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Similar to HY4 1. Hitler's foreign policy
HY4 1. Hitler's foreign policy
- 1. Jeff Moses 201711/7/2017
- 2. Germany: war anddefeat, c. 1939-1945 Origins: Hitler’s aims and objectives in foreign policy The Nazi foreign position in 1939 Key issues: The impact of Blitzkrieg and Total War German successes in Western Europe and the collapse of France The invasion of the Soviet Union The impact of German occupation on the people, regions and countries of Europe The post-war settlement Significance/ consequences The significance and consequences of the main developments in the war years to 1945 Jeff Moses 2017 21/7/2017
- 3. Jeff Moses 20173 Origins: 1.Hitler’s aims and objectives in foreign policy 2. The Nazi foreign position in 1939 1/7/2017
- 4. INTRODUCTION: NAZI FOREIGNPOLICY Hitler’s main political interest lay in the sphere of foreign affairs and much of his domestic policy was geared to help him achieve the aims of his foreign policy. He was an expansionist. But it is difficult to be certain as to the exact nature of his expansionist aims. Also, did he intend war or just accept its likelihood because of his aggressive territorial actions. This was an area of policy-making over which Hitler ruled supreme and rarely sought the advice of others. At his trial at Nuremberg in 1945-6 Hermann Goring told the court, ‘Foreign policy above all was the Fuhrer’s own realm’. Klaus Hildebrand wrote that Hitler ‘ treated foreign affairs as almost entirely his own preserve’. Ian Kershaw concludes that ‘ There seems little disagreement..that Hitler did take the ‘big’ decisions in foreign policy....’ YouTube - Hitler-expert Ian Kershaw: "I never get immune to the horrors" 1/7/2017Jeff Moses 2017 4
- 5. HITLER’S WRITINGS Much ofMein Kampf is devoted to foreign policy issues. On the first page he wrote: ...When the territory of the Reich embraces all the Germans and finds itself unable to assure them a livelihood, only then can the moral right arise, from the need of the people, to acquire foreign territory. The plough is then the sword; and the tears of war will produce the daily bread for generations to come. Theme to which Hitler returns time and time again: If the German people are imprisoned within an impossible territorial area and for that reasons are face to face with a miserable future our people will not obtain territory....as a favour from other people, but will have to win it by the power of the triumphant sword. 1/7/2017Jeff Moses 2017 5
- 6. Hitler was alsoprepared to indicate where Lebensraum or living space would be found: ‘History proves that the German people owes its existence solely to its determination to fight in the east and obtain land by military conquest. Land in Europe is only to be obtained at the expense of Russia. ‘ In Europe 1919-1938: Prelude to Disaster, the American historian J.H. Huizinga writes: ....on January 30, 1933, the nations of Europe awoke to find themselves confronted with a Germany now wholly different from the one with which they had dealt in the twenties – a Germany wholly in the grip of that lunatic fringe, openly vowed to the most barbaric cults, the most outspoken expansionism, the most murderous racism 1/7/2017Jeff Moses 2017 6
- 7. Jeff Moses 20177 Recovery of Germany with its vast economic potential and manpower always ‘on the cards’. Revision of Versailles and the re-emergence of Germany as great power had already begun pre-1933. Under Hitler both pace and direction of foreign policy were altered. Up to the late 1950s it was widely assumed that the expansionist aims of Nazi foreign policy dated from the so- called Hossbach Conference in 1937. Hitler’s address to the chiefs of the armed forces and to Foreign Minister Neurath seemed to mark the turning point from a revisionist policy to one of aggressive expansion. Such a view is not now generally accepted. YouTube - Hitler's Foreign Policy Aims 1/7/2017
- 8. Jeff Moses 201781/7/2017
- 9. Jeff Moses 20179 Hitler’s overriding foreign policy aim was to create adequate living space, Lebensraum, through the conquest of land for the future settlement of the Germanic people. To achieve this meant relocating or eliminating the inferior Slav races then in possession of that territory, namely Poles and Russians. Hitler saw the Jews as the main obstacle to his plans , since they, together with the Marxists were intent on world domination. He hoped that if Germany were supportive of the British Empire, Britain would allow him a free hand in eastern Europe. He also planned to isolate France and destroy the Little Entente. Hitler’s other foreign policy aims were revisionists – reversing the injustices of Versailles and restoring German prestige with the creation of a Grossdeutschland (Greater Reich) 1/7/2017
