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![This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United
States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with
almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away
or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License
included with this ebook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you
are not located in the United States, you will have to check the
laws of the country where you are located before using this
eBook.
Title: Plays of Old Japan: The 'No'
Translator: Marie Carmichael Stopes
Joji Sakurai
Release date: November 2, 2013 [eBook #44092]
Most recently updated: October 23, 2024
Language: English
Credits: Produced by Henry Flower and the Online Distributed
Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file
was
produced from images generously made available by
The
Internet Archive/American Libraries.)
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PLAYS OF OLD
JAPAN: THE 'NO' ***](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/1054925-250526212801-e0344d3f/85/Pensions-At-A-Glance-2011-Retirementincome-Systems-In-Oecd-And-G20-Countries-Oecd-60-320.jpg)
![hope that there will be some readers who will see through the
shrouding veils of a foreign language something of the features of
the eternal loveliness of the original. My great regret is the
imperfections of my handling of these delicate fantasies. But with
the exceptional knowledge and gifts of my collaborator in the
translations, Prof. Sakurai, the standard of detailed accuracy has
been kept up to a point which will, I trust, make these translations
not entirely unworthy of a scholar’s perusal (but see p. 32);
nevertheless, the reader whom my heart desires is not one to take
too close an inspection of each detail, but one who will catch the
spirit of the whole. None of the four plays that follow have been
translated by any one else,[1] so far as I can discover; so that, as
they break new ground for it, the public will perhaps be lenient and
sympathetic towards these efforts.
Concerning the Place the Nō takes in Japan to-
day
In Japan to-day there still lingers much of the old aristocratic scorn
of the common theatre, but the theatres which are dedicated to the
performance of the Nō have no such stigma attached to them.
Indeed, these performances are almost entirely supported by the
gentle and aristocratic classes. The interest of intellectual men in
these plays is not even satisfied with on-looking, and many of the
leading men of the day in Tokio—lawyers, university professors,
statesmen and aristocrats—study the chants and songs and give
private recitals of them. A few even undertake the arduous training
necessary to act a complete part, including the “dancing,” and then
the gentlemen are proud to appear with distinguished professionals.
The only comparable enthusiasm in our country is that of the
Shakespeare societies; but even to act, and act well, a part in a
Shakespeare play requires an amount of application trivial in
comparison with that necessary completely to master a rôle in one](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/1054925-250526212801-e0344d3f/85/Pensions-At-A-Glance-2011-Retirementincome-Systems-In-Oecd-And-G20-Countries-Oecd-76-320.jpg)
![short performances, mostly arranged in connection with festivities),
because half-a-dozen pieces are on the programme, and between
each is given one of the “mad-words,” or Hiogen, which are short,
ludicrous farces, and which serve to relieve the tension of the higher,
and generally tragic pieces.
The Theatre
The theatres, which are specially built for the Nō performances, are
smaller than the common theatres. The stage is a square platform,
generally measuring about eighteen feet, which stands towards the
middle, so that the audience sit on three sides of it. This stage has
its own beautifully curved roof, which is separated from the roof over
the audience by a slight gap, and is reminiscent of the time when
the Nō were performed on the outdoor wooden platforms while the
audience stood round in rain or shine. On the stage itself are two
pillars of smooth wood, which support its roof (see diagram facing p.
10). The stage is horizontal and is raised a few feet above the
ground; it is made of very smooth and peculiarly resonant boarding,
which is of special importance in the “dancing,” in the course of
which the actor has to stamp at intervals with his shoeless feet and
yet to make a loud, though deadened sound. Let us not forget the
inverted tub and the sun goddess. This feature of the dancing is not
to be despised, for its effectiveness is notable. By the kindness of
the Secretary of the Royal Society of Literature I am allowed to
reproduce my plan of the Nō stage[2] from their Transactions, so I
am tempted to quote also a paragraph describing it. “Leading to the
stage is a gallery nine feet wide, along which the actors pass very
slowly on their way from the green-room to the stage, and pause at
each of the three pine trees stationed along it. A curtain shuts the
end of the gallery from the green-room. All the woodwork is
unpainted and unstained, though very highly polished, and there is
neither scenery nor appliances to break the harmony. The three
actual pine trees and a flat painted pine on the wall at the back of](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/1054925-250526212801-e0344d3f/85/Pensions-At-A-Glance-2011-Retirementincome-Systems-In-Oecd-And-G20-Countries-Oecd-80-320.jpg)
![This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United
States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with
almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away
or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License
included with this ebook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you
are not located in the United States, you will have to check the
laws of the country where you are located before using this
eBook.
Title: Plays of Old Japan: The 'No'
Translator: Marie Carmichael Stopes
Joji Sakurai
Release date: November 2, 2013 [eBook #44092]
Most recently updated: October 23, 2024
Language: English
Credits: Produced by Henry Flower and the Online Distributed
Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file
was
produced from images generously made available by
The
Internet Archive/American Libraries.)
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PLAYS OF OLD
JAPAN: THE 'NO' ***](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/1054925-250526212801-e0344d3f/75/Pensions-At-A-Glance-2011-Retirementincome-Systems-In-Oecd-And-G20-Countries-Oecd-60-2048.jpg)
![hope that there will be some readers who will see through the
shrouding veils of a foreign language something of the features of
the eternal loveliness of the original. My great regret is the
imperfections of my handling of these delicate fantasies. But with
the exceptional knowledge and gifts of my collaborator in the
translations, Prof. Sakurai, the standard of detailed accuracy has
been kept up to a point which will, I trust, make these translations
not entirely unworthy of a scholar’s perusal (but see p. 32);
nevertheless, the reader whom my heart desires is not one to take
too close an inspection of each detail, but one who will catch the
spirit of the whole. None of the four plays that follow have been
translated by any one else,[1] so far as I can discover; so that, as
they break new ground for it, the public will perhaps be lenient and
sympathetic towards these efforts.
Concerning the Place the Nō takes in Japan to-
day
In Japan to-day there still lingers much of the old aristocratic scorn
of the common theatre, but the theatres which are dedicated to the
performance of the Nō have no such stigma attached to them.
Indeed, these performances are almost entirely supported by the
gentle and aristocratic classes. The interest of intellectual men in
these plays is not even satisfied with on-looking, and many of the
leading men of the day in Tokio—lawyers, university professors,
statesmen and aristocrats—study the chants and songs and give
private recitals of them. A few even undertake the arduous training
necessary to act a complete part, including the “dancing,” and then
the gentlemen are proud to appear with distinguished professionals.
The only comparable enthusiasm in our country is that of the
Shakespeare societies; but even to act, and act well, a part in a
Shakespeare play requires an amount of application trivial in
comparison with that necessary completely to master a rôle in one](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/1054925-250526212801-e0344d3f/75/Pensions-At-A-Glance-2011-Retirementincome-Systems-In-Oecd-And-G20-Countries-Oecd-76-2048.jpg)
![short performances, mostly arranged in connection with festivities),
because half-a-dozen pieces are on the programme, and between
each is given one of the “mad-words,” or Hiogen, which are short,
ludicrous farces, and which serve to relieve the tension of the higher,
and generally tragic pieces.
The Theatre
The theatres, which are specially built for the Nō performances, are
smaller than the common theatres. The stage is a square platform,
generally measuring about eighteen feet, which stands towards the
middle, so that the audience sit on three sides of it. This stage has
its own beautifully curved roof, which is separated from the roof over
the audience by a slight gap, and is reminiscent of the time when
the Nō were performed on the outdoor wooden platforms while the
audience stood round in rain or shine. On the stage itself are two
pillars of smooth wood, which support its roof (see diagram facing p.
10). The stage is horizontal and is raised a few feet above the
ground; it is made of very smooth and peculiarly resonant boarding,
which is of special importance in the “dancing,” in the course of
which the actor has to stamp at intervals with his shoeless feet and
yet to make a loud, though deadened sound. Let us not forget the
inverted tub and the sun goddess. This feature of the dancing is not
to be despised, for its effectiveness is notable. By the kindness of
the Secretary of the Royal Society of Literature I am allowed to
reproduce my plan of the Nō stage[2] from their Transactions, so I
am tempted to quote also a paragraph describing it. “Leading to the
stage is a gallery nine feet wide, along which the actors pass very
slowly on their way from the green-room to the stage, and pause at
each of the three pine trees stationed along it. A curtain shuts the
end of the gallery from the green-room. All the woodwork is
unpainted and unstained, though very highly polished, and there is
neither scenery nor appliances to break the harmony. The three
actual pine trees and a flat painted pine on the wall at the back of](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/1054925-250526212801-e0344d3f/75/Pensions-At-A-Glance-2011-Retirementincome-Systems-In-Oecd-And-G20-Countries-Oecd-80-2048.jpg)
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- 8. This work ispublished on the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Organisation or of the governments of its member countries. ISBN 978-92-64-09523-6 (print) ISBN 978-92-64-09628-8 (PDF) The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law. Corrigenda to OECD publications may be found on line at: www.oecd.org/publishing/corrigenda. © OECD 2011 You can copy, download or print OECD content for your own use, and you can include excerpts from OECD publications, databases and multimedia products in your own documents, presentations, blogs, websites and teaching materials, provided that suitable acknowledgment of OECD as source and copyright owner is given. All requests for public or commercial use and translation rights should be submitted to [email protected]. Requests for permission to photocopy portions of this material for public or commercial use shall be addressed directly to the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) at [email protected] or the Centre français d’exploitation du droit de copie (CFC) at [email protected]. Please cite this publication as: OECD (2011), Pensions at a Glance 2011: Retirement-income Systems in OECD and G20 Countries, OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/pension_glance-2011-en
- 9. FOREWORD PENSIONS AT AGLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 3 Foreword This fourth edition of Pensions at a Glance provides an expanded range of indicators for comparing pension policies and the outcomes of these policies between OECD countries. The indicators are also, where possible, provided for new OECD member countries and the other major economies that are members of the G20. In Part I, five special chapters provide deeper analysis of the central issues of pensions, retirement and life expectancy. This report was prepared by the pensions team in the Social Policy Division of the OECD’s Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs. The team comprises Edward Whitehouse, Anna Cristina D’Addio and Andrew Reilly. National officials – particularly delegates to the OECD Working Party on Social Policy and members of the OECD pension expert group – provided active and invaluable input to the report. For OECD countries, the results of the OECD pension models have been confirmed and validated by national authorities. Chapter 1 in Part I on “Pensionable age and life expectancy, 1950-2050” was written by Edward Whitehouse. It is based on earlier work with Rafal Chomik of the Department of Work and Pensions in the United Kingdom while he was seconded to the OECD Secretariat. Anna Cristina D’Addio and Edward Whitehouse prepared Chapter 2 on “Trends in retirement and in working at older ages” and Chapter 3 “Pension incentives to retire”. Anna D’Addio, Mark Keese (of the Employment Analysis and Policy Division of the OECD’s Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs) and Edward Whitehouse wrote Chapter 4 “Helping older workers find and retain jobs”. Edward Whitehouse was responsible for Chapter 5 “Linking pensions to life expectancy”, the final special chapter in Part I. The indicators related to private pensions were mainly provided by the OECD’s private-pensions unit in the Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs: Pablo Antolín, Stephanie Payet, Jean-Marc Salou and Juan Yermo. The report has benefited from the commentary of many national officials and colleagues in the OECD Secretariat, notably John P. Martin, Monika Queisser, Stefano Scarpetta, Anne Sonnet and Fiona Stewart. It is a joint project co-financed by the European Commission and the OECD. The OECD pension models, that underpin the indicators of pension entitlements, use the APEX (Analysis of Pension Entitlements across Countries) models developed by Axia Economics.
- 11. TABLE OF CONTENTS PENSIONSAT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 5 Table of Contents Editorial – Three Solutions to the Pensions Paradox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 ISO Country Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Part I Policy Issues: Pensions, Retirement and Life Expectancy Chapter 1. Pensionable Age and Life Expectancy, 1950-2050 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 1.1. Defining “pensionable age” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 1.2. Trends in pensionable ages over a century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 1.3. Expected duration of retirement: Life expectancy at pensionable age . . . . . . . 27 1.4. Conclusions and policy implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Chapter 2. Trends in Retirement and in Working at Older Ages. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 2.1. Older workers: Labour-market participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 2.2. Retirement and labour-market exit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 2.3. Pathways into retirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 2.4. Fiscal imperatives and retirement in the future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 2.5. Summary and conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Chapter 3. Pensions Incentives to Retire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 3.1. Measuring pension incentives to retire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 3.2. Incentives matter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 3.3. Changes in pension wealth from working longer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 3.4. Individual earnings and changes in pension wealth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 3.5. The role of taxes: Changes in net pension wealth from working longer. . . . . . 58 3.6. Adding a dimension to the analysis: Levels of pension wealth . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 3.7. Summary of the results for age 60-64. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 3.8. Policy implications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
- 12. TABLE OF CONTENTS PENSIONSAT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 6 Chapter 4. Helping Older Workers Find and Retain Jobs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 4.1. A greyer workforce. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 4.2. Ageism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 4.3. Labour costs and older workers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 4.4. Labour-market regulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 4.5. Skills and training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 4.6. Working conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 4.7. Help in finding jobs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 4.8. Jobs for younger and older workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 4.9. Policy conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Chapter 5. Linking Pensions to Life Expectancy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 5.1. Life expectancy and recent pension reforms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 5.2. How uncertain is life expectancy?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 5.3. Two benchmark pension plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 5.4. Pension entitlements and uncertain life expectancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 5.5. An indicator of automatic life-expectancy links in pension systems . . . . . . . . 93 5.6. The impact of taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 5.7. The impact of individual earnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 5.8. Living longer, working longer?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 5.9. Conclusions and policy implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Part II Pension-policy Indicators Chapter 1. Design of Pension Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Architecture of national pension systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 Basic, targeted and minimum pensions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 Income-replacement pensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 Normal, early and late retirement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 Chapter 2. Pension Entitlements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 Methodology and assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 Gross pension replacement rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 Gross pension replacement rates: Public and private schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 Tax treatment of pensions and pensioners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 Net pension replacement rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 Net pension replacement rates: Public and private schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 Pension replacement rates: Couples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 Investment risk and private pensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 Gross pension wealth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 Net pension wealth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
- 13. TABLE OF CONTENTS PENSIONSAT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 7 Progressivity of pension benefit formulae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 Pension-earnings link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 Weighted averages: Pension levels and pension wealth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140 Retirement-income package . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 Chapter 3. Incomes and Poverty of Older People . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 Incomes of older people . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 Old-age income poverty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 Chapter 4. Finances of Retirement-income Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 Public expenditure on pensions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 Pension-benefit expenditures: Public and private . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 Long-term projections of public pension expenditure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 Chapter 5. Demographic and Economic Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 Fertility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162 Life expectancy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 Old-age support ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 Earnings: Averages and distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168 Chapter 6. Private Pensions and Public Pension Reserves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 Coverage of private pensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 Institutional structure of private pension plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174 The pension gap. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176 Assets in pension funds and public pension reserve funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 Asset allocation of pension funds and public pension reserve funds . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 Investment performance of pension funds and public pension reserve funds . . . . 182 Pension fund operating costs and fees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184 DB funding ratios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 Part III Country Profiles Guide to the Country Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 Australia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 Austria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197 Belgium. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 Chile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208 Czech Republic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212 Denmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216 Estonia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 Finland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224 France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228 Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 Greece . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237 Hungary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
- 14. TABLE OF CONTENTS PENSIONSAT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 8 Iceland. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246 Ireland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249 Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252 Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255 Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259 Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263 Luxembourg. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266 Mexico. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269 Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272 New Zealand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276 Norway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279 Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283 Portugal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287 Slovak Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293 Slovenia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297 Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301 Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304 Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310 Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314 United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317 United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322 OECD non-member countries Argentina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326 Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329 China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332 India. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335 Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338 Russian Federation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340 Saudi Arabia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343 South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345 This book has... StatLinks2 A service that delivers Excel® files from the printed page! Look for the StatLinks at the bottom right-hand corner of the tables or graphs in this book. To download the matching Excel® spreadsheet, just type the link into your Internet browser, starting with the http://dx.doi.org prefix. If you’re reading the PDF e-book edition, and your PC is connected to the Internet, simply click on the link. You’ll find StatLinks appearing in more OECD books.
