Korea's Isomorphic Platform Regulation Pushes (ASCOLA Asia Oct 2025)

Korea's Platform Competition Regulation Push:
Through the Lens of Institutional Isomorphism
Sangyun Lee
Kyoto University
sangyunl@korea.ac.kr
linkedin.com/in/sangyunl
ASCOLA Asia Regional Workshop 2025
October 10, 2025
1

Introduction
Research Background
● Before mid-2023: Interested in a normative, public-interest-centred approach.
o E.g., My PhD (Jun 2023) on abuse of economic dependence
(which seeks to incorporate the ‘power-over’ dimension into competition law)
● After mid-2023: Realized that rules do not work as intended in practice.
o [Norm ≠ reality] Do governments (competition authorities) really act rationally* in public interests,
e.g., correcting market failures?
* Instrumental rationality – choosing the most efficient means to achieve a given end.
o E.g., Korean Air-Asiana Airlines (in which the government initiated and approved the 2-to-1
merger; individual actors’ rational choices led to a collective irrational choice)
E.g., Criminalization of the MRFTA violations (which was driven by the prosecutorial authority's
organizational self-interest, not by public interest concerns)
● Since then: My main research theme → “How does the government behave in designing and
implementing competition policy, and why?”
o Reasons for failures of the market (as an informal institution)
→ reasons for failures of the government (as a formal institution)
o Papers: Public Choice Analysis of KAL/ASIANA (SSRN) (2024);
Redundancy Theory Analysis of Overlapping Enforcement (2024) (Slides)
2

Research Question
● Recently, what captured my attention is the government’s platform regulation initiatives.
o Korea (including the KFTC) attempted to introduce platform regulations.
o The attempts lacked public interest, rationality, and institutional efficiencies.
o The attempts were hardly explainable even from the perspective of self-interest.
● Literature review
o Many studies either criticize (or support) the regulatory pushes.
o However, few seek to analyse the underlying motives or explain the reasons behind.
● Research question
o Why did the government attempt to introduce platform regulation?
Research Implications
● This is not merely about Korea and its government.
o Rather, it provides a more general insight into how governments behave as monopolistic
providers of public services (in a broader sense).
o The insights may inform the analysis of similar initiatives (now or then) across jurisdictions, such
as Australia, Brazil, India, Japan, and South Africa …
o Also, the analytical lens developed here can be extended to future regulatory movements
regarding new emerging technologies, like AI.
3

What Happened?
Korea’s Attempts to Introduce Platform Regulation
● Korea’s (KFTC-led) attempts to introduce platform regulation:
(Only until December 3, 2024, when the martial law incident occurred)
o 1st
attempt: Online Platform Fairness Act (2020)
o 2nd
attempt: Platform Competition Promotion Act (2023)
o 3rd
attempt: Platform Competition Promotion Act (2024)
o 4th
attempt: MRFTA amendments (2024)
(Dec 3, 2024, the martial law incident occurred)
FYI. EU P2B Regulation (Application: Jul 2020);
EU DMA (Adoption: Sep 2022, Application: May 2023, Compliance: Mar 2024)
4

* The following summary is made, based on my previous blog post, “Lessons from Korea’s Roller-Coaster
Ride Toward Platform (Non)Regulation” (Truth on the Market Sep 25, 2024), available HERE
First Attempt: Online Platform Fairness Act
● Timeline (Under Moon’s Presidency)
o 2020. 06. 25: Legislative initiative announced
o 2020. 09. 28: Draft bill published, with a public consultation period until Nov 9
o 2021. 01. 26: Revised bill approved by the Cabinet
o 2022. 03. 09: Presidential election → administration change; the bill repealed
● Why it failed
o Public opposition: Because public awareness was limited to the ongoing project for Platform
Guidelines since May 25, 2020, not the regulation.
- And, the regulations with “fairness” in their titles tend to become stricter over time
through amendments → It frightened stakeholders.
o Inter-agency conflict: A Power struggle emerged due to poor coordination, particularly with the
KCC, which later proposed its own bill on Dec 11, 2020.
o After delays, it was repealed following the Presidential election.
● Meanwhile, the KCC acquired its regulation, the App Store Act (i.e., Telecommunications Business Act,
Article 50(1)(9)-(11)), which was passed by the National Assembly in Aug 2021.
o The law, excluding the KFTC’s enforcement authority, has never been enforced due to the
KCC’s inexperience in addressing competition issues, particularly vis-à-vis global firms.
o The KCC’s inaction is important as it created a regulatory vacuum, later leading to the public’s
anger against the government’s inaction.
5

