—I’m not even sure if he said—he
said I heard thumping.
He says “when I woke up”—in cell 16,
“A I was sleep. When I woke up I heard the guy in
cell 13 or 14 he was disrespecting the nurse.”
And at that time this is Gillespie talking to the
nurse. So the guy in cell 16 doesn’t say—he’s
asked, did you hear anyone arguing and he says

App.60a
no. Did you hear anything else? No. He didn’t
even hear any thudding. And the people at the
very end, cell 7 and cell 10 say I didn’t hear
anything.
So now to the extent the plaintiffs want to
argue, well, they must have heard something,
well, there were plenty of people who didn’t hear
anything.
But even if you accept as true that they must
have heard something and this is in the reply
brief, Judge, when Mr. Gillespie was asked at
his deposition,
“Q Did the deputies try to do anything? Did they try
to stop you?”
He answered, “yes.”
Mr. Fishman asked,
“Q Did the deputies try to stop you?
“A Yes.”
Gillespie said they came to try to stop the fight.
That’s not deliberate indifference.
Now, to be fair, your Honor, I don’t think that
happened. I think Mr. Horvath was dead by the
time the deputy found him. But their own witness
said, hey, the other witnesses say we didn’t hear
anything. But Mr. Gillespie said, hey, while I
was still beating Mr. Horvath, the deputies came
to stop me. So even if you accept their facts as
true there’s no deliberate indifference there if
his testimony is at the time I’m beating Mr.
Horvath the deputies came to stop me. I’ve cited

App.61a
that in my brief, your Honor, the page—the
pages in my brief.
Judge, I’m probably out of time at this point. I
certainly appreciate the Court’s indulgence this
afternoon. I would like to save maybe one or two
minutes for any rebuttal.
Thank you.
THE COURT: Okay. All right.
Thank you.
MR. THOMAS: Judge?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. THOMAS: Can I just point the Court’s attention
to Exhibit O—
THE COURT: O?
MR. THOMAS: Yes. Just very quickly.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. THOMAS: I will be brief, your Honor.
And the only reason I bring this up, this is the
plaintiff’s response brief, they make several
statements at page 7 where it’s entitled “The
Actual Assault.”
I would just ask the Court as—
THE COURT: Page 7 of their brief?
MR. THOMAS: Page 7 of their brief. It’s entitled,
“The Actual Assault.”
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. THOMAS: I would just ask the Court to just pay
very close attention as you’re reviewing this,

App.62a
there are statements made. I’m just going to
point out two or three statements.
It says,
“As Williams”—and that’s the nurse—“entered
the ward and began distributing medicine, the
assault began.”
And then they say,
“First, Gillespie began experiencing auditory
hallucinations that morning; as Gillespie recounts,
he had begun hearing voices that day and the
voices ‘were having sex, yelling at him and
trying to make deals’.”
Then they cite to Exhibit 0 which Exhibit 0 are
medical records and interviews of Mr. Gillespie
after the murder.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. THOMAS: Judge, you are not going to find
anything and I’m just going to point the Court’s
attention to Page ID 856 and 858—
THE COURT: What does the page say at the bottom?
MR. THOMAS: At the bottom?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. THOMAS: There’s a 17 and a circle, and a 20
and a circle.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. THOMAS: Okay.
Nowhere does he say in these pages that he was
hearing voices at the time of the assault. As a

App.63a
matter of fact, at the bottom of—on page 20, he
says,
“Patient denies symptoms of psychosis. Also
denies symptoms of psychosis at the time of the
incident.”
Nowhere does he say I’m hearing voices during
the assault, telling me to have sex and everything
like that.
They go on to say at page 7 of their brief,
“Gillespie mistakenly attributed these sexual
urges as emanating from Horvath and acted on
them by sodomizing him.”
I don’t know where they get that in the record.
There’s nothing in the record that says that
Gillespie mistakenly attributed these sexual
urges as emanating from Mr. Horvath. There’s
nowhere. It’s just licensed.
So I would just—and then finally at page 8 they
say that Darius Cooper, the inmate in cell 16,
indicated that the argument between Gillespie
and Olzack was what woke him up.
They cite from Exhibit U. Mr. Cooper never said
that he heard an argument and that woke me
up. He said I woke up and I heard Mr. Gillespie
disrespecting the nurse. So I would just ask the
Court to look very carefully at some of these
allegations that are totally unsupported in the
record.
Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
Now, let’s hear from the plaintiff.