- 15. EDITORIAL – THREESOLUTIONS TO THE PENSIONS PARADOX PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 9 Editorial Three Solutions to the Pensions Paradox Editorial – Three Solutions to the Pensions Paradox Pension policy has always involved balancing the adequacy of benefits with their affordability. This balancing act has got harder as a result of the recent economic and financial crisis. It adds to the existing and much greater challenge to pension systems arising from population ageing. Despite these short-term problems, it is important to remember that pensions are a long-term issue. In the first instance, there is an obvious trade off between adequacy and sustainability: higher public pensions deliver larger incomes in old age but cost more. However, if public pensions are at risk of being inadequate, there will be pressure for ad hoc increases in pensions or supplementary retirement benefits to prevent old-age poverty. Similarly, pension benefits can be too high, rendering the system financially unsustainable. If governments delay reforms, then the scale of adjustment to benefits needed in the medium or long term will be more sudden and painful. Greece, Hungary and Ireland have all had to accept substantial pension reforms as part of the fiscal consolidation required for international bail-outs. Such sudden changes make it very difficult for individuals to change their work, retirement and savings decisions to reflect the new financial realities. How can governments maintain retirement-income adequacy without endangering financial sustainability? There are three main routes out of the dilemma. The first is longer working lives. Half of OECD countries are already increasing statutory pension ages or will do so in the coming decades. Pension eligibility ages for men currently average 63 and, for women, 62. These will increase to nearly 65 by 2050 for both sexes on current plans. However, in all but five OECD countries, projected gains in life expectancy over the next four decades will outstrip prospective increases in pension ages. Thus, financial sustainability is not guaranteed unless pension ages are increased beyond current plans in most of the OECD. As an alternative to higher pension ages, seven countries have introduced an automatic link between pension levels and life expectancy. But their effect is different: benefits will fall as people live longer. While stabilising the finances of the pension system, the adequacy of benefits may be jeopardised in the long term. It is surprising that the alternative approach of linking pension ages to life expectancy has been adopted by just a few countries. This policy would have the advantage of providing a clear signal of the need to work longer. And it would allow annual benefits to be maintained at a higher level than if people continued to draw their pensions at the same age as life expectancy increases.
- 16. EDITORIAL – THREESOLUTIONS TO THE PENSIONS PARADOX PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 10 Countries have also dismantled many of the incentives to retire early provided by their pension systems. But we still need to recognise that older workers face a range of barriers in finding and retaining jobs. Pension reforms need to be bolstered by action from government and employers on age discrimination, training opportunities for older workers and working conditions. The ongoing jobs crisis should not be used as an excuse to revert to failed past policies of pushing older workers off the unemployment rolls and into de facto early retirement, especially through long-term sickness or disability benefits. Keeping older workers in the labour force does not reduce job opportunities for the young. The second way of achieving both adequacy and sustainability is to concentrate the efforts of public retirement provision on the most vulnerable. For example, three of the countries with the lowest rates of income poverty in old age – Canada, the Netherlands and New Zealand – spend only 4-5% of their national income on public pensions, well below the OECD average. In contrast, more than one in five older people in Greece and Spain are poor while public pension expenditure is relatively high. The key to explaining this pattern is greater redistribution within public provisions of retirement incomes. Of course, some countries would need to change the philosophy underlying their pension systems if they were to move in this direction, because it involves a weakening of the link between individual contributions and benefits. But this link is already being powerfully tested by demographic realities, which require public schemes to pay low implicit rates of return on contributions to maintain financial sustainability. Indeed, many countries’ reforms have increased redistribution in their retirement- income systems. Finland, France and Sweden, for example, protected low earners from the full force of benefit cuts. Australia and the United Kingdom have used some of the fiscal space created by higher pension ages to increase benefit levels, and these increases have been targeted on low-income retirees. In contrast, Austria, Germany and Japan have cut benefits across the board, including for low earners. And Hungary, Italy, Poland and the Slovak Republic have tightened the link between contributions and benefits, eliminating all or most redistribution. The third solution is to encourage people to save for their own retirement to make up for reductions in public benefits that are already in the pipeline or are likely to be required. There have been some significant successes in this area. The KiwiSaver scheme in New Zealand, which automatically enrols people in private pensions unless they opt out, has rapidly expanded coverage of private pensions. The United Kingdom will follow this approach in 2012. The Riester pensions in Germany have also been widely taken up, notably among the young and low earners, groups that other countries have found hard to reach (although these plans rely on relatively generous fiscal incentives rather than automatic enrolment). Public benefits are the cornerstone of old-age income support in OECD countries, accounting for 60% of old-age incomes on average. The remaining 40% is divided almost equally between private pensions and other savings on the one hand and income from working on the other. The public sector’s role in providing incomes in old age will remain very important, but will diminish. Working longer and private pensions will inevitably have to fill the gap.
- 17. EDITORIAL – THREESOLUTIONS TO THE PENSIONS PARADOX PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 11 However, the financial crisis has sapped confidence in private pensions’ ability to provide a secure retirement income. In some countries that substituted private pensions for part of public provision, recuperating contribution revenues that should go to private pension plans has proved an attractive way out of short-term fiscal problems. But reversal of these pension reforms, which sought to encourage more private provision for retirement, would be regrettable. Taking the long view, a diversified pension system – mixing public and private provision, and pay-as-you-go and pre-funding as sources of finances – is not only the most realistic prospect but the best policy. John P. Martin Carolyn Ervin Director Director Employment, Labour and Social Affairs, OECD Financial and Enterprise Affairs, OECD
- 18. ISO COUNTRY CODES PENSIONSAT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 12 ISO Country Codes OECD countries OECD countries (cont.) Australia AUS New Zealand NZL Austria AUT Norway NOR Belgium BEL Poland POL Canada CAN Portugal PRT Chile CHL Slovak Republic SVK Czech Republic CZE Slovenia SVN Denmark DNK Spain ESP Estonia EST Sweden SWE Finland FIN Switzerland CHE France FRA Turkey TUR Germany DEU United Kingdom GBR Greece GRC United States USA Hungary HUN Iceland ISL OECD non-member countries Ireland IRL Argentina ARG Israel ISR Brazil BRA Italy ITA China CHN Japan JPN India IND Korea KOR Indonesia IDN Luxembourg LUX Russian Federation RUS Mexico MEX Saudi Arabia SAU Netherlands NLD South Africa ZAF
- 19. Pensions at aGlance 2011 Retirement-income Systems in OECD and G20 Countries © OECD 2011 13 Executive Summary Controversies over pension reforms in general – and increases in pension age in particular – have never been far from the news headlines since the previous edition of Pensions at a Glance was published in June 2009. It is appropriate, therefore, that the theme of this 2011 edition is pensions, retirement and life expectancy and the links between them. “Pensionable age and life expectancy, 1950-2050” is the first of five special chapters of Part I. It shows that around half of OECD countries have already begun increasing pension ages or plan to do so in near the future. Pension ages will increase in 18 countries for women and 14 countries for men. By 2050, the average pensionable age in OECD countries will reach nearly 65 for both sexes. This represents an increase in 2010 of nearly 2.5 years for men and 4 years for women. Life expectancy has seen a near-continuous increase in the latter half of the 20th century. The result was an increase in the length of time people spent in retirement. Between 1960 and 1993, life expectancy at national pension ages grew from an average of 13.4 to 16.5 years. For women, the increase in expected duration of retirement from 1960 was 4.8 years, to reach 21.6 years in 1993. In part, this reflected the trend to longer lives. But one-third of the growth was a result of falling pension ages: between 1950 and 2010, ten OECD countries reduced pensionable age for men at some point and 13 did so for women. Most forecasts show continued growth in life expectancy in the future. On the basis of the United Nations projections, life expectancy at normal pension ages will increase further to 20.3 years for men and 24.5 years for women in 2050. This is despite the increases in pension age that are planned for the future. Indeed, only five countries have increased pension ages enough to stabilise the length of time spent in retirement in the coming four decades for both men and women, while a further four will do so for women alone. This analysis looks only at normal pension ages. But most people in most OECD countries retire before the normal pension age. This is shown in Chapter 2 on “Trends in retirement and in working at older ages”. The effective age at which people leave the labour market on average fell throughout the 1970s and 1980s. However, the long-term trend to earlier retirement ended for men in the mid-1990s and, for women, slightly later. Still, in 2002-07, the average age of leaving the labour market on OECD countries was 4-5 years lower than in the late 1960s, at about 63.5 years for men and 62.5 years for women. Simply to keep pace with the projected increase in life expectancy until 2050, effective retirement ages would need to increase to around 66.5 for men and nearly 66 for women. This is an indication of the scale of the challenge that governments face.
- 20. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY PENSIONS ATA GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 14 The policies that governments can pursue to extend working lives are the subject of the next two special chapters. The first of these looks at the “supply side”, presenting information on incentives to work and retire embedded in pension system. The second looks at the “demand side”, examining ways of ensuring that there are jobs for older workers. There is overwhelming evidence that financial incentives affect retirement behaviour. “Pension incentives to retire”, discussed in Chapter 3, therefore matters for reasons of economic efficiency. But they also matter for reasons of equity. People who work more and contribute more should have higher pensions. Equally, those who are forced to drop out of employment early, perhaps through no fault of their own, need to have a reasonable standard of living. Improving incentives to retire has therefore been a central plank of most pension reforms: around half of OECD countries have taken action in this area. These changes include tighter qualifying conditions for early retirement, greater benefit penalties for early retirees and greater pension increments for people retiring after the normal pension age. Chapter 3 shows that these reforms have been effective, and that only a few OECD countries still have pension systems that strongly encourage early retirement. However, there remain ways in which most countries could further improve the financial incentives in their pension systems. Nine policy recommendations that would reward people for working longer are set out. If there are barriers to working longer on the demand side, pension reforms designed to improve work incentives may be less effective. Chapter 4 looks at a range of policies with the aim of “Helping older workers find and retain jobs”. On the part of employers, there are barriers in the form of ageist attitudes, particularly over the ability of older workers to adapt to change. Legislation against age discrimination and public-information campaigns have often (but not always) been effective. The high cost of employing older workers remains a problem in some countries. And employers sometimes use early retirement as a convenient way of adjusting the size of their workforces. The employment opportunities for older workers can also be limited. Sometimes, their skills have become devalued and training remains targeted on younger workers. There is often a need for more help in finding jobs. A recurring theme in the controversies over higher pension ages has been the claim that having more older workers in jobs reduces opportunities for younger workers. There is no evidence to support this view. Indeed, the employment rate of people in their early 20s is strongly and positively correlated with the employment rate of people in their late 50s. A survey of attitudes shows that more people are likely to support the view that older workers worsen the job prospects of youths in countries where the employment of either older or younger workers is relatively low. Chapter 5 returns to the issues of pensions and life expectancy. Around half of OECD countries have elements in their mandatory retirement-income provision that provide an automatic link between pensions and a change in life expectancy. This represents a major shift in pension policy. First, many have introduced mandatory defined-contribution schemes as a substitute for or in addition to public pension provision. Secondly, some have changed their pay-as-you-go public pension schemes into “notional accounts”. Thirdly, a couple have a link between benefit
- 21. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY PENSIONS ATA GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 15 levels or qualifying conditions for pensions and life expectancy. In addition to these changes, there has been a marked shift from defined-benefit to defined-contribution provision in voluntary, private pensions. These changes have important implications for the way the cost of providing for pensions as life expectancy increases is shared. Increasingly, this will be borne by individual retirees in the form of lower benefits. Chapter 5 shows the degree of uncertainty inherent in projections of life expectancy and assesses policies “Linking pensions to life expectancy”. It goes on to show how pension entitlements would be affected by slower or faster improvements in life expectancy than the central forecast. Together, the five special chapters of Part I set out and evaluate the full range of policies that OECD countries have adopted to deal with growing pressure of population ageing on government budgets. Increases in pension age – the most visible and widely understood parameter of the pension system – have tended to grab the headlines. But these are only a small part of the story of pensions, retirement and life expectancy. Part II of the report updates the “Indicators of pension policies” from the previous three editions of Pensions at a Glance and provides an extra 18 indicators compared with the previous edition. Furthermore, where possible the analysis has been extended to G20 countries that are not currently members of the OECD: Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, The Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia and South Africa. It begins with a look at the design of retirement-income systems, providing taxonomy to describe highly diverse retirement-income systems (Part II.1). The main parameters and rules of pension systems are presented to facilitate cross-country comparisons. These parameters and rules are then used to model pension entitlements for men and women at different levels of earnings (Part II.2). While most of the indicators look at mandatory pension provision, there is also an analysis of typical voluntary private pensions in countries where these have broad coverage. Close attention is paid to the tax treatment of pensions and pensioners and how this affects living standards in retirement relative to when working. The analysis of pension entitlements is forward looking, in the sense that it considers the value of benefits for workers entering the labour market today. The indicators in Part II.3 look at the financial position of people of pension age currently: at average incomes, sources of incomes and risk of poverty. Having analysed the position of individuals, Part II.4 examines the finances of retirement-income systems as a whole. Here are data on public and private expenditure on pensions, contribution rates for mandatory pensions and aggregate contribution revenues for public pension schemes. The background and context in which retirement-incomes systems must operate is presented in Part II.5. These indicators include demographic measures – such as life expectancy and fertility – and average earnings. Finally, Part II.6 offers information specifically about private pensions and public-pension reserve funds.