Second And Third Attempts: Platform Competition Promotion Act
(From mid-2022 to mid-2023: A period of self-regulation experiments under Yoon’s administration; the
Platform Guidelines were adopted in Jan 2022. Partly influenced by the US, the proposed congressional
antitrust legislative package soon faced growing criticism, lost momentum, and eventually faded.)
● Timeline
o 2022. 10. 15: Kakao, a locally dominant chat app, experienced an outage crisis.
(+ growing frustration with the ‘self-regulation’ approach and the failure of the App Store Act)
o 2023. 11. 01: The President publicly denounced Kakao’s taxi-hailing service fee policy, labelling
it as “immoral” and “predatory”; he pledged to intervene.
o 2023. 12. 19: Then-Chair of the KFTC announced the agency’s plan to propose the ‘Platform
Competition Promotion Act’ (It took only 1 month).
o 2024. 02. 07: The KFTC paused the release of the bill (first failure).
o 2024. 05. 16: The KFTC Chair announced that he would reinitiate the legislative process.
o 2024. 09. 09: The KFTC announced a new plan to amend the MRFTA, instead of introducing
new legislation (second failure).
● Why it failed
o Lack of coherence: The KFTC’s internal task force (run from Jan to Jun 2023) did not explicitly
endorse such a legislative action.
o NARS’s opposition: On Feb 5, 2024, the National Assembly Research Service published a
report opposing it (emphasizing the effectiveness of competition enforcement and expressing
concerns that regulation could hinder innovation).
o SME’s opposition: In 2023-2024, the Korea Startup Forum, Korea Venture Business
Association, and other organizations expressed opposition (for over-regulation concerns);
- Meanwhile, some SME associations, civil society organizations, and then-opposition
political parties pressured for legislation.
o US’s (informal) pressure: On Jan 29, 2024, the US Chamber of Commerce opposed the bill.
o Transparency issue: The bill’s full text was never disclosed to the public.
6

Fourth attempt: MRFTA amendments
● Timeline
o 2024. 09. 09: The KFTC announced a new plan to amend the MRFTA. Instead of introducing ex
ante regulation, the KFTC decided to pursue the incorporation of presumptions into the law.
o 2024. 10. 28: The ruling party, in cooperation with the government, submitted a revised
amendment bill, adjusting the applicable scope.
o 2024. 12. 03: Martial law incident occurred, and the bill eventually faded.
● Why it failed
o The bill received mixed reactions— while some viewed it as a reasonable compromise, others
still considered it unnecessary.
o The main reason for its failure was political environment rapidly changed, in which platform
issues fell off the policy agenda.
o Still, several new bills* proposed under the new administration face (internally) domestic industry
concerns and (externally) stronger US pressure following Trump’s inauguration.
→ These pushbacks have stalled the process.
(1) Online Platform Monopoly Act(s) (It provides for a designation procedure and sets out strict
prohibitions on self-preferencing, tying, preventing multi-homing, restricting data portability, and MFNs.
The illegality of the specified conduct may be rebutted or justified);
(2) Online Platform Intermediated Transactions Fairness Act(s) (Reportedly, the key point of
contention in these bills is whether to impose caps on intermediary commissions. In addition, it is reported
that proposals such as granting sellers collective bargaining rights and requiring the settlement of sales
proceeds within 14 days have been floated.)
(For more details, see my notes on the bills)
● Summary
o Korea’s (major) regulatory initiatives were driven top-down by high-level officials, rather than
arising from bottom-up policy demand.
o But the top-down initiatives faced strong resistance both internally and externally and ultimately
failed to take off.
7

