© 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved.
| 1 |
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636
Dr. Irv Lachow
Portfolio Manager, International Cybersecurity, MITRE
Visiting Fellow, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University
July 13, 2017
The Promise and Peril of
Active Cyber Defense
| 2 |
© 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use.
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636
Disclaimer
▪ The author's affiliation with The MITRE Corporation is
provided for identification purposes only, and is
not intended to convey or imply MITRE's concurrence
with, or support for, the positions, opinions, or
viewpoints expressed by the author.
| 3 |
© 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use.
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636
Agenda
▪ Active Cyber Defense Primer
▪ Policy Issues
▪ References
▪ Discussion
| 4 |
© 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use.
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636
Why Is Active Cyber Defense Important?
▪ Governments alone cannot protect the private sector
▪ Companies are increasingly capable of taking active
steps to defend themselves—and are doing so
▪ Current legal and policy guidance is "absent, vague
or difficult to operationalize."
– Governments are effectively blocking companies from taking action
▪ Two most likely outcomes are undesirable:
– Companies do nothing
– Wild West
| 5 |
© 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use.
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636
What Does “Active Cyber Defense” Mean?
▪ Center for Cyber and Homeland Security
– Active defense is a term that captures a spectrum of proactive
cybersecurity measures that fall between traditional passive defense
and offensive….the term is NOT synonymous with “hacking back.”
(Emphasis added.)
▪ Hoffman and Levite (from Robert Dewar)
– An approach to achieving cybersecurity predicated upon the
deployment of measures to detect, analyze, identify and mitigate
threats…combined with the capability and resources to take proactive
or offensive action against threats…
▪ DARPA
– DARPA’s Active Cyber Defense (ACD) program is designed
to…[provide] cyber defenders a “home field” advantage: the ability to
perform defensive operations that involve direct engagement with
sophisticated adversaries in DoD-controlled cyberspace.
| 6 |
© 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use.
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636
Examples of ACD Actions
Source: CCHS
| 7 |
© 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use.
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636
Benefits and Risks of ACD Actions
Source: Hoffman and Levite
| 8 |
© 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use.
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636
ACD Activities Involve Risk Tradeoffs
Source: Hoffman and Levite
| 9 |
© 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use.
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636
In Theory ACD Risks Can be Quantified
Source: Hoffman and Levite
| 10 |
© 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use.
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636
Agenda
▪ Active Cyber Defense Primer
▪ Policy Issues
▪ References
▪ Discussion
| 11 |
© 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use.
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636
Key Policy and Legal Questions
▪ Who can do ACD?
▪ What can they do?
▪ When can they do ACD?
▪ Who is help responsible when…?
▪ How address int’l aspects?
▪ How address technical developments?
| 12 |
© 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use.
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636
Legal Frameworks: Not Much Help
▪ National Laws vary considerably but most prevent
the bulk of ACD activities
– Example: United States' Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
▪ International Laws
– "Formal international treaties have no apparent direct application
to the [ACD] questions being considered."
▪ Which legal models are most applicable?
▪ This lack of guidance needs to be addressed…
Source: Lachow, CCHS, Rosenzweig
| 13 |
© 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use.
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636
Principles-Based Approach (Market Driven)
▪ The Concept
– Create normative principles
for ACD behaviors
▪ Risk-based
▪ Formalized via industry-driven
code of conduct
– Use market-based
mechanisms to enforce
desired behaviors
▪ Insurance industry
▪ Civil torts
▪ Advantages
– Relies on incentives to drive
behavior
– Balances risks
– Adaptable to dynamic
environment
▪ Challenges
– Legal authority is still needed
– Actions can have global
consequences
– Markets sometimes fail
Source: Hoffman and Levite
| 14 |
© 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use.
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636
Government-Licensed Private Security
▪ The Concept:
– Only authorized firms are
allowed to conduct ACD
– Licensing requirements set
by each country
– Allowed actions would fall
short of most aggressive
ACD techniques
– Close cooperation with gov’t
authorities
▪ Advantages
– Clear limits about allowable
actions
– Lower risk of collateral
damage and escalation
– Improved public-private
cooperation
▪ Challenges
– Licensing process
– Oversight process
– Coordination across nations
– State-sanctioned activity
Source: Rosenzeig
| 15 |
© 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use.
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636
“ACD Policy Framework”
▪ Fifteen recommended steps for U.S. industry,
Executive Branch, and Congress
▪ Key themes
– Define range of acceptable actions that balance efficacy and risk
– Update legal instruments to reflect balanced approach
– Work towards global standards across nations
– Strengthen public-private cooperation
– Create set of best practices that are promulgated across industry
Source: CCHS
| 16 |
© 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use.
