Pakistan–U.S. Relations: From Cold War Allies to Strategic Distrust (1947–2025).pdf

Pakistan–U.S. Relations: From Cold War Allies to Strategic Distrust (1947–2025).pdf

• 1.
  Pakistan and Unitedstates Relations From 1947 onward, Pakistan’s insecurity shaped its foreign policy. The country didn’t side with the U.S. because of shared democratic values or capitalist dreams it did so because it needed external validation and military aid to counterbalance India. Cold War Era (1945–1991): Geostrategic Alignment with the U.S. Bipolar world order U.S. (capitalism/containment of communism) vs. USSR (communism/ expansion). ‣ So, Pakistan, a new state (1947), sought strategic validation and external security guarantees. It aligned with the West not out of ideological commitment to capitalism, but for military and economic aid. Key Pacts: • SEATO (1954) • CENTO (1955)
• 2.
  Pakistan became afrontline state in the U.S. containment strategy, offering geographical leverage near Soviet in fl uenced regions. 1965 & 1971 Indo-Pak Wars U.S. halted military aid to both India and Pakistan, angering Islamabad. 1979 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan Renewed importance of Pakistan. The U.S. needed ISI’s help to funnel arms and funding to the Afghan Mujahideen Operation Cyclone (CIA’s largest covert operation). This created Pakistan’s deep linkages with U.S. intelligence, but also fertile ground for Islamist radicalization the long-term blowback. Post-Cold War to 9/11 (1991–2001) U.S. disengaged post-1989 Soviet withdrawal. Sanctions under Pressler Amendment (1990) due to Pakistan’s nuclear program. Relations cooled; Pakistan felt abandoned. U.S. designated Pakistan a Major Non-NATO Ally (2004) Pakistan became central to U.S. operations in Afghanistan, allowing logistics, bases (Jacobabad), and intelligence access. Simultaneously, Pakistan was accused of double-dealing: • Supporting U.S. missions publicly. • Sheltering Taliban/Haqqani leadership covertly. Bin Laden’s killing in Abbottabad (2011) exposed this duplicity trust de fi cit worsened. 2011– Present U.S. aid has dropped signi fi cantly since 2018, Trump administration suspended $2B in aid; called out Pakistan for safe havens. Shift towards India as a strategic partner, especially under Indo-Paci fi c strategy and Quad. Pakistan pivoted further toward China (CPEC) and Russia (recent defense ties). Phase 1: Tactical Friendship (1947–1960) • 1947: U.S. quickly recognized Pakistan; early warmth driven by Cold War calculations. • 1954–1955: Pakistan joins SEATO and CENTO, aligning with the U.S.-led anti-communist bloc. • 1957: U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower requests Prime Minister Suhrawardy to permit a secret CIA base in Pakistan approved. This led to the setting up of the Badaber facility near Peshawar (later used for U-2 spy missions). • Aid: Over $3.2 billion in military and economic assistance fl owed during this period. Phase 2: Strategic Drift (1960–1979) • 1960–1965: Relations cool as Pakistan starts doubting U.S. loyalty after the U-2 incident (1960) and growing U.S.-India closeness. • 1962: India–China War → U.S. increases aid to India, unsettling Pakistan. • 1965: India–Pakistan War → U.S. imposes military embargo on both, but Pakistan sees it as betrayal.
• 3.