- 23. PENSIONS AT AGLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 PART I Policy Issues: Pensions, Retirement and Life Expectancy An in-depth look at the questions pensions policy makers face today is provided in this part of the report. Pensions, retirement and life expectancy are the themes of the five chapters. The first looks at pensionable ages, showing how these changed between 1950 and 2010. Around half of OECD countries are in the process of increasing pension ages or have already legislated increases for the future. This chapter also looks at how pension ages will develop between now and 2050 on current plans. By combining this information with projections of life expectancy, the implications for these changes for the length of time people spend in retirement is analysed. The second chapter looks at retirement behaviour, showing how actual ages of labour-market exit compare with the normal pension ages presented in the first chapter. Data are presented on changes in work at older ages, showing a slowing or even a reversal of the trend to earlier retirement in some countries. The financial incentives to retire or to remain in work at older ages embedded in pension systems have been shown to have an important effect on individuals’ decisions. The third chapter looks at measures of retirement and work incentives and suggests policies to improve the situation. Financial incentives alone are not enough to entrench a movement to working longer. The fourth chapter looks at measures that governments can take to help older workers find and retain jobs, such as combating ageism, building skills through training and dealing with the barriers to hiring older workers resulting from labour costs and employment-protection legislation. Increasing pensionable ages, discussed in the first chapter, are one policy response to the continual growth in life expectancy. But many countries have gone further: pension plans that have an automatic link between pensions and life expectancy are discussed in the fifth and final chapter.
- 25. Pensions at aGlance 2011 Retirement-income Systems in OECD and G20 Countries © OECD 2011 19 PART I Chapter 1 Pensionable Age and Life Expectancy, 1950-2050 Around half of OECD countries have already begun increasing pension ages or plan to do so in the future: 18 countries for women and 14 countries for men. Recent increases in pensionable ages have often proved controversial because of their greater visibility to politicians and voters. By 2050, the average pensionable age in OECD countries will reach nearly 65 for both sexes: an increase of nearly 2.5 years for men and 4 years for women on 2010. However, life expectancy is projected to grow faster than these increases in pension age. Life expectancy at pensionable age is forecast to increase by about 3 years for men and 2.5 years for women between 2010 and 2050.
- 26. I.1. PENSIONABLE AGEAND LIFE EXPECTANCY, 1950-2050 PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 20 Rapid ageing of the population around the world is a major challenge to affordability of pensions and financial sustainability of retirement-income systems. This problem has been reinforced by a long period during which increases in life expectancy were continually under-estimated by experts.1 This special chapter explores trends in one key parameter of the pension system: the age of eligibility for mandatory pension benefits.2 The “retirement age” is the most visible parameter of the pension system. As such, it sends a clear signal for people in choosing when to cease work. Increases in pension age have often proved among the more contentious elements of pension reforms, compared with other, less visible, changes to retirement-income provision. The following section discusses some of the issues in defining pensionable age, which is not always as clear cut a concept as one might imagine. Section 1.2 then presents a new dataset of the evolution of pension eligibility age covering a period of a century, looking back to 1950 and forwards to 2050. The main finding is that average pensionable age in OECD3 countries dropped by nearly two years during the second half of the 20th century to 62.5 for men and 61.1 for women. Legislation already in place will increase it almost to 65 for both sexes by 2050. The relationship between pension age and life expectancy – both observed in the past and forecast into the future – is examined in Section 1.3. The analysis shows how the expected duration of retirement has been, and is likely to be, affected by changes in pension age and by the near-continuous growth in life expectancy observed in the past. Between 1960 and the turn of the century, life expectancy after pensionable age is shown to have grown from 13.4 to 17.3 years for men and 16.8 to 22.1 years for women on average in OECD countries. However, life expectancy after normal pension age is projected to reach 20.3 and 24.6 years (for men and women respectively) in 2050, despite many OECD countries having already legislated for phased increases in the pension age in the future. 1.1. Defining “pensionable age” Pensionable age is defined here as the age at which people can first draw full benefits (that is, without actuarial reduction for early retirement). Normal pension ages in most countries are clearly set out in legislation. However, it may be possible to retire earlier than the normal age without an “actuarial” reduction in pension benefits (to reflect the longer duration of benefit payment). Typically, this requires that certain contribution requirements are met (see the indicator of “Normal, early and late retirement” in Part II.1). Some countries do not have a “normal” pension age, instead defining a range of ages at which the pension may first be drawn. The definition adopted here is designed to be comparable between countries. As in the rest of this report, a full career is defined as an individual starting work at age 20 and contributing in every year from that time. In countries where there are different retirement-income programmes for different groups of workers, the data relate to the main, national scheme for private-sector workers. The analysis does not take account of earlier retirement ages or more favourable treatment of, for example, public-sector
- 27. I.1. PENSIONABLE AGEAND LIFE EXPECTANCY, 1950-2050 PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 21 employees or workers in specific hazardous or arduous occupations.4 Where pension ages differ with women’s marital status or the number of children that they have had, pension ages are shown for childless, unmarried women.5 Country-specific issues when it comes to defining pension age are addressed in detail in Box 1.1, which explains the reasoning behind the approach adopted here. Box 1.1. Defining pensionable age: Country-specific issues Recent reforms in France gradually increased the number of covered years for a full benefit from 37.5 years to 40 years in 2008 and 41 years in 2012. (Note that this volume was prepared before the increase in the standard pension age from 60 to 62 was legislated.) Assuming individuals start work at age 20, pensionable age as defined here will move from 60 to 61 in 2012 on the OECD measure (from 20 + 40 to 20 + 41 years). (Again, a further phased increase in the number of contribution years to 42 has been agreed since the detailed analysis was prepared.) A similar difficulty arising with analysis of Turkey: the abolition of the standard retirement age in 1969 meant that the sole constraint on receipt of a full pension was the required 25 years of contributions. Pensionable age for Turkey during the 1970s and 80s was around age 45 (20 + 25 years) on the standard assumption of entry at age 20. This will change in the future as the standard retirement age has been reinstated and will be gradually increased. The standard retirement age in Hungary was 62 for men and 58 for women in 2002 (reaching a unisex age of 62 in 2009). However, a full pension was accessible as early as 60 for men (with a minimum of 38 covered years) and 55 for women (with 37 years of contributions). Recent reforms have tightened the rules for early retirement. For men born after 1950 and women after 1958, early retirement without reduction will no longer be allowed. Consequently the pensionable age (as defined here) and standard retirement age will coincide for these cohorts. Similarly, the statutory retirement age in Belgium is 65 but actuarially unreduced benefits are available from age 60 with 35 years’ contributions. Also, in Greece the normal pension age is 65 but unreduced benefits are now paid from any age with 37 years of contributions, giving a pensionable age of 57 (20 + 37) on the definition used here. The recent reform, however, will restrict access to early retirement to age 60 in the future. The phased increase in the statutory pension age – from 65 to 67 beginning in 2035 – in Germany will open up a difference between this and the OECD definition of pensionable age. It will still be possible to claim a full pension after the reform with 45 years of contributions. Thus, pensionable age on the OECD definition will remain at 65 (that is, 20 + 45 years). In Italy, statutory pension ages in the long term will be 65 for men but 60 for women. However, the notional- accounts scheme means that benefits for women retiring at age 60 will be actuarially reduced to reflect the longer expected duration over which the benefit will be paid compared with drawing the pension from age 65. The earlier statutory pension age for women of age 60 is treated here as preferential access to early retirement and not as a difference in pensionable age. The normal pension age will be increased in line with life expectancy from 2015. But it will still be possible to retire at any age with 40 years of contribution. In most cases, the pensionable age applies to all individuals at a particular point in time. Where the phasing-in of changes in pension ages affects different date-of-birth cohorts differently, it is easy to convert these into the ages that particular people will reach pension age. In others – Italy and Turkey, for example – different conditions apply depending on the number of years of contributions achieved at a certain date or the age of first entry into the pension system. Following the conventions outlined above, the relevant pension age has been computed for individuals with a full contribution history from age 20. The final question is how to deal with countries that do not set a normal pension age in their main schemes. In Finland and Sweden, for example, there is no fixed age for public, earnings-related benefits. However, access to resource-tested schemes – the national and guarantee pensions respectively – is restricted to age 65 and above. This is used as pensionable age here.
- 28. I.1. PENSIONABLE AGEAND LIFE EXPECTANCY, 1950-2050 PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 22 1.2. Trends in pensionable ages over a century Figures 1.1 and 1.2 and Tables 1.1 and 1.2 show the development of pensionable ages in OECD countries over time. The data begin in 1949, by which time all OECD countries bar Korea and Turkey already had some sort of public, retirement-income provision in place. Historical trends in pension ages from 1949 to 2010 and future pension ages on current plans up to 2050 together give a century of pensionable ages for 30 OECD countries. Up to 2010, pension ages were constant for both men and women in only six countries: Finland, Iceland, Mexico, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. Pension ages for men remained the same (while those for women changed) in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Portugal and Switzerland. Only in Poland did the pension age for women remain unchanged while that for men was raised. Looking forward, 11 OECD countries plan to increase pension ages for both men and women: Australia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.6 A further two – Austria and the Slovak Republic – will increase pensionable ages for women to equalise those of men during that period. Switzerland will increase women’s pension age but it will still be one year below men’s. These changes have already been legislated but will be phased in over the coming years. Figure 1.1 shows the time series of pensionable ages for men, country-by-country. (The data underlying the charts is given in Table 1.1). The charts group the countries into five different time series patterns. By far the most common pattern – illustrated in Panels A and B at the top of Figure 1.1 – is for an increase in pension age over time. For example, Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States had pension ages for men of age 65 for much of the period since 1950. But increases to 67 or 68 are now underway or are planned for the future. Poland increased its pensionable age from 60 to 65 for men: the Czech Republic and Hungary are in the process of following suit. The left-hand side of the middle row of Figure 1.1 (Panel C) confirms that, for men, there has been no change in pension age since 1950, nor is any currently planned in the period 2010-50, in nine OECD countries. This is the second most common pattern of pensionable ages over time. Most stick at 65 over this period, but Iceland has retained a pension age of 67 while Belgium provides full-career workers with early retirement at age 60 without reduction in benefits. The right-hand chart in this middle row (Panel D) shows the pattern for five countries that reduced the pension age in the past. In Canada, Ireland and Norway, for example, pensionable age was as high as age 70 in the earlier part of the period studied. The other reductions were from 67 to 65 in Sweden and from 65 to 60 in Luxembourg (for unreduced early-retirement benefits). Declines in pension age typically took place many years ago, with the most recent being completed by the early 1990s. The penultimate group of countries – at the bottom, left-hand side of Figure 1.1 (Panel E) – show a U-shaped pension age for men over time. This is the result of a reduction in the past, followed by a period of no change, and now a reversal of earlier declines that is already being phased in or has been announced. For example, France cut pensionable age from 65 to 60 in the 1980s. However, the increase in the contribution requirement for a full benefit to 41 years from 2012 raises the OECD measure of pensionable age above 60. New Zealand cut pension age from 65 to 60 some time ago, only to return quickly to 65 around the turn of the century. The most striking development was in Turkey: the statutory retirement age of 60 was abolished and replaced with a requirement of around 25 years’
- 29. I.1. PENSIONABLE AGEAND LIFE EXPECTANCY, 1950-2050 PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 23 Figure 1.1. Pensionable age in OECD countries, men, 1950-2050 Note: Changes in pensionable age are based on the data points in Table 1.1. The lines do not therefore show year-to-year changes. Data for Turkey when the pension age is less than 55 are not shown. Source: National officials, OECD calculations and Turner (2007). 1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932370151 70 70 65 65 60 60 55 55 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 2030 2050 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 2030 2050 70 70 65 65 60 60 55 55 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 2030 2050 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 2030 2050 70 70 65 65 60 60 55 55 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 2030 2050 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 2030 2050 Australia Czech Republic Germany Greece Hungary Japan Korea Slovak Republic United Kingdom United States Poland B. Increasing pension age France Italy New Zealand Turkey Denmark E. Falling and then increasing pension age F. Complex pattern of pension age Canada Ireland Norway Sweden Luxembourg D. Falling pension age C. Level pension age A. Increasing pension age Iceland Mexico Netherlands Austria Belgium Finland Portugal Spain Switzerland
- 30. I.1. PENSIONABLE AGEAND LIFE EXPECTANCY, 1950-2050 PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 24 Figure 1.2. Pensionable age in OECD countries, women, 1950-2050 Note: Changes in pensionable age are based on the data points in Table 1.1. The lines do not therefore show year-to-year changes. Data for Turkey when the pension age is less than 55 are not shown. Source: National officials, OECD calculations and Turner (2007). 1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932370170 70 70 65 65 60 60 55 55 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 2030 2050 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 2030 2050 70 70 65 65 60 60 55 55 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 2030 2050 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 2030 2050 70 70 65 65 60 60 55 55 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 2030 2050 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 2030 2050 Australia Belgium Germany Greece Hungary Italy Japan Korea United Kingdom United States Switzerland B. Increasing pension age Austria Czech Republic New Zealand Portugal France Slovak Republic Turkey Denmark E. Falling and then increasing pension age F. Complex pattern of pension age Canada Ireland Norway Sweden Luxembourg D. Falling pension age C. Level pension age A. Increasing pension age Netherlands Poland Spain Finland Iceland Mexico