App.64a
MR. COLELLA: Thank you, your Honor.
Your Honor, Vince Colella, again, for the record.
I’m going to be addressing the claims against the
County of Wayne, the claim against the County
of Wayne, and Mr. Fishman is going to address
the claims against the individual employees.
Your Honor, the Eighth Amendment Protection
for prisoners against inmate on inmate rape
assault and murder is not unique to the Wayne
County Jail. Segregation of inmates has been of
paramount importance for obvious reasons.
One, males are more powerful than females.
Violent offenders are more dangerous than non-
violent. And mentally ill inmates with a violent
history are, of course, very dangerous as well.
Now, the courts have consistently held that
certain physical characteristics should be recog-
nized because physical stature creates a perva-
sive risk. I’ve cited to Taylor versus Department
of Corrections.
However, where an inmate suffers from serious
mental illness visual observations and self-
reporting are simply not sufficient. That is
precisely why the Wayne County Jail policy is
deficient in this case.
The question before this Court is whether the
Wayne County Jail’s policy of screening is valid
on its face. There are 60 pages of jail policies,
your Honor, and out of the 60 pages, there are
only two provisions dealing with mental health
screening. That’s screening policy 2.01, and 5.01.

App.65a
Policy 2.01 says that all inmates that are in need
of mental health services are flagged and
transferred to the mental health department. A
qualified mental health care professional or
registered nurse will perform a mental status
examine. That’s all it says.
The second, 5.01 requires that a social worker
complete a mental status screening evaluation
and make a level of care determination.
As we have cited in our brief, your Honor, these
examinations that are required of mentally ill
persons are simply a question and answer
session. It’s asking questions of the person,
accepting their answers, and writing those
answers down.
If you read those policies in tandem and apply
them to the facts of the case the only requirement
that Larry Cameron had was to complete the
mental status exam, and absolutely nothing
more. The policy’s deficient because it doesn’t
mandate that they review the medical records.
Now, Mr. Thomas is correct there was more than
just the electronic medical record and the IMS,
Inmate Management System documents, for him
to have looked at, at the time he originally saw
Mr. Gillespie and did this mental status exam.
They had available to them the information in
the MHWIN data base. And he’s right there
2,334 encounters of which he didn’t look at one.
And I would submit to you the reason he didn’t
do that is because the jail doesn’t require it.
Now, the data base has more information in it
than counsel would lead this Court to believe.

App.66a
And we’ve attached the affidavit of Dr. Gerald
Shiener that explains it, but I’m just going to
just briefly explain it to the Court as well. Not
only do you have the information about the fact
that a particular inmate has had a mental health
encounter, it has DSM diagnosis. The name of
the psychiatric disorder or condition. The number
of episodes. The place of service, diagnosis,
incident reports, potential severity and types of
treatment of which he didn’t look at any.
THE COURT: Now it has all of those for every
contact?
MR. COLELLA: That’s correct.
And, your Honor, for each field regarding an
encounter to the right of the field there’s a
button, a radio button that can be clicked on and
it says “view full details.” That’s what he’s
saying. He’s saying, you know, I’ve looked at
this. I saw an enormous amount of encounters,
but I didn’t click on that little box to the right to
figure what it was that he was there for.
So what we’re saying is with respect to the policy
argument is that this mental screening policy
which really just relies on self-reporting for
mentally ill individuals is deficient. That’s why
we have the Michigan Department of Corrections
policy because if you look at the Michigan
Department of Corrections policy it does require
not only a face-to-face interview, but a review of
the medical records. And because this policy was
deficient in that regard it was unconstitutional.
Now, one of the arguments that the defense makes
is that if a policy doesn’t have an affirmative

