OECD Sovereign Borrowing Outlook - 2014 Highlights

OECD Sovereign Borrowing Outlook - 2014 Highlights

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  OECD Sovereign Borrowing Outlook2014 HIGHLIGHTS Dr. Hans J. Blommestein Head of Bond Market and Public Debt Management Unit, OECD 28 March 2014
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  1. The combinedgross borrowing needs of OECD governments seem to have peaked but government debt ratios continue to rise or remain at elevated levels • Although the borrowing needs of OECD governments seem to have peaked in 2012, OECD debt managers continue to face considerable funding challenges, with relatively high levels of redemptions in several countries and government debt to remain at elevated levels in many OECD jurisdictions. • OECD Sovereign Borrowing Outlook 2014 shows that the combined gross borrowing needs of OECD governments are expected to fall slightly from USD 11 trillion in 2012 to USD 10.8 trillion in 2013. For 2014, they are projected to drop further to around USD 10.6 trillion. • For the OECD area as a whole, the outstanding central government marketable debt is expected to increase from USD 38.4 trillion in 2013, to around USD 39.8 trillion at the end of 2014. As a percentage of GDP, central government marketable debt is projected to increase to more than 77 % in 2014. • See Chart 1. 2
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  2. CHART 1:Borrowing outlook in OECD countries for the period 2007-2014 Note: GBR= gross borrowing requirement. Source: 2013 Survey on central government marketable debt and borrowing by OECD Working Party Debt Management; and OECD staff estimates. 3
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  3. The Outlookmakes a policy distinction between funding strategy and borrowing needs… • The Outlook makes a policy distinction between funding strategy and borrowing needs. Central government marketable gross borrowing needs are calculated based on budget deficits and redemptions, using the OECD standardised method for calculating gross short-term borrowing needs. • The funding strategy entails decisions on how borrowing needs are going to be financed using different instruments (e.g. long-term, short-term, nominal, indexed, etc.) and distribution channels. 4
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  4. Failure touse a sensible methodology results in highly inflated estimates for gross borrowing needs… • Using an economically meaningful methodology is important because of complications in providing meaningful estimates of gross short-term borrowing requirements that may yield quite different (usually inflated) outcomes that cannot easily be compared across different OECD markets. • Failure to use OECD’s standard methodology results in highly inflated and misleading estimates for gross short-term borrowing needs. • For example, it is estimated that the OECD short-term gross borrowing needs for 2013, using the OECD standardised method, is around USD 5.0 trillion. However, by using a so-called non- standardised methodology this estimate increases by more than 300% to around USD 15.5 trillion! 5
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  5. Central governmentmarketable gross borrowing and marketable debt in the OECD area using OECD’s standardised method Note: GBR= gross borrowing requirement, NBR= net borrowing requirement Source: 2013 Survey on central government marketable debt and borrowing by OECD Working Party on Debt Management; OECD Economic Outlook 94 database; and OECD staff estimates. Trillion USD 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Central government marketable GBR 6.7 8.2 10.7 10.9 10.4 11.0 10.8 10.6 Central government marketable debt 22.9 25.2 28.4 31.7 34.3 36.4 38.4 39.8 Central government marketable NBR 0.6 2.2 3.3 3.2 2.3 2.4 2.0 1.5 General government deficit 0.6 1.5 3.7 3.6 3.0 2.8 2.3 2.1 6
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  6. Outlook forcentral government marketable gross borrowing needs for OECD groupings • Gross marketable borrowing needs in the OECD area as a whole continue to decline slightly. After having peaked in 2009, gross borrowing needs are projected to fall slightly in all country groupings. For example, “G7” gross borrowing requirements of the central government as a percentage of GDP are expected to continue to decline (by a projected 1.2% in 2014). • But, for all country groupings (except “Emerging OECD”), gross borrowing needs remain at elevated levels in comparison to pre-crisis levels (see Chart 2). 7
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  Source: 2013 Surveyon central government marketable debt and borrowing by OECD Working Party on Debt Management; OECD Economic Outlook 94; OECD staff estimates. 7. CHART 2: Estimates and projections of central government marketable gross borrowing requirements 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Total OECD G7 Euro area Emerging OECD Other OECD Central government marketable gross borrowing by OECD country groupings Percentage of GDP 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 8
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  8. The challengeof raising large volume of funds with acceptable rollover risk • For countries that were facing relatively high spreads in 2012 (in particular in the euro area), issuance conditions began to improve significantly in the second half of 2012 with further progress in 2013. • However, debt managers are well advised to keep in mind how capricious markets can behave. As noted in OECD Sovereign Borrowing Outlook 2012 and 2013, very rapid increases in (perceived) sovereign risk can occur without (important) changes in fundamentals. Financial markets often react in a non-linear fashion to delayed or postponed fiscal adjustments as well as to sudden mood swings, thereby creating the risk of cliff effects where markets suddenly lose confidence in yesterday’s safe sovereign assets. • Clearly, these considerations and findings are in particular of importance for countries that are facing high borrowing needs and challenging redemption profiles. • Indeed, the redemption profile of medium- and long-term central government debt in the OECD area is fairly challenging with large projected payment flows for the G7 and euro area governments for 2013 and 2014 (Chart 3). 9
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  Source: 2013 Surveyon central government marketable debt and borrowing by OECD Working Party on Debt Management; OECD Economic Outlook 94; OECD staff estimates. 9. CHART 3: The redemption profile of medium- and long- term central government debt in OECD country groupings 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total OECD G7 Euro area Emerging OECD Other OECD Medium-and long term redemptions of central government debt in OECD country groupings Percentage of GDP 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 10