Why It Happened, What Was Wrong?
Exploring Theoretical Frameworks
● Public Interest Theory
o ‘The government’s actions, e.g., regulation and enforcement, are invoked in the public interests,
such as correcting market failures.’
o X Limited explanatory power:
- At the outset of the initiatives, no evidence of market failure was identified.
- Even where concerns arose, no institutional deficiency was found. (i.e., The MRFTA has
UTPs rules, in addition to conventional antitrust rules.)
- Also, there were no under-enforcement concerns in Korea.
● Public Choice (self-interest) Theory
o ‘The government actions reflect collective decisions made by rational individuals seeking their
own self-interest.’ (See, e.g., Capture Theory, Rent-seeking Theory, Rational Choice
Institutionalism)
o X Limited explanatory power:
- The government (top officials) moved before any interest-group push;
- It was evident that the KFTC’s original plan was to focus on enforcement, after issuing
guidelines (also, the agency increases staff without new regulation, so a budget
maximization account does not perfectly fit).
o Perhaps, the KCC’s acquisition of the App Store Act can be well explained through the public
choice lens (i.e., the agency acted in its bureaucratic self-interest)
● Other Theories
o Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework:
‘When the problem stream, policy stream, and politics stream align, a "policy window"
opens and 'policy entrepreneurs' push for them, new policies or institutions are introduced.’
- X (No such streams were found)
8

- For example, the current initiatives pursued under Lee’s presidency may be explained
through the MSF lens (depending on one’s analytical perspective).
● Problem stream: Platforms’ fees emerged as a public issue.
● Policy stream: Policy experts endorsed the need for intervention.
● Politics stream: The Democratic Party’s control of government expanded the
political feasibility of certain regulatory measures.
o Krasner's, Baumgartner & Jones’s Punctuated Equilibrium Theory:
‘Policy change often shows patterns of long periods of stability (equilibrium) and sudden
change triggered by major events or crises (punctuations).’
- X (No event triggering bursts of significant transformation; the initiatives aligned with
Korea’s prior regulatory trajectory, drawing on EU models.)
o Sabatier's Advocacy Coalition Framework:
‘Policy changes happen over time, through a dynamic process driven by competition, learning,
and adjustment of multiple advocacy coalitions (groups of actors with similar beliefs and
coordinating efforts to influence specific policy).’
- X (Such dynamics appeared only after the announcement of initiatives (pro- and
anti-platform regulation); the initiative itself was top-down, with no prior coalition
competition or learning phase.)
- Perhaps, the current AI Act developments can be seen through this ACF lens.
o Kuran & Sunstein's Availability Cascades Theory:
‘Risk regulations can be introduced based on the availability heuristic, rather than scientific
evidence.’ (e.g., trigger event → public discussion & media amplification → social endorsement
→ availability entrepreneurs → self-reinforcing loop)
- X (The government’s top-down regulatory initiatives preceded the emergence of evident
public concern or social endorsement).
- Rather, this mechanism may be more related to UTPs and ASBP regulations. (UTPs:
unfair trading practices, ASBP: abuse of superior bargaining position)
9

Fitting Lens: Institutional Isomorphism
● DiMaggio & Powell’s Institutional Isomorphism Theory
o A theory that explains the diffusion of certain structures, forms, and practices across different
organizations, administrations, and jurisdictions, even without the need for efficiency.
● Weberian view vs. Institutional Isomorphism
o Weberian view: Bureaucratization and the spread of homogeneous organizational forms are
driven by competition between organizations, and they are outcomes of a rational and efficient
pursuit of their goals
↕
o Institutional Isomorphism view: Organizations often adopt formal structures, not for efficiency,
but due to the desire for social legitimacy or perceived appropriateness within a given
cultural context.
● Specific mechanisms of isomorphism (per DiMaggio & Powell)
o Coercive isomorphism
- “Coercive isomorphism results from both formal and informal pressures exerted on
organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent and by cultural
expectations in the society within which organizations function.”
- E.g., Manufacturers adopting new pollution control techs to conform to environmental
regulations (p.150).
o Mimetic isomorphism
- “Uncertainty is also a powerful force that encourages imitation. When organizational
technologies are poorly understood, when goals are ambiguous, or when the
environment creates symbolic uncertainty, organizations may model themselves on other
organizations. The advantages of mimetic behavior in the economy of human action
are considerable; when an organization faces a problem with ambiguous causes or
unclear solutions, problemistic search* may yield a viable solution with little
expense.” (* problem-driven, ad hoc, reactive, and situational search)
10