App.67a
unconstitutional provision it’s facially valid.
That’s not true, your Honor. The fact that this
policy is devoid of a constitutional requirement
which under the Eighth Amendment to be
reasonable in terms of screening these inmates
to make sure that the other people they are
being housed with are safe that that makes it
unconstitutional. And that’s what we’re saying.
By way of an example, it would be like me
saying that there’s an arrest policy that doesn’t
have a—that doesn’t speak to the issue of
probable cause. The fact there isn’t an affirmative
duty doesn’t matter. The fact that it’s
constitutionally deficit is the argument. And
that’s what we’re saying here, your Honor.
I’m going to let Mr. Fishman speak for the
individuals.
THE COURT: Okay.
Thank you, very much.
MR. COLELLA: You’re very welcome.
MR. FISHMAN: Judge, I’m sure you’d be the first to
agree that I’m not one to stand up and talk
about case law and things of that nature, but I
do have some knowledge of questions of fact
because, I don’t know, over 300 jury trials I’ve
had motions for directed verdict and Rule 29
motions denied in 95 percent of my trials
because the Court directly says that many of the
things that are in front of the jury are questions
of fact. And I suggest to you that what we can’t
do and what Mr. Thomas is trying to do is what
the Court has done eight zillion times in my own

App.68a
criminal cases, we’re trying to take each individual
fact or each individual allegation and say, see,
see, see, instead of considering whether the tota-
lity of the facts raise a question of fact as to the
issue of deliberate indifference.
So when Mr. Thomas says there’s a lot of facts,
he’s right. There’s a ton of facts in this case. And
many of the facts, and let me speak first of Larry
Cameron, many of those facts were known to Mr.
Cameron. And once they’re known to a jury they
could certainly give rise to a finding that he was
deliberately indifferent when he did what he did
with respect to Mr. Gillespie because what did
he know? What facts did he know?
The first thing he knew for sure is the reason
that Mr. Gillespie is there in front of him being
interviewed is because he was referred by
somebody else in the jail, one of the intake
people for a psych evaluation. So he knows he’s
not just dealing with the normal guy who walks
in, who is charged with possession of heroin and
he’s perfectly normal and that’s it. So he’s got
somebody that someone already identified as a
person who ought to be identified—I’m sorry,
evaluated in a psych eval.
Number two, he knows that the referral includes
the notion in it that Mr. Gillespie was acting
strange. It also includes the fact that Mr. Gilles-
pie self-reported that he had been diagnosed in
the past as bipolar schizophrenic. Does that
standing alone? Who knows, but that’s something
else that he knows.

App.69a
What else he knows is he knows what types of
medication Mr. Gillespie takes because Mr.
Gillespie tells the intake person a long list. I
don’t think he got all of them, but he got a lot.
And Mr. Cameron knew that as well.
He knew also what Mr. Gillespie was doing in
the county jail. He wasn’t there for possession of
heroin. He wasn’t here for stealing a car. He was
there for an assaultive crime. And while he
might have known the facts of the case that’s
another indicator that maybe there’s something
about this guy that means we ought to keep him
separate.
What else did he know? I won’t bore you because
you’ve heard it from both lawyers. He knew
about these 2,334 mental health treatment
encounters and he knew that six times Mr.
Gillespie had been hospitalized over the past 11
years which, again, standing alone, well, maybe
2300 of them were just going to get money or
going to get placement. But maybe 34 of them
were he burned down his grandmother’s house,
or assaulted ten people at a school. We don’t
know if you don’t look. Mr. Cameron didn’t look.
We know that Mr. Cameron admitted to Mr.
Colella in his deposition that the diagnoses, the
treatments, the incidents were all viewable in
the MHWIN system if he had chosen to do it.
Now, we heard from Mr. Thomas, it may well be
true, that he started pressing buttons. Maybe
the first six would be just bureaucratic types of
things. He stopped in here, he got some pills. Or
he came by for whatever reason. But maybe in

App.70a
the first ten he might have seen something that
would have told him beyond all doubt this is a
guy we have to keep by himself. This is a guy
who is dangerous to other people. But he didn’t
do that. And we know from Dr. Shiener’s affidavit
that information is available as well as Mr.
Cameron’s own admission.
That in and of itself, Judge, if you think about it,
that in and of itself, if a jury accepted the notion
that, hey, this guy could have looked through
some of these encounters and found out something
that would have told him as a professional because
he’s got training that, hey, this is a guy we can’t
put with other people. That in and of itself could
be deliberate indifference. That in and of itself is
a question of fact right here.
You have Mr. Cameron’s admission, and this is
what he knew or what he didn’t know. He didn’t
know what the term “encounter” even meant. And
he never examined any further encounters. So
that to me is a little bit odd.
I mean, I’m not a psychologist and I’ve been in
the jail plenty of times, but I know what an
encounter is. He says he doesn’t even know what
an encounter is. And then as Mr. Thomas said
he made a subjective decision to do what he did.
That doesn’t excuse it. The fact that it’s subjective
and the fact that he didn’t admit in his deposition
at all, I was deliberately indifferent.
If that were the standard to get pass a directed
verdict or pass a motion for summary judgment
then every criminal defendant that came in front
of the court if he hadn’t confessed would get a