- 10. Bildarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz 1/7/2017JeffMoses 2017 10
- 11. Jeff Moses 201711 Historical opinion falls into two categories, the intentionalist and the structuralist Historian’s views on the aims of Hitler’s foreign policy Intentionalist/programme school Structuralist view Intentionalists place greatest emphasis on Hitler’s personal drive to carry through a pre-planned foreign policy programme. Consider Hitler to have been a man of tremendous will-power and vision whose character and determination are the key factors in shaping German foreign policy. Regard policy as founded on a clearly defined programme of objectives. Some consider that his aim was to progress towards his ultimate goal on a stage-by- stage basis, according to a Stufenplan ( Hugh Trevor-Roper, Klaus Hildrebrand) Structuralists see German foreign policy as being determined collectively by a whole range of different factors, some determined by the Nazi Party and some not. They reject the notion that German foreign policy was set to follow a rigidly defined course. Assert that his foreign policy was unclear, confused even, without specific aims and that Hitler was an opportunist – a man of improvisation and experiment (A.J.P. Taylor) Stufenplan a plan carried out in stages 1/7/2017
- 12. Jeff Moses 2017121/7/2017
- 13. Jeff Moses 201713 A.J.P. Taylor caused controversy when he claimed that Hitler, like all German politicians, simply wanted to restore Germany’s position in Europe. He dismissed the belief that Hitler was a planner, and claimed that his ideas were little more than day-dreaming. In his view, the Fuhrer’s policies were determined by the course of events and he merely took advantage of the opportunities offered him. Most controversial of all was Taylor’s claim that Anglo-French appeasement gave Hitler the chance to exploit Nazi expansionism. Lebensraum, in its crudest sense, meant a demand for empty space where German people could settle. Germany was not overpopulated compared with most European countries: and there was no empty space anywhere in Europe…Lebensraum, in short, did not drive Germany to war. Rather war, or warlike policy, produced a demand for Lebensraum. ‘The Origins of the Second World War’ 1/7/2017
- 14. Jeff Moses 201714 Martin Broszat argues that Nazi foreign policy generally lacked any consistency and had a confused variety of aims – ‘expansion without object’. He even suggests that Hitler’s goals were ‘utopian’ and that it was the dynamism of the Nazi movement with its incessant demands for change, which transformed Lebensraum from an idea into political reality. Another point of view, put forward by Tim Mason, links the evolution of Nazi foreign policy to the domestic pressures which were building up in the second half of the 1930s. He suggested that it was the internal discontent created by the constraints of Nazi economic policy that really shaped foreign policy. In order to maintain his own political supremacy at home, Hitler, Mason argues, was forced to accelerate his war ambitions in 1938-39. 1/7/2017
- 15. The majority ofhistorians disagree and some are scathingly critical of Taylor’s views. They cite what they consider as the overwhelming evidence of Mein Kampf, of Hitler’s policy statement made at the Hossbach Conference in 1937, the fact that Hitler geared the German economy to the needs of his rearmament programme and his ruthless expansionist policies. Hugh Trevor-Roper regards Mein Kampf as a ‘complete blueprint of his intended achievements’ and that Hitler was a systematic thinker whose views should have been taken more seriously. His main aim was to secure adequate lebensraum. These ideas were more fully developed by the intentionalist or programme school of historians. So such a ‘stage by stage plan’ (Stufenplan) amounted to: 1. The destruction of the Versailles Treaty and restoration of Germany’s pre-1914 boundaries. 2. The union of German-speaking peoples such as Austria, western Poland, the Sudetenland and provinces in Hungary and Romania. 3. The creation of Lebnsraum: the establishment of a Nazi racial empire by expanding into eastern Europe at the expense of Poland and Russia. 1/7/2017Jeff Moses 2017 15