- E.g., Japan’s modernization in the late 19th
century, modelling new governmental
initiatives on apparently successful Western prototypes (p.151).
o Normative isomorphism
- “A third source of isomorphic organizational change is normative and stems primarily
from professionalization … the collective struggle of members of an occupation to
define the conditions and methods of their work, to control ‘the production of producers,’
and to establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational autonomy.”
- E.g., Managers and key staff educated at the same universities and hired through similar
filters (e.g., Fortune 500 board members) “tend to view problems in a similar fashion, see
the same policies, procedures, and structures as normatively sanctioned and legitimate,
and approach decisions in much the same way.” (p.153)
o We see, here, the ‘collective rationality’ (which means, in this context, a paradox where rational
actions by individual organizations produce irrational homogeneity)
11

Why It Fits Korea’s Case
● Korea’s institutional background
o No formal pressure: Korea is a single independent state.
- No formal pressures from supranational authorities, in this context.
- The US’s pressure leveraging trade conflicts constitutes an informal one.
o Global awareness pressure: A societal pressure not to fall behind global trends.
- This is perhaps rooted in Korea’s export-oriented economic structure and its historical
experience of late industrialization.
o Attraction to EU models: A widespread positive belief in EU-style rules prevails.
- The EU regulations have often been regarded as successful and exemplary models to be
imported, in fields of, e.g., labour, environmental, and privacy.
- At least until mid-2024 (around the Draghi Report), this perception persisted.
(See also, Comparative Trends in GDP per Capita (1990–2024))
12

o Concern over platforms: Growing vigilance and concerns against large platforms.
- E.g., Khan’s Amazon Paradox, the “New Brandeis”, and Vestager’s enforcement—these
moves may have created uncertainty and urgency among policymakers in Korea.
- The initial concern arose not against U.S. big tech, but from local giants
such as Naver, Kakao, Coupang, and Baemin (now run by Delivery Hero).
o Presidential system: Korea’s presidential system allows a top-down approach.
- Under this, policy agendas are easily set by top officials and can be implemented swiftly
through an efficient administrative hierarchy.
o Administrative elites: Government officials see themselves as leaders.
- These officials, selected through a highly competitive national examination, have
historically played a crucial role in Korea’s economic development.
- Against this background, they have perceived themselves (and are generally regarded)
as leaders guiding society (from the top down).
- This legacy still encourages them to engage in centralized, top-down policy initiatives
and creates a normative pressure to act decisively in response to global discourse.
o Global professional community: The KFTC officials are closely engaged with global peers via
networks, e.g., the ICN and the OECD.
- They may have internalized norms largely shaped by the EU and the U.S.—often seeing
the EU as a model for action and the U.S. as one for inaction.
● Mimetic process: The most salient mechanism
o Within the social, cultural context and under an environment of policy ‘uncertainty,’ Korean
policymakers appear to have decided to quickly follow the EU model — perceived as ‘socially
legitimate’ and offering a “viable solution with little cost.”
- The Online Platform Fairness Act:
The draft was released only 3 months after the initial announcement.
- The Platform Competition Promotion Act:
The initiative was announced only 1 month after the presidential instruction.
- They were indeed outcomes of the “problemistic search”.
13