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636
Consensus Findings
▪ Private sector needs to be given more authority to act
▪ ACD actions need to balance benefits and risks
▪ Legal clarity is necessary if not sufficient
▪ International aspects may be most challenging
▪ Government and industry cooperation is essential
| 17 |
© 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use.
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636
Agenda
▪ Active Cyber Defense Primer
▪ Policy Issues
▪ References
▪ Discussion
| 18 |
© 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use.
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636
Key References
▪ Center for Cyber & Homeland Security (CCHS). Into the Grey Zone: The
Private Sector and Active Defense Against Cyber Threats: Washington,
DC, The George Washington University, 2016.
▪ Croom, Charles, “The Cyber Kill Chain: A Foundation for a New Cyber
Security Strategy,” High Frontier 6, No. 4 (2010): 52-56.
▪ Hoffman, Wyatt and Ariel E. Levite. Private Sector Cyber Defense: Can
Active Measures Help Stablize Cyberspace: Washington, DC, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2017.
▪ Lachow, Irving. Active Cyber Defense: A Framework for Policymakers:
Washington, DC, Center for a New American Security, 2013.
▪ Rosenzweig, Paul, Steven P. Bucci and David Inserra. Next Steps for
U.S. Cybersecurity in the Trump Administration: Active Cyber Defense,
Backgrounder, No 3188: Washington, DC, The Heritage Foundation,
2017.
| 19 |
© 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use.
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636
Agenda
▪ Active Cyber Defense Primer
▪ Policy Issues
▪ References
▪ Discussion
| 20 |
© 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use.
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636
Questions?
Comments?
Ideas?
| 21 |
© 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use.
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636
UK’s Government ACD Program
▪ Goal: “tackle, in [an] automated way, a significant
proportion of the cyber attacks that hit the UK.”
▪ Led by National Cyber Security Centre
▪ Program elements
– Strengthen infrastructure protocols
– Secure email
– Take down criminal websites
– Filter DNS
– Strengthen identity authentication
Source: National Cyber Security Centre
| 22 |
© 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use.
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636
ACD Techniques Most Useful Against
Advanced Adversaries
▪ Cyber “hygiene” can thwart most criminal activity
▪ ACD requires time and effort and carries risks
Source: Lachow and Croom

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Pdf lachow anu

  • 1. © 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. | 1 | Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636 Dr. Irv Lachow Portfolio Manager, International Cybersecurity, MITRE Visiting Fellow, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University July 13, 2017 The Promise and Peril of Active Cyber Defense
  • 2. | 2 | © 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use. Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636 Disclaimer ▪ The author's affiliation with The MITRE Corporation is provided for identification purposes only, and is not intended to convey or imply MITRE's concurrence with, or support for, the positions, opinions, or viewpoints expressed by the author.
  • 3. | 3 | © 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use. Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636 Agenda ▪ Active Cyber Defense Primer ▪ Policy Issues ▪ References ▪ Discussion
  • 4. | 4 | © 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use. Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636 Why Is Active Cyber Defense Important? ▪ Governments alone cannot protect the private sector ▪ Companies are increasingly capable of taking active steps to defend themselves—and are doing so ▪ Current legal and policy guidance is "absent, vague or difficult to operationalize." – Governments are effectively blocking companies from taking action ▪ Two most likely outcomes are undesirable: – Companies do nothing – Wild West
  • 5. | 5 | © 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use. Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636 What Does “Active Cyber Defense” Mean? ▪ Center for Cyber and Homeland Security – Active defense is a term that captures a spectrum of proactive cybersecurity measures that fall between traditional passive defense and offensive….the term is NOT synonymous with “hacking back.” (Emphasis added.) ▪ Hoffman and Levite (from Robert Dewar) – An approach to achieving cybersecurity predicated upon the deployment of measures to detect, analyze, identify and mitigate threats…combined with the capability and resources to take proactive or offensive action against threats… ▪ DARPA – DARPA’s Active Cyber Defense (ACD) program is designed to…[provide] cyber defenders a “home field” advantage: the ability to perform defensive operations that involve direct engagement with sophisticated adversaries in DoD-controlled cyberspace.