- 16. ‘Continentalists’ believethat planned expansion was limited to the establishment of a hegemony within Europe. ‘Globalists’ go further and support the thesis that Hitler aspired to German supremacy in the Middle East and Africa (in particular, at the expense of British colonial territories) and finally to a maritime struggle with the USA for global domination. Debate is speculative as it based on vague statements from Hitler about a future world order. Yet, on fundamentals both schools of thought are in agreement: They uphold the central place of Hitler himself in the creation of Nazi foreign policy. They emphasise the racialist framework of that foreign policy. They view the creation of Lebensraum as the basis for Hitler to build Germany’s status as a 1/7/2017Jeff Moses 2017 16
- 17. Alan Bullockwrites that Hitler had overall aims, but was prepared to adapt and show flexibility. In Bullock’s words, Nazi foreign policy combined ‘consistency of aim with complete opportunism in methods and tactics’. Ian Kershaw has continued to assert that German foreign policy was not solely directed by Hitler’s aims and personality, but by a range of other domestic factors and influences as well. Programme school – A title given to some intentionalist historians who concentrate on Hitler’s foreign policy. 1/7/2017Jeff Moses 2017 17
- 18. The Anschlusswith Austria in 1938 was a spectacular foreign policy triumph for Hitler with important consequences: 1. Diplomatically Britain and France were left looking weak. 2. German access to Austria’s gold and valuable commodities. 3. Shift in strategic balance giving Hitler a gateway into south-eastern Europe. The Czech Crisis and subsequent Munich Agreement brought further significant advantages for Germany: 1. Access to the manufacturing and natural deposits of the Sudetenland. 2. Reinforcement of Hitler’s position and weakened his critics, notably Beck, who had planned to arrest him. 3. Easier to attack rest of Czech state. 4. Isolation of Russia Autonomy – the right of self- government 1/7/2017Jeff Moses 2017 18
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- 20. Jeff Moses 201720 What, no chair for me? (30th September, 1938) 1/7/2017
- 21. YouTube - NevilleChamberlain addresses the crowd Another talk with the German Chancellor, Herr Hitler 1938 21Jeff Moses 2017 1/7/2017
- 22. Expectations ofa fundamental peace in the winter months of 1938-9 evaporated quickly in March 1939. In an act of unbelievable folly, the Czechs asked Hitler for help when the Slovaks demanded greater autonomy. Hitler heaped threats and abuse on the hapless Czech President, Hacha, when he visited Berlin on 15 March. After recovering from fainting, Hacha singed an agreement which allowed German troops into Czechoslovakia to restore order and so provided Hitler with the legal basis for invading his country. The provinces of Bohemia and Moravia were annexed to Germany and Slovakia was reduced to a German protectorate. In late March, in a further act of aggression, German troops occupied Memel. THE END OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA Protectorate – a weak state that is dependent on a stronger one 1/7/2017Jeff Moses 2017 22
- 23. Jeff Moses 201723 Western democracies did not respond militarily to the overturning of the Munich Agreement; it resulted in a few months of peace but frenzied diplomatic activity. Chamberlain felt that he had been duped and so an Anglo- French military guarantee was drawn up on 31 March 1939 to uphold Poland’s independence. This clearly lessened Hitler’s chances of a free hand in eastern Europe and yet, he most definitely did not want a war with Britain and France. In May 1939 Hitler managed to secure an alliance with the Pact of Steel with Italy, but this was of limited military significance. It was the hope of neutralising Britain and France that drove Hitler into the arms of Stalin. Stalin convinced that the western democracies had no sympathy for his security fears re-opened trade talks with Germany in July. A month later, a 10 year Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact was signed. 1/7/2017
- 24. Jeff Moses 201724 By the second half of 1939 Germany was a formidable military power with her pride restored. The pact with Stalin averted the risks associated with a simultaneous war on two fronts. Opposition within the military had been contained, for the time-being. The German populace as a whole did not crave war, but could not fail to be impressed at Hitler’s astonishing foreign policy successes achieved with such incredible ease. By July 1939 Hitler mistakenly believed that he could get away with conquering Poland without British or French intervention. This was a major miscalculation. Unleashing a general war had enormous ramifications, and German success was dependent on her capacity to bring defeat the western democracies swiftly. 1/7/2017