o Korea’s repeated efforts to introduce platform regulation between 2020 and 2024 exhibit a
pattern that closely mirrors the EU’s approach.
- The Online Platform Fairness Act bill (2020) resembled the EU’s P2B Reg.
(Proposal: 2018. 4. 26 → adoption: 2019. 6. 20 → application: 2020. 7. 12)
- The Platform Competition Promotion Act (2023, 2024) initiatives proposed an ex ante
regulatory competition governance model, with the designation system and ex ante
prohibition obligations, drawing on structural features of the EU’s DMA (and Germany’s
Section 19a of the GWB).
(Proposal: 2020. 12. 15 → adoption: 2022. 9. 14 → application: 2023. 5. 2)
- The MRFTA amendment bill (2024), although retreating from the regulatory approach,
still sought to introduce legal presumptions regarding platforms’ dominance and certain
violations, thereby retaining traces of the EU model.
(DMA designation: 2023. 9. 6 → Compliance Day: 2024. 3. 7 → non-compliance
investigations: 3. 25 → preliminary findings (Apple): 6. 24 …)
● Normative pressure: A secondary mechanism
o In addition to the mimetic process, certain professional norms between government officials,
enforcers, and certain transnational policy dialogue may have influenced.
- For example, interactions between Korean and EU policymakers—whether through
bilateral meetings or multilateral forums such as the ICN or OECD roundtables—may
have contributed to the perception of the EU’s regulatory model as a norm or a standard
worth accepting.
- Japan’s (partial) alignment with the EU model further reinforced Korea’s perception of the
latter as a professional norm or a global standard.
● Transparency Act (TFDPA) – Established: 2020. 5. 28 → Promulgated: 2020. 6.
30 → Enforced: 2021. 2. 1 → First designation: 2021. 4. 1.
● Smartphone Act (MSCA) – Submitted (in the 213th
Diet session): 2024. 4. 26 →
Passed (House of Councillors): 2024. 6. 12 → Promulgated: 2024. 6. 19 → Full
enforcement: 2025. 12. 18.
● Coercive isomorphism: Unclear (or reversed)
o No evidence of coercive pressure driving initiatives is found.
14

o In contrast, particularly after the inauguration of the Trump administration, stronger external
pressure emerged against Korea’s regulatory push (see also my notes).
- If there is a US model that emphasizes case-by-case, ex post antitrust enforcement,
rather than targeted ex ante rules, Korea’s current stalled platform initiatives may reflect
coercive isomorphism following the US.
15

What Was Wrong?
● Policy implications: Promises and pitfalls of institutional isomorphism
o [Promises] Adopting established models may, for example,
- enable faster policy design, reducing learning costs and minimizing trial and error (e.g.,
the diffusion of well-established legal doctrines in antitrust enforcement, especially those
from early U.S. case law);
- help secure social legitimacy and political acceptance (e.g., international environmental
norms, such as the Paris Convention, have helped reduce industrial resistance and
promote collective global responses);
- provide policymakers with viable solutions under uncertainty (e.g., Japan’s successful
emulation of Western institutional models, followed by Korea’s emulation of Japan’s
adapted model); and
- promote international interoperability and predictability by aligning domestic systems with
global norms, thereby reducing transaction costs and facilitating cross-border
coordination.
o [Pitfalls] Isomorphic moves may cause, for example,
- contextual misfits, leading to poor performance or symbolic compliance;
- social or political backlash, when top-down approaches lacking sufficient societal
consensus fail to gain legitimacy or acceptance; and
- decoupling, where isomorphic institutions and structures become merely ceremonial,
disconnected from actual practice.
● Korea’s experience: revealing more pitfalls than promises of isomorphism
o Contextual misfits
- No market failure: Unlike the EU, where a few U.S. tech firms dominated, Korea
showed no clear evidence of the need for platform regulation, either from the perspective
of market failure or domestic industrial policy.
- No institutional deficiency: While EU competition law relies on conventional antitrust
provisions—such as those on anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance
16

—which are less effective in addressing challenges in digital markets, Korea already had
a broader framework covering various UTPs, including ASBP, and had been actively
enforcing it.
● This point distinguishes Korea from Japan. While Japan has a similar framework
(e.g., UTPs prohibitions and several sectoral ASBP regulations already in place;
see also the JFTC’s Google case in Apr 2025), its enforcement remains limited in
intensity.
● See also the Australian CCA framework, addressing not only the issue of antitrust
(e.g., Epic v. Apple and Google in Aug 2025) but also that of unconscionable
conduct.
● If any new tools were needed, it would’ve been interim measures or a structural
remedy system, rather than a new regulatory regime.
o Social or political backlash
- As seen above, unlike top officials and policymakers, the broader public did not perceive
the EU’s platform regulations as legitimate or acceptable.
- Consequently, the top-down approach generated greater social costs than a bottom-up
reform process would have.
● Had the government first released a market study, identified problems, and
introduced contextually fit reforms, the process could have been completed at
lower social and political costs.
o Decoupling
- It remains unknown since the rules have not been introduced.
- However, if unnecessary institutional or organizational expansions occurred, they would
likely increase institutional and administrative inefficiency.
17

