Nel Noddings’ reading
Caring
Nel Noddings is closely identified with the promotion of the
ethics of care, – the argument that caring should be a foundation
for ethical decision-making. Her first major work Caring (1984)
explored what she described as a ‘feminine approach to ethics
and moral education’. Her argument starts from the position that
care is basic in human life – that all people want to be cared for
(Noddings 2002: 11). She also starts from the position that
while men and women are guided by an ethic of care, ‘natural’
caring – ‘a form of caring that does not require an ethical effort
to motivate it (although it may require considerable physical
and mental effort in responding to needs)’ can have a
significant basis in women’s experience (ibid.: 2). ‘Natural
caring’, thus, is a moral attitude – ‘a longing for goodness that
arises out of the experience or memory of being cared for’
(Flinders 2001: 211). On this basis Nel Noddings explores the
notion of ethical caring – ‘a state of being in relation,
characterized by receptivity, relatedness and engrossment’ (op.
cit.).
Sympathy
What caring actually means and entails is not that easy to
establish. Nel Noddings’ approach is to examine how caring is
actually experienced (what we might describe as a
phenomenological analysis). She asks “what are we like” when
we engage in caring encounters? ‘Perhaps the first thing we
discover about ourselves’, she continues, ‘is that we are
receptive; we are attentive in a special way’ (Noddings 2002:
13). This attention shares some similarities with what Carl
Rogers describes as ’empathy’ (see Carl Rogers. core conditions
and education). However, Noddings is cautious as ’empathy’ is
‘peculiarly western and masculine’ in its Western usage (op.
cit.). Instead she prefers to talk about ‘sympathy’ – feeling with
– as more nearly capturing ‘the affective state of attention in
caring’ (ibid.: 14).
Receptive attention is an essential characteristic of a caring
encounter. The carer is open to what the cared-for is saying and
might be experiencing and is able to reflect upon it. However,
there is also something else here – motivational displacement.
In other words, the carer’s ‘motive energy’ flows towards the
‘cared-for’. The carer thus responds to the cared-for in ways
that are, hopefully, helpful. For this to be called ‘caring’ a
further step is required – there must also be some recognition on
the part of the cared-for that an act of caring has occurred.
Caring involves connection between the carer and the cared-for
and a degree of reciprocity; that is to say that both gain from
the encounter in different ways and both give.
A caring encounter, thus, has three elements according to Nel
Noddings:
1. A cares for B – that is A’s consciousness is characterized by
attention and motivational displacement – and
2. A performs some act in accordance with (1), and
3. B recognizes that A cares for B. (Noddings 2002: 19)
We could say that a caring person ‘is one who fairly regularly
establishes caring relations and, when appropriate maintains
them over time’ (op, cit.).
Caring-about and caring-for
Nel Noddings helpfully, also, highlights the distinction between
caring-for and caring-about. Thus far, we have been looking
largely at caring-for – face-to-face encounters in which one
person cares directly for another. Caring-about is something
more general – and takes us more into the public realm. We may
be concerned about the suffering of those in poor countries and
wish to do something about it (such as giving to a development
charity). As Noddings initially put it, caring-about involves ‘a
certain benign neglect’. She continued, ‘One is attentive just so
far. One assents with just so much enthusiasm. One
acknowledges. One affirms. One contributes five dollars and
goes on to other things’ (Noddings 1984: 112). However, in her
later works Nel Noddings has argued that caring-about needs
more attention. We learn first what it means to be cared-for.
‘Then, gradually, we learn both to care for and, by extension, to
care about others’ (Noddings 2002: 22). This caring-about,
Noddings argues, is almost certainly the foundation for our
sense of justice.
The key, central to care theory, is this: caring-about (or,
perhaps a sense of justice) must be seen as instrumental in
establishing the conditions under which caring-for can flourish.
Although the preferred form of caring is cared-for, caring-about
can help in establishing, maintaining, and enhancing it. Those
who care about others in the justice sense must keep in mind
that the objective is to ensure that caring actually occurs.
Caring-about is empty if it does not culminate in caring
relations. (Noddings 2002: 23-4)
From this we can see that caring-about is a significant force in
society. As well as being an important feature of our sense of
justice, it also contributes to the cultivation of social capital.
We learn to care-about, according to Nel Noddings, through our
experience of being cared-for. Instead of starting with an ideal
state or republic, care theory starts with an ideal home and
moves outward – ‘learning first what it means to be cared for,
then to care for intimate others, and finally to care about those
we cannot care for directly’ (Noddings 2002: 31).
Source
Smith, M. K. (2004). Nel Noddings, the ethics of care and
education’, the
encyclopaedia of informal education. [http://infed.org/mobi/nel-
noddings-the-ethics-of-care-and-education/. Retrieved:
September 16, 2015].