- 31. I.1. PENSIONABLE AGEAND LIFE EXPECTANCY, 1950-2050 PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 25 contributions to receive a full pension, which translates into a pension age of 44-45 on the OECD definition. (This pensionable age is such an outlier that it is not shown in the chart for much of the time.) Finally, Denmark is shown alone in the bottom right of Figure 1.1 (Panel F). It is unique in increasing pension age from 65 to 67, cutting it back to 65 and then increasing it again to 67 by 2027. Denmark will link pension age to life expectancy after 2027, but the impact of this policy is not shown.7 Figure 1.1 illustrates significant differences in the pace at which pension ages changed. Falls in pension ages were generally rapid (Panels D and E of Figure 1.1). Increases in pensionable age, in contrast, have tended to be phased in more gradually. For example, the Italian reform only affected workers who had been in the system for 18 years or less; the new system will only be fully in place once labour-market entrants of 1995 and beyond have retired. Under reforms in Turkey, the new retirement age of 65 will only be reached for Table 1.1. Men’s pensionable age in OECD countries, 1949-2050 1949 1958 1971 1983 1989 1993 1999 2002 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Australia 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 66.0 67.0 67.0 Austria 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 Belgium 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 Canada 70.0 69.0 68.0 67.0 66.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 Czech Republic 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.5 61.0 62.2 63.5 65.0 65.0 Denmark 65.0 65.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 65.0 65.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 Finland 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 France 65.0 65.0 65.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.5 61.0 61.0 61.0 61.0 Germany 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.5 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 Greece 55.0 57.0 57.0 57.0 57.0 57.0 57.0 57.0 57.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 Hungary 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 64.5 65.0 65.0 65.0 Iceland 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 Ireland 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 Italy 60.0 60.0 60.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 57.0 59.0 61.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 Japan 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 61.0 64.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 Korea 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 62.0 64.0 65.0 Luxembourg 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 Mexico 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 Netherlands 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 New Zealand 65.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 61.1 64.1 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 Norway 70.0 70.0 70.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 Poland 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 Portugal 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 Slovak Republic 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 62.0 62.0 62.0 62.0 62.0 Spain 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 Sweden 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 Switzerland 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 Turkey 60.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 44.0 44.9 48.6 53.1 57.7 62.3 United Kingdom 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 66.0 67.0 68.0 United States 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 66.0 66.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 Average 64.3 63.9 63.8 62.9 62.7 62.4 62.4 62.6 62.9 63.5 64.1 64.4 64.6 Note: Germany refers to West Germany for the period 1949-2002. Czechoslovakian data are used for the Czech and Slovak Republics where appropriate. Where there is more than one value per calendar year, these have been averaged. The recent amendment, in the United Kingdom, to the rate of increase in pension age is not reflected in the table. Source: National officials, OECD calculations and Turner (2007). 1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932372089
- 32. I.1. PENSIONABLE AGEAND LIFE EXPECTANCY, 1950-2050 PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 26 people retiring after 2050, since an increase from age 60 to 65 will be phased in for labour-market entrants from 2008 onwards. In contrast, New Zealand and Poland increased pension ages much more rapidly. Turning to women’s pension ages, exactly one half of OECD countries have had at some time a different pension age for women from men. This is demonstrated in the detailed data of Table 1.2: where women’s pension age is lower than men’s – it is never higher – the data are shown in bold face. These cases account for 28% of the data points in Table 1.2.8 The difference in pensionable age between the sexes is most commonly five years. It is never larger than five years and averages 3.8 years. Figure 1.2 repeats the country-country time-series analysis of Figure 1.1, this time for women. Again, countries have been grouped into five time-series patterns. Table 1.2. Women’s pensionable age in OECD countries, 1949-2050 1949 1958 1971 1983 1989 1993 1999 2002 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Australia 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 61.0 62.0 64.0 66.0 67.0 67.0 Austria 65.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 63.0 65.0 65.0 Belgium 55.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 Canada 70.0 69.0 68.0 67.0 66.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 Czech Republic 60.0 55.0 57.0 57.0 57.0 57.0 58.0 58.7 60.7 63.3 65.0 65.0 Denmark 65.0 60.0 62.0 62.0 62.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 65.0 65.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 Finland 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 France 65.0 65.0 65.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.5 61.0 61.0 61.0 61.0 Germany 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.5 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 Greece 55.0 57.0 57.0 57.0 57.0 57.0 57.0 57.0 57.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 Hungary 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 59.0 64.5 65.0 65.0 65.0 Iceland 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 Ireland 70.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 Italy 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 57.0 59.0 61.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 Japan 55.0 55.0 55.0 56.0 58.0 60.0 60.0 62.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 Korea 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 62.0 64.0 65.0 Luxembourg 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 Mexico 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 Netherlands 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 New Zealand 65.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 61.1 64.1 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 Norway 70.0 70.0 70.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 Poland 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 Portugal 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 62.0 62.0 62.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 Slovak Republic 60.0 55.0 57.0 57.0 57.0 57.0 57.0 57.0 62.0 62.0 62.0 62.0 Spain 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 Sweden 67.0 67.0 67.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 Switzerland 60.0 60.0 60.0 62.0 62.0 62.0 62.0 63.0 64.0 64.0 64.0 64.0 Turkey 60.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 40.0 41.0 45.2 50.4 55.6 60.8 United Kingdom 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 65.0 66.0 67.0 68.0 United States 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 65.0 66.0 66.0 67.0 67.0 67.0 Average 62.9 62.3 61.9 61.3 61.0 61.0 61.1 61.3 61.8 62.9 63.7 64.1 64.4 Note: Data shown in bold type indicates that pension ages are different for women than men. Germany refers to West Germany for the period 1949-2002. Czechoslovakian data are used for the Czech and Slovak Republics where appropriate. Where there is more than one value per calendar year, these have been averaged. The recent amendment, in the United Kingdom, to the rate of increase in pension age is not reflected in the table. Source: National officials, OECD calculations and Turner (2007). 1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932372108
- 33. I.1. PENSIONABLE AGEAND LIFE EXPECTANCY, 1950-2050 PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 27 The first row of Figure 1.2 (Panels A and B) shows the time series for 11 countries where women’s pension ages were flat and then increased. Of these countries, only in Greece, Korea and the United States have women’s pension ages always been the same as men’s. In five other countries in this group, women’s pensionable ages were below those for men and so have increased further. These comprise Australia, Germany, Hungary, Italy and the United Kingdom. In Belgium and Switzerland, women’s pension ages have increased while men’s remained the same. Finally, Japan increased pensionable ages for both sexes from 60 to 65, but the increase was a little earlier in time for men than for women. In the second row of Figure 1.2 at the left-hand side (Panel C), both men’s and women’s pension ages have remained the same since 1950 and will remain the same until 2050 in Finland, Iceland, Mexico, the Netherlands and Spain. Only Poland, of this group, plans to maintain differential pension ages for women in the long term, with an increase in pension age for men from 60 to 65 while women’s pension age remains at 60. There have never been different pension ages for men and women in the five countries in Panel D. Women’s pension age – as for men’s – fell in the past but there are no current plans to increase it in the future. Panel E shows seven countries where pension ages for women fell in the past and have, in most cases, since increased. Future increases are already legislated in Austria, the Czech and Slovak Republics, and Turkey to equalise pension ages between men and women and, in some cases, then increase pension age for both sexes. Portugal equalised pension ages between men and women in the past, while France and New Zealand have always had equal pension ages, with the same pattern of pension age over time applying to men and women. Finally, Panel F shows the more complex time series pattern of pension age in Denmark. Through the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, pension age for women was below that for men. 1.3. Expected duration of retirement: Life expectancy at pensionable age Reductions in pension age up to 1993 in many OECD countries came at the same time as rapid increases in life expectancy. In the early part of the 20th century, most of the gains in total life expectancy were due to lower mortality at younger ages: at birth, during childhood and at working age. But in the second half of the 20th century, mortality risk at retirement ages has also fallen significantly. Between 1960 and 2010, OECD-average life expectancy at age 65 increased by around 3.9 years for men and 5.4 years for women (Figure 1.3). Increases in life expectancy at age 60 were larger than at age 65. The United Nations population division projects further increases in life expectancy between 2010 and 2050. These amount to 3.1 additional years for men and 3.6 years for women at age 65. As in the past, the lengthening of life expectancy at age 60 is greater, but by a smaller margin than observed between 1960 and 2010. Data on national pension ages from Section 1.2 above are now combined with information on developments in mortality and life expectancy. The calculations give the number of years of additional years of life after normal pension age (on average9 ) between countries and over time. This concept is here called “expected retirement duration” for short. Since this illustrates the length of the period over which pension benefits must be paid, it is an important determinant of cost of paying for pensions.
- 34. I.1. PENSIONABLE AGEAND LIFE EXPECTANCY, 1950-2050 PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 28 Tables 1.3 and 1.4 provide detailed national calculations for men and women respectively. In 2010, the period in retirement to death from normal pension age is 18.5 years on average for men. For women, the expected duration in retirement from normal pension age averages 23.3 years, nearly five years longer than for men. The longest retirement durations for men in 2010 – over 20 years – are found in seven countries where the pension age is age 60 or lower: Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Korea, Luxembourg and Turkey. Long retirement durations for women in 2010 – above 25 years – are also found in countries with low pension ages, such as Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Italy and Korea. In contrast, retirement durations are the shortest for men in Poland and the Slovak Republic, reflecting the short life expectancy in these countries: at age 65, for example, life expectancy for men at age 65 is 14.4 and 13.8 years respectively, compared with an OECD average of 16.9 years and 18.8 years or more in Iceland, Japan and Switzerland. Other countries with short retirement durations for men in 2010 include those with pension ages already above age 67: Iceland and Norway. There are also short expected retirement durations for women in these countries plus the United States. However, different pension ages for the sexes in Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic mean that these do not feature among those with the shortest life expectancy at pension age for women (whereas they do for men). Moreover, life expectancy at age 60 or age 65 is closer to the OECD average for women than it is for men. Figures 1.4 and 1.5 summarise the pattern in life expectancy at pensionable age over time for different countries, again for men and women separately. These figures group countries by the degree to which pension age has changed over the period from 1960 to 2050. To explore the impact of life-expectancy changes over time, it is useful first to focus on the countries that saw no change in pension age over the period analysed. This group comprises nine countries for men, as shown in the bottom row of Figure 1.4 (Panels E and F). Average expected duration in retirement increased for these countries from 13.2 years for men in the 1960s to 17.8 years in 2010. With no future increase in pension age Figure 1.3. Life expectancy at age 60 and 65 by sex, OECD average, 1960-2050 Source: Historical data on life expectancy from the OECD Health Database 1960-95. Recent data and projections of life expectancy in the future based on the United Nations Population Division Database, World Population Prospects – The 2008 Revision. 1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932370189 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2030 2020 2040 2050 Women (age 60) Men (age 60) Women (age 65) Men (age 65)
- 35. I.1. PENSIONABLE AGEAND LIFE EXPECTANCY, 1950-2050 PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 29 as on current plans, men’s retirement duration in these countries will expand further to a projected 20.9 years in 2050. The equivalent analysis for the five countries where women’s ages have not changed (Figure 1.5, Panel E), shows an increase from 15.5 years in 1960 to 20.8 years in 2010 and 24.1 years in 2050. This illustrates that a policy of “no change” on pension age does not, in practice, mean there are no changes: it means an ever extending average period in retirement and so a continual increase in pension costs. Turning to the countries where pension ages have changed over time, the top rows for Figures 1.4 and 1.5 show countries with relatively large adjustments. The increase in pensionable ages in Italy will significantly reduce expected retirement duration: from a peak of over 25 years for men to around 20 years at the end of the forecast horizon. For women, expected retirement duration peaked at 30 years in 1999 and is projected to fall to 25.5 years in 2050. Table 1.3. Life expectancy after pensionable age in the OECD, 1958-2050, men 1958 1971 1983 1989 1993 1999 2002 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Australia 12.5 12.5 14.2 14.7 15.7 16.6 17.5 18.6 19.5 19.3 19.0 19.7 Austria 12.0 12.0 13.1 14.3 14.7 15.7 16.0 17.5 18.7 19.5 20.3 21.1 Belgium 15.3 15.3 16.6 17.6 18.1 19.2 19.4 21.1 22.3 23.1 24.0 24.8 Canada 10.7 12.8 14.4 15.8 16.3 17.1 18.3 19.1 19.9 20.7 21.4 Czech Republic 15.4 14.2 14.3 14.8 15.7 16.9 16.5 17.0 16.9 17.8 17.2 18.1 Denmark 13.7 11.7 11.9 12.2 12.0 13.0 13.4 16.4 17.1 15.8 16.5 17.2 Finland 11.5 11.4 13.0 13.9 14.1 15.2 15.5 16.8 17.6 18.3 19.1 19.8 France 12.5 13.0 14.2 18.8 19.4 20.2 20.5 21.7 22.4 23.3 24.0 24.8 Germany 14.2 14.1 15.2 16.0 16.5 17.6 17.2 17.0 17.9 18.7 19.5 20.3 Greece 19.9 20.7 21.6 22.4 22.7 23.1 22.7 24.0 21.8 22.5 23.3 24.1 Hungary 15.6 15.1 14.5 14.8 14.5 14.9 15.6 16.5 14.4 14.5 15.4 16.3 Iceland 13.5 14.0 14.7 14.9 15.8 16.8 17.5 18.3 19.1 19.8 Ireland 7.6 7.7 7.9 13.1 13.4 14.1 15.2 16.9 17.7 18.5 19.2 20.0 Italy 16.7 17.1 23.6 24.2 25.4 23.8 22.8 21.7 19.4 20.1 20.9 Japan 14.8 16.6 19.0 20.0 20.2 20.9 20.9 19.8 19.6 20.3 21.0 21.6 Korea 16.2 17.5 18.7 20.2 21.1 19.9 19.6 19.3 Luxembourg 12.5 11.4 12.9 13.8 17.8 19.0 19.2 20.8 22.1 23.0 23.8 24.6 Mexico 14.2 15.3 15.5 16.2 16.1 16.4 16.4 17.2 17.9 18.3 18.6 18.9 Netherlands 13.9 13.3 13.7 14.3 14.4 15.1 15.7 17.3 18.1 19.0 19.8 20.6 New Zealand 15.7 16.8 17.9 18.8 19.0 17.9 18.1 19.0 19.7 20.5 21.2 Norway 9.5 8.9 12.5 12.7 12.8 13.7 14.3 15.7 16.6 17.3 18.1 18.9 Poland 15.9 15.0 15.7 14.3 14.2 15.0 13.9 14.4 14.9 15.6 16.4 17.2 Portugal 12.4 11.8 13.4 14.3 14.2 15.0 15.5 16.3 17.1 17.8 18.5 19.2 Slovak Republic 16.6 15.5 15.3 15.3 16.1 15.9 16.1 14.9 15.7 16.6 17.6 18.6 Spain 13.1 13.7 14.9 15.6 15.9 16.2 16.6 17.9 19.0 19.9 20.6 21.4 Sweden 11.7 12.0 14.7 15.4 15.5 16.4 16.8 17.9 18.8 19.5 20.3 21.1 Switzerland 12.9 13.3 14.6 15.5 15.9 16.9 17.5 18.9 20.0 20.8 21.6 22.4 Turkey 14.6 29.2 29.9 30.5 31.1 31.5 31.1 28.4 24.5 21.0 22.5 United Kingdom 11.9 12.3 13.2 13.8 14.2 15.4 16.0 16.9 17.7 17.5 17.2 16.9 United States 12.8 13.2 14.4 15.0 15.3 16.1 16.7 16.8 17.3 16.8 17.2 17.7 Average 13.4 13.5 15.0 16.2 16.7 17.4 17.7 18.5 18.9 19.2 19.6 20.3 Note: Life-expectancy is calculated using data from 1960 for the pensionable ages applicable in 1958. Source: Data on pensionable ages over time from Table 1.1. Historical data on life expectancy are taken from the OECD Health Database 1960-95. Recent data and projections of life expectancy in the future based on the United Nations Population Division Database, World Population Prospects – The 2008 Revision. 1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932372127
