![ Compiler [Linker] /SAFESEH option
Static list of known good exception handlers for the binary.
Checks every time when a handler is called against the static list, if
not in the list then handler is invalid and takes preventive measures.
Load configuration directory stores meta information about safe
exception handlers.
If any module is not compiled with /SAFESEH then no check is
done to ensure the integrity of the handler for that module.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/tmsgcnrusywtflszfgda-signature-fa17ef08645a3cce9ed98bc960f7e89b419197b8ab9318d2a54057ce7f634710-poli-160709185309/85/Reversing-malware-analysis-training-part11-exploit-development-advanced-14-320.jpg)
![ I think this deserve a dedicated slide
Depending on the conditions we may have large ROP payload while
space on stack may be less or may be our entire payload is on heap.
Flip the heap on to the stack so that we can get larger room.
Instructions like XCHG ESP[REG], REG[ESP] can be used.
We can also jump inside the valid instructions to change their meaning.
◦ Example: jump one byte inside “setz al” instruction ( From Adobe
U3D exploit in wild)](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/tmsgcnrusywtflszfgda-signature-fa17ef08645a3cce9ed98bc960f7e89b419197b8ab9318d2a54057ce7f634710-poli-160709185309/85/Reversing-malware-analysis-training-part11-exploit-development-advanced-18-320.jpg)
![ Address Space Layout Randomization
Involves randomly positioning the memory areas like
base address of the binary, position of stack and heap.
Compiler[linker] /DYNAMICBASE option](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/tmsgcnrusywtflszfgda-signature-fa17ef08645a3cce9ed98bc960f7e89b419197b8ab9318d2a54057ce7f634710-poli-160709185309/85/Reversing-malware-analysis-training-part11-exploit-development-advanced-21-320.jpg)
Reversing malware analysis training part11 exploit development advanced
- 2. Disclaimer The Content, Demonstration, Source Code and Programs presented here is "AS IS" without any warranty or conditions of any kind. Also the views/ideas/knowledge expressed here are solely of the trainer’s only and nothing to do with the company or the organization in which the trainer is currently working. However in no circumstances neither the trainer nor Cysinfo is responsible for any damage or loss caused due to use or misuse of the information presented here.
- 3. Acknowledgement Special thanks to Null & Garage4Hackers community for their extended support and cooperation. Thanks to all the Trainers who have devoted their precious time and countless hours to make it happen. Thanks to ThoughtWorks for the beautiful and bigger venue.
- 4. Reversing & Malware Analysis Training This presentation is a part of our Reverse Engineering & Malware Analysis training program. Currently it is delivered only during our local meet for FREE of cost.
- 5. Who am I #1 Amit Malik (sometimes DouBle_Zer0,DZZ) Member of Cysinfo Security Researcher @ McAfee Labs RE, Exploit Analysis/Development, Malware Analysis Email: [email protected]
- 6. The material in this presentation is a bit complicated so I will be using the zig-zag approach. ◦ Recap ◦ Protections (GS and SAFESEH) ◦ Client side exploits and Heap Spray ◦ Protections (DEP) ◦ Protections (ASLR) If time permits then few words on the following: ◦ Heap buffer overflows
- 7. In previous session we covered: ◦ Stack based buffer overflow EIP overwrite (saved return address) SEH Overwrite We also discussed “why we need pop pop ret or other similar instruction in SEH overflow” Now Question: Which one is more reliable or considered to be more reliable in terms of exploitation ? ◦ Consider we have overwritten EIP and SEH successfully.
- 8. ASLR DEP GS Cookies SAFESEH SEHOP Forced ASLR *Safe unlinking, Heap cookies etc. are also protection methods added into the OS.
- 9. Fortunately or Unfortunately both protection schemes are based on compiler/Linker options. * SEHOP is a different protection scheme based on run time SEH chain validation, It is not based on compiler options however can be enabled or disabled through registry. GS Cookie EIP Overwrite ? SafeSEH (SEHop*) SEH Overwrite ?