© Mark K. Smith 2004
Nel Noddings’ reading CaringNel Noddings is closely identified.docx

Nel Noddings’ reading CaringNel Noddings is closely identified.docx

  • 1.
    Nel Noddings’ reading Caring NelNoddings is closely identified with the promotion of the ethics of care, – the argument that caring should be a foundation for ethical decision-making. Her first major work Caring (1984) explored what she described as a ‘feminine approach to ethics and moral education’. Her argument starts from the position that care is basic in human life – that all people want to be cared for (Noddings 2002: 11). She also starts from the position that while men and women are guided by an ethic of care, ‘natural’ caring – ‘a form of caring that does not require an ethical effort to motivate it (although it may require considerable physical and mental effort in responding to needs)’ can have a significant basis in women’s experience (ibid.: 2). ‘Natural caring’, thus, is a moral attitude – ‘a longing for goodness that arises out of the experience or memory of being cared for’ (Flinders 2001: 211). On this basis Nel Noddings explores the notion of ethical caring – ‘a state of being in relation, characterized by receptivity, relatedness and engrossment’ (op. cit.). Sympathy What caring actually means and entails is not that easy to establish. Nel Noddings’ approach is to examine how caring is actually experienced (what we might describe as a phenomenological analysis). She asks “what are we like” when we engage in caring encounters? ‘Perhaps the first thing we discover about ourselves’, she continues, ‘is that we are receptive; we are attentive in a special way’ (Noddings 2002: 13). This attention shares some similarities with what Carl Rogers describes as ’empathy’ (see Carl Rogers. core conditions and education). However, Noddings is cautious as ’empathy’ is ‘peculiarly western and masculine’ in its Western usage (op. cit.). Instead she prefers to talk about ‘sympathy’ – feeling with – as more nearly capturing ‘the affective state of attention in
  • 2.
    caring’ (ibid.: 14). Receptiveattention is an essential characteristic of a caring encounter. The carer is open to what the cared-for is saying and might be experiencing and is able to reflect upon it. However, there is also something else here – motivational displacement. In other words, the carer’s ‘motive energy’ flows towards the ‘cared-for’. The carer thus responds to the cared-for in ways that are, hopefully, helpful. For this to be called ‘caring’ a further step is required – there must also be some recognition on the part of the cared-for that an act of caring has occurred. Caring involves connection between the carer and the cared-for and a degree of reciprocity; that is to say that both gain from the encounter in different ways and both give. A caring encounter, thus, has three elements according to Nel Noddings: 1. A cares for B – that is A’s consciousness is characterized by attention and motivational displacement – and 2. A performs some act in accordance with (1), and 3. B recognizes that A cares for B. (Noddings 2002: 19) We could say that a caring person ‘is one who fairly regularly establishes caring relations and, when appropriate maintains them over time’ (op, cit.). Caring-about and caring-for Nel Noddings helpfully, also, highlights the distinction between caring-for and caring-about. Thus far, we have been looking largely at caring-for – face-to-face encounters in which one person cares directly for another. Caring-about is something more general – and takes us more into the public realm. We may be concerned about the suffering of those in poor countries and wish to do something about it (such as giving to a development charity). As Noddings initially put it, caring-about involves ‘a certain benign neglect’. She continued, ‘One is attentive just so far. One assents with just so much enthusiasm. One acknowledges. One affirms. One contributes five dollars and goes on to other things’ (Noddings 1984: 112). However, in her later works Nel Noddings has argued that caring-about needs
  • 3.
    more attention. Welearn first what it means to be cared-for. ‘Then, gradually, we learn both to care for and, by extension, to care about others’ (Noddings 2002: 22). This caring-about, Noddings argues, is almost certainly the foundation for our sense of justice. The key, central to care theory, is this: caring-about (or, perhaps a sense of justice) must be seen as instrumental in establishing the conditions under which caring-for can flourish. Although the preferred form of caring is cared-for, caring-about can help in establishing, maintaining, and enhancing it. Those who care about others in the justice sense must keep in mind that the objective is to ensure that caring actually occurs. Caring-about is empty if it does not culminate in caring relations. (Noddings 2002: 23-4) From this we can see that caring-about is a significant force in society. As well as being an important feature of our sense of justice, it also contributes to the cultivation of social capital. We learn to care-about, according to Nel Noddings, through our experience of being cared-for. Instead of starting with an ideal state or republic, care theory starts with an ideal home and moves outward – ‘learning first what it means to be cared for, then to care for intimate others, and finally to care about those we cannot care for directly’ (Noddings 2002: 31). Source Smith, M. K. (2004). Nel Noddings, the ethics of care and education’, the encyclopaedia of informal education. [http://infed.org/mobi/nel- noddings-the-ethics-of-care-and-education/. Retrieved: September 16, 2015]. © Mark K. Smith 2004