International banking

International banking

• 1.
  Lecture 10: Internationalbanking The sessions so far have focused on banking in a domestic context. In this lecture we are going to look at the issues which arise from the internationalisation of banking, which has been a growing trend since the 1960s.After looking at the nature of international banking and reasons for its growth, we shall focus on risks. The most important risks are the problem of sovereign risk and the behaviour of the international interbank market (IIBM), although exchange rate risk can also pose difficulties.
• 2.
  Definition of internationalbanking Banking transactions crossing national boundaries International lending: • all claims of domestic banks offices on foreign residents • claims of foreign bank offices on local residents • claims of domestic bank offices on domestic residents in foreign currency Deposits similarly classified (by residence of bank or depositor, or currency) Eurocurrency deposits – placed with banks outside the country whose currency the deposits are denominated in (not necessarily in euros!)
• 3.
  Features of internationalbanking Key aspects: currency risk and complexity of credit risk besides typical banking risks Competition for market share among banks (typically spreads very narrow) Cyclical nature, with periodic crises Competition for bank loans from the international bond market (close substitutes for loans) Importance of international interbank market (IIBM) as source of liquidity and funding for banks, and risks arising Role of risk management activities (swaps, options, futures)
• 4.
  Historical evolution: Origin inRenaissance (lending to kings) Active international lending and bond market in the 19th century (also trade financing) Decline in 20s and 30s as governments restricted international trade and financing Growth of trade and multinationals (MNEs) postwar Development of euromarkets in the 1960s (owing to regulatory differences) Abolition of capital controls after breakdown of Bretton Woods Waves of lending to EMEs (such as Latin America in 1970s, Asia in 1990s)
• 5.
  Reasons for internationalbanking Migration of domestic customers, notably MNEs growing foreign activities Effects of regulatory differences (structural and prudential) Input cost differences (e.g. in cost of domestic funding) - Japanese in the past Comparative advantages in retail banking (Citibank) Development of major financial centres offering benefits to banks: • Business contacts • Location of customers • Pool of skilled labour • Trades and professions • Liquidity and efficiency of markets (thick market externalities) • Interrelation of markets (e.g. derivatives and underlying) Potential for increasing returns to scale and self sustaining growth of centres
• 6.
  Main financing activities: Keyfeature is nationality of issuer and investor differs (1) Syndicated lending – credit facility offered simultaneously by a number of banks from more than one country who sign same loan agreement and stand equally in right of repayment. Lead manager does credit assessment and (delegated) monitoring. Unsecured but extensive covenants Use in finance of projects and mergers. (2) Eurobond issuance and trading – bearer bonds issued in markets other than the country of issue. Unsecured and few covenants except negative pledge (no future borrowing at higher seniority), and usually call provisions (3) Euronotes, international equity, international interbank market – see below
• 9.
  Sovereign risks 1 Canoccur for Eurobonds (Argentina 2001) or Syndicated credits (Latin America 1982, see below) Solvency and liquidity concepts blurred – cannot seize assets “countries don’t go bankrupt” Repeated relationship gives borrower leverage to bargain and restructure Lesser enforceability due to both borrower and lender behaviour – lender dependent on “willingness” and not “ability” to repay, dependent in turn on: • Penalties for violation • Lender’s resolve to impose penalties • (All) lenders willingness to lend in future
• 10.
  Sovereign risks 2 Informationasymmetry (e.g. on overall indebtedness and susceptibility to penalties) and hence adverse selection Moral hazard and rationing – sovereign forces borrower to extend more credit than is optimal Possible international rescues and further moral hazard Free rider problems in resolution of crises – never in individual bank’s interests to forgive debt. Issue of “hold- outs” in restructuring a particular problem when debts are securitised.
• 11.
  The LDC debtcrisis 1982- High and volatile inflation and interest rates in 1970s, and shifts in wealth holding due to rise in commodity prices Increase in payment imbalances, financed by syndicated credits, which lowered sunk costs of entry to international bank lending Rise in public debt and leverage, often in foreign currency Wide range of banks participated, with fine spreads Short maturity of loans may have encouraged banks to believe they could easily exit the market Some encouragement by authorities Banks’ focus on balance sheet growth, possible moral hazard, misunderstanding of sovereign risks Oil shock raised needs for financing and cut ability to service
• 12.