- 10. Put some random value (cookie – 32 bit) on stack before return address. While returning, compare the value of saved cookie, if not same then we have an overwrite. Generate “ Security Exception (if any)”, terminate the Application.
- 11. Function Start: Function end: Cookie check function (see “function end” in below picture.)
- 12. Generate exception before cookie check ◦ Code dependent – if some overwritten variables are used before function return. ◦ Overwrite stack up to the end, further overwrite will generate exception Back to the question which exploitation (EIP or SEH) is more reliable ? ◦ SEH method is considered to be a bit more safe and reliable regardless of this bypassing technique.
- 13. Leverage the implementation. Did you see something ?
- 14. Compiler [Linker] /SAFESEH option Static list of known good exception handlers for the binary. Checks every time when a handler is called against the static list, if not in the list then handler is invalid and takes preventive measures. Load configuration directory stores meta information about safe exception handlers. If any module is not compiled with /SAFESEH then no check is done to ensure the integrity of the handler for that module.
- 15. If any loaded module in the vulnerable binary is not /SAFESEH compiled then no check is done to ensure the integrity of the handler for that module, so we can use any p/p/r address from that module. Use the address that is outside the address range of loaded modules. Importance of forward and backward jump. nseh seh payload payload nseh seh Forward jump Backward jump
- 16. Two types: ◦ Software DEP (forget it) ◦ Hardware DEP (NX/XD enabled processors) – we will be talking about it in the rest of the session. We can’t execute the code from non executable area anymore. We are directly dealing with processer in this case.
- 17. ROP (Return Oriented Programming) ◦ Use the system/existing code ◦ How stack works ? Main theme ◦ Either make non executable area executable ◦ Or allocate new area with executable permissions ◦ How ? Well, use ROP
- 18. I think this deserve a dedicated slide Depending on the conditions we may have large ROP payload while space on stack may be less or may be our entire payload is on heap. Flip the heap on to the stack so that we can get larger room. Instructions like XCHG ESP[REG], REG[ESP] can be used. We can also jump inside the valid instructions to change their meaning. ◦ Example: jump one byte inside “setz al” instruction ( From Adobe U3D exploit in wild)
- 19. Methods ◦ HeapCreate ◦ VirtualAlloc ◦ VirtualProtect ◦ WriteProcessMemory (DEMO – simple, easy, demonstrate the entire concept – XpSp3) Often times the small code chunks in ROP are termed as “gadgets”
- 21. Address Space Layout Randomization Involves randomly positioning the memory areas like base address of the binary, position of stack and heap. Compiler[linker] /DYNAMICBASE option
- 22. Search for Non-ASLR loaded libraries in the vulnerable application or if possible load one. ◦ JRE ? Memory leaks Brute force Heavily depends on vulnerability conditions
- 23. Exploits that targets client applications like browsers, plugins, media players, readers etc. Much more dangerous then any other form of exploits Huge impact and landscape Provides solid infection vector Big malicious infrastructure. ◦ Botnets, DDOS, Spam etc.
- 24. A technique used in client side exploits IT’S NOT A VULNERABILITY or CLASS OF VUL. It’s a technique used for code execution. Think about the followings again: ◦ EIP overwrite ◦ SEH overwrite • What we used in the above and why we used that ? Heap spray provides very simple method for code execution.
- 25. Fortunately or unfortunately client side scripting languages like javascript, vbscript etc. provides methods to allocate and deallocate memory on the client. Which means we can make invalid memory addresses valid. Valid address invalid address range (allocated area) 0x200... 0x400.. 0x500.. Valid address invalid address range (allocated area) 0x200... 0x300.. 0x500.. Before Allocation After Allocation (0x300.. To 0x400.. Is valid now)
- 26. Allocate memory and fill with nop + shellcode Overwrite the EIP or SEH with any address within the newly allocated area (the nop region). Here EIP overwrite or SEH overwrite can be by any means. ◦ Stack buffer overflow, Heap buffer overflow, memory corruption, use after free etc..
- 28. Use intelligent guesses Stability depends on the exploitation conditions Fragmented heap, choose little higher addresses. Large number of allocations, choose little lower addresses
- 29. Thank You !