  • 1974–77: U.S.alarmed by Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions; sanctions loom. The relationship enters a dormant phase. Phase 3: Frontline Ally Again (1979–1989) • 1979: Soviet invasion of Afghanistan makes Pakistan the epicenter of U.S.-led jihad. • CIA-ISI collaboration: Billions in covert funding and weapons fl ow to Afghan Mujahideen via Pakistan. • Zia-ul-Haq regime gains international legitimacy. • 1987 onwards: As Soviets begin withdrawing, U.S. interest in Pakistan fades again. Phase 3: Frontline Ally Again (1979–1989) • 1979: Soviet invasion of Afghanistan makes Pakistan the epicenter of U.S.-led jihad. • CIA-ISI collaboration: Billions in covert funding and weapons fl ow to Afghan Mujahideen via Pakistan. • Zia-ul-Haq regime gains international legitimacy. • 1987 onwards: As Soviets begin withdrawing, U.S. interest in Pakistan fades again. This historical pattern shows periodic collaboration driven by U.S. self-interest, not sustained alliance logic. 1979 Soviet Union invades Afghanistan The U.S. sees Pakistan as a frontline ally in its Cold War strategy. Zia-ul-Haq seizes the opportunity to position Pakistan as the launchpad for anti-Soviet operations. The CIA funnels billions in arms and funds to the Afghan mujahideen through the ISI. Pakistan becomes the nerve center of global jihad, with fi ghters, money, and ideology fl owing in. Zia institutionalizes jihad, changing the Pakistan Army’s unof fi cial motto from “Jihad in the way of Allah” to a deeper religious militarism. Thousands of madrassas are funded, many with Saudi money, blending Wahhabi ideology with Deobandi networks. Groups like Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Lashkar-e- Taiba, and Jaish-e-Mohammed either emerge or gain strength. Symington Amendment (1976) Bars U.S. aid to countries pursuing nuclear weapons outside the NPT Pakistan’s nuclear program puts it under watch, but U.S. looks the other way during the war due to geopolitical needs. 1989–2001: Post-Cold War Disengagement Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the U.S. disengages from Pakistan, now viewing it less strategically. 1990 Pressler Amendment Triggers suspension of U.S. military aid to Pakistan due to nuclear weapons development. Despite being a former ally, Pakistan is sanctioned. 1991 Collapse of the Soviet Union → Cold War ends NATO enters a transformation phase; Pakistan’s utility to the West diminishes sharply.
• 4.
  Pakistan focuses itsjihad industry inward and toward India (e.g., in Kashmir) 1990s Proliferation of jihadi out fi ts, often with ISI involvement, continues Strategic shift from Afghan jihad to India-centric jihad. 1989–1998 With the Cold War over and Soviets out of Afghanistan, U.S. loses interest in Pakistan. Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions become the central issue, U.S. cuts off military and economic aid because Pakistan is suspected of developing nuclear weapons. Pakistan feels abandoned after being a loyal Cold War ally. After India tests nukes in May 1998, Pakistan follows with tests of its own. During the ’90s, Pakistan supports jihadi groups in Kashmir and harbors the Taliban in Afghanistan Osama bin Laden relocates to Afghanistan in 1996, under Taliban protection, Pakistan of fi cially denies links, but U.S. intelligence sees growing ties between ISI, Taliban, and Al-Qaeda Beyond the nuclear issue, democracy- related sanctions are imposed after the 1999 military coup by General Pervez Musharraf, who ousts PM Nawaz Sharif. U.S. criticizes the coup, deepening the diplomatic freeze and Pakistan’s incursion into Kargil (J&K) surprises the U.S. and India. Musharraf’s Kargil gamble fails, and Pakistan loses face globally After the Al-Qaeda attack on the U.S., America demands global support for its War on Terror Pakistan becomes “an ally once again” but this time, it’s an unpleasant marriage of convenience. Under pressure, Musharraf switches sides from Taliban patron to U.S. ally Pakistan allows U.S. access to airbases, logistics, and intelligence routes While publicly allied with the U.S., Pakistan’s “double game” begins. • Harboring Taliban leadership (Quetta Shura) • Protecting Al-Qaeda fugitives (eventually including Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad) • Channeling U.S. funds to maintain strategic depth in Afghanistan The Pashtun belt got radicalized (Talibanization of Pashtunistan) U.S. Pakistan relations re-entered a “friendly but unpleasant” 2005: Bush visits Pakistan. U.S. praises Pakistan but behind closed doors, frustrations mount. U.S. begins unilateral drone strikes in FATA (esp. Waziristan) August 2008 Richard Holbrooke (Af-Pak envoy): Pushes “Do More” campaign. Constant pressure on Pakistan to crack down on Taliban sanctuaries. 📊 Drone Warfare: • 2004–2011: 300+ drone strikes • ~3,500 deaths, including 300+ civilians • Pak govt privately allows them, publicly calls them a violation of sovereignty. George W. Bush Era (2001–2008) Massive Financial & Military Support U.S. needed Pakistan for logistical access to Afghanistan (via GLOCs Ground Lines of Communication). Musharraf played both sides kept links with Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network intact Under U.S. pressure, Pakistan sent troops into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). • Total U.S. Assistance: • $33 billion total between 2002–2011 • $7.5 billion in civilian aid (primarily under the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act, passed later in 2009) • Two-thirds ($20+ billion) of aid went to military and security support • Most of this came via the Coalition Support Fund (CSF), reimbursing Pakistan for counter-terror operations
• 5.