- 36. I.1. PENSIONABLE AGEAND LIFE EXPECTANCY, 1950-2050 PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 30 With the possibility of retiring at any age with 20-25 years of contributions, the expected duration of retirement in Turkey is way off the scale of the charts. For men, the peak value is 32 years and for women, 37 years (both occurring in 2002). This means that a woman with a full contribution history from age 20 could draw a pension for nearly twice as many years as the time she spent paying into the system. For men, the expected duration of drawing a pension could be nearly 30% longer than the period they spent contributing. In some other cases where pension ages have been increased, the expected duration in retirement will remain broadly stable for significant periods. In Greece, for example, life expectancy at pensionable age for men is projected to remain in the range 22-24 years from 1993 to 2050. Similarly, in the Czech Republic, retirement duration for men is expected to be around 17 years from 1999 to 2040. A comparable pattern is observed for men in Hungary, Korea, New Zealand and Poland. In Australia and the United Kingdom, increases in pension age for women from 60 to 67 and 68 respectively are sufficient to ensure that expected duration of retirement in 2050 is about the same as it was in 1993. Table 1.4. Life expectancy after pensionable age in the OECD, 1958-2050, women 1958 1971 1983 1989 1993 1999 2002 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Australia 19.4 20.0 22.4 22.8 23.7 24.5 24.2 24.3 23.7 22.6 22.5 23.3 Austria 18.6 19.0 20.6 22.1 22.6 23.7 23.8 25.1 26.1 24.6 23.6 24.5 Belgium 18.5 19.3 21.1 22.5 23.1 23.9 23.6 25.8 27.0 28.0 28.9 29.8 Canada 14.5 17.2 18.7 19.9 20.1 20.4 21.4 22.3 23.1 24.0 24.8 Czech Republic 18.5 23.3 21.4 22.1 23.0 24.1 23.1 23.8 23.1 22.3 21.6 22.5 Denmark 19.3 18.6 19.6 19.9 15.6 16.1 16.6 19.8 20.8 19.6 20.3 21.0 Finland 13.7 14.4 17.5 17.8 18.0 19.5 19.3 21.0 22.0 22.9 23.8 24.7 France 15.6 16.8 18.4 24.0 24.6 25.3 25.4 26.5 26.9 27.8 28.7 29.5 Germany 18.1 19.0 20.8 21.8 22.5 23.7 23.3 20.7 21.7 22.6 23.5 24.4 Greece 21.5 22.5 23.7 25.2 25.6 26.1 25.3 27.1 25.3 26.3 27.4 28.3 Hungary 22.6 23.2 23.5 24.2 24.2 24.7 25.4 22.6 19.0 19.4 20.3 21.1 Iceland 16.5 17.0 17.0 17.2 18.3 19.2 20.2 21.1 22.0 22.9 Ireland 9.4 10.0 10.6 16.5 17.0 17.6 18.6 20.6 21.6 22.5 23.4 24.3 Italy 25.2 26.5 28.1 28.8 29.9 28.1 27.4 26.3 23.7 24.6 25.5 Japan 22.8 25.0 27.7 28.3 25.9 26.3 27.4 26.7 25.2 26.0 26.9 27.7 Korea 20.8 22.2 23.2 25.2 26.2 25.1 24.6 24.5 Luxembourg 14.5 14.7 16.8 17.8 22.9 24.2 23.7 24.9 25.9 26.8 27.7 28.6 Mexico 14.6 16.0 17.2 17.9 17.9 18.0 18.2 19.4 20.4 21.0 21.5 21.9 Netherlands 15.3 16.2 18.3 18.9 18.8 19.1 19.1 20.4 21.2 22.0 22.8 23.5 New Zealand 19.8 21.1 22.0 22.7 22.6 20.9 20.9 21.8 22.6 23.4 24.3 Norway 11.1 11.9 16.7 16.7 16.8 17.5 17.7 18.9 19.9 20.8 21.7 22.5 Poland 18.7 18.9 19.9 19.9 20.1 21.0 21.8 23.1 24.0 24.9 25.8 26.6 Portugal 14.5 14.2 16.5 19.8 19.8 20.8 18.8 20.2 21.2 22.1 22.9 23.6 Slovak Republic 18.4 23.7 22.3 22.8 23.7 23.6 23.8 24.9 21.0 22.0 23.0 23.9 Spain 15.3 16.3 18.2 19.2 19.8 20.3 20.6 21.8 22.8 23.6 24.4 25.1 Sweden 13.3 14.9 18.5 19.1 19.1 19.9 20.0 21.1 21.9 22.7 23.4 24.2 Switzerland 19.0 20.5 22.9 22.3 22.6 23.2 23.4 24.1 24.0 24.9 25.8 26.6 Turkey 16.0 30.8 31.9 32.5 33.1 37.2 36.9 34.7 30.9 27.2 23.2 United Kingdom 18.9 19.8 21.0 21.5 21.9 22.7 23.3 24.5 21.2 21.1 22.0 21.9 United States 15.8 17.1 18.6 18.8 18.9 19.1 19.1 19.3 20.2 20.1 21.0 21.9 Average 17.0 18.2 20.2 21.4 21.7 22.3 22.5 23.3 23.2 23.4 23.9 24.6 Note: Life-expectancy is calculated using data from 1960 for the pensionable ages applicable in 1958. Source: Data on pensionable ages over time from Table 1.2. Historical data on life expectancy are taken from the OECD Health Database 1960-95. Recent data and projections of life expectancy in the future based on the United Nations Population Division Database, World Population Prospects – The 2008 Revision. 1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932372146
- 37. I.1. PENSIONABLE AGEAND LIFE EXPECTANCY, 1950-2050 PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 31 Figure 1.4. Life expectancy at pensionable age in OECD countries, men, 1950-2050 Note: Values have been capped at 25 years, which means that expected retirement duration in Turkey is off the scale. Source: Data on pensionable ages over time from Table 1.1. Historical data on life expectancy are taken from the OECD Health Database 1960-95. Recent data and projections of life expectancy in the future based on the United Nations Population Division Database, World Population Prospects – The 2008 Revision. 1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932370208 25.0 22.5 20.0 17.5 15.0 12.5 10.0 7.5 25.0 22.5 20.0 17.5 15.0 12.5 10.0 7.5 25.0 22.5 20.0 17.5 15.0 12.5 10.0 7.5 25.0 22.5 20.0 17.5 15.0 12.5 10.0 7.5 25.0 22.5 20.0 17.5 15.0 12.5 10.0 7.5 25.0 22.5 20.0 17.5 15.0 12.5 10.0 7.5 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 2030 2050 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 2030 2050 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 2030 2050 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 2030 2050 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 2030 2050 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 2030 2050 Czech Republic France Greece Hungary Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg New Zealand Poland Turkey B. Countries with larger changes in pension age Austria Belgium Finland Iceland Mexico Netherlands Portugal Spain Switzerland E. Countries with no change in pension age F. Countries with no change in pension age Australia Denmark Sweden United States D. Countries with smaller changes in pension age Norway Slovak Republic Canada Germany Ireland United Kingdom C. Countries with smaller changes in pension age A. Countries with larger changes in pension age
- 38. I.1. PENSIONABLE AGEAND LIFE EXPECTANCY, 1950-2050 PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 32 Figure 1.5. Life expectancy at pensionable age in OECD countries, women, 1950-2050 Note: Values have been capped at 30 years, which means that expected retirement duration in Turkey is off the scale. Source: Data on pensionable ages over time from Table 1.2. Historical data on life expectancy are taken from the OECD Health Database 1960-95. Recent data and projections of life expectancy in the future based on the United Nations Population Division Database, World Population Prospects – The 2008 Revision. 1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932370227 30.0 27.5 25.0 22.5 20.0 17.5 12.5 15.0 10.0 30.0 27.5 25.0 22.5 20.0 17.5 12.5 15.0 10.0 30.0 27.5 25.0 22.5 20.0 17.5 12.5 15.0 10.0 30.0 27.5 25.0 22.5 20.0 17.5 12.5 15.0 10.0 30.0 27.5 25.0 22.5 20.0 17.5 12.5 15.0 10.0 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 2030 2050 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 2030 2050 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 2030 2050 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 2030 2050 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 2030 2050 Czech Republic Hungary Italy Turkey United Kingdom Australia Belgium Denmark Greece Slovak Republic B. Countries with larger changes in pension age E. Countries with no change in pension age Japan Korea Luxembourg Austria France Germany New Zealand C. Countries with smaller changes in pension age Netherlands Finland Poland Iceland Spain Mexico Portugal Sweden Switzerland Canada Ireland Norway United States D. Countries with smaller changes in pension age A. Countries with larger changes in pension age
- 39. I.1. PENSIONABLE AGEAND LIFE EXPECTANCY, 1950-2050 PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 33 However, men’s pension age started at 65 in both countries. In the United Kingdom, expected duration of retirement for men is projected to fall to its 2010 level by 2050. But the increase in Australia for men is insufficient to prevent a continued increase in life expectancy at pensionable age. 1.4. Conclusions and policy implications The pension age is the most visible parameter of the retirement-income system. It has an impact on the financial incentives to retire at different ages, which are analysed in more detail in Chapter 3 of Part I (“Pension incentives to retire”). As a signal, it can also have an important effect on people’s retirement decisions. The long-term survey of policy revealed a period of significant decline in pension ages in the latter half of the 20th century (Figure 1.6). Between 1950 and 2010, ten countries reduced pensionable age for men at some point and 13 did so for women. The average pension age in 30 OECD countries fell from 64.3 years in 1949 to a nadir of 62.4 years in 1993 for men, a drop of nearly two years. For women, the fall over the same period was also just below two years, from 62.9 to 61.0 years in 1993. Beginning in the 1990s and after, governments started taking action to reverse the trend and put in place legislation that has already increased or will increase pensionable age up to 2050. From a low point in 1993, 14 countries have increased or plan to increase pension ages for men and 18 for women. Already by 2010, average pension ages have increased by 0.5 years for men and 0.8 years for women from the low point. Looking forward, current plans will increase the average pensionable age to 64.6 years for men and 64.4 years for women in 2050. The slightly lower average pension age for women is because Poland and Switzerland still have legislation in place to keep differential ages in the long term and equalisation of men’s and women’s pension ages in Turkey will not be complete by 2050. Figure 1.6. Average pensionable age in OECD countries by sex, 1950-2050 Source: National officials, OECD calculations and Turner (2007). 1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932370246 65 64 63 62 60 61 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 2050 2030 Pensionable age (years) Men Women
- 40. I.1. PENSIONABLE AGEAND LIFE EXPECTANCY, 1950-2050 PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 34 Despite these increases, it is noticeable that the average pension age for men will only reach the same level as 1950 by 2040. Increases in pension age are larger and often earlier for women than for men, reflecting the equalisation of pension ages between the sexes in 12 of the 15 countries that have had different pensionable ages at some point. However, even for women, the pensionable age will only reach the level it was in 1950 from 2020 onwards. Life expectancy has seen a near-continuous increase in the latter half of the 20th century; and most estimates show continued growth in the future. Over the period from 1960 to the low-point for pension ages in 1993, the amount of time a man of pension age could expect to live grew from 13.4 to 16.7 years (Figure 1.7). Over 40% of the growth in expected retirement duration was a result of falling pension ages, with a small majority coming from longer life expectancy. For women, the increase in expected duration of retirement from 1960 was 4.7 years, to reach 21.7 years in 1993. For women, 70% of the growth was a result of longer life expectancy and 30% from lower pension ages. In the recent period of 1993-2010, the expected duration of retirement has increased more slowly than before: 1.6 additional years for women taking it to 23.3 years and 1.8 extra years for men, increasing to 18.5 years. The slower growth for women reflects the fact that pension ages increased more rapidly than men’s over this period. If pension ages had not increased, expected retirement duration would have been 0.8 years longer for women and 0.4 years for men in 2010. Looking forward to 2050, expected retirement duration in the coming four decades is projected to grow at a much slower rate than observed in the five decades from 1960 to 2010. On average in OECD countries, women in 2050 are projected to have a life expectancy of 24.6 years at pensionable age, compared with 20.3 years for men. Only five OECD countries – Hungary, Italy, Korea, Turkey and the United Kingdom – have increased pension ages sufficiently to stabilise or reduce the expected duration of retirement between 2010 and 2050 for both men and women. Australia, Austria and the Czech and Slovak Republics will do so for women alone (due to equalisation of pension ages). Figure 1.7. Life expectancy after pensionable age by sex, 1960-2050 Source: Data on pensionable ages over time from Table 1.2. Historical data on life expectancy are taken from the OECD Health Database 1960-95. Recent data and projections of life expectancy in the future based on the United Nations Population Division Database, World Population Prospects – The 2008 Revision. 1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932370265 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 22.5 25.0 20.0 17.5 15.0 12.5 Life expectancy at pensionable age (years) Men Women
- 41. I.1. PENSIONABLE AGEAND LIFE EXPECTANCY, 1950-2050 PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 35 In some countries, the debate about a later pensionable age has been framed not only in terms of sustainable pension-system finances but also higher pension levels for retirees than would otherwise be affordable. There is a trade-off between benefit levels and pension age. The terms of this trade-off can be demonstrated by using annuity rates to calculate pension replacement rates at different ages for a given budget constraint on the pension provider. Such a hypothetical scenario is illustrated in Figure 1.8 using the OECD pension models. It shows that delaying retirement by five years from age 65 allows for a pension replacement rate of 72%, compared with 60% at 65. (The rate of 60% was chosen because it is approximately the average replacement rate for people with mean earnings in OECD countries.) Conversely, earlier retirement means that the given budget needs to be spread over a longer period. In this case, retiring five years earlier, at age 60 would result in a replacement rate of 52%. Other reforms to pension systems should be borne in mind when interpreting the results presented above. First, around half of OECD countries have taken measures over the past decade, other than increases in pension age, to encourage people to work longer. These include tighter qualifying conditions for early retirement, larger pension decrements for early retirees and larger benefit increments for later retirement. These reforms are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 in Part I on “Pension incentives to retire”.10 A second significant set of reforms are addressed in Chapter 5 in Part I on “Linking pensions to life expectancy”. Most of these new pension schemes will automatically reduce benefits as life expectancy increases so that the lifetime value of pensions from these schemes will remain broadly constant. These changes can therefore be seen as a partial substitute for increases in pension age in ensuring retirement-income provision is financially sustainable. What happens next? Almost half of OECD countries will increase pension ages over the coming four decades. But in many, the policy is a case of “running to stand still”: in only a few will increases in pension age be sufficient to offset future growth in life expectancy, Figure 1.8. The trade-off between the replacement rate and pensionable age Source: OECD pension models. Annuity rates calculated from mortality data by age from the United Nations Population Division Database, World Population Prospects – The 2008 Revision. 1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932370284 100 75 50 25 0 55 60 65 70 75 Equal cost replacement rate Pensionable age, years