- 25. TERRITORIAL CHANGES, 1935-39 Source:Map 1, "Territorial Changes, 1935-1939," in Germany and the Second World War, edited by the Research Institute for Military History, Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany. Volume I, The Build-up of German Aggression, by Wilhelm Deist, Manfred Messerschmidt, Hans-Erich Volkmann, and Wolfram Wette. Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1990. 1/7/2017Jeff Moses 2017 25
- 26. Why did the Anschlussnot lead to war? How important was the Anschluss? Why did Czechoslovakia become an international crisis? Why was the Munich Agreement so significant? Why and with what result did Hitler break the Munich Agreement? How did Hitler hope to avoid a conflict while pursuing his claims on Poland? Anschluss with Austria, March 1938 The Czech Crisis 1938 Poland – the outbreak of war 1939 Background Occupation The road to appeasement Appeasement, September 1938 Consequences of Munich Agreement Anglo-French guarantee to Poland Nazi-Soviet Pact German invasion Consequences The destruction of the Czech state Key question Why did the German invasion of Poland result in a continental war? Key debate Did Hitler really have a war plan or was he an opportunist ? 1/7/2017Jeff Moses 2017 26
- 27. Concentration and ExterminationCamps and Major "Euthanasia" Centres 1/7/2017Jeff Moses 2017 27
- 28. Europe at the Beginningof December 1941 1/7/2017Jeff Moses 2017 28
- 29. Europe in April1944 1/7/2017Jeff Moses 2017 29
Editor's Notes
- #11 Reichswehr Generals at a Military Parade in Berlin (June 1, 1934) The Treaty of Versailles put considerable restrictions on the strength of the German military. The infantry was limited to 100,000 professional soldiers and the navy to 15,000 members. The air force was forbidden, as were tanks, heavy artillery, submarines, capital warships, and the production and possession of poison gas. Starting in March 1921, the German armed forces were called the Reichswehr (Defensive Land Forces) in accordance to military law. Members of the Reichswehr had to swear an oath to the Weimar Constitution. It was not the rank and file, however, but above all the generals – approximately half of whom came from the ranks of the nobility – who were hostile towards the Weimar democracy. In the 1920s, however, the military was largely unpolitical; its members, for example, were barred from voting and thus detached from the political system. Moreover, the Reichswehr consciously distanced itself from the domestic tensions that erupted during the Weimar Republic. After Hitler was appointed Reich Chancellor in 1933, Reichswehr leaders exhibited mixed feelings toward him and the NSDAP. Whereas they thoroughly welcomed both Hitler’s demand for a revision of the Versailles Treaty and the prospect of a new direction in foreign policy, they viewed the SA “party militia” with deep distrust. But after Ernst Röhm was dispatched and his SA effectively done away with, the Reichswehr was in full service to the National Socialists. On August 2, 1934, Reichswehr Minister Werner von Blomberg ordered the Reichwehr to swear an oath of allegiance to Hitler personally and in doing so made the military Hilter’s own personal weapon. On March 16, 1935, military conscription was reintroduced by law and the Reichswehr was renamed the Wehrmacht. This photograph shows Generals Werner von Fritsch (middle) and Blomberg (right), both of whom were removed from duty two years later after criticizing Hitler’s war preparations. At the left is General Gerd von Rundstedt, who was promoted to senior general in the wake of the Blomberg-Fritsch Affair. Rundstedt participated in numerous military campaigns during World War II and was later charged as a war criminal in Great Britain. Big Chancellor, Little Chancellor: Caricature of Hitler and Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuß Shortly before the Latter’s Assassination (Summer 1934) The Reichswehr Swears an Oath of Allegiance to Adolf Hitler on the Day of Hindenburg’s Death (August 2, 1934) German troops entering Coblenz, March 1936
- #17 Although historians now accept the view that Hitler had a ‘programme’ in mind in his foreign policy, they differ over the analysis of the actual events between 1933 and 1945. Klaus Hildebrand believes that Hitler’s foreign policy was formulated in the 1920s and remained remarkably consistent.