  June 2002 markedthe fi rst deployment into these areas to hunt Al-Qaeda, unprecedented in Pakistan’s history These military operations created internal backlash, insurgency, and rising extremism in the tribal belt, The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) emerged as a direct consequence of FATA operations. Tribal resentment + military mishandling = radicalization TTP Emergence (2004). 2004 onwards, Pakistan saw a steep rise in suicide bombings, including attacks on its own military. The Haqqani Network, operating from Pakistan, was responsible for some of the deadliest attacks on U.S./NATO troops in Afghanistan. While India focused inward. It was undergoing its second wave of liberalization. GDP growth averaged 8–9% annually during these years IT boom and outsourcing made India a global tech hub, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) increased steadily; India became a “darling of emerging markets. The U.S. India Civil Nuclear Deal was signed. A landmark moment that ended India’s nuclear isolation since its 1998 tests India was recognized as a responsible nuclear power, unlike Pakistan, which was tied to A.Q. Khan’s nuclear black market. After the 2001 Indian Parliament attack, India mobilized troops along the border (Operation Parakram) Did not go to war, but maintained pressure diplomatically and militarily. Intelligence and internal security reforms began post-Kargil (1999) and Parliament attack, 2006 Mumbai train blasts and 2008 Mumbai attacks (26/11) pushed India to invest heavily in counterterror infrastructure, including. • NIA (National Investigation Agency) formation • Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) strengthening • Maritime security upgrade post-26/11 Promoted itself as a responsible rising power, pushing for UNSC permanent seat, NSG membership, and deepened Quad ties (though Quad 1.0 fi zzled out in 2008) RAW, under PM Vajpayee and later Manmohan Singh, deepened assets in Afghanistan and Balochistan Counter-terror dossiers were shared with the U.S. to expose Pakistan’s duplicity. After 9/11, General Musharraf quickly aligns with the U.S. under pressure. U.S. gives “with us or against us” ultimatum. Tora Bora (Dec 2001) U.S. fails to capture Bin Laden in Afghanistan. He likely escapes into Pakistan via Khyber Agency. U.S. starts providing massive military and economic aid to Pakistan (~$10B+ over the decade) 2002 . Pakistan launches operations in South Waziristan (SW), Swat, and Bajaur but these are half-hearted, often selective (targeting TTP, sparing Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network) March 16, 2004: Major U.S.-backed operation in Wana (South Waziristan) targets Ayman al-Zawahiri (Bin Laden’s No. 2). He escapes. Civilians are killed → massive backlash. Raymond Davis Case (Jan 2011) • CIA contractor kills two Pakistanis in Lahore. • U.S. demands immunity; Pakistan resists. • He’s released under “diyya” (blood money) but public outrage peaks. • Reveals: CIA was running covert ops without ISI approval.
• 6.
  May 2, 2011Operation Neptune Spear (Abbottabad Raid) • U.S. Navy SEALs kill Osama bin Laden in a house just 800m from Pakistan Military Academy. • Pakistan not informed; U.S. acted alone. • Pakistan: “Humiliated”, massive intelligence failure • U.S.: “You were hiding him.” November 26, 2011 Salala Incident: NATO airstrike on Pakistani military outpost, kills 24 soldiers. Pakistan responds by: • Blocking NATO supply lines • Evicting the U.S. from Shamsi airbase (used for drone ops). Summary Event Signi fi cance Tora Bora (2001) Bin Laden escapes, start of U.S. reliance on Pakistan Waziristan Ops (2002–2004) Musharraf’s selective war; only targeting TTP, not Afghan Taliban Drone Strikes (2004–) Deepened mistrust; U.S. sees them as precision; Pak sees them as sovereignty violation Raymond Davis (2011) CIA ops exposed; sparked national fury in Pakistan Abbottabad Raid (May 2011) Death of Bin Laden; symbolic end of alliance trust Salala Attack (Nov 2011) Final nail; NATO kills Pakistani troops; cooperation collapses Iran–Pakistan Pipeline (IP Gas) U.S. pressures Pakistan to drop it, fearing Iran sanctions Gwadar Port U.S. unease as China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) emerges in 2013
• 7.