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  10. Government debtat a glance: general government debt as a percentage of GDP is projected to surpass the World War II peak… • Fiscal accounts deteriorated sharply in the wake of the global financial crisis. In fact, the direct fallout of this crisis explains roughly two-thirds of the rise in the debt ratio among the advanced economies markets. • As a result, government debt levels in many OECD countries increased to close to the historical World War II peak. For selected OECD economies, the GDP PPP-weighted average government debt ratio reached around 116% of GDP in the 1940s. • The fall-out of the 2007-9 global financial crisis (the most serious financial crisis on record) has put such pressure on the increase in government debt ratios in the OECD area that with an estimated ratio of 115.6% of GDP for 2013 the World War II peak is being nearly scaled. In fact, general government debt, as a percentage of GDP, is projected to surpass the World War II peak in 2014. See Chart 4. 11
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  Notes: Historical debtlevels, GDP-weighted average. * Includes Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Spain, United Kingdom and United States. Source: IMF Historical public debt database; OECD Economic Outlook 94 database; and OECD staff calculations. 11. CHART 4: Development of gross public debt since 1880 for selected OECD economies 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 1880 1887 1894 1901 1908 1915 1922 1929 1936 1943 1950 1957 1964 1971 1978 1985 1992 1999 2006 2013 Gross public debt of selected* advanced economies: 1880-2014 Percentage of GDP 12
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  12. Central governmentmarketable debt to remain at elevated levels 13 • The ratios of central government marketable debt-to-GDP of all country groupings have increased significantly since 2007. See Chart 5. • The G7 central government marketable debt-to-GDP ratio is estimated to reach nearly 90% in 2013 and 2014. • For the Euro area, this ratio is estimated to increase slightly to around 67.4% in 2014. • For Other OECD (which includes a number of OECD countries with a fiscal surplus), this ratio is expected to be 27% in 2013 and slightly higher in 2014. • While for Emerging OECD this debt ratio is projected to reach around 33% in 2013 and 2014.
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  Source: 2013 Surveyon central government marketable debt and borrowing by OECD Working Party on Debt Management; OECD Economic Outlook 94; and OECD staff estimates. 13. CHART 5: Central government marketable debt as percentage of GDP 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Total OECD G7 Euro area Emerging OECD Other OECD Central government marketable debt in OECD countries Percentage of GDP 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 14
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  14. Gross borrowing,sovereign debt and the evolution of fiscal balances 15 • Since 2010, markets and rating agencies pay more attention to relatively high government deficit and debt situations. As a result, the (sudden) increase in sovereign stress led at times to ultra-high borrowing rates. Rollover risk emerged as a key policy concern for debt managers, in particular in countries with (perceived) debt sustainability problems. • As a result, during the past two years, significant progress has been made in strengthening OECD fiscal balances. However, deficits and gross borrowing needs are in many countries not declining enough to stop the rise in public debt (including in relation to GDP). As a result, general government gross debt increased by 2.9% of GDP in 2013 (in 2012 the debt-to GDP ratio was 107.4% and is estimated to reach 110.3% in 2013). In 2014, general government debt as a percentage of GDP is projected to reach 111.8%. • The good news is that debt ratios are increasing at a significantly slower pace than in the past, declining from an increase of 11.3% in 2008-9 to a projected 1.5% in 2013-14. Source: OECD Sovereign Borrowing Outlook 2014 (forthcoming) and OECD Economic Outlook 94 database.
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  15. Maturity structureof the outstanding stock of central government marketable debt for OECD area 16 • At the height of the financial crisis in 2008, there was a sharp drop of almost 4% in the share of long-term liabilities in total marketable central government debt. Since then, most OECD debt managers began to issue more long-term debt and moderating bill issuance. As a result, the share of long-term debt is estimated to reach around 87% in 2013. For 2014, the long-term share is projected to reach around 88.1%. 85.8 81.9 82.7 84.7 86.4 86.5 87.1 88.1 14.2 18.1 17.3 15.3 13.6 13.5 12.9 11.9 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Maturity structure of central government marketable debt for OECD area Percentage Long term Short term (T-bills) Source: 2013 Survey on central government marketable debt and borrowing by OECD Working Party Debt Management and OECD staff estimates.
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  • The demandfor safe instruments issued by sovereigns has increased owing to regulatory changes, the use of unconventional monetary policy, the greater use of high-grade collateral and other structural factors. • At the same time, some analysts believe that the supply of “safe” sovereign assets has fallen (after credit rating agencies began to downgrade OECD governments). • This in turn seems to have created some concern that there is a growing structural shortage of safe (sovereign) assets. • If true, this would be problematic. An adequate supply of safe sovereign assets (functioning as “information-insensitive” instruments that can serve as secure stores of value) is crucial for the proper functioning of the financial system. • Nevertheless, the Borrowing Outlook argues that there is no decisive evidence for supporting the belief that there is a lasting or structural shortage in the aggregate supply of safe sovereign assets. • Still, local and temporary supply-demand imbalances are possible, but they are likely to trigger endogenous policy and market responses. 17 16. Structural shortage in the supply of safe sovereign assets?
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  Source 18 OECD Sovereign BorrowingOutlook 2014 http://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/financial- markets/oecdsovereignborrowingoutlook.htm http://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/public-debt/