App.71a
directed verdict. But he never admitted it. Mr.
Thomas is right. Mr. Cameron never said to Mr.
Colella you’re right, I’m deliberately indifferent,
but the circumstantial evidence raises a question
of fact.
What else did Mr. Cameron do? He relied on Mr.
Gillespie to explain his hospitalizations without
looking at the MHWIN system to see what they
were all about, and that you’re relying on a guy
who’s already been sent to you because he has
problems and he’s acting strange, and you’re
suppose to accept as true and accept as a
complete description of his prior problems what
he has to say?
And then, of course, we have to consider since
Mr. Thomas brought up Mr. Gillespie’s deposition,
there’s a lot in that deposition that goes directly
to whether or not these folks were deliberately
indifferent because Mr. Gillespie told me at the
deposition and it’s in evidence that he told
everybody I’m on all these medications, and I
haven’t had my medications, and I need my
medications. And while that in and of itself,
again, might not be sufficient it’s certainly
enough in combination with the other
circumstances to take to the jury and say they’re
deliberately indifferent. Even Mr. Gillespie is
telling him, that he doesn’t have his medications.
Mr. Cameron another thing he knew at least
through his testimony, he diagnosed Mr. Gillespie
based on what he knew that he’s bi-polar
schizophrenic, and yet in still he authorized him
to be housed wherever. And Mr. Thomas kind of
pood-pood it, well, he did say he needs a

App.72a
psychiatric evaluation, that’s true, but on the
other hand he made a subjective decision he can
be with other people and that’s not to be
questioned, and somehow the jury doesn’t have a
right to make a judgment of whether that
constituted deliberate indifference. And the
Court I think can see from all the things that
were known to him and the things he could have
found out if he bothered to do it, that what he
didn’t do to show his deliberate indifference,
what he didn’t do and would have been very,
very simple to do was to say, hey, I’m not sure
with this guy. He’s referred to me. He is acting
goofy. He’s telling me he’s bi-polar schizophrenic.
He’s got a laundry list of medications. He’s got
2400 or 2300 contacts. All he’d have to say if you
were deliberately indifferent let’s hold this guy
by himself at least until he’s examined by a
psychiatrist. At least let’s do that because he
knew full well and Mr. Thomas concedes it he
knew full well when he made his final conclusions
and recommendations he knew that Brandon
Gillespie was going to be housed with other
inmates. He might not have known it was going
to be Horvath. He might not have known it was
going to be a guy in his physical condition, but
he knew that he was going to be housed with
other inmates.
And that, again, is something given all these
circumstances that a jury should have the right
to decide what facts they want to believe, how
they want to look at it, and see whether or not
they think that the deliberate indifference of Mr.

App.73a
Cameron caused in great part Mr. Horvath to be
dead.
Now, we’ve got Nurse Williams, and we’ve got
Deputy Stinson. And I can almost stand—I
listen very carefully as I’m sure the Court does
when opposing counsel is talking I always listen.
Mr. Thomas is a very smart guy and I like the
way he talks so I’m listening. And quite frankly
in his own argument he’s telling you—he wasn’t
intending to tell you that, but what he was
telling you was this is a question of fact. We’ve
got statements from this inmate that says one
thing. We’ve got statements from another
inmate that says another thing. That is the
classic situation where every trial judge tells
every criminal defense lawyer what do you want
me to do decide that? I don’t decide that, the jury
decides that.
So what did Nurse Williams know? Number one,
we don’t know and we won’t know until there’s a
jury trial exactly what time—and we may never
know by the way—exactly what time the beating
began, exactly what time the beating ended,
exactly what time Mr. Horvath was dead, but we
know one thing about that beating he was not in
the back choking and committing suicide by
swallowing—tying himself up with a belt let’s
say.
What we know is he was beaten to death. And
we don’t have to be geniuses or medical experts
to know beating someone to death happens over
some period of time. Beating someone to death
causes noise and commotion. Sodomizing
somebody causes some kind of reaction. And the