  U.S. View PakistanView Pakistan = Untrustworthy partner, harbors terrorists U.S. = Unreliable ally, violates sovereignty Gave billions, but got deception Gave bases & intel, but got drone strikes & humiliation Wanted to neutralize Al-Qaeda Wanted to use Taliban & Haqqanis as strategic depth in Afghanistan 2011 = Breaking point 2011 = Proof U.S. cannot be trusted Despite Zarb-e-Azb, U.S. intelligence continues to report. The leader of Afghan Taliban is killed in a U.S. drone strike in Balochistan (Pakistan). U.S. proves Taliban leaders are living openly in Pakistan. Pakistan reacts angrily violation of sovereignty but can’t deny presence. The Obama administration withholds $800 million in military reimbursements under the Coalition Support Fund (CSF) [Citing Pakistan’s failure to act against the Haqqani Network] . 🇺🇸 U.S. (White House – Bill Daley) statement: “They’ve taken some steps that have given us reason to pause on some of the aid … the truth of the matter is, our relationship with Pakistan is very complicated.” September 2016 Pakistan’s credibility erodes in Washington; growing calls to designate Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism. India lobbies aggressively post-Uri terror attack (Sep 2016). 🇵🇰 Pakistan (PM Abbasi’s National Security Commission – Jan 2018) statement: “We will continue cooperation with the United States because stability in Afghanistan is one of Pakistan’s core objectives, along with curbing terrorism.”
• 8.
  January 2017 TrumpPresidency Begins Donald Trump enters with a hardline stance on Pakistan • Ha fi z Saeed becomes a fl ashpoint: • Accused of orchestrating the 26/11 Mumbai attacks. • Despite U.N. and U.S. terror designations, Pakistan refuses to prosecute seriously. NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act) for 2017: • Adds strict certi fi cations for Pakistan to get security aid. • Pentagon must certify action against Haqqani Network. 🧾 Aitaz Ahsan’s Joint Session Speech • Veteran Pakistani politician Aitzaz Ahsan, in a 2016–17 speech to parliament, openly names Ha fi z Saeed and militant proxies, questioning state support. • Says: “Everyone knows where Ha fi z Saeed is.” • Re fl ects domestic frustration with selective counterterrorism. January 1, 2018 Trump’s Public Rebuke 🇺🇸 U.S. (President Trump on Twitter): “The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than $33billion in aid … and they have given us nothing but lies & deceit … No more!” 🇵🇰 Pakistan (Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi Sept 2018): “This is not aid. This is our money that we have spent in the fi ght against terrorism.” The relationship between the United States and Pakistan has never been a stable friendship. It’s more like an on-again, off-again alliance based on temporary needs. Both countries have often used each other for strategic goals, but never fully trusted each other.
• 9.
  Timeline Breakdown 1947–1960 Afterindependence, Pakistan quickly aligned with the U.S. to gain security against India. U.S. saw Pakistan as a Cold War ally to contain communism. Pakistan received $3.2 billion in aid and allowed the U.S. to build intelligence bases (e.g., Badaber near Peshawar). 1960–1979. 1962 U.S. supported India during the India China war, making Pakistan suspicious, 1965 & 1971 wars U.S. stayed neutral or tilted towards India, upsetting Pakistan Relations were distant, but not broken. 1979–1989 Strategic Love. Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and U.S. needed Pakistan to fight a proxy war using mujahideen (jihadis) Massive U.S. funding came in, but Zia-ul-Haq’s regime also spread radicalism by mixing Saudi-funded Wahhabism with local Deobandi ideology, ISI became powerful by handling U.S. and Saudi funds. 1989–2001 Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, Cold War ended U.S. imposed sanctions (Pressler Amendment) on Pakistan due to nuclear weapons program and in 1998 Pakistan tested nuclear bombs → more sanctions U.S. considered Pakistan a problem rather than a partner, 2001–2011 After 9/11, Pakistan became a “major non- NATO ally.” U.S. gave over $33 billion, most of it military aid, Pakistan helped capture some terrorists, but also protected Taliban and Haqqani network and U.S. kept asking Pakistan to “do more.” 2011 Osama bin Laden found hiding in Abbottabad → massive trust collapse. 2011–2020 U.S. drone strikes in FATA region → Pakistan claimed civilian deaths. • Raymond Davis case (CIA contractor) and NATO airstrike on Pakistani post worsened ties. • Dr. Shakil Afridi, who helped find Bin Laden, jailed by Pakistan. • U.S. gradually cut aid and shifted focus to India Trump (2018): “Pakistan has given us nothing but lies and deceit.” meanwhile Aid was cut off, and the U.S. got closer to India for Indo-Pacific strategy and Biden administration maintains only minimal functional contact, mostly on Afghanistan. CSIS, RAND, and DoD reviews increasingly describe Pakistan as: “An unstable partner with ties to terror groups and a fragile democracy… not a reliable long-term ally.” As of 2024–2025, U.S. Pakistan relations have not significantly strengthened, even after the Trump administration. While there have been a few tactical meetings, Though Pakistan was removed from the FATF grey list in 2022, U.S. pressure on terror financing and group sponsorship continued and Haqqani Network, LeT, and JeM remain key concerns. • Strategic alignment? ❌ Somewhat • Tactical engagement? ✅ Yes. • Trust restored? ❌ No. • U.S. long-term partner? ❌ Not anymore. India fills that role. Pakistan’s military (GHQ/ISI) frequently crafts narratives to appear geopolitically relevant Claiming Trump favors Gen. Munir helps boost domestic legitimacy for the Army Chief. This is not new in the past, similar claims were made about Clinton, Bush, and even Biden. ✅ Trump was transactional, not ideologically aligned with Pakistan. Pakistan’s military loves projecting a future where Trump: • Ends Biden’s India pivot. • Returns to transactional “give something, get something” diplomacy. • Could reduce FATF, IMF, or sanctions pressure.