- #19 Hitler’s ultimate objective was still Lebensraum at the expense of the USSR. Hoped that Britain would adapt appeasement into a general acceptance of Germany’s dominant central European position. The USSR regarded its exclusion from Munich as a clear signal that the western democracies were not prepared to work with Russia together on the anti-fascist coalition. In the wake of Munich, Soviet diplomacy relaigned itself to consider the possibility of an understanding with Nazi Germany that would protect its borders. Cheering Austrians Greet Adolf Hitler in his Hometown of Braunau am Inn (March 14, 1938)
- #20 Group Photo of the Participants in the Munich Conference (September 29, 1938) Hitler had only reluctantly agreed to the Munich Conference, and he regarded the agreement signed there as a setback. His goal was war, not compromise. His negotiating partners, however, hoped to prevent a European conflict through a policy of appeasement. The photograph shows (front, from left to right) the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier, Hitler, Mussolini, and Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano.
- #22 Neville Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler’s Joint Resolution "Never to Go to War with One Another Again" (September 30, 1938) Hitler's aggressive foreign policy had always been accompanied by declarations of his peaceful intentions. After signing the Munich Agreement the night before, Hitler and Chamberlain met again to issue the following joint declaration of their mutual desire for peace. Germany and Great Britain would henceforth resolve all conflicts diplomatically and "never go to war with one another again." Upon returning to London, Chamberlain announced that he had ensured "peace for our time."
- #25 Photo; Hitler, Ribbentrop and advisory team – Reich Chancellery, 1939.
- #28 Between 1933 and 1945, the Nazi regime set up about 20,000 camps to imprison, exploit, and annihilate its declared enemies. This map shows major camps, grouped according to function. The term “concentration camp” applies to those camps built from 1933 on for the purpose of imprisoning political and ideological opponents of the regime and “racial enemies” under the pretense of “protective” or “preventative” custody. In the first years of the Nazi dictatorship, most of those imprisoned in the camps were Communists and Socialists, Social Democrats, Roma and Sinti, Jehovah’s Witnesses, homosexuals, and individuals deemed “asocial.” After the Kristallnacht pogrom of November 9, 1938, Jews in the German Reich were imprisoned en masse for the first time. After the beginning of the Second World War, the camp system was quickly expanded and supplemented with POW camps and work camps in the occupied territories. Additionally, the camps began to function more and more as execution sites for members of particular groups, for example, Soviet POWs, members of the resistance, and partisans. To this end, gas chambers were built in the camps Auschwitz, Majdanek, Sachsenhausen, and Mauthausen starting in 1941. To implement the National Socialists’ plan for the “final solution of the Jewish question,” extermination camps were built in Poland, the country with the largest Jewish population. The sole purpose of these camps was to carry out the mass murder of the European Jews in an efficient manner. The first of these camps, which were supposed to remain secret, was opened in December 1941 in Chelmno (Poland). In 1942, the camps Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka were built, and Auschwitz was equipped with a neighboring extermination camp, Auschwitz II-Birkenau. Jews from all over Europe were deported there via transit camps and were usually murdered within 24 hours after arrival. The map also shows the places where the National Socialists carried out their secret “Euthanasia Program.” Starting in the fall of 1939, various institutions euthanized individuals who were deemed “unworthy to live” on account of either actual or alleged hereditary illnesses. After the revelation of the “Euthanasia Program” met with public protest, gas-administered euthanasia was halted in August 1941. It was replaced by lethal injections in “euthanasia clinics,” which continued until the end of the war.