App.74a
fact that there may be an inmate in the next
door cell, or other next door where someone says
I didn’t see anything, great. That’s a great
witness for them to bring in. You were in cell 13,
what did you hear? Nothing. Maybe the jury will
believe that, maybe they won’t. But I’ll you one
thing, at the same token they want to bring that
guy, we’ll bring in Logan Scott who says he
heard the screams of “let me out, let me out.” He
heard them. The jury would decide what did that
mean? Did that mean he wanted to be out because
he thought he could go home? Or did that mean
he was being fatally assaulted and was trying to
scream for some help from somebody. That’s for
a jury to decide.
Rokib Ali, I think he was cell 13, I’m not sure,
five or six thumps coming from the cell. He says
in this statement this happened while the nurse
was on the floor.
Now, if Mr. Thomas wants to quarrel with Mr.
Rokib Ali when he testifies, well, were they loud
thumps? Were they small thumps? Could you know
whether someone was getting the heck beat out
of them? Who knows. That’s a question of fact.
We’ll find out what happens when Mr. Rokib Ali
testifies.
Nurse Williams does say, this is similar to
Cameron, I didn’t hear anything. I didn’t know
anything. I had absolutely no idea anything was
going on. That’s fine. That’s her story. But that
story has to be tested against the other evidence
and only a jury can do that.

App.75a
You’ve heard—you didn’t hear, but Rokib Ali
also says in addition to saying that the thumps
came while the nurse was on the floor, says the
water was overflowing from the cell onto the
ward, he says that the nurse saw it, and she
walked around it.
And Brandon Gillespie we can’t ignore his
testimony since—again, Mr. Thomas wants to
say it, I say, he says it was a loud fight. He says,
he testifies that the guards could have heard it.
And made some kind of objection to it, on some
kind of evidentiary ground, but he has the right
to say that. It’s his opinion. Whether it’s worth
anything or not, who will decide that? Not the
Court, not me, not Mr. Thomas, the jury will
decide it.
And what did she do? She didn’t do anything
until some period of time has passed and if it’s
more than two minutes, then it’s less than 30,
and other than that only the trial testimony will
tell us what it is.
So what we know is, sure, there are other
witnesses who were interviewed, who said they
didn’t hear anything. But on the other hand,
prisoners on both sides of where the cell was and
where this beating took place heard the noise
and Mr. Gillespie himself said it was noisy.
And I should interject this by the way: I’m not
certain how the man who murdered our client
has become our witness, but Mr. Thomas said it
twice, Brandon Gillespie was a witness who was
deposed because Brandon Gillespie was the
murderer. He pled guilty or pled no contest to it.

App.76a
And it’s a good idea to depose anybody that
knows anything.
So am I, quote, stuck with his testimony? I guess
if there’s a trial, depending on how it comes out I
may be saying to the jury, look, ladies and
gentlemen of the jury, listen to Mr. Gillespie, he
was terrific for us. Mr. Thomas might say listen
to Brandon Gillespie he was terrific for us. He’s
just a witness. He’s not our client. He’s the
murderer of our client. But he’s a witness who’s
relevant to this case.
So Stinson. Here’s the thing with Deputy Stinson
and obviously we’re going to find out with all
these drawings, and with all these contentions
about the various deputies what they can hear
and what they can’t hear, you know already
because Deputy Meineke, you know not just
intuitively although intuitively the Court knows
this as well we don’t really believe I can’t believe
that Mr. Thomas is contending that these deputies
are sitting in a guard station and they’re sitting
there as if they’re in with their Anthony Hopkins,
you know, locked up and he’s the man in the
mask, and they can’t hear anything, they can’t
see anything. What’s the sense of having a guard
station. Common sense tells you that. The jury
could decide no matter what a deputy says. I
don’t care if they all say they can’t hear. I don’t
believe that because why would you have a guard
station when nobody can hear anything. But the
Court doesn’t have to rely on that in terms of
deciding this issue as to Stinson because Deputy
Meineke tells you. He tells you in his—actually I
think he told me because I think I deposed him.