• 10.
  The relationship betweenPakistan and the United States during Donald Trump's second term (2025– present) has seen a notable shift. Developments in the Pakistan-USA Relationship A signi fi cant moment in the relationship was President Trump hosting Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, for an unprecedented White House lunch in June 2025, the fi rst time a U.S. president hosted a Pakistani military chief not serving as head of state. This meeting, which extended beyond its scheduled hour, signaled a warming of ties after years of strained relations. Discussions covered topics like counterterrorism and regional stability, with Trump praising Pakistan’s cooperation. The engagement re fl ects a transactional approach, with Trump leveraging Pakistan’s strategic position, particularly its in fl uence in Afghanistan and proximity to Iran, to advance U.S. interests. Analysts note that Trump’s personal rapport with Munir and Pakistan’s military establishment has been central to this reset. Trump publicly thanked Pakistan for its role in apprehending a suspect linked to the 2021 Abbey Gate bombing in Kabul, highlighting renewed counterterrorism collaboration. However, analysts caution that this does not signal a return to the robust security partnership of the Cold War or post-9/11 era, as Pakistan’s focus remains on the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) rather than U.S.- prioritized threats like ISIS-K. Pakistan’s complex relationship with Iran poses a challenge. After Trump authorized U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025, Pakistan condemned the action as a violation of international law, despite nominating Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize just days earlier. This contradiction sparked domestic criticism in Pakistan, with fi gures like former ambassador Maleeha Lodhi calling the nomination “ill-conceived.” India has consistently denied Trump’s claims that the U.S. mediated the cease fi re following the May 2025 India-Pakistan con fl ict, which was triggered by a terrorist attack in Indian-administered Kashmir killing 26 people. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri have emphasized that the cease fi re was achieved through bilateral military talks between India and Pakistan, initiated at Pakistan’s request, and not through U.S. intervention. Modi explicitly told Trump in a June 2025 phone call that no discussions on trade or U.S. mediation occurred during the crisis. India strongly opposes the “hyphenation” of India and Pakistan in U.S. foreign policy, a practice it believes Trump is reviving by treating both nations as equals in the South Asian context. India views itself as a rising global power, the world’s fi fth-largest economy, and a strategic counterweight to China, distinct from Pakistan, which it sees as a smaller, economically struggling state with a history of supporting terrorism. Trump’s rhetoric, such as praising both Modi and Pakistan’s army chief Asim Munir for halting the May 2025 con fl ict, and his meetings with Munir without Pakistani civilian leaders, is seen as equating the two nations, undermining India’s global standing. As an Indian, I’m wary of the U.S.- Pakistan thaw under Trump. His cozying up to Pakistan’s military, ignoring their role in terrorism like the Pahalgam attack, risks undermining India’s security. We don’t need U.S. mediation on Kashmir our bilateral resolve is enough. India’s national interest demands we stay vigilant, deepen ties with reliable partners like Russia and France, and counter Pakistan’s moves decisively while keeping China in check. Trump’s unpredictability makes self-reliance our best bet. Bottom Line: The U.S.-Pakistan thaw is a short-term, interest-driven move with potential bene fi ts but signi fi cant risks. A balanced approach engaging Pakistan without undermining India’s strategic weight would serve regional stability better. Without careful calibration, Trump’s diplomacy could stir more con fl ict than it resolves.