  Shock of Mexicandefault in 1982 led to cutoff in lending (although interbank market continued to function with government support) After crisis, banks would only lend to countries which rescheduled and/or seen as best risks Resolution took many years – banks technically insolvent and ldcs suffered fiscal austerity and slower growth to correct imbalances and recover credit standing Banks lost out to securities markets as had to rebuild capital Variety of international efforts (such as “Brady Plan”) contributed to resolution
• 13.
  Indicators of riskin international banking
• 14.
  International interbank market Marketin short term placement of deposits at fixed rate between banks in different countries Initial function liquidity adjustment – improve allocation of deposits Additional functions risk management via derivatives, and funding per se Encouraged by low capital charges on lending to banks (Basel 1 set 20%) Structural current account surplus in some OECD countries Link to central banks and belief in availability of support (Basel concordat), giving less incentive to monitor
• 15.
  Risks in theinternational interbank market 1 (Bernard and Bisignano 2001) Lack of security (collateral) and low levels of information-gathering Link to moral hazard due to implicit guarantees by central banks Growing need for liquidity owing to growth in international trading and transactions (notably OTC derivatives can give rise to unexpected liquidity demands) Increase in backup lines of credit requiring funding if called Existence may lead banks to under invest in liquidity Range of banks with low credit quality (e.g. East Asia) so long as lenders believe in implicit guarantee
• 16.
  Risks in theinternational interbank market 2 - Subject to quantity and not price rationing due to low levels of information on credit risk, unlike even domestic interbank markets - Short maturity making withdrawal easy - Subject to sudden increases in credit rationing during periods of stress, due to asymmetric information and resultant adverse selection and moral hazard - Potential for contagion and global transmission of shocks
• 17.
  The Asian crisis1997- Strong economic growth, profit opportunities, overinvestment, diminishing marginal returns, property booms Rise in private debt and leverage, often in foreign currency, notably by local banks Belief domestic governments would protect their own banks allowed them to operate in IIBM, while Mexican rescue of 1994 encouraged belief in international safety net for Asian countries Fixed exchange rate regime – and sound fiscal positions - gave confidence that such borrowing was sustainable Regime shift to an open economy may have led to errors in credit assessment by domestic banks Foreign banks (e.g. Japanese and Continental) may have sought market
• 18.
  entry at lossleading prices, while IIBM saw declining spreads, plentiful liquidity Growing current account deficits and inflation made pegs less sustainable Concentration of risk in few large borrowers and “crony capitalism” Potential correlations within and between countries ignored Cyclical weakening and speculation led to collapse of currency pegs, and monetary tightening to compensate Domino effect on a range of countries – like contagious bank run Reversal of international lending flows, bank runs, severe macroeconomic effects Key role of IIBM - $184 bn cut in net private flows, of which $149 bn from commercial banks – fall in external finance to 5 most affected countries equal to 5% of GDP IMF rescue operations – and possible further moral hazard
• 19.
  International lending afterthe Asian crisis
• 20.
  Risks in foreignexchange trading Cross currency risk Risks of dealing and taking positions Losses due to improper employee actions Risks of default by counterparty Example of risk of default by counterparty (Herstatt) 1974 - Regime shift of end of Bretton Woods led to growth in forex trading - Accompanied by rapid expansion of international interbank market - Inadequate internal controls due to lack of experience - Banks caught out by depreciation of some currencies and tightening of US monetary policy - Failure of Franklin National (US) in May and Herstatt in June
• 21.
  - Herstatt Bankwas closed abruptly by German authorities and accounts closed by Bundesbank when spot Forex transactions incomplete (“teach speculators a lesson”) - Near-collapse of US financial system and CHIPS payments ceased - Sharp rise in credit rationing for banks and non banks, collapse in share prices - Response of G-10 authorities to declare willingness to intervene to maintain stability of international markets (Basel concordat) - Long term search for security in payments systems against “Herstatt risk”
• 22.
  Regulation of internationalbanking Issues arising include: – cross border supervision of banks – regulation of foreign banks (by home or host supervisor) – need for international agreements to ensure stability (safety net) without generating moral hazard (also prudential regulation) – need to keep a “level playing field” e.g. via capital adequacy agreements – regulation of offshore financial centres – regulation of hedge funds and other offshore vehicles