- 42. I.1. PENSIONABLE AGEAND LIFE EXPECTANCY, 1950-2050 PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 36 let alone claw-back some of the past extension of life. The expected duration of retirement in 2050 is projected to be 25 years for women and 20 years for men 7-8 years or 50% longer than it was in 1960. In some countries, the pension-policy discourse is already suggesting the possibility of further increases in pension ages to mitigate the impact of continuing rises in life expectancy. For example, the former head of the pension-reform commission in the United Kingdom, Lord Turner, has floated the idea of a further increase in pension age to 70 beyond the increase to 68 already planned. In other countries, the debate over the future pension age has only just started, but if past experience is any guide, many are likely to follow those that have already announced increases in pension ages. Notes 1. See the discussion in Whitehouse (2007). 2. This special chapter summarises the more detailed analysis in Chomik and Whitehouse (2010). 3. At the time of drafting this special chapter, new member countries, such as Chile, Estonia, Israel and Slovenia, had not yet joined the Organisation and so they have not been included in this analysis. 4. See Zaidi and Whitehouse (2009) for a discussion of such rules. 5. Such differences have applied to the Czech Republic and the former Czechoslovakia, Denmark and Switzerland at various times. 6. Germany also plans to increase the statutory pension age from 65 to 67, but, for the reasons explained in Box 1.1, the OECD measure of the pensionable age is not affected. 7. See Chapter 5 in Part I on “Linking pensions to life expectancy”. 8. There are 390 data points, comprising 30 countries and up to 13 points in time. 9. The measures of life expectancy are for a given country’s population as a whole. Differences in life expectancy within countries between different socio-economic groups are analysed in Whitehouse and Zaidi (2008). The key finding of that paper is that socio-economic differentials in mortality in OECD countries are much smaller for people of pension age than they are at working age. 10. See also Whitehouse et al. (2009), the chapters on pension reforms in OECD (2007, 2009) and Ebbinghaus (2006). References Chomik, R. and E.R. Whitehouse (2010), “Trends in Pension Eligibility Ages and Life Expectancy, 1950-2050”, Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper, No. 105, OECD Publishing, Paris. Ebbinghaus, B. (2006), Reforming Early Retirement in Europe, Japan and the USA, Oxford University Press, Oxford. OECD (2005), Pensions at a Glance: Public Policies across OECD Countries, OECD Publishing, Paris. OECD (2006), Live Longer, Work Longer, OECD Publishing, Paris. OECD (2007a), Pensions at a Glance: Public Policies across OECD Countries, OECD Publishing, Paris. OECD (2007b), “Public Sector Pensions and the Challenge of an Ageing Public Service”, Working Paper on Public Governance, No. 2, OECD Publishing, Paris. OECD (2008), Employment Outlook, OECD Publishing, Paris. OECD (2009), Pensions at a Glance: Retirement-Income Systems in OECD Countries, OECD Publishing, Paris. Palacios, R.J. and E.R. Whitehouse (2006), “Civil-service Pension Schemes Around the World”, Pension Reform Primer Series, Social Protection Discussion Paper, No. 06/02, World Bank, Washington DC. Queisser, M. and E.R. Whitehouse (2006), “Neutral or Fair? Actuarial Concepts and Pension-System Design”, Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper, No. 40, OECD Publishing, Paris.
- 43. I.1. PENSIONABLE AGEAND LIFE EXPECTANCY, 1950-2050 PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 37 Turner, J. (2007), “Social Security Pensionable Ages in OECD Countries: 1949-2035”, International Social Security Review, Vol. 60, No. 1, pp. 81-99. Whitehouse, E.R. (2007), “Life-Expectancy Risk and Pensions: Who Bears the Burden?”, Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper, No. 60, OECD Publishing, Paris. Whitehouse, E.R. and A. Zaidi (2008), “Socio-Economic Differences in Mortality: Implications for Pension Policy”, Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper, No. 71, OECD Publishing, Paris. Whitehouse, E.R., A.C. D’Addio, R. Chomik and A. Reilly (2009), “Two Decades of Pension Reform: What has been Achieved and What Remains to be Done?”, Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, Vol. 34, pp. 515-535. Zaidi, A. and E.R. Whitehouse (2009), “Should Pension Systems Recognise Hazardous and Arduous Work?”, Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper, No. 91, OECD Publishing, Paris.
- 45. Pensions at aGlance 2011 Retirement-income Systems in OECD and G20 Countries © OECD 2011 39 PART I PART I Chapter 2 Trends in Retirement and in Working at Older Ages This chapter examines labour-market behaviour of older workers, their pattern across countries and over time. There was a strong trend to early retirement throughout the 1970s and 1980s. However, this came to an end in the mid 1990s, and during the 2000s, the proportion of 50-64 years olds participating in the labour market has started to creep up. A detailed analysis of pathways into retirement suggest that at least half of men use routes such as unemployment, sickness or disability benefits in half of countries. Women also often leave the labour market to care for family members. Older workers appear to have fared relatively well in the economic downturn that followed the global financial crisis in most OECD countries. This contrasts with previous recessions, where older workers were often the first to lose their jobs and found it hardest to find new employment. A decomposition of governments’ long-term projections of the finance of the pension system shows that these are highly dependent on further increases in participation rates at older ages and effective retirement ages.
- 46. I.2. TRENDS INRETIREMENT AND IN WORKING AT OLDER AGES PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 40 Increasing the age at which people retire has been a major objective of many recent pension reforms. This has been driven by the greying of the population in OECD countries, a well-known phenomenon that has been going on for six decades. In 1950, there were more than seven people of working age for every one of pension age. By 2047, there will be just two workers per pensioner.1 As a result, public spending on old-age pensions and survivors’ benefits has grown more rapidly than national income for at least 20 years, and this trend is expected to continue in nearly all countries over the next five decades.2 In the face of rapid population ageing, the long-run fall in effective retirement ages in most OECD countries needs to be reversed. There are some positive signs that this is beginning to happen, but how optimistic can we be that this will continue? What is the impact on older workers of the economic downturn in the wake of the global financial crisis? This special chapter examines labour-force participation rates and their pattern across countries, age groups and time (Section 2.1). Sections 2.2 and 2.3 look in more detail at retirement behaviour, examining the effective of age of labour market exit and the different pathways people take into retirement. Section 2.4 takes a look at long-term projections of pension expenditure. Not only are governments seeking to reduce the growing burden on taxpayers and contributors to pay for pensions, but their forecasts are predicated on the assumption that people will work longer in the future. A brief summary is provided in Section 2.5. 2.1. Older workers: Labour-market participation Older workers are less likely to be in employment than their prime aged counterparts (aged 25-50). Participation rates of older workers (age 50-64) in OECD countries averaged 63% in 2008, while those of prime aged workers averaged 75% in the same year. These averages hide large cross-country differences (Figure 2.1). Participation rates for older workers exceed 70% in seven countries, including Japan and the United States. At the other end of the spectrum, Belgium, Hungary, Italy, Poland and Turkey all have less than half of older workers active in the labour market. Participation rates of older workers in most OECD countries were higher in 2008 than they were in 1970. In many cases, participation rates declined during the early part of the period 1970-2008, a trend that was later reversed, typically in the last decade or so. Germany, Iceland, the Netherlands and New Zealand saw the largest increases. In only five countries – France, Greece, Hungary, Poland and Turkey – were participation rates lower in 2008 than they were in 1970. The main reason that the share of 50-64 year-olds that are active in the labour market has increased is growing labour-force participation of women. Between 1995 and 2008, for example, the participation rate for women aged 50-64 in OECD countries increased by around 11 percentage points on average, compared with just 4 points for men. Nevertheless, there
- 47. I.2. TRENDS INRETIREMENT AND IN WORKING AT OLDER AGES PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 41 remains a large difference between the sexes. On average in OECD countries, about 75% of older men were economically active in 2008, compared with just over 50% of women. The gap is particularly large in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Poland, Spain and Turkey. Differences in participation rates between OECD countries widen as people get older (Figure 2.2). For example, more than a half of 65-69 year-olds were still working in Iceland, Korea and Mexico; and between a quarter and a half of all persons in the same group were still working in Australia, Canada, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal and the United States. But these proportions fall to less than one in ten in many European countries, such as Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Slovak Republic and Spain. 2.2. Retirement and labour-market exit Most workers in most OECD countries leave the labour market before the standard pension eligibility age; in some cases, much earlier. Figure 2.3 shows the recent average effective age of withdrawal from the labour market, as well as pensionable, age in OECD countries for men and women.3 Countries are ranked by men’s effective age of labour- market exit. To mitigate the impact of cyclical variations, the exit age is measured here by taking the average age of exit from the labour force over a five-year period (2004-09). In a limited number of OECD countries – such as Ireland, New Zealand and Sweden – labour-market exit occurs, on average, close to the pensionable age. But there are large differences elsewhere. Men leave the labour market, on average, later than the pensionable Figure 2.1. Participation rates of 50-64 year-olds in 1970 and 2008 Source: D’Addio et al. (2010) based on OECD Employment Database. 1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932370303 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 2008 1970 Iceland New Zealand Sweden Switzerland Norway Japan United States Canada Finland Germany Denmark Korea United Kingdom Australia Portugal Czech Republic Ireland Netherlands Mexico Slovak Republic Spain Austria France Luxembourg Greece Hungary Belgium Italy Poland Turkey
- 48. I.2. TRENDS INRETIREMENT AND IN WORKING AT OLDER AGES PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 42 age in 12 of the 30 countries shown. For women, late retirement is the norm in ten countries. People leave the labour market significantly earlier than normal pensionable age in Austria, Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain. In these countries, men retire on average 3-6 years earlier than the pensionable age. Figure 2.4 shows how the effective retirement age for men and women in the OECD changed over time. The charts cover the period from 1965 to 2007, and show both the average figure and the range of observations for OECD countries. In almost all OECD countries, the effective retirement age has declined substantially since 1970. However, this has been reversed more recently. Over the past decade, the average flattened out followed by a small upturn. Nevertheless, the effective retirement age remains well below the levels of the 1960s and 1970s in OECD countries (except in Japan and Korea). For men, the average effective retirement age fell from 68.6 in the late 1960s to 63.5 in the five years to 2009. The average age of labour-market exit for women dropped from 66.7 to 62.3 over the same period. Figure 2.2. Labour-force participation rates by age, 2008 Percentages Source: D’Addio et al. (2010) based on OECD Employment Database. 1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932370322 100 75 25 50 0 100 75 25 50 0 100 75 25 50 0 100 75 25 50 0 55-59 60-64 65-69 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 Australia Austria Belgium Canada Czech Republic Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Iceland Ireland Italy Japan Hungary Netherlands New Zealand Norway Korea Luxembourg Mexico Poland Portugal Slovak Republic Spain Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States Sweden
- 49. I.2. TRENDS INRETIREMENT AND IN WORKING AT OLDER AGES PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 43 Figure 2.3. Average effective age of labour-market exit and normal pensionable age Note: Effective retirement age shown is for five-year period 2004-09; pensionable age is shown for 2010. Source: OECD, updated from OECD (2006). 1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932370341 75 50 55 60 65 70 50 60 55 70 75 65 Mexico Korea Iceland Japan New Zealand Portugal Sweden Switzerland United States Australia Norway Denmark United Kingdom OECD Canada Ireland Turkey Netherlands Czech Republic Greece Finland Germany Spain Poland Italy Hungary Slovak Republic Belgium France Austria Luxembourg Effective Official Men Women Figure 2.4. Average labour market exit age in OECD countries, 1965-2007 Source: OECD, updated from OECD (2006). 1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932370360 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 75 70 65 60 55 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 75 70 65 60 55 Average effective age of labour market exit Highest countries Lowest countries OECD average OECD average Five-year moving average: end of year Five-year moving average: end of year Men Average effective age of labour market exit Highest countries Lowest countries Women
- 50. I.2. TRENDS INRETIREMENT AND IN WORKING AT OLDER AGES PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 44 Iceland, Japan, Korea and Mexico have been amongst countries with the highest effective retirement ages. Countries that have tended to have the lowest effective retirement ages for much of the period analysed include Belgium, France, Hungary and the Slovak Republic. Changes in the effective retirement age have mostly occurred in parallel for both men and women, despite the trend increase in female labour-force participation rates and larger increases in normal pension age for women than for men (see Chapter 1 in Part I on “Pensionable age and life expectancy, 1950-2050”). 2.3. Pathways into retirement Detailed analysis of the ways in which people leave the labour market (Figure 2.5) reveals that more than half of men use pathways other than retirement in 11 of the 20 countries for which data are available. The data comprise all people aged 50-64 who lost a job in the previous year. The three main pathways out of employment considered are retirement, disability or unemployment benefits. Retirement accounts for more than half of labour-market exit for men in nine countries that either have relatively low pension ages or a range of early-retirement options (Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy) or have occupational early-retirement programmes outside the main old-age pension provision (the Netherlands and Norway). In contrast, more than half of older workers leave jobs through either unemployment or disability in five countries: Finland, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. For women, the retirement route out of the labour market accounts for the majority of labour-market exit in just five out of 20 countries. The most striking difference with the pattern for men is the prevalence of those moving out of work into the “other inactive” category. This is most probably an indication of women ceasing paid work to care for other family members. 2.4. Fiscal imperatives and retirement in the future Public expenditure on pensions is expected to continue growing faster than national income over the next 40 years in most of the OECD countries for which data are available. In only two of them is spending projected to fall as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP), although in another five countries, it will remain broadly stable. (See the indicator on “Long-term projections of public pension expenditure” in Part II.4 for more details.) For 23 OECD countries, it is possible to decompose the projected change in spending into a number of different factors. The results of the analysis are shown in Figure 2.6, which gives forecasts for pension spending in 2060. The sum of the different bars shows what would happen as a result of demographic change alone, with everything else (the pension system, retirement behaviour, etc.) remaining the same. On average for the 23 countries, pension spending is expected to increase from 9.2% of GDP in 2007 to 18.0% of GDP in 2060 as a result of population ageing. (Demographic change is measured by the change in the dependency ratio, that is, the population aged 65 and over relative to the population aged 15-64.) However, the actual forecasts show a much slower increase in public pension spending: from 9.2% of GDP in 2007 to 12.7% of GDP in 2060. These projections are shown by the black bars in Figure 2.6.