- #29 This map shows the territorial and political situation of Europe in December 1941, more than two years after the beginning of the Second World War. At that point in time, the territory occupied by Germany and its allies stretched from the western coast of France to the Black Sea. In the north, Denmark and Norway had been occupied; in the south, Germany and the Axis Powers had managed to advance as far as Crete. After a series of “Blitzkriege,” Hitler had succeeded in extending his power to virtually the entire European continent. After the invasion of Poland in 1939, German armed forces conquered Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France, in quick succession. After the signing of Franco-German Armistice on June 22, 1940, France was divided in two: the northern portion of the country was under German occupation, while the southern portion of the country was governed by the collaborationist Vichy Regime. In early March/April 1941, Yugoslavia and Greece were also occupied, and German troops cooperated with Italian forces in the Mediterranean area, above all in Northern Africa. The state of Yugoslavia was dissolved; the state of Croatia was founded. Success eluded Hitler only in the air war against England. On June 22, 1941, the Wehrmacht invaded the Soviet Union, registering initial successes there. That same month, Romania joined the war on the side of the Axis Powers. In the southern part of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was occupied; in the northern part, the Baltic states. On December 5, 1941, Estonia became the last Baltic state to be incorporated into the "Reich Commissariat Ostland". It remained an operational area for the army, however, which is why it is marked both as an occupied territory and an operational area in this map. After Japan launched a surprise attack on the U.S. at Pearl Harbor, Hitler kept a promise he had made to the Japanese government and declared war on the U.S. in December 1941. Germany and its allies were now fighting in Russia, the Balkans, Africa, and on the oceans against the Allied forces of America, England, the Soviet Union, and the French government in exile.
- #30 This map shows the course of the Eastern Front at the beginning of April 1944. The front was approximately 1,000 miles (1,600 km) long and stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The German invasion of the Soviet Union had begun in June 1941. In the early stages of the campaign, German troops registered various successes and made significant territorial gains. Within a year, they had advanced approximately 750 miles (1,200 km) to the east toward Moscow. In late summer of 1942, the German campaign in Russia reached its highpoint: the army had penetrated the Caucasus and made it as far as the Don River. In the northern part of the Soviet Union, the front moved relatively little. This was not the case, however, in the oil-rich southern part of the country, where the front shifted constantly, because the area was of great economic importance to the war effort. Over time, however, it proved logistically impossible to continue supplying soldiers on the Eastern Front with food rations and armaments; the supply routes were simply too long and rail shipments were often attacked by partisans. From spring 1943 onward, the Eastern Front was pushed increasingly westwards. In March 1944, the Soviet army initiated a spring offensive that succeeded in pushing German troops out of Ukraine by the end of April 1944. Although Hitler replaced generals and ordered troops to continue fighting, he would not be able to stop the Red Army's advance. For the German army, it was the Eastern Front – with its insufficient provisions and extreme winter weather – that claimed the highest number of victims. 2,700,000 soldiers, more than half of the German war dead – perished on the Eastern Front. More than 800,000 of those deaths occurred in the last four months of the war alone. At the same time, it must be said that the Russian campaign also saw the most brutal excesses in the National Socialists’ war of race and ideology. It claimed the lives of unfathomable numbers of Soviet prisoners of war, in addition to countless partisans, Jews, Communists, and Roma and Sinti.