App.77a
He tells me you can hear a good amount from
the guard station. In fact, he even talked about
some specific things. He said inmates sometimes
they get loud, they’re watching TV, they’re
rooting for the Tigers or whatever they’re doing.
Or when they play cards and they start yelling,
that’s when you hear them. And that’s what was
going on while Mr. Horvath was being murdered
by Mr. Gillespie. Inmates were saying things.
Mr. Gillespie—I’m sorry, Mr. Horvath was
saying things. There were things going on and
Deputy Stinson if he hadn’t know already
because Deputy Meineke, you know not just
intuitively although intuitively the Court knows
this as well we don’t really believe I can’t believe
that Mr. Thomas is contending that these
deputies are sitting in a guard station and
they’re sitting there as if they’re in with their
Anthony Hopkins, you know, locked up and he’s
the man in the mask, and they can’t hear
anything, they can’t see anything. What’s the
sense of having a guard station. Common sense
tells you that. The jury could decide no matter
what a deputy says. I don’t care if they all say
they can’t hear. I don’t believe that because why
would you have a guard station when nobody
can hear anything. But the Court doesn’t have to
rely on that in terms of deciding this issue as to
Stinson because Deputy Meineke tells you. He
tells you in his—actually I think he told me
because I think I deposed him. He tells me you
can hear a. good amount from the guard station.
In fact, he even talked about some specific
things. He said inmates sometimes they get
loud, they’re watching TV, they’re rooting for the

App.78a
Tigers or whatever they’re doing. Or when they
play cards and they start yelling, that’s when
you hear them. And that’s what was going on
while Mr. Horvath was being murdered by Mr.
Gillespie. Inmates were saying things. Mr.
Gillespie—I’m sorry, Mr. Horvath was saying
things. There were things going on and Deputy
Stinson if he hadn’t been—I don’t know if he was
reading a newspaper, or had his earplugs in
doing whatever people with that texting, I don’t
know what he was doing. But if he didn’t hear
anything, he was deliberately indifferent, if he
didn’t hear anything.
And we know something else. We know from his
deposition that at some point in time and if this
doesn’t put Mr. Horvath in cell 12, 13,14, wherever
the heck he was, because I don’t think the Court
should get bogged down in these little individual
details that a jury is going to eventually decide,
but we know that while in the guard station he
talked to Mr. Horvath about this notion whether
he had to go to his medical appointment, and
Horvath talked back to him. So people can say
whatever they want about you, but Stinson could
hear Horvath and Horvath could hear Stinson
and Stinson knew it because he’s the one talking
to him.
So to say to the Court, well, there’s no evidence
whatsoever that Deputy Stinson could possibly
have heard or known anything is just disingenuous
and it’s not supported by anything. And it’s yet
another instance where at the end of the day the
jury will decide. Stinson may come in and say I
can’t hear anything. He might come in here and

App.79a
say he’s deaf. But the jury will decide what’s the
truth and what’s not the truth, and if we can’t
carry our burden by a preponderance then we’ll
lose. But to ask the Court to make these factual
determinations having seen nobody testify,
having done nothing but read the briefs and
whatever is attached to that is, in my opinion,
really, really premature. This is a very premature
stage to start arguing for—I don’t know what
they call it, not guilty, not responsible, whatever
it is that defendants say in civil cases.
So at the end of the day, I agree with Mr.
Thomas. He said you’ve got to look and see is
there a genuine issue of material fact. I know
that much about civil law. We have to be able to
present it. We’ve got facts, and facts, and facts
that are disputed, that are different, that are
ripe and ready for a jury to decide. But there is
no way, no way given the number of facts as to
each of these three defendants, given the
number of things and inferences what does the
Court tell the jury in every case, criminal or
civil, you can consider the facts and you can
consider inferences that are reasonably drawn
from the facts. And that’s exactly what the
jurors will have to do in this case because a lot of
what we’re saying—again, I agree with Mr.
Thomas, we don’t have any admissions. We don’t
have any of these deputies or Mr. Cameron, my
God, did I screw up. I never should have let that
guy, we don’t have that. So what we wind up
doing is we stand in front of the jury and we say,
you’re right, ladies and gentlemen of the jury,
they don’t admit anything, but these facts, these