- 51. I.2. TRENDS INRETIREMENT AND IN WORKING AT OLDER AGES PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 45 The bars decompose the different factors affecting projected spending. Of greatest relevance here is the impact of assumptions of longer working lives. This combines two elements. The first of these is termed the “coverage-ratio” effect in European Commission (2009). The coverage ratio is the number of pension recipients divided by the population aged 65 and over. The second, called the “employment-rate” effect is measured by the relationship between the number of working people aged 15-64 and the population of that age. Longer working lives would improve both of these measures. Figure 2.5. Pathways out of employment for older workers Source: OECD (2006), Figure 2.12. 1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932370379 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 A u s t r i a B e l g i u m C z e c h R e p u b l i c D e n m a r k F i n l a n d F r a n c e G e r m a n y G r e e c e H u n g a r y I r e l a n d I t a l y N e t h e r l a n d s N o r w a y P o l a n d P o r t u g a l S l o v a k R e p u b l i c S p a i n S w e d e n S w i t z e r l a n d U n i t e d K i n g d o m Retired Unemployed Disabled Other inactive Men A u s t r i a B e l g i u m C z e c h R e p u b l i c D e n m a r k F i n l a n d F r a n c e G e r m a n y G r e e c e H u n g a r y I r e l a n d I t a l y N e t h e r l a n d s N o r w a y P o l a n d P o r t u g a l S l o v a k R e p u b l i c S p a i n S w e d e n S w i t z e r l a n d U n i t e d K i n g d o m Retired Unemployed Disabled Other Women
- 52. I.2. TRENDS INRETIREMENT AND IN WORKING AT OLDER AGES PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 46 The savings in pension spending from longer working lives is shown by the lighter grey bars in Figure 2.6. The chart ranks countries: those with the greatest reliance on longer working lives to offset demographic pressures are towards the top. In absolute terms, longer working lives are expected to save 5% of GDP’s worth of public expenditure or more in Denmark, Hungary and Poland, with figures of between 4% and 5% in the Czech and Slovak Republics and Finland. Longer working lives deliver one-half of the projected savings in pension expenditure in 2060. The remainder, shown by the darker blue bars as “other savings” in Figure 2.6, comes principally from lower benefits relative to earnings, known as the “benefit-ratio” effect. There is also a residual term reflecting the interaction between the different effects. The changes in retirement behaviour that are assumed are, in many cases, very large. For example, labour-force participation of 55-64 year-olds is projected to increase by more than 25 percentage points between 2007 and 2060 in two countries: from 35% to 64% in Italy and 48% to 74% in Spain.4 Large increases in participation rates – of between 15 and 20 percentage points – are also assumed in Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany and Hungary. The average assumption for the EU27 countries is a 10 point increase in economic activity among people aged 55-64. Figure 2.6. Decomposition of different effects on projected pension expenditure in 2060 Note: Luxembourg alone reports increased spending as a result of the coverage-ratio and employment-rate effects. Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom report increased spending result from the benefit-ratio effect. Source: OECD calculations based on European Commission (2009) and information provided by the Office of the Chief Actuary, Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, Canada. 1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932370398 0 10 5 15 20 25 Denmark Poland Hungary Slovak Republic Czech Republic Finland Estonia Italy Ireland United Kingdom Slovenia Germany EU27 Austria Netherlands France Portugal Spain Belgium Canada Sweden Norway Greece Luxembourg Projected expenditure, 2060 Savings from longer working lives Other savings Per cent of GDP
- 53. I.2. TRENDS INRETIREMENT AND IN WORKING AT OLDER AGES PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 2011: RETIREMENT-INCOME SYSTEMS IN OECD AND G20 COUNTRIES © OECD 2011 47 2.5. Summary and conclusions The long-term trend to earlier retirement came to an end for men in the mid-1990s and for women, slightly later. The average age of labour-market exit was broadly constant for a few years, but there has been a noticeable trend to later retirement in recent years. Older workers have not fared too badly during the economic downturn experienced in most OECD countries after the global financial crisis. The proportion of 55-64 year-olds in employment was constant between 2007 and 2009, compared with a decline of 1.7 percentage points in the share of 25-54 year-olds with jobs and 3.6 points for 20-24 year-olds. The proportion of 65-69 year-olds in employment in fact increased a little, from 21.1% in 2007 to 22.0% in 2009. Governments’ long-term projections for public expenditure on pensions are heavily reliant on the assumption that people will retire later in the future. But it is important to bear in mind the scale of the challenge in realising such a change. The average age of labour-market exit for men in OECD countries is 63.5 on the latest estimates and for women, it is 62.3. If life expectancy continues to increase, as most forecasts show, then significant increases in the effective retirement age are required to maintain control of the cost of pensions. In 2050, only an effective retirement age of 66.6 for men and 65.8 for women would leave the duration of retirement at the same level as it is now (based on the United Nations population projections). The policies that governments can pursue to extend working lives are the subject of the next two special chapters of Pensions at a Glance 2011. The first looks at the “supply side”, presenting information on incentives to work and retire embedded in pension system. The second looks at the “demand side”, examining ways of ensuring that there are jobs for older workers. Notes 1. See the indicator of “Old-age support ratios” in Part II.5. 2. See the indicator of “Long-term projections of public pension expenditure” in Part II.4. 3. The average effective age of exit from the labour market is derived from labour-force-survey data. It is the weighted average of the exit age of each five-year age cohort, starting with ages 40-44, and using absolute five-year changes in the labour force participation rate of each cohort as weights. The average exit for each cohort is assumed to be the mid-point between age groups: for example, the exit age for the cohort aged 55-59 in 2004 and 60-64 in 2009 is taken to be 60. The five-year change in participation rates is simply the difference between the rate for each age group (say, 55-59) at the beginning of the period minus the rate for the corresponding age group that is five years older (60-64) at the end of the period. 4. European Commission (2009), Table A31. References D’Addio, A.C., M. Keese and E. Whitehouse (2010), “Population Ageing and Labour Market”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, forthcoming. European Commission (2009), “The 2009 Ageing Report: Economic and Budgetary Projections for the EU-27 Member States (2008-2060)”, European Economy, No. 2/2009. OECD (2006), Ageing and Employment Policies: Live Longer, Work Longer, OECD Publishing, Paris.
- 55. Other documents randomlyhave different content
- 59. The Project GutenbergeBook of Plays of Old Japan: The 'No'
- 60. This ebook isfor the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this ebook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this eBook. Title: Plays of Old Japan: The 'No' Translator: Marie Carmichael Stopes Joji Sakurai Release date: November 2, 2013 [eBook #44092] Most recently updated: October 23, 2024 Language: English Credits: Produced by Henry Flower and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) *** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PLAYS OF OLD JAPAN: THE 'NO' ***
- 61. The Table ofContents was produced by the transcriber.
- 62. Table of Contents PREFACEv LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS vii TO THE READER 1 THE MAIDEN’S TOMB 35 KAGEKIYO 53 TAMURA 70 THE SUMIDA RIVER 76 ENGLISH BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE NŌ.
- 63. PLAYS OF OLDJAPAN THE NŌ BY MARIE C. STOPES
- 64. EPOCHS OF CHINESEAND JAPANESE ART. By Ernest F. Fenollosa. In two Vols. Crown 4to. Illustrated. 36s. net. A HISTORY OF JAPANESE COLOUR-PRINTS. By W. von Seidlitz. Illustrated in Colour and Black and White. One Vol. Crown 4to. 25s. net. JAPANESE PLAYS AND PLAYFELLOWS. By Osman Edwards. With twelve Coloured Plates by Japanese Artists. One Vol. Demy 8vo. 10s. net. KAKEMONA: Japanese Sketches. By A. Herbage Edwards. One Vol. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d. net. A HISTORY OF JAPANESE LITERATURE. By W. G. Aston. One Vol. Large Crown 8vo. 6s. IN JAPAN: Pilgrimages to the Shrines of Art. By Gaston Migeon, translated by Florence Simmonds. One Vol. Crown 8vo. Illustrated. 6s. net. THE JAPANESE DANCE. By M. A. Hincks. One Vol. Crown 8vo. Illustrated. 2s. 6d. net. LONDON: WILLIAM HEINEMANN
- 65. AN ACTOR OFTHE NŌ IN FULL COSTUME TADANORI This plate, taken from a Japanese coloured woodcut, illustrates well the voluminous nature of the mediæval ceremonial garments. The figure is that of an ancient warrior of the Taira clan, to which Kagekiyo belonged (see p. 53), who was noted also for the high quality of his poetry. He composed a
- 66. special verse, whichhe fastened in an arrow that he always carried in his quiver, and that proved to be the means of identification when he was found by his enemies, dead in the field of battle. In the illustration one may particularly note the mask, with the eyebrows painted so high on the forehead that they are above the fillet band. The feet are not bare, but are covered with the white tabi, or cotton boots with soft soles and a separate division for the big toe, in which the Nō dancers always perform their parts.
- 67. PLAYS OF OLDJAPAN THE ‘NŌ’ BY MARIE C. STOPES D.Sc., Ph.D., F.L.S. TOGETHER WITH TRANSLATIONS OF THE DRAMAS BY M. C. STOPES AND PROFESSOR JOJI SAKURAI D.Sc., LL.D. WITH A PREFACE BY HIS EXCELLENCY BARON KATO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR ILLUSTRATED
- 68.
- 69. Copyright and alltranslation and dramatic right reserved by Marie C. Stopes
- 70. PREFACE By His Excellencythe Japanese Ambassador The utai does not appeal to the uneducated, and for that reason its devotees have practically been confined to the gentle and aristocratic classes. In the days before the educational system of Japan was established on Western lines, boys of the Samurai class in many parts of the country were taught to chant the utai in their schools as a part of their curriculum, the object being to ennoble their character by imbuing them with the spirit of the olden times, and also to provide for them a healthy means of recreation in their manhood. Along with many other institutions, it declined in favour in consequence of the great social and political upheaval which ushered in the era of Meiji; and for some time afterwards the people were too much occupied with various material aspects of life to find any leisure for the cultivation of the art, so much so that its professional exponents, meeting with no public support, had to give up the forlorn attempt to continue their task and to look elsewhere for a means of earning their livelihood. With the consolidation of the new régime many old things took a new lease of life, the utai being one of them. Not only has the utai revived, but those who ought to know say that never in the long history of its existence has it been so extensively patronised as it is to-day. Patrons of the art are by no means confined to the aristocratic classes, albeit it is not so popular as the ordinary theatrical play, and never could be from the nature of the thing. This book will, therefore, well repay study on the part of any one desirous of knowing and appreciating the working of the Japanese mind, and the author and her colleague are rendering a good service
- 71. to the publicof the West by initiating them into the subject. As the author frankly admits, to translate the utai into a European language is a most difficult task, and, in my opinion, it is a well-nigh impossible one. The meaning of the original may be conveyed—its spirit to a certain extent—but never the peculiarities of the original language, on which the beauty of the utai mainly rests. It was very brave of Dr. Marie Stopes and Prof. Sakurai to undertake what I should deem an impossible task, and I am glad to be able to extend to them my sincere congratulations on their remarkable achievement. They have succeeded in their work to the best extent any one can hope to succeed, and in my opinion have placed Western students of Japanese art and literature under a debt of gratitude to them. Takaaki Kato. Japanese Embassy, London. November 1912.