  • 6. | 6 | © 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use. Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636 Examples of ACD Actions Source: CCHS
  • 7. | 7 | © 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use. Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636 Benefits and Risks of ACD Actions Source: Hoffman and Levite
  • 8. | 8 | © 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use. Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636 ACD Activities Involve Risk Tradeoffs Source: Hoffman and Levite
  • 9. | 9 | © 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use. Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636 In Theory ACD Risks Can be Quantified Source: Hoffman and Levite
  • 10. | 10 | © 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use. Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636 Agenda ▪ Active Cyber Defense Primer ▪ Policy Issues ▪ References ▪ Discussion
  • 11. | 11 | © 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use. Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636 Key Policy and Legal Questions ▪ Who can do ACD? ▪ What can they do? ▪ When can they do ACD? ▪ Who is help responsible when…? ▪ How address int’l aspects? ▪ How address technical developments?
  • 12. | 12 | © 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use. Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636 Legal Frameworks: Not Much Help ▪ National Laws vary considerably but most prevent the bulk of ACD activities – Example: United States' Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ▪ International Laws – "Formal international treaties have no apparent direct application to the [ACD] questions being considered." ▪ Which legal models are most applicable? ▪ This lack of guidance needs to be addressed… Source: Lachow, CCHS, Rosenzweig
  • 13. | 13 | © 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use. Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636 Principles-Based Approach (Market Driven) ▪ The Concept – Create normative principles for ACD behaviors ▪ Risk-based ▪ Formalized via industry-driven code of conduct – Use market-based mechanisms to enforce desired behaviors ▪ Insurance industry ▪ Civil torts ▪ Advantages – Relies on incentives to drive behavior – Balances risks – Adaptable to dynamic environment ▪ Challenges – Legal authority is still needed – Actions can have global consequences – Markets sometimes fail Source: Hoffman and Levite
  • 14. | 14 | © 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use. Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636 Government-Licensed Private Security ▪ The Concept: – Only authorized firms are allowed to conduct ACD – Licensing requirements set by each country – Allowed actions would fall short of most aggressive ACD techniques – Close cooperation with gov’t authorities ▪ Advantages – Clear limits about allowable actions – Lower risk of collateral damage and escalation – Improved public-private cooperation ▪ Challenges – Licensing process – Oversight process – Coordination across nations – State-sanctioned activity Source: Rosenzeig
  • 15. | 15 | © 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use. Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636 “ACD Policy Framework” ▪ Fifteen recommended steps for U.S. industry, Executive Branch, and Congress ▪ Key themes – Define range of acceptable actions that balance efficacy and risk – Update legal instruments to reflect balanced approach – Work towards global standards across nations – Strengthen public-private cooperation – Create set of best practices that are promulgated across industry Source: CCHS
  • 16. | 16 | © 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use. Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636 Consensus Findings ▪ Private sector needs to be given more authority to act ▪ ACD actions need to balance benefits and risks ▪ Legal clarity is necessary if not sufficient ▪ International aspects may be most challenging ▪ Government and industry cooperation is essential
  • 17. | 17 | © 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use. Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636 Agenda ▪ Active Cyber Defense Primer ▪ Policy Issues ▪ References ▪ Discussion
  • 18. | 18 | © 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use. Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636 Key References ▪ Center for Cyber & Homeland Security (CCHS). Into the Grey Zone: The Private Sector and Active Defense Against Cyber Threats: Washington, DC, The George Washington University, 2016. ▪ Croom, Charles, “The Cyber Kill Chain: A Foundation for a New Cyber Security Strategy,” High Frontier 6, No. 4 (2010): 52-56. ▪ Hoffman, Wyatt and Ariel E. Levite. Private Sector Cyber Defense: Can Active Measures Help Stablize Cyberspace: Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017. ▪ Lachow, Irving. Active Cyber Defense: A Framework for Policymakers: Washington, DC, Center for a New American Security, 2013. ▪ Rosenzweig, Paul, Steven P. Bucci and David Inserra. Next Steps for U.S. Cybersecurity in the Trump Administration: Active Cyber Defense, Backgrounder, No 3188: Washington, DC, The Heritage Foundation, 2017.
  • 19. | 19 | © 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use. Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636 Agenda ▪ Active Cyber Defense Primer ▪ Policy Issues ▪ References ▪ Discussion
  • 20. | 20 | © 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use. Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636 Questions? Comments? Ideas?
  • 21. | 21 | © 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use. Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636 UK’s Government ACD Program ▪ Goal: “tackle, in [an] automated way, a significant proportion of the cyber attacks that hit the UK.” ▪ Led by National Cyber Security Centre ▪ Program elements – Strengthen infrastructure protocols – Secure email – Take down criminal websites – Filter DNS – Strengthen identity authentication Source: National Cyber Security Centre
  • 22. | 22 | © 2017 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. For Internal MITRE Use. Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 17-2636 ACD Techniques Most Useful Against Advanced Adversaries ▪ Cyber “hygiene” can thwart most criminal activity ▪ ACD requires time and effort and carries risks Source: Lachow and Croom