Conclusion and Implications
Answer to the Question
● The question was “Why did Korea attempt to introduce platform regulation?”
● This research’s answer:
o The several attempts were isomorphic pushes.
o Under the given social and administrative context, policymakers confronted policy uncertainty
and reached for the EU’s rulebook as a socially legitimate and “appropriate” solution.
o Viewing through the DiMaggio & Powell’s institutional isomorphism lens, the dominant driver
was mimetic isomorphism (quick, problem-driven imitation under uncertainty), with an additional
influence of normative isomorphism mechanism (which contributes a diffusion through
professional networks or communities sharing norms, standards, or perspectives).
- Although coercive pressures were weak, they manifested in an inverse form:
The US opposition is increasingly pushing back against any regulatory initiatives.
18

What the Korean case teaches
● The general lesson.
o When uncertainty is high and legitimacy matters, policymakers may pursue isomorphic
regulation that is not substantively justified by local market failures or institutional needs.
o Isomorphism can sometimes reduce search costs and speed policy design, but without
contextual fit, it risks poor implementation, backlash, and eventual rollback.
● Lessons specific to platform (and AI) competition governance
o Jurisdictions considering EU-style regulatory models for platforms (and imminently AI) should
proceed cautiously:
o (While contestable, it is assumed that competition intervention is needed. Nevertheless)
o Institutional baselines differ. For example, Korea (and Japan) already have UTP/ASBP-type
tools that support a flexible, ex post approach; under such settings, the marginal value of new ex
ante regimes may therefore be much lower.
o Leverage and exposure differ. The Single Market, which is strongly attractive to investors, may
enable the bloc to implement strong regulations with lower exit risk; smaller or more open
economies can face higher risks of industrial or service withdrawal and diplomatic friction.
o Policy design risk differs. Case-by-case antitrust enforcement travels more easily across
borders than sectoral ex ante regulation, which is highly context-sensitive; the isomorphism risk
is therefore lower for enforcement than for regulation.
● Policy direction
o To avoid government failure and ceremonial institutions, jurisdictions should prioritize contextual
design.
- Begin with a transparent market study, diagnose concrete harms, and choose the
least-cost instruments (e.g., interim measures or structural remedies within existing
competition law) before building a new regulatory superstructure.
- More fundamentally, non-EU jurisdictions (e.g., East Asia) should de-mythologize EU/US
models as“standards” and invest more in regional governance architectures that reflect
regional industrial structures, legal traditions, and geopolitical constraints.
19

Follow-on Research Agenda
● Japan: Was the Smartphone Act (MSCA) itself a case of mimetic isomorphism, or a strategic design to
regain public legitimacy and, on this basis, to reinvigorate enforcement?
● Australia: After the Epic v. Apple/Google decisions (Aug 2025), does the ACCC’s long-standing claim
of “competition-law insufficiency” still hold? One reading: Australia’s judicial outcomes suggest ex post
law can reach core conduct; alternative reading: institutional capacity (rather than legal template) was
the real constraint.
● India: Was India’s pause a failed isomorphism, or a strategic recalibration to protect local ecosystems?
● Brazil: Is Brazil’s regulatory move a desirable effort to establish a competition governance that fits
Brazil’s institutional capacity, or another case of template import?
20

Korea's Isomorphic Platform Regulation Pushes (ASCOLA Asia Oct 2025)

More Related Content

Similar to Korea's Isomorphic Platform Regulation Pushes (ASCOLA Asia Oct 2025)

More from Sangyun Lee

Recently uploaded

Korea's Isomorphic Platform Regulation Pushes (ASCOLA Asia Oct 2025)