- 72. LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Toface page TADANORI Frontispiece VIEW OF THE NŌ STAGE 10 A COUNTRY POETESS 14 MIIDERA 16 SŌSHIARI-GOMACHI 24 THE MAIDEN’S TOMB 38 SUMIDAGAWA 76
- 73. TO THE READER Theirpoetry is the expressed essence of the Japanese. It represents them as the Victory of Samothrace represents the people of Greece, as the scent represents the rose. Chamberlain says, “The one original product of the Japanese mind is the native poetry”—their painting, their porcelain, their ceremonials, are modifications of Chinese classics, but their poetry is their very own. Among the greatest and most characteristic treasures of the native literature, the Japanese rank their ancient “lyric dramas,” the Nō. As Synge and the Irish poets speak for the Irish people the things that matter most to them and that yet go all unexpressed in their outward life, in the same sense, only to a greater extent, do the Nō dramas represent the old spirit of Japan. In Japanese the texts of the Nō dramas, all of which were written before the sixteenth century, are collected in a great work, the Yokyoku Tsukai, in which various editions give as many as two hundred and thirty-five to two hundred and sixty-two utai, as the librettos of the Nō are called. Yet these treasures are practically unknown to the reading public of the West, notwithstanding the interest that has been taken in “things Japanese.” Scholars certainly have paid them some attention, and a few utai have been rendered into English, but in most cases these translations are such as appeal primarily to scholars, and do not reach the wider public. Chamberlain’s Classical Poetry of the Japanese, in which some of the utai find a place, is perhaps the only exception to the general statement that no rendering of any of these plays has yet been made which is calculated to win those readers who do not delve in the Transactions of learned societies nor read transliterated texts in
- 74. weighty volumes, butwho, nevertheless, delight in the great literatures of the world. One of the reasons for this is certainly the extreme remoteness of the subject from everything to which we are accustomed, and the difficulty of translating into our own the obscure language of these mediæval texts. All students of Japanese are agreed about the excessive difficulty of making any rendering from the utai which combines fidelity to the original with lucidity in a European language. Yet these old plays are unique, exquisite, individual, and so full of charm that it is a great loss to the Western world that they should be entirely removed from our ken by being hedged in and shut away from us by the difficulties of language. It is clearly some one’s duty to translate, not merely the words of these plays, but their meaning and spirit, so that the Western public may have partial access at least to the source that delights, and has delighted for centuries, the best minds of our Allies in the East. No translation can ever convey more than a fraction of the power, beauty, and individual characteristics of the original, but it is my hope that there may be found between these covers something of the delicacy and charm of the Nō, some hint of their peculiar flavour and effect. If this consummation is in any single case achieved by this book, it will be, I fancy, only after the whole of it has been read and laid down; when a faint spirit of the Nō may take shape in the reader’s mind. Mountains blue in the distance before which we stand enthralled are composed of grey rough stone and broken screes when viewed at nearer quarters—yet we enjoy not less the illusory blue. The words of a stirring poem that wafts us into a fairy land of dreams are each one commonplace enough, and each can be reduced to its elements, a, b, c, d, e,—twenty-six of them, which can be ranged in a straight line. And so it is with the Nō. They must not be too much analysed and inquired into. Their language is simple, almost to baldness in places,
- 75. it is true,but their simple elements create a wonderland of illusion. In Japanese they have the power to make the spirit soar into the borders of the enchanted regions of romance; and when acted the plays make one ache with Weltschmerz in a way that shows that their place is among the great things of our world, elemental in their simplicity. Then it must not be forgotten that the text of the drama as presented is accompanied by music, and is chanted by highly trained actors in a beautiful setting. Who would think of judging Wagner from the texts of his librettos alone, and of ignoring his power as a scene creator and a musician? The texts of the Nō are largely prosy, if you will. Mr. Sansom recently censured me, and with me the leading Japanese authorities on the subject, for our appreciation of the poetry of the Nō. He would have us believe that the steady popularity of these plays for six hundred years among the leading men of the country, from priests and poets to princes and warriors, is due to over-estimation, and that they are, after all, mostly prose of no high quality. In a language so widely diverging from our own in its construction and mode of thought as Japanese, the details of the literary style and composition are beyond reach of my judgment. As the Japanese for so long have been consistent in their admiration of the literary construction of the Nō, I am content in that matter to accept their verdict. But of the atmosphere and general effect of the plays I can judge for myself, and I find them among the supremely great things in world-literature. That Mr. Sansom does not, depends on his own taste in the matter. I have, in these modern days of unshackled opinion, heard people openly announce that they saw nothing in Shakespeare! I fancy that if we could translate literally into the English language the song of the nightingale to its mate, it would be found to be largely composed of mundane affairs and prosy gossip about its neighbours, the weather and the marauding school-boy. But is it to us any the less romantic and glorious in association? There is a focal distance for every work of art, and if we choose to overstep it and go and rub our noses against the canvas of supreme genius, we will only find smeary paint and an unpleasant odour. So, acknowledging the prosy elements in the texts of the Nō I have attempted to render, I present them in the
- 76. hope that therewill be some readers who will see through the shrouding veils of a foreign language something of the features of the eternal loveliness of the original. My great regret is the imperfections of my handling of these delicate fantasies. But with the exceptional knowledge and gifts of my collaborator in the translations, Prof. Sakurai, the standard of detailed accuracy has been kept up to a point which will, I trust, make these translations not entirely unworthy of a scholar’s perusal (but see p. 32); nevertheless, the reader whom my heart desires is not one to take too close an inspection of each detail, but one who will catch the spirit of the whole. None of the four plays that follow have been translated by any one else,[1] so far as I can discover; so that, as they break new ground for it, the public will perhaps be lenient and sympathetic towards these efforts. Concerning the Place the Nō takes in Japan to- day In Japan to-day there still lingers much of the old aristocratic scorn of the common theatre, but the theatres which are dedicated to the performance of the Nō have no such stigma attached to them. Indeed, these performances are almost entirely supported by the gentle and aristocratic classes. The interest of intellectual men in these plays is not even satisfied with on-looking, and many of the leading men of the day in Tokio—lawyers, university professors, statesmen and aristocrats—study the chants and songs and give private recitals of them. A few even undertake the arduous training necessary to act a complete part, including the “dancing,” and then the gentlemen are proud to appear with distinguished professionals. The only comparable enthusiasm in our country is that of the Shakespeare societies; but even to act, and act well, a part in a Shakespeare play requires an amount of application trivial in comparison with that necessary completely to master a rôle in one
- 77. of the Nō.For in “singing” the utai not only is every minute inflection of the voice prescribed and regulated according to the severest rules, but every movement of the body, every step and movement even of the toes or little fingers in the “dance” that accompanies it, is most strictly governed by an iron tradition, and the secret of some of the parts is only in the hands of a few masters. Mr. Sansom quotes, in an unsympathetic spirit, the opinion of Mr. Tanaka Shohei, but as this opinion represents in substance that of a number of the leading Japanese who interest themselves in the subject, I think it may very well be given as an expression of current opinion of the Nō: “From every point of view it is one of the pre- eminent arts of the world. It is the flower of the Yamato stock. Every art reflects the spirit of a given people at a given time, and, remembering this, we must hold it remarkable that the affections of our people should be retained by an art which arose six hundred years ago. In the West there is no art with such a pedigree. This shows that the Nō represents the national spirit, and is complete in every respect.” A Japanese professor, writing to me, says, “A Nō drama is always very simple in its plot, and it is chiefly its peculiar poetical construction and ring which appeal so much to our emotion and give the charm it possesses.” Another opinion is quoted by Mr. Osman Edwards: “The words (of the Nō) are gorgeous, splendid and even magnificent as are the costumes.” The charm of the Nō is a cumulative one, and its power of conveying much meaning in simple action is largely augmented by the suggestiveness of the interwoven allusions to the classical poems partly quoted or suggested in the words of the texts. Almost every word carries more than its face value, and has been enriched by centuries of usage in innumerable poetical and traditional connections. Concerning the past History of the Nō
- 78. The Nō, asthey are now preserved, date principally from the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, and all of them are prior to the sixteenth century. Their development took place under the Ashikaga Shogunate, particularly in the reign of the Shogun Yoshimitsu (1368-1394), when they soon became exceedingly successful among the nobles. They are to a large extent compounded from much older elements which existed in a more incoherent form prior to the fourteenth century; but they may be described as crystallising and taking their distinctive form under the hands of Kiyotsugu, who lived from 1355 to 1406. It is of great interest to note how closely the dates of our own Chaucer (1340- 1400) correspond with those of the great Japanese master. What world-phase brought two such men to the front at the same time in the two island empires, all unknown to each other? Kiyotsugu was the founder of the Nō proper, and one of his pieces is given on p. 39. It is certain that he did not suddenly evolve this type of drama, but took the elements that were to hand and fused them together with the flux of his personal genius. Chief among the material available were the Kagura or pantomime dances which were performed at Shinto festivals on temporary wooden platforms. Direct descendants of these, nearly in their original form, have lingered on till the present day. I have seen performances on the rough temporary platforms, where the actors were gaudily but cheaply decked and where the crowded audience was almost entirely composed of the common people who stood semi-scornful for a few moments, or were detained for a long time while passing on their daily business. The antiquity of such performances can be imagined from the fact that in the Kojiki, which was written in 712 a.d., they were described as being ancient and their origin was associated with the sun goddess. The mythical story of their origin is one of the well-known tales of Japan. The sun goddess, Amaterasu, was offended and retired to a cave, withdrawing her luminous beauty from the world. As may be imagined, this was very inconvenient for every one, including the rest of the gods, who in their distress assembled on the dry bed of the River of Heaven. (This is the Milky Way, and to one who knows the mountain rivers of Japan it gives a very telling
- 79. little touch, forthe dry bed of a Japanese river is a broad curve of round white stones.) They endeavoured in many ways to lure the sun goddess out of her cave, and at last they invented a dance and performed it on the top of an inverted empty tub, which echoed when the dancer stamped. This excited her curiosity, and the goddess was successfully drawn out of her hiding-place, the light of her radiance once more blessed the earth, and all was right again with gods and men. The stamping on the hollow tub is still suggested in the “dancing” of the Nō, where the actor raises his foot and stamps once or twice with force enough to make the specially prepared wooden floor of the stage echo with a characteristic sound. It is quite probable that the actual words of the utai (librettos) of the Nō were partly, if not entirely, written by Buddhist monks, and Kiyotsugu was only responsible for bringing the whole together and stage managing and stereotyping the plays. Following Kiyotsugu, who died in 1406, was his son Motokiyo (one of whose plays will be found on p. 56), who lived from 1373-1455. As well as adding to the number of the actual plays (as many as ninety- three are attributed to him) he greatly improved the music. By the time of his nephew some of the several different schools of Nō interpreters, which are still in existence, had sprung up. The ruling Shoguns paid great attention to the Nō. Kiyotsugu the founder was taken by the Shogun into his immediate service and was even given the rank of a small daimio. Both Hideoshi and Iyeyasu, two of the greatest men in Japanese history, were not only fond of witnessing the plays, but it is reported that they actually took part in them among the actors. Concerning the Presentation of the Nō A single Nō play is not a lengthy performance, the average time for its complete presentation being merely one hour. But a performance of Nō at a theatre generally lasts a whole day (except at special
- 80. short performances, mostlyarranged in connection with festivities), because half-a-dozen pieces are on the programme, and between each is given one of the “mad-words,” or Hiogen, which are short, ludicrous farces, and which serve to relieve the tension of the higher, and generally tragic pieces. The Theatre The theatres, which are specially built for the Nō performances, are smaller than the common theatres. The stage is a square platform, generally measuring about eighteen feet, which stands towards the middle, so that the audience sit on three sides of it. This stage has its own beautifully curved roof, which is separated from the roof over the audience by a slight gap, and is reminiscent of the time when the Nō were performed on the outdoor wooden platforms while the audience stood round in rain or shine. On the stage itself are two pillars of smooth wood, which support its roof (see diagram facing p. 10). The stage is horizontal and is raised a few feet above the ground; it is made of very smooth and peculiarly resonant boarding, which is of special importance in the “dancing,” in the course of which the actor has to stamp at intervals with his shoeless feet and yet to make a loud, though deadened sound. Let us not forget the inverted tub and the sun goddess. This feature of the dancing is not to be despised, for its effectiveness is notable. By the kindness of the Secretary of the Royal Society of Literature I am allowed to reproduce my plan of the Nō stage[2] from their Transactions, so I am tempted to quote also a paragraph describing it. “Leading to the stage is a gallery nine feet wide, along which the actors pass very slowly on their way from the green-room to the stage, and pause at each of the three pine trees stationed along it. A curtain shuts the end of the gallery from the green-room. All the woodwork is unpainted and unstained, though very highly polished, and there is neither scenery nor appliances to break the harmony. The three actual pine trees and a flat painted pine on the wall at the back of
- 81. the stage areall the ornament there is.” The wood-cut facing p. 10 is an illustration of this stage taken from a Japanese print. It represents an “undress” recital, but shows well the build of the stage itself. The pine tree which is painted on the bare boards at the back is not realistic, but is much conventionalised, with solid emerald green masses of foliage and a twisted trunk. It is like those trees which are seen in symbolic pictures and on ancient ceremonial embroideries such as are used at weddings and at the New Year time. The pine tree, and all it has come to mean to the Japanese as a symbol, is closely associated with the Nō. Deeply interwoven in the national sentiment is the play Takasago, which is the story of the faithful spirits of the pine tree and is perhaps the most important and most beloved of all the Nō.
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