App.80a
facts, these facts lead you to the inference the
kind of deference the Court is going to talk about
in its jury instructions that leads you to the
obvious inference that they were deliberately
indifferent. And if we can’t convince them by a
preponderance we will lose. But there’s certainly
sufficient evidence in this record that when you
look at the totality of it that would certainly
support a jury finding by a preponderance that
they were deliberately indifferent and that we
should be prevail.
Thank you.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
MR. THOMAS: Two minutes, Judge.
THE COURT: Two minutes.
And not anything you’ve already argued.
MR. THOMAS: Absolutely. Absolutely, your Honor.
Just responding to Mr. Fishman.
I’m glad he conceded that he wasn’t necessarily
familiar with the standard that we’re faced with
here.
Accepting Mr. Fishman’s facts as true with
respect to deliberate indifference of the deputy
and the nurse Mr. Gillespie said at page 49 and
50 of his deposition, question by Mr. Fishman,
“Q All right. If any of the deputies come down there
and do anything to break up the fight between
you and your—
“A Yes.
“Q They did?

App.81a
“A Yes.
“Q All right. First, a female deputy in a sheriff’s
uniform?
“A Yes.
Q And that was while you were still beating the
man?
“A Yes.
“Q Did they do anything to stop you?
“A Yes.”
So again I don’t necessarily believe that testi-
mony. I think he was dead. All of the facts, all
the other facts show that he was dead.
But, Judge, this is summary judgment. There
has to be a genuine issue of disputed fact. And
the witness they’re going to bring in has already
testified unless Mr. Fishman is going to cross
him on the stand and get him to, you know, kind
of break him down on the stand, he’s already
testified, the deputies came down while I was
beating him to stop me. That’s not deliberate
indifference. That’s responding to an emergency.
With respect—that if he had clicked on this
button, this shows that he did, what, burn
down—
MR. FISHMAN: Burned down his buddy’s house.
MR. THOMAS: Burned down his buddy’s house, or
whatever. They haven’t come forward with any
evidence, Judge.
What they’re saying is, well, Judge, maybe—
we’re going to make an argument to a jury and

App.82a
maybe they’ll believe us as to what could have
been in there. We don’t know what’s in there,
but maybe it could have been in there. It’s kind
of like the Ragu spaghetti sauce, it’s in there.
And we don’t know what it is, but it’s in there.
Judge, this is summary judgment. They haven’t
come forward with evidence at this point. So
we’d ask that these remaining defendants and
the claims against them be dismissed with
prejudice.
Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
All right. Thank you.
Do you have a trial date?
MR. THOMAS: We do, your Honor.
I believe it’s the third week in August.
THE COURT: The third week in August.
MR. THOMAS: We have a settlement—a final pretrial
conference in two weeks.
Could we have a sidebar?
THE COURT: You could. Now, you have a final
pretrial conference in two weeks?
MR. THOMAS: Yes, we do.
THE COURT: So you know the rules that if you do
not have a decision from me your requirements
to turn in the final pretrial order is delayed until
I’ve decided. You know that, right?
MR. THOMAS: I do now.
THE COURT: Okay.

App.83a
MR. FISHMAN: I knew that.
THE COURT: It’s in the local rule, but people call up
and ask about it all the time, so that’s why I’m
telling you.
(Sidebar Conference, not on the record.)
THE COURT: I’ll issue a written opinion.
(Proceedings concluded.)

App.84a
ORDER OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
(MAY 18, 2016)
________________________
LINDA RICHKO, as Personal Representative
of the Estate of Jeffrey Horvath,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
WAYNE COUNTY, MICHIGAN ET AL.,
________________________
No. 15-1524
The court received a petition for rehearing en
banc. The original panel has reviewed the petition for
rehearing and concludes that the issues raised in the
petition were fully considered upon the original
submission and decision of the case. The petition
then was circulated to the full court. No judge has
requested a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en
banc.
Therefore, the petition is denied.

App.85a
Entered by Order of the Court
/s/ Deborah S. Hunt
Clerk

(Filed) Petition for Writ of Cert.10.17.2016 copy

More Related Content

What's hot (13)

Similar to (Filed) Petition for Writ of Cert.10.17.2016 copy (20)

(Filed) Petition for Writ of Cert.10.17.2016 copy